PBD & Anor v Greater Manchester Police

The Claimants are seeking damages against the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (“GMP”) in two different claims. The First Claimant, PBD, submits that the Chief Constable acted in breach of a duty of care owed to him by revealing his identity to former criminal associates on 16 December 2010 with the consequence that he had to enter into witness protection. The First Claimant contends that he has suffered psychiatric damage during the period when his partner, QGC, the Second Claimant, could not join him in the place to which he had been relocated.

The second claim is made by the Second Claimant who contends that she agreed with officers of GMP that they would pay her £1,500 per month for six months as compensation for her giving up her job in order to enter into witness protection.

Both claims are contested. It has been agreed that liability and causation will be determined in this hearing and, that if necessary, quantum will be dealt with separately.

At an earlier stage of the proceedings, an order was made that the Claimants would be entitled to be named by initials and that no copies of the Statement of Case or the witness statements would be given to a non-party without an order of the Court. Further at a case management conference held on 23 January 2013, it was ordered that the Defendant’s witnesses would be permitted to sign statements of truth by using pseudonyms and that the trial would be heard in private save as directed by the trial judge. At the outset of the trial, I was asked by both Counsel to make an order that the court hearings should be heard in private. None of the members of the Press present objected. I duly gave a judgment making the Order requested and it contained provisions first, giving any party the right to apply to vary this Order, and second, explaining that there would be both redacted and an unredacted versions of the judgment in this case handed down. No application was made to vary or discharge my order. This is a redacted judgment and there is an unredacted judgment which cannot be disclosed without an order of the Court.. I will deal with the First Claimant’s claim first.

The First Claimant is a former member of a criminal gang. A criminal associate shot him in 2003. The person who shot him is still at large. The First Claimant contends that while he was in hospital being treated for a gunshot wound, he decided to cooperate with the Police and to make a new start. He believes that there is still a contract out to kill him.

In October 2004 the First Claimant was sentenced to a long prison sentence.

In sentencing the First Claimant, the Judge explained that the sentences that were imposed, which were of different lengths, were to be concurrent with each other rather than consecutive in recognition of the assistance that the First Claimant had given to the Police. In addition, a confiscation order in the sum of £96,232 was made against the First Claimant with a sentence of two years imprisonment in default; this sentence was later activated.

The First Claimant together with A and B respectively and another were also charged in a United States District Court with serious drug offences. In order to be granted immunity against prosecution in those proceedings, the First Claimant gave evidence for the prosecution in that trial resulting in the conviction of his former associate, A, who then received a sentence well in excess of 20 years imprisonment+.

There was evidence adduced that the First Claimant had signed a contract with GMP that he could ask for protection in return for agreeing to give assistance to GMP and that he later in 2004 withdrew this assistance. The case for the First Claimant is that he withdrew his cooperation with GMP because they had not honoured their promises to him but that is disputed. I do not find it necessary or helpful to make any findings on these matters as they will not assist me in determining either of the claims of the Claimants, which relate to later matters. In addition, many of the assertions in relation to it were made in witness statements made after the end of the oral hearings and so those assertions have not been subjected to cross-examination.

While the First Claimant was still in prison, he sought witness protection from GMP because A and his associates were in his words “very dangerous people” and he, again in his words, “was sure that they would try again”. By a letter dated 24 April 2008, the First Claimant was informed that he could not be offered witness protection because any risk then posed to him arose as a result of him giving evidence against A in the United States and that was not the responsibility of GMP. In this letter, the GMP acknowledged the fact that there was a potential risk to the First Claimant when released from prison and it was then stated that:-

“As stated above Greater Manchester Police acknowledge the fact there is a potential risk to yourself when released from prison and although witness protection is not an option, we strongly advice you take the following actions on release in an attempt to protect yourself.

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Do not reside in the Borough of or any other area you identify as potentially being at risk in.

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Do not associate with any friends that could potentially pose a risk to yourself.

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Change any telephone numbers you have. (Landline, mobile phones).

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Change your name. (Seek assistance from your solicitor).”

Between April and June 2008, while the First Claimant was still in prison, meetings were held between the Police, the Prison Service, the Probation Service and other agencies to discuss his release. He had explained that the authorities then agreed that there was a risk to his life, that threats had been made and that he should be offered support, but still no support was offered.

The First Claimant was released from prison in mid 2009, and he has changed his name. He asked the Police to fix a panic alarm to the property in which he was living and that although this request was agreed to, the alarm has not been fitted. The First Claimant had explained that he was determined to gain employment and to lead a productive life. He duly obtained full-time employment in August 2009 and he had completed his probation period in June 2010.

In September 2010, tenants of the Second Claimant told her that Detective Constable Andrea Wild of the GMP was trying to contact the First Claimant. It transpired that Detective Constable Wild and Detective Sergeant Neil Colburne from the Economic Crime Unit of GMP wanted to interview the First Claimant. Their evidence was that there had been an investigation into individuals and crime groups who were using safe deposit boxes to hide the proceeds of their crime.

Part of the investigation led to the discovery of a large sum in a safe deposit box linked with C and D respectively and these two individuals were investigated. As a result of obtaining production orders, conveyancing files held in the name of C were disclosed and they showed that C had bought a property in Irlam from the First Claimant in his previous name. The property was sold in 2005 by the First Claimant to for approximately half its then value.

The Police were suspicious not least because the First Claimant was still in prison at the time of the sale and their enquiries revealed the existence of a previous sentence of 9 years imprisonment imposed on the First Claimant and of the outstanding confiscation order to which I have referred in paragraph 7 above. DC Wild suspected that the First Claimant had sold the house to avoid satisfying the confiscation order and so it was intended to arrest the First Claimant and C on suspicion of money laundering.

Thus it came about that on 23 September 2010, DC Wild and other officers went to an address in Whitworth with the intention of arresting the First Claimant but, as I have explained, it became clear that this property had been rented to tenants by the Second Claimant. DC Wild left various telephone numbers so that she could be contacted and as a result she received a telephone call from the First Claimant.

The First Claimant contends that he explained to DC Wild his position concerning his change of name and the reasons for it as well as specifying that under no circumstances should his new identity be revealed to any of his old associates or their legal teams because such disclosure would put the First Claimant, the Second Claimant and the First Claimant’s family at risk of serious harm.

