Sheffield City Council v Crump & Ors

This is an application by Sheffield City Council to commit four citizens of Sheffield to prison for contempt of court. Two of these individuals, Simon Crump and Paul Brooke, were defendants in this action and gave undertakings of which they are now alleged to be in breach. The other two individuals, Fran Grace and Benoit Compin, were not named defendants but are alleged to be in breach of an injunction which I granted against persons unknown.

The application arises out of the council’s controversial tree felling programme which forms part of a 25 year highway maintenance programme known as “Streets Ahead”. The background is set out in detail in my judgment in Sheffield City Council v Fairhall dated 15^th August 2017 ([2017] EWHC 2121 (QB)). In that judgment I decided that there should be an injunction to restrain the defendants from taking action to prevent the felling by the council and its contractor of trees on the public highway by maintaining a presence within a safety zone erected around a tree.

It is important at the outset to make the following points.

First, as I hope I made clear in my August 2017 judgment, I expressed no view then, one way or the other, as to the merits of the tree felling programme or the objections to it. That remains the position. It is not for the court to have any view about this or for any such view to play any part in the decision which I now have to make. That decision is whether the defendants or any of them are in breach either of their undertaking or of the injunction.

Second, I recognise that the tree felling programme has excited some very strong emotions. That is certainly so in the case of the present defendants who object strongly to the felling of healthy trees. Their views are shared by a large number of Sheffield citizens and others, many of whom have been both vocal and active. On the other hand, there are also strong views on the other side, albeit less vocal. The evidence was that many residents support the programme.

Third, it is useful to recall the history of these proceedings. The challenge to the council’s tree felling programme began with an application for judicial review which failed. In proceedings brought by Mr David Dillner it was held that the council’s decision to remove trees was a decision made pursuant to its statutory duty to maintain the highway and was lawful: see R (Dillner) v Sheffield City Council [2016] EWHC 945 (Admin). That was followed by the council’s application for an injunction. For the reasons which I gave more fully in my judgment, I held that even if the action taken by protesters had initially been a lawful exercise of the right to protest in order to encourage the council to think again, it was apparent that the council had thought again and had decided that it was in the interests of the people of Sheffield as a whole to maintain its policy. That was, therefore, the considered decision of the democratically accountable statutory body charged with responsibility for determining how the highway should be repaired and maintained and how public resources should be allocated. Whatever view may be had about its decision, it was accountable to the people of Sheffield through the ballot box.

Fourth, since the tree felling programme began there have been not one but two opportunities for the people of Sheffield to consider this issue. In May 2016 there was an election in which all 84 council seats were contested. In May 2018 there was a further local election. Politically controversial as this issue undoubtedly is, the fact is that on both occasions the people of Sheffield voted for councillors a majority of whom supported the tree felling programme.

Fifth, and fundamentally, this is a society governed by the rule of law. It is for the people to vote for their elected representatives at both national and local level. Parliament then makes the law, which includes determining the functions to be carried out by local authorities. Parliament has entrusted to local authorities, in this case Sheffield City Council, the function of repairing and maintaining the highway. It is then for the courts to interpret and, where necessary, enforce that law. If a court gets the law wrong, as sometimes happens, the aggrieved party can appeal to a higher court. The defendants in this action could have sought permission to appeal against my judgment if they considered that the law gave them the right to continue to prevent tree felling by maintaining a presence within safety zones. They did not do so. I have no doubt that they were competently advised as to the prospects of an appeal and took the view that an appeal would not have any real prospect of success.

Sixth, it follows that the injunction which I granted reflects the considered decision of the democratically elected body entrusted by Parliament with the responsibility of repairing and maintaining the highway and is in accordance with the law.

Seventh, it was because of the importance of democratic accountability in this case that I sought reassurance at the outset of the hearing of this application that the application was brought with the approval of democratically elected councillors including specifically the Leader of the Council. It may be, as Mr Yasser Vanderman for the council told me, that the decision whether to bring this application was constitutionally a decision for the council’s Legal Director to make. Nevertheless, I would have been uneasy in the circumstances of this case if an application was being made on behalf of the council to commit citizens of Sheffield to prison without the support of democratically elected councillors. In response to my enquiry, I was told that the application was supported by the Leader of the Council.

