Lirim Geci v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

The appellant appeals against a decision of the Secretary of State to refuse to issue him with a residence card under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 (“the EEA Regulations”). His appeal against that decision was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 6 February 2020 but, for the reasons set out in my decision of 22 March 2021 (a copy if which is annexed), that decision was set aside.

As noted in my earlier decision, the factual basis of this appeal is unusual. The appellant has a poor immigration history and it is accepted that he entered the United Kingdom twice in breach of a deportation order. There is no purpose in setting out the full details of that history, but it is sufficient to note that he has a history of offending in this country. It is not in dispute either that it would have been open to the Secretary of State to take steps to remove the appellant under her powers under the EEA Regulations but instead in this case she chose simply not to issue a residence card and expressly stated, one might think somewhat surprisingly, that the appellant’s rights of free movement as a family member of an EEA national were not being restricted.

It is common ground that the EEA Regulations have been revoked but that certain parts of those regulations are preserved for the purpose of this appeal. What those are is an issue to which I turn first.

I consider it necessary to set out in some detail the law as it now exists in respect of the EEA Regulations and the right of appeal. The position is unfortunately complex and requires the consideration of several different pieces of legislation. I am indebted to Mr Muquit’s comprehensive skeleton argument for setting out the legal position.

The EEA Regulations were revoked in their entirety on 31 December 2020 by paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 1(1) to the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020. They are, however, preserved for certain purposes by three separate instruments:

The Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Act 2020 (Consequential, Saving, Transitional and Transitory Provisions) (EU Exit) Regulations (SI 2020 1309), (“the EEA Transitional Regulations”),

The Citizens’ Rights (Application Deadline and Temporary Protection) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020; and,

The Citizens’ Rights (Restrictions of Rights of Entry and Residence) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“Citizens’ Rights Restriction Regulations”).

This appeal is concerned only with the effect of the EEA Transitional Regulations but some observations about the other instruments are helpful.

The Citizens’ Rights (Application Deadline and Temporary Protection) Regulations regulate the position of EEA nationals who had lived in the UK but who had not, as at 31 December 2020, been given leave under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules. There is a “grace period” until 21 June 2021 during which these people were able to apply for leave, but until that date, some of the provisions of the 2016 EEA Regulations continued to apply to that group and also apply while a valid application is pending, and while a valid appeal against such a decision is pending.

The Citizens’ Rights Restriction Regulations are designed to apply the “old” law in relation to deportation of those previously covered by the 2016 EEA Regulations where the conduct complained of took place prior to 31 December 2020.

The instruments do not preserve all of the EEA Regulations; each instrument preserves a different subset which apply for the purposes covered by that instrument. If that were not complex enough, different subsets of the EEA Regulations are preserved for Immigration purposes and social security purposes; and, those regulations that are preserved are subject in some cases to amendments.

This appeal is concerned only with the EEA Transitional Provisions.

Reg 82 of the EEA Transitional Regulations provides for the savings set out in Schedule 3 to apply. It is not necessary to set those out in full.

Paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 to the EEA Transitional Regulations makes provision for the appeal rights and appeals pending as at the date of revocation of the EEA Regulations as follows:

It is clear from the above that this is an appeal which falls within subparagraph (1)(b) or for that matter (1)(c).

Paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 to the EEA Transitional Regulations sets out those provisions which are preserved and also any amendments made. Those relevant here are as follows:

“EU Treaties” is defined in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 (Footnote: ¹). to include the Treaty on the Formation of the European Union as was in force on 31 December 2020

Part 4 of the EU Withdrawal Agreement maintains in effect the law of the European Union which is in addition defined to include the EU Treaties subject to certain exceptions which are not applicable here.

The effect of this is that the provisions of the TFEU including the legislation done under that which includes Directive 2004/38/EC (“the Directive”) are preserved by the Withdrawal Agreement and thus are applicable. It is also clear from the wording of the Directive although it refers to the Treaty on the European Economic Area that that is made under the TFEU, which was renamed as that by the Treaty of Lisbon.

