David Hackmey v The Commissioners for HMRC

That the requirement for an HMRC officer to have “reason to suspect” sets a low bar, is not in dispute. In Newton [2018] UKFTT 513 (TC), Judge Thomas considered that it was set at about the same height as that for an officer to make a “discovery” under s29(1) TMA:

I disagree with Judge Thomas that the bar for reasonable suspicion is set at about the same height as that for making a discovery. In the case of a discovery, the officer must believe there to be – rather than merely suspecting - an insufficiency of tax. “Belief” sets a higher bar than mere “suspicion” (see Jerome Anderson v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0159 (TCC) at [28] – not cited to me). So, I find that the bar in Paragraph 21(6) is set somewhat lower than the bar for a “discovery”. But on any basis, that bar is low.

Judge Thomas went on to consider the power of the predecessor to the National Crime Agency to take over the taxing functions of HMRC under s317 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This requires the agency to have “reasonable grounds to suspect” that a person’s income arises from criminal conduct:

The requirement for reasonable grounds was also considered by Judge Gething in Perring [2021] UKFTT where she said at [19](1) that:

I find that the requirement for the suspicion to be based on “reasonable grounds” means that this suspicion must have an objective basis. In order for HMRC to meet the burden of proof as regards Condition B, not only must they share the grounds for their officer’s suspicion, but they must provide evidence demonstrating that the officer is entitled to have that suspicion and that it is objectively reasonable for him or her to have it.

One of the issues in this Appeal in respect of the “reasonably required” test relates to information and documents for the tax year 2013/14. This is more than four years before the date of the Information Notice (18 September 2018). The general rule (s 34(1) TMA) is that income tax may not be assessed more than four years after the end of the year of assessment for which the income is taxable. There are exceptions to this general rule, in particular the provisions of s29 TMA relating to “discovery assessments”. These provisions allow (subject to various conditions being met) HMRC to issue an assessment within six years in cases where HMRC make a “discovery”, and the loss of tax has arisen because of the carelessness of the taxpayer.

In his submissions, Mr Turnbull noted that paragraph 1 provided that a notice could be issued if the information and documents were required for the purposes of “checking the taxpayer’s tax position”, and that “tax position” was defined by paragraph 64 to include the taxpayers “past, present and future” tax liabilities. In consequence, he submitted that HMRC were not barred from requiring information and documents relating to periods which might be out of time for assessment. He referred me to the Tribunal’s decision in Cowan [2013] UKFTT 604 (TC), where the periods for which HMRC required information were time-barred for assessment in support of his submission. However, one of the issues in Cowan was the residence status of the taxpayer, and HMRC contended (and the Tribunal agreed) that the information sought was relevant to the residence status of the taxpayer for the periods for which HMRC were not time barred. This is because, for example, the number of days spent in the UK by an individual in year one could be relevant to their UK residence status in year two. I agree with Mr Howard that Cowan does not provide blanket authority for HMRC to seek information and documents relating to periods that are time-barred for assessment.

However, I find that HMRC are not barred from requiring information and documents for 2013/14 providing they have a reasonable basis for suspecting that they could make a discovery assessment for that period, and that the information and documents are otherwise reasonably required. In Perring (at [26] to [27]), Judge Gething said that the purpose of the Schedule 36 information powers is to enable HMRC to raise assessments to collect tax. It must then follow that it cannot be reasonable for HMRC to require documents and information that relate to a period for which HMRC are out of time to raise assessments. She went on to say at [29]:

In my view, what Judge Gething says at [29] is expressed too narrowly – I disagree that the officer must have already made a “discovery” before the issue of an information notice can be justified. In his skeleton argument, Mr Howard submits that

I agree with Judge Gething that a mere desire for background information is insufficient to justify the issue of a notice – that would amount to “fishing” (see also Avonside Roofing [2021] UKFTT 158 (TC) at [62] – [68]).

I found Mr Henstock to be a credible and reliable witness, and there was no challenge by Mr Howard to the truthfulness of Mr Henstock’s evidence. I find that he answered questions honestly and to the best of his ability.

When HMRC commenced their investigations into Mr Hackmey’s affairs, they had – as acknowledged by Gary Gardner in his letter of 17 August 2017 – a legitimate suspicion of undeclared income because of the discrepancy between Mr Hackmey’s lifestyle and the level of income reported in his UK tax returns.

