HH Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj v Eastern Media Group & Anor

The Claimant in these proceedings has the title “His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj”. As I understand it, he lives in India and has never been to England. I understand that he does not speak much English and the proposal is that he should give evidence via videolink and through an interpreter.

There has been no jurisdictional challenge, no doubt because the words complained of were published here, in the Sikh Times dated the 23^rd August 2007.

The first defendant was the publisher and the second defendant the author of the article in question, which was published on page 15 of that issue under the heading, “Cult divides Sikh congregation in High Wycombe”. It is said to be damaging to the Claimant’s reputation in this jurisdiction and particularly among the various Sikh communities in this country. I understand that there are several hundred thousand followers of the religion here, of whom it is likely that many will know of the Claimant and of the controversy that forms the subject matter of this article.

Now, on what is intended to be the first day of the trial, a preliminary issue has to be resolved on the second defendant’s application to stay the claim, either wholly or in part, as being non-justiciable. (The application notice makes reference to striking out the pleading but it matters not substantively.)

That issue was pleaded in the defence on 16^th November 2007 and is founded on the well-known principle of English law to the effect that the courts will not attempt to rule upon doctrinal issues or intervene in the regulation or governance of religious groups. That is partly because the courts are secular and stand back from religious issues while according respect to the rights of those who are adherents or worshippers in any such grouping. It is also partly because such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often likely to involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort of resolution which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal. They may involve questions of faith or doctrinal opinion which cannot be finally determined by the methodology regularly brought to bear on conflicts of factual and expert evidence. Thus it can be seen to be partly a matter of a self-denying ordinance, applied as a matter of public policy, and partly a question of simply recognising the natural and inevitable limitations upon the judicial function.

It is obviously desirable that any such challenge should be made at an early stage in the litigation concerned. Here the issue could have been raised no doubt at any time in the last two and a half years but, whenever it is made, the court will need to examine the issues as they stand in the light of the parties’ respective pleaded cases. It must be a specific inquiry to be made on the facts. It is not simply a question of general impression. In particular, it seems that the judge will need to identify all the issues that the pleadings throw up for resolution and to decide whether they fall within the doctrine of judicial abstention to which I have referred. If that turns out to be the case, in so far as there may be questions of pure fact which taken by themselves could readily be determined by the court in the usual way, it will be necessary to decide whether that process should go ahead despite the exclusion of primary doctrinal or other religious issues. To go ahead in such circumstances may be disproportionate or distort the true extent of the parties’ conflict. Here, for example, it is possible to resolve some questions that can be expressed in purely factual terms. On the other hand, if Mr. Hill QC, appearing for the second Defendant, is correct in his submission that some major questions should be excluded from the court’s consideration, it may transpire that the residue or rump of purely factual questions are incidental or peripheral to the primary conflict. They may have become so isolated from their true context that there would be no point in the court going on to resolve them. These are the sort of questions that arise and I should now turn to the words complained of themselves.

I have already referred to the title of the article. It is in these terms:

“Recently a division due to the influence of an accused Cult leader called Jeet Singh has disturbed the peace in the Sikh community in High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire. The police and local MP are aware of the situation and have offered considerable support in finding an appropriate resolution to the crisis.

The Gurdwara ‘Sikh Temple’ was set up in 1991 by members of the Sikh community with the hope to join the local Sikh congregation and work to provide religious services and guidance for the community members. Wycombe is one of 3 affiliated Gurdwara’s which was set up with the blessings of a Holy Saint Sant Baba Gian Singh Maharaj from Gurdwara Nirmal Kutia in Johla, Jullunder, Panjab.

The Origin of the lineage of true Saints from this ecclesiastical institution began with a man called Sant Baba Karam Singh from Hoti Mardan (1826 - 1903). Upon the dissolution of the Sikh army after the annexation of the Punjab to British India in 1849, Karam Singh joined the Corps of Guides which had been raised by the British in the Sutlej territory in 1846 to defend British interests in the region against the formidable Pashtun/Afghan tribesman, and which was later reorganised as the 5^th (Guides) Battalion of the 12^th Frontier Force Regiment, with Mardan near Peshawar.

