Sheikh v Beaumont

These are applications by the defendants for extensions to general civil restraint orders made by Spencer J on 12 July 2013 in claim number HQ10X01012 Rabia Sheikh v (1) Hugo Page and (2) Nigel Meares and in HQ09X00657 Anal Sheikh v Marc Beaumont. In each case an extension is sought for a further period of two years because, in the first case, the claimant is likely to be used by her daughter, Anal Sheikh, to bring vexatious and unfounded proceedings unless so restrained and, in the second case, because Anal Sheikh herself is likely to bring vexatious and unfounded proceedings unless so restrained. In each case various procedural orders are also sought which I will deal with at the end of this judgment.

A civil restraint order was first made against Miss Sheikh on 15 July 2009 by Burnett J (as he then was) for a period of up to two years (CRO1). That order was extended for a further two years by Tugendhat J on 12 July 2011 (CRO2). On 12 July 2013 Spencer J made a further order (CRO3) against Miss Sheikh and her mother, Rabia Sheikh, for a period of two years. In the latter case Spencer J was satisfied that there were grounds for believing that Miss Sheikh was using her mother’s name to circumvent CRO2 and so made a civil restraint order against Mrs Sheikh at the same time as extending the order against Miss Sheikh.

The applicants for the extension are two barristers who have been sued by Mrs Sheikh and against whom Miss Sheikh has made allegations of negligence, fraud and corruption. They are two of very many individuals who have received emails and threats from Miss Sheikh. The concern is that, from late 2014 Miss Sheikh has been sending numerous communications alleging grave misconduct on the part of an ever increasing list of wrongdoers, mostly lawyers, who have acted in litigation concerning her.

Mrs Sheikh is an 88 year old lady on whose behalf a witness statement was produced at the court hearing before me. In her witness statement she says that she is disabled, ill and unable to attend court. She was separately represented by Mr Rehman. Miss Sheikh represented herself.

The defendants Mr Page and Mr Meares were represented by Mr Speaight QC and Mr Beaumont was represented by Ms Oppenheimer.

I propose to structure this judgment in six parts:

Miss Sheikh was a conveyancing solicitor. For many years she was the principal of a high street practice in Wembley.

Disciplinary proceedings were brought against her by the Law Society. On 1 May 2009 the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal found charges against Miss Sheikh to be proved. The main charges were that she had made improper transfers out of her client account and that she delivered a bill without any honest belief that it represented a proper fee. The tribunal found that, in those respects, she had acted dishonestly. She was struck off the Solicitors List on 5 May 2009.

Prior to then one of Miss Sheikh’s clients, a Mr Dogan, set up a company known as Red River (UK) Limited to buy a former petrol station which had development potential. Miss Sheikh and her mother loaned money to Mr Dogan and his company to assist in the completion of property development in the Stoke Newington Road, London N16. Mrs Sheikh provided money to her daughter with which to make the loan. By way of security, restrictions in favour of both mother and daughter were placed on the title of the land at HM Land Registry.

Disputes arose between the Sheikhs and Mr Dogan and litigation ensued. The disputes were resolved and a settlement agreement was entered into. However, that broke down and, in 2007, proceedings were commenced in the Chancery Division by Red River (UK) Limited and Mr Dogan against Miss Sheikh and Mrs Sheikh. There were numerous contested interlocutory applications in the litigation; on twelve occasions Henderson J ruled that applications brought by the Sheikhs were totally without merit. The case ultimately came to trial before Henderson J who in April 2010 gave judgment at [2010] EWHC 961 (Ch). Almost all points on liability were decided against the Sheikhs.

The settlement agreement had provided for a payment to the Sheikhs of some £1.2 million. It was envisaged that that payment would be financed by a fresh loan raised on the security of the property. That could not be done without the release of the existing restrictions in favour of the Sheikhs. Many of the interlocutory hearings in the Chancery Division were concerned with working out how that mortgage could be accomplished.