According to the First Claimant, he explained to DC Wild that he was at risk as he had given evidence against dangerous people, that he had already been shot at and that there was a contract out on his life. He added that any new investigation would risk disclosing his new identity and more particularly that any investigation of the house sale would involve linking his old and new names and so reveal his new identity to those who were trying to kill him. DC Wild stated that during this conversation, there was some general reference to the risks posed to the First Claimant who refused to elaborate on them. The only documentary evidence relating to this conversation is a schedule of calls on that day of which the longest was 2 minutes and 12 seconds. Contrary to the case for the Defendants, I do not think that the length of the call in itself undermines that correctness of the Claimant’s account. I consider that the First Claimant was at all times after his release from prison a very worried man as he had given evidence against a prominent gang member in the USA who in consequence received a sentence of over 20 years imprisonment, cooperated with the English Police, been shot at and was in his view a person against whom there was a contract out to kill him. So I believe his version of what he said he told DC Wild on 23 September.

On 1 October 2010, the First Claimant went to a GMP Police Station in order to be interviewed. He remained silent during the interview because according to his evidence, he did not have a solicitor but he says that when the tape was off and speaking off the record, he again explained to DC Wild and DS Colburne, first that a contract was out on his life, and second that the GMP, the Probation and Prison Services had acknowledged that he was at risk of harm. The First Claimant says that he showed the Police officers the site of his wound and then he explained to them that he had given evidence in America with the result that he stressed again that his new identity should not be revealed to anyone in the case. According to the First Claimant, the officers acknowledged that they knew of his situation.

DC Wild and DS Colburn do not agree with this account and I accept that if they had been shown the bullet wound they would have noted it down, but they did not do so. Thus I reject the First Claimant’s evidence on this issue. I do believe that as the First Claimant was a very worried man, he would have taken every opportunity to tell the Police that there was a contract out to kill him and that he had been shot at. After the meeting, the First Claimant then instructed Rahman Ravelli Solicitors and he told them that a Police investigation would put him at risk.

On 13 December 2011, SM, who was then employed as a locum legal executive by the First Claimant’s solicitors, telephoned DC Wild and she passed on the First Claimant’s concern about his safety when attending the Police station to answer his bail on 16 December 2011. This is borne out by an attendance note that also showed that the First Claimant had previously phoned her to say that he was concerned about his safety when attending the Police station with his co-defendants. SM also said in evidence that DC Wild had said that the CPS had not made a decision as to whether the matter should go ahead on 16 December 2011. She relayed the First Claimant’s concerns about his safety and wellbeing to DC Wild, who then explained that the First Claimant was due to attend in the afternoon with his co-defendants attending in the morning. Her evidence was that DC Wild said that the next bail date would be different for the First Claimant from the date for the other Defendants. That is borne out by the attendance note.

DC Wild stated that she did not know of the risks but I believe SM, who was a very impressive and detached witness, when she said that she believed that it was in this call that she told DC Wild that it was important that the First Claimant should not come into contact with his co-accused as he had been shot by a member of the gang and as he feared for his safety. As Counsel for the Defendant frankly accepts, DC Wild’s evidence on this part of the case was “somewhat confusing” and this contrasts with the clear, careful and cogent evidence of SM. I have no doubt that by the end of that call, DC Wild was fully aware of the reasons why the First Claimant was scared of coming into contact with his co-defendants. I am quite satisfied that the First Claimant was scared of many things in December 2010 because of the evidence he had given against a fellow-gang-member, the attempt on his life and his opinion that there was a contract out to kill him.

On 15 December 2010, which was the day before he was due to return to a GMP Police Station to answer his bail, the First Claimant contends that there was a detailed call on that day with SM speaking to DC Wild. I consider that the First Claimant is wrong as there is no evidence of such a conversation from SM . I conclude that the First Claimant is confused about the date of this conversation as his account of her conversation is similar to what was said on 13 December 2010.

On 16 December 2010, the First Claimant answered his bail at a GMP Police Station. When he walked into the reception area of a GMP Police Station, he saw J an old associate in his criminal activities. The First Claimant stated that it was snowing, that he had had his hood up and so “I was probably not recognised but I recognised him”. According to the First Claimant, once he had registered that it was D, he, that is the First Claimant, ran out and he telephoned SM from the car park. He explained that he was incensed because in spite of the letters and the phone calls that had been made to the Police to avoid such a meeting, he had nevertheless been put at risk.

SM duly telephoned DC Wild who met the First Claimant once the First Claimants’ old associate had disappeared and she apologised saying that she was running late. The First Claimant was then charged with money laundering with his new and old name on the charge sheet that meant that his new name would be on the charge sheets and that was a further disclosure of his new identity. I consider that DC Wild should have known of the reasons why the First Claimant had to be kept apart from the other Defendants.

The evidence of SM was that in her telephone conversation, DC Wild explained that the First Claimant had discovered D also was there and then DC Wild had apologised “saying that this was simply a mistake” and that “they had been busy that morning and they had no choice”. SM said that she had expressed “our concerns repeatedly” about this form of contact. DC Wild apologised again and had asked the First Claimant to wait in his car where she would go out to see him, which she did. It is said by Mr Stephen Chippok, Counsel for the Claimant, that this attendance note was written up some three weeks after the conversation probably because of the Christmas break but having heard the evidence, I have no reason not to consider it to be accurate.

On 4 January 2011 the First Claimant’s solicitors made a formal written complaint to the GMP on the First Claimant’s behalf about the fact that the First Claimant had encountered C at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010. The First Claimant was then contacted on 7 January 2011 and at a meeting on that date, he had a discussion about the possibility of obtaining witness protection with Paul X and Paul who were two officers at GMP. They said that the First Claimant should speak to the Second Claimant about witness protection and then come back to another meeting.

On 10 January 2011, the First and Second Claimants met the two witness protection officers Paul X and Paul at the Village Hotel in Bury. As I will explain, the Second Claimant’s claim is based on a promise which she says was made at that meeting that the GMP would pay her £1,500 per month for six months as compensation for her giving up her job in order to enter into witness protection. What was said at that meeting is a subject of substantial controversy to which I will return when considering the Second Claimant’s claim in Section VI below.

