Join The Triboo Limited v The Information Commissioner

It is noted that JTT cites no authority for a ‘watered-down’ approach to the issue of specific consent. Read in light of the CJEU’s decisions in Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV v Planet49 GmbH(EU:C:2019:801) [2020] 1 WLR 2248 (‘Planet49’) andCase C-61/19 Orange Romania SA v ANSPDCP (EU:C:2020:901) (‘Orange Romania’) it is submitted that the Commissioner’s requirement that direct marketers demonstrate each user’s consent “as to the type of marketing communication to be received, and the organisation, or specific type of organisation, that will be sending it” is hardly an exacting or an excessive standard.

The opt-ins in relation to three of JTT’s websites (uk.job-search.online, uk.jobinaclick.net and findajob.website) were no more specific than “I agree with marketing activity”.

As regards the link to the privacy policy, there was no separate “3^rd party policy” referred to but only a bland reference to marketing activities for third parties, “who may operate in any business sector” and who are elsewhere referred to as JTT’s “business partners” and “clients”. Individuals are informed in the policy that they “may” be contacted by email within 11 broad categories including “financial” or “clubs, organisations and web sites/portals”. The policy also contains a very broad statement concerning the potential disclosure of data.

In relation to uk.jobs4you.website, the consent statement referred to “offers by email fromjob4you on behalf of selected companies that we will be of interest to you” within one of five specified categories including the catch-all “General”. In relation to savings.direct, the consent statement stated that “by entering you agree to receive information & offers by email, phone, SMS and post from 3rd Parties”, but makes no mention of any marketing, only “communications” made for purposes unspecified and unknown.

In all the circumstances, it is submitted that the Commissioner was plainly right to conclude that JTT had failed to provide users of the websites with “sufficiently detailed” information about its direct marketing to enable them to give consent that was both “specific” and “informed”.

It is submitted that the fact that half of users signed up and half did not says nothing whatsoever about whether the information provided was sufficiently detailed to enable an informed choice to be made.

The Commissioner submitted that it is unsurprising that the Commissioner received no complaints since users who received the emails would not have appreciated any link to the websites operated by JTT.

It is submitted that sending 107 million marketing emails in the space of little over 12 months was plainly an intrusion into the privacy of those recipients who had never properly consented to them in the first place.

It is submitted that sending 107 million emails in little more than a year without valid consent cannot be described as technical or marginal. JTT does not know if there was damage or distress or material impact on recipient’s privacy rights. The potential for very large numbers of infringements is a reason for greater caution.

The Commissioner submitted that JTT’s argument that it could not have known about the risk is fanciful. The PECR guidance made clear the need for specific and informed consent and JTT is an experienced operator.

The Commissioner found that there was damage as well as distress and it is submitted that the exclusion of distress only applies to the making of an EN not a MPN under section 55A.

It is submitted that there has been no failure by the Commissioner to follow his own Regulatory Action Policy or his Internal Procedure. JTT remains unable to point to any specific respect in which they are incompatible with his published policies.

The Commissioner submitted that the reference to ‘legitimate’ companies made in a press release following the issue of the EN has no bearing on the validity of the EN.

It is submitted that if the statutory conditions are satisfied it cannot be argued that the contravention was not serious. It is not unlawful for the Commissioner to exercise his discretion to issue notices in cases where the statutory criteria for those notices to be issued are met.

Although JTT has an operating loss of £1414,801 in the year ending 31 December 2020, JTT’s annual revenues for the same year were £956,114. JTT is part of a large international group whose parent company has market capitalisation in excess of €20 million. The Commissioner submitted that it is very unlikely that the monetary penalty notice would have a “terminal impact” on JTT’s business.

The Commissioner submitted that he took into account that JTT had taken steps to change its consent statements. He disagreed that JTT’s interpretation was reasonable.

Given, however, that JTT continued its operations even after being notified of the Commissioner’s concerns, an enforcement notice, according to the Commissioner, was plainly a necessary and reasonable step to prevent further contraventions of the law.

To the extent that the Commissioner took information about Triboo SpA into account, he failed to include this in the Notices. Consequently, it is submitted that the Notices are defective for, and the decision to serve them is vitiated by, a failure to give adequate reasons. It is submitted that the Commissioner unlawfully and unfairly failed to give JTT an opportunity to address this issue. The market capitalisation of Triboo SpA is irrelevant.

It is submitted that the revenue of JTT is irrelevant when considering its ability to pay a penalty. JTT accordingly stands by the point that a MPN of £130,000 would be terminal for JTT’s business.

The tribunal read and took account of a bundle of documents.

The issues for the tribunal to determine are:

Mr. Hopkins submitted that it was highly relevant that some 2.5 years had elapsed between the end of the relevant period (August 2019 to August 2020) and the decision to issue the notices in April 2023. He submitted that the tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Commissioner in April 2023, should take into account the new versions of the consent statements when deciding whether to exercise discretionary enforcement functions. Mr. Hopkins submitted that the Enforcement Notices was entirely useless because things had changed by then. He said that the notices were an irrational and pointless exercise of the discretion to impose sanctions because they were directed at a target that has long since fallen away, because JTTs practices had been changed since at least December 2021.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that any contravention cannot possibly be categorised as serious. He drew the tribunal’s attention to an important structural feature of this case which he says distinguishes it from many other PECR cases that end up before the tribunal, in that the marketing emails are triggered by a voluntary opt-in box. He submitted that users of the website were entitled to choose without any adverse consequences whether to say yes or not to third party contact. There is no pre-ticked box, there is no reliance on users having done something else such as transacted with JTT or signed up for a produce or a service. In those circumstances Mr. Hopkins submitted that it makes no sense to call a contravention serious and issue draconian enforcement notices where emails have been sent specifically because individuals decided to tick the ‘yes’ box. This is bolstered by the fact that there were no complaints.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that even if the Commissioner establishes that the statutory conditions were met, he was wrong to exercise his discretion to take enforcement action, relying on the same points relied on in relation to seriousness. Further it was submitted that it is simply wrong to issue a monetary penalty notice that would be terminal for JTT’s business.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that marketing emails were only sent by JTT or third parties to those who chose to register on one of these website and filled in the registration details. However that was not sufficient. The individual also had to tick a yes or no box. Mr. Hopkins stated that it was important to note that this was not a regime where, if you did not tick yes, you could not proceed. Mr. Hopkins submitted that you could register and receive updates about job vacancies even if you chose to say no to the marketing communications.

In support of this Mr. Hopkins relied on the letter from JTT to the Commissioner dated 21 September 2020 which states at p 294 of the bundle:

Mr. Hopkins took the tribunal to examples of the consent statements and privacy policies in the bundle.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that even if the tribunal took the view that the wording was ambiguous in relation to whether or not consent was given merely by entering the website or registering, in fact emails were not sent unless the consent box was ticked. He submitted that these enforcement notices relate to the sending of the emails, they are not a penalty for having materials that are not clear or transparent.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that the consent statement had to be read as a package with the privacy policy. He submitted that the privacy policy gives a comprehensive and detailed list of the third parties who might contact the individual and gives links to their privacy policies. It provides specific details of the different types of marketing activities and the different sectors. The individual will understand what they will be getting: they are going to be sent offers for products and services within the categories in the list by the companies in the list.