Eighth, it is critical to the rule of law that the orders of the court should be complied with. If we were to reach a position where orders made by the court could be ignored with impunity by those who disagree with them, we would have lost something very precious.

The undertakings given by Simon Crump and Paul Brooke were as follows:

“I will not:

i)

enter any safety zone erected around any tree within the area shown edged red on the plan attached hereto;

ii)

seek to prevent the erection of any safety zone;

iii)

remain in any safety zone after it is erected;

iv)

knowingly leave any vehicle in any safety zone or intentionally place a vehicle in a position so as to prevent the erection of a safety zone;

Nor will I encourage, aid, counsel, direct or facilitate anybody else to do any of the matters in paragraphs (i) to (iv) above including by posting social media messages.”

The area shown edged red on the attached plan was the administrative area of the City of Sheffield. The undertaking was stated to apply until 23:59 on 25^th July 2018. It contained no definition of a “safety zone”.

Although these undertakings were given reluctantly, it was expressly made clear in their presence that Simon Crump and Paul Brooke gave them of their own free will, understanding that the undertakings bound them to the same extent as if an order in the same terms had been made against them. The undertakings were given in the course of the hearing and before I gave judgment.

The injunction which I granted was in essentially the same terms as the undertakings already given, although it included a definition of a safety zone as follows:

“For the avoidance of doubt a ‘safety zone’ is that area delineated by barriers erected on the public highway around a tree to be felled.”

Strictly speaking, the fact that this definition forms part of the injunction but not of the undertakings opens the door to argument that the regime applicable in the two cases is not necessarily the same. For example, in a judgment dated 31 October 2017 on an application to commit Alison Teal and Calvin Payne, I ruled that in order to comprise a safety zone within the definition in the injunction, there must be a defined area enclosed by barriers which have been erected on the public highway (see [2017] EWHC 2692 (QB) at [11]). That ruling depended on the particular wording of the definition which is not included in the undertakings. Nevertheless it would be absurd in my judgment if two protesters standing side-by-side, one of whom had given an undertaking while the other had not and therefore was subject to the injunction, were to be governed by different regimes. That is not how matters have been understood in practice. It appears to have been the common understanding of the council and of those such as Dr Crump who have given undertakings that the latter are bound to the same extent as provided by the injunction. In my judgment that is a sensible and correct basis on which to proceed.

The application to commit is concerned with five separate incidents on different dates as follows:

I propose to reserve judgment in the case of Paul Brooke as the application concerning him raises issues which require further reflection. This judgment therefore deals with the remaining defendants.

The following principles apply:

I apply these principles.

The council relies on evidence from a number of witnesses, seven of whom not only provided affidavits but also attended for cross examination. As will be seen, in general I accept their evidence on the issues with which these applications are concerned. In particular Paul Billington, the council’s Director of Culture and Environment, came under vigorous attack on the ground that he gave misleading evidence during the trial which led to the grant of the injunction. I reject that suggestion. As before, I found him to be an honest and reliable witness, a conscientious and fair-minded council officer doing a challenging job. Of most assistance, however, there was video evidence recorded at the time of the incidents in question.

Simon Crump and Fran Grace gave evidence, but Benoit Compin elected not to do so. I shall make my findings about the defendants’ evidence as I deal with the issues. It is clear that Dr Crump and Ms Grace are sincere and committed protesters strongly opposed to the tree felling programme. I have no reason to suppose that the same is not true of Mr Compin.

Some of the evidence ranged widely over points of at most peripheral relevance. I propose to concentrate on the evidence relating to the incidents where one or more of the defendants are alleged to be in contempt.

The incident on 18^th December 2017 involving Simon Crump and Fran Grace concerned a tree on Meersbrook Park Road which was due to be felled that day. It arose as follows.

A safety zone was erected around the tree, apparently without difficulty, in the course of the morning. That zone may have been sufficient to allow some work to be done, but was not large enough to allow the safe felling of the tree. A number of protesters were present, including Simon Crump and Fran Grace. They were both outside the zone and were therefore, at that stage, acting lawfully. They made no attempt to enter the zone. Subsequently, however, the area of the safety zone was enlarged with the result that Dr Crump and Ms Grace were within the enlarged area. Other protesters who were present took steps to leave the enlarged zone area as it was being erected, but Dr Crump and Ms Grace did not. Dr Crump made a comment that although they had been outside the zone, they were now inside it. Over the course of several minutes they were asked eight times to leave but declined to do so. Dr Crump said also that it was not a proper safety zone. Ms Grace made a comment that she did not know about the injunction. The two of them remained within the enlarged zone for several minutes.

