Dhir v Saddler

This is the judgment following the trial of a slander claim. Slander claims are rare. Those that make it to a full trial rarer still. This uncommonness is largely due to the difficulties that many claimants have in proving that particular words were spoken about them on a particular occasion. In this claim, although much else is disputed, the words spoken by the Defendant have been agreed from the outset.

The Claimant, Raj Dhir, is 75. He is a business man and owner of Harewood International Products LLP, which is a family business based in Leeds. He is married and has three children: two daughters, Reena and Ruchi, and a son, Rishi.

The Defendant, Bronte Saddler (known as “Annie”) describes herself in her witness statement as an old-age pensioner and is also in her 70s. She is a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Leeds and has five children – three sons and two daughters - and nine grandchildren.

One of her sons, Andrew, has, since 2001, had an on-off relationship with Reena Dhir. That relationship has led to the Dhir and Saddler families into conflict and acrimony and ultimately to this action.

The claim arises from words spoken by the Defendant at a meeting of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, 169 Meanwood Road, Leeds (“the Church”) on 19 July 2015. I will go into more detail below, but the meeting was primarily concerned with a complaint that had been lodged with the Church about the conduct of the Saddler family, in particular Andrew Saddler (“Mr Saddler”). Mr Saddler was, formerly, a member of the Church.

Mr Saddler married Eleanor in 2011. They are now separated. For at least part of their marriage, Mr Saddler’s relationship with Reena continued. The Dhir family considered that the relationship between Reena and Mr Saddler was not a healthy one. They believed that he was exploiting her financially. As he was married, Andrew’s relationship with their daughter was regarded as adulterous. So, in February 2015, the Dhir family complained to the Church about the relationship and what they perceived as the Defendant’s knowledge and sanctioning of it.

Under its procedures, the Church could entertain such a complaint and ultimately, if substantiated, could sanction a member for his/her misconduct. And so it was that on 19 July 2015 members of the Church gathered to hear about the Dhir family complaint about the Saddlers. As a matter of chronology, Mr Saddler had left the Church earlier in 2015 and so by the time of the meeting it no longer had jurisdiction over him in respect of the Dhirs’ complaint.

The Claimant, his wife, Ruchi and Rishi all attended the Church meeting. From the Saddler family, in attendance were the Defendant, her son, Clyde, and her daughter-in-law, Eleanor. The meeting was attended by others from the Church, including Emily Tebbs-Ogutu (a former member of the Church Board), who gave evidence at the trial. She was a friend of Eleanor and had become acquainted with Ruchi Dhir. One of the issues I have to decide is, so far as possible, how many people were in attendance at the meeting to hear the words that were later to become the basis of this slander claim.

What is clear, however, is that at the meeting, Ruchi Dhir addressed those present. She read from prepared notes. I need quote only part of these notes. I do not know whether they were read to the meeting word for word, but this will serve to capture a flavour of her presentation to the Church:

“Andrew came back in my sister’s life in January 2014. He was and still is married to Ellie. I found out by accident about the relationship in July and confronted both my sister and Andrew by telephone… We have watched for 14 years as my sister has been abused, lied to and cheated by Andrew Saddler and it is very hard for a family as close as ours to watch. Time after time, Andrew has come back into my sister’s life and led her on and then told her that he didn’t really love her and never said he would marry her. Recently, when we had a meeting with the church elders after one elder had approached Andrew about his current extra marital affair, he simply said that he wanted out of his marriage with Ellie and to start a relationship with my sister: well as far as we, as Reena’s family are concerned, this has always been to do with money and never to do with love. The evidence is staggering – apart from my sister’s bank statements… showing payments over the years for his mortgage and other amenities, since July 2014, Andrew enjoyed two five star holidays paid for by my sister to Dubai and Thailand, staying in 7 star resorts… I have held back for fourteen years because, in my heart and religion, I believe people are and can be good. But I have stopped believing this in the case of Andrew Saddler and his mother. There is no care or love here, he has a habit. And he has a habit of manipulating women, be it my sister… or anyone else, for material gain…”

Reference was made by Ruchi Dhir to a meeting that she, her father and her brother Rishi had had with the Defendant at her home in September 2014 (“the September meeting”). Again, if the notes are accurate, she gave an account of this meeting to the Church. She claimed that the Defendant had said to the Dhirs that she would never accept Andrew’s relationship with Reena and that she only had one daughter-in-law, Eleanor.

After Ruchi Dhir’s presentation, the Defendant was given an opportunity to speak. There is some dispute over whether she spent time in her address criticising the Church and the way that it had behaved towards her in the handling of the Dhirs’ complaint, but what is clear – and admitted by the Defendant – is that she said that, at the September meeting with the Dhirs at her home, “he [the Claimant] threatened to slit my throat”.

It is the publication of those words, to the assembled congregation of the Church, that has given rise to this claim.

Much time has been devoted, at the trial, to an analysis of what was said at this meeting, by whom and in what order. The Defendant complains that she was ambushed at the meeting and that the Church had denied her a fair opportunity of dealing with allegations that were made against her. Even more time was spent on a detailed scrutiny of the events running-up to the meeting. Little of this is of any assistance in resolving the issues that have to be decided, but these events form the backdrop to this meeting.

Ostensibly, this evidence has been advanced because the Defendant relies upon a defence of truth, and in consequence, I have to decide who is telling the truth about what took place at the September meeting. Five people were present during the meeting – the Claimant, the Defendant, Ruchi (for part) and Rishi. Eleanor Saddler joined part way through the meeting. They have all given evidence during the trial. Two accounts of this meeting have been advanced. One of those accounts is not true. I have to resolve which. There are no contemporaneous documents to shed light on which account is true. In consequence, each side has attacked the credibility of the opposing side’s witnesses and their account of the meeting. It is this issue of credibility that has propelled the parties far and wide in search of material to undermine the credibility of each other and the witnesses who have been called. I will deal below, when I come to deal with the defence of truth, with how much of this credibility evidence was ultimately of any assistance to me in resolving the issues of who is telling the truth about what took place at the September meeting.

A letter marked “letter before action” was sent by the Claimant to the Defendant on 6 August 2015. In it, the Claimant sought a retraction in writing from the Defendant of the allegation that he had threatened to slit her throat. He indicated that, if such a retraction was not forthcoming, he would pursue a case of slander against the Defendant.

