Jenna Corderoy v The Information Commissioner & Anor

The Appellant appeals under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”), against the Commissioner’s Decision Notice dated 18 April 2023 with the reference number IC-217933-T3T1 (“the DN”) which is a matter of public record.

As required by rule 23(3) of the 2009 Rules, the Commissioner states that he opposes the Appellant’s appeal and invites the Tribunal to dismiss it.

The Appellant seeks an oral hearing of this case. The Commissioner considers that this is an appeal which may appropriately be dealt with on the papers. In view of this, the Commissioner does not propose to be represented in person at any oral hearing of this matter, instead being content to rely upon the contents of his DN and the written representations in his Response to the Grounds of Appeal.

On 20 June 2022, the Appellant wrote to the Governing Body of the University of Oxford, the Public Authority herein (hereinafter referred to as “the P.A.”) to align with the DN and for brevity), in relation to this 2- part request for information as follows;

The P.A. responded on 18 July 2022. It relied on sections 40(2) and s43(2) of FOIA to withhold the requested information.

The P.A. upheld reliance on these exemptions following an internal review – although it additionally confirmed that the person making the donation did not hold a government position and was not subject to international financial sanctions.

The P.A. maintained s40(2) FOIA applied to the name of the Donor. Although admitting the DN does not discuss Part 1 and Part 2 of the request separately, the Commissioner agreed s40(2) applies to the name of the Donor because:

The Commissioner reasoned this was because:

On 27 March 2023, during the course of his investigation the Commissioner obtained submissions and a heavily redacted copy of withheld information from the P.A.

The P.A. stated the redactions were made to information it opined was out of scope.

The Commissioner made his determination upon the redacted copy of the withheld information, agreeing s40(2) and/or s43(2) applied to a majority of the information. In respect of the information that did not engage these exemptions the Commissioner ordered the public authority to disclose it. He outlined what needed to be disclosed in a Confidential Annex which was sent to the public authority only. The P.A. provided this information to the Appellant on 16 May 2023, hence complying with this step of the DN.

Prior to the publication of the DN, the Commissioner was furnished with an unredacted copy of the withheld information. Having viewed the now unredacted i.e. additional information, the Commissioner was satisfied that it was not personal data, and nor was it sufficiently covered by the arguments the P.A supplied in relation to s43 for the Commissioner to be comfortable accepting that s43 would definitely apply § [10] DN.

The Commissioner recorded a breach of s1 FOIA in the DN as the P.A. held more information than it originally identified - § [2] DN.

Recognising this, the Commissioner ordered the P.A. to issue a fresh response in respect of this additional information, which may be a refusal notice § [11] DN. The Commissioner noted the P.A. did issue a new refusal notice on 16 May 2023, exempting all the information under sections s40(2) and s43(2). However, this development the Commissioner regarded as out of scope of this present DN as no substantive finding was made in relation to this particular information. As far as the Commissioner is aware, the P.A. complied with the step in the DN by issuing a refusal notice. The Appellant has not challenged this understanding.

A summary of the outstanding withheld information (i.e. the redacted copy minus the disclosure of the information as outlined in the Confidential Annex), and the Commissioner’s detailed reasoning were illustrated in a helpful table by the Commissioner and are not rehearsed herein. - The Commissioner noted and recognised the P. A’s arguments that receiving donations was a competitive and important function of any university. The donations received enables it to maintain and enhance the quality of its research and teaching and thereby it is able to continue attracting the most talented students and staff. Publishing such information would deter donors, losing the significant funding the public authority receives, with obvious implications for its commercial interests §§ [47-49] DN.

The P.A. did not explicitly confirm which level of prejudice it was applying but the Commissioner considered the lower threshold of “would be likely to” applied- § [50] DN.

The Commissioner then considered the public interest and opined that the balance of the public interest favours maintaining the exemption § [61] DN because “The Commissioner has already set out above the information about the public authority’s procedures for considering donations that is in the public domain. He considers that the public interest in disclosure is considerably lower in relation to this particular information because it relates to proposed donations that were not made. The public interest will be highest in relation to donations that the public authority actually accepted. It is difficult to see how anyone could attempt to exert influence by proposing, but not actually making, a donation.”§ [60] DN.