The First Claimant signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on 12 January 2011.

The Second Claimant handed in her notice at work in late January 2011 and applied for a severance payment under the NHS mutual resignation scheme (“MARS”). On 24 February 2011, the Second Claimant was informed that she would receive a severance payment, which she in fact received on 31 March 2011, which was her last day at work. On 3 June 2011, she signed her MOU.

The claim of the First Claimant is that the Defendant acted in breach of a duty of care owed to him in revealing the true identity of the First Claimant to former criminal associates on 16 December 2010 with the consequence that he had to enter the witness protection scheme. The loss alleged is that the separation of the First Claimant from the Second Claimant caused the First Claimant to suffer depression between May 2011 and August 2011. All aspects of this claim are denied. It is common ground that the questions that therefore have to be considered are:-

Was there a duty of care owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant up to and including 16 December 2011? If so, did it extend to psychiatric damage?

The case for the First Claimant depends on there being such a duty but this is denied by the Defendant who says that there is no authority which establishes the existence of such duty and that a Court should be reluctant to extend the categories of established duties of care. The nearest authority that can be found to the present case and which is relied on by the Defendant is the decision of the Court of Appeal in An Informer v A Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197 in which it was held that the Police owed a duty of care to exercise reasonable care in the conduct of an investigation to an informer who was a so-called “Covert Human Intelligence Source”. It was also decided that the nature of the duty of care that the Police owed was to protect the Claimant from risks to his physical safety and well being to which he was potentially exposed as a result of his activities as a CHIS in providing information about others.

In the case of An Informer, there was a claim for psychiatric loss as the breaches of the duty alleged were the Claimant’s arrest on suspicion of money laundering and the making of a restraint order against him as a result of which the Claimant claimed that he had suffered economic loss through the loss of the ability to deal with his assets as he pleased and psychiatric injury in the form of depression and post traumatic stress disorder. The issue in that case was whether the Defendant owed any duty to the Claimant to safeguard his economic interests and psychiatric loss. It was held that this duty of care did not extend to purely economic loss (per Toulson LJ [82] and paragraph 130 per Arden LJ [130], CF Pill LJ [191]). It was also held that the duty did not extend to psychiatric loss (per Toulson LJ [80], Arden LJ [131] and Pill LJ [164]).

The case for the First Claimant is that a duty of care in respect of the First Claimant’s loss arose in this case essentially because of three factors which were first, that he had cooperated with the Police which had led to a reduced sentence being imposed in 2004 as the Judge expressly stated; second, that he had given evidence against another member of the Manchester criminal fraternity in the United States and this had led to the imposition of a sentence of over 20 years on that individual and in return for which the First Claimant received immunity from prosecution; and finally, that an attempt that had been made on the life of the First Claimant who had been shot by a person who was still at large in circumstances in which it was likely that a contract had been offered for killing the First Claimant by other members of the criminal community.

Mr Skelt submits correctly that the claim in the present case that there was a special relationship of proximity between the parties so that it was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care is a much weaker claim than that put forward in the case of An Informer because first the First Claimant was neither a witness in current proceedings nor an informant; second, in April 2008 the First Claimant had been expressly told that GMP was not assuming responsibility for his safety; and third, the First Claimant was being investigated for his own criminal conduct. I regard these as potent points but it is unnecessary to reach a conclusion on whether no duty of care of any type is owed to because even if such a duty of care was owed, it certainly did not extend to preventing psychiatric loss. The reason for that is that the principles set out in the case of An Informer apply in this case with the consequence that even if a duty of care was owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant. In the words of Toulson LJ in that case:-

“80… any duty was necessarily limited to a duty not to cause foreseeable injury. I would also concur with the judge's finding that psychiatric injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the matters about which C complained”.

I have no hesitation in rejecting the claim that there was a duty of care owed in respect of such psychiatric loss. No good reason has been put forward to show why the First Claimant’s claim for his psychiatric loss could succeed when the claim of The Informer failed for not dissimilar loss. In my view, precisely the same reasoning applies to the present case because the psychiatric injury complained of in this case is even more removed or more remote because it is that the First Claimant was deprived of the company of the Second Claimant between May and August 2011 and that must have been because of the delay of the Defendant in permitting the Second Claimant to go and live with the First Claimant.

A further and more basic reason why no duty of care was owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant is the basic principle explained by the House of Lords in a number of recent cases and most recently in Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2009] 1 AC 225, that the Police do not owe duty of care to witnesses and victims. So a fortiori, they did not owe such a duty to those charged or about to be charged, like the First Claimants. It is not possible to see why a person in the position of the First Claimant, who was a suspect about to be charged with a money laundering offence should be owed a duty when a witness and a victim does not have such a duty owed to him.

In Van Colle v Chief Constable of Hertfordshire, the Appellate Committee concluded (with Lord Bingham dissenting) that the proper approach had been explained by Lord Steyn in Brooks v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 WLR 1495, when he concluded that:-

“30.

But the core principle of Hill's case has remained unchallenged in our domestic jurisprudence and in European jurisprudence for many years. …It is, of course, desirable that Police officers should treat victims and witnesses properly and with respect: compare the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/645). But to convert that ethical value into general legal duties of care on the Police towards victims and witnesses would be going too far. The prime function of the Police is the preservation of the Queen's peace. The Police must concentrate on preventing the commission of crime; protecting life and property; and apprehending criminals and preserving evidence: see section 29 of the Police Act 1996, read with Schedule 4 as substituted by section 83 of the Police Reform Act 2002 ; …Halsbury's Laws of England , 4th ed reissue (1999), vol 36(I), para 524; The Laws of Scotland, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia , vol 16, (1995), para 1784; Moylan, Scotland Yard and the Metropolitan Police , (1929), p 34. A retreat from the principle in Hill's case would have detrimental effects for law enforcement. Whilst focusing on investigating crime, and the arrest of suspects, Police officers would in practice be required to ensure that in every contact with a potential witness or a potential victim time and resources were deployed to avoid the risk of causing harm or offence. Such legal duties would tend to inhibit a robust approach in assessing a person as a possible suspect, witness or victim. By placing general duties of care on the Police to victims and witnesses the Police's ability to perform their public functions in the interests of the community, fearlessly and with despatch, would be impeded. It would, as was recognised in Hill's case, be bound to lead to an unduly defensive approach in combating crime.”

