Hall & Ors v Stop Newchurch Guinea Pigs

The First to Fifth Claimants in this case are engaged in a farming partnership called Messrs. David Hall, and they have three farms - namely, Darley Oaks Farm, Ivy Banks Farm, and The Oaklands. They are all in Newchurch, Staffordshire. The family who run the farm are called the Halls, and that is how, with respect to them, they have been described in these proceedings.

One of the farming activities that they carry on at Darley Oaks Farm is the breeding of guinea pigs for medical research.

The Sixth Claimant, Mr. Clamp, is a councillor for the parish of Newborough, and is suing for and on behalf of himself, the Residents and Members of the Community of the Parishes of Newborough and Yoxhall, and the Suppliers and Contractors of Darley Oaks Farm.

The Defendants are a number of individuals, and four unincorporated groups, or associations. I take it that both the individuals and the groups share a wish to prevent, so far as is possible, the experimentation on live animals. They are animal rights activists.

These proceedings have been brought today, 2 December, 2004, because there is to be a demonstration on Saturday, 4 December, starting in Oxford, against the Claimants' activities. The Claimants' concern is that that demonstration might spill over into unlawful activities at, or around, their premises. In addition, very recently, there has been an arson attack on one of the suppliers to the Claimants. That has reinforced the wish of the Claimants to obtain an interim injunction today.

Before me, the Claimants were all represented by Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden. Mr. Dally, a lay representative, has represented the First to Third Defendants, the Seventh and Eighth Defendant, and the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Defendant. The Animal Liberation Front, the Seventeenth Defendant, has not appeared and is not represented. Ms King, represented herself. Mr. White, the Eighth Defendant represented himself, but adopted what was said on behalf of the defence by Mr. Dally. Finally, Mr. Curtin, the Fourteenth Defendant, represented himself and put a number of points to me.

The papers in this case were served on short notice. Both sides accept that there has not been enough time for the defence to prepare the case as fully as they would have wished. I have therefore been invited to make an interim order - an injunction, certainly, but one that can be seen as a holding injunction. We have identified the 17 January for a full hearing. That will give the defence an opportunity to put their case fully, and there may be matters which the Claimants wish to deal with in relation to their presentation of the case as well.

So, it is an interim order that is to be made - not a final one. I do not make findings of fact. What I do is I assess the evidence set out in the papers before me, and decide where the balance lies, and make an order consequent on that exercise. I have been assisted in that Mr. Dally accepts that an interim injunction order can be made, and the other Defendants are understanding of that. Everybody wishes to preserve the right to make general submissions about the whole process once again in six or so weeks time.

The foundation for this action is the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Section 1(1) and (2) reads:

It is clear that the Act applies to persons. There is an issue as to whether the Act applies to unincorporated associations, but for the purposes of this interim injunction I take it that it does.

I was shown a video of a BBC programme which set out a helpful background to the case. It showed the kind of attacks that have been made on the Claimants, the Claimants' staff and employees, and many associated with them. I can well understand how unpleasant much of this has been. The evidence suggests that the campaign against the Claimants' business has gone on since 1999, and it has clearly become more fierce of recent times.

The police officer in the case, Inspector Bird, has sworn an affidavit. He deposes to over four hundred and eighty incidents which have occurred since the beginning of 2003. These incidents include lawful protest incidents, but they also include a large number of criminal acts against various of the Claimants and their staff and contractors.

The effect of the protests on the Halls has, in my judgment, clearly been devastating. A number of those who have provided services to them have withdrawn. These include the suppliers of services such as gas and fuel supplies. They have stopped being able to use their farm for milking purposes as those who collect the milk are no longer prepared to do so. Even the person who delivers the newspapers has been stopped doing so. Their employees have been targeted. These are people who work on their farm and, in one case, a lady who has passed her retiring age, but who works with the Hall family as a cleaner. Homes have been attacked with paint; bricks have been thrown through windows; cars have been spray-painted on. The suppliers of services have been subject to e-mail overload, switchboard overload, and the like. False letters have been distributed in the neighbourhood of some associated with the Halls, suggesting that they have been involved in wrongful or unlawful activities. It is no surprise that the Claimants are here today.

I have not had argument today on issues around the role of the Civil Procedure Rules and the representative nature of the various parties, but I proceed on the basis that it is right that those who are here as representatives are here properly and correctly.

