QRS v Beach & Anor

On 30 April 2015, I heard applications to commit the Respondents for contempt of court with reference to alleged breaches of court orders. I had ruled that the matter should proceed in their absence, having been satisfied that they had chosen not to appear. There was no doubt that they had been notified of the proceedings and had made no response; in particular, there had been no suggestion that an adjournment was required either on health grounds or because of a need for further time to prepare. (I note that on 22 January 2015 Warby J, having granted an adjournment unopposed on that occasion, had then prescribed the procedure to be adopted if any further adjournment was to be sought on grounds of ill health. No such steps were taken.)

Prior to my ruling on that matter, Mr Busuttil had properly referred me to relevant modern authorities as to the circumstances in which it may be appropriate to take such an exceptional course: R v Jones (Anthony) [2003] 1 AC 1, R v Jones; R v Purvis [2001] QB 862, Hammerton v Hammerton [2007] EWCA Civ 248 and Sanchez v Oboz [2015] EWHC 235 (Fam). He pointed specifically to the considerations addressed by Cobb J in Sanchez at [4]-[5], and I took those factors into account in the light of the evidence before the court in the present case.

My conclusion that the Respondents had chosen not to appear seems to be confirmed by a video uploaded on or about 17 April this year, and displayed on one of the websites recently set up, in which the First Respondent is shown setting fire to the box of court bundles sent to him for the purposes of the hearing. They were apparently completely destroyed. The Second Respondent posted a copy of the video on YouTube on 17April. (I make clear that this conduct is not relied upon in itself to support the contempt applications, as no reference is made to it in the Grounds which, of course, pre-date it. Nevertheless, it was legitimate to have regard to this evidence, contained in Mr Wilson’s third affidavit, in determining the preliminary issue of whether it would be appropriate to proceed in the absence of the Respondents.)

As appears from the title of the case, there was originally a Second Defendant, Mr Kordowski, but the claim against him was settled last December and he plays no further part in the proceedings.

The Claimant is a solicitor, who sues not only on his own behalf but also in a representative capacity on behalf of a number of “protected parties”, in respect of what is alleged to have been a continuing campaign of harassment via the internet. Steps were taken at the outset to protect the Claimant and those he represents by the grant of anonymity. For the same reasons as those given by the Judges who have been seised of the matter so far, I confirmed that such protection should continue on the present applications. Accordingly I shall not identify anyone by name in the judgment and will attempt to avoid giving any information (e.g. by revealing the address of any of the relevant websites) which could lead to their identification.

There are now two applications before me. The first (dated 10 December 2014) related to the First Respondent only and concerned alleged breaches of an interim order made by Slade J on 14 August of last year. The second application relies upon alleged breaches of the final order (dated 16 September), which was made by Stuart-Smith J following the grant of judgment in default.

In the second application, it is not only alleged that the First Respondent has breached the order in a number of respects, but also that the Second Respondent is liable for criminal contempt. He was not a party to the original claim for harassment, and the order was thus not made in relation to him. The case is based on the long established principle that a non-party can be liable for criminal contempt through his actions in encouraging or assisting a party to breach a court order, and/or by setting out deliberately to undermine the court’s intention in granting the order in question: see e.g. Att-Gen v Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333 and Att-Gen v Times Newspapers Ltd [1992] 1 AC191.

The procedure to be adopted in relation to such a non-party respondent is laid down now by CPR 81.10(2), which stipulates a Part 23 application notice. This procedure has been correctly complied with in the present case.

It is well established that the Claimant is confined on any committal application to reliance upon the grounds expressly identified for the purposes of the relevant application. Moreover, it is for the Claimant to establish the conduct relied upon to the criminal standard of proof (whether the contempt alleged is to be classified, technically, as civil or criminal in nature). Mr Busuttil took time, therefore, carefully to go through each of the grounds relied upon here, in relation to each of the Respondents, and took me to the evidence in order to demonstrate that this burden was discharged. None of the witnesses went into the witness box to confirm the evidence contained in the relevant affidavits, but they were present and available for cross-examination had either of the Respondents wished to make such an application. Obviously, in the circumstances, none of the evidence was opposed or challenged.

I was satisfied that all relevant documents have been served upon the Respondents in accordance with the rules.

I now turn to the first application and the breaches alleged to have been committed by the First Respondent in relation to the injunction granted by Slade J last August.

Paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 11 of the interim order were, so far as material, in these terms:

“5 Until the conclusion of the trial of this action or further Order of the Court in the meantime:

5.1

the First Defendant must not (whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever) harass … the Claimant or any person who the Claimant represents in these proceedings;

5.2

in particular (and without limiting the generality of the foregoing), the First Defendant:

5.2.1

must cease forthwith from operating or publishing any of the websites identified as items 1 to 5 in Confidential Schedule B to this order by removing them from the internet in their entirety and not reinstating them to the internet;

5.2.2

must forthwith cause to be removed from the website identified as item 6 in Confidential Schedule B to this order the entirety of his posting on that website that refers to the Claimant and the Claimant’s firm [and] must not reinstate that material or any similar material to that website;

5.2.3

must not (whether by himself, his servants or agents or otherwise howsoever) post or cause or permit to be posted anywhere on the internet any material (verbal or pictorial) which:

(i)

lists, identifies or otherwise refers to the Claimant or any person who the Claimant represents in these proceedings or the Claimant’s firm; or

(ii)

is published in juxtaposition with any pre-existing material on the internet that identifies or otherwise refers to the Claimant or any person who the Claimant represents in these proceedings or the Claimant’s firm;

…

6

The First Defendant must by 4 p.m. on 21 August 2014 disclose and produce in writing to the Claimant’s solicitors:

6.1

the identity of each and every person who to his knowledge has been involved since 1 August 2011 in operating, running and/or publishing the website identified in item 6 in Confidential Schedule B to this Order (in each case, disclosing to the Claimant’s solicitors the following details if and in so far as they are known to him: (i) the person’s full name; (ii) his or her address; (iii) his or her telephone or mobile phone number; (iv) his or her email address; (v) his or her IP address; (vi) any other contact details); and

6.2

all information and documents within his control evidencing the identity of any person who has been involved since 1 August 2011 in operating, running and/or publishing that website.

…

8

The First Defendant and any third party given advance notice of the Application … and any person who the Claimant puts on notice of this Order must not, except with the express prior permission of the Court, publish or communicate or disclose or copy or cause to be published or communicated or disclosed or copied to any third party by any means whatsoever any document related to or disclosed in or generated in the course of or in connection with these proceedings (‘the Litigation Papers’) other than (a) this Order (excepting the Confidential Schedules thereto) and (b) any public judgment of the Court in these proceedings.

PROVIDED THAT the First Defendant and any third party given advance notice of the Application and any person who the Claimant puts on notice of this Order shall be permitted to copy, disclose and deliver the Litigation Papers (or any of them) to any solicitor or barrister duly instructed by any such person for the purpose of these proceedings.

…

11

The First Defendant and any third party given advance notice of the Application and any person who the Claimant puts on notice of this Order must not, except with the express prior permission of the Court, publish or communicate or disclose or cause to be published or communicated or disclosed by any means whatsoever any information derived from the Litigation Papers other than (a) this Order (excepting the Confidential Schedules thereto) and (b) any public judgment of the Court in these proceedings.

… ”

It is elementary that court orders are there to be obeyed and there is no doubt that the First Respondent was under an obligation to comply with the interim order (and indeed, later, the final order) for so long as it remained in effect, whether he thought it appropriate or not. There has never been an application by him to set aside either of these orders. At all material times, therefore, they remained in effect and binding upon him.

Ground 1 alleges that the First Respondent breached paragraph 5.2.1 of the Order of Slade J by failing to cease forthwith, following service on 16 August 2014, from operating the five websites identified in Confidential Schedule B to that order, and by continuing to operate them, for almost three days, until about 12.30 p.m. on 19 August 2014.

Ground 2 alleges a breach of paragraph 5.2.2 of the Order of Slade J because the First Respondent failed, upon being served, to cause the removal of the entirety of his posting referring to the relevant persons; it remained on the website in question for four days after service until 20 August 2014. I shall refer to this simply as “website 6”. It is clear that the continued posting fell foul of paragraph 5.2.2.

I am satisfied, to the appropriate standard, that these first two breaches occurred; that is by reason of the evidence of the Claimant’s solicitor, Mr Wilson, contained in paragraphs 14 to 19 of his first affidavit, dated 28 November 2014. He confirmed in each case that the offending material remained on the internet until the domains were cancelled by the Registrar, Webfusion Ltd, on respectively 19 and 20 August. That was not because any attempt had been made by the First Respondent to obey the order, but rather in response to a request made on the Claimant’s behalf directly to the Registrar.

