Hugh Craddock v The Information Commissioner

On 8 August 2021, the Appellant submitted this request (“the Request”) to Kent County Council (“the Council”):

The Council responded on 31 August 2021, informing the Appellant that:

The Council clarified on 3 September 2021 that its refusal of the Request had been made by reference to Regulation 6(1) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“EIR”) as follows:

The Council maintained its position upon internal review on 29 September 2021. The Appellant complained to the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”). This is an appeal against the Commissioner’s Decision Notice dated 30 November 2022 (IC – 144241 – S0K1), wherein he concluded that the Council was entitled to rely on Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR to refuse disclosure.

The hearing of this appeal took place on 13 September 2023, via Cloud Video Platform. The Appellant appeared in person. The Commissioner did not appear at the hearing and was not represented, relying instead on his written response to the Notice of Appeal and the Decision Notice.

The Appellant conducts rights of way research in relation to Kent on a voluntary basis on behalf of the British Horse Society. For this purpose, he needs high quality copies of individual tithe maps. As at September 2021, he had researched more than thirty ancient parishes in Kent and intended to research more. He says the research calls for frequent reference to the tithe maps prepared for parishes in Kent under the Tithe Act 1836; extracts from the maps may be required for inclusion in applications to record or upgrade rights of way made to the Council; the Council holds the vast majority of the maps in its records office; there are about 425 maps; with the benefit of a Heritage Lottery Fund grant of £310,000 in or around 1997, the Council has restored and digitised the maps. The Appellant told us in the hearing that he looks for various information in the maps which might indicate an unrecorded right of way, for example a route coloured in sienna might, taken together with other information, indicate an unrecorded right of way.

Upon receipt of the Council’s response of 31 August 2021, the Appellant emailed the Council, saying that its response, which appeared to be a refusal, was not in accordance with EIR as it did not explain the reason for refusal. He concluded that the refusal relied on Regulation 6(1) EIR and sought an explanation for that in writing.

By its clarificatory response to the Appellant dated 3 September 2021, the Council accepted that it should have explained the reason for its position, and confirmed that:

The Appellant elaborated his position to the Council by email dated 6 September 2021 as follows:

The Council conducted an internal review, and emailed the Appellant on 29 September 2021, referring to Regulation 6(1)(a) and (b) EIR, saying that it was clear that “these have been met, as the information you request is ‘already publicly available and easily accessible to the applicant’ also in the format you request which is ‘in electronic form’. The Council stated that they were entitled to charge the Appellant for copies of the maps pursuant to Regulation 8 EIR, as the documents were already freely available for access. The Appellant responded to the Council the same day, saying that he did “not see any distinction such that r.6 applies to the disclosure of information and r. 8 applies to copies: they apply equally to both.” He asked for information about the charges. By email dated 8 November 2021, the Council informed him that the copying charge for one tithe map was £15, that a list of charges was on their website, and that if over 40 tithe maps were requested, the Council would offer a discount of 20%.

The Appellant complained to the Commissioner on 5 December 2021. He stated that the basis of his complaint was that the Council was wrong to refuse his request under Regulation 8 EIR in that, so far as the information requested was made available at a charge, the charge specified did not comply with Regulation 8(3) EIR because the charge was not a reasonable amount; no request had been made in accordance Regulation 8(4) EIR; and the charge was not published in its schedule of charges in accordance with Regulation 8(8) EIR. He said that he would be satisfied if the Council were to disclose the requested data in electronic form to him, subject to any reasonable charge to cover the actual costs of disclosure. He did not consider that a charge of £5,100 (being 425 (the number of tithe maps) x £15 x 80%) was reasonable.