I am troubled, however, about one aspect of that matter. Mr. Clamp, the Sixth Claimant, is proceeding on behalf of himself and the residents and members of the community of the parishes of Newborough and Yoxhall, and the suppliers and contractors of Darley Oaks Farms. He has submitted two short affidavits. He is a parish councillor. There are some hundreds - indeed, probably some thousands - of residents and members of the community of the parishes of Newborough and Yoxhall Mr. Dally says, "How on earth can they properly join in these proceedings". The response is that the police officer says he thinks nearly everybody is supportive. Mr. Clamp himself so confirms.

I remind myself that this is an interim process. It seems to me that the Court should be more satisfied than I am that Mr. Clamp does indeed represent such a wide group of Claimants at this stage. I therefore do not propose to make the injunction that I will make on behalf of the residents and members of the community of the parishes of Newborough and Yoxhall today. I do not rule out the possibility, and perhaps even the likelihood, that that is a sensible and proper order to make in the future. But, I think the Court, before doing so, needs to be satisfied more than it has been possible so to do at this stage, that there is that kind of representative nature to his role.

Mr. Clamp has been indemnified, as often happens in such cases, by the Halls for taking part in these proceedings. I welcome that. I welcome the fact that Mr. Clamp is prepared to put himself forward. I accept that he can do so on behalf of the suppliers and contractors of Darley Oaks Farm. They are a much clearer, and more specific, group. The injunction will run in favour of that group, with Mr. Clamp, for the moment, acting on their behalf.

I have summarised some of the factual background to this case. I was taken to a series of details by the Claimants' advocate. They are set out in the Particulars of Claim. The Claimants have selected a number of examples of harassment to various groups. There have been harassments directed against the partners of the Halls' farm; harassments directed against the farm itself; harassments directed against the tenants and the employees; harassments directed against relatives and friends; harassments directed against members of the community; and harassments directed against suppliers and contractors.

Today, I do not need to detail them. But, they show a catalogue of smashed windows, paint-spraying, vandalism of motor vehicles, threatening letters, abusive telephone calls, and similar matters. The Claimants have been targeted in relation to their role in the local community. As a result of campaigns against the local public houses, a hotel, and a nearby golf club, the Claimants have had to stop being involved in, or going to, those places. Electricity poles have apparently been chopped down, and although there is no direct evidence, it is thought that these actions were directed against the Claimants by people associated with the campaign against them. I detailed earlier some of the matters where the contractors have been targeted.

In my judgment it is right that some form of injunction should be granted against the Defendants. I think the balance points strongly that way. Although I am making no findings of fact, the evidence of serious problems for the Halls is very strong in my judgment. Both sides accept that.

As a matter of law, I am satisfied there is a clear arguable case to support the grant of an injunction. I think it right to provide some protection of the legitimate interests of the Claimants. The question is how to do it. As the parties in front of me know, there have been a number of similar injunction applications in relation to the activities of animal rights activists. There is, it might be said, a reasonably developed approach to this sort of litigation. It is common to ask for, and generally to be granted, a fairly wide-ranging injunction, and in particular there is often a prohibition on the Defendants and any associated with them from approaching near to any of the Claimants. That seems to me to be the first issue in this case - what area should the injunction cover? Put more exactly: should there be an exclusion zone into which the Defendants and others are prohibited from going, and if so, how large should it be?

I note that in similar cases - Oxford University, and Huntingdon Life Sciences are an example - the more general rule is that exclusions are limited to a certain number of metres from particular places. In the Huntingdon Life Sciences litigation, there is an exclusion zone which includes the farm, and the land on which that company conducts its business.

Here, the exclusion zone contended for by the Claimants is said to cover an area of some 200 sq.km. It covers the parishes, as I understand them, of Draycott, Newborough, Hanbury, Tattenhill, Orcross, Yoxhall and Barton-under-Needwood. There are some 10,000 people who live in that area. The area has been chosen by the Claimants because it is easy to define geographically. Around the perimeter of the area, for three-quarters of it, there are main roads. The other quarter is a river boundary. It seemed to me that so very large an area is hard to justify as a general exclusion zone. I proposed a slightly smaller one, but Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden, on behalf of the Claimants, contended for the larger area.

