University of Oxford & Ors v Broughton & Ors

This is an application for the continuation of injunctive relief granted to the 2^nd and 3^rd Claimants against all Defendants. The injunction was initially granted ex parte by Mrs. Justice Cox on the 3^rd September 2004. The matter came before Mr Justice Simon on the 13^th of September 2004. There was not sufficient time for the matter to be heard. Mr. Justice Simon varied the terms of the injunction but continued it until this hearing. The time estimate was for 2 to 3 days. That was, in the event, grossly optimistic. It is to be hoped that time estimates for the actual hearing will be more accurate. They should include a sensible estimate of the time necessary for the trial judge to ‘read himself into’ the papers.

The 1^st Claimant is the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford, referred to as the University.

The 2^nd Claimant is David Robert Holmes, Registrar of the University who acts as representative of the employees and members of the University pursuant to CPR 19.6.

The 3^rd Claimant is Jennifer Gregory as representative for the employees and shareholders of the contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers of the University pursuant to CPR 19.6.

I have given leave to add a 4^th Claimant, the Oxford University Fixed Assets Ltd [‘OUFAL’]. This Claimant is the contractor responsible for carrying out the work on the Research Laboratory. The 3^rd Claimant, Jennifer Gregory is expressly authorised by the 4^th Claimant to represent its employees and shareholders.

1^st Defendant: Mel Broughton. Mr. Broughton is a Co-founder of SPEAK (the 4^th Defendant) and a spokesman for that organisation. He denies that he was an organiser of SHAC (the 6^th Defendant) and that he is associated with any other animal rights group or campaign. He states that he is not a member of ALF (the 10^th Defendant) and claims that his role as a spokesman for SPEAK is incompatible with membership of ALF.

On the 25^th February 2000 he was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment at the Northampton Crown Court for conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life or property. It is argued that the fact of that conviction supports the suggestion that he was then a member of or closely associated with ALF. Mr. Broughton points out that the facts upon which this conviction was based occurred in 1998. Mr. Broughton has entered into a personal undertaking as a consequence of which the Claimants do not pursue their claim for interim injunctive relief against him. He has made representations on behalf of himself and SPEAK.

2^nd Defendant: John Curtin. Mr. Curtin represents himself. He has filed no evidence. He has addressed me upon various of the issues. He relied upon the joint declaration of Greg Avery, Natasha Avery and Heather Nicholson as evidence that he was not involved with SPEAC as a founder or organiser. The 2^nd Claimant, Mr. Holmes asserts that Mr. Curtin was a member of ALF. Mr. Curtin accepts that in the past he has taken part in criminal activities in pursuance of his aims as an animal rights activist. Mr. Holmes also asserts that Mr. Curtin is an Co-leader and Co- founder of both SPEAC and SPEAK. Mr. Curtin denies both. He accepts that he was involved in tortious acts (trespass) as part of the SHAC campaign. He states that his only role as far as Oxford University is concerned is that he has attended two protests. Mr. Curtin has not entered any undertaking so it will be necessary to refer the evidence relating to his beliefs and activities in more detail. Mr. Curtin has been convicted of a number of criminal offences arising from his support of animal rights and has served sentences of imprisonment. The last conviction for an offence so motivated was on the 16^th July 1992, some 14 years ago, a fact which Mr. Curtin relies upon to support his contention that he is no longer prepared to commit crime in pursuit of his aims.

3^rd Defendant: Robert Cogswell. Mr. Cogswell is a co-founder and a spokesman for SPEAK and the editor of Arkangel Website. He denies that he is associated with any other group or organisation: in particular he denies that he was an organiser of SHAC. He has a previous conviction. I do not regard it as relevant to these proceedings. He has given an undertaking in similar terms to that given by Mr. Broughton, with the same consequence.

4^th Defendant: SPEAK campaigns. SPEAK is the name of the campaigns whose aim is to stop the construction of the research laboratory at Oxford. It was founded by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants.

