The deceased was born on 3 January 1948. The details of his medical history, the progression of his symptoms and the nature of his treatment are set out in reports from Dr R M Rudd, consulting physician dated 3 May 2013, 4 September 2013 and 4 March 2015. As noted above, I have also had the benefit of reading the deceased’s witness statement and his deposition and hearing the evidence of Mrs Mosson, the Claimant.

Mr Mosson said that he first became ill in about November 2011. Fluid was drained from his chest and a biopsy was reported as “clear”, the biopsy chest wound became infected and required repeated dressing. Regrettably, a further biopsy led to a diagnosis of mesothelioma of which he was informed on 9 January 2013. He described his shock at receiving that news and how the progression of the disease affected him. Mrs Mosson gave particularly graphic evidence of the effect of this dreadful disease on her husband until his death on 19 January 2014.

It is not necessary for me to set out the detail of Dr Rudd’s reports in this judgment. It suffices to say that the deceased underwent a number of invasive investigations, including a video-assisted thoracoscopy and surgical biopsies. After one of these biopsies the wound became infected. The deceased underwent surgery to remove thickened pleura. He developed recurrent pleural effusions and needed repeated drainage procedures. After he was informed of the diagnosis he underwent six cycles of chemotherapy together with radiotherapy.

The chemotherapy was particularly unpleasant causing the deceased nausea, vomiting, fatigue, peripheral neuropathy and tinnitus. His condition steadily declined and he died on 19 January 2014. But for this illness it is said that he would have lived for a further 12 years.

Mr Steinberg, for the claimant, puts the effect of this illness in graphic terms in his skeleton argument. He says:

“This was a devastating illness – Mr Mosson suffered terribly – made exceptional by the unusually long period of suffering (i.e. 26 months).”

As he points out, Mr Mosson’s second statement and the evidence of the Claimant provides a “harrowing account of the effect of the illness on Mr Mosson and his family”.

I was referred by both counsel to the Judicial College Guidelines which give the bracket for mesothelioma cases of £53,200 to £95,700. I was also taken to a number of reported decisions including:

Mr Steinberg submits that the appropriate award of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity is £95,000; Mr Boyle suggests an award of up to £75,000 would be justified.

No sum of money can ever provide anything close to adequate compensation for an illness as dreadful as mesothelioma. My task however is to determine where, within the appropriate range, this particular case lies. In my judgment it lies within the upper half of the most severe category for asbestos related disease. I have no doubt that the deceased suffered severe pain and gross impairment of function and quality of life. His pain and suffering lasted for longer than is typical in these cases. The deceased underwent repeated pleural drainage, repeated investigation, six cycles of chemotherapy, radiotherapy and the surgical removal of parts of the pleura.

However, the disease affected the pleura and not the peritoneum and it is well recognised that the involvement of the peritoneum causes the most severe pain. Furthermore, it is right to say that the deceased was able to continue working until April 2013, that it appears he was able to tolerate the chemotherapy reasonably well (something that not all patients are able to do), that he was able to take a holiday in October 2013 and was able to give evidence on commission in November 2013 (although it is plain that by then he was extremely unwell). The deceased provided his last witness statement some eight days before his death.

In my judgment although this case falls in the upper half of the appropriate category, it is not at the very top. As dreadful as his pain and discomfort must have been, it was not as severe as it would have been had the disease involved the peritoneum and it is plain on the evidence that he still had some amenity and some quality of life well into 2013.

The appropriate figure in my view is £85,000.

The parties have been able to agree the majority of funeral expenses. The only items that remain in dispute are the costs of the wake, funeral attire and the purchase of a memorial bench. Mr Steinberg argues that “social obligations” arise as a result of the death and that the costs of meeting these items is properly recoverable.

I disagree. As Mr Steinberg very properly pointed out, Bean J (as he then was) pointed out in Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2014] EWHC 2553 (QB) that, in the first instance decision in Gammell v Wilson [1982] AC 27, Mr Bennet Hytener QC, sitting as a deputy judge, disallowed the costs of a wake. As Bean J held “Mr Hytener’s decision has been regarded as good law ever since”. He was not prepared to depart from it and nor am I.

