Serious Organised Crime Agency v Lundon, the Estate of & Ors

In the course of the interchange between EL and the Revenue it was stated on his behalf that his explanation to the police in interview of unlicensed bookmaking was false, and something that he had invented to secure his wife’s release from custody. The truth was that he had been a skilful and fortunate gambling with various bookmakers and that was the source of his assets. The schedule showed summaries of annual winnings paid by bookmakers from 1995 to 1998 as: £390,158, £315,401, £297,951, and £89,850.

In due course the Revenue were persuaded that no substantial income tax was payable on these assets or the means by which they had been acquired. It appeared therefore to have accepted the representation that EL had not been trading as an unlicensed bookmaker.

There is a substantial body of evidence that from February 2006 until his arrest later that year EL was engaged in money laundering on a large scale and part at least of the funds that he was laundering was the product of drug trafficking. The evidence gathered by the police revealed amongst other things:-

The claimant submits that the events of 2006 and following cast fresh light on as to how EL acquired his wealth that was noted in the Cobham Murphy schedule. Its principal witness was Ms Tania Croft, who has pieced together the available material informative as to how the deceased came by his wealth.

The broad and undisputed picture that emerged was that before 1994 Mr and Mrs Lundon had a modest income and lifestyle. Between 1969 and 1991 EL had 17 court appearances recorded against him largely for theft by way of shoplifting. He then worked for the local authority and bought the former matrimonial home in Bootle in 1984. In 1989 EL had acquired a licensed taxi cab that he used to ply for hire in Liverpool or hire out to others. From 1996 to 1998 his declared profit from his taxi business and interest was in the region of £12,067, £6,815, and £12,808 per annum, rising to £28,857 in the year 2003-2004. Statistics suggest that a married couple would need from £16,000 to £19,000 to live on through this period. It is clear that earnings from a taxi business cannot explain the acquisition of large assets noted in the schedule. Neither can Mrs Lundon’s declared earnings from interest, rent and child benefit.

From 1994 very large sums of money entered EL’s bank accounts, some of which he invested in property and some in successful share dealing. It is the origin of these funds that are the heart of the issue in the present trial. The claimant seeks the recovery as criminal property of assets that were in existence by 1998 some eight years before the demonstrable unlawful conduct of 2006 and after. There are no statutory presumptions to be applied. The question is thus to what extent can the court be satisfied on the civil balance of probabilities that EL’s unlawful conduct extended back into the period before 1998?

It is clear that many of the large payments in from 1994 onwards were from the proceeds of betting. Successful gambling has been the general tenor of EL’s response to enquiries as to how he came about his wealth, and as far as is Mrs Lundon is concerned that is what she was told by her husband and the explanation for large amounts of cash being left around the house. There is no doubt that EL did receive very large sums of money from gambling. Apart from the winnings declared in his accountants schedule there was considerable evidence from various bookmakers.

In the period 1993 to 1997 he had been identified by several bookmakers as a high stakes gambler with an idiosyncratic betting style. They accordingly monitored his accounts and betting offices where he was known needed authorisation from central monitoring before accepting any wager from him. By this means information as to his betting practices were recorded and retained and is now available for assessment. It appears that his practice was to bet on sporting events rather than horse races and place large amounts of money on short odds. The evidence may be summarised as follows:-

There was independent police evidence to support a social connection between Jason and EL attending Liverpool away games. When interviewed under caution in 1998 he denied any such close connection and suggested that Jason must have been using his name or that of his wife without his consent to launder the proceeds of the robberies and pay some of the betting winnings back to the robbers.

His own account in interview of running an unlicensed book making business was subsequently withdrawn as false. No documentary evidence to support such an arrangement has ever come to light. Coded entries in a diary kept by EL at the time are evidence of suspicious activity, but in my judgment are no more likely to be connected to unlicensed bookmaking than any illicit activity where the telephone number of contacts was to be kept secret. The fact that a number of the entries relate to transport in different ways provides some basis for Ms. Croft’s suspicion that the entries may be connected with arranging the transport of drugs. This was a role with which EL was connected in the 2006 unlawful activity.

