The Law Society of England And Wales v Sheikh

By a claim form issued pursuant to CPR 8, the Law Society of England & Wales (“the Applicant”) applies against Ms Anal Sheikh (“the Defendant”) for various declaratory and injunctive relief. First of all, a declaration is sought that the Defendant’s current claims against the Claimant proceeding before the Employment Tribunal are totally without merit. Secondly, a mandatory injunction is sought that the Defendant apply forthwith to the Employment Tribunal for an order that her current claims be dismissed upon withdrawal. Thirdly, that, subject to the above, the Defendant be restrained from issuing any claim or making any applications in any court, Employment Tribunal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal, or in any other tribunal against their defendants, employees, servants or agents without first obtaining the permission of this court.

The matter is before me today pursuant to an application notice issued under Part 23 and mirrors the relief sought in the Part 8 claim form. The relief sought is in the nature of injunctive relief and is in effect for a further Civil Restraint Order governed by the provisions of CPR 3.11 and the relevant practice direction, PD3C.

This case has a lengthy, complex and in many ways tragic background. I am not going to cover all of the relevant background, but will alight on that which is necessary for this judgment to be understood.

Many years ago, the Defendant was a practising solicitor. She specialised in conveyancing and related property matters. There was litigation involving one of her clients, Mr Dogan and his company Red River UK Limited. That was resolved before Henderson J in April 2010. The Defendant lost that litigation. Meanwhile, the Defendant was struck off the Roll of Solicitors for dishonesty in May 2009. The first GCRO was made against her in July 2009 by Burnett J (as he then was). That order was extended by various judges over time, the last extension being made by Turner J on 13 July 2017.

For the purposes of today’s proceedings, I have paid particular attention to the judgment of Patterson J made in 2015 and the judgment of Turner J made on the occasion I have mentioned. The effect of Turner J’s GCRO is that the Defendant is restrained from litigating in the High Court and the county court, but the order does not extend to inferior courts, including Employment Tribunals. What has happened in the light of the GCROs is that it is clear to me that the Defendant has sought to circumvent them by bringing proceedings in the Employment Tribunal. It is necessary for these purposes to identify those proceedings and for me to say something about them.

The first set of proceedings was issued in Central London on 11 April 2017 and bears case number ET-2200748/2017. The claim is against a number of entities including the Law Society, Bar Council and Ministry of Justice, and is for race and religious discrimination. An examination of the substance of the claim reveals that it is a thinly veiled attempt to re-litigate some of the matters which gave rise to the Defendant’s current difficulty. It is said, for example, that between certain dates in October 2007 various senior judges, barristers and solicitors entered into a conspiracy to commit an identity theft in the context of a certain conveyancing transaction, described as the Red River Conveyancing and Mortgage Fraud. It is immediately clear that the focus of the claim is the underlying dispute which was determined by Henderson J (as he then was) back in April 2009. The conspirators – they include Briggs J (as he then was), Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (formerly Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and President of the Supreme Court) and Henderson J – are all said to be guilty of fraud, in particular Briggs J, in relation to an order he made on 2 October 2007. It is said in this claim that Briggs J impersonated a judge and stayed enactments of trials. He put on his judicial robes and wig and used the empty courtroom and bribed the court to stand around and pretend that a hearing was taking place.

The claim is in discrimination on the basis of protected characteristics contrary to relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 and, as the Defendant informs me, the basis of the claim is sections 111 and 112, because the Employment Tribunal is a public body for these purposes and is, in effect, conniving in the discrimination carried out by others. That is the first claim.

The second claim (although the pleadings are not available) was brought before a separate tribunal in Watford. It is to be inferred that the allegations were the same, or, if not quite the same, very similar, because there is in the paperwork a letter from the Employment Appeal Tribunal dated 14 December 2017, which was an attempt by the Defendant to appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal given by letter dated 16 August 2017 rejecting her claim because the ET had no jurisdiction. Paragraph 4 of the reasons of Elizabeth Laing J demonstrate that the subject matter of the claim is likely to have been, as I have said, the same if not very similar. Laing J said that, in her opinion, the notice of appeal disclosed no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim and had no reasonable prospects of success, although does not say in terms that the claim or the application to appeal the ET’s refusal of jurisdiction was totally without merit.

There is a yet further claim based, it seems to me, on identical facts, brought this time again in the Tribunal in Central London. The case number on this occasion is 3306713/2017, and it was received by the Tribunal in July 2017. The Employment Tribunal decided of its own motion that the claim should be rejected against the majority of the respondents named, but could be pursued against the Ministry of Justice. It is not clear why that view was taken. The Ministry of Justice sought to defend the claim, as was its right, and the Defendant’s riposte was, on my understanding, to apply either for summary judgment or for the Defence to be struck, it matters not precisely, but the matter came before Her Honour Judge Eady QC, sitting in chambers, on 28 March 2018.