After Dr Crump and Ms Grace made clear that they did not intend to leave, the contractors adjusted the barriers in the corner of the zone where they were standing so as to exclude them from the area of the enlarged zone. Shortly after that, a masked man arrived and climbed over the barrier, entering the zone and preventing any further work.

The defendants’ case is that (1) a “safety zone” must be a zone which is erected in order to provide a safe working area; (2) it was unnecessary to enlarge the zone initially erected for reasons of safety; (3) the enlargement of the area enclosed by barriers was not carried out for reasons of safety but in order to entrap the defendants within the zone; and (4) the fact that it was possible to reduce the area of the zone to exclude them from it demonstrates that the initial enlargement was unnecessary. Accordingly, the defendants say, the enlarged area was not a safety zone within the meaning of the undertaking and/or injunction.

On behalf of the council Mr Yaaser Vanderman accepted that the council (or in practice Amey) does not have carte blanche to erect a safety zone wherever it chooses or over whatever area it chooses, however extensive. He accepted that in order to qualify as a “safety zone” within the meaning of the undertakings and/or injunction, the barriers must be erected around a tree to be felled and that the decision as to the area to be covered by the zone must be taken rationally for safety reasons. A number of factors will affect this decision. These will include the nature of the work to be carried out, the area covered by the canopy of the tree, the number of personnel who would be required to work within the safety zone and the vehicles which would need to be located there in order to carry out the work. There may be other factors also which are relevant to particular trees. It is apparent, therefore, that an exercise of judgment is required and that opinions as to the precise area needing to be enclosed for safety reasons in the case of any particular tree may reasonably differ.

I accept the claimant’s submission that the location of a safety zone is a matter for the council (or in practice Amey to whom the council has delegated the function of removing trees) to determine as part of the performance of its duty to maintain the highway. So long as the decision is made on safety grounds and is not one which no reasonable contractor taking appropriate arboricultural advice could make, the decision will be lawful and the zone thus erected will comprise a “safety zone” within the meaning of the undertakings and/or injunction.

I accept the evidence of the claimants’ witnesses that the erection of the initial zone around the tree on Meersbrook Park Road on this day was in order to enable at least some tree work short of felling to be carried out and a safety zone to be established, and that the enlargement of the zone was for the purpose of creating a safe area in which the tree could be felled. Both decisions were made for genuine safety reasons by Dom Barratt, the lead arboriculturalist present on site, and were rational, taking proper account of the factors identified above. Although the claimants’ witnesses were not entirely consistent in their accounts of the way in which these factors affected the decision to enlarge the safety zone, I have no doubt that these were the factors in play.

In contrast, the evidence of Dr Crump and Ms Grace was that Amey was seeking to entrap them within the enlarged safety zone. Initially Dr Crump explained that his allegation of entrapment meant that he was being prevented from leaving the enlarged zone. He insisted that he and Ms Grace were being trapped in the sense of being stopped from leaving even though they were repeatedly asked to leave, and that this was malicious on the part of the Amey personnel present. Subsequently Dr Crump said that he and Ms Grace were being entrapped in a different sense, namely that the Amey personnel were seeking to erect barriers around them in order to be able to say that they were unlawfully present in a safety zone and to bring proceedings against them for contempt.

Both suggestions are nonsense. They demonstrate the paranoia and mistrust which now exist on the part of some protesters including Dr Crump. It is obvious that the Amey personnel wanted Dr Crump and Ms Grace to leave the enlarged zone and would not have prevented them from doing so. It is obvious too that, if they had left, there would have been no question of contempt proceedings relating to this incident. A desire somehow to entrap the defendants played no part in the decision to enlarge the safety zone. The Amey contractors had no reason to create a larger zone than was necessary in their judgment to carry out the felling work. Their concern was to get on with that work safely. Once it became clear that this was not going to happen, it was reasonable to reduce the area of the zone with a view to doing at least some work on the tree.