The claimant called Michael Hawkins as a witness. He is now a Principal Officer and member of staff of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, but in 1998 he was an officer in the Greater Manchester police and part of the police team investigating the robberies and consequent money laundering offences (Operation Jaguar) as part of which Mr and Mrs Lundon had been arrested. After the prosecution against EL had been discontinued, he had been tasked with the job of returning the proceeds seized from the matrimonial home. He did this by way of a cheque that was for a larger sum than had been seized as the cash had been placed in an interest bearing account in the meantime. He indicated that when the money was returned the deceased spoke quite freely with him and indicated that he now made profits from shares rather than gambling, and that the police had got the origin of the money in question all wrong. He was laughing and said that the money was from all kinds of criminal activity including prostitution and drugs. Mr Hawkins said that at one time during this frank conversation Mrs Lundon came into the room with a cup of tea and told her husband to keep quiet. She was not there throughout the conversation and he could not now be sure precisely what this was a response to. He had kept no notes of these matters as the investigation was concluded. He added that since the return of the money he had received intelligence from a reliable source (whose identity he disclosed) that EL had been identified by a betting shop manager as someone who had offered a successful punter more money than his winnings to buy his ticket off him. His evidence regarding Mrs Lundon’s comment to her husband was not contained in his witness statement prepared for these proceedings, even though she had been identified as a respondent by the time the statement came to be made.

From this core of material the claimant submits that this is a case of substantial and unexplained riches accumulating from 1994 to 2006 by someone who was reasonably suspected of being a money launderer in 1998 and proved to be one in 2007.

In particular it is contended:-

Mr. Power acting for the respondents point to the long gap between the money laundering conviction in 2007 and the activity in 1995 to 1997 and the first evidence of acquisition of substantial wealth before that. He cautions against an over-readiness to read back later-criminality into earlier events.

He draws attention to the developing judicial learning that, where civil recovery proceedings are brought, the fact that the property is indeed recoverable as the product of criminal activity must be proved and not assumed. It is not sufficient for a claimant to show that the property was acquired by a person with no known source of legitimate income sufficient to acquire it. At least, the broad class of criminal activity concerned needs to be identified: see Hamblen J in SOCA v Pelikanos [2009] EWHC 2301 (QB); Carnwath LJ in Olupitan v Director ARA [2008] EWCA Civ 104 at [16]; Moore-Bick LJ in Director ARA v Szepietwoski [2007] EWCA Civ 766 at [106] to [107] as well as Sullivan J in Director ARA v Green [2005] EWHC 3168 (Admin) .

Mr Power explored the bookmakers’ evidence with a number of the witnesses, and established that there was every reason for a legitimate gambler to seek to use means that would avoid him being monitored, including gambling through proxies or in different names. The total winnings that Ladbrokes record as being won by EL may well not be an accurate statement of the totality of winnings he has collected from them.

He stressed the limited evidence of connection between EL and Jason, the dangers of relying on anything Jason may have said in police interviews, the self-serving and therefore unreliable nature of admissions by EL and others as to other supposed unlawful activities such as unlicensed book-keeping, fraudulent trading and pre 2006 drug smuggling.

He invited me to treat with great caution the evidence of Mr Hawkins as to the statements allegedly made by Mr and Mrs Lundon at the end of 1998. No contemporaneous record was made of them. In Mrs Lundon’s case it is striking that there was no reference to any comments by her when he made a witness statement for the present proceedings even though he was aware she was a defendant in those proceedings.

There is no substantial evidence to justify the conclusion that at the relevant period EL was engaged in distinct criminal conduct on his own account. The claimant’s primary hypothesis must therefore be that the property was acquired as a result of the unlawful activity of money laundering, but money laundering itself depends on proof that it is the product of criminal activity.

Mr Power points out that there is cogent evidence of acquisition of substantial wealth by the Lundons before the first of the successful Operation Jaguar robberies in October 1995 that were the focus of the prosecution in the case of Jason Metcalf. Those robberies could not explain the source of those assets. He relies particularly on evidence of successful share-dealing from 1993. There is no or no sufficient evidence to conclude that the assets acquired before the sequence of robberies began were the product of unidentified and un-investigated criminal conduct.

He therefore submits that even if some of the funds that were used to acquire the assets can be shown on balance to be the product of criminal activity not all such funds can be. In the case of mixed funds it is necessary to apportion the percentage of tainted and untainted funds in tracing the history of the assets and only the percentage represented by the tainted funds is recoverable.