On 2 October 2007 a hearing took place before Briggs J (as he then was). Miss Sheikh contends that the order that was made on that occasion was part of a conspiracy to defraud her. At the ultimate trial Henderson J found that there was no credible evidence to support any allegation of fraud. He found also that Miss Sheikh had intentionally and with her eyes open undermined the refinancing in such a way as to make it impossible to perform. The unfortunate outcome was that the Sheikhs received nothing from the settlement at all.

Miss Sheikh then began proceedings against Marc Beaumont, a barrister who had acted for her at one stage in the Red River saga, and alleged professional negligence on his part. She obtained judgment in default of defence but that was set aside. She then applied for summary judgment and for an interim payment. Mr Beaumont applied for the claim to be dismissed in its entirety on the grounds that it had no prospect of success. Those claims were heard by Simon J who gave judgment at [2009] EWHC 1619 (QB) in which he found against Miss Sheikh. He considered the twelve bases of claim advanced against Mr Beaumont and decided that none had any real prospect of success. He ruled that four applications brought by Miss Sheikh were totally without merit.

Miss Sheikh then issued proceedings in Willesden County Court against five more lawyers who had acted against her in the Beaumont case. Those claims were stayed on grounds that the case was an abuse of process, or alternatively, that it disclosed no reasonable grounds to bring the claim.

On 6 July 2009 two actions were commenced in the Chancery Division by Miss Sheikh and her mother as claimants against a total of 16 defendants. The defendants included three individual solicitors, two barristers who acted for the Dogans and Red River and Marc Beaumont and Mr Beaumont’s wife. On 17 and 18 February 2010 Norris J struck out both actions against all professionals as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

On 18 June 2009 Withers, solicitors acting on behalf of Marc Beaumont, had issued an application for a civil restraint order against Miss Sheikh. Having been adjourned for want of time on 25 June 2009 it came on as an effective hearing on 16 July. On that occasion Burnett J (as he then was) in a judgment at [2009] EWHC 2332 (QB) made a general restraint order to last for two years. In the course of his judgment Burnett J said:

“20.

The way in which Miss Sheikh has behaved in respect of her litigation with Mr. Beaumont demonstrates in my view that she has been vexatious. It is clear that Miss Sheikh is using her legal knowledge acquired over years as a solicitor to harass not only Mr. Beaumont but also his wife and now his legal advisers. Whilst I understand the depth of her feelings about the way in which she says she has been treated her actions demonstrate an all too common feature of vexatious litigation. There is an underlying dispute that mushrooms out of control; disappointments in the courts are visited with further applications, appeals and fresh actions. The involvement of lawyers on the other side as defendants in due course is also a very common feature, so too is increasingly intemperate language to describe the conduct and actions of judges who have disappointed the litigant in the course of his/her travels through these courts. But it is clear from the conclusions reached by Henderson J last year in the Red River litigation, that this behaviour is not an altogether isolated incident. Miss Sheikh has taken a lot of time today to impress upon me that her underlying complaint about the Red River property transaction amounts to fraud, in respect of which she alleges many people were involved. She considers that in due course she will be vindicated in those proceedings. Nonetheless, it troubles me that she should have started fresh proceedings in the Chancery Division on 7th July. At the heart of it is a complaint against one of the claimants in the Red River litigation, and the hallmarks of vexation are, I am afraid, present in the very long list of defendants that one sees there.”

He concluded that a general civil restraint order was proportionate. An extended restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate in the case having regard to the history of unmeritorious applications made in other proceedings and the additional claims and applications that Miss Sheikh had flagged up in front of him on that day.

Miss Sheikh sought permission to appeal. Richards LJ, in orders dated 21 December 2009, found that her proposed appeals against the judgments of Burnett J and Simon J were totally without merit.

