Dermot McMeekin v The Commissioners for HMRC

In 2017, HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) informally requested information from Mr McMeekin relating to his domicile and worldwide income, but Mr McMeekin did not provide that information. On 18 February 2020, HMRC issued Information Notices under Finance Act 2008, Sch 36 (“Sch 36 Notice” or “Notice”) for seven of the eight years 2011-12 through to 2018-19, the exception being 2014-15.

Mr McMeekin appealed against the Notices on the grounds that the information was not “reasonably required” because he was not domiciled in the UK (“the Notices Appeal”), and that his domicile should be decided as part of the Notices Appeal.

Mr McMeekin’s barrister, Mr Vaines, had put forward essentially identical submissions in another case, that of Mr Robert Perlman. A preliminary hearing of Mr Perlman’s case took place before me on 29 April 2021 and 5 May 2021, and the judgment was issued on 22 June 2021, see Perlman v HMRC [2021] UKFTT 219 (TC) (“Perlman”).

In Perlman, I decided that the FTT had no jurisdiction to decide Mr Perlman’s domicile as part of a hearing against a Sch 36 Notice, and that if that conclusion was wrong, the FTT should nevertheless decline to exercise the jurisdiction.

On 19 August 2021, I gave Mr Perlman permission to appeal that decision to the Upper Tribunal. The Notices Appeal made by Mr McMeekin has been stayed until 28 days after the final resolution of Perlman. Mr Vaines, on behalf of Mr McMeekin, has agreed that this stay is appropriate, saying:

Of the seven years for which Notices were issued, the last four are under enquiry and the status of the tax year 2014-15 is disputed: HMRC’s position is that it is also under enquiry and Mr Vaines disagrees.

On 30 March 2021, HMRC issued discovery assessments for the three tax years 2011-12 through to 2013-14 because they would otherwise have been out of time to assess those years under the “Requirement to Correct” (“RTC”) provisions in Finance (No 2) Act 2017. HMRC also issued an assessment for 2014-15 on a precautionary basis, in other words in case Mr Vaines was right, and 2014-15 was not under enquiry. On 13 April 2021, Mr McMeekin appealed against those assessments (“the Assessments Appeal”). One of his grounds of appeal was that the quantum was excessive.

On 5 July 2021, the Assessments Appeal was stayed pending the outcome of the preliminary hearing in Perlman. On 10 September 2021, I directed that the parties provide submissions as to the next steps, and that the stay remain in place pending my consideration of those submissions.

Both parties made submissions on whether the Assessments Appeal should be stayed behind Perlman, and whether it should be stayed behind the Notices Appeal. In summary, Mr Vaines submitted that the stay be lifted and the Assessments Appeal proceed to a hearing, and Mr Hilton submitted on behalf of HMRC that the Assessments Appeal should be stayed behind the Notices Appeal.

For the reasons set out in the rest of this decision notice, I agree with Mr Hilton, and have directed that the Assessments Appeal be stayed until 28 days after the final resolution of the Notices Appeal.

The issue I have to decide is therefore whether:

Mr Vaines submitted that the Assessments Appeal should proceed now, for the following reasons:

Mr Hilton pointed out that there were two errors in Mr Vaines’ submissions:

Mr Hilton also said that Mr Vaines was wrong to submit that the Tribunal could only stay an appeal in “exceptional circumstances” in reliance on “a 50-year-old first instance VAT Tribunal decision”. Instead, the correct test to be adopted in relation to an application for a stay in the absence of agreement between the parties was set out by the Court of Session in RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH v HMRC [2007] STC 814 (“RBS Deutschland”) at [22], which reads:

Mr Hilton added that weight must therefore be attached to the principles of “material assistance” and “expediency”, and that the Tribunal’s key task is to ensure that the case is dealt with in accordance with the overriding objective. He added that although Rule 2 (2)(e) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Tribunal Rules”) says that compliance with the overriding objective includes avoiding delay, this is subject to the rider that delay is to be avoided only “so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues”. On the facts of this case, proper consideration of the issues requires that the Notices Appeal be decided before the Assessments Appeal.

Mr Hilton set out the following reasons why this was the case:

I begin by considering Mr Vaines’s submission that each tax year should be treated separately, and then consider and apply the principles relating to the granting or refusing of a stay.

Mr Hilton is clearly correct that three of the four years are covered by the Assessments Appeal. Years 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 are also the subject of the Notices Appeal. The only year for which HMRC have issued a discovery assessment, but for which there is no Sch 36 Notice is 2014-15.

As Mr Vaines says, income tax and capital gains tax are charged by reference to separate tax years. As a result, any factual determination made in relation to one tax year is not binding in relation to a later tax year. Whether a person is UK domiciled is a question of fact, and thus Mr Vaines is also correct that the position could be different as between one year and another.