Finally he submitted that in respect of the property that was put into the name of Mrs Lundon, the principles developed in matrimonial property cases indicate that such a transfer should be treated as for value, namely the wifely duties performed in pursuance of a long lasting marriage, and should prevent recovery in these proceedings.

I have no doubt that the stake money used to finance EL’s extensive gambling activity in 1995 to 1998 was the product of criminal activity. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons:-

The claimant asserts that the following properties were acquired by Mr Lundon from the proceeds of unlawful activity.

The Colonnades was purchased without a mortgage. The source of the funds was a series of payments into the accounts of the respective solicitors for the purchaser and vendor. The payments were either bookmakers cheques, sums described as cash from bookmakers, or transfers from bank accounts of Mr and Mrs Lundon that themselves had been the recipients of gambling winnings.

Allerford Road was paid for by deposits from bank accounts in the name of Mr and Mrs Lundon. There was insufficient legitimate income in this period to have made these payments. The overall evidence suggests that directly or indirectly the cash in the bank accounts were the product of winnings from gambling stake money.

South Ferry Quay was purchased in 2003 with funds that were the product of EL’s share portfolio with Blankstone Sington. The Terremar Apartment was also funded from the same share portfolio in the same year.

The Blankstone Sington account still holds 175,000 Vodafone shares valued at £272,212, representing the balance of 200,000 shares purchased in 2005. There are cash deposits and ISA accounts held by same firm. Blankstone Sington was also the source of funds:

Three other bank accounts held in the names of Mrs Lundon or Mr and Mrs Lundon were funded from gambling winnings or sale of shares in Liverpool Football Club in 2006. The shares were purchased in 2005.

In so far as the source of the funds for the residential properties, the bank accounts and the share accounts was gambling winnings from bets placed in the period from 1995 onwards then the first part of my conclusions as to the source of the stake money advanced in that period, leads to the result that the property that represents the proceeds of such tainted winnings is recoverable property. In my judgment all the gambling activity over this period was using tainted money and therefore all the proceeds from this activity is tainted.

The position with share dealing is more complicated. Ms. Croft’s conclusions on the information available suggest that the first of EL’s share acquisitions were made in January 1992 and February 1993 when some 27,365 ASDA shares were purchased for a total of £11,505.95 and sold in July 1995 for £25,323. There is very little information as to Mr Lundon’s activities legitimate or otherwise in 1992 or 1993. The £25,323 achieved on the sale of these shares was part of the source of the purchase price of 74,600 shares in WPP for £101,088 that were sold in two tranches in April 2002 and September 2002 for a total of £411,276.95.

The bulk of the money from the share dealing in 1995 and after appears to have been introduced as fresh capital assets and is therefore more probable than not the product of the betting activities with tainted funds. Profits made on share dealing before 1995 does not fall into this category. Assuming , for present purposes that I were to conclude that at least 25% of the purchase price of these shares had come from funds that I could not be satisfied on the civil balance were untainted, this would result in a fund of £102,819 that is subsequently mixed in with other share dealing. It also appears that some shares were acquired without a purchase price (Manweb, Scottish Power, Abbey and Aviva) in the subsequent transactions and cannot therefore have been funded by the proceeds of tainted bets.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s.304 is concerned with following property obtained by unlawful conduct in the following terms:

“ (1) Property obtained through unlawful conduct is recoverable property.

(2)

But if property obtained through unlawful conduct has been disposed of (since it was obtained), it is recoverable property only if it is held by a person into whose hands it may be followed.

(3)

Recoverable property obtained through unlawful conduct may be followed into the hands of a person obtaining it on a disposal by-

(a)

the person who through the conduct obtained the property, or

(b)

a person into whose hands it may (by virtue of this subsection) be followed.”

Section 305 adds to these provisions the following:

“(1)

Where property obtained through unlawful conduct (“the original property”) is or has been recoverable, property which represents the original property is also recoverable property.