5^th Defendant: SPEAC. Stop Primate Experiments at Cambridge (SPEAC). It is common ground that the campaign to stop the construction of a research laboratory at Cambridge where experimentation of live animals would take place has succeeded. It is the 5^th Defendant’s case that this organisation has ceased to exist. There is evidence that this organisation still has a website which has the same registration address as the Arkangel website, namely BCM 9240 London WC1N 3XX.

6^th Defendant: Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC). This organisation was founded by, inter alia, Greg Avery, Natasha Avery and Heather Nicholson. In a joint declaration they state that neither Mr. Broughton, John Curtin nor Robert Cogswell have ever been members of SHAC, nor have they played any active role in the foundation, organisation or structure of SHAC. They assert that neither SPEAC nor SPEAK have been members of SHAC.

Dr Gastone is a representative of SHAC and has spoken on behalf of that organisation. Dr. Gastone has previous convictions arising from his beliefs in animal rights. On the 17^th October 2003 for criminal damage a community service order for 100 hours was imposed. On the 16^th January 2004 he was convicted at Lichfield and Tamworth Magistrates Court of two offences of aggravated trespass and ordered to perform community service. He tells me that this conviction is subject to an appeal. The incident relates to a demonstration against those who operate the Newchurch Guinea Pig Farm.

Greg Avery was convicted in March 2000 of harassment and in November 2001 at Basildon Crown Court for inciting a public nuisance. That offence arose from the campaign against HLS. Heather Avery was convicted of the latter offence. She has 3 convictions subsequent to that for public order offences. Natasha Avery was also convicted of inciting a public nuisance.

Evidence has been adduced on behalf of SHAC from Maxime Kaye, Helen Brand, Doreen Brand, Peter Radcliffe and others as to the draconian effect of the injunctions granted at the behest of Huntingdon Life Science against SHAC.

7^th Defendant: Oxford Animal Rights Group.

8^th Defendant: People against Cruelty to Animals – West Midlands.

9^th Defendant: West Midlands Animal Action. Mary Brough also known as Mary Brady has attended this hearing and has put in a written statement. She is an Oxford graduate and asserts that the effect of the injunction is “to criminalize her” as well as forbidding her to enter Oxford. She does not tell me how often she would normally visit Oxford, excluding visits for the purposes of demonstrating. She ignores the fact that the application before me is for the temporary extension of the present injunction.

10^th Defendant: ALF The Animal Liberation Front. ALF is not represented. That is no surprise as those who belong to this organisation are more likely than not to be engaged in criminal activities and consequently seek to remain anonymous. They do post bulletins on the Arkangel website publishing their activities.

Mr. Gratwick appears here as a representative of what it is convenient to refer to as law abiding protesters. He takes particular care to ensure that his actions are lawful.

There is a body of opinion which holds that the use of live animals in research is both immoral and unjustified. How large is the number of persons holding that opinion is a matter of conjecture. Those who hold those opinions want to stop research which involves experiments on live animals. They can be described as the Animal Rights Movement. This movement is entirely amorphous. It has no structure only a community of belief. There is no consensus as to the means by which the research involving live animals may be stopped. The Animal Rights Movement includes those who restrict their activities to that which is lawful and, at the other end of the spectrum, those who believe that they are morally justified in committing crime in order to achieve their aims. It includes organisations with a formal structure such as the R.S.P.C.A. and the League against Cruel Sports. Within this ‘broad church’ are groups whose activities are directed against specific targets, for example, SHAC. Whilst such groups may have founders and organisers, they have no formal membership. Their activities are advertised and those who support their aims are invited to participate. The activities are, as advertised, lawful although, on occasions, these advertised activities may be accompanied by actions which are either tortious (for example trespass) or which are deliberately criminal (for example assault or criminal damage.)

The movement includes those who will adopt civil disobedience as a means of achieving their aims and those who will commit crime in order to do so, an example of which is the Animal Liberation Front. A person can easily be part of the Animal Liberation Front – a fact which will be kept secret for obvious reasons – but also participate in activities which are entirely lawful or which are deliberately tortious.

