DSV Air & Sea Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC

DSV say that NB is a witness with a detailed technical knowledge dealing with a difficult subject who sought at all times to act appropriately to declare the correct amount of duty. He followed CHIEF which declared no duty and so no duty was apparently payable but his doing so was a genuine error.

From August 2018 when he became fully aware that duty was payable, he still had difficulty in obtaining the commodity code information and based on further incorrect advice, the last two shipments showed the incorrect amount of duty payable.

DSV say that MG admitted that Assessment 1was made on the basis that GWY were holding the goods then subsequently stated that the assessment was based on the importation of the goods DSV say the tribunal should disregard this assessment.

DSV say that there are no valid assessments and accordingly no liability to duty on the part of the DSV.

The assessments which HMRC raised against GWY were raised under s. 12(1A) Finance Act 1994 (“FA 1994”) which was confirmed by HMRC in the review conclusion letter. No assessments have been raised against DSV.

The power to make assessments to Excise Duty is given by s. 12, FA1994, which says (so far as material):

DSV does not dispute that the Assessments 1 and 2 were made within the time limits set out in s. 12(4) of FA 1994 and that they were notified to GWY as the person liable to pay the duty.

Section 12 of FA 1994 operates as follows. Both section12(1) and section 12(1A) say that HMRC may assess: “… where it appears to the Commissioners … that that person is a person from whom any amount has become due in respect of any duty of excise…”

Section 12(3) says “Where an amount has been assessed as due from any person and notified in accordance with this section, it shall, subject to any appeal under section 16 below, be deemed to be an amount of the duty in question due from that person and recovered accordingly…”

The effect of the section is to permit HMRC to turn its view that a person is or may be liable to pay excise duty into a deemed situation in which the person is treated for all purposes as so liable.

As GWY did not appeal against either assessment, GWY was deemed to owe the amounts of duty shown on the assessments. That deemed situation must be treated as Marshall v. Kerr [1993] STC 360 at 366 CA (approved in the House of Lords at [1995] AC 164) where Peter Gibson J. said:

In the absence of anything further, GWY, and only GWY, must be treated as the person who owes the duty referred to in the assessments.

Section 1 of the Finance (No 2) Act 1992 (“F(2)A 1992”) (which implements Article 7 of Directive 2008/118/EC – “the Directive”) enables HMRC to make regulations to fix excise duty points, to specify the person or persons on whom the liability to pay duty is to fall at the excise duty point and to specify whether a liability is joint and several. So far as material, the section says:

The Regulations are the relevant regulations. Regulation 12 says: -

This is the Regulation under which HMRC are purporting to make DSV jointly and severally liable with GWY.

Article 8 of the Directive (which the Regulations implement) says who is liable to pay excise duty that has become chargeable. Paragraph 1(d) (which is implemented by Regulation 12) says:

Paragraph 2 of Article 8 says:

DSV does not dispute that, where a person is liable under Regulation 12(1), to pay excise duty, another person may also be liable under Regulation 12(2) if involved in an irregular importation. That is clear from both the Directive and from Regulation 12.

Nor does DSV dispute that Regulation 12(3) provides that where more than one person is involved in the irregular importation, each is jointly and severally liable.

DSV say that HMRC have taken the position that they need not assess DSV but can simply notify DSV of joint and several liability as though the operation of Regulations 12(2) and (3) requires no more than an administrative act on their part.

The flaw in that position is demonstrated by the structure of the Directive and of Regulation 12. Regulation 12(1) (under which HMRC assessed GWY) provides that liability attaches to the person who declares the goods or on whose behalf they are declared upon importation.

As DSV declared the goods on behalf of GWY, it would have been open to HMRC to assess both DSV and GWY under Regulation 12(1), but HMRC did not adopt that course. They assessed only GWY.

Regulation 12(2) deals with persons whose actions are not covered by Regulation 12(1) but who had some other involvement in an irregular importation. An obvious example would be a person who imports excise goods without making any form of declaration or assists someone who does so – for example, a lorry driver who drives a cargo through a port of entry where another person has made the declaration or a person who loads or unloads that cargo from the lorry.

Accordingly, it is perfectly possible for a person to be liable to excise duty under Regulation 12(2) and not be liable to excise duty under Regulation 12(1) and it is also possible for more than one person to be liable under Regulation 12(2) with none of those persons being liable under Regulation 12(1).