During the famous ‘Sepoy Mutiny’ in 1857 Karam Singh along with his regiment, the ‘Guides’ helped the British defeat the mutineers in the British India forces in the Historic battle for Delhi on the 20^th of September 1857. He later took official leave from his services to the British army and spent many years in solitude and deep meditation.

The fifth and present successor to Karam Singh the Historical Saint Soldier figure, is Sant Baba Roshan Singh who has set up Hospitals and Schools for the poor in the Panjab and is working to tackle deprivation and social/Health inequalities in the state.

The current conflict effecting Wycombe’s Sikh community started in 2003 when the last of the lineage of Saints in the Gurudwara Nirmal Kutia, Jullunder passed away, without inaugurating a ‘legally appointed successor’ to the assets and position as head authoritarian of Nirmal Kutia.

In Wycombe, the catalyst for the division is the split over the allegiance to the cult leader who is currently contesting his claim over successorship to Nirmal Kutia in the Indian High courts, the matter is still pending.

Cults are by no means a new phenomenon affecting the Sikhs globally and Jeet Singh is one of several high profile accused Cultists who are causing difficulties for the community worldwide.

He has asserted that the place known as Gurudwara Nirmal Kutia, India is not in fact a Sikh Gurudwara at which an offertory is maintained. It has been stated that Nirmal Kutia is a ‘Dera’ (abode or residence) of Jeet Singh and any offerings made there are offerings made to him personally.

Only last month July 24 in Sirsa, district of Haryana, Six persons were injured when a Dera Sacha Sauda (cult) follower fired at Sikhs in a village in Sirsa district of Haryana, leading to tension in the area. According to official sources in Chandigarh, the six persons, belonging to Sikh community, had received minor injuries on their legs after the shooting incident in Mallewala village, about 10 kms from Sirsa, and were treated in a local hospital.

The area was tense following the stand off between the Cult followers and members of the Sikh community after the recent alleged blasphemous act of the Cult Chief Sant Gurmit Ram Rahim Singh following his appearance in dress similar to that of 10^th Guru, Guru Gobind Singh.

Colonel GS Sandhu, Chairman of a Non Governmental organisation and Human Rights front called ‘Aapna Panjab’ www.aapnapunjab.org, is alarmed by the increase in Cultist activities in India,

‘Simple Sikh men and women are being exploited by some of the ever increasing numbers of so-called sants and babas who have established dera’s (cults) where many have sexually exploited and abused the women followers.’

He stated that the Sikh community needs to be aware of the nefarious activities of these anti-panthic (religious) people. He exhorted the Sikhs all over the world to seek the guidance and follow the teaching of only Sri Guru Granth Sahib and not from these self styled Babas. He gave examples of three such Bababs ‘Johlanwala Babu’ ‘Ram Rahim Singh’ and finally the Mann Singh of Pehowa and the latters exploitation of followers.

The Management Committee and Trustees of an affiliate Gurdwara to Wycombe, APDD Birmingham, Oldbury are fully aware of the APDD Wycombe situation which has also had a detrimental impact on their congregation, trustees and fellow management committee members.

In Oldbury, Birmingham the Cult leader attempted to even go as far as producing counterfeit trust deeds with an Attorney from India and remove the incumbent trustees and management committee in order to take over. These aggressive tactics and underhand operations demonstrate the influence these Cult leaders have both in India and abroad, tentacles which have now spread as far as Wycombe, Buckinghamshire.

We advise the Whole Sikh community which is 850,000 strong in the United Kingdom and in particular now those in Wycombe to stand up to these Cult leaders and we urge them to follow the true Guru Sri Gurur Granth Sahib Jee, The holy Scriptures of the Sikhs.

Members of the Sikh community in Wycombe will be looking to work with the local authorities and police to maintain peace within the community in light of this recent difference of opinion with reference Cultist activities which has divided the congregation and caused a bitter demarcation between those who oppose the Cult and those who support it.”

That is the end of the article, and the name of the second defendant as the author, Hardeep Singh, appears at the end.

The defamatory meanings which the Claimant attributes to the contents of the article are to be found in paragraph 4 of the particulars of claim. The meanings relied upon are said to be natural and ordinary or inferential meanings, not depending on any true innuendo:

“4.1

The Claimant was the leader of a cult and an impostor.

4.2

The Claimant had disturbed the peace in the Sikh community of High Wycombe.