I remind myself again that this is an interim hearing. Imposing an exclusion zone is certainly lawful. The cases show that. Exclusions zones are referred to, and held lawful, in Burris -v- Azadani [1995] 4 All ER, 802. I quote from the headnote:

I think that at present it is going too far to make so wide an exclusion zone as is asked for here. To include in it such a large area and so many people seems to me to be unwise on an interim application. It is difficult to provide specific examples of how people might be adversely affected by it, but there are so many people who could be that, in my judgment, I should not at this stage make such an order.

The common order made in these proceedings has been that the Defendants should not go within 100 metres of the Claimants or the people the Claimants are representing - here, the relatives, friends, employees and tenants of the Halls, and the suppliers and contractors to Darley Oaks Farm. They are identifiable.

Mr. Justice Grigson, in University of Oxford & Ors. -v- Broughton & Ors. [2004] EWHC 2543 (QB), heard a case between Oxford University and a number of Defendants, including a number of animal rights activists on 10 November, 2004, here in this Court. He said at para. 4:

The next issue relates to the other matters in the draft injunction. At para. 5 in the definition section draft there is a definition of 'protesters'. There was some debate about this. It is the protesters, as defined, who will be restrained under the terms of the injunction from doing the acts which are prohibited. I propose to make an order in the way set out in 5(a) and (b). I accept Mr. Dally's argument that some amendments are needed to 5(c). I was initially attracted by the use of the phrase 'protesting against the Claimants' as an addition to it, but Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden agreed that the way forward was to add at the end of (c) 'who does an act prohibited by this order'. That achieves the same result, and I shall make an order at 5(c) defining protestors as follows: "(c) any other person who has been given notice of the terms of this order, whether by himself, his servants, agents or otherwise, who does an act prohibited by this order".

Next, the order itself. As a general order at (1) the protestors are restrained from pursuing a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of the protected persons, contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. I certainly make that order. At (2) there are some particulars. 2(a) provides in the draft 'assaulting, molesting, harassing, threatening, or otherwise interfering with the protected persons by doing acts which cause harassment, intimidation, or harm to the protected persons by any means whatsoever, including (i) photographing the protected persons or their vehicles which activities are prohibited in their entirety".

Ms. King, speaking on behalf of herself, and supported I think by Mr. Dally, says that they have got to have cameras with them when demonstrating. People have driven vehicles at them in the past. They need them for protection. There is, in fact, no injunction prohibiting anybody protesting, and bringing a camera with them. No order I am going to make will do so. I note that the police are present currently at all the protests that go on lawfully.

These protests have been happening, until recently, twice a week on Wednesdays and Sundays. They take place just off the main road - the A515 - at the entrance to the Halls' farm. The Halls' farm is down a farm road, well over 100 yards away. I think the police are there, and will properly protect any protester who is driven at. I regard it as essential that the Claimants are protected.

There has been at least one incident of a photograph of one of the represented Claimants being spread around, and I regard that as dangerous for her, and so I propose to make an order as asked there.

At 2(a)(ii) there is a proposal that the protesters should be restrained from "using any instruments whatsoever", whether or not designed for the purpose, in order to make artificial or musical noise or using anything to amplify sound, including loudhailers. Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden says that the protesters against the Claimants are urged to "give them hell". The noise is certainly regularly a nuisance. I saw on the video a group, including, it seems, Ms. King, playing drums, blowing horns, blowing whistles, and making a loud noise. To protest outside the farm is however lawful.

The circumstances have changed somewhat recently. The desecration of the grave of Mrs. Hall's mother caused the protesters to call off their protest for a period. They have said today in Court that they do not want to disturb the Claimants over the Christmas period. I see the use of these instruments as a nuisance, and I propose - in this order anyway - to prohibit them. Again, I say this does not prevent the Claimants arguing on the further hearing in mid-January that this order should be lifted.

At para. 2(e) in the order there is a reference to knowingly picketing, demonstrating, loitering within 250 yards of the premises of any contractors being exclusion zones. Mr. Dally contends that this should be 100 yards. I do not know the size of any of the contractors' premises. Some may be large. It seems to me that a 250 yard exclusion zone around the contractors' premises is, for the moment anyway, appropriate. So, I will make an order in those terms.

There was considerable debate about Clause 2(f) of the draft injunction. In particular, Mr. Dally took understandable objection to the phrase "or other activities" contained in it. Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden indicated, and I agree, that his aim would be achieved by amending Clause (f) so that it begins, "Entering into, remaining, or" and then going on, "-- conducting any demonstrations or protests within the exclusion zone". Hence, I agree that the phrase "or other activities" should be deleted.