Ground 3 relies upon a breach of paragraph 5.2.3 of the interim order by reason of material posted on the website identified as item 1 in the Confidential Schedule annexed to the grounds, and to which I shall simply refer as “website 7”. This occurred between approximately 17 August and 8 September 2014. The material consisted of verbal and/or pictorial postings which identified (i) the Claimant, (ii) one of the Listed Protected Parties identified (as No 10) in Confidential Schedule A to the Order, and (iii) the Claimant’s firm. Again, I am satisfied to the criminal standard of proof.

The relevant evidence was contained in Mr Wilson’s first affidavit at paragraphs 23 to 28 (and in pages 12-17 of his first exhibit thereto). He described how he had discovered on 5 September that there were three further websites publishing the material in question. One of these, “website 7”, had been set up earlier, but it was updated on 25 August after the First Respondent had been served with the interim order. (The other two were set up on 3 September 2014 after, and in breach of, the interim order.) The material on this website was in substance the same as that found on website 5. The domain’s registration was cancelled on 8 September, but again only after Mr Wilson had contacted the Registrar (Webfusion Ltd). Despite this, however, he recorded how adverse search engine results and snippets persisted up to the date of his first affidavit (28 November). He exhibited an example.

Ground 4 was based on a further breach of paragraph 5.2.3 of the same order. This was covered in Mr Wilson’s affidavit at paragraphs 29 to 30 (and in his exhibit at page 7). After he had been served with the order, the First Respondent posted or caused to be posted on one of the original five websites (“website 1”) some new material referring expressly to the Claimant’s firm. The burden has also been discharged in this instance.

Ground 5 consists of an alleged breach of paragraph 6 of the interim order. The deadline passed and he had failed to produce any of the required information or documents, as Mr Wilson confirmed in paragraph 35 of the same affidavit. That is thus proved also to the criminal standard.

Ground 6 identifies another breach of paragraph 5.2.3. The First Respondent is said to have posted (or caused to be posted), between 3 and 8 September 2014, material to the same effect as that published on the fifth of the original five websites (“website 5”). How this came to be discovered was described by Mr Wilson in paragraphs 36 to 41 of the first affidavit. I shall refer to the relevant website as “website 8” (i.e. the second of the three new websites discovered by him on 5 September). This was found to have been registered by the First Respondent on 3 September, following the removal of the original five by the Registrar. It effectively reproduced the material which had been contained in website 5 (thus, it is said, deliberately flouting the interim order). It identified the Claimant, his firm and one of the Listed Protected Parties. Various pages were exhibited by Mr Wilson (at pages 18 to 28). Again, I find the breach proved.

Ground 7 is once again founded upon a breach of paragraph 5.2.3 of the interim order. What the First Respondent apparently did was to use one of the new websites registered on 3 September (and discovered two days later by Mr Wilson), to which I shall refer as “website 9”, for the purpose of reproducing what had been posted on the first four of the original five websites listed in Confidential Schedule B to Slade J’s order. This was described by Mr Wilson at paragraphs 42 to 46 of the same affidavit and illustrated by references to extracts from the new website at pages 29 to 35 of his exhibit. There is no doubt that there was thus another breach of paragraph 5.2.3.

“Website 9” also contained a new statement, set out at paragraph 46 of the affidavit and exhibited at pages 29 to 30, which was headed “In the interest of Openness, Transparency and Freedom of Speech on the Internet and NO to secret Courts”. This too identifies a number of the people contrary to paragraph 5.2.3. It also involved publishing the “Litigation Papers” (which, in themselves, identified people impermissibly). Accordingly, I am again satisfied that the Claimant’s burden of proof has been clearly discharged.

Ground 8 is closely related. Here, it is said that there has been also a breach of paragraph 8 of the interim order, in revealing the content of “Litigation Papers”. There is no doubt that he did so in the new material to which I have referred in the previous paragraph, but it would hardly further the court’s intentions, as disclosed in the interim order, if I were to list or describe them in the course of this judgment. They are sufficiently identified in the evidence of Mr Wilson. I find this breach also proved.

Ground 9, by the same token, asserts a breach of paragraph 11, on the basis that the conduct described in relation to Grounds 7 and 8 entails that information derived from the “Litigation Papers” has also been impermissibly communicated. That plainly follows and the burden is correspondingly discharged. Mr Wilson made clear that, although he managed to obtain the suspension of the website by approaching Nominet, the Registry for the two domain names ending in “co.uk” (websites 8 and 9), after a relatively short time (four to five days), the postings resulted in a number of adverse search engine results, which he exhibited.

