Bedfordshire Police v Golding & Anor

Last Friday 26 June the Chief Constable of the Bedfordshire Police sought interim injunctions under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (“the 2014 Act”) against the Leader and Deputy Leader of “Britain First” (“the Respondents”).

“Britain First” is a registered political party, registered with the Electoral Commission since January 2014. It has contested European and national elections, albeit in very limited numbers. It holds anti-Muslim views, to which I will return.

I granted certain interim injunctions, and did so largely with the agreement of the Respondents through their Counsel, Mr Ian Glen QC. However I refused the first injunction sought by the Chief Constable, which was an injunction forbidding the Respondents from entering the town of Luton and its surrounding area (“injunction (a)”).

All injunctions were sought for a one year period. However it was clear that the immediate reason for the application was in fact a proposed march by “Britain First” the next day, Saturday 27 June 2015 (“the March”). The day chosen for the March fell during the month of Ramadan. It was also the day scheduled for a community celebration known as “Luton in Harmony”.

The interim injunctions that I did grant were granted until a full hearing at a future date. In practice they were final for the purposes of the March.

Having announced my decision at the end of the hearing on Friday, I reserved my reasons to be given in writing.

The 2014 Act has only recently come into force, on 23 March 2015. Leaving aside a number of detailed provisions that are not material in the present case the essential features of the 2014 Act may be summarised as follows.

By section 1 a court may grant an injunction against a person aged ten or over if two conditions are met. The first condition is that the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in anti-social behaviour. The second condition is that the court considers it just and convenient to grant the injunction for the purpose of preventing the Respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour. Section 21(7) permits the court, when deciding whether to grant an injunction under section 1, to take account of conduct occurring up the six months before the commencement date of the 2014 Act.

By section 5 the chief officer of police for a police area is one of those entitled to apply for an injunction. By section 7 of the 2014 Act where the court adjourns the hearing of an application (whether made with notice or without) for an injunction the court may grant an injunction lasting until the final hearing of the application or until further order (an “interim injunction”) if the court thinks it just to do so.

“Anti-social behaviour” is defined in section 2 as including conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person, and conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to a person in relation to that person's occupation of residential premises. By section 4 a court granting an injunction may attach a power of arrest to a prohibition or requirement of the injunction if the court thinks that the anti-social behaviour in which the Respondent has engaged or threatens to engage consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence against other persons, or there is a significant risk of harm to other persons from the Respondent.

Ms Sonia Rai of Counsel appeared for the Chief Constable. It transpired that the injunctions had been sought without notice a week earlier on Friday 19 June (when Ms Rai was not Counsel instructed). The Court (Supperstone J) on that occasion, wholly understandably on the facts of this case, required that any application be considered on notice to the Respondents. The hearing on Friday 26 June was the result.

In advance of the hearing on Friday 26 June, notices had already been given by the Bedfordshire Police under sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (“the 1986 Act”) imposing conditions on any public procession and public assembly in support of “Britain First” to be held on 27 June in Luton. The conditions in respect of the procession required a moving procession, taking a prescribed route, and within stated hours.

The interim injunctions I did grant prohibited the Respondents from doing the following (“injunctions (b) (c) (d) and (e)”):

“(b)

Entering any Mosque or Islamic Cultural Centre or its private grounds within England and Wales without prior written invitation.

(c)

Publishing, distributing or displaying, or causing to be published, distributed or displayed, any words or images, whether electronically or otherwise, which having regard to all the circumstances are likely to stir up religious and/or racial hatred.

(d)

Using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour thereby causing harassment, alarm or distress to any person.

(e)

Carrying or displaying in Luton on Saturday 27 June 2015 at or in connection with the march by “Britain First” any banner or sign with the words “No More Mosques” or similar words or words to like effect.”

The evidence on behalf of the Chief Constable included witness statements of Tracy Hall (Legal Services Manager with Bedfordshire Police) dated 21 June 2015, Assistant Chief Constable Michael Colbourne dated 19 June 2015, Police Sergeant Perri (attached to the Community Cohesion Team) dated 17 June 2015, Detective Sergeant Greenacre dated 24 June 2015 and Nicola Perry (Head of Policy and Performance, Luton Borough Council: “the Council”) dated 18 June 2015.

The evidence included evidence of conduct occurring more than the 6 months before the commencement date of the 2014 Act. Leaving that evidence out of account as required by the legislation, I took the view that, applying the statutory test, the remaining evidence was nonetheless sufficient to support interim injunctions (b), (c), (d) and (e). As indicated, and in fact to their credit, the Respondents agreed to interim injunctions (b) (c) and (d), pending a full hearing in due course. At the full hearing, one of the points the Respondents may take is whether injunctions (c) and (d) are appropriate given the criminal law that already covers conduct there prohibited.

Interim injunction (e) I added of my own motion when Mr Glen QC very properly ensured that I was told about a banner that was proposed to be carried at the March. I made interim injunction (e) rather than leave any uncertainty at the March whether a banner stating “No More Mosques” would be in breach of injunctions (c) and (d).

I attached a power of arrest to injunctions (b) to (e) having found that the conditions for this in the 2014 Act were satisfied. In order to allow time for the full hearing the power of arrest was ordered for a 3 month period unless amended or renewed in the meantime (see further sections 4(2) and 8(3) of the 2014 Act).

I do not propose in giving these reasons to go through all the evidence that I have taken into consideration and relied upon in reaching the conclusions I have to grant interim injunctions and attach a power of arrest. However I do in the following paragraphs draw attention to certain aspects of that evidence that concern events on 3 June 2015 because of the attention given by all parties to events on that date.