(2)

If a person enters into a transaction by which-

(a)

he disposes of recoverable property, whether the original property or property which (by virtue of this Chapter) represents the original property, and

(b)

he obtains other property in the place of it,

the other property represents the original property”.

s.306(2) deals with cases of mixed property and states:

“the portion of the mixed property which is attributable to the recoverable property represents the property obtained through unlawful conduct”

Ms Croft calculates at [205] in her witness statement that between January 1992 and July 2006 shares were acquired for £1,949,738 and sold for £2,688, 381 making a profit of £738,642. If the £102,819 derived from the proportion of pre-1995 profits in share dealing is added to the shares obtained without a purchase price a total of £124,861 is reached, which is 16.9% of the £738,642. This 16.9% may be profit generated other than from funds that are the source of gambling winnings from 1995 onwards. There are other shares purchased from 1996 onwards that complicate the picture. It is not possible to perform a precise tracing exercise but, depending on the conclusions finally reached as to the source of funds in 1992 and 1993, I conclude that about 15% of the investment into the Blankstone Sington accounts is untainted by the product of criminally derived betting stake money. On this basis and subject to the respondent’s further submissions, :

Mr Power for the respondents submits that even if the stake money used to win the bets and any property derived there from was recoverable property it ceases to be recoverable property within the meaning of the statute once EL transferred property to his wife. He submits that both the payment out of the winnings in the form of a cheque made payable to Mrs Lundon, and putting the residential properties in Liverpool and Spain in her sole name is a transfer.

In order to consider this submission it is necessary to set out further provisions of the statutory scheme:

“308.

General exceptions

(1)

If-

(a)

a person disposes of recoverable property, and

(b)

the person who obtains it on the disposal does so in good faith, for value and without notice that it was recoverable property,

the property may not be followed into that person’s hands and, accordingly, it ceases to be recoverable.”

“314.

Obtaining and disposing of property

(1)

References to a person disposing of his property include a reference-

(a)

to his disposing of a part of it, or

(b)

to his granting an interest in it,

(or to both); and references to the property disposed of are to any property obtained on the disposal.

(2)

A person who makes a payment to another is to be treated as making a disposal of his property to the other, whatever form the payment takes.”

Mr Power submits that when EL transferred property to Mrs Lundon this was not a gift but a disposal in good faith for value and without notice of the tainted origins of the property in question. The basis for that submission is the application of the principle of matrimonial law that parties to a marriage give value by their respective endeavours. The wife who has no income earning job gives value by way of her services as housewife and mother to the children of the marriage. That is the basis of the presumption of beneficial ownership in equal shares in jointly owned matrimonial property. These principles have been reflected in the field of asset recovery.

In the case of Re Marion Gibson [2007] EWHC 1405 (Admin) (unreported) Mr Goudie QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge had to apply these principles to a third party claim made by a wife for exemption from enforcement of her interests in the matrimonial home in respect of property that had been made subject to a criminal recovery order following the conviction of the applicant’s husband for drug trafficking.

The judge was concerned with the provisions of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and had to consider whether any payments made by the husband to the wife or to the mortgage company in discharge of the mortgage on a home in joint names was to be construed as a gift within the meaning of S. 8 of the Drug Trafficking Act. He said this:

“The question, however, is whether there was a gift, constituted by the Defendants’ payments in relation to the Applicant’s interests in addition to his own. I doubt it. There was to my mind consideration from the Applicant by bringing up the children and looking after the home.”

He nevertheless concluded that there was a principle of public policy that precluded the wife obtaining the property because she was aware that it was tainted.

The case went on appeal to the Court of Appeal: Gibson v Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office [2008] RWCA Civ 645 on the second point. The Revenue did not cross appeal on the first (see judgement [11]). In any event Arden LJ thought the judge was right to conclude that the principles in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 applied to the determination of the nature of transaction in question and that a transfer of property into joint names should not be considered a gift by reason of the presumption of advancement (see paragraphs [26] to [27] ). It was by application of the Stack v Dowden principle that Mr Goudie QC had reached his conclusion noted at [51] above. Wall LJ agreed with her (see paragraph [28]). The Court of Appeal held that public policy did not apply to entitle the Revenue to deprive her of her own property (see May LJ paragraphs [15] to [22]).

Mr Brettler submits that the case of Gibson does not assist because it was concerned with a different point under a different statute and the claimant in the present case makes no concession that the property provided by EL to Mrs Lundon were not gifts. In the context of the 2002 Act he further submits that:

As to the first of these submissions I am not satisfied that the claimant’s case on absence of good faith or actual knowledge of the taint is made out. There was no attempt to develop such a factual finding in cross-examination of Mrs Lundon. The high point is the remarks she made that were heard by Mr Hawkins. In my judgment this is far too fragile material to support such a serious finding. Knowledge of the tainted source of the property cannot be assumed or lightly inferred. Mrs Lundon was of course aware of the exponential growth in her husband’s wealth and saw substantial sums of loose cash about the house. She thought that they were the proceeds of gambling on which EL made substantial winnings. She was correct about this. He did procure large sums by winning bets.