Ground 10 concerns a further breach of paragraph 5.2.3 of the interim order, as described in Mr Wilson’s affidavit at paragraphs 53 to 57. He discovered on 11 September that another two websites had been set up (to which I refer as “website 10” and “website 11”). They were available on the internet between 10 and 20 September. They were registered on 10 September (i.e. one day after Nominet removed “website 8” and “website 9”). Eventually, they were removed from the internet on 20 September by the Registrar, a company called Web Commerce Communications Ltd and based in Malaysia. As in other cases, however, adverse search engine results continued for some while thereafter.

Mr Wilson demonstrated that website 10 was substantially the same in content as (new) websites 7 and 8 and (original) website 5. Thus, it is submitted, it inevitably reveals identities prohibited by the interim order. Illustrations are given in his exhibit (at pages 36 to 53). Correspondingly, the burden has again been discharged.

Ground 11 relates to “website 11” and similarly points to yet another breach of paragraph 5.2.3, which also took place between 10 and 20 September. The content was substantially similar to that of websites 1 to 4 and website 9. The evidence is contained in paragraphs 58 to 61 of the affidavit and illustrations are set out in the exhibit at pages 54 to 72. Adverse search results were produced (and illustrated at pages 199 and 202-203). It has, therefore, been proved to my satisfaction that this material, revealing yet again prohibited identities, does indeed constitute a breach of the interim order.

Ground 12 relies upon another breach of paragraph 8 of the interim order taking place between 10 and 20 September on “website 11”. As Mr Wilson makes clear, that website also made available seven PDF files, previously available on “website 9”. His evidence is set out at paragraphs 62 to 63 of the affidavit and illustrated in his exhibit (at pages 73 to 175). The publication of these “Litigation Papers” was obviously in breach of paragraph 8 of the interim order.

Ground 13 points to the fact that “website 11” also contains the new material contained in “website 9” and referred to in the passage of this judgment dealing with Ground 9. The evidence dealing with this was contained in paragraphs 64 to 66 of Mr Wilson’s affidavit and in his exhibit (at pages 54-55). It consisted of information derived from the “Litigation Papers” and there was accordingly a clear breach of paragraph 11 of the interim order. The burden has again been discharged.

I must now address the second application to commit (dated 14 April 2015), which relates partly to alleged breaches by the First Respondent of the final order granted by Stuart-Smith J on 16 September 2014, and partly to the conduct of the Second Respondent in “aiding and abetting” him. I shall first consider the evidence directly concerning the First Respondent. This is contained primarily in the second affidavit of Mr Wilson dated 13 April 2015.

By way of introduction, however, it is necessary to set out the relevant parts of the final order:

“…

7.1

the Defendants and each of them and any person who the Second Defendant [i.e. Mr Kordowski] represents in these proceedings must not whether by themselves, their servants or agents or otherwise howsoever post or cause or permit to be posted anywhere on the internet any material (verbal or pictorial) which:

(a) lists, identifies or otherwise refers to the Claimant or any person who the Claimant represents in these proceedings or the Claimant’s firm; or

(b) is published in juxtaposition with any pre-existing material on the internet that identifies or otherwise refers to the Claimant or any person who the Claimant represents in these proceedings or the Claimant’s firm;

…

9

The First Defendant must forthwith:

9.1

permanently delete all the data within his control comprising (a) all content (textual and pictorial) that was published at the websites identified as items 1 to 5 and 7 to 12 in Confidential Schedule B to this Order and (b) his posting and other material referable to the Claimant’s firm that was published at the website identified as item 6 in Confidential schedule B to this Order; and

9.2

cause all such data to be deleted permanently from the servers or other electronic storage device or system of any third party which to the knowledge of the First Defendant holds such data…”

(The persons referred to in paragraph 7.1(a) and (b) of the final Order were set out in Confidential Schedule A to the Order.)

Ground 1 alleges a breach of paragraph 7.1 of the final order by the First Respondent (by himself and/or by the Second Respondent and/or by other persons unknown). The breach consisted in posting (or causing or permitting to be posted) certain material on the internet on the website identified as item 1 in the Confidential Schedule 1 to the Grounds, but to which I shall refer simply as “website 12” (for the obvious reasons I have already given). The material in question was partly verbal and partly pictorial and it identified (i) the Claimant, (b) one of the persons he was representing in these proceedings and (iii) his firm. The evidence establishing this charge was contained in Mr Wilson’s second affidavit at paragraphs 34 and 36 to 38 and in his second exhibit (at pages 71 to 125). He found on 1 April 2015 this new website containing the same material as that which had already appeared on the websites to which I have referred as “website 7”, “website 8” and “website 10”. (It happens that they are referred to in Confidential Schedule B to the final order as items 9, 10 and 12.)