In his investigation of the Appellant’s complaint, on 31 August 2022, the Commissioner asked the Council the following in the context of the application of Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR:

The Council responded on 21 October 2022 as follows (adopting the same paragraph lettering as the Commissioner had used):

By his Decision Notice, the Commissioner stated that although the Council had not specified the sub-section of Regulation 6(1) EIR on which it relied to refuse disclosure, he considered that it was relying on Regulation 6(1)(b) on the basis that the Council had stated that it considered the requested information was publicly available and easily accessible. He concluded that: any decision about whether information is easily accessible depends upon the circumstances; while he recognised that the Appellant would need to travel to the Archive centre, incurring both time and cost which would multiply depending upon the amount of separate visits needed, he also recognised that the information was made available for inspection at the centre, which is a local records office, whose purpose is to maintain historic records and allow their public inspection; he was satisfied that the information was publicly available and easily accessible to the Appellant at a facility established and maintained for the purpose of examination of the information, and that accordingly Regulation 6(1)(b) was engaged. He noted that he had not considered the Council’s application of Regulation 8 EIR which appeared to have been based on a misunderstanding of the EIR, and that “if information is publicly available and easily accessible for the purposes of the EIR, the Council is not required to make the information available in another form or format.”

By his Notice of Appeal dated 27 December 2022, the Appellant contended that:

By his Response to the appeal, the Commissioner submitted that: the information requested is environmental information within the meaning of the EIR and was not disclosable under FOIA, which contains a specific exemption from disclosure for environmental information which falls to be considered under the EIR; he maintained that Regulation 6(1)(b) applied to the Request; the arrangements made by the Council for inspection of the information were such as to make it publicly available and easily accessible for the purposes of Regulation 6(1)(b); there is no geographical distance beyond which information is not easily accessible for inspection; a complaint that the information was not available in permanent form was irrelevant as the EIR concern access to information not documents; Regulation 8 EIR was irrelevant, given the Commissioner’s finding as to the application of Regulation 6(1)(b).

By his Reply of 7 April 2023 to the Commissioner’s Response, the Appellant supplied detailed submissions, which, while acknowledging their detail and erudite presentation, we summarise as follows:

By his final written submissions dated 6 September 2023, the Commissioner stated his position as follows: in making information publicly available, an authority is not required to provide permanent copies of it; any failure by an authority to disseminate information as widely as possible by electronic means has no bearing on whether the information is to be regarded as “publicly available” or “easily accessible” under Regulation 6(1)(b); the information is publicly available and easily accessible to the Appellant; as the information is environmental information, its disclosure falls to be considered under EIR, not FOIA; Regulation 8 EIR is not engaged on the facts of this case as the requested information is already publicly available and easily accessible to the Appellant under Regulation 6(1)(b), and, in any event, the assessment of a reasonable charge is a matter for the Council to determine in the first instance.

The relevant provisions of EIR are as follows:

Dissemination of environmental information

Duty to make available environmental information on request

General right of access to information held by public authorities

Information accessible to applicant by other means

For the purposes of determining this appeal, we have considered all the material contained in the Hearing Bundle, the Bundle of Authorities, final written submissions from the Commissioner, a Bundle of legislation filed by the Appellant, and the Appellant’s oral submissions.

The parties agree, and the Tribunal finds that, the information requested is environmental information within the meaning of EIR.

Regulation 6(1) EIR provides that an applicant is entitled to relevant information in a particular form or format, if so requested, unless either of Regulation 6(1) (a) or (b) is engaged. In refusing to provide the information as requested by the Appellant, the Council has elected to rely on Regulation 6(1)(b).

The Appellant contends that the information is neither publicly available nor easily accessible. We deal with each of those propositions in turn

The Appellant submits that we should interpret the words “publicly available” in Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR by reference to (1) the European Council Directive 2003/4/CE on public access to environmental information (“the Directive”), transposed by EIR pursuant to paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2 to the European Communities Act 1972; and (2) the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, knowns as the Aarhus Convention (“the Convention”), to which the Directive was intended to give effect. The Convention entered into force on 30 October 2001, and was ratified by the United Kingdom on 23 February 2005. Provisions of the Convention have been reproduced in the Directive.