The expenses claimed must be “reasonable in all circumstances”. In my view it is not reasonable to claim for the cost of the memorial bench or for clothing to be worn at the funeral. The cost of mourning clothes had been disallowed in Gammell v Wilson at first instance. In the Court of Appeal, a distinction was drawn between a headstone which marks the grave and is a legitimate funeral expense and a memorial which is not. That seems to me to apply a memorial bench.

Mr Steinberg suggests that the £1,010 expended by the estate on probate is properly recoverable. Unlike funeral expenses, there is no reference to probate costs in the 1934 Act. I see no basis upon which such a claim could be read into the Act. I see no other potential basis for it and I disallow it.

The claimant claims £15,914.61 in respect of sick pay paid to the deceased during his life time by his former employers. Mr Steinberg says this is a subrogated claim on behalf of the employers and refers to an email dated 21 August 2013 indicating that they seek reimbursement.

In Dennis v London Passenger Transport Board [1948] 1 All ER 779 Denning J (as he then was) was dealing with a case in which the Ministry of Pensions was not asserting a legal obligation to refund money which they had paid the claimant. He said:

“A wrongdoer is not to be allowed to reduce damages by the fact that other persons had made up to the plaintive his wages… In point of law, therefore, prima facie he should have been paid by the wrongdoer. As they had been made up to him by other people who expect to be repaid, I think it is proper that that sum should be included as damages, but subject to the direction of the amount paid to the plaintive by the Ministry of Pensions and the London County Council shall be paid to those bodies out of the sums recovered.”

I respectfully agree. The defendant must pay the sums claimed and the claimant will hold those sums on trust for the former employers.

The claimant’s schedule of loss claims bereavement damages of £11,800. In the counter schedule the defendant agreed that figure. In fact the appropriate award had been increased in April 2013 to £12,980. Mr Steinberg seeks the corrected sum; Mr Boyle says he should be held to the agreement of the lesser sum.

Statute now provides that the appropriate figure is £12,980. The earlier claim by the claimant was plainly a mistake. I see no possible basis for holding Mr Steinberg to that mistake and disregarding what the statute provides. The claimant will be allowed £12,980.

The parties have agreed all the appropriate figures for the past loss of income dependency except the deceased’s likely retirement date.

In both his witness statement and deposition the deceased maintained that, but for the mesothelioma, he would have worked until aged 70. There is documentary evidence that there was no contractual retirement age for the deceased and he would have been able to work as long as his health permitted. In fact, he retired in April 2013 at the age of 65 years and three months.

It is right to observe that the deceased was suffering from other conditions at the time he developed mesothelioma. However, Dr Rudd says that there were “no other conditions present which would have been likely to prevent him working until the age of 70 as he stated as being his intention before he became ill as a result of mesothelioma”.

What in my view is decisive of this issue is the evidence of the deceased’s determination to get back to work if he could. Dr Rudd notes that “on 22 July 2013 his doctor noted that he needed a certificate of unfitness to work. This was issued for one month as Mr Mosson said that he would like to try to get back to work if he was feeling better”. There is evidence in the medical reports that the deceased’s private pensions became payable when he was 70.

In my view, it is plain the deceased had the ability to work on to age 70, was willing to do so, intended to do so and had the opportunity to do so. In my judgment it is likely he would only have retired at age 70. It follows that the loss of dependency calculations should be based on the assumption that the deceased would have worked to age 70 had it not been for the mesothelioma.

The claimant claims for loss of services, including gardening and general home maintenance based on the likelihood he would have worked 10 hours per work for the rest of his life. She claims £5,000 per annum with a multiplier of 10.39. It is said that 10 hours a week is a reasonable estimate of the amount of time the deceased would have spent on such activities each week. It is said that he undertook work around the house and for his children including gardening, hoovering, DIY, decorating and shopping. It is pointed out that he was a caretaker by employment and was well able to maintain his house and home. References were made to the report of the nursing expert, Ms Wells, and it is she who suggests that 520 hours a year is the appropriate figure.

