Sube & Anor v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Anor (Rev 1)

This judgment follows the trial of the claimants’ claims against two newspaper publishers, for damages and an injunction in respect of alleged harassment contrary to the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (“PHA”), and for remedies under the Data Protection Act 1998 (“DPA”).

The claimants (“Mr and Mrs Sube”) are a married couple with 9 children. They moved to this country from France in 2012. The first defendant (“News Group”) is the publisher of The Sun and the operator of its website. The second defendant (“the Express Group”) is the publisher of the Daily Express, the Daily Star, and the Daily Star Sunday, and the operator of two websites, www.express.co.uk (“the Daily Express website”) and www.dailystar.co.uk (“the Daily Star website”).

In the spring and summer of 2016, the Subes were in dispute with Luton Borough Council about the adequacy of the housing which the Council had offered the family, which at that time included 8 children. On 6 September 2016, an article about the matter appeared in a local free newspaper, the MK Citizen. Between 7 September 2016 and 2 November 2016, The Sun, the Daily Star, and the Daily Express carried articles, in print and online, about the claimants, of which the claimants complain (“the Articles”). In addition, user generated content (“UGC”) in the form of a number of reader comments relating to the Articles appeared on the websites of News Group and the Express Group. The claimants complain of a number of these (“the Posts”).

The claim against News Group relates to an article in The Sun for 7 September 2016, headed “Are they serious? First picture of four-bed house that jobless couple with eight kids slammed council for offering”, 6 other articles published in The Sun or on its website, and a number of Posts on the Sun website relating to the online articles.

The claimants sue the Express Group over

The harassment claims rely on the Articles and the Posts. They are brought pursuant to ss 1 and 3 of the PHA. Those sections, the terms of which are set out below, prohibit a person from engaging in a course of conduct that amounts to harassment, and provide for a civil remedy where harassment is established.

The data protection claims concern the Posts only. There is a claim under s 10 of the DPA, which confers a “right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress”. The section of the Particulars of Claim that relates to data protection also contains a claim for compensation, and for the remedies of blocking and erasure under DPA s 14.

The main issues for trial are, in relation to each defendant:

The main issues at the start of the trial were these:-

Mr Sube and Mrs Sube have each made two witness statements, and each has been cross-examined. News Group has relied on four witnesses: Beth Pearson, at the material times a reporter on the MK Citizen; Victoria Watson, Digital Managing Editor of The Sun; James Manning-Monro, The Sun’s Head of Social Media in September 2016; and Paul Clarkson, Managing Editor of the paper since April 2016. All have given evidence and been cross-examined. The same is true of the three witnesses on whom the Express Group has relied: Charles Wade-Palmer, who is now an Express reporter but was working for Caters News agency at the material time; Geoffrey Marsh, who had overall responsibility for the digital content of the two Express group websites; and Daniel Townend, news editor on the Daily Express.

In addition, I have a quantity of documentary evidence, the chief features of this being the MK Citizen article, the Articles, the Posts, some third-party publications, and some inter-party correspondence.

There are some factual disputes which I shall have to resolve, but first I set out some background matters which are common to all the claims. The following matters are not in dispute, save for some of what the claimants say about the impact of the publications complained of.

The family is originally from Cameroon, West Africa, but moved to France. Mrs Sube had French citizenship from birth. Mr Sube acquired it, in 2011. In 2012, the family moved to the United Kingdom. Mr Sube aimed to train as a psychiatric nurse, which he did between September 2014 and September 2017, when he qualified. Since then, he has worked as a psychiatric nurse in the NHS and acquired British citizenship.

The fees for Mr Sube’s training were met by the NHS, but the family’s living and accommodation costs were not. Initially, Mr Sube rented privately a family home in Wauluds Bank Drive, Luton, funding this with savings of £15,000 from what he had earned working in a French warehouse. There was a falling out with the landlord, and the family left. Mr Sube had been working part-time. Mrs Sube has looked after the children, and has not been in paid work. Their housing became a responsibility of Luton Council (“the Council”), albeit with contributions from Mr Sube. He had approached the Council about the family’s housing situation as early as 8 September 2014.

From April to August 2015, the family was provided with temporary hotel accommodation. On 10 August 2015, they were provided with a 3-bedroom home in Melfort Drive, Milton Keynes. The Subes’ view was that this was cramped accommodation, unsuitable for such a large family, and their evidence – unchallenged in these proceedings – is that the conditions had detrimental effects on the welfare of the parents and the children. Mr Sube complained to the Council, but was told that no alternative accommodation was available. He looked for help and support from third parties.

Mr Sube approached the homelessness charity, Shelter, and in September 2015 they asked the Council for a review of the suitability of Melfort Drive, on the grounds of location, affordability and size. On 10 November 2015, the Council upheld its original decision that the premises were suitable. At some point around this time, Mr Sube also approached the Citizens Advice Bureau. His evidence is that they told him they would contact the Council, but nothing happened. He also had some assistance from a Councillor, Hazel Simmons. By 8 December 2015, the Subes had instructed Abbott Solicitors to pursue the issue. Their efforts seem to have borne no fruit, and by 21 July 2016, Rodman Pearce solicitors had been instructed in their place. On 12 August 2016, Rodman Pearce submitted representations to the Council in support of a statutory review under s 202 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council responded on 2 September 2016. But in the meantime, Mr Sube had contacted Beth Pearson.

Ms Pearson was at that time a reporter at the MK Citizen. Mr Sube made contact with her on 25 August 2016, by phone. He called another number at the MK Citizen, and was put through to Ms Pearson. They spoke, and then had some email exchanges. She arranged for a photographer to attend the family home. The photographer attended, and took some photographs. Ms Pearson wrote an article for the MK Citizen, which was published at around 17:24 on Tuesday 6 September 2016, under the headline “Milton Keynes family of 10 slate council over claims their five bedroom home is not big enough.”

The article contained quotations attributed to Mr Sube, complaining that the family had been neglected, the conditions were cramped and terrible, and they needed a bigger house. A Council spokesperson was quoted saying that, despite the difficulties, they had managed to find affordable housing that was large enough for the family. The article reported that the family had turned down a five-bedroom house, and Mr Sube was quoted explaining that there was not enough wardrobe or storage space. The article was illustrated by a photograph of the family on the settee at Melfort Drive. Over time, this article attracted 21 comments, the majority castigating the family as “benefit scroungers”, who should be sent home and forced to repay the benefits provided to them, or similar. Some of the comments referred to other publications.

On 7 September 2016, the day after the publication of the MK Citizen article, Mr Sube and Beth Pearson had at least one phone conversation and then, between 10:24 and 10:59, some email exchanges. In an email, Mr Sube sought to correct aspects of the MK Citizen article, and provided some additional information for publication. Ms Pearson responded in some detail, concluding that she and her editor did “not see that any changes needed to be made”.