It accordingly makes no sense for an assessment to be required to fix liability under Regulation 12(1) (which HMRC do not appear to deny) but not to be required for fixing liability under Regulation 12(2). It is clear from the purported notification of joint and several liability that HMRC’s position is that DSV was involved in irregular importations.

However, there can be no conceptual difference between Regulations 12(1) and (2) as regards the machinery required to turn HMRC’s view that a person is liable to pay duty into an enforceable debt due to the Crown. If that step requires an assessment as regards Regulation 12(1) it must do so for Regulation 12(2).

The machinery for doing that is in FA 1994 and there is nothing in Part I of F(2)A 1992 that provides to the contrary or confers a power on HMRC to override that machinery.

Regulation 12(3) builds upon Regulation 12(2) by making it clear that each person involved in an irregular importation is jointly and severally liable to pay the duty, permitting HMRC to assess multiple parties under Regulation 12(2).

It cannot be argued that F(2)A 1992 or Regulation 12 dispense with the need to assess. A power to make delegated legislation may not be used to amend primary legislation without clear authority, which will usually be express but might exceptionally be implied. See Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation (2020) at 13.2(1).

In any event, there is nothing in the Regulations, express or implied, that purports to override the assessment machinery in cases to which Regulation 12 applies.

Article 9 of the Directive makes it clear that Excise Duty is to be levied and collected according to the procedure laid down by each Member State, so there is nothing in that Directive to suggest that Community law requires or permits a departure from that procedure.

It is noteworthy that in Canmi Limited v. HMRC [2020] UKFTT 0016 (TC), HMRC raised 35 assessments against an import agent in respect of alleged joint and several liability under Regulation 12 (see paragraphs [5] and [10] of the report) and apparently did not rely on Regulation 12 alone.

By way of alternative, Assessment 1 on its face assesses the Product held at GWY’s premises on 30 November 2018 and seized by HMRC on that date. That assessment is accordingly on its true construction an assessment in respect of a release for consumption under Regulation 6(1)(b), arising when goods: “are held outside a duty suspension arrangement and UK excise duty on those goods has not been paid ...”.

The persons liable in such a case are specified in Regulation 10: “(1) The person liable to pay the duty when excise goods are released for consumption by virtue of Regulation 6(1)(b) … is the person holding the excise goods at that time. (2) Any other person involved in the holding of the excise goods is jointly and severally liable to pay the duty with the person specified in paragraph (1)”.

As there is no evidence that DSV has had any involvement in the holding of the Product at GWY’s premises, DSV cannot be liable under Regulation 10. Nor can purported liability under Regulation 12 be prayed in support of GWY’s primary liability under Regulation 10. See B & M Retail v R&CC [2016] STC 2456 at paragraph [137]:

There is no definition of “irregular” or of “irregular importation” in the Directive, F(2)A 1992 or the Regulations. The word “irregularity” occurs in Regulations 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 80, 83 to 85 and is defined for specific purposes in Articles10 and 38 of the Directive.

Neither definition sheds any direct light on the degree of knowledge or dishonesty that is required for there to be an irregular importation under Article 7 2. (d) or Article 8 1. (d) of the Directive or Regulation 12.

In DSV’s skeleton argument it referred to HMRC v. Perfect [2019] EWCA Civ 465, (“Perfect 2019”) where the Court of Appeal referred to the CJEU the question as to whether a person in possession of excise goods who did not know and had no reason to suspect that the goods had become chargeable to excise duty in the Member State was liable to pay excise duty as a person holding the goods (and whether the answer was different if the person did not know that he was in possession of excise goods). DSV said that pending the decision of the CJEU, the correct approach is to treat an innocent agent as not holding excise goods. See Dawson's (Wales) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2019] UKUT 296 (TCC).

At the hearing reference was made to the relevant CJEU decision in Case C-279/19 The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. WR EU: C: 221:473 and following that judgement to The Commissioners for Her Majesties Revenue and Customs v. Martin Glenn Perfect [2022] EWCA Civ 330. (“Perfect 2022”).

Perfect 2022 stated that the CEJU decision had “binding force on and in the United Kingdom as it was a reference from a United Kingdom Court and Tribunal made before the end of 2020.

Lord Justice Newey [at 18] stated

DSV say that this case can be distinguished from the circumstances of a lorry driver holding goods on which no duty has been paid and where there is a strict liability. This is not analogous to the circumstances where a professional organisation, engaged in the process of declaring the goods on entry, honestly attempts to declare the correct duty to someone who does not know whether duty is payable or not, as was the case with the lorry driver.

