Sarah Manzi v The Commissioners for HMRC

With the consent of the parties, the form of the hearing was V (video) using the Tribunal video hearing system. A face to face hearing was not held because it was expedient not to do so. I was provided with a Hearing Bundle of 196 pages and a High Income Child Benefit Charge (“HICBC”) Generic Bundle of 846 pages. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.

Mrs Sarah Manzi (“Mrs Manzi”) has been assessed to HICBC for tax years 2014/15 to 2019/20 inclusive. She appeals against the following:

Following the hearing, I noted, whilst considering the evidence and the submissions, that whilst Officer Young’s evidence addressed the ‘discovery’ of Mrs Manzi’s liability to HICBC, there was no evidence concerning the making of the assessment. Consequently, I gave HMRC the opportunity to make written submissions on (i) the making of the assessment and (ii) whether an assessment under s.29 (1) TMA can be made by someone other than the person making the ‘discovery’ (“the Validity Issue”). On 8 May 2024, I received HMRC’s written submissions along with eight annexes. This decision takes into account those submissions.

In all the circumstances, the issues for determination are:

As to the Hearing Bundle, it was notable that it did not contain telephone logs of any of the phone calls that were alleged to have taken place between Mrs Manzi and the Respondents. This omission was stark. First, because there was a disagreement between the parties concerning the telephone calls. Second, because Officer Young’s witness statement summarised a number of such telephone calls. She informed me that that this evidence came from her review of the Case Management System. Ms Serdari could not explain the omission of the telephone logs. In closing submissions, Ms Serdari suggested that the telephone logs could be provided by way of written submissions. I noted that cross-examination of all witnesses had closed but invited Ms Serdari to make an application to adduce the telephone logs if she wished. No such application was made. The hearing was concluded without sight of the telephone logs.

In addition to the Hearing Bundle and the HICBC Generic Bundle, I heard oral evidence from Mrs Manzi, Officer Young and Officer White. Mrs Manzi, who had been informed that she could ask questions of the Respondent’s’ witnesses, did not cross-examine either Officer Young or Officer White. Officer Young answered a number of my questions. Officer White’s witness statement dealt with the Respondents’ HICBC intervention process generally. It was not specific to this appeal. Accordingly, I had no questions for Officer White. Mrs Manzi was cross-examined by Ms Serdari and answered my questions. I am entirely satisfied that all of the witnesses were doing their best to assist the Tribunal.

On the basis of all of the evidence, I make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities.

At all material times, Mrs Manzi was paid PAYE. She was not within the Self-Assessment regime. Mrs Manzi received child benefit from 2005 until 2019. As between herself and her partner, Mrs Manzi was the higher earner.

In 2012, the Respondents, in preparation for the introduction of the HICBC, issued a number of press releases detailing the introduction of the HICBC and advising high income Child Benefit parents, being those whose Adjusted Net Income (“ANI”) exceeded £50,000, to register for Self-Assessment. Additionally, there was a body of information about the HICBC on the Respondents’ website. As Mrs Manzi’s earnings were below £50,000.00 at this time, she “…didn’t pay any attention to the new requirements” as they did not apply to her. Similar press releases were issued in 2014 but did not come to Mrs Manzi’s attention.

On 7 January 2013, HICBC was introduced. In brief, it is an income tax charge on individuals who receive Child Benefit, or whose partner’s received Child Benefit, and whose ANI, or whose partner’s ANI, exceeded £50,000.00 within a tax year. Where the recipient of Child Benefit and their partner both had an ANI in excess of £50,000.00, HICBC is charged on the partner with the higher ANI. An income tax charge of 1% of the Child Benefit received arises for every £100 by which the ANI of the person liable to HICBC exceeded £50,000.00. Accordingly, where the person’s ANI reached £60,000.00 in a tax year, the HICBC amounts to 100% of the Child Benefit received. A taxpayer whose ANI in a tax year exceeded £50,000.00, but who chose to continue to receive Child Benefit payments in that tax year has a legal obligation to notify chargeability to income tax under s.7 TMA if they have not received a notice to file a tax return under s.8 TMA, or to file a tax return if they received a notice to file under s.8 TMA.