The EIR are retained EU law pursuant to s2 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. Subject to an exception made for the Supreme Court and other specified appeal Courts, s6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act requires that “any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided … in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law.” This means that the interpretive approach applicable to EU law applies to retained EU law; legislative provisions should be interpreted in light of the objectives they are intended to achieve. By virtue of the Marleasing principle of consistent interpretation (pursuant to the CJEU ruling in Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA, EU:C:1990:395), domestic courts must interpret domestic legislation compatibly with EU law.

The Recital of the Directive provides as follows:

Article 1 of the Directive provides as follows:

Article 3 of the Directive provides as follows:

Article 5 of the Directive provides as follows:

Article 7 of the Directive provides as follows:

Article 1 of the Convention provides as follows:

Article 4 of the Convention provides as follows:

Article 5 of the Convention provides as follows:

We do not record the Appellant’s full analysis of the provisions of the Convention or the Directive in our decision although we have given it full consideration. In summary, he submitted that: making information publicly available requires a clear intention to place information in the public domain, for example, on a website, in a reference book or in a publication scheme; this interpretation is supported by Article 3(4)(a) of the Directive, which provides that where an applicant requests a public authority to make environmental information available in a specific form or format (including in the form of copies), the public authority shall make it so available unless it is already publicly available in another form or format, in particular under Article 7, which is easily accessible by applicants; Article 7(1) requires public authorities to take steps to ensure the “active and systematic dissemination to the public, in particular by means of computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology.”; Article 7(1) also requires member states to “ensure that environmental information progressively becomes available in electronic databases which are easily accessible to the public through public telecommunication networks.”; Article 7(1) is replicated in Regulation 4(1) EIR.

The Appellant noted also the objectives of the Directive. He submitted that the words “publicly available” must be interpreted in line with the objectives, and what he described as the “gloss” provided by Article 3(4)(a) of the Directive; and that making information available, particularly electronic information, in a council’s records office was not making information publicly available for the purpose of Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR. While he acknowledged that Article 3(5)(a) of the Directive required, inter alia, “the establishment and maintenance of facilities for the examination of the information required”, he submitted that merely maintaining such facilities does not render the information publicly available, rather that the maintenance of such facilities is one of a number of practical arrangements intended to promote the exercise of an applicant’s right to the information, and the discharge of such measures does not in itself cause such information to become “publicly available”.

The Appellant further submitted that we should have regard to Article 5(2) of the Convention requiring the State to ensure that environmental information is effectively accessible, and Article 5(3) requiring the State to ensure that environmental information progressively becomes available in electronic databases which are easily accessible to the public through public telecommunications networks. He submitted that it is notable that while Article 4(1) of the Convention provides for an exception from the information being made available upon request in the form requested by an applicant if “the information is already publicly available in another form.”, it does not contain the additional condition that the information should also be “easily accessible”; those words have been included in Article 3(4)(a) of the Directive, and replicated in Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR. He suggested that the Convention does not include a requirement that publicly available information should also be easily accessible because “publicly available” was intended to have a restrictive meaning, namely to convey that the information should be placed in the public domain e.g. on a website, in a reference book or in a publication scheme. He submitted that by this means, a public authority must act in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Convention, whereunder an applicant may request “copies of the actual documentation containing or comprising” the information, unless the information is, as the Appellant puts it, “genuinely” publicly available in the manners described by him.

As we have already observed, the Tribunal must interpret EIR, so far as possible, in the light of the meaning and purpose of the Directive to achieve the result pursued by the Directive. For this purpose, we must interpret, first, the relevant parts of the Directive, and, second, the EIR in the light of the meaning of the Directive, thus interpreted: see HMRC v IDT Card Services [2006] EWCA Civ 29. At the second stage, our interpretation of EIR is to be undertaken in accordance with the following principles (see: Vodafone 2 v JMRC [2009] EWCA Civ 446 [37]): it is not constrained by conventional rules of construction; it does not require ambiguity in the legislative language; it is not an exercise in semantics or linguistics; it permits departure from the strict and literal application of the words which the legislature has elected to use; it permits the implication of words necessary to comply with Community law obligations; and the precise form of the words to be implied does not matter. However, it is not for us to interpret the legislation in such a way as to cross the boundary between interpretation and amendment or to make a decision which gives rise to practical or policy repercussions which we are not equipped to evaluate.