The Commissioner recognised the majority of the document identifies the Donor § [23] DN hence s40(2) applied to this, and these aspects could be withheld using the same s40(2) considerations as previously. The Commissioner noted the remainder of the document engaged s43(2) FOIA for reasons set out in §§ 52, 53 and 60 of the DN. Appendix One Part 1 is thus withheld in its entirety. Appendix One Part 2 - This section was provided fully redacted when it was initially provided and so the Commissioner, upon receipt of the unredacted copy ordered the public authority to issue a fresh response, which it has done so by way of refusal notice, on 16 May 2023 and as indicated above the Commissioner confirms that this part of the request is outside the scope of this appeal and has not been challenged in this regard.

A person requesting information from a public authority has a right to be informed by the public authority in writing whether it holds the information (s.1(1)(a) FOIA) and to have that information communicated to him if the public authority holds it (s.1(1)(b) FOIA).

However, these rights are subject to certain exemptions. The relevant exemptions applicable here are s40(2) and s43(2) FOIA:

s40(2) – Personal data is:

Personal data is defined as “data which relate to a living individual who can be identified (a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual.” (s.1(1) of the Act.

The effect of section 40(2) of FOIA is that a request for personal data of a third party may only be disclosed if such disclosure is compatible with the data protection principles enshrined in the Act. Section 40(2) is an absolute exemption, so the public interest balancing test does not apply (FOIA, section 2(3)(f)(ii)). The term “personal data” is broadly defined by section 1 of the Act as “data which relate to a living individual who can be identified”. The first data protection principle (as set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Act) is that personal data “shall be processed fairly and lawfully” and in particular shall not be processed unless at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met. Aside from the individual’s consent (Schedule 2, condition 1), the most significant condition in Schedule 2 is typically condition 6(1), which is in the following terms:

Reliance on the data protection principles under s. 40(3)(a)(i) FOIA constitutes an absolute exemption (s. 2(3)(f) FOIA). The first data protection principle (Sch 1 Pt 1 §1 Act) is that:

Processing includes “disclosure of the information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available” (s. 1(1) Act), and therefore includes disclosure under FOIA.

s43(2) – commercial interests

The Tribunal in Christopher Martin Hogan and Oxford City Council v the Information Commissioner (EA/2005/0026 and 0030) (“Hogan”) set out the following useful steps to take when considering whether disclosure would be likely to prejudice commercial interest:

This exemption is subject to the public interest test.

The Appellant challenges the Commissioner’s DN. The Appellant does not object to or dispute the Commissioner’s findings that the information pertaining to the Donor is their personal data, nor disputes the other information is commercial information. Her Grounds of Appeal (“GoA”) are:

The Commissioner resists the Appeal and argues as follows:

The Commissioner maintains the data subjects’ rights outweigh the legitimate interest in publishing the information for reasons comprehensively set out in his DN and in his written Response to the GoA.

This Ground does not dislodge the Commissioner’s findings because:

The Commissioner notes the Appellant’s criticism that she found the s43(2) section of the DN difficult to decipher. The table at §§ 15 of the Commissioners’ Response is meant to assist the parties and Tribunal. However, criticism of the way the Commissioner’s DN is drafted in any event, he argues, is outside the scope of this appeal.

The Commissioner maintains the public interest in maintaining the s43(2) exemption outweighs disclosure, and none of the following GoA dislodge or overturn this conclusion:

In § 23 of the GoA the Appellant simply states the P.A. must open itself to scrutiny and reveal the name of the donor and associated documents. She adds that the disclosure is very much in the public interest but does not clearly explain why this disclosure will ‘bring much needed transparency.’ This statement infers there is controversy surrounding this particular donation but from the Commissioner’s research, and for the reasons outlined in the DN, he effectively argues no material controversy exists. In addition, the P.A. already stated the donor is not subject to international sanctions nor public facing.

In paragraph 24, the Appellant, the Commissioner argues, overstates the anonymity of this donation by stating “by continuing to be secretive about the highly significant donation, then questions will remain.” The Commissioner notes this donation was not the only anonymous one made to the public authority nor was it the most sizeable in the public authority’s history. There is already much published about the public authority’s processes around accepting donations. This Ground thus doesn’t tip the balance in favour of disclosure and can be dismissed.