Prior to the 2014/15 tax year, Mrs Manzi’s earnings were below £50,000.00. Mrs Manzi’s ANI was as set out in the table at paragraph 2 (1) above. Mrs Manzi was neither notified to make a Self-Assessment Tax Return (“SAR”) under s.8 TMA nor did she make a voluntary SAR under s.12D TMA. Accordingly, Mrs Manzi did not notify her chargeability to HICBC.

On 4 November 2019, the Respondents issued a ‘nudge letter’ to Mrs Manzi asking her to check if she was liable to the HICBC in the 2017/18 tax year and to check previous tax years. If the HICBC was due, the letter set out instructions for declaring the chargeability. It is agreed between the parties that, due to moving house, Mrs Manzi did not receive this letter.

On 3 December 2019, the Respondents issued a ‘final reminder letter’(“FRL”). This letter again invited Mrs Manzi to check if she was liable to the HICBC in the 2017/18 tax year and to check previous tax years. If the HICBC was due, the letter set out instructions for declaring the chargeability. Mrs Manzi received this letter via postal re-direction. This was the first point at which Mrs Manzi was alerted to her potential liability to the HICBC.

On 9 December 2019, Mrs Manzi telephoned the number on the FRL and spoke to Alex. Mrs Manzi was distressed by the FRL. She wanted to speak to an individual in order to receive reliable and up to date information. Alex told her not to worry because the FRL could be an error. I do not accept, as Mrs Manzi suggested, that Alex explained this error by reference to HMRC v Jason Wilkes [2020] UKFTT 256 (TC) (“Wilkes FTT”), as this appeal was not heard by the First-tier Tribunal until 12 March 2020, being three months later. However, I do accept that he informed her that the most important thing to do was to deregister for Child Benefit. He provided Mrs Manzi with the web address to deregister for Child Benefit and helped her with the login details. Mrs Manzi asked Alex about the next steps. He told her that she did not need to do anything further and that she would hear from the Respondents in due course. Alex did not tell Mrs Manzi that she needed to file a SAR or take any further steps to notify her chargeability to HICBC. To the extent that the advice from Alex was inconsistent with the FRL, Mrs Manzi understandably relied on Alex’s advice believing that advice from a human being was superior to and more up to date than that in the FRL. Accordingly, she did not file a SAR.

Immediately following the telephone call with Alex, Mrs Manzi set up an account on the Government Gateway and marked that she was no longer entitled to Child Benefit. She did not seek advice from an accountant. She undertook some limited online research so as to understand when the £50,000.00 limit came into force. She also spoke to her partner and friends. However, other than that, she followed Alex’s instructions and waited to be contacted by the Respondents. No contact was received. Mrs Manzi, in reliance on her conversation with Alex and, in particular, his statement that the FRL could be an error, assumed that the FRL was an error and that the matter had been resolved by de-registering for Child Benefit. She made no attempt to pursue the matter.

For the avoidance of doubt, the Respondents disputed that the telephone call on 9 December 2019 took place, having no record of it. Further, in closing submissions, Ms Serdari disputed that such advice would have been given over the telephone. In the absence of the telephone log, the only first-hand evidence was from Mrs Manzi who informed me that she had made this call and set out the contents of the call. I note that Officer Young’s witness statement dealt only with events from 28 May 2021 onwards, so postdating the disputed telephone call. I am satisfied that it is Mrs Manzi’s practice to telephone the Respondent on receipt of written communication, see paragraphs 21 and 25 below. Also, it was only with Alex’s assistance that Mrs Manzi was able, the same day, to set up her Government Gateway account and de-register for Child Benefit, as detailed in paragraph 15 above. As to Ms Sedari’s submission that no such advice would have been given over the telephone, there was no evidence from the Respondents as to what would or would not have been said over the telephone and, consequently, there was no evidential basis for this submission. Also, Ms Serdari had not put the point to Mrs Manzi in cross examination. In all the circumstances, I find that this telephone call took place and that Mrs Manzi was advised in the terms detailed in paragraph 14 above.

On 12 March 2020, the First-tier Tribunal heard Mr Wilkes appeal against income tax assessments raised under s.29 TMA in respect of the HICBC. On 15 June 2020, the First-tier Tribunal released its decision in Wilkes FTT.

On 26 May 2021, the Upper Tribunal heard the appeal in HMRC v Jason Wilkes [2021] UKUT 0150 (TCC) (“Wilkes UT”). The decision was released on 30 June 2021.