We interpret the Directive as follows: its objective is to guarantee a right of access to environmental information, and to set out the basic principles of, and practical arrangements for, exercise of that right, and to ensure that the information is progressively made available and disseminated to the public, to which end the use of computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology, where available, shall be promoted. Where an applicant requests environmental information to be made available in a specific form or format (including in the form of copies), it shall be made so available unless it is already publicly available in another form or format, which is easily accessible by applicants or it is reasonable for it to be made available in another form or format, and for these purposes, all reasonable efforts shall be made to maintain environmental information in forms or formats which are readily reproducible and accessible by computer telecommunications or by other electronic means.

We may take the Convention into account in resolving ambiguities in legislation intended to give it effect (see Morgan v Hinton Organics (Wessex) Limited 2009 EWCA Civ 107, per Carnworth LJ [22]: “For the purposes of domestic law, the Convention has the status of an international treaty, not directly incorporated. Its provisions cannot be directly applied by domestic courts, but may be taken into account in resolving ambiguities in legislation intended to give it effect (see Halsbury’s Laws Vol 44(1) Statutes para 1439)). Ratification by the European Community itself gives the European Commission the right to ensure that Member States comply with the Aarhus obligations in areas within Community competence (see Commission v France Case C-239/03 (2004) ECR I09325 paras 25-31). …"

The Appellant submitted that, having regard to the Convention, the Directive and the EIR, the Council has fallen short of its obligations to disseminate the information more pro-actively than by provision of a digital copy of it in its Searchroom. Specifically, he submitted that Article 7(1) of the Directive requires public authorities to take steps to ensure the “active and systematic dissemination to the public, in particular by means of computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology.” We have noted that, in fact, Article 7(1) of the Directive provides for public authorities to organise the information “with a view to” dissemination by such means, “where available”.

The Appellant further submitted that Article 4(1) of the Convention provides that, in response to a request for information, public authorities shall make available copies of the actual documentation containing or comprising the information. However, that requirement is expressly subject to a provision that the authority need not provide copies, if so requested, if it is reasonable for the public authority to make the information available in another form, or the information is already publicly available in another form. The Appellant’s submission was that for that provision to apply, the information must be, as he put it, “genuinely” publicly available, by which he means on a website, in a public library or in a publication scheme.

We are conscious that the close analysis of the Convention and the Directive invited by the Appellant, may tend to conflate the issue of the Council’s fundamental compliance with Regulation 4 EIR (and behind EIR, the Directive), which is not an issue before us, with the interpretation of the words “publicly available” within Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR for the purposes of considering the lawfulness of the Decision Notice, which is an issue before us. The question before us is whether the access currently afforded by the Council is such as to enable the information properly to be characterised as “publicly available” (and “easily accessible”, with which separate concept we deal below) so as to engage the application of Regulation 6(1)(b).

We do not consider that there is any ambiguity in the words “publicly available” which requires us to draw on the Directive or the Convention behind it to understand them, nor any words we need to imply or read in to give effect to the Directive’s intention - which is, in summary, that such information should be publicly available, promoting the use of electronic technology, including telecommunication networks, where available. We consider that “publicly available” means “available to the public”. We consider that the information which is subject of the Request is available to the public in the ordinary sense of those words: the information is not restricted from any person in principle. Both the Convention and the Directive set out non-exclusive methods by which that should be achieved, with an exhortation for the use of electronic methods where possible. In this case, the method by which the relevant information is made available to the public is as set out in the Council’s letter of 21 October 2022, to which we have already referred. The progressive dissemination of information by electronic means is a separate, ancillary issue (as the means by which the Directive and Convention would prefer information to be made available); the primary consideration is whether information is publicly available.