The Defendant did not respond to that letter. The matter rested there until, on 15 July 2016, solicitors instructed by the Claimant wrote again to the Defendant to complain about what she was alleged to have said at the 19 July 2015 meeting of the Church. The solicitors sought from the Defendant a written apology, an undertaking that she would not repeat the allegation, compensation for the damage to the Claimant’s reputation and his legal costs. If there was a response to this letter, it has not featured at the trial.

Clearly mindful of the limitation period for defamation claims, on 14 July 2016, a Claim Form had been issued. It was not served on the Defendant until much later and Particulars of Claim were not served until around 8 November 2016. In his statement of case, the Claimant set out the words he alleged that the Defendant had spoken and contended that they meant that:

“(a)

the claimant has criminal tendencies;

(b)

in particular, that he was given to threats of violence, and

(c)

specifically, murderous threats against the Defendant.”

The Defendant dealt with the early stages of the litigation (and all the way to a couple of weeks before trial) acting in person, assisted by her son, Clyde, who has legal qualifications and experience. She filed her Defence on 8 December 2016. Perfectly candidly, the Defendant accepted that she had spoken the words attributed to her in the Particulars of Claim at the 19 July 2015 meeting at the Church. She maintained that “the natural and ordinary meaning of these words is that the Claimant threatened to slit [her] throat” and she relied, simply, on a defence of truth based on what she alleged had happened when the Dhirs had visited her home at the September meeting.

A Reply was served by the Claimant. He denied that it was true that he had made the alleged threats.

The Defendant instructed Counsel, John Samson, who represented her at the trial, about 2 weeks prior to trial. Upon being instructed, Mr Samson naturally reviewed the case and the pleadings. In the days before the trial, an application seeking permission to amend the Defence was issued. Apart from minor tidying-up, the amendments sought fell into three broad categories: (1) a revised defence of truth with particulars in support of the meaning “when crossed in family matters, the claimant is prone to anger, intimidating and bullying behaviour and making wild threats”; (2) a defence of qualified privilege; and (3) a denial that the publication complained of by the Claimant had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation (as required by s.1 Defamation Act 2013) and/or that, in all the circumstances, the Claimant could demonstrate no real or substantial tort and his claim should therefore be dismissed as an abuse of process under the principle recognised in Jameel –v- Dow Jonesand Co Inc [2005] QB 946.

The Claimant consented to the proposed amendments. Nevertheless, given the proximity of the trial date, I considered that the Court’s approval should be obtained for the amendments as there was at least a clear risk that the trial estimate of 3 days would be jeopardised by the widening of the issues in the proposed amendments.

Following argument on 6 November 2017 (the day before the trial was listed to commence), the amendments in categories (1) and (2) above were either abandoned or disallowed. I gave my reasons at the time. With the agreement of the parties, I went on to determine the actual meaning of the words spoken by the Defendant. For reasons given in a separate judgment, I ruled that the meaning of the words was:

“the Claimant had threatened to slit the throat of the Defendant.”

The trial was thus able to commence on 7 November 2017 proceeding directly to the calling of evidence.

Having determined meaning before the trial commenced, the following issues require determination, logically in this order:

Ordinarily, the cause of action for slander requires proof of special damage caused by the publication. However, there are certain established categories of slander in which the claimant is relieved of this obligation. Relevant for this case is the well-established exception that words imputing to the claimant the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment are actionable per se: Webb –v- Bevan (1883) 11 QBD 609, 610 per Pollock B.

Mr Mitchell for the Claimant submits that this is an obvious case. The words impute that the Claimant has committed the offence of making a threat to kill. Section 16 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provides:

“A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other would fear it would be carried out, to kill that other or a third person shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.”

He submits that a threat to slit someone’s throat is a colloquial expression that refers to a gruesome way to kill someone.

Mr Samson for the Defendant relies upon authorities that suggest that to say of someone that he has threatened or intends to do something in the future that is a criminal offence is not actionable per se. He has referred me to §4.8 in Gatley which states (omitting most footnote references):

“Words which merely impute an intention or inclination to commit a crime are not actionable without proof of special damage, for criminal intention does not amount to a crime. But to impute an attempt to commit an indictable crime is actionable without proof of special damage, for an attempt to commit an indictable crime is an offence punishable corporally. Thus where the words were ‘she would have cut her husband’s throat and did attempt to do it’, it was held that no action lay for the words, ‘she would have cut her husband’s throat’, but that an action was maintainable for the remaining words which charged an attempt (Scot –v- Hilliar (1611) Lane 98). A fortiori therefore it is not actionable to state an opinion that the claimant will commit a crime in the future or that he would commit a crime if the opportunity presented itself.”

He also submits, relying upon the wording of s.16, that it is necessary for the Claimant to show that all of the ingredients of the offence have been made out.

I am quite satisfied that the words “he threatened to slit my throat” impute the commission of the offence of making a threat to kill under s.16. That is an offence punishable by imprisonment and so the slander claim can be maintained by the Claimant without proof of special damage. My reasons for this conclusion are:

Although relevant to damages (if that stage is reached), the extent of publication is potentially relevant to the issues of Serious Harm and Jameel Abuse.

The evidence as to the number of people who were in attendance at the Church when the Defendant’s words were spoken has varied widely. Although there are two versions of “minutes” of the meeting, neither includes any information about the number or identity of those who attended.

Mr Samson on behalf of the Defendant submitted that the original 300-400 estimate was a dishonest exaggeration. Only Rishi Dhir’s evidence suggested that the attendance was of this sort of order. He submits that I should accept the lower estimates given by the Defendant’s witnesses.

In closing, Mr Mitchell did not urge me to find a particular figure for the attendance. Realistically, he did not press the pleaded case of 300-400. He invites me to accept the evidence of Ms Tebbs-Ogutu as someone who was (a) a member of the Board of the Church (and so more likely to be able to give a realistic estimate); and (b) independent of the parties.

As I have set out, the evidence conflicts. For reasons I explain in more detail below, I have found some of the evidence of Eleanor Saddler to be unreliable. Both she and Clyde Saddler struck me as witnesses who were obviously clever and both seemed to me to have appreciated the potential importance of the decision as to the number of publishees. Having seen them give evidence, I gained the clear impression that they were seeking to minimise the number of people that were at the meeting rather than assisting the Court with their genuine recollection. Neither had previously given an estimate in their witness statement. Clyde Saddler’s use of the strange phrase, “we will give them 70”, satisfies me that the figure of “no more than 70” pleaded in the Defence was born more of expediency than a genuine effort to recall the number that were present at the meeting. On this point, I also regard as significant the evidence of the Defendant when cross-examined. I made a specific note at the time of her answer when she was asked whether the meeting was particularly busy. Her immediate response - “more than ever” – struck me as entirely genuine. It appears to me to be consistent with the thrust of Ms Tebbs-Ogutu’s evidence.