On 28 May 2021, Officer Young undertook a compliance check on Mrs Manzi and discovered that Mrs Manzi had not notified chargeability to the HICBC for the tax years 2014/15 to 2019/20 and that there was a loss of tax in these tax years.

On 1 June 2021, the Respondents wrote to Mrs Manzi stating that the HICBC may apply to her, that she had not registered to receive a SAR for the tax years ended 5 April 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 and that she owed HICBC in the sum of £10,480.00. The Respondents did not invite Mrs Manzi to complete a SAR as this was now a discovery position. This was the first communication Mrs Manzi had received from the Respondents since the telephone call with Alex on 9 December 2019.

On 10 June 2021, Mrs Manzi telephoned the Respondents. In this conversation, she disclosed her ANI for the relevant years. She disagreed with the Child Benefit calculation as she had deregistered on 9 December 2019. Accordingly, the Respondents recalculated Mrs Manzi’s liability to the HICBC for the tax year ending 5 April 2020 reducing the total to £9,930.00. The Respondents arranged to call Mrs Manzi back on 14 June 2021 to explain their findings and issue a new opening letter.

On 16 June 2021, the Respondents tried, unsuccessfully, to contact Mrs Manzi by telephone. They left a voicemail stating that they would try to call again on 17 June 2021 and, in default of making contact, updated correspondence would be issued, no such correspondence is in the Hearing Bundle.

Between 16 June 2021 and 18 October 2022, HMRC paused all work on HICBC due to the Upper Tribunal decision in Wilkes UT, which found that the Respondents had no power to make a discovery assessment in respect of the HICBC as Child Benefit was not an amount of income which should have been assessed to income tax. Instead, the HICBC is a free-standing charge to tax. In response, s.97 of the Finance Act 2022 was enacted amending s.29 TMA such that a discovery assessment can be issued for “an amount of income tax … [that] ought to have been assessed but has not been assessed.” Thereby, enabling HICBC to be assessed via discovery assessment. At no stage, did the Respondents inform Mrs Manzi in writing or at all either that her case was on hold or the reasons for that hold. In short, there was radio silence from the Respondents during this period.

On 10 October 2022, the Respondents wrote two letters to Mrs Manzi:

On 31 October 2022, Mrs Manzi telephoned the Respondents who informed her of the penalties. Mrs Manzi disputed the penalties and indicated her desire to appeal. The Respondents explained to Mrs Manzi that any appeal would need to challenge (i) the Assessments, (ii) the interest and (iii) the Penalties. Also, during this call Mrs Manzi confirmed that she had previously telephoned the Respondents in response to the FRL.

On 1 November 2022, the Respondents sent a closure letter to Mrs Manzi, six Notices of Assessment for the amounts set out in the table at Paragraph 2 (1) above, a SA Statement and a Notice of Penalty Assessment for the amounts set out in the table at Paragraph 2 (3) above.

On 28 November 2022, Mrs Manzi wrote to the Respondents appealing (i) the Assessments, (ii) the interest and (iii) the Penalties. In summary, the basis of Mrs Manzi’s appeal was that she was innocent as she was, until December 2019, ignorant of the law relating to the HICBC. In addition, she highlighted the precarious nature of her family’s finances, certain personal medical matters and the stress of the situation.

On 7 December 2022, the Court of Appeal released its decision in HMRC v Jason Wilkes [2022] EWCA Civ 1612 (“Wilkes CA”).

On 16 December 2022, the Respondents issued their View of the Matter letter upholding the Assessments and the Penalties.

On 12 January 2023, Mrs Manzi appealed to the Tribunal. The Respondents accept that the appeal is in time.

On 30 January 2023, the Respondents sent a Notice of amended Penalty Assessment, albeit the total sum claimed in penalties remained the same, £1,862.60.

On 19 July 2023, Mrs Manzi telephoned the Respondents and it was agreed to put Mrs Manzi’s account on hold pending determination of her appeal.

The relevant statutory provisions and authorities are not in dispute and, so far as relevant, are included as an Annex to this decision.