That same morning of 7 September 2016, Mr Sube was contacted by two other journalists. One was Charles Wade-Palmer, who then worked for Caters. He interviewed Mr Sube. The other was Robert Pattinson, then working for a news agency called Masons, also known as South West News Service or SWNS. By 9:54am Joanne Webb of SWNS had produced news copy under the heading “No room to manoeuvre”. Within the hour, copy from SWNS had reached the Daily Star news list.

At about 10:48 on 7 September 2016, the first of The Sun articles complained of was published online. I have set out the headline at [4] above. The article is set out in full in the Annex to my judgment of 24 May 2018 ([2018] EWHC 1234 (QB), “the First Judgment”). The article included photo captions crediting SWNS. In the First Judgment, I held that: (1) the factual meanings complained of were not conveyed by this article; (2) the article did convey derogatory comments or opinions about the Subes; but (3) none of those comments or opinions was sufficiently harmful to either claimant’s reputation to satisfy the serious harm requirement laid down by s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013: see First Judgment [13(1)], [34] and [38(1)].

The following further publications in this period are complained of. It is not necessary to set them all out in full. Appendix B to this judgment contains most of the text of one of them. This, and the headlines of the others, will give a fair summary of their gist. Some details of their content and the meanings attributed to them by the claimants can be found in the First Judgment, at the paragraphs identified below.

Depending on how one counts it, this is a total of 12 or 13 articles. In the same period, the defendants published other material, which is not complained of: an article in The Sun on 9 September, an article by Nick Ferrari in the Sunday Express for 11 September, and a letter in the Sunday Express on 18 September 2016. In addition, articles about the

The rest of September and most of October, a period of some 6 weeks, passed without any articles, of which the claimants complain, being published. In October 2016, the Subes moved to a council house in Braford Gardens, Milton Keynes. Mr Wade-Palmer found out about this, and on 30 October 2016 he visited the property and spoke to Mr Sube. A number of other journalists were present, waiting in cars to speak to the Subes. Mrs Sube asked everyone to leave. There then followed some further publicity. The following articles are complained of:

This is a total of 9 articles. Over these same few days, between 30 October and 2 November 2016, aspects of the same story were reported and commented upon in a Sun leader column of 31 October 2016, which is not complained of, and in the Mirror online (30 October), the MailOnline (31 October), the MK Citizen (31 October), The Times (1 November), the Daily Mail print edition (1 November), and in a letter published in the print edition of the Daily Express (2 November 2016).

Mr Sube’s first witness statement contains a section headed “The impact of the press articles on my family and I”, running to 15 paragraphs. His evidence is that following the publication of the initial publications by the defendants he “felt helpless, upset and felt like I had been betrayed by the MK Citizen”. He says he read “a majority” of the articles that were then published. He was shocked by the reaction of the public to the articles “in both posts on the Defendant’s (sic) website in the comments the articles they published and on social media”. He says he read “most of the comments” and that his wife spent a lot of time “reading these comments” and became “extremely upset”. He refers to “comments which threatened my family” and to “death threats”. He illustrates this by referring to a Tweet by Viscount Rhodri Colwyn Philipps, the 4^th Viscount of St David’s, offering cash to the first person to carve Mr Sube into pieces, describing Mr Sube as a “piece of shit”. (The evidence shows that, for this and other threatening behaviour, the Viscount was sentenced to imprisonment).

Mr Sube’s statement speaks of events after the family’s move to Milton Keynes. He says that, as a result of the move “we were then followed again by the press”. He suggests that neighbours were offered money to provide information about the family. He complains of journalists hiding, and of intimidation by a photographer coming out of some bushes to take pictures of Mrs Sube. As for the further articles, Mr Sube says these had “the same reaction by the public” which made the couple “very upset”. He alleges that, as a result of the articles, reporters went to Mrs Sube’s former home in Cameroon, took pictures and asked for interviews. He believes a former friend had provided the press within information, causing him a loss of trust in people.

Overall, Mr Sube says the experiences he had to endure had a detrimental effect on him and the family, at the time and in the long term. He was placed under investigation at the university and by the NHS. He lost friends at the university, and thought of leaving his course. He also lost many personal friends “who no longer wanted to be associated

The written evidence of Mrs Sube is to similar effect. She confirms what her husband says. She speaks of having lost all her friends, and says most of her family are not talking to her. She says that the reporters who visited Cameroon cast doubt on whether all the children were hers, which caused serious illness to her father. She adds this:

This written evidence was supplemented by oral evidence, in answer to questions from the claimants’ Counsel in re-examination. Mr Sube re-affirmed what he had said about the impact on him and the family, and broke down in tears.

The key features for present purposes can be quite shortly summarised.

On 17 February 2017, the claimants’ solicitors wrote a letter of claim to News Group pursuant to the Pre-Action Protocol for Defamation. It complained of 10 articles, identifying an overall “false and defamatory meaning … that [the claimants] are greedy, ungrateful and lazy jobless scroungers”, and alleging that the articles had caused and were likely to continue to cause serious harm to the claimants’ reputations.

On the morning of 21 February 2017, an internal email was sent to James Manning at The Sun, asking him “Can we urgently switch off the comments” upon six articles listed in the email. Mr Manning promptly passed this on to Victoria Watson. At 12:14 she replied, “Comments off on all”. The six articles were all those that are now complained of, except for “Take Your Pick”.

On 24 February 2017, Adam Cannon, Senior Editorial Legal Counsel, replied in detail to the letter of claim, describing it as “frivolous”. His letter included the following:

“You highlight some specific comments. Comments are not routinely pre-moderated, and if you are concerned about particular comments, they do need to be flagged. We have now removed the comments from the articles.”

On 29 August 2017, the claimants’ solicitors wrote a letter of claim to the Express Group. The letter advanced claims in relation to 7 articles. The causes of action relied on were defamation and harassment. There was no complaint about any reader comments, nor did the letter invoke the DPA. There was some correspondence between the claimants’ solicitors and the in-house lawyers for the Express Group about a “standstill agreement” to keep the claims alive, despite the imminent expiry of the limitation period in respect of some articles. No such agreement was reached.

On 5 September 2017, just before the expiry of the limitation period in respect of the earliest articles complained of, the claimants issued a claim form against News Group, the Express Group and MGN Ltd, the publisher of the Mirror titles. The claim form sought damages and other remedies for libel and harassment in respect of some of the Articles and some Posts. The proceedings were not served at that stage.

By 10 October 2017, the claim against MGN Ltd had been settled. Shortly before lunchtime on 11 October 2017, Adam Cannon emailed Victoria Watson, referring to the “ongoing legal case” involving the Subes, and asking her to remove comments on four articles. One was “Take your Pick”. Three were articles that are not complained of now. Ten minutes later, Ms Watson replied “all done”.

