Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SUPPERSTONE
Between :
(1) RAYMOND STEVENSON (2) LUCIA HINTON (3) MICHAEL TAYLOR | Claimants |
- and - | |
LONDON BOROUGH OF SOUTHWARK | Defendant |
DECISION ON PERMISSION TO APPEAL
Kevin Leigh and Philip Williams (instructed by Messrs Webster Dixon) for the Claimants
Lord Faulks QC and John Norman
(instructed by MessrsBarlow, Lyde & Gilbert) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 6 October 2010 to 12 November 2010
Judgment
Mr Justice Supperstone :
On 28 January 2011 I dismissed the claim and I gave directions with regard to any application for permission to appeal.
Pursuant to those directions I received written submissions from Mr Leigh and Mr Williams, for the Claimants, dated 25 February 2011 in support of an application for permission to appeal, and submissions in response from Lord Faulks QC and Mr Norman, for the Defendant, dated 7 March 2011.
The reason for the delay in dealing with the Claimant’s 1999 application between the time when Ms Khakee left the Council at the end of August 2000 and when the application was determined in July 2002 was not due to the conduct of Mr Dennett. When Ms Khakee left the Defendant the application was passed to Mr Allanah (164). I reject the allegations that Mr Dennett and Mr Chambers deliberately sat on the 1999 application and that they asked Mr Allanah to hold up the application (183). There was considerable delay in dealing with the application. However the delay was because of the failure by Mr Stevenson to provide the information that had been requested in order to determine the application (163 and 164). The information required was identified in Ms Khakee’s handover note of August 2000. The Claimants took no active steps to pursue their application until January 2002 (165-167). Between January 2002 and July 2002 there was further delay by the Claimants and departments other than Planning within the Defendant in providing information that was required (170). Applicants who pressed their applications were likely to have their applications dealt with more speedily by overworked case officers (170). The sole motive suggested for Mr Dennett’s alleged wrongdoing was to promote the railway station. I reject that suggestion. At the material time there was no realistic prospect of there being a railway station that would impact on the Claimants (178 and 180). There was no evidence of any act of misfeasance by Mr Dennett and no misfeasance for which the Defendant is responsible.
The grounds of appeal raise no realistic prospect of success and there is no other reason why an appeal should be heard. Accordingly the application for permission to appeal is refused.