The Appellant has submitted that for information to be properly characterised as publicly available, it must be “genuinely” publicly available, which means published in a library or on a website or in a publication scheme. We do not consider that the availability to the public of the digital maps in the Council’s Searchroom is any less “genuine” than that which might be achieved by publication of the types identified by the Appellant, and is consonant with the requirements of Article 3(5)(c) of the Directive. Such publications are some, but not the only, methods of making the information available to the public. Moreover, the information has been made available using electronic technology, even though not published online. We accept that, were the information to be published online, that may be more convenient to the Appellant himself (even if not to someone who did not have internet access and for whom the information would only be available by a visit to the Searchroom), but we consider that that raises an issue of access rather than ‘availability’ in principle.

The Appellant submitted that “accessible” connotes not only the ability to access information but to make use of it, engaging consideration not only of issues such as the distance an applicant may need to travel to the Searchroom, and the associated costs, but the ease with which an applicant may review, capture and take away the information to study.

He invited us to consider the Oxford English Dictionary definition of “accessible” as “able to be received, acquired, or made use of; open or available (to a particular class of person)” He also referred to that Dictionary’s definition of “easily” as meaning “with little exertion, labour, or difficulty”. He fairly noted in both cases that he had selected the most appropriate definition of several for his purpose.

He explained to us the challenges of trying to capture the information viewed on a screen in the Searchroom: there are 425 tithe maps of which digital copies have been made, each containing information relating to features such as fields, buildings and roads across each parish of Kent; were it even possible to photograph the screen or print copies, that would effectively dissect each map into fragments, and make relevant detail difficult to discern.

He submitted that the exceptions to the requested form of disclosure provided for by Regulation 6(1) (a) and (b) are drafted with the applicant’s interests foremost, and the applicant’s preferred form of disclosure is only to be overridden because the alternative (in either case) is almost equally acceptable.

We consider that that is to overstate consideration of the applicant’s convenience. The exceptions from disclosure afforded by Regulation 6(1)(a) and (b) are intended, in our view, to balance against the rights of the applicant the burden on a public authority. On the facts of this case, we consider that the information is easily accessible to the Appellant. We accept that he must make a journey, at cost, to the Searchroom but we do not consider his journey times or costs to be material for the purposes of EIR. Some kind of travel is inevitable for any applicant where the information, albeit in electronic form, is held in a specific, physical location. Travel distances and travel costs will necessarily vary for individuals, and consequently achieving access, in that sense, will inevitably take longer or be more expensive or arduous for some than for others.

As it is, we do not consider that accessibility to information is properly determined by considerations of travel for the purposes of EIR. We consider that accessibility connotes, more immediately, the ability to “get at” (our own, inelegant phrase) the information in its entirety. In our view, access to the information is afforded directly to the Appellant at the point of the screen. He has not suggested that any of the information is not readily accessible by him at the point of the screen. The practical arrangements around that access which are offered by the Council afford every reasonable accommodation.

The Appellant’s construction of “accessible” entails not just the ability to access the information, but the ability to capture and retain the information in a particular way for a specific use by him outside the Searchroom, achieved by receipt of electronic copies of the maps. We consider that that is to strain the meaning of the words “easily accessible to the applicant” in the context of Regulation 6(1)(b), and we find no support for that in the Directive or the Convention. In this case, the Appellant has two challenges : (1) the nature of the information and the original medium in which it was collected ( large maps) and from which it has been transposed to digital format, and (2) the use which he wishes to make of the information. The former precedes, and the latter succeeds, the point of access itself. We do not construe a requirement that the information be “easily accessible” as having to accommodate either of those challenges.

