Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE TUGENDHAT
Between :
QWE | Claimant |
- and - | |
(1) SDF (2) GHJ (3) RTY | Defendants |
Hugh Tomlinson QC (instructed by Withers LLP) for the Claimant
The hearing was without notice
Hearing dates: 24 November 2011
Judgment
Mr Justice Tugendhat :
At about 5pm on 24 November 2011 I granted an injunction to prohibit the disclosure of information specified in the order, and in particular any information concerning the fact or details of the sexual relationships between the Claimant and the First or Second Defendants. The order is in terms which substantially reflected those of the Model Order recommended in the Practice Guidance: Interim Non-Disclosure Orders issued by the Master of the Rolls on 1 August 2011 setting 7 December as the return date.
The parties to the proceedings are all individuals, and the Claimant has no present intention to notify any third party of the terms of the order.
The reason why I was satisfied (as required by the Human Rights Act 1998 s.12(2)(b)) that there were compelling reasons why the Defendants should not be notified was that the Claimant’s case is that the First Defendant has threatened to reveal private information about the Claimant unless the Claimant pays a large sum of money. In other words the Claimant claims to be the subject of an attempt at blackmail. In the case of ASG v GSA ([2009] EWCA Civ 1574), the Court of Appeal accepted that when a privacy injunction was being applied for in a blackmail case it was appropriate to make an application without notice, and the facts of the present case are sufficiently similar so that I am so satisfied.
For similar reasons I am satisfied that it was necessary for the hearing to be held in private and for there to be the other derogations from open justice set out in the order, if the purpose of the proceedings is not to be frustrated.
In accordance with the applicable principles set out in numerous cases (such as McKennitt v Ash ([2008] QB 73) I am satisfied that the Claimant has raised a case which, on the evidence at present before me, is likely to succeed at trial. The case is that the Claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the information in question and that there is unlikely to be established at trial any justification for a publication of the information, and so an interference with that right, pursuant to Art 8(2) or Art 10 of the ECHR.
The Claimant gave the undertakings set out in the order, and I set the return date at 5 December.