There is no evidence that she knew how much was needed to stake to make such returns or where the source of the stake money was. She said she did not know much about gambling herself and she had no knowledge that the money had tainted origins, certainly in the period of the 1990’s when this wealth was accumulated.

As to the remarks she is said to have made in 1998 they could only have significance if the context of what she was responding to is clear and the whole exchange between EL and Mr Hawkins had been accurately heard and understood by here. I am not satisfied that this is the case. If Mr Hawkins himself considered this to be important evidence of Mrs Lundon’s knowledge of the source of the tainted funds, it is very difficult to imagine that he would not have mentioned this in his witness statement for the purpose of the proceedings. Mrs Lundon was not present for the whole of EL’s disclosures to Mr Hawkins. It is not possible to know what she was telling him to keep quiet about. If whilst bringing in the tea she heard some jocular remarks about criminal activity her remarks could as easily have been a rebuke to her husband from making a singularly inappropriate joke, given the difficulties into which she had been put by his activities. Both she and Jennifer Lundon gave evidence in a straight forward way. I see no reason to reject it.

However, I accept the claimant’s submission that on the fact of this case s.308 was not engaged at all, because there was no exempt transfer within the meaning of the Act. Section 308 falls within chapter 4 of the Act. The first section of chapter 4 is s.304 that explains the meaning of property obtained through unlawful conduct and is quoted in full above at [42]. Section 304( 2) provides that

“if property obtained through unlawful conduct has been disposed of (since it was so obtained) it is recoverable property only if it held by a person into whose hands it may be followed.”

(emphasis supplied)

Sections 305 to 307 go on to explain the particular circumstances when original recoverable property can be followed into different property. Section 308 the terms of which have been noted above is a general exception to the following permitted by the statute, namely where there has been a disposal for value.

The claimant submits that there has been no disposal by EL to Mrs Lundon, since the property acquired from the bookmakers was made directly over to her in the form of cheques paid into bank accounts or acquisition of residential properties in her sole name using entirely tainted funds. The acquisition of recoverable property itself cannot also be said to be a disposal since it was so obtained. Rather this is an application of the basic rule in s.242(1) that a person may obtain property through the unlawful activity of another. Here Mrs Lundon obtained the property through EL’s unlawful activity. It was not being disposed of to her by EL.

If the respondents’ submissions on this point were right there would be a very significant lacunae in the regime of the Act and a person who was entitled to assets obtained by unlawful activity could achieve exemption from recovery under the Act by the simple device of securing that they were paid out direct to an unwitting spouse.

There is nothing in the judgment of Gibson that requires a different construction to be placed on this section. Indeed it is generally impermissible to transpose a judicial conclusion reached in one statutory context to a completely different one.

Further, the facts in Gibson were very different from the present case. In Gibson there was a matrimonial home in joint names that preceded criminal wrongdoing by the husband. The mortgage payments were met by payments from the husband who had a legitimate income throughout the time he was also making profits by unlawful activity. The court was only concerned with who owned the property and whether the wife’s legal interest could be defeated by a public policy presumption. It was not concerned with the statutory regime for tracing property from one disposal to another with an exemption for the purchase for value.

My conclusion on the second of the claimant’s submission under this issue, is sufficient to dismiss the respondents’ case on this point since all the qualifying conditions of s.308 must be made out before an exempt disposal arises. However given the proximity between the second and third submissions, and in case I am wrong on the second submission I will set out my conclusions on the third.

The claimant points out that value means market value (see s.316 (1)) and Parliament cannot there have intended that wifely duties over a long-marriage could be said to be market value within the context of the section. The section is merely concerned with the innocent purchaser for full market value.