In my judgment, this claim is excessive. There is no evidence as to the commercial cost of replacing the services referred to. Furthermore little allowance appears to have been taken of the fact that as Mr Mosson got older he would have been less and less able, regardless of the mesothelioma, to carry out DIY and maintenance work. The evidence of Ms Wells is, in my judgment, wholly insufficient to make good this claim; she is a nurse and professes no expertise either in the amount of time the services would have taken up or their likely cost if purchased commercially.

Having said that, it is clear that the deceased did provide valuable services to his family and it is right that there is some allowance in respect of the value of those services. Doing the best I can, and considering the likely cost of having those services provided commercially, I would allow £1,500 per annum and allow a multiplier of five.

The final disputed item of damages concerns what Mr Steinberg calls “loss of intangible services”. He says such an award would reflect “additional value and convenience in having someone who is willing and able to provide these services out of love and affection rather than bringing in outside help and contractors”.

This claim is disputed on the basis that it is not a valid head of claim.

I have already indicated that the claimant should be able to recover for loss of the services which her husband previously provided, including DIY and gardening services. Whilst I was critical of the lack of evidence going to the value of these services, I did my best to assess what the likely cost would be of replacing what had previously been done by the deceased. This final head of claim is, as I have described, a claim for compensation for the inconvenience for having to commission such services and use the damages I have allowed to purchase them.

Mr Steinberg says that such claims are now “well established”. He refers to a number of authorities in which such claims have been allowed and in particular to the decision of Hamblen J (as he then was) in Beesley v New Century Group Ltd. At paragraph 79 of that judgment, Hamblen J said:

“79.

The claimant submitted that this is an appropriate case for such an award, which is based on the premise that Mrs Beesley has not just lost domestic services, but on the extra value that is derived from having such help provided by a husband and friend; see Regan v Williamson [1976] 1 WLR 305. It was submitted that a reasonable award would be £3,000.

80.

The defendant submitted that this was not a maintainable head of claim. It was contended that it was contrary to the principle that Fatal Accident Act damages are only awarded for financial or pecuniary loss. The statutory award for bereavement covers any non-financial loss.

81.

However, it is clear that there have been a number of cases in which such awards have been made. In Regan v Williamson , which followed the Court of Appeal decision in Hay v Hughes [1975] QB 790, the dependency figure for the loss of the services of a mother was increased to reflect the benefit of the personal attention to a child’s upbringing which a mother provided and which could not be replaced by a housekeeper, nanny or child minder, although no separate award was made. However, in Mehmet v Perry [1977] 2 All ER 529 a separate award was made to the children and the approach extended to the husband’s claim and a separate award was made to him as well. Subsequent cases have followed this approach.

82.

The defendant submitted that properly understood the authorities of Regan and Hay are only applicable to claims by children and then only to the extent of reflecting the loss in an increased multiplicand for the services dependency, not in a separate award.

83.

In my judgment the principle of making awards for loss of intangible benefits is now well established – see Kemp and Kemp [29-052]. It reflects the fact that services may be provided by a mother, wife, father or husband over and above that which may be provided by a paid replacement. In principle there is no reason for differentiating between the position of children and spouses in connection with the availability of such awards.

84.

In relation to services provided by a husband or father the position is summarised in Kemp and Kemp at p29074 as follows:

‘Awards of this kind have also been made to a widow or child for the loss of services provided by a deceased husband or father. There is no reason in principle why such awards should not be made where the services provided by a husband or father justify it on the facts. Such awards ought to be in proportion to the more conventional awards already noted for wives/mothers. This will mean that they will be lower in the average claim where the deceased husband/father was the family breadwinner.’

85.

The present case is a good illustration of why it may be appropriate to make such an award to a widow. So, for example, there are considerable advantages in having jobs around the house and garden done by a husband at his own time and convenience rather than having to go out to find and choose commercial providers, and to have to work around the hours that suit them for the work in question.

86.

I therefore consider that such an award can be made, that this is an appropriate case for such an award to be made and that the suitable figure is £2,000. ”

In Ghoorah v West Essex Clincial Commission Group and Others (2014) HH Judge Gore, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, apparently awarded £15,000 under this head of claim. I say ‘apparently’ because I have only a short Lawtel summary of his judgment.