On 2 November 2017, Nicole Patterson, Head of Legal at the Express Group, wrote to the claimants’ solicitors in response to the letter of claim. She declined to deal with the substance of the claim, save to say that the Express Group did not believe that the article was defamatory of the claimants, and accepted no liability. An offer was made to publish some limited corrections and to make a contribution to costs. The corrections offered related to statements that Mr Sube had worked in two part-time jobs whilst studying to be a psychiatric nurse, that the sum received in benefits was far lower than £100,000 and that the Subes were exercising their statutory rights in asking Luton Borough Council to provide suitable accommodation.

On 20 December 2017, the claimants’ solicitors wrote to News Group’s solicitor, and to the Express Group, requesting that each publisher cease processing certain articles and reader comments upon them. Section 10 of the DPA was relied on. The letters said:

“Our clients are entitled to require that you as the data controller within 14 days of the date of this latter cease processing the data, on the ground that the processing of the Data in the publishing the same to readings (sic) of your newspaper and website and as widely as you have is causing and is continuing to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to our clients and their children [which] … is or would be unwarranted.”

News Group’s response, by letter of 10 January 2018, was to say that the reader comments had ceased to be available on The Sun website in February 2017. The Express Group’s response has been a little confused. It first wrote on 8 February 2018, stating that Express Newspapers did not intend to comply with the s 10 notice. Subsequently, the Express Group has asserted that this was an error and that, in fact, it had already

In the meantime, on 22 December 2017, the claimants expanded their claims against News Group and the Express Group by amendment (the proceedings had yet to be served, so permission was not required). The amendments encompassed additional articles published by the Express Group and three additional causes of action: malicious falsehood, breach of the Equality Act 2010, and breach of duty under the DPA.

On 28 December 2017, the claimants served their Particulars of Claim, reflecting the amendments made on 22 December 2017.

In January 2018, the defendants applied for orders for the trial of meaning and other issues as preliminary issues, for most of the claimants’ amendments to be disallowed, and for parts of the existing claims to be struck out. The claimants made crossapplications for permission to amend.

By the First Judgment, and a further judgment of 27 July 2018 ([2018] EWHC 1961 (QB)), I determined preliminary issues in the libel claims, and resolved the various applications and cross-applications I have mentioned. The upshot was that the libel claims were dismissed, and the amendments to add malicious falsehood and Equality Act claims were disallowed or struck out, as was a claim for exemplary damages. Permission was refused for the proposed amendments to the DPA claim, without prejudice to a further application. The unamended DPA claims were stayed pending a determination by the Information Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”). The harassment claim was not attacked at that stage, and was allowed to proceed, in an amended form.

On 13 August 2018, Amended Particulars of Claim were served, reflecting the outcome of the hearings before me. In September 2018, Defences were served. Disclosure and witness statements followed. On 27 October 2019, the Express Group served a Notice to Admit that “the online articles complained of … were taken down on 16 January 2018”. No such admission was made.

By January 2019, the basis for the stay of the DPA claims had come to an end. The DPA claim against News Group had been stayed on the basis that, on the evidence before the Court, a stay was mandatory pursuant to DPA s 32(4), as previously interpreted by the High Court: see the First Judgment at [94-98]. In July 2018, the Court of Appeal clarified the law (see Stunt v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1780 [2018] 1 WLR 6060). On 15 January 2019, in the light of that decision, the ICO made a written determination under DPA s 45(1)(b), that the data which are the subject of the pleaded claims were “not being processed with a view to the publication by any person of any journalistic, literary or artistic material which had not previously been published by the data controller”. The effect was to bring an end to the stay in respect of News Group: see DPA s 32(5)(a). The stay against the Express Group was imposed on different grounds (see the First Judgment at [99]), but has also been lifted, by order of the Court.

Thus it is that the DPA claims have come to trial together with the claims in harassment. The DPA claims remain, however, as pleaded in the Particulars of Claim served on 28 December 2017. There has been no further application for permission to amend, in that

On 23 January 2020, Steyn J, DBE heard and dismissed an application by the claimants for specific disclosure. The Judge refused the claimants’ application for “copies of all social media shares of the articles and the replies and shares of those social media posts” on the basis that there was no pleaded claim to which such documents were relevant. An application for disclosure of a recording and any transcripts of the interview between Mr Pattinson and Mr Sube was dismissed on multiple grounds. These included the fact that such an application had already been made to me, and dismissed, on the basis (among others) that the claimant’s pleaded assertion that aspects of the articles were false was a “loose end”, not anchored to any pleaded claim, and liable to be struck out unless it was somehow amended, for instance to advance a claim under DPA s 14(2): see the First Judgment at [42], [72], [107]. The pleadings never had been amended, and Steyn J said:

“It is now clear that there is no claim under section 14(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998 being pursued. Paragraph 10 of the Amended Particulars of Claim remains disembodied, unlinked to either the harassment or the Data Protection Claim.”

[2020] EWHC 358 (QB) [34]. There is therefore no context in which I could properly adjudicate on the allegations of falsity. Instead, I shall strike them out.

Another class of document of which the claimants sought disclosure was “metadata, to include when the articles were taken down”. It was contended that such data were relevant to the DPA claim. The Judge dismissed that application on the basis that neither defendant still held any such data. She noted that the defendants’ uncontradicted evidence was that the Posts had all been taken down long ago, and doubted that there was any real issue for trial on that question: [11-13].

Despite what Steyn J said about the pleaded claim under DPA s 14, that claim was still being floated when the trial began. By the end of the trial, however, that issue had fallen away; the claimants had made clear that their case was confined to claims for relief in respect of breaches of s 10. That was a wise decision: there has never been any adequately pleaded claim under DPA ss 13 or 14. As for the claims under s 10, the position remains substantially as it stood before Steyn J, and the claims must be dismissed.

Section 10 contains these relevant provisions:-

“10 - Right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress

(l)

Subject to subsection (2), an individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing, or processing for a specified purpose or in a specified manner, any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject, on the ground that, for specified reasons-

(a)

the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to another, and

(b)

that damage or distress is or would be unwarranted.

(2)

Subsection (l) does not apply-

(a)

in a case where any of the conditions in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Schedule 2 is met, or

(b)

in such other cases as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order.

(3)

The data controller must within twenty-one days of receiving a notice under subsection (1) ("the data subject notice") give the individual who gave it a written notice-

(a)

stating that he has complied or intends to comply with the data subject notice, or

(b)

stating his reasons for regarding the data subject notice as to any extent unjustified and the extent (if any) to which he has complied or intends to comply with it.

(4)

If a court is satisfied, on the application of any person who has given a notice under subsection (1) which appears to the court to be justified (or to be justified to any extent), that the data controller in question has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to take such steps for complying with the notice (or for complying with it to that extent) as the court thinks fit. …”

The relief claimed is an order under DPA s 10(4) in respect of the Posts. The claimants’ case in support of that claim remains as pleaded in paragraphs 36-38 of the Particulars of Claim served on 28 December 2017. These allege, and it is not disputed, that the Posts were “data”, and that the defendants were data controllers, within DPA s 1. Nor is issue taken with the claimants’ allegation that their solicitors’ letters of 20 December 2017 amounted to “notice in writing requiring [the defendants] at the end of 14 days to cease processing” the Posts complained of. The main issue relates to the contention in the Particulars of Claim that the defendants “despite the terms of that notice, as of the date hereof, have failed to comply with the claimants’ requests in breach of s 10 of the Data Protection Act 1998.”