On the basis of the privacy policy, Mr. Hopkins submitted that there is amply sufficient information to enable the people using the website and contemplating whether to click no or yes to understand exactly what they were signing up for if they clicked yes.

Mr. Hopkins argued that the fact that over the relevant period around 56% ticked the boxes saying yes, suggests that people could and did exercise a genuine choice and understood what they would receive. The fact that around half said yes and half said no does not support the impression that this was skewed so as by default to trick people into signing up for things they didn’t understand.

Mr. Hopkins took the tribunal to an example of one of the marketing emails from during or shortly after the relevant period (p353). Mr. Hopkins drew the tribunal’s attention to the unsubscribe links and the fact that the email states how the individual came to receive such emails (‘You have received this email to [redacted] as a registered user of Jobsearch’). If the Commissioner is right that insufficiently specific information is provided on the basis of the consent boxes, Mr. Hopkins argued that any information gap is quickly remedied in the first email which specifies which website they signed up on and gives an option to unsubscribe.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that this is a vital part of the analysis in relation to seriousness and in exercising the discretion to take enforcement action bearing in mind the guiding principles of purposiveness and proportionality.

Mr. Hopkins took the tribunal to the new versions of the consent statements introduced in 2021 (see p 410). Mr. Hopkins submitted that this was not a concession that the earlier versions were inadequate but JTT trying to improve, taking advice and making improvements to enhance the information provided.

Mr Hopkins submitted that the financial position of JTT does not enable them to pay a fine of £130,000. He relies on the email to the Commissioner at p 127 of the bundle and the profit and loss accounts at p 189 which show an operating loss of £180,616 for the financial year up to December 2020, and an operating loss excluding finance costs of £141,801.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that the Commissioner is wrong to rely on JTT’s revenue. Further, he argued that it is fundamentally misconceived to take into account speculation that JTT’s parent company might ‘bail them out’.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that there was no alleged contravention in relation to whether consent was freely given or unambiguous. He submitted that the issue was whether the consents were sufficiently ‘specific’ or ‘informed’ to meet the standards in Article 4(11) GDPR. Mr. Hopkins drew the tribunal’s attention to what he termed a specific acceptance at p 219 by the Commissioner in the enforcement decision record to the effect that consent was freely given.

In relation to the meaning of ‘specific and informed’ Mr. Hopkins submitted that this is not defined in the legislation. The meaning is context dependent.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that ‘specific’ means that the tribunal has to ask if the opt-ins were specific indications of agreement to the purpose for which data will be processed. Specific does not mean that there needs to be specificity as to the particular party or sector. Mr. Hopkins relied on the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679 to support his submission.

Mr Hopkins argued that individuals were asked to give consent to the specific purpose of marketing, which was hived off from registration to the website.

In relation to ‘informed’ consent, Mr. Hopkins noted that the EDPB is of the opinion that at least the following information is required for obtaining valid consent:

Mr. Hopkins submitted the express descriptions of emails, marketing activity, sectors and the third parties taken together comfortably falls within the EDPB guidance on what informed consent looks like.

Mr. Hopkins noted that the Commissioner at para 47 of the MPN states that:

Mr. Hopkins argued that that is not what the EPDPB guidance says, which is that it has to be specific as to purpose not as to the granular detail.

Mr. Hopkins submitted even applying the Commissioner’s ‘gloss’ on the standard, JTT met that threshold. He argued that the consent statements and the privacy policy provided sufficiently clear specific granular information about what the email address would be used for, and who would be sending the communications.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that, for the same reasons, the opt-ins were provided on a sufficiently informed basis. “Marketing” is a very common and well-understood aspect of 21^st century life, in particular in the context of registrations on websites. Those who were interested in more information about the kinds of organisation who might send them marketing communications could click the hyperlink to the privacy policy. Within that privacy policy, JTT described the types of third parties who may send marketing communications (e.g. by sector or type of offer). For the jobs websites, the privacy policy also provided a lengthy illustrative list specifying companies who may send marketing communications (e.g. Scottish Power, O2, Sky UK), together with links to the privacy policies of those companies.

Mr. Hopkins argued that it is not open to the Commissioner or the tribunal to ‘micro-manage’. the exact way in which the information was presented, if that information complies with the minimum standard imposed by law.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that it is important to take a step back and take a purposive and proportionate approach. The Commissioner’s approach, he submitted, is divorced from reality in a case where half the individuals opted in and half did not, and where there have been no complaints. Mr. Hopkins submitted that there was a strong resonance between this case and Xerpla Limited v ICO (EA/2017/0262), where the tribunal overturned a MPN issued for alleged contraventions of regulation 22(2) PECR.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that data protection legislation, including PECR, must be read purposively not mechanically Dixon v North Bristol NHS Trust [2022] EWHC 3127 (KB); 191 BMLR 148 at para. 104.

The purpose of PECR, as set out in recital 40 to Directive 2002/58/EC is the protection of privacy. Mr. Hopkins submitted that the emails sent by JTT and third parties in this case did not intrude or cause any meaningful interference in an individual’s privacy given the voluntary sign-up.

Further, it is submitted that the Commissioner lost sight of the proportionality principle when it applied a ‘gold-standard’ gloss to the terms “specific” and “informed” in ways that overlook:

It is submitted that the EN is fatally undermined by the fact that it is a forward-looking document issued in April 2023, yet it fails to say anything about the new versions of JTT’s consent statements and privacy policy.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that whatever breaches the tribunal might find, they would constitute marginal and technical, rather than serious contraventions, based on differing views as to the required standards for ‘specific’ and ‘informed’. It is not an egregious case where accessing some kind of service is conditional on consent, or where repeated emails are sent after opting out.

There is no damage or distress. JTT does not understand how it is said that damage or distress would be likely where there is an opt in consent model accompanied by opt-outs in the emails.

It is submitted that the volume of emails is unsurprising given the kind of business that JTT operates, and the large number of customers who ticked a box to agree to receive such emails.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that it is accepted that the contravention was not deliberate, and it cannot be said that it knew or ought to have known about the risk because the law is not clear. JTT’s interpretation of/approach to consent was (at its lowest) reasonable, and it was thus reasonable for it not to take other steps to change its approach at that time.

In relation to the EN Mr. Hopkins submits that the ‘has contravened’ limb in section 40(1)DPA 1998 must be subject to a qualifier that the alleged contravention is (i) sufficiently recent, and (ii) risks being repeated.

It is submitted that the EN refers to distress when that is omitted from section 40(2) DPA 1998 as it applies to PECR.