His further researches revealed a contact email address of xxxx@gmail.com, suggesting that the site was operated by the Second Respondent, who was already known by him to be a friend or associate of the First Respondent. This was confirmed by one piece of new material that also appeared on the site:

“Open Letter …

Mr Wilson of Brett Wilson Solicitors. I am not going to take any notice of you or any civil court trying to hide the truth.

If I have committed a crime, do your duty and inform the police, until then you can stick your injunctions where the sun don’t shine. You know where I live, any letters, emails or phone calls will be put on MY websites. Do yourself and the industry a favour and get some urgent legal advice.

Up Yours,

Jim Bloomfield

31 March 2015”

The later postings, between 31 March and 8 April 2015, clearly represent a continuation of the First Respondent’s earlier campaign (albeit now aided by, or carried out through, the Second Respondent). It would be quite unreal to come to any other conclusion. I thus find the breach alleged in Ground 1 of the second application proved.

Ground 2 represents a further breach of paragraph 7.1 of the final order. This time it relates to material appearing on a website identified at item 2 of the Confidential Schedule to the Grounds, and to which I shall refer as “website 13”. It was published between 31 March and 8 April 2015 and was clearly in breach of paragraph 7.1(a) of that order. It identified (verbally and/or pictorially) (a) the Claimant, (b) all the persons he represents in these proceedings, (c) the Claimant’s firm, and (d) a lawyer acting for the Claimant in the proceedings. This was plainly in breach. Although most of what appeared on this new website had been posted earlier, it also contained the same open letter quoted above (in relation to Ground 1 under the second application).

The evidence establishing these matters was to be found in paragraphs 40 to 44 of Mr Wilson’s second affidavit and in his second exhibit (at pages126 to 137). With a little persistence, he was able to have the Registrar of the new websites (TLD Registrar Solutions Ltd) suspend the domain names and the websites are no longer on the web.

Ground 3 alleges a breach of paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the final order. The point was shortly dealt with at paragraphs 48 and 49 of the second affidavit, where he points out that the data could not have been deleted as those provisions required; otherwise they would not have been available to be reproduced on the most recent websites. That conclusion is obviously also consistent with the attitude of the Second Respondent in his “open letter” quoted above. I am accordingly also satisfied that the breach has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

I pause before considering Ground 4, which relates to the Second Respondent, in order to address the particular aspects of the evidence to which Mr Busuttil drew attention as confirming that the First Respondent was indeed responsible personally for the breaches so far alleged in support of the two applications to commit. Obviously, that has to be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt. The first point he made was that the First Respondent must take responsibility for any posting or publication, even if he did not bring it about directly, if it was done on his behalf (e.g. by the Second Respondent).

The First Respondent was the registrant of the new websites set up after the interim order, to which I have referred as websites 7, 8 and 9. That emerges from Mr Wilson’s first exhibit (at pages 181 to 194), which reproduces the results of his searches via “WHOIS”.

It is surely an overwhelming inference that the various new websites that were set up, in the sequence described above, were intended to replace those of which complaint had originally been made (after they had been removed by the relevant registrar). There is no reason why these steps should have been taken by anyone other than the First Respondent or someone acting on his behalf. The new domain names were very close to those of the websites being replaced. In any event, the content was substantially similar (as I have described above).

It is also obvious, Counsel submits, from the content of some of the material, that it could only have come from the First Respondent. For example, he cites the new content added on or about 19 August (which constitutes the fourth breach identified above). It was fully quoted in paragraph 29 of Mr Wilson’s first affidavit. The reference to litigation papers which had been served upon him also bears this out.

The same point can be made in relation to the new material set out at paragraph 46 of the same affidavit (to which I have already referred in connection with Ground 7). It is, in any event, signed by the First Respondent. My conclusion is consistent also with his warning in that new material to the effect that “… you will eventually work out that I can set up new websites faster than you can take them down”.

Ground 4 relates to the involvement of the Second Respondent, who is said to have “aided and abetted” the First Respondent in committing his breaches of paragraph 7.1 of the final order (as reflected in grounds 1 and 2 for the second application). That would be an instance of criminal contempt and also, needless to say, has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Mr Busuttil began by referring to the evidence that the Respondents are friends and associates. This is confirmed in the witness statement of the Claimant relied upon for the harassment proceedings (at paragraphs 179-180) and by Mr Wilson’s first two affidavits (at paragraphs 82 and 11 respectively). (The Claimant later attested to the proposition on oath, for the purpose of these committal proceedings, in an affidavit of 4 December 2014.) What is more, the Second Respondent became directly involved in what has been called the campaign of harassment. The witnesses refer to unpleasant and threatening remarks posted by the Second Respondent on the First Respondent’s original website.