It is correct that the reasons for the enlargement of the safety zone were not explained to Dr Crump and Ms Grace. However, the council was not required to provide an explanation or to engage in an argument with protesters about the area which needed to be enclosed in order for safe working to take place. It is sufficient that its decision about this was a rational decision made for safety reasons, as I find that it was. In any case, even if an explanation had been given, Dr Crump and Ms Grace would not have believed anything they were told.

As it was, they were told in clear terms that remaining within the enlarged zone would be a breach of the injunction and they chose to remain within the enlarged zone. I am satisfied that they did so deliberately, not caring whether by so doing they were breaching the terms of (in Dr Crump’s case) the undertaking and (in Ms Grace’s case) the injunction. Dr Crump said that he did so in order to delay felling of the tree. Ms Grace said that she did not know how the terms of the injunction applied to the situation where an initial zone was enlarged.

I do not accept that Ms Grace was not aware of the terms of the injunction. She heard and echoed a remark about the “real” injunction. That referred to a complaint of the protestors (which has some validity) that some of the council’s warning signs did not properly reflect the terms of the injunction actually granted. Her remark demonstrates that she was well aware of the existence of the injunction and its requirement not to enter or remain in a safety zone. She chose to take the risk that she was remaining in a safety zone contrary to the terms of the injunction.

Accordingly the allegation of contempt is proved against both defendants.

In the event, felling the tree became impossible once the masked protester arrived and climbed into the safety zone. That would probably have happened regardless of whether Dr Crump and Ms Grace left the zone as it was being enlarged. To that extent it can be said that their actions did not in the event prevent the felling of the tree. However, that does not affect the finding of contempt against them. At most it goes to mitigation.

Benoit Compin admits that on 10^th January 2018 he intentionally entered a safety zone erected around a tree to be felled on Meersbrook Park Road and remained there for 3 ½ minutes before leaving. Apparently he did so because he wanted to recite a poem in the belief that this would be entertaining for those present. He accepts that his conduct was a breach of the injunction. It is not altogether clear to me whether he accepts also that he knew this to be the case. In any event, I am satisfied that he did. He had been involved in the campaign of protest against the tree felling programme since November 2017 and in my judgment was well aware that it was forbidden to enter a safety zone. That is apparent from his conduct as shown on the video evidence and also from the Facebook post made by him on 27 October and 20 December 2017 respectively.

Accordingly the allegation of contempt is proved.

Mr Compin points out, however, that there was a masked protester within the safety zone during the whole of the time during which he was also present and, accordingly, that in any event no tree work could have been carried out during the time of his presence within the zone. Again, that does not affect the finding of contempt and is at most a matter of mitigation.

On 16^th January 2018 Simon Crump was one of three protesters protesting against the felling of a tree on Meersbrook Park Road. The Amey contractors were seeking to complete the erection of a safety zone by placing barriers against the park railings. The three protesters stood in a gap, linking their arms together and with Dr Crump hooking his arm around the railing. It was made clear to them that they were preventing the erection of the zone and they were requested to leave. After a while the other two protesters did leave, but Dr Crump remained. While he continued to stand in the gap, it was impossible to complete the erection of barriers there to form the safety zone. After a while he moved away in order to get a better view of something which was happening further down the street and the contractors took the opportunity to complete the safety zone. Dr Crump then left, cutting the plastic ties which were holding two of the barriers together in order to pass through the gap.

There is no doubt that Dr Crump’s conduct prevented the completion of a safety zone in the location where the contractors sought to erect it. His case is that it would have been possible for barriers to be placed around him and that, on some occasions, that had been done in a way which enabled work to proceed. However, it was apparent to him that Amey was seeking to erect barriers in the location where he was standing and that his presence prevented this from happening, as he intended.

As I have already stated, it was for the council (or Amey to whom it had delegated this function) to determine where a safety zone needed to be erected, provided that the decision was made for safety reasons and was rational. Subject to these qualifications, Dr Crump’s undertaking not to prevent the erection of a safety zone was an undertaking not to prevent the erection of such a zone in the location where it was sought to be erected, not in some other location. In any event I accept the claimant’s evidence that it was thought to be necessary to erect the barriers adjacent to the railings for genuine safety reasons and that it would not have been sufficient to divert the perimeter of the zone around Dr Crump. This was a rational decision. The fact that on some other occasions it was possible for work to be carried out on other trees with protesters standing between safety barriers and a natural barrier such as a wall or railings, a practice known as “geckoing”, is nothing to the point.

