Intertrade Wholesale Ltd & Ors v Revenue & Customs & Anor

The Claimants apply for injunctive relief in relation to the seizures of very substantial material, electronic and documentary, from the Claimants’ premises on 20 June 2018 by HMRC pursuant to search warrants issued on the application of HMRC by Birmingham Magistrates’ Court two days before.

The history of this matters is that there have been associated judicial review proceedings which were dismissed by Supperstone J on 9 November 2018 who gave a reserved judgment (“the Judgment”). I shall at the outset quote from paragraphs 3-4 of the Judgment where Supperstone J said the following:

“3.

HMRC is conducting a criminal investigation named "Operation Bowshot" which concerns potential large-scale excise duty evasion and the subsequent laundering of the criminal funds generated. The laundered monies are suspected to be derived from the sale of illicit alcohol imported from the Continent and other organised crime groups across the UK. The total loss to HMRC since 1 April 2010 is estimated to be in excess of £440m. The investigation is being carried out in conjunction with a French Judicial Customs operation, and a Joint Investigation Team ("JIT") agreement was signed on 21 July 2016. The JIT agreement covering the operation has since been extended.

4.

The application for search warrants and their execution in respect of an earlier phase of Operation Bowshot were the subject of previous judicial review proceedings. On 11 December 2017 the Divisional Court (Gross LJ and Carr J) found in R (on the application of Superior Import/Export

Limited and others) v HMRC and Birmingham Magistrates'

Court [2017] EWHC 3172 (Admin) [“the Superior

Import/Export case”] that the warrants were vitiated due to their drafting. HMRC failed to meet the requirements of s.15 of PACE and provide sufficient information such that the Justice could properly be satisfied for the purposes of s.8(1) of PACE (see para 86). However the court did not find any bad faith on the part of the HMRC, or make a finding that the statutory preconditions for the grant of the warrants were not met. Those proceedings are currently subject to a s.59 application by which the HMRC seeks permission to retain the seized material or copies thereof.”

In respect of the Superior Import/Export case, on 21 June 2017, copies of almost all the material seized from properties associated with Mr Harpreet Singh Johal in Kent, were sent to France pursuant to the JIT agreement which records “According to French legislation, all information collected in the framework of the JIT must be included in the judicial file and can be used in the criminal proceedings.” The legal power to transfer material in this way is conferred by section 19 of the Crime International Cooperation Act (“the 2003 Act”).

The JIT agreement is an agreement for establishing a joint investigation team

Under a heading at paragraph 13.2 “Recording of and use of information

Annexed to the JIT agreement is a list of members of the JIT who include the

Following judgment on 11 December 2017, consequential orders were made on 8 January 2018. The warrants were declared unlawful and the warrant quashed and the entries into, searches at and seizures from the Claimants’ premises were accordingly unlawful. There was no order made in relation to the return of the documents and/or copy documents save that HMRC was given permission to make an application in Birmingham Crown Court under section 59 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. No order was made in relation to the materials which had been sent to France on 21 June 2017. It was stated that the claim did not seek any relief in that regard, HMRC had stated that only copy documents had been sent to France and “the copy documents are now with the French authorities over which this Court has no jurisdiction”.

On 11 January 2018, a District Judge made an extradition order against Mr Johal. An appeal was lodged, but Mr Johal has since voluntarily submitted himself to the French authorities and has been bailed. On 18 June 2018, the Birmingham Magistrates Court issued the search warrants referred to in paragraph 1 above. It was said in the judicial review proceedings before Supperstone J that a central plank of the application for search warrants was connections between Mr Johal and Mr Rishi Lakhani, the Sixth Claimant in these proceedings. On 20 June 2018, the warrants were executed by officers of HMRC. The Claimants say in the Particulars of Claim at paragraph 9 that they were assisted in the search by officers of the French Customs Authority including Ms Hautcolas. At paragraph 11, they say that during the search those officers were liaising with HMRC officers in relation to the search and were also searching for and then passing items to be seized to HMRC officers.

By an email dated 27 June 2018 from Karn Chopra on behalf of HMRC to Mr Panessar, solicitor for the Claimants, it was stated that the material taken on the search had not been submitted to the French authorities or any other person. However, Karn Chopra went on to state that HMRC and the French authorities are one team under the JIT agreement so technically the French authorities have the material, although not physically since they have not been provided with the material by HMRC.