What became clear during the course of Mr Henstock’s oral evidence was that HMRC’s initial suspicions were no longer in point following Gary Gardner’s explanations (and the various documents and explanations subsequently provided to them). Mr Henstock confirmed that at the outset of HMRC’s investigations, they had suspected fraud, but that they now accepted that Mr Hackmey was funded by transfers of cash from his father. Mr Henstock also acknowledged that publicly available information confirmed that Joseph Hackmey was extraordinarily wealthy and had the means to be able to make substantial gifts to his son and other children without having any material adverse impact on his own overall lifestyle.

In consequence, the focus of HMRC’s investigation had changed, and could be described as falling primarily into investigating two issues. The first issue (which Mr Howard described as the “quantum issue”) relates to the amounts

The second issue was described by Mr Howard as the “taxability issue”. This includes the relationship Mr Hackmey has with Circleplane and WECF, and the fact that he does not appear to have received any income from these companies. HMRC suspect that Mr Hackmey is being remunerated for the work he does in the UK – whether in his capacity as a director or otherwise in relation to Hackmey Family Interests – and that he should have paid UK tax on this remuneration. One area that HMRC are considering (described by Mr Henstock in his evidence as being of “central concern”) is that all or part of the funds transferred to Mr Hackmey by his father represent such taxable remuneration. HMRC are also considering the potential application of anti-avoidance legislation (such as, but not limited to, the legislation relating to transfers of assets abroad).

Mr Howard submits that as regards the quantum issue, HMRC no longer have any reasonable grounds for suspecting that the amounts declared by Mr Hackmey as having been remitted into the UK are inaccurate.

He submits that as regards the taxability issue, the information sought by HMRC is not reasonably required for the purposes of checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position.

A central focus of HMRC’s enquiries is the relationship of Mr Hackmey to the real estate projects connected with Circleplane, WECF, and the Hackmey Family Interests. HMRC note that Mr Hackmey is not receiving income from either WECF or Circleplane (whether by way of dividends or earnings). They note that Circleplane does not appear to be profitable. They speculate whether all or some of the funds received by Mr Hackmey in the UK ought properly to be regarded as taxable remuneration, or whether Mr Hackmey is, in substance, being remunerated outside the UK for work he does in the UK.

Mr Howard acknowledged that HMRC might legitimately want to investigate the nature of the arrangements between Mr Hackmey and the Hackmey Family Interests and the potential application of anti-avoidance provisions (such that the legislation relating to the transfer of assets abroad). But he submitted that none of the items included within the Information Notice addressed these “taxability issues”. Much of Mr Howard’s cross-examination was concerned with demonstrating that HMRC’s current concerns were outside the scope of the items in the Information Notice. Mr Henstock acknowledged that HMRC had raised no questions, for example, which might relate to transfer pricing issues – whether the fees charged by Circleplane to its clients were anything other than arm’s length.

Nor had Mr Henstock included in the Information Notice questions been about the nature of the deposits into Mr Hackmey’s bank account by Nicholas & Co and BMOR Limited. Although these deposits were unexplained, Mr Henstock confirmed under cross-examination that he had not asked any questions about their nature. Mr Howard made cogent submissions as to why these payments related to Mr Hackmey’s purchase of a house for himself and were a return of capital respectively – but these submissions were not supported by detailed evidence, so I make no findings in this regard.

Great emphasis was placed by Mr Turnbull on the Blackfriars Limited profit and loss account – and the fact that it appeared to show that a profit of £46.5m having been made in 2014/15 by Blackfriars Limited. However, the provenance of that account is unclear, and much (if not all) of the profit appears to arise as a result of loan waivers by NAMA (which Mr Howard submits would suggest that the project was not profitable – as NAMA would not have waived any of its debt if it were). All that said, the profit and loss account provides evidence to support HMRC’s suspicions that there may be some untaxed profits relating to the Blackfriars project which arose outside the UK, and I can understand why HMRC may want a better understanding of the various line items shown in the accounts. However, none of the items in the Information Notice are directed at these issues.