DSV made efforts from the outset to declare the correct amount of duty and relied on a system to do so, which initially showed that no duty was payable. This is different from someone who has no right to or interest in the goods and is not aware that they are subject excise duty or if so aware, is not aware they have become chargeable to excise duty.

In Canmi v. HMRC [2020] UKFTT 16 (TC) the Tribunal refused an application to stay proceedings pending the CJEU decision in the Perfect 2019.

Canmi was an importer of alcohol into the UK and was assessed on a joint and several liability basis on unpaid excise duty in terms of Regulations 6 (1) (d) and 12. Duty arose as a result of the wrong duty code being submitted to HMRC on form C88 to CHIEF.

In Canmi, the Appellant conceded that the entry of an incorrect code on form C88 when importing beer was irregular for the purposes of Regulation 12, the only issue between the parties being whether the appellant in that case was involved in irregular importation. The Tribunal took the view that the decision in Perfect 2019 could be relevant to a Regulation 12 case. The Judge said, at [32]

Canmi referred to two Court of Appeal Criminal Division cases, R. v. Taylor [2013] EWCA Crim 1151 and R. v. Tatham [2014] EWCA Crim 226.

In Taylor, the Court of Appeal had to consider Regulation 13(1) of the Tobacco Products Regulations 2001. Regulation 13(1) of those regulations (now repealed and subsumed within the Regulations) said:

The Court said, as regards that at [31]:

In Tatham, the Court of Appeal said at [23]

By analogy with those cases, a person who is unaware that goods are subject to a duty of excise – and in particular one who takes steps to discover whether or not they are dutiable and, as a result of the steps taken, honestly believes them not to be dutiable - is in a similar position. He should not be regarded as having been “involved” in an irregular importation for the purposes of Regulation 12(2).

HMRC, via the “Route One” entry clearance requirements, had all of the documentation supporting the entries made by DSV on form C88. Those documents, in several places, described the Product as “Cooking Wine”. DSV took steps to discover whether the Product was subject to excise duty. The evidence of NB shows that DSV made efforts from the outset to ascertain the customs classification and excise duty status of the Product and relied on a customs declaration system produced by a major software provider that appears on HMRC’s list. That system did not show that the Product was subject to excise duty. Nor did HMRC’s online trade tariff service.

Given that the information provided both by HMRC’s online trade tariff service and by the software provider did not show that the Product was subject to excise duty, DSV was no more “involved” in an irregular importation than the defendant in Taylor was “holding” the tobacco.

If HMRC are correct that they can collect tax from a person to whom they serve a notification of joint and several liability without serving a notification, then there is no requirement for them to notify the person they are jointly and severally liable.

GWY were holding the goods which were seized but this was later retracted and changed to importation. DSV say there are differences between the details of Assessment 1 and Assessment 2 and there are differences in the methodology.

DSV say that the key words are “released for consumption”. You can have more than one excise point usually the earliest but HMRC have chosen a later date. Regulation 6 (1) (b) says that the person holding at the time is responsible and that is GWY. It might not have mattered to MG because GWY was still in the firing line but there is no evidence that DSV had any involvement in holding the goods.

DSV cannot be liable under Regulation 10 and there is no cross-reference between Regulation 12 (importation) and Regulation 10 (holding) as if this is an assessment on GWY then DSV cannot be liable. DSV refer to B&M, the product retailer who was the holder of the excise goods and where there was an irregular importation but not by them. This was due by someone else who failed to pay the duty, but HMRC found the goods on BLM’s premises.

If persons are involved in an irregular importation but not in holding, their involvement in irregular importation cannot link them to a joint and several liability because of holding.

DSV say that HMRC require an irregular importation to prove regulation 12 and, therefore, joint and several liability.

Advice was not given to GWY and even if it was, no liability attaches to DSV. DSV researched the matter and that is a matter of the contractual arrangements between DSV and GWY. The fact of whether or not there is an indemnity is similarly a commercial consideration for both GWY and DSV and does not link DSV to GWY’s liability.

The Regulations were in 2010 and FA 1994 did not deal with how Section 12 FA 1994 operates. DSV say an assessment is needed in terms of both section 12(1) and 12(1)(a) FA 1994.

DSV say HMRC guidance is not law and however long-standing nor how many times challenged it may still be wrong. DSV say HMRC did not follow its own guidance in Canmi where the importer, the appellant, claimed to be an “innocent agent”.