I accept that it is not usual in most relationships to find that the parties have put a purely financial value on the services that one spouse provides another in a marriage or recognised partnership. There is, however, no particular reason in law to prevent such services having an assessed value, or to preclude the activity of the non-employed party in such a relationship from constituting real economic value for the purpose of constituting consideration for the grant of an interest in property. I am not prepared to accede to the generality of the claimant’s submissions that transfers of property to spouses in a family context are incapable of ever being a disposal for value within the meaning of s.308. Such a sweeping submission would appear to be inconsistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Gibson, in so far as it upheld the judge’s conclusions that the husband’s contributions to the value of the wife’s interest in the matrimonial home were not to be construed as gifts by reference to the presumption of advancement. In my judgment, in her observations at [24] and [26] and [27] Arden LJ was indicating that even in the absence of a prosecution concession, the judge was right to conclude that the wife acquired an interest in the property other than by way of gift.

However, in the particular context of this case, I can find no evidence that EL was seeking to compensate his wife for her activities during the marriage. This was not a case of tainted contributions to a mortgage or housekeeping or other allowance made to the wife. Nor was it a transfer of property made on divorce or in response to particular family events that might have made redistribution of assets appropriate: death, separation, estate planning, or something similar.

The former matrimonial home is not property that the claimant seeks to recover, neither are the payments made by EL to pay off his parents in law’s mortgage. What is sought to be recovered is an asset wholly acquired with tainted funds when the family lifestyle and asset acquisitions dramatically exceeded any legitimate income that may have been available to the couple. There is nothing in the Gibson judgment to indicate that as a matter of law every time a husband puts property in a wife’s name that is a transfer for market value within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act. In my judgment, the act of putting the Colonnades and the Terramar Apartment in Mrs Lundon’s name was neither a disposal of property by EL, nor, in the particular circumstances of this case, was it a disposal for value.

I have accepted the claimant’s case that EL was engaged in money laundering and other serious criminal activity in 2006 and was engaged in laundering the proceeds of serious criminal activity in 1995 to 1998 by which time most of the wealth of which recovery is sought had been brought into existence. Profits made legitimately from assets that are themselves recoverable are to be treated as recoverable (see s.307 POCA). It has not been necessary to examine EL’s activities between 1998 and 2006.

However, if the claimant is to succeed in recovering the totality of the assets claimed, including the 15% that in my judgment were not derived from tainted bets in the period 1995 to 1998, it would be necessary to make a further inference that the unlawful activity that EL was engaged in during that period must have been engaged in earlier.

However, by contrast with the 1995 period onwards there is virtually no information as to EL’s activities in 1993 when he first started acquiring shares for much more modest sums than the subsequent acquisitions. I recognise that there must be suspicion that because of his subsequent conduct he was probably up to no good in the earlier period. However, although propositions of fact can be demonstrated by inference from primary facts there must be a body of primary facts from which the inferences can legitimately be drawn. As the case law shows mere absence of evidence of legitimate earnings is not sufficient to draw the conclusion that assets were illegitimately acquired through offending of a particular class.

In Sweeney v Cote [1907] 1 AC 221 was a case where the House of Lords was concerned with whether a civil conspiracy could be established by inference from uncontested facts. Lord Loreburn observed at p.222 :

“Now, a conclusion of that kind is not to be arrived at by a light conjecture; it must be plainly established. It may, like other conclusions, be established as a matter of inference from proved facts, but the point is not whether you can draw that particular inference, but whether the facts are such that they cannot fairly admit of any other inference being drawn from them.”

I am not satisfied that I can exclude lawful explanations for EL’s assets obtained before 1994. He may have turned to gambling as a means of money laundering because he had some success as a gambler with lawfully acquired assets. He seems to have had some skills in investment in the stock market, and the absence of any earlier information about his bank accounts and the link I cannot exclude the realistic possibility that the purchase price of the acquisitions of shares in 1992 and 1993 were not profits made from earlier transactions. Proof by inference is not to be degraded into mere speculation.

The position is not entirely clear in 1994, but this seems to have been a time when he was observed more often in bookmaker’s shops and the start of the high stakes period, where tainted money was used. In any event I am unaware of any acquisition of shares or other capital assets in 1994 that may be said to have contributed to the wealth accumulating in 1995 to 1998. I accordingly conclude that the 15% of the property that I decided in Conclusions (2) above did not derive from gambling winnings in the period 1995 to 1998 is not recoverable property.

For these reasons I am satisfied that this claim succeeds to the extent indicated above in this judgment. I shall invite counsel to draw up an order reflecting these conclusions.