On 9 July 2018, the Claimants issued the claim for judicial review. On 7 July 2018 and on 17 July 2018, limited injunctive relief was granted by Mostyn J, which was varied on 15 August 2018. On 21 September 2018, Sir Ross

Supperstone J made limited observations in the Judgment where he indicated that if relief was appropriate, it would be in a private law rather than a pubic law action. He rejected 10 allegations of failure to make full and frank disclosure. In respect of the fourth of those matters entitled “the entries, searches and seizures were unlawful by virtue of s.15(1) and s.16(8) of PACE”, he said the following:

“42.

The Claimants contend that the entries, searches and seizures from the premises authorised to be searched were unlawful, by virtue of s.15(1) of PACE because, contrary to

s.16(8), the searches exceeded the authority granted by HMRC.

43.

The facts relied on under the first allegation of nondisclosure set out under Ground 1 (see para 10 above) are relied on in support of this ground.

44.

In my view this ground does not add significantly to that first ground raising this issue.

HMRC does not accept that the searches exceeded the authority of the warrants. I do not consider this to be a 'clear case'; that being so the court is not in a position to assess the merits of this ground (see Fitzpatrick at para 23 above). There is an alternative private law remedy available to the Claimants, better suited to resolving issues of fact.”

According to the skeleton argument of the Claimants, these proceedings have been brought because Supperstone J in refusing permission for judicial review stated that the subject matter of the excessive search/seizure ground was more suited to private law proceedings. Whilst this is true, a closer examination of the Judgment of Supperstone J reveals that the Judge was not particularly encouraging in this regard. As noted from the quotation above, the first of the alleged instances of failure to make full and frank disclosure was related to the fourth matter. The first and fourth matters were described as follows:

In respect of the first matter, at paragraph 10 of the Judgment, Supperstone J

In respect of the fourth matter, the discussion was at paragraphs 16-19 of the Judgment. The Judge found that there was no basis for contending that at the time of the application for warrants HMRC knew that special procedure material or excluded material would be included in the items to be sought. There was reference to legally privileged material, but it was made clear that there was no interest in seeing that material.

There was a fourth ground related to the above allegations of non-disclosure, namely that “the entries, searches and seizures were unlawful under s.15(1) and s.16(8) of PACE”. Despite the reference to a private law remedy in paragraph 45 of the Judgment, that was not an indication as to any prospect of success of the private law remedy. The Judge was simply making the point that this was not a clear case, and a case with such issues was not suitable for dete

rmination by judicial review. Far from giving an endorsement of a private law case, the Judge was asked if he did not permit judicial review to transfer the fourth ground (and a fifth ground relating to handcuffing) to the Queen’s

The Claimants submit that the searches and seizures on 20 June 2018 were unlawful on the basis of the statutory scheme as reviewed in R v Chief

The Claimants rely in particular on the following provisions, namely

In the Superior Import/Export case, Carr J identified the following authorities as regards section 15(6)(b):

“68.

In R (Energy Financing Team Ltd) v Director of the

The Claimants prepared witness evidence with a view to contending that the search warrants in this case were executed in a manner which made the entry on or search of premises unlawful due to non-compliance with sections 15 and/or 16, in particular in going beyond that which was permitted under the search orders.

The evidence on which the Claimants rely comprises searching for wider material than that permitted in the search warrants. Mr Jones QC addressed the Court by reference to many of the witness statements. The most recent witness statements prepared for this application by the Claimants are the statements of Mr Sanjay Panesar dated 12 November 2018 and the fourth statement of Mr Tristam Thornton dated 21 November 2018. In addition to the four witness statements of Mr Thornton, there are witness statements on behalf

I do not intend to set out the entirety of what Mr Jones QC read out to me of the evidence, but to set out instead a substantial part of the matters upon which he relied on to give a flavour of what was presented to the Court. In

In his second statement at paragraphs 9-13, Mr Thornton provides

In his fourth statement, Mr Thornton at paragraphs 4-7 provides a number of instances where documents were being removed going beyond the warrants,

In a second statement, Mr Sanjeev Patel refers to having seen the additional list which Mr Thornton saw and that it was propped up on a long desk before Ms Hautocolas and makes comments about his observation of the copies of the

The evidence of Mr Konde refers to searching for jewellery (paragraph 11) and Mrs Priya Lakhani refers to jewellery being removed. Mr Konde referred to using a list of paper with names not on the warrant (paragraph 15).