The new websites to which I have referred as “website 7”, “website 8”, “website 10” and “website 11” each contained an entry to the following effect:

“UPDATE Due to ill health, Mr Danny Beach is no longer able to continue updating his websites. My name is Jim Bloomfield. I am the new owner of his websites including this one and [another is identified]. I am more familiar with Facebook and Twitter and will be seeking support and help to expose [name omitted] Borough Council”.

I note that the later websites, to which the second committal application is directed, contain similar statements from the Second Respondent. He would seem clearly, therefore, to be associating himself with the “campaign” throughout.

Mr Busuttil has applied, in this context, for permission to rely on some later evidence, which has been served on the Respondents but post-dates the applications, pursuant to the provisions of CPR 81.28(1). It is not in my view necessary for this to be admitted in order to establish the allegations of contempt but, nonetheless, it would be appropriate to let the material be included simply to update the position and to complete the narrative. There is in my judgment no unfairness to either Respondent in doing so.

First, the Second Respondent wrote a letter to Warby J on 8 April, on behalf of the First Respondent, to ask that Mr Kordowski (formerly the Second Defendant) be permitted to act as his (i.e. the First Respondent’s) McKenzie Friend. Enclosed with the letter were documents which could only have been obtained from the First Respondent. He also provided his own address (that used by the Claimant’s solicitors for service) and his email address as xxxxx@gmail.com.

Secondly, on 15 April, the Second Respondent posted a statement on one of the new websites in these terms: “Mr Daniel Charles Beach is still unwell and will be for some time, this article has been written on his behalf. Jimmy Bloomfield”.

Against that background, Mr Busuttil submits that the evidence now before the court, to the effect that the Second Respondent aided the First Respondent in the breaches of paragraph 7.1 of the final order, is overwhelming. He relies specifically upon the following matters.

When the order of Stuart-Smith J was personally served on the Second Respondent, it was accompanied by a letter of 17 September 2014 inviting him to indicate to what extent it was true, as stated on various new websites, that he was the new owner. It also warned him of his potential liability for criminal contempt if he continued to assist the First Respondent. He did not reply. I accept that there was no obligation on him to do so, but in the absence of any reply or explanation, the inference that he was indeed involved, as suggested on the websites, becomes all the more convincing.

The Second Respondent’s email address appeared as that of the registrant in respect of two of the new websites. That is confirmed by Mr Wilson’s second exhibit (at pages 33 and 37). Those websites also contained the personal statement of the Second Respondent of 31 March 2015, concluding “Up Yours”, and which I have quoted more fully above in connection with Ground 1 of the second application.

Again, Mr Busuttil seeks permission to admit later material, if thought necessary. Specifically, the Second Respondent posted on the evening of 15 April another statement on one of the new websites, which is said to be strikingly similar to the terms of the letter of 8 April which he had sent to Warby J. This was following the service upon him of the committal application and supporting documents. I do not consider it to be necessary, although its admission would hardly be unfair to the Second Respondent, as it represented his own defiant response to the court proceedings.

On 17 April, the Second Respondent posted a copy of the fire-setting video on a YouTube account in his own name. It clearly suggests that he shares the attitude of the First Respondent to the court proceedings, but it is hardly a necessary addition for the purpose of establishing that proposition. It does, however, go to support the decision to proceed in his absence, since it confirms his knowledge of the application and his intention not to attend.

That is also confirmed by his posting a copy of a letter addressed to him by the Claimant’s solicitors, dated 20 April, on one of the new websites, together with his response to it. He made his position clear: “… I do not recognise the court’s jurisdiction in this instance and will not be attending court nor will I be making any type of apology for my actions”. Again, however, I do not regard it as necessary to admit this evidence on the main issue of his liability for contempt. That has been in my judgment well established by the evidence already served.

In conclusion, I am persuaded that both Respondents have been shown to be liable for contempt of court on the grounds alleged. When this judgment is handed down, it would be appropriate for them to be present and to make any submissions they wish (either through legal representatives or in person) on the matter of what penalties (if any) should be imposed. It will clearly be relevant for the court to take into account any medical evidence at that stage.