It is impossible to ascertain the precise figure, not least because the evidence suggests that some people left at points during the meeting. The best I can do is to make a reasonable estimate based on the evidence. I derive most assistance from the evidence of Ms Tebbs-Ogutu on this issue, largely for the reasons Mr Mitchell urged.

In my judgment, and on my assessment of the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied that the Claimant has demonstrated publication of the alleged slander to at least 90 people at the meeting. Recognising that the Claimant has the burden of proving publication, the figure I will settle upon is 90 people. As my decisions below on the issues of Serious Harm and Jameel Abuse do not depend upon a precise number of publishees, I am satisfied the figure is not ultimately likely to have a significant impact on the disposal of this claim.

The basic legal principles do not appear to be in dispute (or at least neither Counsel has sought to suggest that there is any dispute).

Under s.1 Defamation Act 2013, to succeed with any defamation claim (including slander) a claimant has to show that the publication of the statement complained of “has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant”.

“Serious harm”, under s.1, is to be determined at the point of publication of the words complained of: Lachaux–v- Independent Print Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 1334 [67] and [82(2)]. The words “is likely to cause” are to be taken as “connoting a tendency to cause”: [50].

In Lachaux, Davis LJ stressed the importance of distinguishing between harm to reputation and the consequences of it (see [27], [32], [59] and [82(2)]).

If the objective meaning of the statement complained of is seriously defamatory, then an inference of serious harm can and should be drawn [70] [83(3)]. Once that threshold is reached, further evidence (as to reputational harm) will then be likely to be more relevant to quantum and any continuing dispute should ordinarily be left to trial [83(3)].

As to the sort of rebuttal evidence upon which a defendant might seek to rely at trial, Davis LJ said [79]:

“There may… be cases where the evidence shows that no serious reputational harm has been caused or is likely for reasons unrelated to the meaning conveyed by the defamatory statement complained of. One example could, for instance, perhaps be where the defendant considers that he has irrefutable evidence that the number of publishees was very limited, that there has been no grapevine percolation and that there is firm evidence that no-one thought any the less of the claimant by reason of the publication. Whether such evidence is in truth unanswerable … is then for the court to determine. Alternatively, if subsequent events or evidence show that there has ceased to be a "real and substantial tort" then a strike out application, in accordance with the principles of Jameel, may also be available…”

The Judge’s scepticism that, in cases of publication of a seriously defamatory allegation, evidence could successfully be adduced to persuade the Court not to draw the inference is likely to reflect the reality in many cases. As I noted in Alsaifi –v- Trinity Mirror plc[2017] EWHC 2873 (QB) [95(iii)]: “In mass media cases (where it is unlikely that the readers can be identified) it is almost impossible to advance evidence that publishees did not believe the allegation made against the claimant.”

Where the publishees are identifiable, a defendant may have a more realistic prospect of displacing the inference of serious harm. For example, in Bode –v- Mundell[2016] EWHC 2533 (QB), Warby J found that the Defendant had, on the evidence, demonstrated that no serious harm to reputation had been caused by the publication of a limited circulation email. The Judge was satisfied that [56]:

The Claimant’s closing submissions did not deal with serious harm and dealt with the issue only in passing in his trial skeleton. I infer that is because it is thought that the seriousness of the allegation made by the Defendant means that the serious harm requirement is satisfied.

In his trial skeleton argument, Mr Samson, for the Defendant, submitted that:

“… the Claimant will be unable to establish that the publication of the alleged slander caused any harm, let alone serious harm, to his reputation. Publication was confined to a private gathering of the 70 or so people present at the disciplinary hearing on 19 July 2015 none of whom had any dealings or connection with the Claimant… It is not [alleged]… that the claimant has a close relationship with any of the publishees, or that their attitude to him is a matter of importance to his personal or professional life. Nor are any particular facts about their treatment of him alleged, such as ‘shunning or avoiding’ him.”

Finally, it is submitted that, as the Claimant’s complaint against the Defendant was upheld at meetings that followed the alleged slander, that showed his reputation could not have been seriously damaged by the allegation made by the Defendant.

I have already found that the statement made by the Defendant at the meeting meant “the Claimant had threatened to slit the throat of the Defendant” (see paragraph 22 above). That was to impute to the Claimant the commission of the criminal offence of making a threat to kill punishable, upon conviction, by imprisonment (see paragraph 30 above). The allegation was published to 90 people at the meeting of the Church on 19 July 2015 (see paragraph 37 above).

The seriousness of the allegation is one where I am quite satisfied that it raises an inference of serious reputational harm (as explained in Lachaux - see paragraph 42 above). Mr Samson does not challenge that. However, on behalf of the Defendant he does contend that the small scale of publication means that the Claimant cannot demonstrate serious harm. His submissions on this point were premised on a publication to 70 or so people, but his argument would apply equally to the figure of 90 that I have found.

In light of Davis LJ’s observation that serious harm might not be established where the defendant has “irrefutable evidence that the number of publishees was very limited” (paragraph 43 above), where stands the requirement for “serious harm” in slander cases? In a typical slander case, the number of publishees will (almost by definition) be very limited; most slanders are uttered to a small audience not to a crowd of tens of thousands in Wembley Stadium.

In the context of slander claims, a publication to 90 people might be regarded as pretty substantial, but measured against defamatory statements published in national broadcast or print media, publication on this scale is very limited.

When considering this question, it is interesting to note that Parliament did not overlook slander when it framed the Defamation Act 2013. Section 14 removed two categories of slander that were actionable without proof of special damage. Section 1 (and the rest of the Act) clearly applies equally to slander claims. So, Parliament must have envisaged that a slander was capable of causing serious harm to reputation (otherwise s.1 would have excluded the requirement for slander or slander might perhaps simply have been abolished altogether). Necessarily, therefore, Parliament must have thought that serious harm could be caused by the sort of very limited publication that would typically be found in most slander claims.