During the course of the tribunal appeal, the Appellant indicated her expectation both parties will provide details on how due diligence was conducted over the £10 million donation, and what research was carried out on the donor. For instance, did parties:

Universities she argues, serve a vital role in society – and have much influence - but the public should know how they are funded – and who exactly is providing those funds. She draws a comparison to politics and the think tank world.

At “OpenDemocracy”, the publication the Appellant writes for, which specialises in the flow of ‘dark money’ into society, dark money refers to money given to political parties, campaigns or politicians, whose sources are not disclosed, to influence the democratic process. She has also relaunched the Who Funds You? campaign, which uses think tanks’ own income and disclosures to position them on a funding transparency scale.

Over the years the Appellant argues, there have been many calls for politics and the think tank world to be transparent over funding and there have also been calls for universities to really scrutinise the money it accepts and where it ultimately comes from. One she argues, can only do this when the names have been disclosed. If the name of the donor who provided the £10 million donation is not disclosed, then it stops the public from really scrutinising – and questioning – the source of funds.

Oxford University and Cambridge University are the UK’s top universities and are also world-renowned (and often referred to as the same e.g. ‘Oxbridge’). If Cambridge University recognises that it cannot keep information confidential indefinitely, nor, she argues, can Oxford University keep information confidential indefinitely.

The P.A.’s position, as upheld by the Commissioner, is that public disclosure of this personal data otherwise than under FOIA at the time of this request would be unfair and unlawful, contrary to Article 5(1)(a) UKGDPR. This they argue is for the following reasons;

The withheld information also includes the identities of the members of the CRDRF who considered this donation. That information is clearly the personal data of those members. The Commissioner was right to conclude that this personal data is also exempt from disclosure under section 40(2) FOIA, for these reasons: § “42 “In relation to the membership of the Committee, the public authority argued that the individuals had a reasonable expectation that their membership of the Committee would not be revealed. Membership of the Committee was kept anonymous so that the individuals involved could reach an independent view on each donation or funding proposal, free from external influence.”

Given the information already in the public domain about the Committee’s remit, the guidelines it must follow, and the criteria for judging proposals, the Commissioner was satisfied that this largely meets any legitimate interest in understanding how the Committee works. Publication would therefore be contrary to the reasonable expectations of the Committee’s membership and would be likely to cause them a certain amount of damage and distress.

Public disclosure of the withheld information in response to this FOIA request would, the P.A. argue, also have created a very significant and weighty risk of substantial prejudice to the University’s commercial interests. This is because;

Ms Corderoy’s grounds of appeal contain nothing that undermines that conclusion. Ms Corderoy understandably emphasises the importance of transparency and scrutiny, but those points have been addressed above. Transparency and scrutiny have already been adequately served; any incremental benefit from further transparency (specifically, public disclosure of information relating to the Donor, contrary to their desire for anonymity) is firmly outweighed by the harm that these disclosures would cause to the University’s fundraising efforts.

The P.A. writes in its Response to the GoA how the public interest in transparency about the acceptance of the donation was “adequately served by the information that has already been disclosed about this donation; transparency about the University’s mechanisms for vetting donations and ensuring that donated funds are not spent inappropriately; transparency about ONGC.” However, the Appellant reminded the Tribunal that the information originally published on the P.A’s website was not clear and had to be amended after she sent her FOI request.

The P.A. writes in its response: “As is apparent from the disclosures it has made, the University did carefully consider matters relating to BFSAC, given that this donation was made in recognition of BFSAC.”

The Appellant believes it is very important to examine the timeline in detail. If she is not mistaken, she argues, the BFSAC was established sometime in late 2016 according to the Charity Commission website. The inauguration of the BFSAC occurred on 1^st February 2017. 3 4 Oxford University announced the £10 million donation in May 2018. In October 2018, Professor Nargiz Pashayeva was accepted as a member of the Chancellor’s Court of Benefactors. For an organisation that is so new (and ceased to operate shortly after), what exactly had the BFSAC done from late 2016 to May 2018 for it to be deserved to be recognised? I expect Oxford University to provide some explanation.

Furthermore, at the inauguration, Professor Nargiz Pashayeva said: “I would like to thank Mr Iskandar Khalilov for his first financial support of the Oxford Nizami Ganjavi Centre.”. The Appellant asks whether Mr Khalilov, or any other individuals named in the Azer News newspaper article, was the source of the £10 million donation.