A right to appeal the notification is not in itself relevant but instead it is a procedural requirement that HMRC still needed to raise an assessment under section 12, and this is required for secondary and primary liability.

DSV the say that HMRC could have assessed them, and it is not the case that they could only assess under section 12(1).

If HMRC are of the opinion that the liability arises then under FA 1994 section 12(1)(a) HMRC can turn it into an assessment.

Notification is no effect in law because it is not sufficient to fix liability because an assessment is required.

DSV agreed that the notice is not an assessment, but it could be in appropriate circumstances

DSV referred to the policy in B&M where HMRCS say they assessed at the earliest stage. DSV say that is not what HMRC did with Assessment 1. HMRC only assessed on one date and the difference between the forms of Assessment 1 and Assessment 2 confirmed this anomaly. Just because HMRC say they assess at the earliest date does not mean they did so assess.

DSV say there was no proof that the assessment was correct and was only based on MG’s admission.

DSV said there is no evidence of irregularities. NB entered the calculation as he thought it ought to be entered and he had advice from the internal officers of DSV.

In relation to Assessments 1 and 2 there is a clear line of authority, dating from before the relevant imports in this case, explaining that cooking wine, the Product, is chargeable to excise duty (see Répertoire Culinaire Ltd v HMRC (Case C-163/09) at [23] and [27]; HMRC v Asiana [2014] UKUT 0489 (TCC) at [5], [10] and [22]; and HMRC v Repertoire Culinaire Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 1845 at [19]).

HMRC say that the first import to which the appeal relates occurred on 17 October 2016, with further relevant imports occurring until 6 June 2018. Excise duty was not paid on the majority of importations and where it was paid, the incorrect amount was paid.

The term “made-wine” is defined at s.1(5) of the ALDA 1979: “any liquor which is of a strength exceeding 1.2 per cent and which is obtained from the alcoholic fermentation of any substance or by mixing a liquor so obtained or derived from a liquor so obtained with any other liquor or substance but does not include wine, beer, spirits or cider”.

It is not in dispute that the Product was chargeable to excise duty and that the correct amount of excise duty was not paid.

HMRC’s power to raise assessments in respect of excise duty is set out at s.12 FA 1994. For the purposes of this appeal, the applicable time limit for HMRC raising the Assessments is within “the end of the period of one year beginning with the day on which evidence of facts, sufficient in the opinion of HMRC to justify the making of the assessment, comes to their knowledge…”

By Regulation 6(1)(d) of the Regulations excise goods are released for consumption in the UK at the time when the goods are, amongst other things, charged with duty at importation unless they are immediately placed under a duty suspension arrangement.

Regulation 12 explains who is liable to pay duty:

DSV’s initial Grounds of Appeal raised the following grounds:

Grounds 2 and 3 misconstrue the nature of HMRC’s decisions that are under challenge.

HMRC’s email dated 22 September 2020, attaching the letter dated 17 September 2020, was not an assessment to excise duty. Instead, it was a notification to DSV that HMRC considered DSV to be joint and severally liable in respect of the Assessments. To that end, HMRC agree with DSV in respect of Ground 2: the notification on 22 September 2020 was not an assessment.

HMRC’ position in this regard is consistent with their published guidance (underlining added):

It follows that Ground 3 does not arise, at least as far as it refers to s.12(4) of the FA 1994. This is because Ground 3 is premised on the basis that an assessment was raised on 22 September 2020. That is not correct – there was no assessment on that date.

However, DSV appears also to advance an argument under Ground 3 that HMRC’s “delay in notifying DSV of such liability was of sufficient length to render the assessments raised against GWY and the Notification nullities as regards DSV”. This is incorrect:

By Ground 1, DSV argues that the Assessments were not valid, at least in relation to DSV, and DSV’s “purported joint and several liability is accordingly of no effect”.

DSV contends that the Assessments were not “valid as regards DSV” but if that is seeking to suggest that HMRC should have assessed DSV then the argument is misconceived. It is no part of HMRC’s case that DSV was assessed (or that they needed to be). Instead, the Assessments were issued to GWY because GWY (as the importer) had primary responsibility to pay the outstanding excise duty.

By law, DSV is jointly and severally liable for unpaid excise duty in relation to the imports. Nothing in law requires HMRC to raise an assessment addressed to DSV. It assessed the unpaid excise duty in an assessment addressed to GWY.