Similar statements were made by other members of the Appellate Committee (see, for example, Lord Hope of Craighead at para 776 and Lord Carswell at para 108). The impact of this approach is apparent in the actual decisions in the Van Colle case and another case heard with it because the House of Lords rejected contentions that the Police owed duties of care in the first case to a witness in a criminal case who had sought protection from the Police following threats from the defendant which were late implemented; in the second case, it was held that a duty of care was not owed to a witness who had told the Police that he had received threats of violence which were also implemented. It is difficult to see how in those circumstances a duty of care could be owed to the First Claimant who was prospective defendant in criminal proceedings and who was then charged.

This means that the First Claimant’s claim fails but, as I have heard argument on the other ingredients of the claim, I will deal with them although much more briefly than if they had been crucially important factors in this case.

If the Defendant owed the First Claimant an appropriate duty of care in relation to the psychiatric loss suffered by him, was that duty broken?

This issue is academic in the light of my conclusion that the Defendant did not owe the First Claimant a duty of care in respect of his psychiatric loss, but in case I am wrong, I will assume that such a duty existed. In that event, the case for the First Claimant is that on 16 December 2010, the GMP and in particular DC Andrea Wild permitted former associates of the First Claimant to discover his new identity first because of what had occurred at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010, and also second because of the old and new names of the First Claimant appearing on the charge sheet when he was charged together with some of his former criminal associates, who would have then have appreciated the new identity of the First Claimant. There is a substantial dispute as to what these officers and in particular DC Wild, knew about the First Claimant’s past and, in particular, the reasons why he was very scared of his former criminal associates because of his assistance to prosecutors and the fact that he had been shot in circumstances where there was a contract out to kill him.

I have already explained why I have concluded that DC Wild knew about the risks to the First Claimant if he came into contact with his former associates at GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010.The real risk came from M through C’s link to D and then from D’s link to X as D was his right-hand man, but there is no evidence that this was known to DC Wild or DS Colburn as the First Defendant and SM had only talked of the wish that the First Claimant did not attend the Police station at the same time as his co-defendants, namely C orD. In this case, there was only the very limited contact with C but he was then the Second Claimant’s landlord and he knew that the Claimants were in a relationship. This indicates that the First Claimant was not cared of C knowing his new identity. I cannot see how this meeting could in those circumstances have constituted a breach of any duty of care even if contrary to my view, a duty was owed by the Defendant to the First Claimants.

In the case of An Informer, Toulson LJ explained that:-

“80 ..The question of foreseeability went to the issue of breach of duty, because any duty was necessarily limited to a duty not to cause foreseeable injury. I would also concur with the judge's finding that psychiatric injury was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the matters about which the Claimant complained”.

This reasoning provides further support for the finding that there was no breach of duty committed by the Defendant, because, as I will explain, the alleged psychiatric injury suffered by the First Claimant was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the disclosure of the First Claimant’s identity but a consequence of the belated decision by the Second Claimant to seek witness protection and of the need for her to provide the requisite financial information.

There is now the contention not made to the Defendant prior to 16 December 2010 that the First Claimant did not want to see his new name on the charge sheet, but I cannot see how it could be a breach of the duty of care for the Defendant bearing in mind that it was the duty of the Defendant to take the appropriate steps for crimes to be prosecuted. This duty, which would include charging criminals for offences, would trump any duty of care owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant. This conclusion can be shown by considering what would have happened if it had transpired, which is not the case, that the First Claimant, X, M and C had carried out a joint enterprise to murder somebody. Surely it cannot be right that the First Claimant’s name could not appear in the Indictment. The true position is that even if there is a possibility of an individual who might need protection being charged with another person who is likely to want to kill that individual, that is not a reason for not charging them jointly, but, of course, it might be a reason for taking steps to protect that individual.

Assuming that the duty of care owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant extended to psychiatric damage, I consider that such duty has not been broken.

Detective Superintendent Swan explained that all the information that would have been available relating to the First Claimant (including his previous convictions and the facts that he had given evidence against a criminal associate and had been shot at in consequence) was not readily available to DC Wild or indeed anybody else in GMP. Thought might perhaps be given as to if, and how, all such information might possibly be more readily available and accessible in the future although I am not making any recommendation for any form of action but only that this matter might be considered.

On the assumption that the Chief Constable owed a duty of care to the First Claimant in respect of psychiatric damage and it had been broken, did that breach of duty cause the First Claimant to go into WP?

The case for the First Claimant, in the words of his witness statement, is that the acts of DC Wild in revealing his identity to his former associate have the consequence of “forcing me into Witness Protection”. I am satisfied that the First Claimant was at all times up to and after his release from prison keen to enter into witness protection and there was no question of what occurred at the Police station “forcing” him into witness protection. There are four main reasons that individually or cumulatively lead me to that conclusion.

First, as I have already explained, when he was in prison, the First Claimant made contact with GMP in December 2007 because of his view of the potential risk to himself on his release from prison from B because in 2003 he had sustained a gunshot injury after an altercation with B. The letter in response of 24 April 2008 from GMP explained that he:-

“Did not fall into the remit for being adopted by the witness protection unit in [GMP] and as such they cannot offer any assistance”.

Second, the First Claimant admitted in evidence that he was annoyed having received that letter at not being admitted to the witness protection scheme at that time when he received that letter. I have no doubt that the First Claimant was terrified of being attacked by his former criminal associates because of his actions first, of helping the prosecution of them in this country, and second of giving evidence against A in the United States. He was also worried that he would be shot at again especially as he believed that there was a contract out to kill him. It is difficult to believe that he would not have been very keen to be accepted into witness protection so as to ensure that he was not shot.