One difficulty with this contention will be immediately apparent: the 14-day period specified in the s 10 notices had not expired by the time the Particulars of Claim were served. There is a second problem of prematurity: DPA s 10(3) allows 21 days, not 14,

News Group has a further, substantive answer to this claim: that it had ceased the processing which was the subject of the s 10 notice long before it received that notice on 20 December 2018. That is what News Group said via its solicitors’ letter of 10 January 2018. The same case was advanced in News Group’s Defence of September 2018, and again in the application to strike out which came before me in May of 2019, when it was supported by evidence. I accepted the claimants’ argument that the pleaded case should go to trial: see the First Judgment [56-61] and [91-93]. But the substance of the case previously advanced has now been firmly established by documents coupled with the evidence of Victoria Watson, which I accept.

Ms Watson’s evidence is that what she said in her emails of 21 February 2017 and 11

Accordingly, I find that the s 10 claim against News Group was premature; and that in any event News Group complied with its obligations under s 10(3) within the 21-day period allowed by that sub-section. Further, the data processing, which was the subject of the s 10 notice, had already ceased before 28 December 2017. It is true that the data were still being processed at that date, but only by holding them inactive and inaccessible on Livefyre. That limited processing was not and is not complained of, and for good reason: it could not be said to be causative of any damage or distress and, by the same token, could not provide a basis for a remedy under s 10(4).

The Express Group’s position is not quite the same, but I am satisfied not only that the claim against it was premature but also that any prospect of obtaining a remedy under s 10(4) had vanished within three weeks of service of the Particulars of Claim, and over two years before this trial began. The facts, as I find them, are these. The s 10 notice referred to seven articles. Two of these were among the articles now complained of and, by implication, the notice referred to the Posts associated with those two articles. I find that on 16 January 2018 all the online articles then complained of were taken down, which in practical terms means they were deleted. When that happens, at least under the system in place at the time, the UGC are also deleted. Publication ceases. Further, when an article and any associated UGC are deleted, the content is wiped from the CMS, which retains no record.

I make those findings on the basis of the written and oral evidence of Geoffrey Marsh, which I accept. This is the case that was pleaded in paragraph 29.4 and 29.5 of the Express Group’s Defence, on 21 September 2018. The claimants and their legal team can be forgiven for being a little sceptical of that assertion at first, given the absence of a timely response to the s 10 notice, and this defendant’s letter of 8 February 2018, with its uncooperative approach. Again, my decision of May 2019 was to let the issue go to trial: see the First Judgment at [62]. But when Mr Marsh was cross-examined, he explained that he knew of the take-down from “Joe”, meaning Joseph Lewis, the inhouse lawyer, who told him that he (Joe) had taken down the articles. Mr Marsh was adamant that when an article is deleted the comments are deleted with it. He was clear that no records survive, except for hard copies retained for this case. He suggested, plausibly, that the Express Group’s letter of 8 February 2018 resulted from a failure of internal communication. The claimants had no other evidence to cast doubt on Mr Marsh’s account, which I consider to be reliable hearsay.

In the light of these findings, I reject the claimants’ pleaded case of non-compliance with the s 10 notice as at 28 December 2017. The deadline the claimants had set did not expire until 11 January 2018. The statutory deadline was 18 January 2018. What the Express Group should have done on or before the latter date is to make a statement as required by s 10(3). It did not do that, but the claimants do not complain of that failure. Their complaint is that the Express Group continued publishing the Posts. It did not. On 16 January 2018 it had ceased to process the data by publication. It held only hard copies, for archive purposes. Even if that amounts to processing (which it may not), the s 10 notice was not aimed at processing of that kind, which could not cause damage or distress and is not alleged to have done so. There is no basis on which I could be satisfied that the Express Group failed to comply with the notice, or that any remedy under s 10(4) should be granted.

These conclusions mean that it is unnecessary to resolve the issue about whether the data in the Posts complained of were sensitive personal data, as alleged in paragraph 36 of the Particulars of Claim. I am not sure that issue had any substantive importance anyway, as the rights conferred by DPA s 10 appear to be unaffected by the categorisation of the data. However, in case this aspect of the matter needs consideration later or elsewhere, I will deal with it, as I can do so briefly.

The pleaded allegation is that “the Posts were ‘sensitive personal data’” (emphasis added). At the hearing in May 2019, however, Mr Engelman made clear that the intention was to limit this claim to such of the Posts as contained sensitive personal data within one of the two categories specified in the Particulars of Claim: see First Judgment [89]. The pleaded case asserts that Posts fell within DPA s 2(a) “as referencing the Claimants’ respective racial or ethnic origin”, and within s 2(g) “as it concerned (sic) the commission or alleged commission by them of any offence in unlawfully claiming benefits”. There are three short points.

There are other pleaded issues that also become academic in the light of my findings of fact. One is consent, relied on as a legitimate basis for processing the data complained of. Further, the Express Group pleads in the alternative that the processing of the data which are the subject of this claim was exempt from s 10 because the data were processed with a view to the publication of journalistic material within the meaning of DPA s 32(2)(c). That issue is not resolved by the ICO’s determination. These issues involve a number of factual and legal complexities which I do not need to resolve, and I do not intend to say more about them.

The PHA contains the following relevant provisions:-

“1 – Prohibition of harassment

(1)

A person must not pursue a course of conduct- (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and

(b)

which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.

…

(2)

For the purposes of this section… the person whose course of conduct is in question ought to know that it amounts to … harassment of another if a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of the other.

(3)

Subsection (1) … does not apply to a course of conduct if the person who pursued it shows-

…

(b)

that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.

…

2 – Offence of harassment

(1)

A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1(1) … is guilty of an offence …

(2)

A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both.

3 – Civil remedy

(1)

An actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1) may be the subject of a claim in civil proceedings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question.

(2)

On such a claim, damages may be awarded for (among other things) any anxiety caused by the harassment and any financial loss resulting from the harassment.”

Section 7 contains interpretative provisions, among them:-

“(2)

References to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress.

(3)

A “course of conduct” must involve—

(a)

in the case of conduct in relation to a single person (see section 1(1)), conduct on at least two occasions in relation to that person…”

The overall approach which the Court should take to the interpretation and application of these provisions is well-established.