In response to DSV’s submission that s.1(4) of F(2)A 1992 does not permit HMRC to make regulations that alter the assessment/notification procedure in FA 1994, HMRC say that F(2)A 1992 predates FA 1994 and does not contend that the Regulations amend the assessment/notification procedure in FA 1994 and in any event that procedure doesn’t apply in relation to DSV’s joint and several liability.

The Regulations were made under s.1 of F(2)A 1992 which empowered HMRC to fix duty points at s.1(1), specify the person or persons on whom the liability to pay duty falls at s.1(2)(a) and specify whether liability is joint and several at s.1(2)(b).

Regulation 6 defines a duty-point arising when goods are released for consumption in the UK as occurring: (i) when the goods are held outside a duty suspension arrangement and excise duty is unpaid (“holding”, regulation 6(1)(b)); and (ii) at importation unless the goods are immediately placed under duty suspension (“importing”, regulation 6(1)(d)).

In relation to holding: (i) the “holder” of the goods is liable (regulation 10(1)); and (ii) another person can be jointly and severally liable “to pay the duty with the person specified in paragraph (1)”. Accordingly:

In relation to importing:

In any event, the Assessments were clearly valid because they related to unpaid excise duty and, in this appeal, it is not disputed that GWY paid the incorrect amount of excise duty. In addition, the Assessments were raised within the applicable statutory time-limit of one year: HMRC did not receive purchase invoices in relation to all the relevant imports until early July 2019.

DSV can appeal to the FTT from a notification informing it that it is being held jointly and severally liable. On appeal to the FTT, DSV can argue, amongst other things, that: (i) an error has been made in assessing the amount of excise duty due; (ii) DSV is not liable for the duty contained within the assessments (for example because the import is not “irregular”).

By Ground 4, DSV argues that there was no “irregular importation” of the Product because the failure to account for the correct amount of excise duty did not involve dishonesty. This is incorrect:

DSV say that Regulation 12(2) deals with persons whose actions are not covered by Regulation 12(1) but who had some other involvement in an irregular importation. HMRC say that there is no reason a person’s actions might not make them liable under both Regulation 12(1) and Regulation 12(2).

HMRC say that it makes no sense to require an assessment of unpaid excise duty in a document addressed to DSV when there has already been an assessment of the same duty in a document addressed to GWY. DSV does not need to be assessed to “fix liability”. Regulation 12(3) provides that DSV is jointly liable and that effectively ‘fixes’ DSV’s liability.

An assessment is not “needed” so that DSV has a right of appeal to the FTT, because it is common ground that DSV can bring an appeal. There is, however, a need to establish the amount of excise duty that is unpaid and that was done in the assessment that was addressed to GWY.

S.12(1A) of the FA1994 provides that HMRC may assess the amount of duty due from a person and notify them. It does not say that HMRC must assess (and HMRC did not need to assess DSV because Regulation 12(3) already provides that DSV is jointly and severally liable in respect of the unpaid excise duty).

S.12(3) of the FA 1994 deals with the situation where the same person is assessed and notified which does not apply. That does not apply here and legal principles about deeming provisions therefore do not apply.

HMRC say the case of Canmi should be considered with a degree of caution as the Judge was dealing with an application for a stay [at 3 and 4] and not about an alleged “need” for an assessment. The precise mechanism by which the taxpayer was being held liable is not described in detail. HMRC followed the same procedure in Canmi as it has here by assessing ‘primary’ liability and notifying ‘secondary’ liability.

The Regulations are not purporting to amend primary legislation and the Regulations are made under the F(2)A 1992 which predates the FA 1994.

HMRC cannot collect tax without serving a notification. Commencing recovery proceedings through a civil claim requires notification. In any event, if HMRC failed to follow its policy in relation to notifications then this might provide a ground for a public law challenge.

DSV argues that assessments were properly raised in respect of GWY but those assessments do not impact DSV. If that is correct, the notification letter sent to DSV can have no legal effect and it is unclear what the purpose of an FTT appeal would be. DSV’s argument would be more suited to defend an attempt by HMRC to enforce, through a civil claim, a joint and several notification.

DSV argues that, in relation to the goods seized from GWY’s premises, the duty point arises as a result of being held outside duty suspension. This is misconceived because it is:

The importations were “irregular” because excise duty that was payable on the goods was not paid and therefore the goods were declared for release without the collection of excise duty that was due, see Canmi [at 12].

HMRC say for an importation to be “irregular” it does not require a “degree of knowledge or dishonesty, the question is whether an importation was “irregular” is in accordance with the natural meaning of that word.