However, neither party sought to argue that Mr McMeekin’s domicile was different for any of the years in issue. Mr McMeekin’s case is that he was non-domiciled for all the years, whereas HMRC have issued the assessments on the basis that he was domiciled in each of those years. On the basis of the facts as both parties understand them to be, either Mr McMeekin is domiciled for all of the years, or he is not. It follows that there is no basis for distinguishing one year from another.

For the same reason, the fact that there is a single year (2014-15) for which HMRC have not issued a Sch 36 Notice does not change the position. The relevant period runs from 2011 through to 2019, and the 2014-15 year sits in the middle of that period. Neither party has sought to argue that Mr McMeekin’s domicile was different for that year.

The Tribunal’s power to stay appeals is given by Rule 5(3)(j) of the Tribunal Rules. Rule 2(3) reads:

It is therefore clear that a decision by a tribunal to stay a case must give effect to the overriding objective. I also agree with Mr Hilton that the relevant case law authority is RBS Deutschland, and that I must therefore decide whether the outcome of the Notices Appeal will be of material assistance in determining the Assessments Appeal, and whether it is expedient to direct the stay.

There are the following possible outcomes for the Notices Appeal:

Either outcome will put the FTT in a better position to determine the Assessments Appeal, because it will have been provided with:

If, on the other hand, the Assessments Appeal proceeds without the assistance provided by the Notices Appeal, the FTT would decide Mr McMeekin’s domicile and the quantum of the assessments on the basis of information he had chosen to provide, even though there is a live and open question as to whether further information was reasonably required to determine his liability for three of the four years.

There is thus no doubt that the outcome of the Notices Appeal will be of material assistance in deciding three of the four years which form part of the Assessments Appeal.

In R (oao McCormack) v St Edmund Campion Catholic School [2012] EWHC 3928 (Admin), Beatson J considered the meaning of the word “expedient”. He first agreed with counsel that it was to be characterised as “subjective and not hard edged” and continued:

I respectfully agree with that definition. In RBS Deutschland the word “expedient” is clearly not used in the deprecative sense, but instead means “convenient and practical”, “suitable or appropriate” and “conducive to advantage in general or to a general purpose, suitable to the circumstances of the case”.

In considering whether granting the stay is suitable to the circumstances of Mr McMeekin’s case, I take into account Stephen Price at [10], where Judge Mosedale said, in a passage later approved by Judge Sinfield in Andreas Michael [2015] UKFTT 0577 (TC) at [29], as well as by other Tribunal judges:

Thus, the normal position is that Sch 36 Notices operate at a preliminary investigative stage, which may be followed by the closure of enquiries, the issuance of assessments and taxpayer appeals. However, in Mr McMeekin’s case, the events relating to years 2011-12 to 2013-14 have not followed that normal course. Although HMRC issued the Notices on 18 February 2020, after repeated attempts to obtain the information and documents on a voluntary basis and well over a year before the relevant assessment time limits, Mr McMeekin then appealed the Notices and his appeal was delayed by the same procedural challenges as were later decided in Perlman, and that in turn has been appealed to the UT..

If the Assessments Appeal is stayed behind the Notices Appeal, the Sch 36 process will precede the FTT’s determination of Mr McMeekin’s appeal against HMRC’s assessments, so putting him as far as possible in the normal position. In my judgment, that outcome is expedient – in other words, “suitable and appropriate” and “suitable to the circumstances of the case”.

Mr Vaines did not suggest that the appeal for 2014-15 should be separated from the rest of the assessments, on the basis that it was the only one for which HMRC had not issued a Sch 36 Notice. As the key point in issue is the same, namely whether Mr McMeekin was domiciled in the UK, I find that it is expedient to hear the appeals against all four assessments at the same time, and thus that Mr McMeekin’s appeal against the 2014-15 assessment should be stayed behind the Notices Appeal.

Rule 2(1) of the Tribunal Rules provides that the purpose of the overriding objective is “to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly”. Rule 2(2) says:

The parties’ submissions under this heading focused on subparagraph (e), namely delay. Staying the Assessments Appeal will of course cause delay. However, the period of delay will be significantly less than that submitted by Mr Vaines, because as Mr Hilton pointed out, there is no right of onward appeal against the FTT’s judgment in relation to a Sch 36 Notice. In addition, if Perlman is upheld, the Notices Appeal will fall away, given Mr McMeekin’s current grounds of appeal.

In my judgment, staying the Assessments Appeal will allow for “proper consideration of the issues”, whereas lifting the stay would not be in the interests of justice. That is because, for the reasons set out at §30-33 above, staying the Assessments Appeal allows the question as to whether Mr McMeekin has to provide further information and documents to be decided before the substantive appeal. Moreover, one of Mr McMeekin’s grounds of appeal against the assessments is that the quantum is too high. If Mr McMeekin is required to comply with the Sch 36 Notices, he will be required to provide the information and documents relating to that quantum.

For the reasons set out above, I direct that the Assessments Appeal is stayed until 28 days after the determination of the Notices Appeal.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the preliminary decision. Any party dissatisfied with this preliminary decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.