As this is an appeal lodged on 26 November 2019 in respect of a decision made on 8 November 2019 it falls within paragraph 5(1)(b) of Schedule 3 and on that basis, there is a right of appeal.

The first issue for consideration is what now is the ground of appeal. Prior to the revocation of the EEA Regulations that was set out in Schedule 2 of the Regulations which provided as follows:

The effect of the amendments as set out above is that the sole ground of appeal is, in effect, whether the decision under appeal breaches the appellant’s rights under the EU Treaties as they applied in the United Kingdom prior to 31 December 2020.

The decision made in this case was to refuse to issue a residence card pursuant to reg 24 (1) on the basis that this was justified on grounds of public policy, public security, or public health (reg. 27). Both regs 24 and 27 are preserved.

I now turn to the Directive. Articles 9 and 10 provide:

The right of residence of family members of a Union citizen who are not nationals of a Member State shall be evidenced by the issuing of a document called "Residence card of a family member of a Union citizen" no later than six months from the date on which they submit the application. A certificate of application for the residence card shall be issued immediately.

For the residence card to be issued, Member States shall require presentation of the following documents:

There is little dispute about the effect of the Directive in this case. Both Articles 9 and 10 of the Directive require that somebody must be issued a card as confirmation of a right of residence. It is not in dispute that this appellant has a right of residence conferred on him by the Directive as he is the spouse and therefore family member of an EU national exercising treaty rights in the United Kingdom nor does the respondent contend that the appellant has not provided the correct documents.

In the refusal letter it is not expressly confirmed (or denied) that the appellant has a right of residence, merely referring to it as “claimed”. At [16] the letter states that the decision made “does not attach any requirement for him to imminently leave the United Kingdom and does not place any restrictions on your claimed right of residence”.

Before me, it was not in dispute that the appellant has a right of residence as his wife was exercising her right to work in the United Kingdom as an Italian citizen.

I accept, as indeed does the appellant, that his rights of free movement could be restricted were a decision made, for example to remove him on the basis that his removal was conducive to the public good justified by reference to the factors set out in the Directive subject to the procedural considerations set out in Articles 27, 28 and 31 of the Directive.

The Directive does not permit a refusal to issue a residence card on public policy, public security or public health grounds. The Directive is expressed unambiguously in mandatory terms. It is also of note that the Directive places strict time limits on how long can be taken to issue a residence card. The issue of a residence card is an administrative matter.

Refusal to issue a residence card is not therefore a restriction on the right of free movement although I accept that in practice it may make exercise of that right difficult in practical terms.

While I accept that the Directive gives a right to Member States to restrict rights of free movement, and to remove people on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, I am not satisfied that it grants Member States the power to dispense with complying with the requirement to issue a residence card so long as the documentary evidential requirements are met.

I accept that the Secretary of State does have power under the EEA Regulations to refuse to issue a residence card on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, but what is in issue here is the rights under the EU Treaties and the Directive.

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there is any proper basis on which under the Directive or for that matter the EU Treaties that the Secretary of State has the right to refuse to issue a card as confirmation of the rights that a person holds. That is entirely different from the situation where someone’s rights of residence have been restricted, curtailed or cancelled on grounds of public policy, public security and so on, set out in Article 27(2). But the Secretary of State has not done this although she would appear to have the power to expel or remove the appellant, subject to any right of appeal.

Further, and in any event, such a decision would need to be proportionate and no proper basis appears is put forward as to why, if the Secretary of State accepts that an individual has the right of free movement, the means of them being able to vindicate that or confirmation of that should be denied them. While it may well be that, given the appellant’s convictions, his removal could be justified, the respondent had not sought to do so despite having the power to do so.

Accordingly, for these reasons I am satisfied that the decision made in this case was contrary to the appellant’s rights pursuant to the EU Treaties and I allow the appeal on that basis.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and I set it aside

I remake the decision by allowing the appeal on EU grounds.