Whilst the issue of serious harm will always be highly fact specific, it does seem to me that this does rule out the simple proposition that a defamatory publication to, say, a handful of people is incapable of causing serious harm to reputation. In my view, the effect of Lachaux is that the requirement is to show serious harm caused to the reputation of the claimant in the eyes of the publishees; not damage to the claimant’s reputation in the eyes of people generally. If it were the latter, then almost every slander claim would not be actionable under s.1. For the reasons I have identified, that cannot have been the intention of Parliament.

In my judgment, the authorities demonstrate that it is the quality of the publishees not their quantity that is likely to determine the issue of serious harm in cases involving relatively small-scale publication. What matters is not the extent of publication, but to whom the words are published. A significant factor is likely to be whether the claimant is identified in the minds of the publishee(s) so that the allegation “sticks”.

If a defendant is unable to rebut the inference of serious harm, but contends that a claim should nevertheless be dismissed because it involves only a very small-scale publication, it seems from Lachaux that it is to the Jameel jurisdiction that the Court must turn. The issue is then whether the limited number of publishees (and the likely reputational harm occasioned by the publication) means that there has been no real and substantial tort or the cost of continued litigation is “out of all proportion” to what can be achieved: Jameel [69]-[70].

I turn therefore to consider the particular circumstances of the publication of the Defendant’s defamatory words at the meeting of the Church on 19 July 2015. It is quite clear from the Claimant’s presence at the meeting, its agenda and the context of the Defendant’s address, that all 90 people would have understood her words to have referred to the Claimant. For the reasons I have set out above (paragraph 55(iv) and (v)), the Defendant’s submission that “none of [the publishees] had any dealings or connection with the Claimant” is not relevant to the assessment of serious harm. It is correct that the Claimant has produced no evidence of any ‘shunning and avoiding’ but that sort of behaviour is a consequence of reputational harm. If a claimant can demonstrate ostracism from a community, that may be very good evidence (subject to proof of causation) that his reputation has been seriously harmed, but the absence of such evidence does not prove the opposite.

In terms of evidence that might displace the inference of serious reputation harm that arises from the gravity of the allegation, there is very little upon which the Defendant here can rely. She has not been able to put forward the sort of evidence that was determinative in Bode –v- Mundell. The Church could not provide a list of those who were in attendance at the meeting and who heard the alleged slander. In consequence, the Defendant could not identify the publishees so as to be able to embark on the exercise of attempting to establish (if she could) that no real harm had been caused to the reputation of the Claimant in their eyes. In fact, the Defendant has not obtained a witness statement from a single person who attended the meeting saying (for example) that s/he did not believe the allegation made against the Claimant. For the reasons explained above (see paragraphs 44-45 above), adopting this course only offers any real prospect of success if all (or at least a very large majority) of the publishees have been identified and give evidence displacing the inference of serious reputational harm.

There was some suggestion during the trial that there had been some laughter in the Church when the Defendant made her allegation about the Claimant’s threat to slit her throat. That there was laughter was put to both the Claimant and Clyde Saddler when giving evidence. Both denied it. Inherently, it does seem to me to be improbable that, in the context of this meeting, such an allegation would have provoked laughter. On the evidence, this point cannot rebut the inference of serious reputational harm. Had there been widespread laughter it might have provided a basis on which the Court could have been invited to infer that at least a significant number of the publishees did not take the allegation seriously, but the evidence does not demonstrate that there was any laughter at the meeting.

The final point relied upon by the Defendant is the fact that, following the 19 July 2015 meeting, the Church upheld the Dhir family’s complaints about the Defendant at a meeting on 16 August 2015. It is submitted that this shows that, at least those voting in favour at the 16 August 2015 found the complaint substantiated and therefore, it is said, they disbelieved the Defendant. This evidence is far too tenuous to provide a basis on which to conclude that, in fact, no serious harm had been caused to the Claimant’s reputation. I do not know (a) whether those who voted at the 16 August 2015 meeting were present at the 19 July 2015 meeting; and, even if they did; (b) whether a vote to uphold the Dhirs’ complaint demonstrates that they disbelieved the Defendant’s allegation. The basis of the Dhirs’ complaint was largely unconnected to the Claimant’s alleged threat. I do not have the evidence to resolve the point, but it seems to me that it would have been perfectly possible for a member voting at the 16 August 2015 meeting to have upheld the Dhirs’ complaint without necessarily disbelieving the allegation that the Claimant had made a threat to kill the Defendant.

In conclusion, I am quite satisfied, therefore, that the seriousness of the allegation and the circumstances of its publication are such that the Claimant has demonstrated that serious harm has been caused to his reputation.

The contention that the Claimant’s claim ought to be dismissed as being Jameelabusive was included in the Defendant’s trial skeleton; indeed, it was added specifically to the Amended Defence as a basis for resisting the Claimant’s claim. Furthermore, in the trial skeleton it was also alleged that the Claimant was abusing the process of the Court because, it was said, he was motivated, not by a desire for vindication, but for the collateral (and illegitimate) purpose of forcing an end to the relationship between Andrew Saddler and his daughter, Reena.

Neither of these bases for dismissing the Claimant’s claim as an abuse of process was pressed in the Defendant’s opening or closing submissions. The skeleton argument had been prepared before my ruling on the meaning of the words spoken by the Defendant at the meeting and the skeleton sought to advance a lower meaning of the words that reduced the seriousness of the allegation.

As the points have not been formally abandoned by the Defendant, I should deal with them shortly.

There is no basis on which I could properly conclude that this claim is being used by the Claimant, not for the purposes of vindication, but the impermissible collateral objective of, it is alleged, bringing to an end the relationship between the Claimant’s daughter and the Defendant’s son. I struggle to see how suing the Defendant (as Andrew Saddler’s mother) would be likely to achieve that objective in any event. The Defendant did not put forward any explanation or evidence as to how it might and no suggestion along these lines was made to the Claimant. Cross-examination on this subject was limited to the suggestion that the claim was “part of your campaign to end the relationship between Reena and Andrew”, which the Claimant rejected. In answer, he said that he was “here for one thing; my slandering (sic).”

I reject the suggestion (if it still be maintained) that this action was an abuse of process on either of the bases alleged.