HMRC say that Perfect 2022 is against DSV ([30]-[36])

HMRC say that it is wrong in law that by “analogy … a person who is unaware that goods are subject to a duty of excise … is in a similar position to one who attempted to declare duty”.

On the evidence NB’s instinct from the outset was that excise duty was due but it was not paid or not paid correctly. Notice 41 indicated that excise duty was payable and contemporaneous evidence indicates an understanding within DSV that excise duty was payable.

When DSV finally sought to declare excise duty on CHIEF, it used a formula to calculate the litres of chargeable product that made no sense, particularly given that the law provides that the rate of excise duty varies depending on the strength of wine.

Regulation 10(1) says the person liable to pay the duty is the person holding the goods-they have a primary liability. Regulation 10(2) refers to any other person holding with the person in Regulation 10(1) and accordingly, they have a secondary liability. If no one is liable under 10(1) then there cannot be anyone liable under Regulation 10(2).

EAIG3500 means that it is necessary to establish who has the primary liability. You cannot hold a second person liable unless there has been an assessment of the primary liability and the secondary liability should not be assessed they should be notified in writing.

There is nothing in the legislation saying it is necessary to raise an assessment. Regulation 12 says who is liable to pay. As with Regulation 10, this creates a primary and secondary liability.

DSV can appeal a notification to an appeal as they done so here so no assessment is needed for an appeal.

HMRC say the regulations themselves fix the liability.

F(2)A 1992 does not dispense with the need to assess. HMRC say there is no need to assess DSV in law. FA 1994 says HMRC may assess the amount of duty and does not say it must. HMRC did not need to assess.

Regulation 12(3) is a defining provision and has no relevance to this appeal because it relates to those assessed and notified. HMRC are not relying on Regulation 12(3).

In relation to Canmi, HMRC say that the Tribunal should exercise caution as this was a procedural case pending a CEJU decision. Paragraph 3 refers to an ‘innocent agent’ and this was not a substantive appeal but instead about a stay of proceedings. HMRC say the focus is on the stay application and not on the issue and there was no factual analysis of who was assessed or notified [at 2].

HMRC say that if they did not send a notification there could be no joint and several liability. The Tribunal should see the arguments in the round. There may be other cases where a notification letter is issued when the law requires an assessment but that is not the case here.

In relation to the holding of goods, DSV say that duty is not payable as it relates importation and because it is out of suspension. In B&M, the goods were at the warehouse and there were missing traders. The owner was assessed as the holder although there was an earlier duty point and the goods could be released again and there was no second duty point.

Assessment 1 used the earliest date which was the importation date. This was the earliest point in time. There is to a nothing to say that HMRC can assess only on an early duty point - they can also set at a later date. When MG arrived to see the goods, he knew the duty point had arisen on importation so that he had to use that to assess the goods. HMRC say that the evidence is clear that the assessment was in respect of an importation

HMRC say the mistakes and procedural errors resulted in duty not being payable and this comprised an irregularity which is backed up by Canmi [at12] leaving the only issue whether Canmi was involved in that irregular importation.

HMRC that say there is a strict liability as shown by an analysis of the Perfect 2022 and Taylor cases. It does not matter if there is awareness of a liability to duty or not. DSV accept that Perfect 2022 is against them.

Both NB and MG were credible witnesses. It was clear that NB had detailed technical knowledge and had sought at all times to act appropriately to declare the correct amount of duty.

DSV and any import agent would logically rely on the importer, in this case GWY, to provide details of the goods they were importing, in this case, the Product, as the importer would have a detailed knowledge necessary and details of the intended use of the goods.

NB placed considerable reliance on the CHIEF system and HMRC’s official tariff system, but he and his colleagues made several errors so that excise duty on the Product was either not paid or paid incorrectly. NB’s instinct, however, was that duty was payable on rice wine.

HMRC clearly leave the responsibility for ascertaining the commodity code and payment of excise duty on the importer. The Tribunal considered that DSV acted simply as agents for GWY and accepted NB’s position that neither he nor DSV provided advice to their customers, including GWY.

The Tribunal did not consider it relevant to the liability for excise duty in terms of the law that DSV sought an indemnity agreement from customers in relation to outstanding amount of excise duty.

The Tribunal accepted HMRC’s submissions that duty was payable on the Product, namely “made wine” being Chinese rice cooking wine call Shaoxing in terms of ALDA 1979.