Mr. Hopkins relied on the points made under ground 2 and emphasised the following:

Mr. Hopkins submitted that the tribunal should ask itself, in the light of the changes made to the polices, if something less draconian would do.

The Commissioner accepted that there is no suggestion that anyone was compelled to give consent but the concepts of freely given consent and informed consent very much go together, because, as is clear from the case law, you cannot freely give consent if you do not properly understand what you are being asked to consent to.

The Commissioner submitted that consent has to be judged in context and the factual matrix in Xerpla is very different: the Upper Tribunal noted in paragraph 64 of Leave EU the specific factual matrix described by the First-tier tribunal in Xerpla, “it was obvious what its subscribers were consenting to. It was obvious because of the service Xerpla was offering. Whether consent is informed has to be judged in context. The nature of Xerpla’s discounts/deals website was that subscribers could be sent third party offers about any products and services. That is why they subscribed to it. Had they wished to subscribe to a service offering only certain types of products and services, this was not the website for them.”

There is no meaningful comparison to this appeal, Mr. Metcalfe submitted, where individuals were using the primary websites to look for jobs.

The Commissioner submitted that, in light of the CJEU’s decisions in Planet49 and Orange Romania, the Commissioner’s requirement that direct marketers demonstrate each user’s consent “as to the type of marketing communication to be received, and the organisation, or specific type of organisation, that will be sending it” is hardly an exacting or an excessive standard

The Commissioner relied in particular on the statement by the CJEU in Orange Romania in that the data controller was required to:

It is submitted that the Commissioner’s guidance is entirely consistent with the requirement to provide users with “sufficiently detailed” information to understand the consequences of any consent they may give.

Mr. Metcalfe submitted that the EDBP guidance does not support JTT”S case.

Mr. Metcalfe highlighted paragraph 71 of the Commissioner’s guidance on direct marketing:

Mr. Metcalfe also referred to p 30 of the Commissioner’s detailed guidance on direct marketing:

Mr Metcalfe submitted that any third party controllers who are going to rely on the direct marketing consent have to be identified at the point at which consent is given and it is not enough to rely on a list of sectors or a list of particular companies buried at the end of the privacy policy.

Mr. Metcalfe took us to the consent statement of Jobinaclick and submitted that there is no specificity, the third party controller is not identified and there is no detail of the purpose beyond ‘marketing activity’, no description of the type of processing and no indication as to how to withdraw consent.

Mr. Metcalfe submits that the consent statement is not saved by the reference to the privacy policy. The specific sectors are only identified at page 7 out of 12 and the list of business partners at page 9.

Mr Metcalfe submitted that the fact that there have been no complaints does not assist. He submitted that realistically anyone aggrieved will turn on the spam filter and click unsubscribe rather than complain to the Commissioner.

Mr Hopkins relied on the fact that half the individuals clicked the ‘opt in’ box. Mr. Metcalfe submitted that if consent is not properly informed it is not consent and it follows that every email then received is an invasion of privacy because it is unsolicited. It still causes distress even if it is not as serious as a more substantial breach of privacy.

JTT’s contravention involved sending out 107 million emails to 437,324 individuals in the space of little more than a year, in circumstances where it had failed to obtain their valid consent. It is submitted that a breach of such magnitude can hardly be described as “technical” or “marginal”.

Mr. Metcalfe submitted that the fact that JTT is dealing in such very large numbers is all the more reason why they need to take very particular care in making sure that the consent form conforms with the requirements.

It is submitted that JTT’s argument that it could not have known about the risk is simply fanciful: JTT has been active in direct marketing for over 10 years and must be taken to be aware not only of the law relating to the GDPR and PECR but also all applicable guidance (including the EDPB guidance it cites repeatedly without appearing to have read its contents). In this case, both the EDPB guidance and the Commissioner’s own PECR guidance made clear the need for specific and informed consent and, in failing to follow that guidance, JTT – an experienced operator in this field - evidently ran the risk of a breach occurring.

Mr. Metcalfe submitted that the new consent forms were not in place until 16 months after the events under consideration.

It is submitted that there has been no failure to follow the Commissioner’s own policies.

Mr. Metcalfe submits that it is unusual to suggest that the operating loss for a single year should somehow be determinative. There is no obvious reason why a penalty which falls to be paid in accordance with the regulations should be given less weight than the other costs of JTT’s business.

Mr. Metcalfe submits that it is for JTT to give evidence as to the broader financial picture. JTT made a profit the following year and in the year ending 2022. The penalty would be paid now, not in 2020.

The Commissioner took into account the fact that JTT had put in place new consents in December 2021, but was not satisfied that they were necessarily compliant. It was clear to the Commissioner that JTT’s conduct in the relevant period was in breach and that is what is material to the lawfulness and the exercise of the commissioner’s discretion.

In relation to the parent company, Mr. Metcalf submits that there is nothing to say why a parent company’s resources cannot be taken into account where JTT submits that a penalty would be terminal.

In relation to the assessment of the amount of the penalty Mr. Metcalfe submitted that the tribunal was entitled to take account of the financial position as it stands in April 2024.

In relation to the enforcement notice, Mr. Metcalfe submitted that JTT continued its operations under the original consent forms for a period of 16 months after it was first notified of the Commissioner’s investigation. Mr. Metcalfe submitted that it was entirely lawful for the Commissioner to issue an enforcement notice to spell out exactly what JTT has to do in order to meet the requirement. The Commissioner's view was that the additional consents and privacy policies were not necessarily compatible, and the enforcement notice can be a mechanism whereby the Commissioner can more swiftly take steps if there are any continuing breaches in the future.

When questioned by the Judge on the clarity of some of the wording in the consent statements and the privacy policies Mr. Hopkins accepted that it could be worded better but did not accept this was anywhere near a substantive problem of people not knowing what they were getting into.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that, factually, this appeal was much closer to Xerpla than Leave EU and Planet 49. He stated that the highest these cases go in terms of principles is that there is a relatively high bar for valid consent. They do not provide that there must, for example, be a list of opt in boxes listing every single person who might send you marketing communications.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that Leave EUdoes not say anything about the relevance of the number of complaints to seriousness or the exercise of discretion and therefore this can still be taken into account under grounds 2 and 3.

Mr. Hopkins noted that the detailed guidance referred to by the Commissioner dates from December 2022 so cannot be used as a pointer to what JTT ought to have known. In any event the general principles in that guidance are unproblematic. JTT were specific in the privacy policy that this was email marketing and listed every company that was going to send emails. The option to unsubscribe is contained in the emails. The Commissioner complains that the information appears in the ‘small print’. Mr Hopkins submits firstly that the online journey would look slightly different to the print out and in any event that the Commissioner is micromanaging exactly how he wants the notices to be laid out which is not permissible.

Mr. Hopkins submitted that the bottom line appeared to be that the Commissioner says that in order to be valid there has to be a list of every intended sender with a tick box next to each one. He submitted that is not what JTT does, nor what anyone does, nor what the law requires.