The Appellant referred us to Office of Communications v Information Commissioner EA/2006/0078, in which the First-tier Tribunal found [69] that whether the information sought by the applicant in a particular form or format was easily accessible to the applicant should be assessed by reference to the particular format which had been requested. In that case, the applicant sought information relating to the location, ownership and technical attributes of mobile phone cellular base stations in the United Kingdom contained in localised maps published on a website operated by Ofcom. He requested for every mobile phone base listed on the website, various categories of information, including a grid reference number. He noted that there was no facility to download the information on all the base stations. He asked for the information to be supplied as either a text file, csv file, Access database, or Excel spreadsheet. The Tribunal found that while access to the website was easy and that it would have been possible, once on the website, to extract the relevant information, base station by base station, and to assemble it into a text listing of some form containing the whole of the network, the second of those steps would have been time consuming, could not be described as an easy process, and it would not have yielded the grid number, which was not, in any event, disclosed on the site. On that basis the Tribunal did not consider that that part of the information could properly be described as easily accessible.

The Tribunal is not bound by the previous decisions of the First-tier Tribunal. It seems to us in this case that determining whether the information requested is to be regarded as easily accessible by reference to the particular format requested, would be the wrong approach. By that means, there is a risk that assessment of accessibility is viewed only, or overly, through the lens of the applicant’s convenience and purpose. Possible difficulties in recording and using information, once accessed, do not make information any less accessible. Moreover, there is no suggestion before us that any information in the original tithe maps has not been included in the digitised versions so that it is not accessible at all through that medium.

We are satisfied that the information requested is both publicly available and easily accessible to the Appellant in another form or format, and that the Council was entitled to refuse the Request, pursuant to Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR.

The Appellant suggested that if the Tribunal were to find that Regulation 6(1)(b) did not apply, the Respondent may wish to argue that Regulation 6(1)(a) may apply in the alternative, and the Appellant sought to anticipate such an argument in his written submissions. The Commissioner (the only Respondent) has not offered such an argument, and the Council’s (and the Commissioner’s) position has rested on Regulation 6(1)(b) alone. We do not therefore address the Appellant’s points in relation to Regulation 6(1)(a); nor do we think any analysis of that part of the Regulation is required, given our findings on Regulation 6(1)(b).

The Appellant submitted that, if we were to find that the Council was entitled to rely on Regulation 6(1)(b) EIR to refuse the Request, the information ought to be disclosed under FOIA. This was on the basis that if the Council is not required to make the information available under EIR because of the application of Regulation 6(1)(b), the information nevertheless satisfies section 39(1)(a) FOIA because the information must be made available under EIR, and is not therefore exempt under section 39(1)(b).

The Commissioner’s position is that the information requested is environmental information which falls to be considered by EIR not by FOIA; section 39(1)(a) FOIA provides that information is exempt information if the public authority holding it is obliged by environmental information regulations to make the information available to the public in accordance with those regulations.

As was noted by the Tribunal in Rhondda Cynon Taff CBC v IC, IT, 5 December 2007, EIR is legislation derived from the Directive and is enacted in pursuant of paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 2 to the European Communities Act 1972. FOIA, by contrast, is primary domestic legislation. In that case, the Tribunal viewed it as better to describe the two regimes as running in parallel. Each legislation imposes distinct obligations on public authorities, most notably section 1(1)(b) FOIA provides that an applicant has a right to have the information communicated to him, whereas Regulation 5 EIR provides that the public authority is obliged to make environmental information it holds available to the applicant upon request i.e. there is no obligation to communicate it to the applicant; inspection at the authority’s records office may be sufficient.

We do not accept the Commissioner’s submission (as we understood it) that disclosure of environmental information does not fall to be considered under FOIA, only under EIR. We read section 39 FOIA as acknowledging EIR as the paramount but not exclusive regime governing the disclosure of environmental information. The legislation is effectively linked in that section 39(1) FOIA gives an exemption under FOIA for information which the public authority (a) is obliged by EIR to make available, or (b) would be obliged by EIR to make available were it not for an exemption in EIR. However, the FOIA exemption is a qualified exemption so that the public interest in maintaining the exemption must outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