The Claimant’s skeleton is silent on the legal framework for a truth defence under s.2 Defamation Act 2013. Mr Samson submits:

I accept those submissions accurately reflect the law. In some cases, the issue whether the defendant has proved the substantial truth of a defamatory imputation may give rise to fine points of judgment as to whether the defendant’s evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the truth of the imputation. This will be particularly the case where the defendant relies upon a number of instances said to demonstrate the relevant conduct. Here matters are stark. There is no room for argument about whether the Defendant has proved the imputation “substantially true”. On the facts of this case, the answer whether the Claimant threatened to slit the Defendant’s throat at the September meeting is binary; either he did, or he did not. There is no room for interpretation; no-one suggests that there is room for a finding that his words were misunderstood, that they were a joke or that witnesses have misremembered events or failed to appreciate the nuance of what the Claimant is alleged to have said. As I said at the outset (paragraph 14 above): one of the parties’ accounts of this meeting is not true; there is no room for mistake.

In civil litigation, the court can, and usually does, order that a witness’s statement should stand as their evidence-in-chief. Given that it was clear that there was going to be a very substantial attack on the credibility of the accounts given by each of those present at the September meeting, I directed that the evidence of each witness on this topic was to be given orally in examination-in-chief. With hindsight, I am quite satisfied that this was the right decision because I have benefited greatly from seeing each giving his/her account.

In this review of the evidence I am only going to concentrate on the key issues and the evidence that helps me to resolve them.

The Relationship between Reena and Andrew

The root cause of this dispute is the relationship between Reena Dhir and Andrew Saddler. It is, I think, common ground that this relationship started in 2001. The relationship was ‘on-and-off’ at various points from that date. The Dhir family disapproved of this relationship. I do not need to go through the evidence in detail, but Ruchi thought that her sister’s relationship was “destructive” and Andrew was “predatory” and financially exploitative (see further her statement to the meeting in paragraph 9 above). For his part, Rishi thought that there was “emotional and financial abuse in the relationship” with his sister having spent “vast sums of money on holidays, gifts, bills and mortgages”. The Claimant himself said that he believed that it was “a relationship of grooming and financial exploitation of [his] daughter”.

For balance, and in fairness it is right for me immediately to refer to the evidence of Reena, who was a witness for the Defendant. She denied that the relationship was exploitative and in her witness statement she was clear and firm:

“I am not brainwashed or groomed and cannot reiterate that enough. I am a 42-year-old woman, who has made some mistakes but learnt and believe me I am not a push over the way I am being made out to be… What my family think is happening in my life is untrue and it is so sad to see my father has let my younger siblings act in the way they have with a lack of respect for their sister”.

Andrew Saddler, complained in his witness statement that the Dhir family had “relentlessly sought to end [their] relationship.” When cross-examined, he denied that the relationship with Reena was exploitative.

Having seen Reena Dhir and Andrew Saddler give evidence, I very much doubt that Reena has been “brainwashed”. She was articulate, considered and firm in her evidence. It was clear when she gave evidence that she was very upset by her family’s behaviour, but she hoped that one day there could be some reconciliation. I need not (and should not) probe any further into the relationship between Reena and Andrew. Both are adults. The privacy of their relationship has been intruded upon far too much during this trial already. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to seek to resolve the serious allegations made by the Dhir family against Andrew (even if I could). It is a matter of regret (and as I warned during the trial potentially to be regretted by the Dhir family for years to come) that allegations about the nature of their relationship and Andrew’s behaviour have been pursued as vigorously as they have been in this trial when, as must have been appreciated, they could only ever have been (at best) peripherally relevant to the issues I have to decide.

The immediate run-up to the September meeting

The Defendant’s evidence was that she had not been expecting the Claimant and his son and daughter when they turned up at her house at the September 2014 meeting. She said that they were not invited into her home, and they had essentially entered as trespassers when she found them in her dining room. In support of this, she relied upon the fact that the meeting took place in the dining room which, the Defendant said, was not where she would have chosen to entertain invited guests.

The Claimant’s case (and evidence) is that the meeting with the Defendant had been pre-arranged the day before. Ruchi and Rishi Dhir said that they had arranged a meeting at Ms Tebbs-Ogutu’s house on Sunday 28 September 2014 to which both Eleanor and Reena were to attend as well. Reena was not aware that Eleanor was to be present. In her evidence, Ruchi said that, before Reena arrived, Eleanor had told her (Ruchi) that she would like to have a meeting the next day at the Defendant’s house with Andrew present. She said that Ms Tebbs-Ogutu had passed a message from the Defendant at this meeting that she did not approve of the relationship between Andrew and Reena.

Rishi gave a similar account. He said that when Reena arrived at the meeting and was introduced to Eleanor she was “obviously taken aback” but that she spoke calmly and said that she and Andrew were only back in touch “as friends”.

Eleanor Saddler did not mention the meeting on 28 September 2014 in her witness statement for trial. In examination-in-chief she confirmed that she had attended the meeting on 28 September 2014. She knew that the intention was that Reena would be brought to the meeting. She said she was really hurt to learn that her husband was cheating on her. At the time, she said, her interest was to understand “what was going on” and to see whether anything could be done to save her marriage. She said that a message was relayed at the meeting from the Defendant. The Defendant had been invited to the meeting by Ms Tebbs-Ogutu but she had said the Defendant would not attend without telling Andrew.

Eleanor was cross-examined about her failure to mention the 28 September 2014 meeting in her witness statement. She said that “these are things that [she] had blocked out of [her] memory”. I found that answer unconvincing.

Reena Dhir also did not deal with the 28 September 2014 meeting in her witness statement. However, it is plain to me from its terms that Reena wrote entirely her own statement (in the sense that it was not structured in a way to deal with evidence relevant to the dispute as it would have done had a solicitor assisted with its drafting). She was not asked about the meeting on 28 September 2014 in examination-in-chief. In cross-examination, she said that she was tricked into attending the meeting (that she was tricked was accepted by Ruchi and Rishi) and that it was the first time she had met Eleanor, although she knew that Andrew was married. She said she recalled no discussion about a meeting the following day.

In examination-in-chief, but not in her witness statement, the Defendant said that, possibly the day before the September meeting, Ms Tebbs-Ogutu had telephoned her and told her that Reena’s sister was planning a meeting at her house. The Defendant said that she was told that if she wanted to come to the meeting, she could, but that she should not say anything to Andrew. She denied sending any message via Ms Tebbs-Ogutu to the meeting. When cross-examined, the Defendant agreed that, at this time, her position was that Andrew should not have been in a relationship with Reena because he was married to Eleanor. Mr Mitchell asked her whether it was adultery, to which the Defendant replied: “it was what it was”.