Over the years, the Appellant argues, the P.A. has attracted much controversy over who it takes money from. For instance, it has taken money from Vladimir Potanin, one of Russia’s richest men. It was criticised for accepting oligarch Len Blavatnik’s £75 million donation. It has taken millions from an oligarch’s son. It has taken money from the Sackler family. It has taken millions from fossil fuel companies.

Focusing on the specific facts of this case, it is categorically clear that (i) this Donor has given an assurance, confirmed in a legally binding Deed of Gift, about anonymity (i.e. the Donor has a legally enforceable right to remain anonymous), (ii) the Donor expressly seeks the maintenance of their anonymity, for reasons that have been openly summarised and which make sense, and (iii) as the Tribunal will see from the withheld information in the CRDRF documents, the University has carefully scrutinised the suitability of this donation.

It should also be borne in mind that the heart of this appeal is the personal data rights of the Donor (the University’s concerns about its commercial interests flow from the interference with those rights that Ms Corderoy seeks to achieve). Other than speculative generalised propositions about Azerbaijan (addressed above), there is no basis for concluding that this Donor deserves to have their anonymity flouted and their personal data rights contravened. The Donor has made a very generous gift, for the specific objectives of ONGC’s work. It is worth repeating that the Donor holds no government position, has been subject to no financial sanctions, and does not cultivate a high profile. It is also obvious that, as the IC has rightly noted, the Donor is not seeking any reputational advantage via this (expressly anonymous) donation. In summary, it would be unfair to subject this Donor to the public disclosures Ms Corderoy urges this Tribunal to order. That would be the wrong thing to do. The Donor does not deserve that outcome.

Nor is there anything in the Appellant’s case that justifies such an outcome for the Donor. Aside from generalised points about anonymous donations and about the Azerbaijani regime.

George Greenwood is a journalist employed by Times Media Ltd (“TML”) of the above address. He writes for The Times, a newspaper published by TML.

He wrote a statement in support of Jenna Corderoy’s appeal against the decision notice of the Information Commissioner’s Decision Notice IC-217933-T3T1, covering the identify of a major Azeri donor to the University arguing as follows;

On the question of public interest arguments in favour of disclosure he points to the fact there was a due diligence process and therefore we should be reassured, does not address the issue that a key reason for disclosure is to check whether that very process is working as it should, as the circumstances of this case raise serious questions about its effectiveness. This is ably demonstrated, he argued in the lack of due diligence completed on Aliyev’s sister-in-law. This argument therefore he suggests holds little weight.

At the oral hearing the Tribunal heard the Appellant provide a concise but comprehensive summary of her Grounds of appeal and expressed her genuine concerns and legitimate interest in such a significant anonymous donation, the lack of transparency in the donor’s identity and background and about the potential for “reputational laundering”. The Appellant conceded she had little added to her GoA but wished to present Professor Heathershaw and thereby substantiate her arguments and challenge the P.A assertions including the witness evidence of Professor Herzig who had provided a witness statement for the hearing to facilitate the Tribunal by way of response in clarification on the issues (mostly of the concerns) raised by Professor Heathershaw on behalf of the Appellants case.

The Tribunal heard from Professor Heathershaw, Professor Herzig and from Mr Greenwood on behalf of the Appellant and Professor Herzig on behalf of the P.A. The evidence left the Tribunal in no doubt that everyone involved is well aware of the importance of transparency and accountability on the part of this renowned and influential P.A. and particularly on the acceptance of significant and anonymous donations and in the robust scrutiny in the acceptance of donations to the P.A. Much was suggested about particular causes of concern about the identity of the donor of the significant sum of £10M and of those who sanctioned the formal agreement leading to the Deed of Gift for the donation referred to in the request for the withheld information.

Of note, Professor Heathershaw's evidence was that he had no reason to believe the due diligence process for accepting donations at the University of Oxford was not robust, although he raised concerns that financial pressures could pose risks to that process.  

The Appellant referred to confusion over the circumstance of the donation, which had initially been described on the website as being 'from' BFSAC and later changed to being “in recognition of' BFSAC”. Professor Herzig's statement described the donation as being made “on behalf of' BFSAC”.  In his evidence Professor Herzig explained that it was clearly a regrettable slip that the website had initially said from BFSAC. He clarified that, as set out in the Deed of Gift, the donor had made the gift “in honour of the BFSAC” and any other descriptions had been down to paraphrasing. The Tribunal had sight of the Deed of Gift in the closed bundle and notes that it is recorded as being in honour of the BFSAC. 