Next, how many protesters should be there at each demonstration? This is Clause (f)(i). The Claimants contend for eight. Mr. Dally said that various courts have made orders between twelve and fifty. He wanted an order that the number should be limited to twenty-five. I agree. I will make such an order.

The next issue is the maximum duration of each demonstration. I regard it as important that there should continue to be a right to protest. I made that point to Mr. Curtin when he was addressing me. The maximum duration at present for the Sunday protests was, I noted, between twelve and three (when people are, in practice, there). I propose to make an order limiting the maximum duration for each such demonstration. I do not want to draft it here, but my aim is to achieve a result which says it should be between the hours of twelve and three on a Sunday.

As to Item para. 2(b)(iii) I accept the Defendant's view that it would put a severe brake on their ability to carry out lawful protests if the demonstrations could not take place at weekends. I propose to direct that they should not take place on Saturdays or Bank Holidays. So, they can take place on Sundays. We are coming up to the Christmas period, and the Defendants said they would not be demonstrating over the Christmas period. Sunday, 26 December is Boxing Day. I propose to make an order which ensures that no protest takes place on Boxing Day, and certainly not on Christmas Day.

Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden wanted me to limit the total number of demonstration protests to two between now and 17 January. The simplest way, I think, of dealing with that is to say that I regard that as too little, given that for five years there have been protests twice a week. It seems to me that it is reasonable to make an order limiting the protests to a set number of Sundays. So, the first is to be Sunday, 5^th and then Sunday, 12^th and Sunday, 19^th. I agree the Claimants deserve a rest over the Christmas period, as everybody seems to contend for, and I regard that as including the New Year. So, the first day on which a protest may be held in the New Year is Sunday, 9^th, and again on Sunday, 16^th. The demonstrations are to run, as I have said, between twelve and three on those days, and there are to be no other occasions when protests and demonstrations are to take place.

Paragraph 2(b)(vii) provides for a condition precedent before demonstrations are held. That should be deleted here, because we now know when they are going to be.

At para. 2(h) - the draft injunction provides that "The Defendants must not publish by website, e-mail or in any form whatsoever names, addresses, telephone numbers, faxes, electronic mail addresses, car registration numbers, or any other material, whether defamatory or otherwise designed to make known to any protestor or other person the identity of any of the protected persons". Mr. Dally says that should not be there. There is a need to identify the name of the businesses who deal with the Claimants, and, anyway, most of this information is already public. I cannot agree with that submission. It seems to me to be absolutely right that the addresses, and so on, should not be published in the way enjoined here. One result of that publication has been the wholly undesirable and, in some cases, seriously unlawful attacks which have taken place on those supplying the Claimants.

Para. 2(i) provides that there should not be any placing of orders for goods or services with third parties in the name of the protected persons, and that is obviously right. At para. 2(j) incitement is prohibited. That is right as well.

At para. 3 of the draft order, there is an order directed to the Staffordshire Police. That is to be deleted. I have had a lengthy discussion with the parties on para. 4, which has resulted in my decision that the last line and a half should be deleted. So, we delete the words "-- and for the purposes of Section 3(6) aforesaid the words 'protestor' and 'Defendant' and be interchangeable". (4) will then read, "The Claimants have permission to enforce the order herein as against the members of the First, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Defendants and the protesters as defined in this order, pursuant to CPR 19.6.4(b) under Section 3(6) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997". It seems to me that that gives the Claimants the protection they need.

I am asked to make an order for substituted service which I do.

Mr. Curtin asks me to exclude him from these proceedings on the basis, as he put it, that he had had very little involvement in this particular campaign. He accepted he had been near the Halls' farm on at least two occasions in the April demonstrations. I do not need, for today's purposes, to make any findings or decision about that. His wish to be removed from the proceedings can be best advanced if he sets out his case in a full statement, or affidavit, for the next hearing.

As for Ms. King, I am not clear that she was submitting to me that she should be excluded, but I do not do so. She is clearly closely involved in the lawful protests. The Claimants' case is that the lawful protests and the unlawful protests are intermingled in a way which means it is right to make the order I am making today, and I agree with that. So, the injunction is made against her.

That concludes the Judgment itself, although I am prepared to hear any observations you have on the actual order which will be for you to draw up and serve.