Mr. Hopkins drew the tribunal’s attention to the other financial information in the bundle. The yearly profit for the year ending 2022 was just less than £40,000. The accounts for 2020 include the figure for 2019. The details provided in the letter at p 127 show that the company did not have the cash reserves to pay the penalty.

Mr. Hopkins noted that Mr. Metcalfe had stated that the new versions of the consent statements were ‘not necessarily compliant’. Mr. Hopkins stated that JTT had never been told what was wrong with the new versions.

It is submitted that the idea of the enforcement notice being used expressly to enable the Commissioner to punish JTT for future infractions illustrates why it should not be in force. An enforcement notice cannot simply say that JTT should comply with the law, they are obliged to do that in any event. The enforcement notice has to specify what practice needs to change and what JTT must do to avoid potential future sanctions.

We undertake a full merits review, although we accord due respect to the Commissioner as regulator.

Whilst we have needed to examine the wording of the consent statements and privacy policies in detail, we do not accept that this is ‘micro-managing’ the exact way in which the information is presented.

Information does not need to be presented in a particular way, but the Controller must ‘provide the data subject with information relating to all the circumstances surrounding the data processing, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, allowing the data subject to be aware of, inter alia, the type of data to be processed, the identity of the controller, the period and procedures for that processing and the purposes of the processing. Such information must enable the data subject to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and ensure that the consent given is well informed.’ (para 40 Orange Romania)

We accept that data protection legislation must be construed purposively and not mechanically. Mr. Hopkins referred us to recital 40 to Directive 2002/58/EC which reads:

Mr. Hopkins submitted that the notion that unsolicited emails might impose a burden and/or cost on the recipient was somewhat out of date. We note that the ECJ in Pegnitz(Case C-102/20 StWL Städtische Werke Lauf a.d Pegnitz Gmbh v Eprimo Gmbh [2022] 2 C.M.L.R. 21), which was decided in 2021, proceeded on the basis that unsolicited emails (spam) did impose a burden. An individual is only able to free the space to see all their exclusively private emails after they have checked the content of the unsolicited email and actively deleted it (paragraph 41 Pegnitz).

We agree with the Advocate General’s opinion in Pegnitz at paragraph 57 that unsolicited emails do amount to an invasion of privacy because users regard their private email inbox as coming within their private sphere. Thus we do not accept that there is no meaningful invasion of privacy where those emails are unsolicited and prior consent, as defined, has not been obtained.

We accept that whether consent is informed has to be construed in context. Mr. Hopkins submitted that there was a strong resonance between this case and Xerpla. That case concerned consent given on a discounts/deals website where subscribers could be sent third party offers about any products and services.

That is very different to the websites in this appeal which are either (a) a website that provides assistance with searching for jobs or (b) in the case of Savingdirect a website for finding the best quote for solar panel installation. Unlike subscribers in Xerpla those who register on a jobs website or a solar panel installation quote website are not registering in order to be sent third party offers about any products and services. They are registering specifically for assistance with job searches or for getting the best quote for solar panel installation. That is the context in which we must construe whether or not the consent was informed.

We have taken care not to apply any gloss, and certainly no ‘gold-standard’ gloss to the terms “specific” and “informed”. We have interpreted them in the light of the statute, the case law and, where appropriate, the EDPB guidance.

We do not accept that any information contained in the emails themselves is relevant to the question of whether the prior consent was informed or specific.

The changes made after the relevant period are not relevant to the question of whether or not there was a contravention of PECR in the relevant period.

The fact that no complaints were made is not, we find, relevant to the question of whether or not there has been a breach of PECR. As the Upper Tribunal stated at paragraph 54 of Leave.EU, ‘the volume of complaints cannot be a reliable let alone determinative metric for deciding whether there has been a PECR breach, given that subscribers have easier default options than lodging a formal complaint with the Commissioner’.

Between 1 August 2019 and 19 August 2020 JTT sent approximately 107 marketing communications by email, either on its own behalf or on behalf of other organisations, to 437,324 recipients who had provided JTT with their email addresses via one of five websites.

These were unsolicited communications. Under regulation 22 PECR such emails can only be sent if the recipient of the electronic mail has previously notified JTT that ‘he consents for the time being to such communications being sent’ by JTT.

For the purposes of regulation 22, consent is defined in article 4(11) GDPR as follows:

We accept that the Commissioner did not base the MPN or the EN on the grounds that the consent was not ‘freely given’ or ‘unambiguous’ and the parties’ and thus our focus is primarily on whether the consent was specific and informed. However, there is significant overlap between the different elements, and a number of factors that would be relevant to whether consent was freely given and unambiguous will also be relevant to whether consent was, in particular, informed. The fact that recipients of emails ‘voluntarily signed up’ for such emails does not carry weight if they did not sign up on an informed basis.

We accept Mr. Hopkins’ submission, which he based to a large extent on the EDPB guidelines, that consent has to be specific as to purpose. At paragraph 58 of Planet 49 the Court of Justice ruled that “the indication of the data subject’s wishes referred to in Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46 must, inter alia, be ‘specific’ in the sense that it must relate specifically to the processing of the data in question and cannot be inferred from an indication of the data subject’s wishes for other purposes”.

The purpose for which personal data is collected must, under article 5(1)(b) GDPR, be ‘specified, explicit and legitimate’. ‘Specified’ implies that the purpose of the collection must be clearly and specifically identified. The purpose has to be defined sufficiently precisely and specifically, because it enables the assessment of, for example, whether further processing is for compatible purposes, and in order to apply other GDPR requirements including, for example, the adequacy, relevance and proportionality of the data collected. (Footnote: ¹)

Thus, the purpose has to be sufficiently defined to delimit the scope of the processing operation. The EDPB quotes p 17 of the Article 29 Working Party Opinion 3/201 on purpose limitation of 2 April 201 (WP29 Opinion 3/2013) at FN30 of its guidance on consent: “For these reasons, a purpose that is vague or general, such as for instance ‘improving users’ experience’, ‘marketing purposes’, ‘IT-security purposes’ or ‘future research’ will - without more detail – usually not meet the criteria of being ‘specific’”.

Consent also has to be informed. In Planet49theCourt agreed with the Advocate General that clear and comprehensive information (as required by Article 5(3) of the 2002 Directive) “implies that a user must be in a position to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and ensure that the consent given is well informed. It must be clearly comprehensible and sufficiently detailed so as to enable the user to comprehend the functioning of the cookies employed” (CJEU judgment at paragraph 74).

The Court reaffirmed the passage from Planet49 at paragraph 74 in Orange Romania at paragraph 40:

Turning to the question of whether or not JTT had obtained consent under regulation 22, we look first at the two Jobsearch consent statements:

We refer to the marketing activity consent statement as ‘the first consent statement’ and the 3^rd parties policy consent statement as ‘the second consent statement.