On 16 March 2010 proceedings were issued in the Queen’s Bench Division in the name of Mrs Sheikh against Hugo Page QC and Nigel Meares claiming damages in the amount of £1.5 million. Both Mr Page and Mr Meares had acted for Miss Sheikh at different stages of the Red River litigation. Allegations were made in the particulars of claim that both had been negligent, acted in breach of their duties to Mrs Sheikh, acted in breach of contract and had conspired to defraud. In addition, the particulars of claim asked the court to make a number of declarations, amongst which was a claim that Simon J erred in his decision in the Marc Beaumont proceedings (to which Mrs Sheikh was not a party), that Marc Beaumont was negligent, that Norris J erred when he struck out the Sheikhs’ claim against Mr Tom Smith, that Burnett J erred when he granted the civil restraint order and that Richards LJ erred in the Court of Appeal in his finding that Miss Sheikh’s appeals in the proceedings against Marc Beaumont were totally without merit.

A hearing was held on 30 June 2010 before Deputy Master Hoffman which Miss Sheikh attended with her mother. The Deputy Master refused to allow Miss Sheikh to represent her mother and recorded his findings in relation to Mrs Sheikh’s capacity and Miss Sheikh’s involvement. In the transcript he said:

“Mother does not understand what is going on is being used by the daughter who has got a general restraint order against her, for her own ends and it is not something that the court is going to contemplate, so I am staying it.”

He stayed the proceedings and ordered that no further application could be made without permission of a Queen’s Bench Master.

In February 2011 Miss Sheikh applied to a High Court Judge for permission to issue a claim form against two other lawyers who had acted for her, namely, Gregory Treverton-Jones QC and Nigel West of RadcliffesLeBrasseur. Her proposed particulars of claim also alleged that the Law Society had committed banking fraud, used its powers illegally and relied on false and perjured evidence. She alleged that the Court of Appeal was part of a conspiracy against her. CRO1 required her to give notice to proposed defendants but she sought to issue the proceedings without giving such notice.

On 12 July 2011 Tugendhat J made an order extending for a further two years the general civil restraint order which had been made by Burnett J. In late 2012 Miss Sheikh began sending communications to senior members of government and the judiciary. She made a further complaint against Anesta Weekes QC who had acted for her at one stage in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal proceedings.

Miss Sheikh then sought a default judgment on behalf of her mother in the action against Mr Page and Mr Meares. The application came on before Deputy Master Bard. He refused the application. Miss Sheikh contends that is evidence of the Deputy Master being part of a conspiracy against her.

Mr Page and Mr Meares were concerned that Miss Sheikh would commence fresh proceedings of some kind against them, if she was able to do so, but also that if the civil restraint order was not extended to include her mother she would use her mother’s name to bring proceedings. As a result they sought a civil restraint order in respect of Mrs Sheikh at the same time as seeking an extension of Burnett J’s order.

The most convenient vehicle in which to bring those applications was in the actions stayed by Deputy Master Hoffman. Permission was sought and granted by Master Eastman on 25 June 2013 to make an application to join Miss Sheikh in those proceedings.

The substantive applications for civil restraint orders came before Spencer J on 12 July 2013. He extended the general civil restraint order in respect of Miss Sheikh for a further two years and made a similar civil restraint order in respect of Mrs Sheikh.

There was then a period of quietude but, on 2 January 2014, Miss Sheikh sent an email entitled ‘Urgent Application to the Right Honourable Lord Justice Neuberger for Interim Relief in the UK Claim or in the Case of Anal Sheikh v The Law Society [2005] EWHC 1409’. She contended that the intervention by the Solicitors Regulation Authority was a hate crime.

The following month, on 26 February 2014, Miss Sheikh emailed Patricia Robertson QC saying that she was applying to the Supreme Court to join her as a respondent in her application.

In an email dated 4 March 2015 she sent an email to significant numbers of barristers involved in the Global Law Summit 2015 entitled “The Law Society’s bank scam, fraud on the compensation fund, theft of solicitors’ billed costs, theft of residual balances, theft of bona vacantia, theft of client deposits, theft of client data and its unlawful interventions into solicitors firms.”

On 23 April 2015 Miss Sheikh emailed Ouseley J and Baroness Deech and copied in members of the board of the Council of the Inns of Court (COIC) giving notice of her intention to intervene in the case of Marc Beaumont v Bar Standards Board. She said that her description and history was set out in a document entitled UK37. She said:

“Mr Beaumont has also let me down very badly in what I call the SRA’s bank scam, compensation fund fraud etc in which he acted. He has also behaved unconscionably in the Red River conveyancing and mortgage (also as defined) in which he purported to act. Finally, Mr Beaumont and Bar Mutual have embarked upon what I refer to as the Bar Mutual fraud.”