Dr Crump chose to impose his own opinion as to where the barriers should be erected, deliberately preventing the erection of the safety zone in the location where it was sought to erect it. He remained in position for about an hour and a half. Although he denied this, in my judgment it is obvious. Accordingly this allegation is proved.

There was a parked car within the safety zone (or, more accurately, the area which would have comprised the safety zone if it had been completed) during the whole period when Dr Crump was preventing the completion of the zone. However, I accept the claimant’s evidence that, if the zone had been completed, the car would have been removed to enable felling to proceed.

The incident on 5 March 2018 concerned a tree in Abbeyfield Park Rise which was due to be felled. On that day a female protester was being escorted out of the safety zone when Benoit Compin rushed in to prevent her removal. He became excited and was shouting out that he was using reasonable defence on behalf of the people. He swore at security personnel who were present, saying that he was going to break the injunction, whereupon he climbed the tree and remained there for some time. He was calling out that he was a poet and a public servant and said that he would do it again. He remained up the tree for a period well after the incident involving the female protester was over. Altogether he was present in the zone for about 50 minutes.

Mr Compin (who did not give evidence) does not assert that he acted in lawful defence of the female protester. There is no evidential basis for such a defence and, in any event, he remained in the zone for far longer than would have been necessary for this purpose. His only case in relation to this incident is that the definition of a “safety zone” in the injunction must be restricted to trees which it had been decided to fell as a result of a proper decision-making process and that this was not the case for this particular tree. It was submitted on his behalf that the tree in question did not need to be removed because it did not interfere with passage along the highway as the curb was displaced by only 30 mm, and accordingly that section 41 of the Highways Act 1980 was not engaged; and that an alternative engineering solution was available without significant cost or was costed within the scope of the PFI contract with Amey. Mr Greenhall sought to adduce expert evidence to support the latter submission but I refused permission for such evidence. As I shall explain, it would have been irrelevant.

The fact is, as Mr Billington’s evidence made clear, that the council followed its usual procedure in deciding that this tree needed to be felled. This was a decision made pursuant to the council’s duty under section 41 of the Highways Act 1980 to maintain the highway, for the reasons which I gave in my August 2017 judgment. It was considered by the Independent Trees Panel and was the subject of a recommendation by Amey that an engineering solution enabling the tree to be retained would be possible if funds were available for this. Amey clearly took the view that the proposed solution (removal and replacement of two of the kerbs and a narrowing of the footway by 150 mm) was not costed within the PFI contract and would require additional funding. The council agreed with that view but did not have the substantial funding available which it considered would be required to provide such a solution for this and similar trees. Accordingly it decided that the tree should be removed and replaced.

Regardless of whether the decision that the proposed solution would require additional funding was correct, this was a decision arrived at by the council’s standard decision-making process as described in my August 2017 judgment. The tree was therefore “a tree to be felled” within the meaning of the definition of “safety zone” in the injunction. It is not a tenable meaning of the injunction that it applied only to safety zones where the tree in question had been correctly assessed as one which needed to be removed. To interpret the injunction in that way would deprive it of any effect in circumstances where many protesters are irreconcilably opposed to the removal of almost any healthy tree. Nobody would be able to know which enclosed areas were a “safety zone” within the meaning of the injunction and which were not if that depended on the correctness of the council’s decision that the tree needed to be removed. If the council made a public law error in deciding that this particular tree needed to be removed, that could if necessary and if proceedings had been brought in time, have been corrected by judicial review. But that possibility cannot affect the meaning of the injunction, the terms of which are clear.

It follows that this allegation of contempt against Mr Compin is proved.

In addition to the circumstances of the contempts proved against him, the council relies on a Facebook post by Dr Crump which was posted in the week before the hearing, on or about 29^th May 2018. It read:

“Just to pre-empt anything which may come in High Court next week, I would like to make it perfectly clear that if necessary, I will continue to enter the so called ‘safety zone’ and will encourage others to do so on Social Media.”