The Appellant speculated in his Reply to the Commissioner’s Response to his Notice of Appeal as to what public interest might justify withholding the information in the form sought, even though this was not an issue which the Commissioner addressed in his Response, or in the Decision Notice). The Appellant noted that in the Commissioner’s published guidance “Charging for information under the Environmental Information Regulations (EIR)”, the ICO has stated “Section 39 of FOIA states that information is exempt from disclosure under the Act if the public authority is obliged to disclose the information under the EIR. The exemption is subject to a public interest test. Although there is a public interest in making information freely available under FOIA, the ICO considers that there is an overriding public interest in implementing the EIR as intended by the Directive. Therefore, the ICO would not accept the argument that it would be in the public interest for requests chargeable under the EIR to be handled under FOIA instead.” The Commissioner also did not address the issue of the public interest in his final written submissions.

The Appellant inferred that perhaps the Council did not wish its intellectual property rights in the map data to be prejudiced by proliferation of the data in the public domain e.g. if it were to place the data on a website. He submitted that the placing of the data in the public domain would indirectly achieve the objectives of the Directive; that the Council had received a substantial grant to digitise the maps so that the public might have access to the data; the Convention recognises that public authorities hold environmental information in the public interest; and the Convention Guidance refers to the requirement of public authorities to serve the needs of the public, including individual members of the public.

It may be that it was implicit in the Commissioner’s position that there is a public interest in upholding EIR as the exclusive regime to govern disclosure of environmental information. It is not obvious to us, however, that there is a public interest in upholding EIR as the exclusive regime, and, absent submission from the Commissioner on the public interest point in any event, we are not satisfied, in all the circumstances of the case, that the public interest in maintaining the exemption can be said to outweigh the public interest in disclosing the information. On that basis, we do not find that the information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.

Accordingly, it is necessary for us to consider section 21 FOIA, which provides that information which is reasonably accessible to the applicant otherwise than under s1 FOIA is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Information is to be regarded as reasonably accessible to the applicant even though it is accessible only on payment (section 21(2)(a)), and if it is information which the public authority is obliged by or under any enactment to communicate (otherwise than by making the information available for inspection) to members of the public on request, whether free of charge or on payment (section 21(2)(b)).

We read section 21(2) as identifying non-exclusive circumstances in which information might be characterised as reasonably accessible. Section 21(2)(a) is of no relevance as the Council is not making the information available to the Appellant under the EIR on condition of payment. We do not consider that the information falls to be characterised as reasonably accessible under section 21(2)(b) as the Council is not obliged to communicate the information in the maps to the Appellant (as distinct from making it available to him).

Section 21(1)(3) provides that information which does not fall within section 21(2)(b) is not to be regarded as reasonably accessible to an applicant merely because it is available from the public authority on request, unless the information is made available in accordance with the authority’s publication scheme and any payment required is specified in, or determined in accordance with, the scheme. Although the tithe maps are not available in accordance with the Council’s publication scheme, in our view, it is not right to characterise the information in the maps as being available on request. The Council has made the information publicly available. The request which an applicant must make is only to enable practical arrangements for inspection to be made.

We consider that the information is to be regarded as reasonably accessible to the Appellant within the meaning of section 21 FOIA. We accept that he must travel, at a cost and with expenditure of time, to the Searchroom but we do not consider that this means the information is not reasonably accessible by him. The Searchroom opening hours are generous. He has not suggested that any of the information is not readily accessible at the point of the screen in the Council’s Searchroom. We remind ourselves of the Appellant’s position that accessibility of information entails the ability to capture, retain and take it away for study. As we have already observed, we do not consider that such matters properly inform a determination of accessibility per se. We conclude, therefore, that the information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 21 FOIA.

In circumstances where we find that the information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to Regulation 6(1)(b), it is not necessary for us to address the Appellant’s submissions as to the reasonableness of the Council’s proposed charges for copies of the maps under Regulation 8 EIR.

The Tribunal upholds the Decision Notice and dismisses the appeal.