On 30 April 2015 Miss Sheikh sought to intervene in a judicial review brought by Marc Beaumont against the Bar Standards Board which was listed for hearing before Ouseley J. During the course of those proceedings she was asked if she was wanting to be joined as an interested party. She replied:

“My Lord, firstly I seek to respond to Mr Hendy’s comments. Put in a nutshell there is no civil restraint order but that obviously can’t be in dispute.”

She was asked then what she was seeking. She replied:

“What I seek my Lord, in broad terms is this I seek a remedy from the state for loss I have suffered because of … I will put it in these terms … an act of corruption by a public official. In narrative, I seek to be joined in these proceedings to ventilate issues concerning the role of barrister in these times of [several inaudible words] but that does need some explanation my Lord so I wonder if I can take a few minutes of your time.”

On 6 May 2015 Miss Sheikh sought to intervene in the case of Rehman v Bar Standards Board before Lang J. Lang J recused herself but allowed Miss Sheikh ten minutes to address the court. During the course of that address she alleged that Hugo Page QC was a thief and that the civil restraint orders against her were fraudulent.

On 20 May 2015 Miss Sheikh contacted the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service seeking to intervene in the interim suspension of Tariq Rehman. Her email was copied to Howard Kennedy, solicitors acting for Mr Beaumont. In turn they wrote to the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service saying that although they appreciated that the general civil restraint order concerned litigation only their client was concerned that Miss Sheikh should not be allowed to intervene in or influence disciplinary proceedings.

On 1 June Miss Sheikh responded with a further email to which were attached applications to:

On 20 May 2015 an application notice was issued in CO/4920/2014 between Tariq Rehman and the Bar Standards Board which referred to Miss Sheikh as the third appellant and the tenth intervener.

On 3 June 2015 Miss Sheikh emailed the president and members of the COIC about their consideration of the case of Marc Beaumont, the SRA’s bank scam, the compensation fund fraud etc, the Red River conveyancing and mortgage fraud, the Bar Mutual fraud, the theft of Margaret Gomm’s house and 3.5 acres of land and other frauds.

On 4 June 2015 Miss Sheikh emailed Mr Coffin, the partner at Withers, with conduct of the current application before the court. In that she said:

“If you proceed with this fraudulent application I will apply under section 50 of the Solicitors Act 1974 to have you removed from the roll. Please let me know the name of any barrister whom you propose to instruct in advance of any hearing as I am applying for interim suspensions for everyone connected with the Red River fraud.”

On 5 June 2015 the Bar Mutual Indemnity Fund received an email from Tariq Rehman entitled ‘Rabia Sheikh v Hugo Page and Nigel Meares’ referring to his client’s issued breach of duty claim.

CPR 3.11 provides that a practice direction may set out circumstances in which the court has power to make a civil restraint order. PD 3(C) is the relevant Practice Direction. The provisions in relation to general civil restraint orders are set out in the Annex to this judgment.

The question for me, as it was for Burnett J, and those subsequently who considered applications for renewal is whether a general civil restraint order is proportionate and required in this case or whether either a limited civil restraint order or extended civil restraint order would be sufficient.

In presenting her case to the court Miss Sheikh spent a lot of time and was extremely anxious that I should understand what went on in 2007. She submits that the events between 2 October 2007 and 5 October 2007 are fundamental to any understanding of the issues that have arisen since. None of the lawyers or judges who have been involved have been conveyancers. She had instructed Mr Page and Mr Meares to draft a legal charge as part of what became the Red River litigation. She is quite satisfied that no person since 5 October 2007 has made a valid judgment or understood matters properly.

She says that she obtained a judgment in default in the sum of £900,000 in May 2009 which has just disappeared.

The whole process is an insurance fraud conducted to avoid paying her money which she is owed.