Mr Vanderman submitted that this demonstrates contumacious intention by Dr Crump to continue to enter safety zones unlawfully, contrary to the terms of his undertaking, regardless of the outcome of this hearing and further demonstrates that his behaviour on 18 December 2017 and 16 January 2018 constituted deliberate breaches. Dr Crump denied this. He was at pains to explain that he has a PhD in English literature and chose his words very carefully. They meant something else, namely that he would continue to stand in public parks which in the past the council had wrongly claimed to constitute a safety zone. I regard this explanation as far-fetched. PhD or not, the words are clear and mean what they say.

In fact this post was deleted some time between 29^th May when it was posted and 4^th June, the day before this hearing began. Somewhat surprisingly, Dr Crump claimed that he could not remember whether he had deleted the post himself or whether this had been done by the moderators of the STAG website. I do not accept this evidence.

For reasons which I have explained, the application to commit all three defendants dealt with in this judgment succeeds in relation to all four incidents with which I have dealt.

I turn therefore to consider the question of sanction. The most serious penalty for contempt is committal to prison. Such a committal may serve two distinct purposes, namely the punishment of past contempt and securing compliance with the order of the court. There are no formal sentencing guidelines, but it is well established that in general the court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders, particularly those of previous good character such as these defendants are, out of prison if possible. Immediate imprisonment is in general reserved for cases where there is serious and contumacious flouting of an order of the court. Although sometimes necessary, it is a last resort.

In deciding what sentence to pass it is necessary to take account of an offender’s culpability, of the harm which his or her action has caused, and any personal mitigation which may be available. I will consider these matters separately in relation to each of the defendants.

I have found that on 18^th December 2017 Dr Crump remained within the enlarged safety zone deliberately, not caring whether by so doing he was in breach of the undertaking which he had given voluntarily to the court, and that he did so in order to delay felling of the tree. However, it is apparent that he did not on that occasion set out with the intention of entering a properly constituted safety zone. That is obvious from the fact that he made no attempt to enter the safety zone which had been erected before his arrival. In the event his conduct in remaining within the enlarged zone, which lasted at most for about ten minutes, did not prevent the felling of the tree because of the arrival of the masked protester. Although I can understand the council’s suspicion, not least because Dr Crump is seen speaking to somebody on his mobile phone shortly before the masked protester’s arrival, it has not been proved to the criminal standard that he was speaking to or arranging for the arrival of that protestor. The fact that Dr Crump’s presence within the zone for about ten minutes did not prevent the felling of the tree is, however, a point which only goes so far in his favour. It will always be possible for one protester to say that his or her conduct was not causative if there are others also within a safety zone. However, the presence of one protester within a zone encourages others to act similarly. There is in this sense strength in numbers.

I accept that until 18^th December 2017 Dr Crump complied with his undertaking, despite attending many sites where trees were to be felled and despite his strong views about this. The contrary has not been suggested. The situation which arose on 18^th December was unusual in the sense that it was the first time when a safety zone was enlarged with the result that, as Dr Crump put it at the time, “we were outside and now we’re inside”. Although I have found that his suspicions about entrapment were groundless, it may be that, because of his hostility towards the council and Amey together with his obvious mistrust of them, they played at any rate some part in his decision to remain within the enlarged zone.

I have found also that on 16^th January 2018 Dr Crump chose to impose his own opinion as to where the barriers should be erected, deliberately preventing the erection of the safety zone in the location where it was sought to erect it, and that this did in fact prevent work from being carried out. Dr Crump’s conduct was deliberate in this sense, although I accept that on other occasions it had been possible for work to be carried out on a tree despite the presence of protesters inserting themselves as geckos between the safety barriers and a natural barrier such as a wall or park railings.

Both of these occasions occurred after the sentencing of Calvin Payne for contempt which took place on 3^rd November 2017. Dr Crump was present in court on that occasion and will have heard me warn that breaches of the injunction will be treated seriously, and that in the case of deliberate and repeated breaches, a sentence of imprisonment will need to be considered.

Apart from these two occasions, Dr Crump has complied with his undertaking although there have been many opportunities for him to breach it. These included occasions after 16^th January 2018 before the council decided to introduce a moratorium on further tree felling. Dr Crump is in my judgment, having seen him give evidence and observed him on the video evidence, a proud man and one who in general has treated his undertaking seriously.