There is evidence of French officers searching for property and in particular rummaging in cabinets and in drawers: e.g. Mr Popat (paragraph 16); Mr Viral Mehta (paragraphs 8 and 9); Mr Dharamkumar Patel (paragraph 16); Mr Rikin Patel (paragraphs 7 and 11).

There is evidence of post-it notes on the CCTV which might have prevented recording of the search on the CCTV: see Mr Ramanandi (paragraphs 3 and 4) and Mr Dharamkumar Patel (paragraphs 4 and 14).

The Particulars of Claim contain 24 items which were said to have been removed and which went beyond that which was contained in the warrants. Attention is drawn in the evidence for the Claimants and the Defendants to removals of items not in the warrants which might have been justified under section 19 of PACE. Mr Jones QC drew the attention of the Court that this is not a backstop provision for the benefit of the authorities, but that the requirements to fall within in it are not widely drawn. He also referred the

The evidence relied upon by HMRC includes the following:

They confirm that:

The application is made for interim injunctions. The law is as stated in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 with the need for the Court to consider:

As to balance of convenience, Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid said the following at page 408:

“It would be unwise to attempt even to list all the various matters which may need to be taken into consideration in deciding where the balance lies, let alone to suggest the relevant weight to be attached to them. These will vary from case to case.”

and his further statement, at page 409 (after referring to particular

In R(Factortame) v Secretary of State (No.2) [1991] 1 AC 603, the House of

Eady J considered the issue of balance of convenience in Faisaltex v Chief Constable of Lancashire Constabulary [2009] EWHC 1884 (QB). There were some common facts with the instant case. There had been preceding the private law claim, as here, an unsuccessful application for judicial review. The warrants had been held to have been obtained lawfully, as in this case. There were some judicial observations in the judicial review case that cases with disputed matters of facts might be more appropriate for judicial review. As in this case, the Claimants sought a wide ranging injunction preventing law enforcers inspecting material pending the outcome of a private law claim based on excessive seizure. The following parts of the judgment of Eady J are informative:

“4.

It is plainly undesirable for the court to become involved in such a way as to inhibit the discharge of the Defendants' duties in the investigation of suspected crimes, save in so far as it can be demonstrated to be necessary and proportionate to do so.

…

10.

What is now claimed is an injunction to extend the protocol much more widely, so as to prevent the investigators inspecting or retaining material which might be irrelevant to their task. That goes beyond any legitimate function of private law proceedings contemplated by the Divisional Court. They may be apt for resolving issues of fact and law for the purpose of deciding to what remedies the Claimants may ultimately be entitled, but there is no reason why they should be used for the supervision or management of ongoing criminal investigations.

…

25.

Both parties addressed me on the principles derived from the House of Lords' decision in American Cyanamid v Ethicon[1975] AC 396and Mr Bird, in particular, considered their application in the context of injunctions sought against public bodies. He referred, for that purpose, to their Lordships' decision in R (Factortame) v Secretary of State (No 2)[1991] 1AC 603.

26.

Given the statutory background, which I have attempted briefly to summarise, Mr Bird submits that there is not even a triable issue as to the need for the Claimants to be protected by injunctive relief on the issue of relevance. I would accept that submission. Nevertheless, I go on to consider the balance of convenience. I would agree also with Mr Bird's submission that the balance lies in favour of the court declining to interfere with the examination of the seized material by the Defendants in discharge of their statutory duties.

27.

Mr Bird's submissions are encapsulated in the following paragraphs of his skeleton argument:

"45.

The Chief Constable and HMRC have a duty to investigate allegations of serious crime, and to do this as thoroughly and as effectively as possible, in the public interest. In this case there was (and is) ample evidence that serious commercial crimes (counterfeiting, VAT fraud and excise fraud on a multimillion pound scale) had been committed. The question was and is as to who had committed them.

46.

It is in the public interest that the Defendants should pursue their investigations thoroughly, efficiently and speedily so as to make a report in due course to a prosecutor (in this case RCPO) who can then decide whether criminal proceedings should be instituted, in accordance with the Code for Crown Prosecutors.

47.

The Claimants are seeking the exercise of a judicial discretion to interfere in an ongoing and incomplete criminal investigation, in a way that will necessarily impede it.

48.

Injunctive relief is neither necessary nor convenient – the scanning exercise that is in place is a straightforward and workable process that does not require judicial intervention save as a last resort, and then in the more appropriate and cost-effective jurisdiction of the Crown Court.