She maintained that she has not seen the emails that were sent to her as part of the documents in relation to the current application. That is despite the fact that she responded to at least one of them. She says that she is a victim. She is convinced that the fraudulent proceedings have worked. The allegations made are a sham, as are all the documents. These proceedings are not the way to deal with the situation.

The basic flaw she contends is that there is no basis to proceed when a judgment in default has been obtained. Deputy Master Bard did not understand the Red River fraud and wanted to steal the money that she was rightfully owed.

She did not deny sending the emails attributed to her.

On behalf of Mrs Sheikh, Mr Rehman made the point that she was properly an interested party having been involved in the loan advanced as part of the Red River litigation. If there is a professional negligence claim against Messrs Page and Meares then she is a proper party to that action. She took action in issuing the particulars of claim in April 2010. That action has never been determined. Accordingly, those proceedings remain outstanding. Mrs Sheikh has a legitimate cause of action which she should be entitled to pursue. It has to be recalled that this is an 88 year old lady so the fact of her forgetfulness is easy to understand. All that the defendant is able to point to is a finding by Deputy Master Hoffman in June 2010, a long time ago, that she was being used in proceedings before him. His observation then is not an indication that Mrs Sheikh will put her signature to other documents or matters and will be used as a conduit for her daughter.

At the hearing the claimants produced a file which included the witness statement of Rabia Sheikh which I have already referred to. That was signed by her. In the course of making her submissions Miss Sheikh said that she was the author of her mother’s statement. It is evident from that that she is very much involved in her mother’s case as she is in her own.

The difficulty is that, whilst I would ordinarily be sympathetic towards a forgetful 88 year old lady, the history of the events since 2007 up to and including the recent witness statement mean that there is every possibility that if a general civil restraint order is not continued vexatious proceedings will be issued in Mrs Sheikh’s name alleging bribery on the part of the Deputy Master Bard who, it is contended, wrongly failed to grant Ms Sheikh judgment in default, to name but one likely recipient of proceedings.

On that, it is of note that in the judgment of Simon J (at paragraphs 66 and 67) he refers to a default judgment obtained by Miss Sheikh which was then set aside. Withers had learnt of the judgment from a journalist from the Sun newspaper. As a result, on 29 May, Master Eastman ordered that the judgment be set aside on the basis that it had been made erroneously. Simon J found that in the light of that history it was clear that the claimant’s application to restore the judgment in default was wholly without merit and would be refused.

Further, after the successful strike out of the proceedings brought by Miss Sheikh against Mr Beaumont shortly thereafter proceedings in which he was included as a defendant were started in the Chancery Division.

I cannot ignore the persistent way in which the claimant has pursued people against whom she perceives she has a genuine grievance. That conduct has continued up to and including June 2015. As part of that course of conduct she has demonstrated that she has no compunction in using her mother as a tool in her broader litigation aims. The behaviour is very much that of a vexatious litigant.

In the circumstances I have no doubt that the renewal which is sought of the general civil restraint orders is both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances of the case.

At present in the proceedings by Rabia Sheikh against Mr Page and Mr Meares no action can be taken without the permission of the court. I consider that is not needed in terms of any other application which may need to be made for future civil restraint orders against Mrs or Miss Sheikh.

Miss Sheikh should be added as a party to the action against Mr Page and Mr Meares both to allow for this application and for any future applications for extensions of civil restraint orders against her.

It is not known where Miss Sheikh or Mrs Sheikh are currently living. Master McCloud’s order made provision for service on Miss Sheikh and Mrs Sheikh at five email accounts which Miss Sheikh has used in recent years. At least one must have been successfully received as Miss Sheikh was able to prepare volumes of documentation and appear at the court proceedings before me.

Miss Sheikh wanted an order made in terms of a draft which she included in the red file submitted on the day of the hearing. That included an order that judgment in default in Rabia Sheikh v Hugo Page be entered forthwith in the sum of £8 million payable on account with the hearing to be listed on the first open day after a date to be determined for directions as to the quantification of damages.