What happened is that the Employment Tribunal had on 13 October 2017 accepted the Ministry of Justice’s response, in other words its Defence, and the EAT decided that, in effect, there was no judicial decision which could be appealed and that the proposed appeal was wholly without merit, which I take to mean totally without merit. The EAT was so concerned that the Defendant would be seeking to pursue claims in the EAT as a means of avoiding the GCRO that consideration should be given to referring the matter to the Attorney General.

In relation to the first set of proceedings, it is right to point out, in the Defendant’s favour I suppose, that those have been stayed pending the determination of the Law Society’s application. The Defendant, dissatisfied with that, sought to appeal the original stay and the order extending the stay, and those appeals were determined, again by Her Honour Judge Eady QC, at the end of May of this year. She concluded that both appeals were totally without merit.

That is not the only material which has been placed before me on behalf of the Applicant Law Society. As paragraph 19 of the first witness statement of Mr Sakrouge makes clear, there has been a spate of applications within the ET proceedings, and a number of frankly ludicrous assertions have been made by the Defendant. Just by way of example, the Defendant has said in terms that Mr Sakrouge has been misleading the Employment Tribunal in saying that a GCRO was made by Patterson J. Plainly such an order was made. I have read a copy of my Lady’s judgment, and it is simply arrant nonsense to say that her order should somehow be ignored. Attempts have been made within the ET proceedings, but as a matter of form such attempts are wholly misconceived, to impeach a number of Lord Justices of Appeal before Parliament, as well as, for good measure, at least one Employment Tribunal judge.

The Defendant is also seeking to enlist the support of others in bringing together some sort of group litigation or class action. This gives just some of the flavour of what the Defendant has been seeking to do.

The only matter I need to decide on this material is whether the first claim, which bears action number 22000748/2017 is frivolous, vexatious and/or totally without merit. I am completely satisfied that it is all of those things for a number of quite obvious reasons. The claim is plainly abusive because it is an attempt to re-litigate the Defendant’s underlying concerns, which were determined conclusively against her by Henderson J back in April 2010. It is plainly and obviously an attempt to circumvent the GCRO imposed by my judicial colleagues on several occasions. Moreover, the claim is obviously time-barred. So, I would hold, and I have jurisdiction so to hold, that this set of proceedings is totally without merit. The appeals sought to be brought within those proceedings are totally without merit.

The second claim, which the Watford Tribunal refused to issue based on identical facts, is totally without merit, and the same applies to the third claim insofar as the Employment Tribunal agreed that it could be pursued against the Ministry of Justice. So, we have a plethora of claims and applications within those claims which are totally without merit.

The question arises as to whether (a) I have jurisdiction to make the order sought by the Law Society and (b), if I do, this is an appropriate occasion on which to exercise that jurisdiction. I will address those matters before I address the Defendant’s arguments.

I am entirely satisfied that the court has an inherent jurisdiction in this sort of case to impose its coercive or injunctive powers on a vexatious litigant if she persists, without reasonable cause, in litigating in inferior tribunals.

To the extent that it is necessary to refer to authority, I am grateful for the analysis and conclusions given by Hamblen J (as he then was) in the case of Harrold v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2016] IRLR 30. I would also endorse his conclusion that if a statutory basis for the jurisdiction is required, one need look no further than section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. I also have jurisdiction to declare that proceedings before Employment Tribunals are totally without merit – see the second Harrold case – and, to the extent necessary, I have jurisdiction to order that the Defendant apply to the Employment Tribunal, in relation to those claims which I have held are totally without merit, to withdraw them. If authority is required for that proposition the relevant case is Karen v Lane.

In considering whether this is an appropriate case to exercise that jurisdiction, I take into account the following matters. First of all, the Defendant is plainly a vexatious litigant who has troubled the courts now over many years and has been made the subject of numerous General Civil Restraint Orders. Secondly, she has shown no loss of appetite over the years; indeed, it is clear from her submissions that litigation is her main raison d’être. Misguided though it be, she believes that there is an underlying injustice which must be rectified. Therefore, she continues to litigate. Thirdly, as I have said, the proceedings in the Employment Tribunal are the most obvious attempt to circumvent the effect of the GCROs. Fourthly, there is ample material (and I have reviewed it sufficiently already) which demonstrates that the litigation in the Employment Tribunal has been predicated on completely erroneous bases, and has amounted to a spate of proceedings and applications which are totally without merit. So, on the face of it this would be a clearly paradigm case which would justify the making of the relief sought by the Law Society.