Ms Rai, for the Chief Constable, made clear in her submissions that the application would not have been made but for an episode on 3 June 2015. This echoed a letter from Ms Hall on behalf of the Chief Constable dated 24 June 2105 to the Respondents’ solicitors in which Ms Hall stated that the application for injunctions against the Respondents was “a direct result of their personal actions in the Town of Luton on the 3^rd June 2015”. Other evidence on behalf of the Chief Constable speaks of alarm and distress caused and tensions raised as a result of this visit to Luton.

Film of some of the events of 3 June 2015 was made into an edited video by “Britain First” that Ms Rai asked me to watch. In the interests of time I have done so out of Court; a transcript was available and referred to in open court. The episode includes provocative, threatening and offensive remarks or gestures levelled by the Respondents against members of the public, and by members of the public against the Respondents.

One of the Respondents uses the words “go back to your own country” (and “go back to the desert”) as if England is not just as much the country of the member of the public to whom the Respondent is talking as any other member of the public. The phrase “Muslim extremists” is used by one of the Respondents. An object appears to have been thrown at a car in which the Respondents were travelling.

The evidence on behalf of the Chief Constable included evidence of “Britain First” undertaking “mosque invasions”, involving provocative entry to mosques or Islamic cultural centres or their grounds without invitation. The Respondents’ evidence, by witness statement, was that “Britain First” “did have a policy colourfully described as ‘Mosque invasion’ but that policy ceased in July 2014” and “will not be repeated”. The evidence is challenged by the account given by Police Sergeant Perri which suggests (possibly on information rather than from first hand knowledge) that on 3 June (although the evidence could be clearer as to the date being described) the Respondents entered a mosque and acted in an unwelcome fashion.

However the video of events on 3 June is quite clear in showing a banner being displayed by the Respondents outside a mosque or Islamic cultural centre. The banner includes the words “No More Mosques”. These words are absurd and offensive, just as, for example, “No More Churches”, “No More Synagogues”, “No More Temples” or even “No More Places of Worship” would be.

So how do the Respondents, as leaders of “Britain First”, explain their speaking and behaving in this way?

On occasion “Britain First” says that its concerns are about extremism. Yet it directs those concerns to Muslims. There is nothing extremist about being a Muslim. There are extremists who claim to be of the Muslim faith, just as there are extremists who claim to be of other faiths or of no faith. However, and fundamentally and obviously, to be a person of Muslim faith does not mean to be an extremist. Those who think it does are fundamentally and obviously wrong.

The point was well put in an open letter dated 20 May 2015 signed by a number of leaders of churches in Luton, and exhibited in evidence:

“The Muslim community have for years now been working closely with the police and the council to deal with extremism, and as a church we have been totally supportive of them in that work. There are members of the Muslim community who break the law and do wrong, but we don’t generalise that to blame the whole community nor their faith; just as we don’t blame the whole Christian community and our faith when Christians do wrong.”

In his witness statement the First Respondent gives evidence that “Britain First” is not opposed to all Muslims and does not brand all Muslims extremist. It is not easy to see that evidence borne out by the video.

On other occasions “Britain First” says that its concerns are instead over immigration. Yet it directs those concerns to Muslims, and to Muslims who are members of the community like everyone else. And it shows no analysis of the contribution that immigrants, from the world over, have made to the United Kingdom, and can and will make in the future.

As noted above, interim injunction (a), which I refused, would have forbidden the Respondents from entering the town of Luton altogether.

The reasons I was not persuaded that interim injunction (a) was appropriate, either for 27 June 2015 (the day of the March) or for the longer period to a full hearing were as follows.

First, the March was already regulated by conditions imposed under the 1986 Act. Ms Rai confirmed to me that the route imposed by those conditions went close to one mosque or Islamic Cultural Centre but no others. Injunction (b) would prevent the Respondents entering that Mosque or Islamic Cultural Centre or its private grounds without prior written invitation.

Second, the Respondents are Leader and Deputy Leader of “Britain First”. As regards the March specifically, the evidence and submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable contained no evaluation or analysis of the potential impact of their absence from the March on the proper conduct of the March.

More generally, to ban the leaders of a registered political party altogether from a town is a very considerable thing. The evidence and the submissions on behalf of the Chief Constable did not address the consequences for legitimate political activity by that party in a town. Nor did they address the potential for an injunction in one town to lead to calls for injunctions in other towns and cities with a Muslim population of appreciable size, and in turn how legitimate political activity might be conducted if those calls were heeded. The submission of Ms Rae that the Respondents do not “have any link to Luton and have no need to be in Luton” is not, with respect, correct where leaders of a registered political party are concerned.

Third, in addition to interim injunction (b) (referred to above), interim injunctions (c), (d) and (e) would be in operation, and they were directed to the actual conduct that was of concern to the police and the community.

Fourth, until 3 June 2015 no injunctions (additional to the powers under the 1986 Act) were thought necessary by the Chief Constable. Considered objectively, the events of 3 June 2015 do not justify removing the Respondents from the March or from Luton for all purposes.

Of course “Britain First” comes across as fundamentally and obviously wrong, and even extremist itself, when it focuses on Muslims. In these times, which are troubled times, that error is particularly damaging. The police have the hardest job in dealing with it, nationally and locally. And so does the Council, locally.

But in dealing with it, all must strive not to inhibit the freedom to express views, the freedom to demonstrate and the freedom to organise politically. Indeed it is sometimes through allowing views to be heard, that error in views can be exposed. And it is sometimes through allowing the opportunity for support to be shown, that lack of support can be exposed.