Lawful activities of the Animal Rights Movement include public protest and dissemination of information. Tortious activities include trespass. Criminal acts include assault, criminal damage, theft, burglary and harassment.

Research involving the use of live animals done in conformity with the Animal (Scientific) Procedures Act 1986 is lawful. Those who conduct such research or who, in the broadest sense, provide the facilities for such research are acting lawfully and are entitled to go about their lawful business. If citizens use unlawful means to prevent them doing so, or promote the use of such means, then those involved in lawful activity are entitled to such protection as the Courts can provide to enable them to pursue their lawful activities. See judgement of Stuart Smith LJ in Monsanto Plc v. Tilly [2000] ENV. LR. 313:

“Those views were genuinely and sincerely held and there was nothing whatever unlawful in trying to persuade others and particularly the Government of the rightness of their views provided they did not employ unlawful means to do so, and provided they did not incite others to use unlawful means, such that they were liable in tort to the Claimant….

In a democratic society, the object of change in Government policy had to be effected by lawful and not unlawful means. Those who suffered infringement of their lawful rights were entitled to the protection of the law. If others deliberately infringed those rights in order to attract publicity to their cause, however sincerely they believed in its correctness, they had to bear the consequences of their law breaking. That was fundamental to the rule of law in a civilised and democratic society”

The University of Oxford (1^st Claimant) is engaged in the construction of a research laboratory at South Park Road, Oxford. Some of the work to be carried out at that laboratory will involve experimentation on live animals, Such experimentation will conform with the Animal (Scientific) Procedures Act 1986 and will be monitored by the Home Office. The object of SPEAK is to stop this construction.

Until the 19^th July 2004 the main contactor for the construction of the laboratory was Walter Lilly, part of the Montpellier Group. Other contractors included Bullock Construction, also part of the Montpellier Group, HTC, Getjar and R.M.C. who were the main suppliers of concrete to the project. On the 19^th July 2004 all those companies resigned from their contracts to do work on the construction of the laboratory.

Prior to that date the University and the contractors and sub-contractors engaged upon the construction of the research laboratory had been subject to a variety of activities designed to stop the project. They are listed in Ex D.R.H. 2. I shall only refer to parts of it. There have been lawful demonstrations. There have been acts of trespass. There have been serious acts of criminal damage against contractors and sub-contractors. There have been threats both explicit and veiled.

Inspector Pearl’s witness statement (Claimants’ bundle A.Tab 12.p.159) reveals that.

I have particular regard for the statement of witness A. ( Claimants’ Bundle d. Tab 6 p. 575.)

Since the 19^th July 2004 the University has been unable to continue with the construction of the laboratory and Miss Gregory expresses the view that unless there is injunctive relief to protect contractors and suppliers it is unlikely that it will be possible to resume construction.

Since the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Cream Holdings & others v. Banergee and others [2004] UKHL 44 that there are in fact two tests.

Where the right of freedom of expression is engaged, the threshold test which has to be satisfied before a Court may grant interlocutory injunctive relief is to be found in Section 12(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998.

“no such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the Court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.”

Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead who gave the only judgement discussed what ‘likely’ meant in this context and reach this conclusion, at para 22.

“There can be no single, rigid standard governing all applications for interim restraint orders. Rather, on its proper construction the effect of Section 12(3) is that the Court is not to make an interim restraint order unless satisfied the applicants prospects of success at the trial are sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular circumstances of the case. As to what degree of likelihood makes the prospects of success ‘sufficiently favourable’ , the general approach should be that Courts will be exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not satisfied the Court that he will probably (‘more likely than not’) succeed at trial. In general, that should be the threshold an applicant must cross before the Court embarks on exercising its discretion, duly taking into account the relevant jurisprudence on article 10 and any countervailing convention rights.”

It is to be noted that the “Cream” case involved a breach of confidentiality and that the restraint imposed precluded any publication of the material.