49.

The Claimants' private interest (that the police should not have access to potentially incriminating material until after their civil action is determined) is outweighed by the greater public interest."

28.

I agree that these powerful factors are sufficient to determine the balance of convenience in the Defendants' favour.

29.

Furthermore, I am not persuaded that damages would be an inadequate remedy for the Claimants if there has indeed been seizure in excess of authority. Their rights can be adequately protected without the grant of an injunction.”

There was another related case which the Claimants have sought to distinguish, namely Faisaltex Ltd v Chief Constable of Lancashire Police [2009] EWHC 799 (QB) (Blake J). This was in the context of an application for injunctive relief against the Chief Constable and HMRC in a private law action arising out of an allegedly unlawful search. The Claimants seek to distinguish it on the facts including the fact that there was no different cover list of the kind referred to in the instant case. However, there are similarities in that there was a finding that there was a finding of a serious question to be tried, but the Court was not prepared to make a wide-ranging order pending consideration of the state of mind of the individual officers who seized the materials. This was a case also where it was submitted, as in the instant case, that the practical arrangements to date were so defective as to require relief in

The threshold in most interim injunction cases, applying the American

I have the following concerns about the case as to whether there is a real issue to be tried. First, as noted above by reference to R v Chief Constable of Warwickshire, ex parte Fitzpatrick [1999] 1 WLR 564, 574ff, the Claimants say that a breach of sections 15 or 16 of PACE can render an entry or search and seizure under the warrant unlawful. It is important to qualify this by the fact that in this case judicial review proceedings have been brought in which the lawfulness of the warrants have been challenged and those proceedings were dismissed substantively. It is therefore not available to the Claimants to challenge the lawfulness of the warrants. In any event, as Fulford LJ stated in ex parte Chaudhary [2014] EWHC 4096 (Admin) at paragraph 61: “in my view the jurisprudence is clear: the only route to challenge whether a warrant is lawful is by way of judicial review.”

The point that is then taken by the Claimants that notwithstanding that the warrants were lawful, the effect of excessive searching is to render the entirety of a search and seizure unlawful. However, that by itself is not sufficient as is made clear by Fulford LJ in ex parte Chaudhary at paragraph 68 as follows:

“I consider that Kennedy LJ in Bramley correctly doubted the decision in Fitzpatrick, as set out above, that a search is rendered unlawful if there is any transgression, in the sense that an item is taken that falls outside the scope of the warrant. I have already cited the relevant passage from Bramley above, and the reasoning set out therein seems to me to be entirely persuasive. As Kennedy LJ observed "section 16(8) […] only confines the area of search. It has nothing to do with seizure and the fact that something has been seized which should have been left behind does not necessarily mean that the search was too extensive" [10]. There is no sustainable basis in law for contending that whenever there has been a more than de minimis breach of section 16(8) the entirety of the entry, search and seizure under that warrant was unlawful. Instead, the particular documents which were taken in excess of the warrant's authorisation should be returned and there may be liability in damages.”

The Particulars of Claim raise a case to the effect that items have been seized which should not have been seized: see the reference above to the 24 items seized. However, at this stage, there is no analysis of the kind of items seized to show that by their nature, they are more consistent with an intention to ignore the scope of the warrants rather than simply the taking of items in excess of the warrant giving rise to the liability to return the same, but not invalidating the searches.

In assessing the nature of the case, there are a number of points by reference to the evidence as follows:

Mr Panesar, the solicitor for the Claimants says in paragraph 26 of this witness statement of 12 November 2018 that the correspondence between the parties shows that by reason of the bulk of the property taken, arrangements to isolate legally privileged material (“LPP”), special procedure material (confidential material) and excluded material (as defined in sections 10, 11 and 14 of PACE) are “unworkable and prohibitively expensive”. Mr Lakhani at paragraph 66 expressed concern about special procedure material including about medical records seized. Mr Fletcher on behalf of HMRC informed the Court on instructions that copies of all material taken have been returned to the Claimants (with the originals being retained by HMRC) with the exception of pin-locked and password protected items and high value jewellery. In oral submissions, no particular detriment was identified and no particular order was sought as regards special procedure material, perhaps because copies of the material had been returned. However, what was developed was concerns relating to the protection of the Claimants’ LPP. The Claimants said that even if HMRC were able to resist the injunction on other grounds, in order to protect LPP, the injunction as sought should be granted. It was submitted that the burden should then be on HMRC to apply to have exceptions from the order: this would then enable the Claimants’ LPP to be preserved. I shall return to this at the end of this Judgment under the heading “Legally privileged material”.