This is a claim for harassment by publication. That is clearly legitimate, as a matter of principle. Although the PHA was primarily aimed at the problem of “stalking”, it has been clear for some time that the tort and the crime encompass harassment by publication. Indeed, much harassment does involve the persistent publication of embarrassing or otherwise unwelcome statements, true or false, on the internet or on social media. But the tort and the crime can be committed by a course of conduct consisting of publication in or by the conventional news media. The Court of Appeal addressed the point in Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233

When presented with a claim of this kind, the Court must be especially mindful of the threshold of gravity required before a finding of harassment can be made; and it must be careful to ensure that its approach is compatible with the human rights engaged by the particular facts of the case. In this case, as in all or most cases of alleged harassment by publication, there is a tension. On the one hand, the claimants have Article 8 rights to respect for their private and family life and their home. On the other side are the publishers’ Article 10 rights to convey information and ideas, and the rights of the public at large to receive such information and ideas. The PHA must be interpreted and applied in a way that upholds the Article 8 rights but avoids undue interference with Article 10 rights.

These points emerge from the authorities:

Those observations appear to be borne out by history to date. Trimingham was the first claim for harassment by a media publisher to come to trial in England and Wales. It related to the content of 65 articles referring to the claimant’s sexual orientation in what were said to be disparaging terms, 152 reader comments, said to taunt and lampoon her over her sexuality and appearance, and the conduct of journalists in gathering information for publication. The claim was dismissed. In the 8 years since then there have been cases, such as Hourani v Thomson [2017] EWHC 432 (QB), involving campaigns of harassment using a variety of media. But no other case of harassment by a media organisation appears to have come to trial in this jurisdiction. Two such cases have been brought unsuccessfully in Northern Ireland, relating to series of articles alleging involvement in serious criminal activity: King v Sunday Newspapers Ltd ([2010] NIQB 107, appeal dismissed [2011] NICA 8) and Fulton v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2015] NIQB 100 (appeal dismissed, [2017] NICA 45).

The claimants’ case is stated in paragraphs 20-26 of the Particulars of Claim, in terms which are relatively succinct. The essence of the pleaded, case re-ordering the allegations a little, is this:

Mr Engelman, for the claimants, opened his Skeleton Argument for trial with the same quotation relied on at the hearing in May 2018: “Falsely shouting fire in a Crowded Theatre”. (This is taken from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s opinion in the US Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States in 1919, which held that the defendant's speech in opposition to the draft during World War I was not protected free speech

The claimants’ Skeleton Argument addressed the defendants’ case, that only a small number of Posts was racially abusive, thus: “A version of the Posts underlined to show those racist in nature and those alleging criminal misconduct will be produced at trial”. This did not happen. But, as I have indicated, the claimants’ case in relation to the Posts has now been particularised, pursuant to a direction by me. The schedule of Posts complained of, in its final form, runs to many pages. It has defects I have already mentioned. It is also not easy to analyse, as the articles are not listed chronologically, and there is no numbering, but I have done my own summary analysis, as set out in Appendix C to this judgment. This agrees with Ms Michalos’ calculation that a total of 111 Posts are complained of against her client. It shows that all of these related to articles in the Daily Star. None related to an Express Article. In summary, a total of 93 posts are complained of against News Group. The grand total is therefore 204. Whether or not there were 5,000 Posts in all (as to which I make no finding), this plainly cannot be described as “the majority” of that number.

Mr Price QC, for News Group, and Ms Michalos QC, for the Express Group, have each urged me to analyse and assess the case against their clients separately from one another. But both make common cause on a number of points. They submit that the circumstances of this case are far from the “exceptional” and “rare” oppressive abuse of media freedom that could give rise to liability. The publications were legitimate reporting and comment; they do not cross the high threshold of seriousness required to sustain criminal liability; accordingly, the claimants have not proved a course of conduct amounting to harassment and the claim should be dismissed on that footing. Alternatively, the claimants have failed to prove the necessary state of mind. Alternatively, the Court should uphold the defence under s 1(3)(a). Were the claim to be upheld, submits Mr Price, it would amount to a significant restriction on the editorial freedom of the media to report and comment on matters of legitimate interest to readers, effectively cast the court as censor and extend the PHA way beyond the intention of its framers.

Both Counsel are critical of the way the claimants’ case has been pleaded and presented in argument and in evidence. Mr Price’s skeleton argument for trial spoke of a “casual attitude to the ordinary disciplines of litigation”. He returned to the theme in closing, devoting the first main section of his written submissions to “Basic principles of litigation”. Counsel urge me to adhere to fundamental principles of pleading and evidence. They argue that it is particularly important to hold fast to these in a case which is novel, involves allegations of criminality, has a potentially harmful impact on freedom of expression. Both Counsel submit that, on a proper analysis, the issues for resolution are narrow in scope, and that there should be little difficulty in resolving the limited factual disputes that have any relevance, and dismissing the claim.

Mr Price QC advances the following main submissions on behalf of News Group:

Ms Michalos advances arguments on similar lines to those of Mr Price. She makes some additional, distinct points:-

I start by making clear that I accept the honesty and sincerity of the claimants’ evidence about the feelings of distress and anxiety they experienced during the period September to November 2016. Following, and as a result of, the publicity which started with the MK Citizen article, the Subes found themselves at the centre of what can fairly be described, in its totality, as something of a media storm. That endured, albeit intermittently, over a period of some 8 weeks. I do not doubt that the publication of the Articles that are now complained of made a contribution to the claimants’ distress and anxiety. I accept that each of them probably saw some of the Posts that are now complained of, at the time, and found them upsetting, I do not, however, accept that the claimants have established that they were the targets, or that they were victims, of harassment by News Group or by the Express Group. I shall set out the main reasons for that conclusion, and then elaborate where necessary.

It should go without saying that the conduct and state of mind of each publisher must be considered separately. The conduct of News Group cannot be part of a course of conduct by the Express Group, or vice versa. Nor can the state of mind of anyone working for News Group be attributed to the Express Group.

When assessing the case against and for each defendant, the boundaries of the conduct and state of mind that I can properly and fairly consider are set by that which has been alleged against that defendant in the Amended Particulars of Claim, or averred in the Defences, clearly and distinctly. These are fundamental principles, applicable to any case, but have recently been reiterated in the specific context of harassment by the Court of Appeal: see Worthington v Metropolitan Housing Trust Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1125 [2018] HLR 32 [59] (Kitchin LJ). As Steyn J held, relevance is not determined by what is contained in the witness statements.

I accept the defence submission that the claimants’ evidence and argument have gone well beyond those boundaries in a number of respects. There has been a lack of rigour and discipline in the analysis and presentation of the claimants’ case. Courts must not be overly rigid or formalistic in their approach to pleading requirements. But, as Mr Price has submitted, the rules about statements of case play a fundamental role in promoting the overriding objective of a fair trial at proportionate cost. I am satisfied that it would be wrong to rule on allegations that were not properly notified in advance, in accordance with the rules, in sufficient detail to enable the defendants to prepare to meet them. All the more so, given the gravity of some of allegations.

The pleaded case, on a proper analysis, is relatively confined. Some important features are these:

It follows from this analysis that there is much in the argument of Counsel for the claimants, the evidence of the claimants themselves, and in the cross-examination of the defendants’ witnesses, that must be left out of account. Accordingly:-

I should also correct a misapprehension about paragraph [29] of the First Judgment.