Following that meeting, Reena spoke to Rishi and asked him to go around to her house. When he got there, a friend of Reena, Indy, was present. Unheard by Reena, Indy told Rishi that Reena had been in a relationship with Andrew since the beginning of the year, that she had taken him to Thailand and Dubai and that he was “financially abusing her and using her”. Rishi told Ruchi what he had learned. They agreed that they should inform their parents the following morning.

There was a meeting of the Dhir family the following day Monday 29 September 2014 (the day of the September meeting). At this meeting, Ruchi and Rishi told the Claimant and his wife that Reena had re-commenced her relationship with Andrew Saddler. The Claimant said that he was told by Ruchi that a meeting had been arranged with the Defendant and the Claimant asked if he could come along.

I consider the significance of the meeting on 28 September 2014 to be that it demonstrates that there was a concern about the relationship between Reena and Andrew prior to the September meeting the following day. I cannot resolve on the evidence whether the Defendant was aware of the plan that there should be a meeting the following day, but key participants of the September 2014 meeting (including Reena’s participation on the telephone) had met the day before - Reena, Ruchi, Rishi and Eleanor – and they had been discussing the relationship between Reena and Andrew. From the evidence, it is clear that, of those, Ruchi, Rishi and Eleanor, all wanted the relationship to end. So that is the context. Assessed against that, the failure of Eleanor Saddler’s witness statement to include any reference to the 28 September 2014 meeting in her witness statement is potentially significant. I will return to this point below.

The September meeting

The evidence of what took place at the September meeting from those who were present is as follows:

Events after the September meeting

I shall set out now further evidence that was adduced during the trial that sheds light on which account of the September meeting is true.

The Defendant relies on two incidents involving the Claimant which she says demonstrates that he is a man who is capable of making a death threat when he is angry.

The first is an incident that took place at Reena Dhir’s flat in March 2015 (“the Flat Incident”). The Claimant and his wife had come around to the flat unannounced. The Claimant let himself in with a key. Reena Dhir said in her evidence that she did not know that he had a key. The Claimant maintained, repeatedly in his evidence that it was “his flat” and that he paid for it. Whether that is right or not, it is plain that the flat was Reena’s home and he entered uninvited. When they entered, both the Claimant and his wife fell to the ground. There is a dispute on the evidence, which I do not need to resolve, as to whether they stumbled and fell (as Andrew and Reena say in their evidence) or whether they were pushed to the ground (and the Claimant then kicked) (which is the Claimant’s account). What happened next, however, was recorded on Andrew Saddler’s phone. I have watched the footage a number of times. It is plain that the Claimant is very angry. There is shouting between those present. The Claimant can be clearly seen grabbing at and pulling Reena’s hair. Andrew Saddler tells him to stop it. The Claimant then retreats, with his wife, into the kitchen. Andrew Saddler holds the door shut and tells Reena to leave the flat.

When the Claimant was cross-examined about the incident, he initially denied that he had pulled his daughter’s hair, saying (ridiculously) that her hair had “come into his hand”. Without accepting any responsibility for essentially assaulting his daughter, he maintained that he had been kicked, that it was his flat and complained about being “locked” in the kitchen.

When Andrew Saddler was cross-examined, astonishingly, it was put to him that when he was holding the kitchen door shut he had struck Reena. This allegation was unheralded in the evidence. I asked on what evidence this allegation was being put to Mr Saddler. Mr Mitchell told me that it was the evidence of the video recording itself. That was a plainly inadequate basis. There was nothing in the video recording that showed that Mr Saddler had struck Reena. I gave Mr Saddler the opportunity to watch the video recording and to tell me what was happening when he was holding the door to the kitchen shut and had been alleged to have struck Reena. The sound that Mr Mitchell (or the Claimant) had decided was a slap or punch delivered to Reena was, Mr Saddler explained, his putting the phone between his teeth so both of his hands were free. I accept that explanation. The putting, on such a plainly inadequate basis, of an allegation of what (if true) would have amounted to domestic violence was completely unacceptable. The allegation should never have been made.

The second incident was on 26 April 2016 (“the Car Incident”). On that day, an employee of the Claimant, Ayesha Hussain, visited Andrew Saddler at his shop. She gave evidence at the trial for the Claimant. Mr Saddler alleged in his witness statement that she entered his shop and threatened him. In her evidence, Ms Hussain said that she was ashamed of what she had done and said, but that she had done it off her own bat, not at the behest of the Claimant. The circumstances in which Ms Hussain came to be in the shop (she had been driven to the locality by the Claimant and another employee, Lucas, was also in the car) lead me to doubt that claim, but I do not need to resolve that issue because there is again footage recorded by Andrew Saddler of what happened shortly afterwards. Mr Saddler went after Ms Hussain when she left the shop and followed her to the Claimant’s car in which he found the Claimant. An argument then ensues with a large amount of shouting. At one point, the Claimant says this to Mr Saddler: “Do you know something? I might end up somewhere, but you won’t live any more”. Mr Saddler responds (repeating the Claimant’s words back to him): “You won’t live? If something happens to me it will happen to you? Don’t come here threatening me”. The Claimant replies: “You’re fucking living with [a] Malawian girl. You’re cheating I’m gonna…” and then he is interrupted as the police arrive.

Leaving aside whether Ms Hussain was also his emissary, Mr Samson relies upon this as an incident of the Claimant himself threatening violence towards Andrew Saddler. The threat made in the Car Incident is of a different order to that alleged to have been made at the meeting. This was in the thick of a heated argument between the two men. Nevertheless, Mr Samson relies on both incidents as support for the submission that the Claimant is capable of using violence and, when provoked and/or angry, of making serious threats of violence.

Many other allegations and counter-allegations have been traded in the course of the trial or raised in the evidence. I will not refer to them as they do not assist me in resolving the key issues.

I have come to the firm conclusion that the Defendant has not proved that the Claimant made a threat to kill at the September meeting. Indeed, I have come to the positive conclusion that he did not. My reasons for this conclusion are:

Neither Counsel has referred me to any authorities on the general approach to be adopted when assessing damages in defamation cases. Some reference has been made to individual cases, and I will refer to those below.

The relevant principles are helpfully gathered together by Warby J in Barron –v- Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB):

I shall gratefully adopt that summary of the law.