Third, the First Claimant was, as I have explained, exceedingly worried about meeting his associates when he went to a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010 and this attitude, which was not surprising, reflected what he had been fearing since he left prison in mid-2009.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, SM, who was employed by the solicitors for the First Claimant, has produced an attendance note stating that on 7 January 2011, DC Colburne had phoned and asked her if the First Claimant would be happy to talk with someone from witness protection. The attendance note shows that SM spoke to the First Claimant and passed on the message from the officer and it was then recorded that:-

“[the First Claimant] said he was happy to speak with someone from witness protection and stated that is what he had wanted from the beginning”.

Having heard and seen SM give evidence I have no doubt that this note accurately showed that the First Claimant had wanted to go into witness protection at least from the time when he was released from prison in 2009 because it was quite clear that since his release from prison the First Claimant must have been and indeed was very scared as the associates of those against whom he had given evidence had a very major grievance against him as was shown by the attempt made on his life. Thus this constitutes another very powerful reason why the claim of the First Claimant must be rejected. It also seriously undermines my faith and confidence in the First Claimant’s reliability as a witness and his honesty.

In reaching those conclusions, I have not overlooked an assertion made by the First Claimant which was the reason why he was put on witness protection was because of what occurred at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010 when he saw C and also when he realised that his old and new names were clearly stated on the charge sheet, which would have been shown to his co-defendants.

A further and important reason why I reject the First Claimant’s case that the events at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010 somehow forced him into accepting witness protection comes from the evidence of Detective Superintendent Swan who explained convincingly that what had occurred on this occasion at the Police Station was irrelevant to his decision to offer witness protection to the First Claimant. That was because the reason why the First Claimant was put on witness protection was as a result of what the Coroner said in the well-known case of Stirland. This showed an enhanced need for Police forces to put people at risk on witness protection.

Indeed Detective Superintendent Swan said that in the light of the Stirland case, he would have put the First Claimant on witness protection if he had known first that the First Claimant had given evidence against his co-accused in the United States, second that the First Claimant had been shot by or at the request of his criminal associates, and third that he was jointly charged with C and D. Nothing has been said to show that his evidence was not totally reliable. Indeed I find it cogent and I unhesitatingly accept it as correct. For those reasons, there is no causative link whatsoever between what occurred at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010 and the fact that the First Claimant was placed in WP. That is another powerful reason why the claim must be rejected.

Was the alleged loss claimed by the First Claimant which was his depression between May and August 2011 alleged to be as a result of his separation from the Second Claimant suffered as a result of the Defendant’s breach of duty?

The case for the First Claimant is that he suffered psychiatric damage that is described in the report of 25 June 2013 of the joint expert Dr Michael Bond, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist. He observed that there was nothing in the First Claimant’s medical record that showed any history of mental illness on his part preceding the events that took place in and after October 2010. Dr Bond explained that the detailed clinical notes relating to the First Claimant from early May 2011 until August 2011 showed that the First Claimant had a variety of psychological complaints, including low-mood, tearfulness, reduced appetite, disturbed sleep and impaired concentration.

Dr Bond noted that the GP of the First Claimant did not make a formal psychiatric diagnosis although symptoms of depression and anxiety were documented; treatment was recommended with anti-depressants and anxiolytic medication. In Dr Bond’s opinion, the First Claimant’s clinical presentation was probably consistent with an ICD-10 diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depressive order.

He then concluded in respect of this that:-

“I would expect a range of psychiatric opinion in connection with [the First Claimant] psychiatric diagnosis at that time with the differential diagnosis including Mixed Anxiety and Depressive Disorder, a Depressive episode (ICD-10 F32) and an adjustment disorder (ICD – 10F43.2)”.

As I am not dealing with quantum at this stage, I will assume that the reports of Dr. Bond are correct.

The actual cause of these psychiatric symptoms is said to be the delay in the Second Claimant joining the First Claimant on the witness protection scheme. There is no basis for the First Claimant’s assertion that it was a term agreed with the Defendant that both Claimants would be introduced into witness protection quickly. Indeed there was no obligation either at common law or pursuant to statute to that effect. I have already explained that the law does not impose duties of care on the Police to protect witnesses and there is no reason why a duty of care should be imposed on the Police to reach a decision to take a person into witness protection. That would mean that any delay in allowing the Second Claimant to enter into witness protection was not a consequence of the Defendant’s breach of duty.

In any event, even if that is incorrect, the delay in admitting the Second Claimant to the witness protection scheme was not the fault of the Defendant. As I will explain in paragraphs 105(e) below, much information had to be obtained before a decision could be made whether a person should be admitted to the witness protection scheme. It is not surprising that the process of obtaining the information necessary to decide if the Second Claimant could be admitted to witness protection could take months. Thus, for example, at a meeting on 26 January 2011, the First Claimant was asked to obtain details about the outstanding mortgages on the Second Defendant’s property, the Second Claimant’s intentions in relation to it, the value of that property, what she intended to do in relation to her vehicles which were registered in her name, how much she had paid into occupational pension scheme and what her expectations were in respect of it, what she intended to do in relation to her outstanding debts if she was successful in obtaining a financial settlement if she volunteered for redundancy, and also the amount of her net take home pay. This information took time to obtain and it then had to be appraised by Detective Superintendent Swan.

This process took much time as must have been obvious to the Claimants. Indeed at a meeting on 28 April 2011, not surprisingly, the First Claimant accepted the period that it was taking for the Second Claimant to come onto the witness protection scheme had been “reasonable”. This is noteworthy as this was three days before the period began in respect of which the First Claimant is contending that his loss started as a result of the Defendant’s breach of contract.

Indeed, the Second Claimant did not enter the witness protection scheme more speedily for a whole series of reasons some of her own making. Those reasons included the facts that first that she did not resign until late January 2011, second that she then wanted to work out her notice until 31 March 2011 and third that she had to submit a whole series of financial documents for assessment and which like the valuations took a long time to produce, which then had to be considered by the GMP. Thus it is clear that the reason why the Second Claimant did not enter witness protection earlier is not a consequence of any breach of duty by the Defendant but of totally different factors for which the Defendant cannot be liable.

I have no difficulty in concluding that there is no connection whatsoever between any breach of duty owed by the Defendant to the First Claimant and his psychiatric symptoms. The delay was caused by separate factors such as those set out in the last paragraph. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider whether the First Claimant was contributorily negligent.