Where Convention Rights are not engaged, then the test is that derived from American Cyanamical Co v. Ethican Ltd [1975] A.C. 396 namely whether ‘there is a serious question to be tried’. It seems safer to apply the more stringent test.

I remind myself and the parties that it is no part of the courts function at this stage of litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit nor to decide difficult questions of law calling for detailed argument and mature consideration. Per Lord Nicholls

“Unless the applicant fails to show he has ‘any real prospect of success in his claim for a permanent injunction at trial’, the court should proceed to consider where the balance of convenience lies.”

It is a criticism of myself as much as it is of the parties that we have tended to forget that important aspect of interlocutory proceedings.

Mr. Dally argues that the use of CPR 19.6 in these circumstances is an abuse of the process. He asserts that the “Protected Persons” must be part of a close-knit group. He relies upon a number of decisions which preceded the decision of the Divisional Court in D.P.P. v. Dziurznski [2002] EWHC 1380 as well as the judgement in that case. Lord Justice Rose in Dziurznski accepted that the Act could apply both to an individual and to ‘a close knit group’. The Court ruled that 60 employees whose only common feature was that they worked for the same employer did not come within that definition. Mr. Dally argues with some force that the ‘protected persons’ here cannot be described as a close knit group.

In my judgement this submission is flawed as it confuses the terms of a civil injunction with the ingredients of a criminal offence. Dziurznski and the preceding cases (Mills/Dunn) were criminal cases. The issue was whether the Crown had proved against the Defendants the elements of the offence. The purpose of this injunction is to prevent harassment as defined by the Act taking place. To that end, the restraint is designed to prevent acts which may, if continued, constitute the full offence. It would be pointless otherwise. If the Claimants had to wait for the full offence to be committed, they could rely upon the Criminal Law but the Criminal Law acts retrospectively. A civil injunction is prospective. Necessarily an injunction is designed to catch acts which are less than the full offence. Consequently the Courts have the power to grant injunctions in wide terms to prevent the harassment of a class of persons, for example, the employees of contractors or sub-contractors, so that they may go about their lawful business.

Further, the broad definition of ‘Protected Persons’ in the order (as granted by Simon J) is appropriate at this stage because it can be assumed that no individual will consent to being the subject of ‘harassment’ as defined by the Act. They have a common interest. No Defendant would in fact be deprived of a defence if charged with either a breach of the injunction or the criminal offence. Each case would be ‘fact sensitive’. If charged or made the subject of breach proceedings, the ordinary rules as to the burden and standard of proof would apply. There is no reason why any defendant in such proceedings should not have a fair trial.

Further, as Gibbs J. said in his judgement in HLS v. SHAC and Others given on the 20^th.June 2004,

Mr Dally submits that the ‘Protected Persons’ must be named. He relies upon the case of R v. Mann. (2000) L.S.Gazette. That case was about an order made under Section 5 of the Act and turned on the specific requirements of subsection (2). In my judgement it has no application here. He goes on to assert that the use of CPR 19.6 denies the Defendants of the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the European Convention. For the reasons stated at para 38 and 39 above, I reject this argument.

He asserts correctly that at this stage the contractors and sub-contractors and their employees are anonymous. In that he is plainly right. However for the purpose of any breach of proceedings or criminal proceedings the alleged victims would have to be identified. He goes on to argue that the anonymity of the protected persons make it impossible for ‘protesters’ to comply with the order. I simply make two comments. The first is that the notion of ‘accidental harassment’ which is in effect what Mr. Dally complains about is absurd. The second is that in none of the other reported cases involving various members of the Animal Rights movement have the protesters had the slightest difficulty in identifying contractors, sub-contractors and their employees. Not only has there been no difficulty, the details of such people have been publicised on web-sites and they have been the target of harassment. If a protester can identify a person as a suitable target of harassment, he or she can equally identify those who are protected by injunction.