Turning now to my conclusions on the issues that are properly before me for determination, I have considered the conduct of each defendant in publishing the articles complained of, and its conduct in relation to the publication of the Posts complained of. Having done so, I hold that neither claimant has succeeded in proving that either defendant is guilty of a course of conduct amounting to harassment. The standard of proof in these proceedings is the civil standard, but the task that confronts the claimants is to establish conduct that represents an abuse of media freedom so serious that it deserves the label of criminality. That means that the burden on them is a heavy one. They have not discharged that burden.

I have addressed my mind to the pleaded allegations of actual and imputed knowledge, and the evidence relevant to those. My conclusion is that even if, contrary to that conclusion, either defendant did engage in a course of conduct by publication which, objectively considered, was harassing in its nature, to such an extent that it represented a criminal abuse of its rights of freedom of expression, the claimants have not established that either defendant knew or ought to have known this was so.

It is not necessary to go further than this, but having read and heard the evidence and argument I would make the further finding that, on the evidence before me, each of the defendants has made out the justification under s 1(3)(c) of the PHA.

I have borne in mind six general points.

There are only four main issues on which findings of fact are required. The first area of dispute concerns the defendants’ contentions as to the relevant background facts ([75(3)] above). The issue was identified by Steyn J at [28]:

“The defendants have alleged that the claimants put their housing situation in the public domain by giving an interview and having photographs taken by a local newspaper, the MK Citizen. It is not in dispute that the claimants did so. What they dispute is that they did so knowingly, that is knowing that it was a newspaper.”

That issue has been explored at the trial, mainly through the evidence of Mr Sube and Beth Pearson.

I am not entirely sure that, on a proper analysis, it was necessary for News Group to plead a case, or that it is necessary me to make a finding about, what actually happened between Mr Sube and Ms Pearson. The issue is whether one or both of the defendants engaged in a course of conduct which was, and which they knew or ought to have known to be, harassment. The conduct of Ms Pearson is not relied on by the claimants. She was not working for either of the defendants. The truth or falsity of the article is not in issue now. There is no allegation, nor was it put to any of the defendants’ other witnesses, that they knew the truth about what passed between Ms Pearson and Mr Sube. It seems to me that the main if not the only relevance of the MK Citizen article is that it was source material for the defendants, which appeared to them to show that the Subes had deliberately gone public with complaints about the Council. There is no reason to doubt that this was the state of mind of the relevant journalists and editorial staff at each of the three newspapers with which I am concerned.

But the truth about Mr Sube’s conduct in consenting, or not, to publicity in the MK Citizen may be relevant to the objective assessment of whether it was harassment for the defendant to publish stories about him. Trimingham indicates that the circumstances to be considered include the status of the claimant, whether he or she was a public figure, and whether the claimant placed the subject-matter before the public. For those reasons, and also in fairness to Ms Pearson, I shall record my findings. In short, wherever the evidence of Mr Sube and Ms Pearson differs I accept the evidence of Ms Pearson. Mr Sube approached her and asked her to publish an article, to help the family. I do not accept that Mr Sube was ignorant of her role and status as a journalist. That is too improbable. As I have noted, the submission that Ms Pearson misled Mr Sube was not pursued in cross-examination. I reject it. I accept that she answered the phone using the words “news desk”. It is likely that at least one email from her to him carried the designation “Reporter”. I find that Mr Sube, acting in this respect on behalf of his wife, knew what he was doing.

Mr Sube, at the time, was seeking to explore every avenue to press his case with the Council. He knew Ms Pearson intended to publish. He provided her with information and access for the taking of photographs in the knowledge that both would be used for the purposes of media publication, and with that intention. He never expressed any objection, before she did so. The publicity he secured was not to his liking. It was not what he was after. He complained. That is clear. But whatever he may now believe, my conclusion is that he deliberately and knowingly sought press publicity. I also find that Mrs Sube was aware of and approved his conduct in doing so.

Those findings are supported not only by the evidence of Ms Pearson but also by the contemporary documents, which are clearly more consistent with Ms Pearson’s evidence than that of Mr Sube, and by the evidence of Charles Wade-Palmer.

The second main area of factual dispute concerns News Group’s system for dealing with Posts. At the end of the evidence, however, there is very little of relevance that is in issue.

In the light of this evidence, it is impossible to conclude as a fact that any of those responsible for writing and publishing the articles complained of had actual knowledge of the content of any of the Posts complained of. Whether they should have done is not an issue for determination. Nor are issues about the adequacy of the systems described by the witness, or whether they comply with the IPSO Code.

The position is similar when it comes to the evidence about the Express Group’s approach to Posts, which is the third main area of factual dispute.

Again, in the light of this evidence, I could not uphold the claimants’ case that this defendant had actual knowledge of the content of the Posts complained of.

The fourth area of dispute on which I should say a little more concerns the content of the Posts complained of, that is to say those posted on The Sun website and the Express website. For reasons I have already given when dealing with the DPA claim, I do not propose to examine and make findings about each of the 204 Posts listed in the claimants’ schedule. But I will say this much.

In my judgment, the 7 articles complained of do not constitute a single “course of conduct” by News Group. They fall into two groups: those of September, and those published in the three-day period, from 30 October to 1 November 2016. The first group appeared over four or five days, essentially rehearsing the story from the MK Citizen, and Mr Sube’s angry response. This set of articles, although it was in substance a group, was not all on the same theme. There was an additional feature, when Mr Wade-Palmer reported on how Mr Sube had spent his savings. The second group, however, was quite separate and distinct. It followed many weeks later, prompted, on their face, by new events and new information, and they had different content. The publication of these two groups of articles is properly analysed, for present purposes, as two “courses of conduct”.

The Posts would likewise fall for consideration in two groups. But I do not consider that, for the purposes of harassment, the Posts are properly treated as part of the same “course of conduct” as publication of the Articles. In ordinary language the Posts were “published” on The Sun website. But when considering the Posts, I do not consider it necessary or helpful to address the rather abstract and potentially complex question of whether the conduct of News Group (or that of the Express Group) in relation to the Posts amounts as a matter of law to “publication” by it, or publication for which it is responsible. That may be so. There are cases in Australia that so hold (see Voller v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 766 (Rothman J)) and the defendants did not submit that they could not or should not be regarded as publishers of the Posts in law. In my view, however the real question in the present context is not whether those labels or categories are apt, but one of fact: what was the nature and quality of the defendant’s conduct, in this respect?

The defendants provided a platform which enabled readers to post comments on the defendant’s articles. At the minimum, this allowed or facilitated the communication of some such comments to other readers and to the general public via News Group’s website. But I cannot make a finding that the defendant did this, knowing the content of all or any of the Posts complained of, let alone with actual knowledge that some of them were racist and offensive. That would be entirely contrary to the evidence, as I have made clear.