She sought also a similar judgment in default in relation to her case against Marc Beaumont. Further, if the parties did not show cause why those orders should not be made then she sought an order that they be committed to prison for contempt of court on the basis that they have conspired with others to commit the Red River conveyancing and mortgage fraud and various other matters.

No notice was given of an application for an order in those terms. As Miss Sheikh was keen to refer the court to the CPR on other matters, she must know that there is no basis for the court considering such orders without notice.

Another matter which emerged during the course of the hearing was a submission made by Miss Sheikh that Mr Speaight QC, who appeared on behalf of the defendants Page and Meares, should be committed for contempt. As I pointed out there is a well trodden process to be gone through for contempt proceedings commencing with an application notice and proceeding in accordance with the current Practice Direction. That had not been followed. If Miss Sheikh wishes to pursue that course then that is what she should do having, in the circumstances, obtained permission of the court to do so.

The documentation in a case such as this is voluminous. I have taken into account all of the evidence which is relevant to the issues before the court in relation to the applications which I had to determine.

Practice Direction 3C – Civil Restraint Orders:

“3CPD.4 – General Civil Restraint Orders

4.1

A general civil restraint order may be made by-

(1)

a judge of the Court of Appeal;

(2)

a judge of the High Court; or

(3)

a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy in the County Court,

where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.

4.2

Unless the court otherwise orders, where the court makes a general civil restraint order, the party against whom the order is made-

(1)

will be restrained from issuing any claim or making any application in-

(a)

any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court of Appeal;

(b)

the High Court or the County Court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court; or

(c)

the County Court if the order has been made by a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy,

without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order;

(2)

may apply for amendment or discharge of the order provided he has first obtained the permission of a judge identified in the order; and

(3)

may apply for permission to appeal the order and if permission is granted, may appeal the order.

4.3

Where a party who is subject to a general civil restraint order-

(1)

issues a claim or makes an application in a court identified in the order without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order, the claim or application will automatically be struck out or dismissed-

(a)

without the judge having to make any further order; and

(b)

without the need for the other party to respond to it;

(2)

repeatedly makes applications for permission pursuant to that order which are totally without merit, the court may direct that if the party makes any further application for permission which is totally without merit, the decision to dismiss that application will be final and there will be no right of appeal, unless the judge who refused permission grants permission to appeal.

4.4

A party who is subject to a general civil restraint order may not make an application for permission under paragraphs 4.2(1) or 4.2(2) without first serving notice of the application on the other party in accordance with paragraph 4.5.

4.5

A notice under paragraph 4.4 must-

(1)

set out the nature and grounds of the application; and

(2)

provide the other party with at least 7 days within which to respond.

4.6

An application for permission under paragraphs 4.2(1) or 4.2(2)-

(1)

must be made in writing;

(2)

must include the other party's written response, if any, to the notice served under paragraph 4.4; and

(3)

will be determined without a hearing.

4.7

An order under paragraph 4.3(2) may only be made by-

(1)

a Court of Appeal judge;

(2)

a High Court judge; or

(3)

a Designated Civil Judge or their appointed deputy.

4.8

Where a party makes an application for permission under paragraphs 4.2(1) or 4.2(2) and permission is refused, any application for permission to appeal-

(1)

must be made in writing; and

(2)

will be determined without a hearing.

4.9

A general civil restraint order-

(1)

will be made for a specified period not exceeding 2 years;

(2)

must identify the courts in which the party against whom the order is made is restrained from issuing claims or making applications; and

(3)

must identify the judge or judges to whom an application for permission under paragraphs 4.2(1), 4.2(2) or 4.8 should be made.

4.10

The court may extend the duration of a general civil restraint order, if it considers it appropriate to do so, but it must not be extended for a period greater than 2 years on any given occasion.

4.11

If they consider that it would be appropriate to make a general civil restraint order-

(1)

a Master or a District Judge in a district registry of the High Court must transfer the proceedings to a High Court judge; and

(2)

a Circuit Judge or a District Judge in the County Court must transfer the proceedings to the Designated Civil Judge.”