Mr. Dally submits that the definition of ‘Protester’ is too wide. Mr Lawson-Cruttenden relies upon the case of M. Michaels (Furriers) v.Askew [1983] C.A. Bound Transcript 278. Dunn. LJ said this,

“Care must be taken to ensure that Ord. 15 v 12 is not abused. But when a number of unidentified person are causing injury and damage by unlawful acts of one kind or another, and there is an arguable case that they belong to a single organisation or class which encourages action of the type complained of, and their actions can be limited to that organisation, then the rule enables the Court to do justice in the particular case. The narrow construction of the rule advanced b y Mr. Warner would in my view deprive the Courts in a situation like this of a useful remedy.”

Purchase LJ said

“Convenient administration of justice, in my judgement demands that the Courts should be able to afford effective protection to the victims of illegal or threatened illegal action by members of associations whose declared aims are in line with a calculated to promote such illegal action.”

Mr Dally argues that that case is distinguishable because the two named defendants had been ordered to represent members of an unincorporated body. He asserts that no such order has been made here. In that he is correct. The individuals named here are defendants in their own right. The case of M Michael (Furriers) v. Askew. established that an injunction can be ordered against unknown members of loosely formed unincorporated association. That is what is sought in this case.

He argues that the declared aims of both the named individuals and of most of the unincorporated associations are lawful. That is so but it is a matter of evidence whether the named individuals and/or unidentified members of the named associations restrict themselves to lawful activities.

Mr. Dally further argues that the judgement of Lord Justice Rose in D.P.P. v. Dziurznski [2002] EWHC 1380 makes it clear that the provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (The Act) cannot be invoked to protect corporations. The 1^st and 4^th Defendants are, on the face of it, corporations. Mr Lawson-Cruttenden whilst accepting that that is the effect of the judgement does not accept that that is an accurate statement of the law nor that the 1^st Claimant is a body corporate. It seems likely that this court is bound by the decision in Dziurznski but I do not need to decide these issues and decline to do so

a) Do members and/or employees of the University face or can it be reasonably anticipated that they are likely to face a course of conduct which amounts or may amount to unlawful harassment by members of the animal rights movement?

Mr Lawson-Cruttenden’s submission is that the actions which have been (and still are) directed against the Newchurch Guinea Pig Farm, against Huntingdon Life Science and were against Cambridge University are ‘likely’ to be repeated in the campaign to stop the building of the research laboratory at Oxford.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this judgement to set out in any detail what happened in the course of those campaigns. There were entirely lawful protests and demonstrations. There was also a catalogue of actions which were tortious and/or criminal. None of the organisations represented here seek to justify criminal acts. Mr. Curtin whilst he disassociates himself from the more extreme actions seems to me to be at best ambivalent about less extreme but none the less criminal acts. I have been taken through the evidence and to the passages upon which both sides rely. I am not going to detail all the evidence nor rehearse all the arguments. The test I have to apply is whether I am satisfied that the Claimants are more likely than not to succeed at trial on this issue.

Claimants File B p.259 SPEAK Website May 2004:

“This new phase on the SPEAK campaign is clear in its objective to make sure that no ‘expansion’ of the vivisection industry can be allowed to happen, no matter where it raises its ugly head. The victory over Cambridge University ………marked a truly historic day for our movement and democracy. We must stand firm and resist any attempt to reverse the gains we have fought so hard to achieve.

The fight against those who torture animals in the name of science has moved up a step and we must be ready to take our struggle forward. Now is not the time to rest on our laurels, now is the time to stand together and strike another blow for justice for the animals, compassion, and real science.”

This article is accompanied by a plan of the proposed site of the laboratory.

Claimants’ File B p. 260 SPEAK Website. May 2004

“Oxford University can rest assured a line has been drawn in the sand, SPEAK and the animal rights movement will stop your barbarism, there will only be one victor in this campaign. We defeated the Government and Cambridge University and we plan to do the same”.

I attach no weight to the use of the word ‘barbarism’. I do attach importance to the words ‘will stop’ and to the last sentence.