The Claimant’s trial skeleton referred me to only one authority on the issue of damages: Woodward –v- Grice [2017] EWHC 1292 (QB). In that case, King J awarded £18,000 (£8,000 of which were aggravated damages) for a website publication “read by at most 100s of people rather than 1000s” [53] making a false allegation against a solicitor that he had been struck off. There was no plea of truth (or any other defence) advanced and the Defendant had published an apology (albeit the Judge found rather late in the day). I am not clear what principle is sought to be derived from this case (and nothing more was said of it in the Claimant’s closing submissions). I have not found it of assistance.

In his trial skeleton, Mr Samson submitted the following:

Mr Mitchell did not address the issue of damages in his closing submissions. Mr Samson submitted that the audience that heard the slander was small and included a number of members of the Defendant’s family. He suggested that there would also have been people who would not have believed the allegation made by the Defendant. He submitted that “in reality, this case is nothing to do with vindication”. His principal plank of mitigation, however, is the conduct of the Claimant, which (relying on the above authorities) he submits should substantially reduce any award of damages.

Neither Counsel has referred to any personal injury awards as possible comparators. In his closing submissions, Mr Mitchell relied upon the awards of damages in Houston –v- Smith (unreported, Court of Appeal, 16 December 1993) and Cairns –v- Modi.

I deal first with the harm to the Claimant’s reputation. At the 19 July 2015 meeting, the Defendant made a very serious allegation against the Claimant. If true, he could have faced prosecution for the offence of making a threat to kill. It was published to 90 people. I can, and do, infer from that that the allegation has caused serious harm to the Claimant’s reputation in the eyes of many of those who were present. The Defendant may well have appeared to be authoritative to the publishees when she recounted what she alleged the Defendant had done at the September meeting. Certainly, she would have appeared to have been someone with direct knowledge of what had happened. There is some evidence that might suggest that at least one publishee may not have taken the Defendant’s allegation at face value. In his witness statement, the Claimant said that, immediately after the Defendant had made her allegation at the Church, he “started to rise from [his] seat to object but [a] member of the church behind me put his hand on my shoulder and told me not to worry… and said she is always ‘going on like this’”. I bear that in mind, but I have no evidence on which to determine whether this view was taken by others in the congregation.

The seriousness of the allegation meant that it would be likely to have a significant ‘sticking power’ in people’s memories. I should therefore make some allowance for the propensity of the ‘grapevine effect’ when assessing the harm to reputation (see paragraph 55(ii) above). Against that, it is right to note (and take into account) that the Claimant has adduced very little evidence of actual reputational harm (whether caused by the direct publication to those at the Church or by any ‘grapevine effect’). In his witness statement, the Claimant referred to an employee of his, Alfonso, who was not present at the Church when the slander was uttered, but who had heard about it from others. That is tangible evidence of the ‘grapevine effect’ in operation. Apart from this, there is no other evidence of the Claimant having to deal with the allegation when it is raised by someone subsequently, and he does not suggest that he has been shunned or avoided in his daily life. That does not mean such reputational damage has not occurred, but it means that the scale of that damage is not as great as it sometimes can be.

The Claimant was present at the meeting. That seems to me to be relevant for two reasons. First, he would have been identified (or at least identifiable) to all present. Second, it must have been acutely embarrassing and upsetting for the Claimant to witness the attack on his reputation. The first is relevant to the damage to the Claimant’s reputation. The second is relevant to the impact on the Claimant’s feelings, to which I now turn.

In his witness statement the Claimant said this about the impact on him:

“I was very upset by the allegations made by [the Defendant]. I am a very calm person and I was worried that her allegations would damage my reputation in the community. My business obtains employees from the very area in which a lot of the congregation live and indeed one of my staff members is a member of the Church… Whilst I would hope that many people may not believe the allegations to be true, I worry that some people may believe the false allegations made by [the Defendant]. This has not only been tremendously traumatic for me personally since my intention in contacting her was always resolution and she has used this to attack me. It is also extremely detrimental to my business which is part of the local community and upon which my family and staff rely. It does not make recruitment or retention of staff any easier. And will not until these false allegations are formally retracted.”

There is no evidence of the slander being detrimental to the Claimant’s business, whether in terms of recruitment or retention of staff or otherwise. The Claimant can legitimately rely on the anxiety that his fears that the slander would have this effect, which comes out clearly from this passage. The Claimant referred in his evidence to his having a number of health problems. He does not suggest that these have been caused by the slander, but he says that “the stress of this does not assist my health”. On this point, it was clear to me that the Claimant did find giving evidence at the trial physically taxing and he had to make repeated use of an inhaler.

Malice is not pleaded, either in the Particulars of Claim or the Reply. However, a claimant is entitled to rely upon the way that the defendant has conducted the case. Here, the most significant aggravating factor is the persistence in a plea of truth in answer to the claim. The Claimant must inevitably have known that her allegation was false, yet she has maintained it all the way to and through a public trial. This has an impact on the assessment of damages (see factor 2(c) from John – paragraph 96 above): first, because it aggravates the stress and hurt feelings that a claimant inevitably feels in confronting serious allegations of wrongdoing that are maintained in the face of his/her denials; second, it also underlines the need for vindication.

In some defamation cases a defendant is willing to retract an allegation and to apologise. There, the role played by (and need for) a substantial award of damages in providing the element of vindication is diminished. Sometimes, the Court’s judgment can provide an element of vindication. How much it does is likely to vary case by case, but a court judgment is unlikely to prove a wholly effective means of vindication, simply because few people read court judgments. In Cairns –v- Modi Lord Judge CJ explained the part played by these factors in fixing the appropriate sum in damages [32]:

“…[I]t cannot be right in principle for a defendant to embark on a wholesale attack on the character of a claimant in a libel action heard by a judge without having to face the consequences of the actual and potential damage done to the victim both in the forensic process and as a result of further publicity. There will be occasions when the judgment will provide sufficient vindication, but whether it does so is always a fact-specific question. The judge will be well placed to assess whether the terms of the judgment do indeed provide sufficient vindication in the overall context of the case. In the present case, we think it unlikely that cricket fans will have downloaded the judgment of Bean J and read it with close attention. It is more likely, as in so many cases, that the general public (or rather, interested ‘bystanders’ who need to be convinced) will be concerned to discover what might be called the ‘headline’ result. What most people want to know, and that includes those who read the judgment closely, as Mr Caldecott submitted, is simply ‘how much did he get?’”