The Directive sets out the general arrangements for excise duty which seek to harmonise the principles to be applied across the EU member states as regards the point at which excise duty should be levied on excise goods. The Directive 2008 repealed the Directive of 1992 which formerly governed these matters.

Article 7 makes provision for the time and place of chargeability of excise duty and provides that excise duty becomes chargeable on the “release for consumption” in the Member State in which they are so released.

Article 8 describes who shall be liable to pay excise duty that has become chargeable, the identity of that person depending on the event which causes the release for consumption.

F(2)A 1992 contains the necessary authority or the making of regulations to implement the provisions of the Directive concerning the chargeability of goods to excise duty in the UK and the persons liable to pay such duty.

Regulations 6(1) and 7(1) set out when goods are released for consumption and when excise goods leave a duty suspension arrangement. Regulations 8 to 12 describe those who are liable to pay duty when excise goods are released for consumption in accordance with Regulation 6.

Regulation 6 (1)(d) states that excise goods are released for consumption at the time when the goods are charged with duty at importation unless they are placed, immediately upon importation of duty suspension arrangements.

None of the Product imported by GWY was placed under excise duty suspension arrangement and the correct amount of excise duty was not paid.

Assessment 1 relating to 71,060 litres of Product seized at GWY’s premises and imported all their behalf by their import agents DSV.

In respect of the period default dates contained within Assessment 1 and the accompanying letter of 21 November 2019 the Tribunal preferred the submissions made by HMRC to those made by DSV that the duty point was correct under Regulation 6(1)(d) (importation). HMRC knew the duty point had arisen on importation and this was made clear in MG’s evidence.

Accordingly, the Tribunal considered that Assessment 1 was based on the importation of the goods and not the “holding” of goods under Regulation 6(1)(b).

Similarly, the Tribunal considered that Assessment to which was calculated in respect of imports of the Product by DSV on behalf of GWY between 17 October 2016 and 6 June 2018 was valid.

It was common ground between the parties that the assessments were within the time limits set out in FA 1994 and that no assessments were raised against DSV

DSV’s submission is that there were no valid assessments against DSV, but only to GWY, and accordingly there can be no liability to duty on the part of DSV.

The power to assess is given at section 12(1) FA 1994 and section 1(2) F(2)A 1992 enables HMRC to make regulations to fix excise duty points, to specify the person or persons on whom the liability to pay duty is to fall at the excise duty point and to specify whether a liability is joint and several.

Regulation 12(1) says the person liable to pay duty when excise goods are released for consumption by virtue of Regulation 6(1)(d) is the person who declares the excise goods or on whose behalf they are declared on importation.

Regulation 12 (2) states that in the case of an irregular importation any person involved in the importation is liable to pay the duty and Regulation 12(3) states that were more than one person is involved in the irregular importation, each person is jointly and severally liable to pay the duty.

DSV say that F(2)A 1992 does not permit HMRC to make regulations that alter the assessment of notification procedure in FA 1994.

The Tribunal does not consider that the regulations alter the assessment notification procedure in FA 1994 nor that the power to make delegated legislation is being used to amend primary legislation, without clear authority, for the reasons put forward by HMRC. The assessment/notification procedure in FA 1994 do not apply in relation to DSV’s joint and several liability.

Legally valid assessments were made on GWY who had the primary liability which fixed the amount of excise duty that was payable. These established DSV’s secondary liability.

GWY were clearly the importer and if DSV’s contention is correct and that an assessment should also be made on the import agent, notwithstanding that the primary liability is with the importer, it would create an impossible burden on HMRC.

It was unclear to the Tribunal how this would work in practice if, for instance, one party decided to challenge the assessment and the other did not and on what basis the import agent would challenge the assessment given the limited role in ensuring that the appropriate declaration is made and duty paid based on information from the importer.

DSV say that looking at the structure of the Directive and Regulation 12 it would have been open to HMRC to assess both DSV and GWY under regulation 12(1).

The Tribunal could see nothing in the legislation that requires HMRC to raise an assessment addressed to DSV in relation to it secondary joint and several liability.

HMRC assessed and fixed the amount of the unpaid excise duty in an assessment addressed to GWY who HMRC considered to have been primary liability. DSV have a secondary liability. There was no assessment on DSV and the Tribunal accepted HMRC’s contentions that there was no need for them to do so.

In relation to the holding goods, a secondary liability arises when goods are held outside a duty suspension arrangement and excise duty is unpaid (“holding”) under Regulation 6 (1)(b). Under Regulation 10 the holder of the goods is liable and another person can be jointly and severally liable to pay the duty which is akin to a secondary liability.