Under cross-examination, Mr Henstock’s response to a number of Mr Howard’s questions indicated that whilst it might have been reasonable to seek much of the information and documents set out in the Information Notice in the light of HMRC’s reasonable suspicions in 2017 (at the start of their investigations) and in 2018 (when the Information Notice was issued), that no longer remained the case in the light of the information provided since then, and in the light of the change of focus in HMRC’s investigations. This can be seen from the answers given by Mr Henstock to Mr Howard’s questions – such as confirming that a particular matter was not within the scope of his witness statement, that he “struggled to give an answer” as to why HMRC had not asked a particular question, or that a matter could have been expressed better in his statement.

I agree that HMRC may well have reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr Hackmey may not have declared all of his UK taxable income – and Mr Howard in essence concedes that Mr Hackmey’s affairs are complicated and there are matters as to which HMRC may well have legitimate questions to ask. However, what HMRC have largely failed to do in relation to the Information Notice is to “join the dots” and link the documents and information they require to their reasonable suspicions. I can only speculate whether the outcome of this appeal would have been different if HMRC had prepared their case with more care, or had varied or replaced the Information Notice to reflect the changed focus of their investigations.

It is convenient to deal with each of the items in the Information Notice in turn.

This item is no longer being pursued by HMRC.

Mr Henstock’s evidence is that the movement of funds from Mr Hackmey’s bank accounts in Switzerland into the UK, and their subsequent “introduction” to Circleplane is “central to HMRC’s concerns”. In his witness statement he says:

Mr Henstock was questioned at length by Mr Howard about the information already provided to him, whether he accepted its veracity, and why he needed to see unredacted UK bank statements.

Mr Henstock said that he was satisfied that Mr Hackmey had disclosed all gifts made to him by his father. He agreed with Mr Howard that there was no evidence of there being any covert or undisclosed payments. Mr Henstock confirmed that he had seen the entries in the bank accounts showing the amounts transferred from overseas into Mr Hackmey’s UK bank account, but he wanted to know whether these amounts were paid exclusively by Joseph Hackmey. He also confirmed that he had no reason to believe that either Joseph Hackmey or Askenazy & Co had lied in their July 2020 letters. Mr Henstock’s said that his only reason to question the amounts is an inability to reconcile a deposit of £150,000 into Mr Hackmey’s UK bank account on 13 December 2013 by Nicholas & Co, and two deposits made on 7 October 2016 of £10,000 and £50,000 respectively, which are described as “Bmor Ltd, Jaytray Ltd”.

Mr Turnbull submits that the Item 2 information is reasonably required in order to determine the source of funds paid to Mr Hackmey and to determine whether the amounts declared as paid to Mr Hackmey by way of gift are accurate. The statements need to be unredacted to show the flow of funds from Joseph Hackmey to Mr Hackmey, and this will evidence whether there is any artificiality in the nature of those payments. The statements will also show the connections between Mr Hackmey and the Hackmey Family Interests – and whether Mr Hackmey is being paid for managing the Hackmey Family Interests. As regards the BMOR Limited and Nicholas & Co payments, the disclosure of unredacted statements will show why the funds were deposited into the account and whether there was any corresponding withdrawal – and this information would help to establish whether these payments gave rise to unassessed tax.

Mr Howard submitted that HMRC no longer had any grounds for suspecting that the amounts disclosed by Mr Hackmey as having been transferred into the UK are incorrect. Whether Mr Hackmey introduced funds into Circleplane (directly or indirectly) is irrelevant to any determination of his income tax position. Providing Mr Hackmey pays the relevant amount (if any) of UK tax on his UK and remitted overseas income, how he chooses to spend that money is irrelevant to his UK income tax position. To seek that information represents, submits Mr Howard, an unnecessary and unreasonable intrusion into Mr Hackmey’s private life contrary to his Article 8 ECHR rights. Because the redacted statements provided to HMRC include running balances, they can see whether the payments in and out of Mr Hackmey’s accounts are large or small – and it remains open to them to make further targeted requests for information. Providing unredacted bank statements will not provide HMRC with any relevant information relating to HMRC’s concerns about the payments from BMOR Limited or Nicholas & Co – if HMRC require additional information about these payments, Mr Howard said that Mr Hackmey would be happy to consider their requests. In summary, Mr Hackmey had already provided HMRC with statements from his personal UK bank accounts which show the amounts received. As none of the redacted information relates to the receipt of funds by Mr Hackmey, the redacted information is not relevant to establishing his UK taxable income - removal of redaction would not assist HMRC to check Mr Hackmey’s income tax position as it would assist HMRC neither with the source nor level of his taxable income.