HMRC bears the burden of proof. This means that they must show that the assessments and the penalties are valid, in time and for the correct amounts. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. If they do so, the burden then shifts to Mrs Manzi to prove, also on the balance of probabilities, that:

The Assessments:

The Assessments have been raised pursuant to s.29 TMA, being HMRC’s discovery assessment powers. Following Wilkes CA, s.97 Finance Act 2022 (“s.97”) was enacted which amended s. 29 TMA. Specifically, s.29 TMA as amended provides for HICBC to be assessed by way of a discovery assessment where “an amount of income tax … ought to have been assessed but has not been assessed”. Further, s.97 provides that where a discovery assessment has been made to collect HICBC prior to tax year 2021/22 the provision is retrospective and the assessments are ‘protected assessments’, the protection is afforded to HMRC not the taxpayer. However, any such appeals, being those referable to tax years prior to 2021/22, are not protected if either, on a date prior to 30 June 2021, a notice of appeal was given to HMRC in respect of the assessment and the Wilkes basis of challenge was asserted in that appeal, s.97 (5), or, prior to 30 June 2021, a notice of appeal was given to HMRC in respect of the assessment, the appeal was the subject of a temporary pause which occurred prior to 27 October 2021, that temporary pause was notified to the tax payer in writing and “it is reasonable to conclude that the temporary pausing of the appeal occurred (wholly or partly) on the basis that [the Wilkes issue] is, or might be, relevant to the determination of the appeal”, s.97 (6, 8-9). In this case, the Assessments are protected assessments as the requirements in s.97 (5) and/or s.97 (6, 8-9) are not met.

As to the Validity Issue, HMRC bear the burden of establishing that they have discovered that an amount of income which ought to have been assessed to income tax has not been so assessed. In HMRC v Tooth [2021] UKSC 17, the Supreme Court held that s.29 (1) TMA operates by reference to the state of mind of a specific HMRC officer not by reference to HMRC’s collective knowledge. Accordingly, a discovery must be made by an individual officer. I am satisfied that on 28 May 2021 Officer Young made a discovery. In consequence thereof, s.29 (1) TMA allows Officer Young to make an assessment, see Tooth at [69 & 82]. However, Officer Young did not make the Assessments. Her involvement ceased following the letter dated 1 June 2021. In light of HMRC’s written submission, I am satisfied that the Assessments were made by Officer Markiewka on 1 November 2022. I am also satisfied that the Assessments were delegated actions pursuant to Officer Young’s discovery and in accordance with s.2(4) of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (“CRCA”). I note that the operation of s.2(4) CRCA was clearly considered in Tooth at [79]. Further and, in light of the case of David Beadle v HMRC [2019] UKUT 0101 (TCC), which considered s.30A TMA and I apply by analogy, I am satisfied that the fact that the Assessments identified the HICBC Team and not Officer Markiewka does not invalidate the Assessments. Therefore, I am satisfied that the Assessments are valid.

The Time Limits:

As to time limits, s. 34(1) TMA provides that HMRC may raise a HICBC discovery assessment at any time within 4 years of the end of the tax year to which it relates. However, HMRC can raise assessments within an extended period of 6 years of the year of assessment if the tax payer fails to take reasonable care to avoid not paying the HICBC, s.36(1) TMA. S..118 (5) TMA provides that “…,a loss of tax …is brought about carelessly by a person if the person fails to take reasonable care to avoid bringing about that loss or situation.” Further, HMRC can raise assessments within an extended period of 20 years of the year of assessment. However, s.118(2) TMA provides that the 20-year assessment provisions do not apply where the taxpayer establishes a reasonable excuse for the failure to notify their liability under s.7 TMA. Nonetheless, if the assessment is protected then HMRC will always have a period of 4 years in which to make a discovery assessment.

In this case, the Assessments cover the tax years from 2015/15 to 2019/20. HMRC submit that the assessments are made within the statutory time limits: those for 2018/19 to 2019/20 were made within the 4 years permitted by virtue of section 34 TMA, those for 2016/17 and 2017/18 were made within the 6 years permitted by s.36 (1) TMA subject to s.118 (5) TMA and those for 2014/15 and 2015/16 were made within the 20 years permitted by s.36 (1A) TMA subject to s.118 (2) TMA. I accept that the assessments for 2018/19 to 2019/20 were made within the 4 years permitted by s.34 TMA and, accordingly, they are valid assessments. The question for my consideration is whether or not, in light of s.118 (2) and/or (5) TMA, the remaining assessments were made in time.