Claimant File B p. 265 SPEAK Website. 2^nd August 2004. The article is headed:

“The gloves are off”

This phrase derives from boxing. As I understand its wider meaning it is that the rules of combat (the Queensbury Rules) no longer apply and that any means may be used to achieve ‘victory’.

Claimants’ bundle B. At p. 275 ‘No Compromise’ The Militant, Direct Action Publication of Grassroots Animal Liberationists and their Supporters. This publication contains an article jointly written by Mr. Cogswell (3^rd Defendant) and Mr. Broughton (1^st Defendant) (p.275) and is under the headline ‘SPEAK’. It says that SPEAK evolved from SPEAC. There are references to SHAC. At p.276 this passage appears:

“The SPEAC campaign of Cambridge remodled itself into the SPEAK campaign –Voice for Animals, which now focuses its attention on Oxford………

Now the battle begins……………..

The successful campaign in Cambridge is a clear indicator to the animal rights movement……of just what can be achieved when the animal rights movement comes together in a spirit of co-operation. No height is ever too difficult to scale when we work as a unified force. As a movement we are an unstoppable force for change, and by working together, our goal of animal liberation is one step closer.”

I have already commented how the animal rights movement encompasses those who advocate and use unlawful means in pursuit of their aims. No distinction is made in this article between the two. On the contrary, the actions of the whole movement are endorsed.

Claimants’ bundle B p. 339 SPEAK website. This article announces the decision of Cambridge University to abandon its plans to build a new research facility. This paragraph appears:

“Today’s announcement is a victory for everyone fighting greed and political self interest; it would not have been possible without the inspiring efforts of those already engaged in the struggle against HLS and Newchurch. We are one movement and together we will move forward.”

I comment that the campaigns against HLS and against the Newchurch Guinea Pig Farm have included serious and substantial criminal acts.

Mr. Dally has referred me to other passages. I have considered them. He argues as does Mr. Cogswell that these are examples of ‘mere rhetoric’. Rhetoric they certainly are but it is the rhetoric of the militant.

I am quite satisfied that these passages provide ample proof that all the aspects of the campaign against HLS, Newchurch Guinea Pig Farm and Cambridge University will be deployed against the University of Oxford in general and in particular, they will be employed not only against the members and employees of the university but also against contractors and sub-contractors and their employees. It is hard to resist the conclusion that it is the unlawful means which are effective.

Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden points to particular articles which he submits evidence a community of interest between SHAC and SPEAK, in particular : Claimants Bundle B p.334. The SHAC website report of World Day 2004. That event featured speeches by Robin Webb (a spokesman for ALF) and Mr. Broughton the first Defendant speaking on behalf of SPEAK campaigns.Greg Avery of SHAC is reported as saying:

“…..direct action works and that if the political process worked then we would do it. In fact we will do whatever works to save animals from the agony they go through at the hands of monsters.”

Other speeches are quoted which demonstrate the common intention and the lack of nicety as to means. At P. 330 there is a reference to the December 6^th National March and Rally and Mr. Avery giving an ‘impassioned angry talk about how everyone needs to stay focused on HLS, their customers and suppliers and keep piling on the pressure until they go under’. Mr. Broughton spoke also see p. 331.

The article ends with this paragraph:

“All in all the Dec 6^th demo was a passionate, angry heartfelt demo uniting activists and campaigns from all over the country together to renew their determinations and sheer will to close down HLS and all the other evil disgusting hell-holes run by the worst filth of the earth. These filth are learning the lesson that if you are responsible for animals dying in fear and agony, then you will be held accountable for your crimes.

SHAC has reports of home demos against directors of HLS suppliers taking place after the above as well as reports of damage caused to officers at companies supplying HLS.”

It is difficult to see this as anything other than an endorsement of an encouragement to illegal activity.

Mr. Cogswell accepted that the SPEAK Website published reports of the illegal activities of activists. He is the editor of the Arkangel Website which he describes as ‘a news service and discussion forum’. On this Website he has permitted the posting of unedited material posted to the Website anonymously but by necessary inference, in fact posted by or on behalf of ALF.