I find that HMRC have not established grounds for requiring unredacted UK bank statements. The redacted statements provided by Mr Hackmey show the funds remitted by him into the UK, and Mr Henstock in the course of his oral evidence stated that he did not suspect Mr Hackmey of concealing amounts transferred into the UK. I find that, in the light of the disclosures made by Mr Hackmey prior to this hearing, HMRC no longer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that Mr Hackmey has failed to disclose all amounts transferred into the UK.

Neither Mr Turnbull nor Mr Henstock have been able to explain why removal of redactions will assist HMRC in checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position as regards the taxability issue. Mr Turnbull submitted that seeing the flow of funds will evidence whether there is any artificiality in the nature of the payments made by Joseph Hackmey to Mr Hackmey – but when I asked him to explain why this was the case, he was unable to do so.

HMRC know about the deposits made by BMOR Limited and Nicholas & Co, and there is no evidence of any suspicion relating to other deposits. Rather HMRC central concern that the character of payments of which they are aware has the nature of taxable income. HMRC have not been able to explain why the removal of the redactions relating to payments out of the account will assist them in determining the character of payments made into the account. HMRC are also concerned that payments are being made outside the UK in respect of work done by Mr Hackmey within the UK – or that transfer pricing or other anti-avoidance legislation might be in point. Again – to the extent that these may be relevant avenues for HMRC to investigate, they have not been able to explain why the provision of unredacted bank statements will assist them with these matters.

Mr Hackmey had disclosed in response to the receipt of the Information Notice a number of purchases of goods and services in the UK for which he paid using his non-UK credit card. There was some dispute in the course of submissions as to whether this disclosure was entirely voluntary – Mr Henstock described the disclosure as being “prompted” which I think is a fair description. Mr Hackmey has provided HMRC with details of his UK credit cards, and provided redacted copies of his non-UK credit card statements.

Mr Henstock’s evidence was that the details of all of Mr Hackmey’s credit cards was reasonably required by HMRC in the light of his disclosure of untaxed remittances through one of these cards. Mr Henstock considered that it was reasonable to test the risk that the use of non-UK credit cards may have triggered other remittances. During the course of cross-examination, Mr Henstock said that it was HMRC’s practice to require taxpayers to provide details of all credit cards (UK and non-UK) and statements in the course of investigations where payments in the UK using non-UK credit cards had been made.

Mr Turnbull submits that HMRC required this information and documents to ascertain the correct amount of taxable remittances to the UK, as payments from any credit card could potentially be a taxable remittance. He repeated Mr Henstock’s statement that it was HMRC’s usual practice to require sight of overseas credit card statements. He further submits that the links from credit card transactions to projects will also establish whether funding of Circleplane and WECF are linked back to Joseph Hackmey.

During the course of his closing submissions, Mr Turnbull mentioned (for the first time) that HMRC believed that Mr Hackmey had incurred expenses in Singapore relating to Victoria using an overseas credit card, which had been reimbursed by SRD. However, Mr Turnbull acknowledged that there was no evidence before the Tribunal in relation to these expenses – it was not mentioned by Mr Henstock in his witness statement nor his oral evidence, nor is there any document in the bundle which refers to these expenses.

Mr Howard submits that HMRC have provided no evidence to suggest that Mr Hackmey has made undisclosed purchases in the UK using non-UK credit cards beyond those already disclosed. Nor have they adduced any evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that Mr Hackmey had not made an honest and genuine disclosure of all such purchases, or that the disclosure of such purchases is in any way incomplete. Only the expenditure details have been redacted from the UK credit card statements provided to HMRC – and removing these redactions will not assist HMRC in identifying taxable remittances into the UK. Rather, says Mr Howard, this information is not reasonably required and will in breach of Mr Hackmey’s Article 8 rights.