In that way, the Court’s award of damages serves as “an outward and visible sign of vindication”: Cleese –v- Clark [2004] EMLR 3 [37] per Eady J.Where the allegation made against the claimant is very serious that sign must be unambiguous. A claimant should be able to “point to a sum awarded by [the court] sufficient to convince a by-stander of the baselessness of the charge”: Broome –v- Cassel & Co Ltd1071 per Lord Hailsham.

Some libel trials attract significant media attention and coverage. This has the effect of bringing the defamatory allegation made against the claimant to a much wider audience. In such cases, the need for vindication is increased, but equally a significant vindicatory element may be likely to be provided, if the claimant is successful, by media reports of the judgment. These are all factors that will vary on a case by case basis. In this case, I am not aware of any media reports of the trial.

I turn to consider the factors relied upon by Mr Samson to reduce the award. I reject, without hesitation, the suggestion that the award of damages should be nominal. Not only does that not begin to recognise the serious reputational harm that the Defendant’s very grave allegation will have caused, it would also send out completely the wrong message. The notional bystander identified by Lord Judge CJ, when told that a claimant has been awarded, say, 10p in damages for a seriously defamatory allegation, might very well reach the conclusion that the Court thought that there was ‘something in it’. I have found that the Claimant did not make the threat to kill that was alleged by the Defendant (or anything similar). For the reasons identified above (paragraph 109), the award of damages I make must be sufficient to satisfy any bystander that there was, in fact, ‘nothing in it’.

There can be no real suggestion that the slander was provoked by the Claimant, or that it was part of some tit-for-tat exchange.

I will deal with Mr Samson’s two final submissions (see paragraph 99(iv) and (v) above) together.

Is the Defendant entitled to rely on these incidents in mitigation of the damages award? The starting point is the rule in Scott –v- Samson (see Barron –v- Vines [21(5)] paragraph 96 above) and Plato Films –v- Speidel [1961] AC 1090. Had the Defendant sought to plead these two incidents in mitigation of damages, then I should very much have doubted that they would have been permitted. However, there is a long-standing exception to this rule recognised in Pamplin –v- Express Newspapers, in which Neill LJ said the following (at 120):

“[A] defendant is also entitled to rely in mitigation of damages on any other evidence which is properly before the court and jury. This other evidence can include evidence which has been primarily directed to, for example, a plea of justification or fair comment.”

As is clear, this principle was recognised in the context of jury trial. In effect, it allowed a defendant to rely upon such facts as he was able to prove in his (failed) defence of justification or fair comment to reduce the damages. In practice, this allowed a defendant to rely upon evidence which, had it been advanced purely as mitigation of damages, would likely have been excluded. It might be thought that this principle was premised on practicality rather than principle (but c.f. Turner [46]below); how was a jury supposed to exclude from its consideration evidence that they had heard during the trial if they rejected the plea of justification/fair comment?

Nevertheless, the Pamplinprinciple has been applied recently and to non-jury cases (see Cruddas –v- Calvert & Others [2015] EMLR 16 [135]-[138], although Cruddas was an example of partial justification). In Turner –v- News Group Newspapers Ltd[2006] 1 WLR 3469, Keene LJ considered both Pamplin and Burstein as bases for reliance upon other ‘misconduct’ of a claimant to reduce damages:

I am rather sceptical as to the confidence expressed by the Judge about the ability of a jury to put out of their mind irrelevant material at the direction of the trial judge. That may be realistic for the sorts of slips that happen from time to time in criminal trials, but I am highly doubtful that a jury could have been expected to exclude entirely from their consideration evidence that may well have represented a substantial part of the defendant’s case in a libel trial. Likewise, a jury in a criminal trial could scarcely be expected faithfully to disregard the evidence of one or more prosecution witnesses who, ex hypothesi, have given damaging evidence against the defendant that is later ruled to be inadmissible. In Speidel (at 1143), Lord Denning said (in a slightly different context, but the point is the same): “It is not good for the law that a judge admit a ‘roving’ cross-examination to credit and then go on to tell the jury to ignore it when they come to assess damages, knowing that it is an impossible thing to ask them to do. Better not to have it introduced at all.”

Nevertheless, Turner does provide clear authority (in the passages underlined) for the admission, in mitigation of damages, of evidence of acts of misconduct of the claimant in the relevant sector of his reputation. There is an issue as to what evidence “properly” before the Court can be relied upon. Keene LJ (in [46]) appears to limit the admissibility to evidence that was before the court on (failed) plea of justification or fair comment. With respect, I think the principle was wider than that. In Pamplin,Neill LJ stated the principle as applying to any evidence properly before the jury which could include evidence advanced in support of a justification or fair comment defence (see paragraph 114 above). It was not limited to evidence in these categories.

In this case, the evidence of the Flat and Car Incidents was admitted on the issue of the Claimant’s credibility and his propensity to act (or threaten to act) in a violent manner. The usual rule on issues of credit is that if the claimant denies what is put to him in cross-examination, no further evidence can be called to rebut the denials. But if he admits the conduct alleged, then that becomes evidence in the case. Proper case management, the need to avoid mini-trials on a myriad of peripheral issues and to prevent “a roving inquiry” will mean that the Court will keep cross-examination on credit to what is necessary to deal with the case justly. Here, as both incidents were recorded (and the footage available), there was little dispute as to what it showed. The other “credibility” evidence that was adduced at trial was either disputed or it is irrelevant and I ignore that when considering the factors that reduce the award of damages.

The conduct of the Claimant in the Flat Incident and the Car Incident clearly reflects badly on him. They indicate that he has in the past resorted to violence (to his own daughter) or the threat of violence to Andrew Saddler. This conduct is in the same sector of his reputation as the allegation made by the Defendant. As I have noted above (paragraph 105), the Claimant described himself in his evidence as a “very calm person”. The purpose of that was to lead evidence of his good reputation and/or his upset at the falsity of what had been alleged against him. The Flat and Car Incidents show that he has the capacity, perhaps when angered and/or provoked, to be anything but calm.

In principle, relying on Pamplinand Turner, it seems to me that the Defendant can rely on this evidence and I should have regard to it when fixing the appropriate sum in damages.

Balancing these competing factors, I have decided that the appropriate and proportionate sum to award in damages is £35,000.