As regards the case that the intention in the execution of the search was to seize items not covered by the warrants, I regard the evidence as far less “powerful” than the way in which it has been characterised. Mr Jones QC is able to rely upon evidence of the kind referred to above, and particularly of a

Looking at the state of the case and the evidence as a whole at this stage, I have come to the conclusion that there is sufficient to get over the low threshold of a serious question to be tried for the case of trespass having regard to the evidence which has been adduced. At this stage of the case, I accept the case of the Claimants that there is a serious question to be tried. I reject the submission of HMRC that this case is not made out. I regard the case to the effect that the searches as executed were unlawful to be far less powerful than was submitted on behalf of the Claimants. My finding of a serious question to be tried is simply for the purpose of this application alone, it is based on the evidence at this stage, and it reflects how low the threshold is for the purpose of the American Cyanamid test.

There is a cogent argument to the effect that if the Claimants were to establish at trial their entitlement to final relief in the nature of a permanent injunction, they would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss they would have sustained as a result of the Defendants' continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. I note that Eady J held that this was the case in the Faisaltex case, but I do not have sufficient conviction in this possibility to decide the case on this basis. Since I entertain doubt as to whether damages are an adequate remedy, I must go on to consider whether damages are an adequate remedy to compensate the Defendants.

I am of the view that if an injunction were granted but at trial it would appear that HMRC was entitled to do that for which it was prevented from doing due to the injunction, damages would not be an adequate remedy to compensate it for the loss that it would suffer due to the injunction. Its work in law enforcement would be seriously interfered with and its ability to prosecute the alleged criminal offences underlying the search warrants would be seriously damaged. Further and in any event, there is no evidence of the ability of the Claimants to compensate at all, let alone on the possible premise that they are found guilty of the alleged criminal offences.

I have come to the view that the balance of convenience is firmly in favour of HMRC. I refer against to the summary of Supperstone J of the nature of the alleged criminality where he stated that “HMRC is conducting a criminal investigation named "Operation Bowshot" which concerns potential largescale excise duty evasion and the subsequent laundering of the criminal funds generated. The laundered monies are suspected to be derived from the sale of illicit alcohol imported from the Continent and other organised crime groups across the UK. The total loss to HMRC since 1 April 2010 is estimated to be in excess of £440m.”

The injunction is to prevent the Defendants from reviewing, making use of, copying or transmitting to any other person or authority any of the material seized (or photographs, copies, notes or records taken of material documents)

Not only was the criminal investigation lawful and necessary, but the process through which search warrants have been sought has been upheld as lawful in the judicial review proceedings before Supperstone J. The warrants were obtained because the Birmingham Magistrates’ Court must have been satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to believe that serious crime had been carried out and that search orders were required in order to investigate that crime.

This action is designed to show that the search process itself was unlawful because the searching not only went beyond the warrants, but it was intended so to do by the searching officers. At this stage, all that has happened is that a case to the effect has been asserted and evidence has been adduced from which inferences are sought to be adduced. Supperstone J said that he did not consider that this was a ‘clear case’, and insofar as there are issues of fact, they cannot be resolved at this stage. The Court is considering an interim injunction against a public authority which has been held at the judicial review stage to have been obtaining warrants which were lawful and necessary. If this matter proceeds to trial, there will have to be established the extent, if any,

In my judgment, it is in the public interest that the HMRC should pursue their investigations thoroughly, efficiently and speedily so as to make a report in due course to a prosecutor who can then decide whether criminal proceedings should be instituted. The Claimants are seeking the exercise of a judicial discretion to interfere in an ongoing and incomplete criminal investigation, in a way that will necessarily impede it. A consideration in the balance of convenience is that it is in the public interest for that investigation to be carried out so that if appropriate charges can be brought.

Against this, it is submitted by the Claimants that in the event that there is no restraint, there is an imminent danger that the materials seized will be shared with the French Judicial Customs Authority pursuant to the JIT agreement referred to above. To this, HMRC contend at paragraph 20f that it is speculative that the material would be sent to France, and that there is no evidence to support that contention. That submission is not well made having regard to the JIT itself and the consequent inference of sharing of documents and information with the French authorities.