The first consent statement does not contain any indication of what marketing activity might be carried out. The stated purpose of ‘Marketing Activity’ is too vague to be a specified purpose within the GDPR and accordingly the consent is not specific. There is no indication of who will be carrying out the marketing activity or whether the controller is JTT or third parties or both. There is no indication that the marketing activity will include communication by email. The consent statement does not show that the data subject had consented to ‘such communications’ as required by regulation 22 of PECR.

Mr. Hopkins asks us to consider the consent statement in conjunction with the privacy policy. The privacy policy is not hyperlinked from the first consent statement, but is hyperlinked from a number of other places.

There is a third consent statement on the page, which was not referred to in this appeal, which allows the data subject to tick a yes or no box in relation to receiving marketing from Trades Courses. That consent statement contains a hyperlink to the privacy policy as follows: ‘By selecting yes, you consent to Trades Courses sending you marketing about their products/services that are relevant to you. You can unsubscribe at any time. Read the Privacy Policy to find out more. Thank you! Read.”

The hyperlink to the privacy policy is also at the bottom of the page, above a button labelled ‘Register’ in the following statement: ‘By entering you agree to our privacy policy, and to receive communications by email, phone & sms from Jobsearch’. The ordinary meaning of ‘entering’ would be entering a website. In this context it might also be construed to mean ‘clicking the register button’. What it cannot sensibly mean is ‘By clicking yes to the first of three different consent statements above’.

It would have been apparent to anyone considering selecting ‘yes’ in relation to marketing from Trades Courses and to anyone wondering what the consequences of registration were that more information could be found in the privacy policy.

In contrast it is not made clear to the data subject wondering whether or not to click ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to ‘marketing activity’ that there is another information layer applicable to that particular consent statement.

In any event, whilst a layered way of presenting information can be appropriate, the first layer in JTT’s first consent statement does not even specify the purpose of the processing or the identity of the controller. Particularly in the light of the lack of clarity as to where further information in relation to this particular consent statement could be found, the data subject is not in a position to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give.

We note the following passage from FN42 to the EDPB guidance:

In addition, although we accept JTT’s evidence that it was not necessary to tick ‘yes’ to the first consent statement to register, and that registration alone provided access to job bulletin emails, this is not clear from the registration and welcome pages.

At no point was the data subject informed that receiving job related emails was not conditional upon giving consent to marketing activity.

We agree with the Advocate General in Planet49 when he gave his opinion at paragraph 67 that, in relation to the obligation to inform, “it must be made crystal-clear to a user whether the activity he pursues on the internet is contingent upon the giving of consent. A user must be in a position to assess to what extent he is prepared to give his data in order to pursue his activity on the internet. There must be no room for any ambiguity whatsoever. A user must know whether and, if so, to what extent his giving of consent has a bearing on the pursuit of his activity on the internet.”

JTT’s welcome page and registration page are, at best, ambiguous as to whether it is possible to register without consenting to marketing activity. The bottom of the registration form states clearly that ‘by entering’ you agree to our privacy policy and to receive communications by email, phone and sms from Jobsearch. Further information is provided in a ‘notice’ on a page headed ‘Welcome to Jobsearch’. This page states ‘By registering with JobSearch you permit us the right to pass some or all of your information to third parties who may send you marketing material via email, SMS or other means.’ It is not at all clear that registering to receive job related emails is separate to agreeing to marketing activity.

Read as a whole, particularly given the use of the broad phrase ‘marketing activity’ we find that data subjects might well form the view from the first information layer that receiving job emails or registering to receive such emails was conditional on ticking ‘yes’ to marketing activity. It is not clear that separate consent can be given to those separate purposes.

Even if a data subject understands that further information is available in the privacy policy, we are not satisfied for the following reasons that the consent statement, considered in conjunction with the privacy policy, meets the requirements of regulation 22.

First, it is not clear from the policy what a data subject is separately consenting to by clicking the ‘yes’ box to marketing activity. As set out above, data subjects are informed that by ‘entering’ (presumably registering or using the website) they have agreed to the privacy policy, and to receive communications by email, phone & sms from Jobsearch. They are also informed that by registering with Jobsearch they have permitted Jobsearch the right to pass some or all of their information to third parties who may send them marketing material via email, SMS or other means.

The nature of the communications that are sent to those who simply ‘register’ without opting in to marketing (whether job alerts or otherwise) is not made clear in the privacy policy, and therefore the additional communications that are covered by the separate consent tick box are unclear.

For example, the privacy policy sets out on the first page that it ‘describes how Join The Triboo Ltd, will use the information that you provide to it (whether by completing the registration form or using its website job-search.online’). It does not identify which purposes are related to which consent statement and which arise purely from filling in the registration form or using the website.

The privacy policy creates further confusion as to whether it is possible to register without agreeing to marketing activity.

For example, under ‘your personal information’ the policy states that personal information is collected ‘when you register with us’ and that ‘We use this information for directing advertising campaigns’ and that ‘Once you register with us and agree to the terms and conditions of this Privacy Policy that govern how your information will be processed, you will not be anonymous to us and our partners and clients and will become of our users’.

Under ‘disclosure of personal information’ the policy states ‘By registering with us you permit us or our partners or clients to use such information that you provide to alert you to a range of promotions etc..’ and ‘When you register with us you consent to us sending personally identifiable information about you to our partners or our clients and in particular we may” share, rent or sell such information for marketing purposes… send the information to our partners or clients who work with us for marketing purposes’.

It also states, under ‘Your acceptance of these terms’, ‘By using this site you consent to the collection and use of this information by use and to our privacy policy’.

Under the heading ‘Data Sharing’ the privacy policy states ‘Following explicit consent in the registration form Triboo may share you email address and job-related preferences with vendors that they use to send them email job alerts’. It is unclear which consent statement in the registration form is intended to apply to the sending of job alerts.

Finally, the heading ‘Opting-out (Deregistration)’ follows a table setting out the list of Commercial Purposes, referred to above, which includes technical administration of the web site, research and development, customer administration, marketing and trading in personal data. Under the ‘Opting out (Deregistration)’ heading the privacy policy states:

This opt-out paragraph creates the clear impression that registration and consent to marketing and trading in personal data are intrinsically linked. By opting out from marketing, data subjects are told that they will not receive any further communications from Jobsearch.

Even having read the privacy policy we find that data subjects might well form the view that receiving job emails or registering to receive such emails was conditional on ticking ‘yes’ to marketing activity. It is not clear that separate consent can be given to those separate purposes.

Mr. Hopkins argued that the fact that over the relevant period around 56% of those registering ticked the boxes saying yes, suggests that people could and did exercise a genuine choice and understood what they would receive. He said that the fact that around half said yes and half said no does not support the impression that this was skewed to trick people into signing up for things they didn’t understand by default.