As against that, the Defendant has adduced a mass of material and advanced a number of submissions in support of various applications, not all of which, indeed most of which were not, were germane to a defence of the Law Society’s application. What the Defendant seeks from me is the following. She wants me to set aside the order of Nicola Davies J dated 25 May 2018. I should add that before the hearing she wanted me to recuse myself on the basis of my involvement in the Leveson Enquiry. Secondly, she applied for declaratory relief that the Law Society intervention made over a decade ago never took place, and she also seeks me to say that Park J’s order be varied to record that he made a mistake in law because no intervention ever took place. Next, she applies to set aside the order of Briggs J made on 2 October 2007, which is, on her analysis, the fraudulent instrument which has given rise to most of her current difficulties. As I have said, the basis of the application seems to be that Briggs J was not acting in a judicial capacity, that he misunderstood basic conveyancing principles, and that everything following his order is “non-existent because it is based on Briggs”. Next, it is said that the Part 8 procedure is inappropriate, because facts are in dispute. Then it is said that Turner J’s order and other similar orders are per incuriam, because they are based on the same fundamental misconceptions and stem ultimately from Briggs J’s order. Then there are applications to arrest various people, including Mr Adam Solomon QC and his instructing solicitor Mr Sakrouge. And the applications continue.

The way I propose to deal with these applications is as follows. I am simply not prepared to deal with applications made many years after the event, seeking in effect to appeal against orders properly made in other divisions in the High Court. The applications themselves are inherently vexatious and completely misconceived. I need say no more about them. The orders are valid and must be obeyed and respected.

Let me focus on the matters which are potentially germane to the Defendant’s defence of the Law Society’s claim today. The Defendant submits that sections 111 and 112 of the Equality Act are germane because the ET are public authorities bound by the Act and they have connived in or are someway involved in the underlying conspiracy. In my judgment, that submission is completely misconceived. The ET is a court for these purposes and receives discrimination claims. The ET has power to decide whether or not those claims should be issued. It has decided to do so on some occasions; it has refused to do so on others. It is for the ET itself, and if necessary for this court, to decide whether the claims before the tribunal are or are not totally without merit, and I have so decided. As for the submission that the Part 8 procedure is inappropriate because the facts are in dispute, my riposte would be to say: which facts are in dispute? There are no facts in dispute relevant to the Law Society’s application, which is based on the pleadings in the Employment Tribunal. The underlying facts are disputed by the Defendant insofar as they go back to what happened before Briggs J and possibly what happened before Henderson J, but they are not relevantly in dispute for present purposes; and in any event, as I have pointed out more than once now, it is not possible to re-open those matters before me.

The Defendant finally, in a plea for mercy I suppose, invited me to take a broad and humane view and to say that all she really wanted was her money back. In other words, that which she says was expropriated pursuant to the order of Briggs J. On one level I understand the Defendant’s concern, but it all comes back to the same point, that Briggs J made an order on 2 October 2007, and I have seen nothing to suggest that the order was procured by fraud, or that he was not acting in a judicial capacity, or that his order was wrong. It is a valid order until set aside. It is not something which can appropriately be dealt with by me now, nor is it germane to the relief the Law Society seeks from me now.

It is clear from the post-hearing exchanges that the defendant felt that I did not deal adequately with her submission that Park J’s order should be upheld and the Claimant be ordered to pay her a sum in the region of £250,000. That submission was completely misconceived. It has nothing to do with the Claimant’s present application. It is obviously statute-barred. It is obviously an attempt to re-litigate the making of the GCRO. Finally, it ignores the fact that Park J did not order that the Claimant pay the defendant any money, and, in any event, that his order was reversed in the Court of Appeal.

There is no basis, I should add, for setting aside any part of Nicola Davies J’s order. I note with concern two aspects of the Defendant’s conduct in relation to that order. The first is that Nicola Davies J ordered that the Defendant file no further documents. The Defendant has breached that order. I have taken into account the documents she has filed, but I note the breach. Secondly, I am concerned at the wild, if not outrageous, allegations that the Defendant has chosen to make against the conduct of Nicola Davies J without any conceivable basis, and frankly can only have been actuated by a completely misconceived apprehension of the proper judicial function. But it is really all part of a theme, that any order or judgment that the Defendant does not like is regarded by her as nonexistent and any judge who makes the order, acting in good faith, must be guilty of the gravest form of conspiracy and of fraudulent conduct.

These are all matters which demonstrate that this case cries out for the making of the order sought by the Law Society. Indeed, it is a completely overwhelming application and I grant it in the terms sought by the Law Society. But I am going to do two further things. First of all – I am sure Mr Solomon can assist with the drafting of the order – I am going to extend Turner J’s order, which was made in July 2017, so that it will run as from today’s date for the 2 years (which is the maximum period permitted under the practice direction). Secondly, I am going to order that a transcript of my judgment be prepared at public expense, and that once it has been approved by me the transcript and all the papers I have seen be provided to Her Majesty’s Attorney General with a request that serious consideration be given by him to apply to the court under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (as amended) for an “all proceedings order” against the Defendant without limit as to time. There is absolutely no reason why private parties, even parties exercising semi public or public functions should have to come to the court at 2-yearly intervals to make further applications for GCROs. The matter needs to be determined once and for all by the Attorney General.