I have to say, however, that his Facebook post gives cause for concern. I have rejected his explanation of what he was intending to convey as far-fetched and I have rejected his claim that he cannot remember whether it was him who deleted it. Nevertheless the fact is that the post has been deleted and that, by his explanation, Dr Crump has in effect sought to reassure me that it is not his intention to continue to enter safety zones regardless of the outcome of this application. That was confirmed by his counsel in the course of submissions. I note that in fact the contempts proved against Dr Crump do not involve his having entered any completed safety zone, as distinct from conduct of a different nature. In the circumstances I am prepared to treat the Facebook post as bravado which does not represent Dr Crump’s more maturely considered position. He would do well to act accordingly.

I must also take account of the fact that Dr Crump is a man of good character, who has lived a productive life working in the education sector and as a support worker for deaf and disabled students. It is also relevant that the events with which I am concerned occurred in his case some six and five months ago respectively and that for much of that time this application has been hanging over him.

In all the circumstances, taking account of the various considerations which I have mentioned, I conclude that the appropriate sentence in his case is a suspended sentence of imprisonment. The sentence will be concurrent for each of the two contempts proved. He must understand, and I have no doubt will understand, that if further breaches of his undertaking are committed, he can expect that the sentence will be activated.

My sentence in the case of Simon Crump is one of two months imprisonment, suspended for one year.

I have found that on 18^th December 2017 Ms Grace remained within the enlarged safety zone deliberately, not caring whether by so doing she was in breach of the injunction. Although this was a novel situation for her, she nevertheless chose to take the risk that she was remaining in a safety zone contrary to the terms of the injunction.

As with Dr Crump, it is apparent that she did not set out with the intention of entering a properly constituted safety zone. Like him, she made no attempt to enter the safety zone which had been erected before her arrival on site; her conduct in remaining within the enlarged zone lasted at most for about ten minutes; and it did not prevent the felling of the tree because of the arrival of the masked protester.

Further, this was an isolated incident so far as Ms Grace is concerned. It took place some six months ago. She has attended regularly at sites where trees were to be felled, before and since, sometimes attending on two or three occasions a week. This is the only occasion on which it is suggested that she acted in breach of the injunction. She too is a person of good character and, as a retired primary school teacher, has lived a life of valuable public service.

In her case there is no reason to suppose that she threatens to commit further breaches of the injunction. If that assessment is wrong and she were to do so, those matters could be dealt with on their own merits. I have concluded that in the case of Ms Grace the finding of contempt against her is sufficient sanction and that it is unnecessary to impose any further punishment.

I have found that Mr Compin was in contempt on two occasions, on 10^th January and 5^th March 2018. He admitted being in contempt on the former occasion, which lasted only for 3 ½ minutes and did not prevent felling work from being carried out. I take this admission into account in his favour. It was, however, a deliberate breach of the injunction, as was the latter occasion, when his statements made clear that he intended to breach the injunction. He said, moreover, that he would do it again. It is particularly serious that the second incident occurred after Mr Compin had been notified that proceedings for contempt would be brought against him as a result of the first incident.

As with Dr Crump, a Facebook post by Mr Compin is cause for concern. It was posted the day before this hearing began and shows a photograph of him inside the safety zone on 5 March 2018 making offensive gestures towards security staff. The caption to the post is, “my defense for tomorrow”. Mr Vanderman submitted, with some justification, that this indicates an attitude of defiance towards the court process. Mr Greenhall, however, was able to tell me, on Mr Compin’s instructions, that this was essentially a display of bravado on his part and does not represent a disregard for the court process. He told me that Mr Compin does not propose to breach this injunction again.

Mr Compin, like the other defendants, is a person of good character.

In his case I have concluded that in view of his deliberate conduct and his threats to repeat this conduct, both on 5^th March 2018 and, at least by implication, in the Facebook post of earlier this week, a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate but that this can be suspended. Mr Compin too must understand that if there are further breaches of the injunction, this sentence will be activated. I sentence him to two months imprisonment, suspended for one year. That sentence will be concurrent on each of the contempts proved against him.

It would be premature to deal with issues of costs until I have given judgment in the case of Mr Brooke.

Finally, I would like to thank counsel for their assistance and to thank also those in the public gallery, many of whom I know have strong feelings about this case, for the quiet and respectful way in which they have listened to these proceedings.