The Posts were written by the readers, and the process by which they appeared online was initiated by the readers and semi-automatic. The readership was primarily, if not exclusively, other readers. The Posts were not addressed to, or aimed at the defendants’ journalists, nor were they read by those journalists. The Posts were not edited or vetted by the defendant, other than in the ways I have identified.

I have not overlooked the claimant’s pleaded case about the “indignant tone” of the articles, or their allegation that the Articles were “designed to incite” racial hatred. The tone was indeed indignant, to an extent. But I reject the remainder of this allegation.

So the conduct to be considered, so far as the Posts are concerned, is unwittingly allowing or facilitating the communication by some readers to some other readers of a relatively small number of Posts, some of which were racist and offensive to the claimants. Whatever might be said about that conduct, and the adequacy of the controls put in place by the defendant, I do not believe this behaviour is properly regarded as part of a course of “targeted” conduct by the defendant, that has an “oppressive” character, and is criminal in character.

Even if this analysis was wrong, I would conclude that the nature of the publications under consideration, including the articles and the Posts, was not harassment within the meaning of the PHA, as elucidated in the authorities. This is because, in short, (a) the subject-matter of the Articles was of legitimate interest to the public, and the reporting could only be held to be tortious if that was an interference with freedom of speech that is necessary in order to protect the rights of the claimants; (b) the content and the manner of publication of the Articles and Posts, even considered as a single course of conduct, was not offensive, insulting, alarming or distressing to the degree that would be necessary to sustain criminal liability.

The nature of the tort of harassment means that, in a publication case, this assessment will include, but should not be confined to the informational content of the publication: what is said, and the meaning(s) it conveys. That would be the focus in a defamation case. A claim in harassment requires a holistic review, encompassing the way in which the information is presented: how it is said. That will always include the number of occasions that make up the alleged course of conduct. But the Court must take account of the right to speak, and to speak robustly, on topics of public policy and other matters of legitimate interest to members of the public. In this regard, two points of importance emerge from Trimingham:

In his witness statement Mr Clarkson said this:

“10.

All newspapers cover stories that are of interest to readers in a way that is consistent with their position and attitudes. The Sun has a consistent and long history in covering stories relating to the benefits system in such a manner. By and large our readers are hard-working, but not highly paid or living in luxurious housing. In 2016, the average salary of a reader nationally was around £17,000 a year. In general, our readers believe there is a legitimate need for a safety net, but that people should be grateful and not take unfair advantage of it.

…

12.

There are a number of elements to the story which were of legitimate interest to our readers once the Claimants went public with their complaints: The fact that the Claimants had chosen to criticise the Council. The claim of the Council, in response, that suitable accommodation had been offered and declined. The statements of politicians on the subject. The Claimants' apparent expectation that they were entitled to have a large number of children and a comfortable lifestyle which the taxpayer was expected to subsidise. The fact that they were able to come to the UK as a result of the NHS funding degrees in nursing. As the coverage illustrates, the costs involved are much greater than the £27,000 cost of the degree. The apparent attempt to pressurise the Council into giving them the accommodation that they wanted by going public with their complaints, thereby getting priority over those who are more patient and wait their turn. The house that the Claimants obtained. The large amounts that the Claimants have received directly or indirectly, having only recently arrived in the UK.”

This is more in the nature of comment or submission than evidence, and may not have needed challenge by way of cross-examination, as opposed to argument. Mr Clarkson was however cross-examined about the composition and content of the article, but he was not challenged on these points. It is not appropriate for me to make findings about whether Mr Clarkson is right to speak of “the Claimants’ apparent expectations” or “the apparent attempt to pressurise the Council”, in these terms. The question is whether these are interpretations, points of view, or assessments which it was not only tortious but also criminal for News Group to publish. Not so, in my judgment.

I repeat that I do not doubt that the Subes suffered distress. I am not persuaded that it was all attributable to The Sun articles, or those published by the Express Group. The strong impression I gain from the evidence is that the Mail coverage was a main cause, if not the main cause. It is plain that reputational concerns loomed large. The test is an objective one, which excludes any element of defamation. Focusing on the coverage in The Sun, it was reporting on matters of proper interest to the readership of The Sun. It

The content of the Posts that are complained of does not take the case across the line. It necessarily follows that in my view neither of the two sets of Articles could sustain a finding of harassment as a matter of fact, if considered separately.

Turning to the issue of knowledge, the allegation that News Group had actual knowledge that its conduct amounted to harassment is untenable on the evidence called at the trial. It was not clear from the Particulars of Claim on what basis that allegation was made; the pleading was inadequate. The claimants plainly could not give evidence to establish such an allegation. Nor could a finding be made merely as a matter of inference. Such evidence as there was came from the defendant’s own witnesses, and its effect was as already indicated: that they considered the articles to be reasonable journalism on matters of legitimate interest and concern to their readers. I accept Mr Price’s submission that an intention to sell newspapers cannot be put forward as improper. The claimant’s allegation that News Group intended to dissuade the claimants from claiming appropriate council house accommodation is not credible on its face. It is credibly denied by Mr Clarkson.

I uphold News Group’s reliance on the defence or exception of reasonableness for essentially the same reasons as those I have given for rejecting the claimants’ case that this was harassment, which the defendant knew or ought to have known to be such.

Having said what I have, I can deal more shortly with the case against the Express Group. This, in my judgment, is weaker than that against News Group. My assessment is this:

The Express Group, like News Group, did not call evidence from any of the editors or journalists involved with the stories that are said to have been harassing. That has been commented on by Counsel for the claimants, but in view of the very general nature of the pleaded case, I do not think it right to draw any particular inferences from it. It does mean that the evidence of Mr Townend, about the elements of the stories that he considers to have been of legitimate interest to readers of the Express Group newspapers has an element of comment or advocacy. He does, however, have a good deal of experience and in any event, in my judgment, the following passages set out standpoints which cannot be classed as unlawful, and which support the conclusions at (6), (8) and (9) above.

“… these sorts of stories - where you are looking at a big family with lots of children that needs housing from a council - come up on a regular basis and are of interest to our readers… As it is public money that is being spent, and because councils have finite resources, the public has the right to know how their money is being spent.

…

The story would be newsworthy because of the issues of the spending of taxpayer money, the pressure on local authorities with limited resources and the issue of to what extent is there a personal responsibility that people have for providing for their family. If we do not publish stories that are of interest to our readers, we would no longer exist as a publisher. The coverage of the story reflects the interest we believed our readers would have in the story.”

Of course, general observations of this kind have to be assessed in the light of the actual subject-matter and content of the articles complained of, and the manner of their publication. I have done that. I do not consider that, even taking all the matter complained of as a course of conduct, the content, tone and presentation of the Articles and Posts complained of amounted to harassment.

For the detailed reasons given above, there will be judgment for each defendant in relation to the claims of each claimant, under the DPA and the PHA. The issue of damages does not arise.