Professor Herzig confirmed that the donor had not been in direct contact with the ONGC since the time of the gift and had not involved themselves in its work. He explained that Professor Pashayeva, who is a board member appointed by BFSAC, inputs in a way that is usual for a board member.   

The closed session began at 12:15 and concluded at 12:28 and occurred so that the Tribunal could interrogate the Second Respondent on issues arising from and about the withheld information without risking its disclosure thereby defeating the purpose of the exemptions applied. The Gist of that short-Closed session has been summarised by Counsel for the P.A. and covers the points he raised briefly beforehand in Open session prior to the Closed session. He made three points that he thought necessary.

The First point is about scope: this is to ensure that, if the Tribunal were to order disclosure, it is clear that this would not extend to information that does not fall within the parameters of this request, but instead appears in the closed bundle because it is bound up in the in-scope information or is material that was shared with the ICO. That material is not relevant to the donation at which this FOIA request is aimed.

Second, he raised two points by reference to the withheld material in order to support his submission that the CRDRF’s scrutiny process for this donation was rigorous. One of those points involves showing the Tribunal what the CRDRF took into account. The other is a point about the CRDF’s decision-making.

Third, a short point about this donor, in light of what the Appellant says in her submissions. None of this can be done in open – these are all short but necessary points that will assist the Tribunal.

A final supplemental point that arose in closed session in relation to a query by the Tribunal was that the P.A. demonstrated to the Tribunal a specific example of a sizeable donation that had previously been proposed in relation to this subject area – and which the University had considered but rejected.

The Appellant submits after the evidence and in addition to her GoA the following;

If the information I seek is continued to be withheld, then we cannot scrutinise the source of that funding and the trail goes cold. Questions of legitimacy of the donation, as well as the Oxford Nizami Ganjavi Centre, will continue. We cannot assess the quality of that due diligence undertaken by the University over the £10 million donation and assess whether those policies and guidance are robust enough.

Counsel on behalf of the P.A. made the following closing submissions;

Ms Corderoy seeks the public disclosure of (i) the identity of the Donor who made an anonymous donation of £10m that the University had received in 2018 for the work of the Oxford Nizami Ganjavi Centre (“ONGC”), and (ii) correspondence of the University Committee to Review Donations and Research Funding (“CRDRF”) relating to that donation.

The latter cannot be disclosed without disclosing the former. The crucial issue in this appeal is thus whether the Donor should be named. The University’s case is that the identity of the Donor is exempt under section 40(2) FOIA (personal data) because the public disclosure of their identity would contravene their rights under the UK GDPR – specifically, it would be unfair to them, and their interests outweigh any legitimate interest in transparency (particularly by application of the principles of proportionality and the “pressing social need” test, which is a high bar). Based on the evidence, the crucial point is this: it would be unfair to subject this Donor to the public disclosures Ms Corderoy urges this Tribunal to order. That would be the wrong thing to do. The Donor does not deserve that outcome. That disclosure would not meet the “pressing social need” test; it would be disproportionate and otherwise contrary to the Donor’s data protection rights under Article 5(1)(a) UK GDPR. By application ofSouth Lanarkshire Council v Scottish IC [2013] UKSC 55 at [6], as well as the discussion in Goldsmith v IC and Home Office [2014] UKUT 0563 (AAC) at [35]-[42], section 40(2) FOIA applies in this case.

The University’s case is further that, if the Donor’s identity were to be revealed, there would be substantial adverse impact on the University’s commercial interests – most particularly, its ability to raise funds from donors who wish to remain anonymous. The University makes these key points, alongside those made in its skeleton argument:

That unfair disclosure would in turn cause real, actual and substantial prejudice to the University’s commercial interests; section 43(2) FOIA is thus engaged and the public interest favours maintaining that exemption. In a nutshell: the University’s fundraising activities take place in a highly competitive market; it competes not only against other universities (both nationally and internationally) but also other charitable institutions involved in research and similar activities (some of whom are not subject to the FOIA or similar legislation); if the University contravenes a significant donor’s reasonable expectation of privacy and anonymity, this would have a significant adverse impact on how the University is perceived in that competitive market and thus on prospective donors’ willingness to make substantial donations to the University.