We accept that those that said ‘no’ (around 44%) presumably did not form the view that receiving job emails or registering to receive such job emails was conditional on ticking ‘yes’. However, in relation to those that said ‘yes’, we do not know what their understanding was. For the reasons set out above, we find that the information provided to them was not clear enough on this issue to make such consent informed consent.

Further, it is not clear from the privacy policy which parts apply to the first consent statement (as opposed to those parts that are consented to by ‘registering’ or ‘using the site’ or ticking the ‘3^rd parties policy’ box or agreeing to the privacy policy by ‘entering’ or by ticking the Trades Courses box). Accordingly, it is not clear which purposes set out in the policy have been consented to by agreeing to the first consent statement. As a result, it is not clear who will be carrying out marketing activity that has been consented to and it is not clear what type of marketing activity is covered. On that basis we are not satisfied that the consent is informed or specific.

If we are wrong about this, and in the alternative, if it is adequately clear that references to ‘marketing activities’ included all marketing activity in the privacy policy, we find that the bundle of purposes included in the policy is too broad and too vague to be a specified purpose within the GDPR and accordingly the consent is not specific.

The start of the policy states that JTT carry out ‘marketing activities’ for ‘third parties (who may operate in any business sector) and are referred to in this Privacy Policy as Our Business Partners and Clients’. Those ‘marketing activities’ are said to be ‘web publicity display, e-mail marketing and mobile marketing services to promote a wide range of products and services and client recruitment campaigns through the internet and affiliate marketing’.

‘Marketing Activities’ is defined differently later in the policy in the context of third parties as ‘the communication directly to particular individuals by e-mail, post, telephone or sms of any advertising or marketing material in response of any product or service from us, our partners or clients’. The purpose of ‘Marketing activities’ is thus extremely broad and non-specific, including direct marketing by JTT and others, by a variety of means and also the undefined purpose of ‘client recruitment campaigns’.

We find for all the reasons set out above that there is not sufficient information to enable the data subject to be able to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and that the purpose to which the agreement related was not specified, in the sense discussed above.

We conclude that the consent given by agreeing to the first consent statement was not informed or specific and accordingly that the recipients of the marketing emails had not previously notified JTT that they consented for the time being to such communications being sent by JTT.

The second consent statement states ‘I agree with 3rd parties policy’. The wording ‘3rd parties policy’ is hyperlinked to the privacy policy.

We do not accept that ticking this box amounts to ‘informed consent’. First. whilst a layered way of presenting information can be appropriate, the first layer in JTT’s second consent statement does not even specify the purpose of the processing or the identity of the controller. Particularly in the light of the confusing nature of the information that is provided in the second information layer, the data subject is not in a position to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give. We have already set out the relevant passage from FN42 to the EDPB guidance.

Further, and in any event, clicking on the link does not lead to a ‘3rd parties policy’. It leads to the privacy policy. This is confusing and may well lead data subjects to assume that the link is not working.

Even if a data subject scrolled down to attempt to find the ‘3^rd parties policy’ there is no section headed ‘3^rd parties policy’. The first substantive reference to third parties is a reference to the placing of cookies by LiveRamp and its group companies. A reader might assume that this is the ‘3rd parties policy’ to which they are agreeing.

As the 3rd parties policy tick box is separate to the ‘marketing activity’, a data subject might assume that the second consent statement is not a consent to marketing activity. They might assume that it is, for example, consent to emails from third parties containing job opportunities. Because there is no separate ‘3^rd parties policy’ or explanation of what this separate consent means, even if the data subject clicks on the hyperlink it is not possible for the data subject to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give. On this basis we find that the consent is not informed.

Further, the purpose for which consent is given via this tick box is not specified and therefore the consent is not specific. First, as set out above, the ‘3^rd parties policy’ does not exist, either as a separate document or as a separate section within the privacy policy. It is accordingly not possible to identify the purpose for which consent is given.

Second, the sections which refer to the use of data by third parties in the privacy policy include purposes as wide as ‘any Commercial Purpose including marketing activities’ (p 324). There is a table within the privacy policy that lists purposes that are referred to in the policy as ‘Commercial Purposes’, this includes research and development, marketing and trading in personal data. This bundle of purposes is too broad and too vague to be a specified purpose within the GDPR and accordingly the consent is not specific.

Finally there is confusion in relation to whether it is possible to register without agreeing to the ‘3^rd parties policy’ in the way that is set out in detail above in relation to the first consent statement.

We find for the reasons set out above that there is not sufficient information to enable the data subject to be able to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and that the purpose to which the agreement related was not specified, in the sense discussed above.

We conclude that the consent given by agreeing to the second consent statement was not informed or specific and accordingly that the recipients of the marketing emails had not previously notified JTT that they consented for the time being to such communications being sent by JTT.

The above reasoning deals with the Jobsearch consent statement and privacy policy. The reasoning and conclusions apply equally to Jobinaclick. The minor difference in the wording of the consent statement on the Findajob website does not affect our conclusions and thus the reasoning and conclusions also apply to Findajob.

The original consent statement for Job4you states:

The registration page ends with a slightly different statement to the Jobsearch page:

The ‘welcome page’ is similar to that for Jobsearch. It also provides that:

The original privacy policy for Job4you is in the bundle, but it is too small to read. We assume that it is materially identical to the privacy policies for the other jobs websites.

Much of our reasoning set out above applies equally to the Job4u statement, particularly because the privacy policy is the same.

Certain elements of our reasoning do not apply in the case of the Job4you consent statements because the wording of the consent statements is different. The consent statements attempt to set out the purposes with more specificity. They contain specific reference to emails. Both contain a link to the privacy policy.

The first consent statement specifies that the agreement is to receive offers by email from job4you on behalf of selected companies that job4you believes will be of interest to the data subject within the following categories: automotive, retail, finance, insurance or general. The statement contains a link to the privacy policy after the words ‘selected companies’.

The second consent statement specifies that the agreement is that job4you partners ‘may contact you with more interesting offers’ by email or telephone. The statement also includes a link to the privacy policy after the words ‘partners’.

Whilst ‘offers’ could be read as referring to marketing activity, in the context of registering for a jobs website, we do not accept that the data subject can identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give from this statement. Neither statement mentions advertising or marketing. It is not clear from the consent statement that the consent extends beyond ‘offers’ relevant to the data subject’s job search.

Further, even if it is understood to refer to marketing offers, there is insufficient information to allow the data subject to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give. The categories of companies are meaningless because they include the catch all category ‘general’. JTT, the controller of the data, is not identified. The privacy policy, for all the reasons set out above, is confusing.

The confusion as to what consent is given by registering/entering the website remains, because of the wording of the registration form, on the welcome page and in the privacy policy. It remains unclear which parts of the privacy policy apply separately to the first consent statement (as opposed to those parts that are consented to by ‘registering’ or ‘using the site’ or agreeing to the privacy policy or by ‘entering’ or by ticking the Trades Courses box). The bundle of purposes set out in the privacy policy is, for the reasons set out above, too vague and broad to be a specified purpose. There is confusion in relation to whether it is possible to register without giving consent for the reasons set out above.