Thus this claim must be dismissed because:-

The Second Claimant contends that at a meeting held between the Claimants and Police officers Paul X and Paul in the Village Hotel in Bury on 10 January 2011, it was agreed that the Claimants would be admitted into the witness protection scheme upon a number of terms, which included a term that for six months the Second Claimant would receive the sum of £1,500 per calendar month from the GMP.

The existence of this agreement is denied by the Defendant who contends that although there were discussions at the meeting on 10 January 2011, significantly no agreement was reached. In addition, it is the case for the Defendant that it was made clear at the meeting that his two officers present (namely Paul and Paul X) were not authorised to agree to make such payments.

It is common ground that this issue is to be determined by considering the credibility and the reliability of the evidence of the Claimants and of the two witnesses for the Defendant, namely Paul X and Paul, who were at the meeting on 10 January 2011.

The Second Claimant explained in her evidence that she was a professional healthcare and that until March 2011, she worked for the NHS in Manchester. She had job security and she was at the top of her band with promising prospects of progressing to a higher band. Her evidence was that prior to the events on 16 December 2010 at a GMP Police Station, she and the First Claimant were financially stable and were surrounded by a close network of supportive friends and family with whom she was in daily contact.

Her evidence was that after the events of 16 December 2010, “my life was turned upside down” with the consequence that she became extremely upset and angry that DC Wild had completely disregarded their safety by revealing the new identity of the First Claimant. She explained that in consequence, both the person who shot the First Claimant and the associates of A against whom the First Claimant gave evidence in the United States would then be able to locate the Claimants and to come after them in order to shoot or kill them.

The Second Claimant’s evidence was that on 7 January 2011, the First Claimant had told her that the Police had offered to take the Claimants into the witness protection scheme, but that to do so would have required them to give up everything from their life, their home, their jobs, their family and friends which was everything that they had both valued and had worked for.

Her evidence was that on 10 January 2011, she and the First Claimant met the officers Paul X and Paul at a hotel in Bury to discuss joining the witness protection scheme, but she said that they were both extremely apprehensive and worried about the threat to their safety as well as being in turmoil about the prospects of having to abandon everything and everyone they knew.

The Second Claimant said that during the meeting on 10 Januarys 2011 lasting three hours, the Claimants were told by Paul X that there was a risk and a danger to the Claimants so they were offered the opportunity to participate in the witness protection scheme. The Claimants, according to the Second Claimant, discussed their finances, their income and outgoings and they were told that they would be unable to work for a period of at least six months. The Claimants were told that the witness protection unit would pay the Claimants’ wages at the rate at which they were currently earning for a period of six months, but that this period could be extended to a possible period of twelve months depending on how things panned out. She explained that the purpose of those payments was that the Claimants could then honour their existing debts because they were told that they had to continue to pay their debts.

The Second Claimant said that she was asked for three months’ worth of wage slips in order to calculate the payments that would be made to her. She stated that she was asked about her flat, which was mortgaged and let to tenants but had negative equity. She explained that she relied on the income from the tenants. The Second Claimant explained that she was told her property would be sold and that any shortfall would be met by the witness protection unit and she was asked to get a valuation of it.

The evidence of the Second Claimant was that she and the First Claimant were told that they could not keep their cars and that they would have to be sold. When the Second Claimant asked about her job, the Defendant’s officers told her first, that she would have to hand in her notice at work on the following day; and second, that they knew people at the highest level in organisations such as the NHS and that they could “place us” into employment.

The Claimants were told, according to the Second Claimant, that they would be housed and that they would be “no better off, no worse off than their present position”. She said that she was told that she could not be able to visit her family but eventually they might be able to come and see the Claimants. The main concern of the Second Claimant was that she would be giving up a job she loved which was secure and at which she had spent many years working hard. So she did not want to go from being a successful professional with a fulfilling career to someone living off the State “with no prospects or no sense of self worth”.

The Second Claimant explained that she did not want to give up her life, but it was clear that they had no choice because the Police had made known the First Claimant’s new identity to people who were trying to kill him. As the First Claimant and the Second Claimant were committed to each other, the Second Claimant said that she knew that if the First Claimant had to move away from the area in which they were living, then she would have to do the same thing especially as she was personally at risk because of her links to him.

The Second Claimant’s evidence was that the Claimants were told at the meeting on 10 January 2011, first that they had 24 hours in which to decide about going into the witness protection scheme; and second that they were allowed to go home as no one knew where they lived or that they were together. She stated that the ensuing 24-hour period was “extremely difficult” with so much for the Claimants to take in, especially as the Claimants were required to make a major decision out of the blue and in such a short time. The First Claimant puts it rather differently because he explains that as he was most at risk, it was agreed that he should go into the witness protection scheme straight away and as the Second Claimant was less at risk and had a professional career, she would work out her period of notice and that she could then join him when it was over.

Therefore the Second Claimant said she was faced with a traumatic decision as she had to choose either to live in fear or to abandon everything which she knew. She explained that the Claimants trusted the Police and therefore on the basis of the assurances given at that meeting by Paul and Paul X, she and the First Claimant decided to enter into the witness protection scheme. In consequence, the Second Claimant said that she handed in her notice at work and applied for a payment under the MARS scheme which would provide her with a severance payment. She explained that the witness protection unit were told about her application for a MARS payment and that they were informed of the progress of the application with her giving the information to the First Claimant at each update and with him then passing it on to the witness protection unit. The Second Claimant said that the witness protection unit were told as soon as the Second Claimant was accepted for MARS and then later as soon as she received payment.

The Second Claimant has explained that on 24 February 2011, she was informed that she would be receiving a MARS payment and that her leaving date was fixed for 31 March 2011. On her last working day, the Second Claimant received a severance payment of £10,000 and a few days later on 4 April 2011, she used it to pay off her debts which had initially been paid off by her uncle in 2009 with the result that the Second Claimant still owed him money. According to the Second Claimant, her uncle was upset when he heard that the Second Claimant was participating in the witness protection scheme as he believed that he would never see the Second Claimant again. She said that she promised him that she would pay him the sums she owed him before she left so that there would be one less worry for him. She explained that she did not mind using the MARS payment to repay him as she believed that the witness protection unit would be paying her wages for the next six months as they had promised.