Ms Corderoy’s arguments and evidence do not undermine those conclusions. She understandably focuses on public interests in ensuring that donations such as this are appropriate and have been subject to appropriate scrutiny, but the disclosures she seeks would be disproportionate to those ends. She has also made numerous points about Professor Nargiz Pashayeva’s role with ONGC, but there is already ample transparency about Professor Pashayeva’s involvement. Further, to the extent that Ms Corderoy’s case focuses on academic freedom, the evidence shows that this donation has not impinged on academic freedom at the University in any way.

The withheld information also includes the identities of the members of the CRDRF who considered this donation. That information is clearly the personal data of those members. The IC was right to conclude that this personal data is also exempt from disclosure under section 40(2) FOIA, for the reasons given at paragraphs 42-43 of the IC’s decision. In short, confidentiality about the CRDRF’s membership enables free and frank deliberation and decision-making, free from potential external pressures.

Finally, Counsel for the P.A submitted the Tribunal should therefore uphold the University’s reliance on section 40(2) and also section 43(2) FOIA. The IC reached the right decision in this case.

These have been set up out clearly in other decisions of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's general powers in relation to appeals are set out in section 58 of the Act. They are in wide terms. Section 58 provides as follows. (1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers (a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or (b) to the extent that the notice involved is an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal. (2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based. The question whether the exemptions under s40(2) and s43(2) apply is a question of law or alternatively of mixed fact and law. The Tribunal may consider the merits of the Commissioner's decision as to whether the exemption applies and may substitute its own view if it considers that the Commissioner's decision was erroneous. The Tribunal is not required to adopt the more limited approach that would be followed by the Administrative Court in carrying out a judicial review of a decision by a public authority. Our task is essentially one of fact finding and interpretation of the Law to apply on our determination of those facts.”

On hearing this appeal afresh, the Tribunal have considered all the documents, evidence and submissions before us, and referred to above, and we unanimously find that in relation to the request for the withheld information herein to be processed at the time of the review of the refusal of the request, the section 40(2) exemption was properly applied (by the P.A.) to all the Data subjects concerned (and referred to above). We can find no lawful basis under data protection legislation that would allow for their personal data to be published.

This is because on all the evidence before us (including in closed session which provided an opportunity of the Panel to carefully study the detail and scrutiny of the P.A. in their rigorous analysis, inter-alia the sources of the donation and the reputation of the donor). The Tribunal note that this was regarded by the P.A. as a High-Risk case, and we also noted an earlier similar proposed donation from another source had been rejected. We are satisfied that there was detailed and careful scrutiny by the P.A. It is not the role of the Tribunal to decide whether Universities per se should be allowed to accept anonymous donations, nor to consider the merits of any particular donation. The P.A. has a committee and a process in place for just this purpose and in this case after careful scrutiny it found no issues that would render the donation unwelcome. We find the legitimate interests in disclosing the withheld information do not outweigh the Data subject’s privacy rights and in all the circumstances before us and as referred to above it would be disproportionate to do so. We are satisfied that the criteria as set out herein at § 23 above have been met in that regard.

Further on consideration of all the evidence before us and in all the circumstances as outlined above (including in closed session) we find s43(2)(2) was properly relied upon by the P.A. in relation to the withheld information because of the clear prejudice to the P.A.’ s commercial interests (see § 26 above).

We accept and adopt the comprehensive and compelling submissions by Counsel on behalf of the P.A. (referred to above) and without rehearsing the detailed evidence and submissions thereon we accept and adopt his substantive submissions on the material issues before us.

The Tribunal having heard this appeal afresh and considered all the factual background and legal submissions we accordingly can find no error, either in law or in the exercise of his discretion by the Commissioner in the DN and we must dismiss the appeal.

The Tribunal wish to thank the parties and all the above-named witnesses for giving evidence and for their conscientious and thorough presentation of their respective cases. The Appellant presented her appeal with thorough and sincere design. However as UT Judge Wikeley said: (cited at § 42(7) above) ” - - desirability is not necessity”.

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as we can find no error of Law in the DN nor in the exercise of his discretion by the Commissioner therein. We effectively accept and adopt his reasoning as so clearly set out throughout his comprehensive DN and his compelling Response to the GoA as summarised at §§ 30 – 36 above.