I agree with the decision in Hextall v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 390 at [74] that no meaningful distinction can be drawn between ‘reasonable care’ and ‘reasonable excuse’. I also agree with the analysis in Brown v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 245 at [78] and adopt it here. Accordingly, in determining whether Mrs Manzi was careless, I assess her conduct by reference to what would be expected of a prudent and reasonable taxpayer in the same position as Mrs Manzi, that is to say considering Mrs Manzi’s ability and circumstances, HMRC v Hicks [2020] UKUT 12 TCC [120] (not cited to me). In considering whether Mrs Manzi had a reasonable excuse for her failure to notify her liability to HICBC, I must consider whether she had an excuse that is objectively reasonable, considering her attributes and circumstances. If Mrs Manzi satisfies me that she took reasonable care, then she will also have satisfied me that she had a reasonable excuse in the circumstances of this case and vice versa.

As to reasonable excuse, whether or not a person had a reasonable excuse is an objective test and "is a matter to be considered in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case" Rowland v HMRC (2006) STC (SCD)(“Rowland”) 536 at paragraph 18.  

In The Clean Car Company v C&E Commissioners [1991] VATTR 234, Medd QC set out the test to be applied when considering whether there is a reasonable excuse as follows:  

In Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 156 (“Perrin”) at paragraph 81, the Upper Tribunal provided guidance as to the correct approach to a reasonable excuse defence as follows:  

When considering a “reasonable excuse” defence, therefore, in our view the FTT can usefully approach matters in the following way:  

One situation that can sometimes cause difficulties is when the taxpayers asserted reasonable excuse is purely that he/she did not know of the particular requirement that has been shown to have been breached. It is a much-cited aphorism that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’, and on occasion this has been given as a reason why the defence of reasonable excuse cannot be available in such circumstances. We see no basis for this argument. Some requirements of the law are well known, simple and straightforward but others are much less so. It will be a matter of judgement for the FTT in each case whether it was objectively reasonable for the particular taxpayer, in the circumstances of the case, to have been ignorant of the requirement in question, and for how long. The Clean Car Co itself provides an example of such a situation.’”  

In summary, whether there is a reasonable excuse or not depends on the particular circumstances in which the failure occurred and the abilities of the person who failed. The standard by which this falls to be judged is that of a prudent and reasonable taxpayer, exercising reasonable foresight and due diligence, in the position of the taxpayer in question: David Collis v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 588 (TC) (“Collis”). What is a reasonable excuse for one person may not be a reasonable excuse for another. Finally, in respect of beliefs, I remind myself that the Upper Tribunal in Perrin concluded that for an honestly held belief to constitute a reasonable excuse, it must also be objectively reasonable for that belief to be held.   

Further, in Ashe v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 538 TC at [32-33] Judge Brown KC and Mr McBride summarised Judge Popplewell’s approach in Mark Goodall v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 18 (TC)) (“Goodall”) and in Leigh Jacques v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 331 (TC) as follows:

I apply the Perrin approach in considering whether or not Mrs Manzi had a reasonable excuse.

First, the relevant facts are that Mrs Manzi was an employee paid PAYE. She was not within the Self-assessment regime. At the time she applied for Child Benefit, the HICBC did not exist. She did not pay attention to the 2012 media campaign because her earnings were below £50,000. The 2014 media campaign did not come to her attention. She was not notified to make a SAR under s.8 TNA 1970. She was unaware of the requirement to notify her liability to HICBC and, consequently, did not make a voluntary SAR under s.12D TMA 1970.

Second, I accept that the facts relied on by Mrs Manzi are proven. In short, Mrs Manzi’s position is that her reasonable excuse is ‘ignorance of the law’.