In relation to importing goods, under Regulation 6(1)(d), when goods are charged with duty at importation unless they are placed, immediately upon importation, under a duty suspension arrangement, Regulation 12 provides that the declarant or the person on whose behalf the declaration was made is liable but others can be liable if there is an irregular import and where more than one person is involved in irregular importation each is liable.

The issue of whether an assessment related to a duty point arising from holding goods outside of duty suspension, rather than from the earlier import of goods, arises only in respect of Assessment 1.

This ground of appeal arose during the hearing and was based on the evidence of MG and consideration of Assessment 1 and the duty point based on the dates used in the assessment. The accompanying letter dated 21 November stated that the assessment referred to “excise duty on excise goods (alcohol) released for consumption in the United Kingdom”.

The letter referred to Regulation 6(1)(d) where “excise goods are released for consumption in the United Kingdom at the time when the goods are charged with duty at importation unless they are placed, immediately upon importation under a duty suspension arrangement”.

It continued “As the goods held by you were not placed immediately under excise duty suspension arrangement after customs duty was paid and the correct amount of excise duty was not immediately paid regulation 88 made those goods liable to forfeiture”.

The letter then referred to regulation 12(1) stating that the person liable to pay the duty when excise goods are released for consumption by virtue of Regulation 6(1)(d) is the person who declares the excise goods or on whose behalf they are declared upon importation. As you were the person on behalf of the goods were declared on importation, you are therefore liable to pay the UK excise duty”.

The Tribunal considered that the goods were not assessed under Regulations 6 (1)(b) and 10 when they were confiscated. They had been assessed under Regulations 6(1)(d) and 12 as being imported and there was no ‘holding’ of the goods.

The Tribunal accepted HMRC’s submission that section 12(1A) of F A 1994 provides that HMRC may assess the amount of duty due from a person and notify them but it does not say that they must assess.

HMRC, say they did not need to assess DSV because Regulation 12(3) provides that DSV is jointly and severally liable in respect of the unpaid excise duty.

The Tribunal held that there was an irregular importation because GWY purported to release the product into free circulation in the UK, and the consumption in the UK, without the necessary formalities having been complied with to release those goods for consumption.

The reason the necessary formalities had not been complied with resulted on the incorrect information received by and the difficulties encountered by DSV on the import declarations and the use of CHIEF.

The excise duty was not declared correctly and was unaccounted for. In Canmi, the taxpayer and HMRC agreed that “the use of an incorrect tax code comprises such an irregularity”.

DSV say that Regulation 12(2) deals with persons whose actions are not covered by Regulation 12(1) but who had some other involvement in an irregular importation. Accordingly, a person can be liable to excise duty under Regulation 12 (12) and not be liable under Regulation 12(1) and it is also possible for more than one person to be liable under Regulation 12 (2) with none of those persons being liable under Regulation 12(1).

Regulation 12(3) builds on Regulation 12 (2) by making it clear that each person involved in an irregular importation is jointly and severally liable to pay the duty.

DSV state that to be ‘involved’, requires a degree of knowledge or dishonesty. By contrast a person who take steps to discover whether or not goods are dutiable and, as a result of the steps taken, honestly believes them not to be dutiable should not be regarded as having been “involved” in an irregular importation for the purposes of Regulation 12 (2).

In Perfect 2022, Mr Perfect had no interest of his own in the imported goods, was not part of any conspiracy and had simply followed instructions, the Court imposed a strict liability in relation to Regulation 13. This stated that the individual’s innocence did not matter and that the liability to excise duty was a strict liability.

The Tribunal considered that a degree of knowledge or dishonesty was not required in order to be ‘involved’ and the DSV were involved.

The Tribunal consider that the same strict liability set out in Perfect 2022 applies to Regulation 12 and agrees with Canmi [at 32] that the strict liability in relation to Regulation 13 is equally apposite to ‘involvement’ in Regulation 12.

In any event DSV were not “unaware that the goods were subject to a duty of excise” as NB’s instinct from the outset was that excise duty was payable and the various attempts were made to declare it which were ultimately to confirm that instinct.

The Tribunal considered that on the facts before it the importation was “irregular” and that DSV was involved in that irregular importation.

Accordingly, the Tribunal considered that DSV were joint and severally liable for the assessments against GWY in terms of the Regulations.

For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.