Examples can be seen at Claimants Bundle C tab 27 where there is a report of an incident of criminal damage being inflicted upon the car of a director of the Montpellier Group. Mr. Cogswell likens that to a newspaper report . That is a description which I regard at best as disingenuous. The account included these words:

“This is just the beginning however. It is time to sever that contract before your life is ruined. For the animals ALF.”

There are other similar examples. At Claimant’s Bundle C Tab 38 there is an account of an attack on R.M.C. premises at Weeford and a description of the damage caused. The article ends:

“The ALF wants to make it clear to RMC, if you persist in the construction of this animal torture centre then we will wage an unending war against you.”

This is not news reporting. It is acting as a publicity agent for ALF. It is re-enforcing ALF’s message by publishing it without comment. In effect ,it not only condones such illegal activities but incites others to commit such acts. It is of note that below the title “ Arkangel”, the words:

“Barry Horne/SHAC/SPEAK/SNPG/Subscribe appear”

At Claimants’ Bundle C. Tab 44 p. 371 another article appears which reinforces Mr. Lawson-Cruttenden’s point,

“The Montpellier Group is building the new animal torture lab at Oxford University. This means that they are a legitimate target for actions. Over the past two weeks some of their directors have been visited. Two of these directors live in Birmingham, the other lives in Cannock. In three separate attacks a total of seven cars have had paint stripper poured over them. We would like to suggest to the Montpellier Group that they stop building this hell hole for animals with immediate effect.”

I do not have to consider the First and Third Defendants. I shall come to the Second Defendant after I have considered the case against the others. As far as the 10^th Defendant is concerned, the evidence against it is plain and I shall, subject to what I say hereafter about its terms, grant the relief sought.

SPEAK Campaigns, [the Fourth Defendant]. In my judgement, the evidence is equally plain that injunctive relief should be ordered against this organisation. I have referred to the lack of distinction in their publications between lawful and unlawful activities and to the terms in which their spokesman describe their campaign and their aims. A recent declaration that they do not endorse criminal activity is in my judgement a device which is designed to deal with the argument now available to the Claimants following the decision in the case of Thomas v. News Group Newspapers Ltd and Simon Hughes Neutral Citation Number 2001 EWCA Civ. 1233. In my judgement the late addition of a disclaimer is both cynical and ineffective.

SPEAC, The Fifth Defendant. The evidence is that this organisation has achieved hits objective and that SPEAK has succeeded it. The mere fact it has a website is not sufficient evidence that it has any active role. The application to continue the injunction against this Defendant is refused.

SHAC, The Sixth Defendant. This Defendant is till active and its members have a community of interest with SPEAK. In my judgement there is a real prospect of the Claimants showing that there is also a community of means.

The 7^th, 8^th and 9^th Defendants. Mr. Dally has submitted that there is not sufficient evidence against any of these Defendants to justify the continuation of the injunction, I agree. In any event, these organisations support SPEAK and in my judgement, if they joined in SPEAK activities they would fall within the definition of “ Protester”.

Mr. Curtin, the Second Defendant. Mr. Curtin asserts that he presently is no longer engaged in unlawful activities in support of his beliefs. I am inclined to accept that assertion. However, that does not provide an answer to the Claimants case. Mr Lawson-Cruttenden has take me through various reports, for example, the interview to be found at Claimants Bundle B Tab 2 p 190 from ‘Biteback’. Mr, Curtin invites me to dismiss this whole interview as being untrue and offensive to him. That is the sort of judgement I cannot make at this stage of the proceedings. In fact, I do not need to. The best evidence regarding Mr. Curtin comes from his own mouth and is to be found in the interview he gave to a BBC Journalist, John Waite. The edited version is to be found in the Claimants’ bundle A p.140. We have all listened to the unedited interview on tape. I quote from a passage at p. 141:

“But I haven’t got a problem with direct action. I haven’t got a problem…with right down to smashing the windows of someone’s house…….are they responsible for animal abuse? And if they are, then they become a legitimate target for us.”