The evidence of the Second Claimant is that she met the witness protection handlers Bob and Mick at a hotel on the next day and she gave them the information they wanted on her financial situation which was her wage slips as well as her mortgage and car finance details. At that meeting, the Second Claimant says that all the witness protection handlers did was to try to persuade her not to enter into the witness protection scheme as they told her first that she should think about it carefully, second that she had time to change her mind, and third that she should make an informed decision. Her evidence was that by this time she had already left her job on the say-so of the officers at the meeting on 10 January 2011 and so there was no turning-back because she had made her decision three months earlier in the period of 24 hours after the meeting on 10 January 2011.

The Second Claimant explained that having agreed to leave her job and to arrange witness protection, she was expecting to be able to move to be with the First Claimant as soon as she stopped work, but the Police had not sorted out the MOU that they wanted her to sign before joining him. Thus she was left alone in Manchester with no job, no income and no information as to when she would be able to be with the First Claimant. So the Second Claimant said that she was in a situation which she described as being enormously stressful as she still had financial responsibilities, but that she was without the replacement income promised by GMP. She was worried as to how to support herself while being distressed at her enforced separation from the First Claimant and very upset about the misery that this was causing him. She explained that she found it very difficult to cope and that the First Claimant had to pass on to her some of the money that he had received from GMP so that the Second Claimant could pay her bills.

In May 2011, about six weeks after the Second Claimant had left work, she said that she was told that she could join the First Claimant, but that the GMP had decided not to pay any of the wages that she said they had promised to pay her. Her evidence was that they said that she ought to have used the MARS payment to live on despite the fact that they knew that she had already used it to pay off her debts.

The Second Claimant said in evidence that she could not believe what GMP had done and how they had gone back on their word, but she was very conscious that at this time the First Claimant was by himself and a long way from home. She said that therefore on 3 June 2011, she signed the MOU because she could bear separation no longer but she felt manipulated and worn down. The Second Claimant explained that because she did not receive the promised sums from the GMP, she had to go back to her uncle and ask if she could borrow money from him again to pay her mortgage because she was not allowed to claim benefits.

So she described herself as being worried and stressed especially as after she had left work in Manchester, the Police had told her that she could not do so as she was having her name changed, but after the MOU was signed, she was told that she could look for work. The Second Claimant sent out nine applications very speedily, but on 18 June 2011 two weeks after she had been given the go ahead to apply for jobs, the Police Officer called Bob said that it was taking longer to get a job than they expected. She explained that one of her problems was that she had to lie in interviews, because she could not tell them about her situation and in theory she was at risk of being attacked at work. The Second Claimant said that eventually she found herself work. She stressed that she felt that the GMP had let her down as they had failed to comply with their obligations to pay her the agreed sums in lieu of her wages.

The background to the witness protection scheme is that Detective Superintendent Graeme Swan is the designated officer for protective measures in GMP and so he is the person who makes the decision as to whether a particular person should receive protective measures. He is the senior officer responsible for the Protected Persons Service (“PPS”) which is a separate unit within the Serious Crimes Division of GMP and which has the purpose of providing protection to vulnerable people.

Section 82 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (“the 2005 Act”) provides that a protection provider (i.e. in this case, the Chief Constable of GMP, the Defendant in this action) may make such arrangements as he considers appropriate for protecting a person of a description specified by Schedule 5 of that Act. Among the group covered by that Schedule are witnesses in legal proceedings, Covert Human Intelligence Sources, family members of such persons or individuals who live with such persons or had a close personal relationship with such persons. The provisions of the 2005 Act imposes a statutory duty on public bodies to take steps to assist Police officers in making witness protection arrangements.

Section 82(4) of the 2005 Act provides that in determining whether to make arrangements, the protection provider must, in particular, have regard to the nature and extent of risk to the safety of the person concerned, the costs of the arrangements, the likelihood that the person or associated person will be able to adjust to a change in their circumstances which may arise from the making of arrangements or from their variation or cancellation, if the person is or might be a witness in legal proceedings (whether or not in the United Kingdom), the nature of the proceedings and the importance of being a witness in those proceedings. The Act does not place an obligation on agencies to provide protection or on a person to accept protection.

It is necessary to stress the process of assessment of the PPS. Its role is to organise and control the practical aspects of providing information and gathering information on persons who might be identified as being potentially needing protection. Officers of the PPS will obtain and pass the information on to the designated officer, who in the case of GMP was Detective Superintendent Swan, and he alone would determine what level of protection and support the individual could and would receive. He is the decision-maker who has to take into account all the necessary information, and the assessment of a particular person’s suitability may take time because the officers will need to research the background of the person concerned, the urgency of the person’s situation and the speed at which they will require protective measures. The MOU contains the mutual understanding and it is the basis upon which the person concerned is assessed for their ability to comply and accept the terms.

Turning to the assessment of the First Claimant, the Defendant’s case is that he was as at 6 January 2011 initially reluctant to meet and to discuss with the officers the risk that he perceived and, in particular, the First Claimant declined to let GMP know what the implications were of L (the co-accused of the First Claimant) knowing the new name which the First Claimant had adopted. It is true that the charge sheets given to L did include the First Claimant’s new and changed name. The Second Claimant lived at an address which L owned and the First Claimant considered that L was not a threat to him.

The commencement of the assessment of whether the First Claimant was suitable for participation in the witness protection scheme took place at the meeting on 7 January 2011, which was conducted on behalf of the GMP by Paul and Paul X at which only the First Claimant was present and its purpose was to ascertain from the First Claimant the risk that he believed he faced. An assessment questionnaire was completed and Paul X made it clear that at no point during the meeting was it agreed or suggested him or by Paul that the First Claimant would be admitted to the programme but that the decision on whether the First Claimant could enter into the WPS was a voluntary one. Paul X explained to the First Claimant that he should discuss the matter with the Second Claimant.