In Fleet v Fleet [2009] EWHC 3166 (QB) Mackay J considered this head of claim which he described as a claim for “special care”. He said that there “is no doubt that it is increasingly awarded in the form of modest sums in these cases” and referred to Hamblen J’s award in Beesley. He went on:

“Although in its origin it was an attempt by the Court to value the services of a mother or a father to a child over and above the commercial cost of replacing him or her, it has sometimes been extended to cases involving spouses. That should not be an automatic extension in my view. The features of this case that I think justifies an award is that Mrs Fleet was considerably older than her husband and would as the years have gone on needed more than usual care which I have doubt he would have been happy to provide and provided extremely well. I think £2,500 is appropriate to award under this head.”

I have had careful regard to these previous cases, in particular to the reasoning of Hamblen J and Mackay J. I take on board the fact that the making of awards of this sort has become increasingly commonplace. However I regret to say that, for two reasons, I find myself in disagreement with the conclusions of the other judges of this Court to whom I have referred. I can see no proper jurisprudential foundation for this claim.

First, damages for personal injuries are intended, so far as money can achieve it, to put the claimant in the position he or she would have been in had the tort not occurred. But that is an art not a science, especially in the case of claims for future loss. There can be no precise equivalence in money terms of every loss that flows from an injury or a death. The Court fixes on a sum, often by reference to commercial costs, but recognises that that is unlikely to be a precise reflection of all the future consequences of the event. In the case of claims for services, the award is the Court’s best estimate of the value, rather than the cost, of the services lost.

I have already made an award in respect of the services the deceased would have provided his family had he not contracted mesothelioma. I have done so by seeking to estimate the cost of providing commercially what would otherwise have been provided by the deceased. Obtaining services commercially, rather than from a member of the family, has both advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are those to which Mr Steinberg refers. But since few individuals, even caretakers, possess all the skills of all trades people, there are also advantages in having work carried out commercially. The work can be provided by specialist contractors at times that are convenient to the claimant; it may be of a better quality; its provision does not necessarily detract from other activities the family may wish to carry out. The award I have already made recognises both the advantages and disadvantages of having services provided commercially rather than by the deceased.

In my judgment, there is no room here for an additional award for the loss of intangible benefits over and above the claim for the lost services.

Second, what the claimant seeks is further financial compensation for the inconvenience of having to pay someone to do what her husband would have done voluntarily. In other words, she seeks financial compensation for what is a non-financial loss consequent upon her husband’s death. That, it seems to me, is a claim of the sort which bereavement damages were intended to cover.

Pursuant to the Fatal Accidents Act 1976, a claim may be made by a limited number of relatives for their bereavement suffered due to the death. The award is described in this way in the third edition of Personal Injury Schedules edited by William Latimer-Sayer and Langstaff J:

“A bereavement award is an oddity in the law of damages. The fundamental principle in personal injury claims is that the claimant should be compensated for his or her loss. Therefore a claimant needs to prove the loss, and an attempt to quantify it must be made. However, bereavement awards are subject to no such condition. Once the relative has proved he or she was within the specified class of claimant and that the defendant is liable, then an award is made. There is no need to prove any actual loss suffered by the relatives; the Court assumes certain people will inevitably be adversely affected by the death of a close relative. There is no right to seek to argue for any additional or higher sum in the event of extreme suffering. This may seem an arbitrary approach awarding damages, but the alternative has long been considered to be against public policy…”

Bereavement takes many forms and has many consequences. Where the consequence can be valued in financial terms, they can be a separate head of claim. But where they cannot, in my judgment, they fall to be regarded as part of bereavement damages.

In those circumstances the claim for intangible services is not a proper claim in law.

Were a higher court to say that I was wrong about that, and that such an award could be made in principle, I would favour the approach of Mackay J over that of Hamblen J. In my view, it would be necessary to prove some circumstance out of the ordinary to justify an additional award. There is no such unusual circumstance here; the claimant is the spouse of the deceased, not his child and she and he were of a similar age.

In those circumstances I would make no award under this head even if, in principle, it were to be decided that the head is one recognised by law.

In those circumstances I have reached the following conclusions:

Counsel have indicated that once I have made these decisions on matters of principle, they will carry out the necessary calculation.