The unedited version does not qualify this passage. It is plain that whilst Mr. Curtin is no longer prepared to perform illegal acts himself, he still regards the less extreme of criminal acts as both justified and necessary. One then has to look at the role he admits to playing at Oxford. He says he has attended two meetings and spoke at the ‘Spring Demo’. He told me ‘I am known as a demonstrator now’. At Claimants’ Bundle B, Tab 6 p. 333 is an article from the SPEAK Website reporting on the ‘Spring Demo’. I quote:

“The demo marched to the rallying point in Broad Street where John Curtin addressed the crowd. John spoke of the animal liberation struggles waged in Oxford over the last two decades, including the raids which resulted in the liberation of hundreds of animals from places like Newnham Courtney Cat Colony, Park Farm and Hillgrove. Oxford University have only got a taste of what is to come, they can look to Newchurch, HLS and Cambridge to see that the animals rights movement has never been more focused and angry.

Oxford University may have been living under the illusion that they could quietly usher in the next phase of their animal abuse establishment. Academic arrogance and lies are no protection from the cutting edge of a movement ready to act as ‘the voice of the animals’.”

Mr Curtin denies these sentiments are attributable to him. It is difficult to see why SPEAK should seek to misquote him. Further, what he is reported as saying is consistent with what he said to John Waite in his BBC interview.

In my judgement, there is clear evidence that Mr. Curtin endorses the use of illegal means in pursuit of his aims and that his words are capable of being an incitement to others so to act.

These comments apply equally to SPEAK. This article also demonstrates the community of interest between SHAC and SPEAK.

Reliance has been placed upon various articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. I have already dealt with Mr. Dally’s submissions as to Article 6.

Mr. Gratwick, in particular, has relied upon Article 10 and Article 12. Article 10 provides for freedom of expression. It involves the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority… Section 2 states:

“….the exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of……….or for public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime…..for the protection of the rights of others.”

The right of freedom of expression is not to be exercised in a vacuum created by the assumption that only the views of the animal rights movement are correct. Those who believe that experiminentation on live animals is both morally and scientifically justified also have the right of freedom of expression. Further such people and those who, in the broadest sense, work for them have the right to respect for their private and family life, their homes and correspondence under Article 8.

Whilst Mr. Gratwick has the right to express his views, another citizen has an equal right not to listen to Mr. Gratwick. Mr. Gratwick has no right to coerce an unwilling citizen to receive Mr. Gratwick’s opinions. Freedom of expression entitles you to publish your views on a website. It does not entitle you to incite others to commit criminal offences.

Further, when considering the infringement upon Mr. Gratwick’s right to express himself, the Court must keep in mind.

On analysis the real objection to the restrictions imposed upon ‘protesters’ by the continuation of this injunction is that they allow the Claimants to go about their lawful business,, namely the building of the research laboratory - a project that the ‘protestors’ are determined to stop.

With all these considerations in mind, I am satisfied that it is both just and convenient to continue the injunction. I find:

Mr. Dally submits that any order should be made only in respect of persons who are actually harassing or are likely to harass the protected persons. As regards the first category, such persons could simply be arrested and charged with the criminal offence. As regards the second category, other than the specific defendants, it is unlikely that they could be identified. To grant an order in those terms would be to neuter it. As I have pointed out, the purpose of injunctive relief is to prevent acts which, if repeated against individuals would amount to harassment, whoever it is who commits them.

I have considered the submissions made by the defendants. I have considered the case of Burris v. Azadani [1995] 4 All E R . I have been much assisted by the analysis of Gibbs J. in the case cited above. I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the exclusion zones as defined in the order of Simon J. are both necessary and proportionate .

I am persuaded that it is equally necessary to include the prohibition on photographing the protected persons. Photography is the easiest way of identifying potential targets.

The Order is to be in the same terms as the Order of Simon J of the 17^th September 2004 save that :

Costs reserved.