I consider that it was inappropriate for Mr Turnbull to introduce new matters into his closing submissions. Be as that may, there was no evidence of any kind before me to support his submission that Mr Hackmey had incurred expenses on behalf of SRD using one of his overseas credit cards – and submissions are not evidence. If such evidence had been provided, I would have found that HMRC would have had reasonable grounds to suspect that there may have been undisclosed remittances made via overseas credit cards, and upheld items 3 and 4 of the Information Notice.

The mere fact that HMRC’s usual practice is to require disclosure of overseas credit cards does not of itself provide a reasonable basis for seeking those documents in this case. There has to be evidence to support HMRC’s submissions, and HMRC must demonstrate why they required the information. In the absence of any such evidence, it follows that I have to find that HMRC had no reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr Hackmey was using his overseas credit card to pay for goods and services on behalf of SRD. In any event, none of the evidence of Mr Henstock, nor any of Mr Turnbull’s submissions explains why HMRC needs the removal of the redactions to the UK credit card statements that have been disclosed.

These are no longer being pursued by HMRC.

HMRC have made it clear that the information required by this item is limited to information within Mr Hackmey’s knowledge, and documents are limited to those within Mr Hackmey’s power or possession.

The evidence before me is that Mr Hackmey is a discretionary beneficiary of CIT, and that CIT was one of the ultimate beneficial owners of Blackfriars and Victoria. It is not disputed that Circleplane provided services relating to these projects. There is also evidence which indicates that CIT has lent £6.5m to WECF.

The CV included in the bundle states that from 2007 Mr Hackmey is “investor and owner” of Circleplane, and that Circleplane “manages UK real estate assets and projects for off shore investors (mainly Hackmey family trusts and partners).”

Mr Henstock’s evidence was that whilst HMRC had some knowledge regarding trusts used by Mr Hackmey’s family, he considered that it was reasonable to gather information regarding those trusts and any others which may have been used to facilitate property transactions in the UK.

Correspondence included in the bundle confirms that Mr Hackmey is a discretionary beneficiary of the Notting Hill Discretionary Settlement, and had received a distribution from that trust of £500,000 which was paid into a non-UK bank account. The correspondence also refers to the South London Discretionary Settlement, and that the Guernsey tax authorities had informed HMRC that this was one of the ultimate beneficial owners of Black Pearl Limited and that Mr Hackmey was a discretionary beneficiary of that trust.

Mr Turnbull submits that CIT, Notting Hill Discretionary Settlement, and South London Discretionary Settlement were all linked to the ownership of UK property. He noted that these trusts, as well as the Southwark Partners Discretionary Settlement had names which were associated with London districts. As Mr Hackmey was a discretionary beneficiary of a number of these trusts, information relating to trusts was reasonably required for the purposes of checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position. Mr Turnbull submitted that there would be “money available to be paid” to Mr Hackmey out of these trusts, and this was relevant to Mr Hackmey’s future tax position (see paragraph 64(1)(a)). Further, there was also the issue of whether the amounts lent to WECF by CIT represented a taxable remittance in the hands of Mr Hackmey given his ownership of the WECF shares.

Mr Howard notes that Mr Hackmey has confirmed to HMRC that he is not the trustee or settlor of any trusts, and there is no evidence produced by HMRC that casts doubt on the truthfulness of this statement. Mr Hackmey has given details of the distribution made to him by Notting Hill Discretionary Settlement outside the UK, and has also confirmed that he has received no undisclosed benefit from any trust. Whilst HMRC may have identified trusts of which Mr Hackmey may be a potential beneficiary, but as these are discretionary trusts, Mr Hackmey has no defined right to any of these trusts’ assets. As regards Mr Turnbull’s submission that there was “money available to be paid” to Mr Hackmey, this was not supported by any evidence. And in any event, unless and until Mr Hackmey receives a benefit from a trust, there is no possibility of him being taxable. Requesting details of any worldwide trusts for which he is, or might be a beneficiary of, even though he has not received any benefit from them, is not reasonably required to establish Mr Hackmey’s UK income tax position.

In contrast to the other information sought by HMRC by the Information Notice, I find that HMRC has “reasons to suspect”, and that the information sought by Item 11 is reasonably required for the purpose of checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position.