Third, I must decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts amount to an objectively reasonable excuse and the time that reasonable excuse ceased. In so doing, I should ask myself “was what [Mrs Manzi] did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?” I have not found this an easy question to answer. I have given the question anxious consideration. On balance, I have decided that there was an objectively reasonable excuse namely that Mrs Manzi, in the circumstances of this case, was ignorant of the requirement to notify chargeability to HICBC and, as a result, failed to notify her chargeability. I find that that reasonable excuse ceased on receipt of the FRL which alerted Mrs Manzi to the possibility that she was required to notify chargeability to HICBC. Without undue delay, on 9 December 2019 Mrs Manzi telephoned the Respondents. I do not think that anything turns on the intervening 6-day period. Mrs Manzi would not have received the letter on the day it was dated, being 2 December 2019. A short period to digest the FRL and take actions is not unreasonable. As a result of the telephone call with Alex on 9 December 2019, Mrs Manzi had a further or additional reasonable excuse. Specifically, Alex advised her that she did not need to do anything else and that she would hear from the Respondents in due course. For the avoidance of doubt, she was not advised of the need to notify chargeability to HICBC. Quite the opposite. She was advised to do nothing and wait. Mrs Manzi was entitled to and did rely on this contemporaneous advice from a human being. This reasonable excuse continued until at least 1 June 2021 and, as a result, Mrs Manzi has a further or additional objectively reasonable excuse for failing to notify her chargeability through to 1 June 2021.

Fourth, this step is not applicable on the facts of this case as at 1 June 2021 the Respondents no longer required Mrs Manzi to complete a SAR. They did not invite her to do so because this was now a discovery position.

In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that Mrs Manzi had a reasonable excuse(s) for failing to notify her liability to HICBC. Accordingly, I am also satisfied that Mrs Manzi did not fail to take reasonable care as a prudent and reasonable tax payer, having the same state of knowledge and in the same circumstances, would have behaved the same way. As a result, the assessment for tax years 2014/15, 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18 were made out of time.

The Penalties:

As to the Penalties, Mrs Manzi failed to give notice of her chargeability to the HICBC as required by s.7 (1) (a) TMA. By so doing, she failed to comply with a relevant obligation and is liable to a penalty in accordance with Paragraph 1, Sch 41 FA08.

The Penalties have been correctly calculated on the basis that the behaviour was non-deliberate but prompted, Paragraph 5, Sch 41 FA 08. The standard amount of such a penalty is 30% of the potential lost revenue (“PLR”), Paragraph 6 (1) (c), Sch 41 FA 08. The PLR equates to the figures in the HICBC due column in the table at Paragraph 2 (1) above. The Penalties have been charged at the minimum percentages provided for by Paragraphs 12 and 13, Sch 41 FA 08 to reflect the timing and quality of Mrs Manzi’s disclosures.

Accordingly, the burden of proof passes to Mrs Manzi to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that she has a reasonable excuse such that liability to the Penalties does not arise, Paragraph 20, Sch 41 FA.

Save that Paragraph 20 (2) (a-c), Sch 41 FA 08 sets out three situations that are incapable of constituting a reasonable excuse, there is no statutory definition of what constitutes a reasonable excuse.

For the purpose of the Assessment time limits, I have found that Mrs Manzi had a reasonable excuse for her failure to notify HMRC of her liability to HICBC. Accordingly and for the same reasons, I also find that Mrs Manzi had a reasonable excuse for the purposes of Schedule 41 and the penalty provisions. Therefore no penalties arise.

As to special reduction, in light of my decision on reasonable excuse no penalties arise and, consequently, it is unnecessary to proceed to consider special reduction, Paragraph 14(1), Sch 41 FA 08.

The Interest:

As to interest, at the outset of the hearing I explained to Mrs Manzi that there is no legal right of appeal against interest, which is chargeable under s.101 (3) and Sch 53, Paragraph 3 of the Finance Act 2009 from the date tax should have been paid and continues to accrue until the date the tax is paid in full. I informed Mrs Manzi that I had no discretion to determine that interest should not be payable, HMRC v Neil and Megan Gretton [2012] UKUT 261 (TCC) (“Gretton”). Also, by analogy with the position of penalties, I had no power to discharge or adjust the interest on the grounds of unfairness, HMRC v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) (“Hok”). I noted (and the Respondents did not disagree) that any interest referable to an assessment that was successfully appealed, would fall away. Accordingly, there is no interest on the assessments for tax years 2014/15 - 2017/18 inclusive as they are out of time, but the assessments for 2018/19 and 2019/20 carry (and continue to carry) interest. I refer Mrs Manzi to HMRC’s View of the Matter Letter, dated 16 December 2022, and the possibility of making an ‘interest objection’ once all the tax owed is paid.

In summary:

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.