The Claimants submit that it will be practically impossible for that material to be recovered in the event that the claim succeeds. Following the Court’s inquiry as to whether there were cases as to what occurred in the context of inter-state cooperation agreements, the Claimants have stated in a note dated

The response of the Claimants to the foregoing is first to deal with the question as to relevant law. They have referred to the case R (Van de Pijl) v

It is not surprising to read either of the decision of the High Court in those circumstances or the willingness of the Dutch authorities because prima facie such willingness to return the items must make possible cooperation between the respective authorities.

As to the observations of the Claimants in respect of French law and practice, HMRC submit correctly that the content went beyond the assistance sought by the Court. Further, HMRC makes the valid comments that the evidence is not in an evidential format, not identifying the source of the information and not stating the connection between the lawyers who provided the information and the Claimants. It is not apparent or verifiable whether the source of the evidence is from somebody having intimate knowledge of the practice of the French authorities in such circumstances.

Those are weighty objections, and in the circumstances, little weight is to be attached to the information provided. I am prepared to assume that there is a possibility to be put into the balance that it might not be possible to retrieve documents from the French authorities, albeit that it is not shown to be anything higher than that. I do not attach more significance than that because I would expect in the event of a successful outcome at trial for the Claimants that the Court would make a similar direction to the one made in the Van de

On the basis of the above, and without further consideration of the merits of the case, I have come to the clear conclusion that the private interest of the Claimants that the HMRC should not have access to potentially incriminating material until after their civil action is determined is outweighed by the greater public interest. The matters set out in the first five paragraphs above under the heading of “the balance of convenience” are in my judgment decisive and outweigh any other matters which have been advanced to the Court in this case. Using the language of Hoffmann J in Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales [1987] 1 WLR 670 at 680 as cited in Factortame at 683, the “a fundamental principle is therefore that the court should take whatever course appears to carry the lower risk of injustice if it should turn out to have been ‘wrong’ [meaning either by granting an injunction to a party who fails to establish his right at trial or in failing to grant an injunction to a party who succeeds at trial] in the sense I have described.”

I referred above to the concerns of the Claimants about LPP in respect of the order, and their submission that the order should be in the form sought in order to preserve their LPP. They submitted that the Court should provide an injunction in the terms sought in any event and to the extent that HMRC was

In fact, the parties had agreed a procedure which has been judicially endorsed to protect those items which the Claimants say are subject to legal professional privilege (“LPP”): see the orders of Mostyn J dated 17 July 2018 and Robin Knowles J dated 17 August 2018. On 14 September 2018, a lengthy letter was sent on behalf of the Claimants dated 14 September 2014 seeking that HMRC should not review any of the material pending the conclusion of the judicial review claim. On 18 September 2018, HMRC proposed a procedure to identify LPP on a “rolling basis”. The procedure involved the documents being considered by independent counsel and returned if appropriate. On 20 September 2018, the application for judicial review was rejected on paper by

The Claimants applied to the Court supported by the third witness statement of Mr Thornton that HMRC should not review the material pending the conclusion of the judicial review claim. On 2 October 2018, Swift J considered that HMRC should be able to inspect documents and that “HMRC have put forward an entirely reasonable proposal to address the Claimants’ difficulties…to identify material over which LPP is claimed.” (see paragraph 6 of Swift J’s reasons for dismissing the Claimants’ applications).

There is nothing put before the Court on this application as regards LLP and any other species of information which require protection which indicates that the agreed procedures and the proposal of HMRC do not meet the concerns of the Claimants. The notion that LPP should be addressed by a blunt order preventing review, use of, copying or transmission of any of the items seized is far too wide and disproportionate.

The Court refused that in the context of the judicial review proceedings. As noted, the Court has subsequently dismissed the renewed application for judicial review. It is apparent as regards the matter of particular concern to the

There is an additional point which does not arise for decision and upon which I have not been addressed. There is a question as to whether an injunction is available against HMRC in private law proceedings, even although it is available in principle in judicial review proceedings: see section 21 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and M v Home Office [1994] 1 A.C.377. If an injunction would not have been available, then this might have little practical effect because of the availability of an interim declaration: see Gee on Commercial Injunctions 6^th Edition para. 3-032 and CPR 25.1(1)(b). In view of my other findings, I do not rule on any question which might have arisen as to the availability of either an injunction or an interim declaration.

In all the circumstances, for all these reasons, the application for injunctive relief is dismissed.