I agree with Mr Turnbull, and find, that the fact that the trusts of which HMRC are aware are named after London districts gives HMRC reasonable grounds for suspecting that the trusts have (or had) a connection with property in London. Mr Hackmey’s CV and the statement given on his visa application is evidence that he manages family property projects, and so I also find that HMRC have reasonable grounds for suspecting that Mr Hackmey is involved in managing the affairs of trusts associated with the Hackmey family. As Mr Hackmey is known to be a discretionary beneficiary of some of these trusts, it is reasonable to suspect that he is a discretionary beneficiary of other trusts associated with the Hackmey family.

Mr Howard acknowledged that HMRC might have legitimate reasons for wanting to investigate the relationships between Mr Hackmey and the Hackmey Family Interests in connection with the potential application of anti-avoidance provisions (such as the transfer of assets abroad). There is evidence before me of complex links between Mr Hackmey and the Hackmey Family Interests – which include CIT’s loans to WECF and the ultimate beneficial interests of CIT in both Blackfriars and Victoria, and of South London Discretionary Settlement’s ultimate beneficial interest in Blackfriars. These were projects on which Mr Hackmey worked – albeit through companies owned or controlled by him.

I have mentioned the profit and loss account of Blackfriars Limited for 2014/2015 which appears to show a profit of £30.4m on the Blackfriars project. Whilst I acknowledge that these accounts are of uncertain provenance, and that much of the profit shown in the accounts arises as a result of NAMA waiving debt owed to it – I find that it does give rise to reasonable suspicion that there may be profits that have not been appropriately taxed in the UK. It also appears that Mr Hackmey is or may be a beneficiary of trusts that are ultimate beneficial owners of Blackfriars Limited.

In the light of the information provided to HMRC, they know, or have reasonable grounds to suspect that Mr Hackmey may be a beneficiary or discretionary beneficiary of family trusts which have invested in UK real estate projects – including, but not limited to, those already disclosed. Mr Henstock mentioned during the course of his evidence the possibility of tax being payable by Mr Hackmey under anti-avoidance legislation (including, but not limited to, the transfer of assets abroad provisions) – and an understanding of the ownership arrangements for the various property projects in which Mr Hackmey may have an interest is reasonable in this context – notwithstanding that Mr Hackmey may only be a discretionary beneficiary of these trusts.

I consider that it is reasonable that HMRC are provided with the information and documents relating to Mr Hackmey’s status as a beneficiary (including as a discretionary beneficiary) of these and the other Hackmey family trusts.

I agree with Mr Howard that Mr Turnbull’s submission that “money is available to be paid” to Mr Hackmey is not supported by evidence. But this does not detract from the weight of the other evidence. I therefore find that the information and documents in Item 11 are reasonably required by HMRC.

I find that the outstanding matters within Items 2 to 4 of the Information Notice are information and documents in relation to which neither (a) HMRC have reasonable grounds for suspecting that tax has not been assessed (or that the tax is insufficient), nor (b) are such information and documents reasonably required by HMRC for the purposes of checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position.

Items 1, and items 5 to 9 of the Information Notice have either been satisfied or are no longer being pursued by HMRC. Item 10 has been removed from the Information Notice following the statutory review by HMRC.

I find that HMRC have reasonable grounds for suspecting that tax may not have been assessed (or that the tax is insufficient) in relation to the matters within Item 11, and that the information and documents required by Item 11 are reasonably required by HMRC for the purposes of checking Mr Hackmey’s tax position.

I therefore set aside Items 1 to 10 inclusive of the Information Notice. I confirm Item 11.

In this Schedule, "taxpayer notice" means a notice under this paragraph

Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply where, or to the extent that, any of conditions A to D is met.

Condition B is that, as regards the person, an officer of Revenue and Customs has reason to suspect that –

Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply to a requirement in a taxpayer notice to provide any information, or produce any document, that forms part of the taxpayer's statutory records.

Where the tribunal confirms or varies the information notice or a requirement, the person to whom the information notice was given must comply with the notice or requirement—

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 11 and 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 a decision of the tribunal on an appeal under this Part of this Schedule is final.

Subject to this paragraph, the provisions of Part 5 of TMA 1970 relating to appeals have effect in relation to appeals under this Part of this Schedule as they have effect in relation to an appeal against an assessment to income tax.

In this Schedule—