We find for those reasons, along with those set out in relation to Jobsearch where relevant, that there is not sufficient information to enable the data subject to be able to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and that the purpose to which the agreement related was not specified, in the sense discussed above.

We conclude that the consent given by agreeing to the consent statements on the Job4you website was not informed or specific and accordingly that the recipients of the marketing emails sent by JTT on behalf of third parties had not previously notified JTT that they consented for the time being to such communications being sent by JTT.

In relation to SavingDirect the consent statements are embedded in a box entitled ‘Request a free quote’ and the final button reads ‘Request a callback’. There is no reference to marketing in the first consent statement which merely states ‘I agree to receive communications by email, phone and sms from Saving Direct’. The second consent statement refers to ‘information & offers by email, phone, sms & post from 3^rd parties’.

Looked at in the context of the webpage, it is not clear that the consents are to anything other than receiving the requested ‘no obligation quotes’. There is no reference to JTT and no reference to the purpose of direct marketing. On that basis, particularly in the light of the confusing nature of the information that is provided in the privacy policy, the data subject is not in a position to be able to determine easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give.

Although both consent statements include an ‘I agree’ and ‘I do not agree’ box, they both begin with the wording ‘By entering you agree to…’. The statement at the end of the ‘request a free quote’ box reads ‘By entering you agree to our to Privacy Policy and Terms and Conditions’. As with the jobs websites it is not clear that it is possible to consent separately to being contacted about the ‘no obligation quote’ as opposed to the broad range of marketing communications referred to in the privacy policy, many of which bear no relation to solar panel installations. The privacy policy contains much of the same wording in this regard set out above in relation to Jobsearch.

It remains unclear which parts of the privacy policy apply separately to the first consent statement (as opposed to those parts that are consented to by ‘entering’ or by agreeing to the second consent statement). The bundle of purposes set out in the privacy policy is, for the reasons set out above, too vague and broad to be a specified purpose.

We find for those reasons, along with those set out in relation to Jobsearch where relevant, that there is not sufficient information to enable the data subject to be able to identify easily the consequences of any consent he or she might give and that the purpose to which the agreement related was not specified, in the sense discussed above.

We conclude that the consent given by agreeing to the consent statements on the SavingDirect website was not informed or specific and accordingly that the recipients of the marketing emails had not previously notified JTT that they consented for the time being to such communications being sent by JTT.

For all of those reasons, we are not satisfied that the recipients of the emails sent by JTT had previously notified JTT that they consented to such communications being sent by JTT. On that basis, we find that JTT was in breach of regulation 22 of PECR in that it sent approximately 107 marketing communications by email, either on its own behalf or on behalf of other organisations, to 437,324 recipients between 1 August 2019 and 19 August 2020.

Although our reasons differ in some aspects to the Commissioner’s we agree that the consent was not specific or informed and therefore this ground of appeal does not succeed.

The statutory preconditions for issuing a MPN are that the breach is serious and that the controller knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that the contravention would occur, but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.

Mr. Hopkins argued that any breaches that we find can be categorised as ‘marginal and technical’ and are based on differing views as to the required standards for ‘specific’ and ‘informed’.

The case law gives clear guidance on the standards required and we have applied that, assisted by the EPBD guidance, to the facts.

On the Jobsearch website, the controller and the specific purpose are not provided in the first layer of information. The EDPB guidance was relied on by JTT. That guidance expressly states that ‘marketing purposes’ will - without more detail – usually not meet the criteria of being ‘specific’ and that when the identity of the controller or the purpose of the processing is not apparent from the first information layer of the layered privacy notice (and are located in further sub-layers), it will be difficult for the data controller to demonstrate that the data subject has given informed consent.

The EDPB guidance is not law, but it is a good indication of how the Commissioner or the tribunal is likely to interpret the GDPR and PECR.

JTT’s privacy policy is poorly signposted. It is confusing. Statements on the website and in the privacy policy contradict JTT’s position that registration alone is not treated as consent to direct marketing. It is impossible to identify which purposes relate to which specific consents.

In those circumstances the breaches cannot be categorised as ‘marginal and technical’. We do not accept that there is any genuine doubt or uncertainty as to whether there was a contravention of PECR. We do not accept that the breaches are based on differing views as to the required standards for ‘specific’ and ‘informed’.

We understand that the nature of JTT’s business is the sending of large numbers of direct marketing emails. Therefore, if it does not obtain consent, the number of emails in breach of PECR sent will necessarily be large. The fact that the number of emails sent is not surprising, does not, in our view, affect the impact of that number on the seriousness of the breach. 107 million marketing communications to 437,324 recipients in one year is a serious number, and we take that as a starting point.

In terms of the impact on individuals, we do not need to find damage or distress. We do take account of the fact that unsolicited direct marketing by email is a burden and an invasion of privacy. It intrudes into the private sphere of an individual’s inbox which is for private correspondence. ‘Spam’ filters are not always effective. Marketing emails take up storage space. They take up physical space on the display and have to be checked and deleted to make way for private correspondence.

The fact that any individual who received an email had clicked a ‘yes’ box, does not reduce the burden or invasion of privacy in circumstances where we have found that they were not properly informed about what they were agreeing to receive.

We accept that this is not a case where the controller has sent repeated emails after an opt out. We accept that the emails, when they are sent, identify JTT and give a number of opt-out options. Further, we accept that in fact registering is not conditional on signing up to marketing activity, albeit that this is not made clear to the data subject. These are factors that are relevant to the level of seriousness, but in our view taken along with the other matters dealt with in this section do not mean that the breach is not serious.

The fact that there have been no complaints is of limited assistance in assessing the seriousness of the breach. As the Upper Tribunal noted at paragraph 54 of Leave.EU recipients of unwanted emails have easier default options than lodging a formal complaint with the Commissioner. For example, JTT provided an opt-out button in the emails, some email providers have a ‘report as spam’ button or recipients can simply delete the email. Nonetheless we accept that this does have some relevance to our assessment of seriousness. People do make complaints to the Commissioner, and if there had been a large number of complaints we would have taken that into account as an indication of an even more serious problem. The lack of complaints is therefore a small but significant factor when assessing seriousness.

Taking account of all the matters set out above, we find that sending approximately 107 million marketing communications to 437,324 recipients in one year without having obtained prior consent is a serious breach of PECR.

It is accepted that the contravention was not deliberate.

We do not accept that the law is unclear, as set out above. The relevant parts of the EDPB guidance are set out above. The judgment in Planet49is dated 1 October 2019. The Commissioner has produced a number of guidance documents which are relevant to consent.

JTT’s business was the sending of large numbers of direct marketing emails either on its own behalf or others, via personal data obtained through websites offering unrelated services helping people find jobs or obtain solar panel quotes.