Paul X said that the First Claimant was told that GMP would then be having discussions at a senior level and that it would take some time to reach a decision. He said that after the meeting he discussed the matter with Detective Superintendent Swan and it was agreed that there was an element of risk if the First Claimant would return to his usual address that evening. So the First Claimant was offered a temporary move to a hotel which he refused because he explained that this would make his girlfriend, the Second Claimant, more “stressed” and that instead the Claimants would stay with relatives in the Manchester area.

Moving on to the meeting on 10 January 2011 attended by both Claimants, both Paul and Paul X deny that the Second Claimant was told that she would be paid her wages less bills for a period of six months at a rate of £1,500 per calendar month. They both say not only was she not told this but also that the Claimants would have been told that any offer which would have to be authorised by senior officers. In addition, it was the officers’ evidence that they would not have said that they could find employment for the Claimants or that they had contacts in “high places”.

Paul X said that he would not have advised the Second Claimant to stop working but if she were to relocate, he accepts that relocating her would require her to leave her job. His evidence was also that her debts were discussed because they were important in making an assessment. Paul X said that he would have reminded the Claimants of the need for them to be open and transparent and that GMP would not take responsibility for debts.. Paul X explained that both the Claimants wanted time to discuss matters and that at the time of the meeting, there were still ongoing criminal matters against the First Claimant which was a matter very much on the mind of the Second Claimant. Paul X said that he wanted to give updated information to Detective Superintendent Swan.

Detective Superintendent Swan said that by 10 January 2011, he had made a policy decision that the First Claimant could enter the witness protection regime and one of several reasons why the First Claimant was to be allowed to enter onto the scheme was that the First Claimant had been compromised at the Police station on 16 December 2012 with the First Claimant identifying J as a conduit to alerting others who would seek retribution. Detective Superintendent Swan had also said that in the light of the Stirland case, he would have put the First Claimant into the witness protection scheme if he had known first that the First Claimant had given evidence against his co-accused in the United States, second that the First Claimant had been shot and third that he was jointly charged with J and L. The Stirland case related to an approach advocated by a Coroner in that case which required much greater care to be taken before not offering witness protection in an appropriate case. So Detective Superintendent Swan’s decision to admit the First Claimant to witness protection was not a consequence of anything that occurred at a GMP Police Station on 16 December 2010.

As I have explained the First Claimant signed his MOU on 12 January 2011. His assessment was to continue and further amendments to the agreement could be made when more was known for about example his financial background, his debts and other matters. Detective Superintendent Swan explained that at the time when the First Claimant was relocated, he would be without a job in a new location and he agreed that in those circumstances, the First Claimant was to be paid money in lieu of wages This decision would have required the specific authorisation of Detective Superintendent Swan as he alone could authorise payments in lieu of wages.

Detective Superintendent Swan explained that it was only on 14 January 2011 that the decision was made by the CPS to drop the charges against the First Claimant because the value of continuing charges against him was outweighed by the dangers of highlighting his identity in court. He also explained that as at 11 January 2011, the Second Claimant was not given protection arrangements and she was at that time, as he understood the position, far from decided as to what she wanted to do. He also noted that she was not under any direct risk at that time with the result that further investigations into her background were required with such investigations focussing on her debts, on whether she was able to cope with a change of location, on whether an identity change was required and the cost of implementing such changes.

On 10 January 2011, the First Claimant spoke to Paul X who explained that they decided to move but he asked if he could go first so that the Second Claimant could work out her notice which was a period of one month. It was said that the decision as to when the Second Claimant would have to relocate was a matter of an ongoing assessment. He explained the terms of any financial support would still have to be decided and that the Second Claimant wanted to delay relocating.

There was then a discussion between Paul X and Detective Superintendent Swan and it was decided that the First Claimant would move straight away while the Second Claimant could remain where she was. The evidence of Paul X was that at that point he did not believe that the Second Claimant had decided that she wanted to be on the scheme.

Paul X stressed that it was not agreed at the meeting on 10 January 2011 that the Claimants would be admitted into witness protection. He also denies that he ever used the words “no better off or no worse off”, because that was not a feature of the witness protection regime because GMP would not be able to re-house people used to a wealthy lifestyle in similar accommodation to what they had had previously. He denies that there was any mention of a MARS payment or the payment of £10,000 at the meeting of 10 January 2011. He continued thereafter to have contact with the First Claimant in his capacity as a welfare officer.

The case for the Claimants is that they have been consistent throughout in their assertions that the Second Claimant was promised £1,500 a month for six months. It is very clear that they both have a continuing deep sense of injustice because this alleged promise has not been honoured and my task is to see if this is justified. It is submitted by Mr Chippeck that the Claimants would not pursue these claims against those responsible for their safety unless they were sure that they were telling the truth. He also points out that Police officers sometimes do make promise which they are not authorised to make.

Mr Chippeck stresses that the Police officers such as Paul X do not recall precise exchanges and that caution should be applied when considering the Police officers’ notes, because none of which were shown to the Second Claimant or indeed the First Claimant at the time. He stresses that the Second Claimant would not have given up her job which she had held for ten years with the NHS and which she greatly enjoyed without some offer of financial stability. In addition, it is pointed out that the First Defendant was paid his wages but, as I have explained, this was after Detective Superintendent Swan had approved this payment.

Mr Chippeck submits that no importance should be attached to the terms of the MOU which he says was a pro forma document a copy of which had not been given to the Second Claimant. He says that the First Claimant has changed his ways since imprisoned in October 2004 and points to matters in support. I have considered the First Claimant’s evidence against this background but it has many inconsistencies.

There are many matters, which cause me concern about the Second Claimant’s evidence and which individually and cumulatively show that I cannot accept her evidence as being credible, which therefore cannot be accepted. These matters include in no particular order of importance the facts that:-

I also considered the evidence of the First Claimant as he supported the case of the Second Claimant that she was promised 6 months’ salary of £1500 per months. I reached the conclusion that his evidence was not reliable or credible and should not be accepted for many reasons including the facts that:-

In contrast, I found the evidence of Paul, Paul X, Bob and Detective Superintendant Swan to be credible and reliable and whose evidence I accept especially as:-

I therefore reject the Second Claimant’s claim as I am satisfied that she was not offered 6 months’ salary.

Notwithstanding Mr Chippeck’s clear and forceful submissions, the claims of both Claimants must be dismissed.