Daily Express online article of 11 September 2016 (extract)

“REVEALED: Benefits dad-of-8 demanding bigger council house splurged £15k savings

A MIGRANT dad who complained a five-bedroom council house was not big enough for the family had a five-figure savings account when he moved to the UK, it has been revealed.

Dad-of-eight Arnold Sube, 33, revealed he had £15,000 saved up from his job at a warehouse in Paris – but stopped work when he moved to Luton in 2012.

He splurged the sum in weeks trying to keep up the lifestyle he had enjoyed in a posh Paris suburb, renting a large five bedroom house in Luton.”

…

But before long, his cash ran out, and he turned to the British taxpayer to pick up the tab.

Mr Sube said: “I came with £15,000, and I paid by myself but after a few months I applied for a house on benefits.

‘I love working. I have been working for the last 13 years, my intention was just to live and study while my family were still in

France but my wife couldn’t do it.”

…

‘I rented a five bedroom house to give my kids the same standard of life but I couldn’t keep it.

‘Everything I own I bought before moving to England. In Paris we lived a very different life.’

And he claims that he and wife Jeanne haven’t ruled out having even MORE children.

When asked if he planned to add to their eight-strong brood, he replied: ‘You never know.’

Mr Sube worked as a warehouse worker in France and managed to save what he thought would be enough when he moved to fulfil his lifelong ambition of studying to become a psychiatric nurse.”

…

He said: ‘When my eight children are working how much will the government be collecting in taxes from them? The government will benefit from us living here in better conditions.

‘We used to live more than comfortably, now my children ask me why did we leave our house in France and I feel guilty. ‘They have to live like any other children not in this kind of condition. It is like they’re being ignored by the authority, like any other children they deserve respect and dignity, it’s their right.

‘I want to make a contribution to society, I don’t like lazy people – my dad told me to work hard and I have always been. ‘People should take responsibility when they’re supposed to and Luton council had a responsibility to find us accommodation suitable for our needs.’”

…

Mr Sube claims an English family moving to Paris would be welcomed with open arms by French authorities and does not understand why people are so angry at him.

Mr Sube said: ‘Where I’m from they would give houses to English people easily and treat them very fairly so I this expect fair treatment from any country I move to.

‘It is my right to live a normal life like any other normal family, these conditions are not good for the children who did not want to go to school today as they’re traumatised by this whole situation.

‘I don’t see why the fact I’m French should make any difference, all families should be put first by the council.’

…

‘The council did not give us the opportunity of viewing the property, they took advantage of our lack of understanding of the housing situation.

If we viewed it, we would never have accepted the property because we found that it was a three bedroom only after one room had been split into two.’”

APPENDIX B

Daily Star article of 31 October 2016 (extract)

“Fury as benefits dad-of-eight moved into plush £425,000 house

A MIGRANT dad who complained a five-bedroom council house was not big enough for the family had a five-figure savings account when he moved to the UK, it has been revealed.

Dad-of-eight Arnold Sube, 33, revealed he had £15,000 save up from his job at a warehouse in Paris – but stopped work when he moved to Luton in 2012.

He splurged the sum in weeks trying to keep up the lifestyle he had enjoyed in a posh Paris suburb, renting a large five-bedroom house in Luton.”

…

But before long, his cash ran out, and he turned to the British taxpayer to pick up the tab.

Mr Sube said: ‘I came with £15,000, and I paid by myself but after a few months I applied for a house on benefits. ‘I love working, I have been working for the last 13 years, my intention was just to live and study while my family were still in

France but my wife couldn’t do it.”

…

‘I rented a five bedroom house here to give my kids the same standard of life but I couldn’t keep it.

‘Everything I own I bought before moving to England. In Paris we lied a very different life.’

And he claims that he and wife Jeanne haven’t ruled out having even MORE children.

When asked if he planned to add to their eight-strong brood, he replied: ‘You never know.’

Mr Sube worked as a warehouse worker in France and managed to save what he thought would be enough when he moved to fulfil his lifelong ambition of studying to become a psychiatric nurse.”

…

He said: ‘When my eight children are working how much will the government be collected in taxes from them? The government will benefit from us living here in better conditions.

‘We used to live more than comfortably, now my children ask me why did we leave our house in France and I feel guilty. ‘They have to live like any other children not in this kind of condition. It is like they’re being ignored by the authority, like any other children they deserve respect and dignity. It’s their right.

‘I want to make a contribution to society, I don’t like lazy people – my dad told me to work hard and I have always been. ‘People should take responsibility when they’re supposed to and Luton council had a responsibility to find us accommodation suitable for our needs.’”

…

Mr Sube claims an English family moving to Paris would be welcomed with open arms by French authorities and does not understand why people are so angry at him.

Mr Sube said: ‘Where I’m from they would give houses to English people easily and treat them very fairly so I this expect fair treatment from any country I move to.

‘It is my right to live a normal life like any other normal family, these conditions are not good for the children who did not want to go to school today as they’re traumatised by this whole situation.

‘I don’t see why the fact I’m French should make any difference, all families should be put first be the council.

‘The council did not give us the opportunity of viewing the property, they took advantage of our lack of understanding of the housing situation.

‘If we viewed it, we would never have accepted the property because we found that it was a three bedroom only after one room had been split into two.”

…

One woman said: ‘If you have eight kids you should not expect to be bailed out. The father has played the system and won.

‘They are extremely fortunate. This is a lovely estate. Parents are desperate to mover here.’

Luton Council told the Sun it does not provide updates on

individual cases to protect residents’ privacy.” APPENDIX C

Analysis of Posts complained of

Articles complained of			Posts complained of
Newspaper	Date	Headline Italics denote print article
The Sun
1	07.09.16	Are they Serious?	25
		The Great British Rake-Off	0
2	07.09.16	Benefits dad’s defiance	5
3	09.09.16	It’s my right!	23
4	11.09.16	He played the system and won	23
5	30.10.16	Cul-de-spat	10
6	31.10.16	Take your pick	3
7	01.11.16	No more	4
Sub-total			93
The Express
1(a)	08.09.16	Shameless French family-of- 10	0
1(b)		Jobless migrants do not deserve British handouts (leader)	19
2	09.09.16	“I’m NOT greedy!’	13
3	11.09.16	“REVEALED: Benefits dad ..”	70
4	31.10.16	“Migrant dad-of-eight lands plush four-bed detached ..”	10
5(a)	01.11.16	What a scandal	0
5(b)		A family of 10 living on British taxpayers’ money (Leader)	0
Sub-total			111
The Daily Star
1	07.09.16	Jobless dad whines ..	0
2	08.09.16	Shameless family-of-10 who refused bigger home ...	0
3	11/12.09.16	Shameless benefit migrant dad …more kids	0
4	11.09.16	I blew 15k in weeks	0
5	31.10.16	“Fury as benefits dad-of-eight moved into plush £425,000 house”	0
		Benefit scroungers we LOVE to hate [slideshow]	0
Sub-total			0
GRAND TOTAL			204