In those circumstances such a business should have been fully aware of the risk that consent statements and privacy policies of the type used on these five websites presented at least a risk of a contravention of PECR.

We do not accept that the approach to consent taken by JTT was reasonable. This is clear from our reasoning on why the consent was neither specific or informed.

For those reasons we find that JTT ought to have known that there was a risk that the contravention would occur, but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.

We find that the statutory preconditions for issuing a monetary penalty notice were present in that the breach was serious and JTT ought to have known that there was a risk that the contravention would occur but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.

There are no statutory preconditions for issuing a EN other than that the Commissioner must be satisfied that a person has contravened or is contravening any of the requirements of PECR. There is no basis upon which we could, as argued by Mr. Hopkins, read into section 40(1) DPA 1998 additional requirements that the alleged contravention is (i) sufficiently recent, and (ii) risks being repeated.

For the reasons set out above we have concluded that JTT has contravened regulation 22 of PEC. The statutory precondition for issuing the Enforcement Notice is accordingly present.

In summary whilst our reasoning differs to some extent from the Commissioners’, we agree that the statutory preconditions were met and therefore this ground of appeal does not succeed.

Once the statutory preconditions are met, the Commissioner must determine (a) whether it is appropriate to issue a MPN and (b) if so, the amount of the MPN.

Article 15a(1) of the 2002 Directive, as amended provides:

We note that article 15a(1) explicitly recognises that penalties may be applied to cover the period of any breach, even where the breach has subsequently been rectified.

The RAP at pages 23-24 sets out the factors that the Commissioner will consider when deciding whether to impose a penalty and the amount of the penalty. These include:

Although these factors are a useful indicator or the relevant factors, the requirement is that the Commissioner exercise his powers in accordance with the statutory framework and there is nothing in the RAP that precludes him from so acting, as the Upper Tribunal said in Leave.EUat paragraph 104 ‘Guidance cannot fetter discretion, so expecting it to be too prescriptive or interpreting it as if it were is not permissible’.

The factors set out in section 108(2)(b) of the Deregulation Act 2015 are also relevant, including the nature and level of risks associated with non-compliance, including the risks to economic growth; the steps taken by the business to achieve compliance and reasons for its failure; the willingness and ability of the business to address non-compliance; the likely impact of the proposed intervention on the business, and the likely impact of the proposed intervention on the wider business community, both in terms of deterring non-compliance and economic benefits to legitimate businesses.

We have had regard to all the above factors, where relevant.

In particular, we note that JTT have maintained throughout the Commissioner’s investigation and throughout the tribunal process that the original consent statements were not in breach of PECR. Although JTT amended their consent statements and privacy policies from, at the latest, December 2021, this was after a significant period of time had passed and they did so explicitly on the basis that they maintained that the original consent statements were compliant. This is not a case where the organisation acknowledges the breach at an early stage and takes steps to remedy the failure.

In any event, although some improvements have been made, we are not satisfied that the new consent statements (i.e. those introduced at the latest in December 2021) were compliant with regulation 22 PECR.

We note that the first information layer does now name the controller (Join the Triboo) and includes reference to emails, but it still only includes the non-specific broad ‘marketing purposes’. The welcome page is the same, so is the statement at the bottom of the registration page that ‘by entering’ you agree to our privacy policy. Although the privacy policy is hyperlinked from the bundle, we have not been provided with copies in the bundle and therefore we do not know how the content of the privacy policies differed in December 2021. For those reasons we are not satisfied, on the evidence before us, that JTT had remedied the issues in relation to specificity and information that we have identified in our section on breaches above.

We take account of the fact that awarding a penalty would have deterrent effect in relation to businesses engaging in similar practices, and would reinforce the need to ensure that consent is specific and informed.

The fact that there are no complaints, is of some relevance. If there had been a large number of complaints we would have seen this as evidence of a very significant level of intrusion into people’s privacy, which would have been an aggravating factor. That is not present in this case. However, as was made clear in Leave.EU, there are easier options than complaining to the Commissioner, and therefore an absence of complaints does not lead us to conclude that there was no burden or invasion of privacy for the individuals receiving unsolicited marketing emails.

We have taken account of the nature and gravity of the failure. The nature of the failings in the consent statements and privacy policies is clear from our detailed consideration of the consent statements and privacy policies above. A serious and significant number of emails were sent without proper consent over a year, each of which carries with them a small but significant intrusion into the private sphere of each individual, and a small but significant burden as a result of having to take action in relation to each of those emails.

We have also taken account of the matters considered under seriousness above.

In our view, taking all those factors into account it is proportionate to issue a monetary penalty, applying proportionality in the sense that this is a fair balance has been struck between means and ends.

Looked at in the round, we agree with the Commissioner that it was appropriate to issue a monetary penalty notice in this case.

In terms of the amount of penalty, many of the considerations considered above in relation (a) the statutory criteria and (b) whether the MPN should be issued are relevant to the amount of penalty. We have taken all the factors set out above into account.

We have also taken particular account of the financial impact on JTT.

When considering the financial impact on JTT it is appropriate to take into account the current financial position of JTT, given that the penalty will have to be paid now.

We take account of the fact that with a revenue of around £1-1.5 million this is a comparatively small enterprise and that it has no cash reserves and a negative bank balance. Further we note that the company made significant operating losses in 2019 and 2020. Since 2020 the amount of profit made by the business has increased every year. In 2021 the company made a small profit of £9,715. In 2022 the company made a profit of £36,014.

In relation to Mr. Hopkins’ submission that a fine of £130,000 would be terminal to JTT, we note that even if JTT’s profits do not continue their upward trajectory, and even if expenditure remains the same, after paying the fine JTT would make an operating loss of about £93,000. This is much lower than the operating losses made in 2019 and 2020 which were not terminal for the business.

Further, we find that that the resources of JTT’s parent company can properly be taken into account in the light of the following statement that appears in JTT’s accounts for the year ended 31 December 2022 on Companies House:

By analogy with R v NPS London [2019] EWCA Crim 228, in our view it is proper to have regard to the likely provision of funds by the parent company of the group, Triboo SpA, given the guaranteed support set out in JTT’s most recent published accounts and the fact that the parent company has market capitalisation in excess of €20 million.

For all those reasons, we are not persuaded that the fine would be terminal to JTT.

Looked at as a whole, taking into account the circumstances and seriousness of the contravention, and all the other factors set out above, we consider that the fine of £130,000 was proportionate in the sense that a fair balance has been struck between means and ends.

For the reasons set out above, ground 3 of the appeal fails in relation to the MPN.

As any enforcement notice will be forward looking, we have concluded that it is appropriate to consider the current consent statements and privacy policies operated by JTT, before determining this issue. The Judge has issued a separate case management order requiring JTT to provide the current consent statements and privacy policies and allowing the parties to provide written submissions on this issue. The parties have also been asked to indicate if they consent to the remaining issue being dealt with on the papers.