4.3

The Claimant promoted blasphemy and the sexual exploitation and abuse of women.

4.4

The Claimant had dishonestly produced counterfeit trust deeds to remove the trustees and Management Committee of a Gurdwara.

4.5

The Claimant acted detrimentally to the Sikh community”.

Before I leave the contents of the particulars of claim it is right that I should refer to the introductory paragraph (paragraph 1), which is in these terms:

“The Claimant was installed as the Third Holy Saint on 20 March 2002. The Holy Saint is the head of Nirmal Kutia Johal, a religious institution following the teachings of the Nirmal Sikh faith. Since the religious institution was established, three Gurdwaras have been established in England as branches of the Nirmal Kutia Johal. The Claimant is responsible for the teaching of the Nirmal Sikh faith, the legacy of the original Holy Saint and his successors and the institution’s properties, including the Gurdwaras”.

In the defence, a number of defences are raised, in particular of justification, fair comment and qualified privilege, but for present purposes probably what matter most are the issues raised in the defence (and addressed also in the reply) on justification and/or fair comment.

It is necessary for me to recite certain passages in the defence. First of all, I turn to paragraph 3: “Paragraph 1 [i.e. of the particulars of claim, which I have just read] is not admitted. In particular no admissions are made in respect of the Claimant’s religious background, heritage, lineage or beliefs”.

Paragraph 8 contains the following:

“Further and/or alternatively, if the said words complained of bore or were understood to bear the meanings pleaded in paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5 and the first part of paragraph 3 (promoted blasphemy) then they are true in substance and in fact.”

Paragraph 4.1 is the Claimant’s “meaning” paragraph which refers to the Claimant as the leader of a cult and an impostor. Paragraph 4.2 refers to disturbing the peace in High Wycombe, no doubt indirectly, and paragraph 4.5 makes reference to having acted detrimentally.

I turn then to paragraph 9, which introduces the defence of “fair comment”, or “honest comment” as it is sometimes called:

“Further and in the further alternative, the Second Defendant will defend as honest comments on matters of public interest that the Claimant is a leader of a cult which acts contrary to true Sikh teachings and has disturbed the peace in the Sikh community of High Wycombe and acted detrimentally to the Sikh community.”

There then follow a considerable number of sub-paragraphs which are relied upon as particulars of justification and/or particulars in support of the defence of “fair comment”. I need not, obviously, read them all but I will refer to certain particular passages in them, as they need to be brought into account in making a judgment on the present issue.

Paragraph 9.4 cites the Reht Maryada, which is described as “the official Sikh Code of Conduct that Sikhs are required to follow”. It states that:

“9.4.1

A Sikh is any person who faithfully believes in (i) one immortal Being; (ii) ten Gurus, from Guru Nanak Dev to Guru Gobind Singh; (iii) the Guru Granth Sahib; (iv) the utterances and teachings of the ten Gurus; (v) the baptism bequeathed by the tenth Guru, and who does not owe allegiance to any other religion ...

9.4.2

It is necessary for a Sikh to visit the places where the Sikhs congregate for worship and prayer (the gurdwaras) ... [that is a reference apparently to Chapter 4, Article 5, clause (a), to which reference will be made later].

9.4.3

The worship of any idol or any ritual or activity should not be allowed.

9.4.4

A Sikh should follow only the Guru’s tenets. These tenets state that Sikhs should only worship the One Timeless Being; regard only the ten Gurus, the Guru Granth and the ten Gurus word alone as saviours and holy objects of veneration ...”.

There are then certain other sub-paragraphs which I need to refer to:

“The Claimant belongs to a strand of the Sikh religion that he describes in various ways such as Nirmal Sikh or Nirmal Sikh Bhekh that is not in the mainstream of Sikhism. His teachings and practices are heretical and blasphemous and not in accordance with the parts of the Reht Maryada set out above. This is because

I turn now to paragraph 9.19.5, which refers to certain passages contained in the constitution of the Gurdwaras. It includes the following:

“amendments and additions to the Constitution could only be made by a joint meeting of the committees of all three Gurdwaras and with the approval of His Holiness Sant Baba Gian Singh Ji Maharaj [clause 12(a)].”

I turn now to three sub-paragraphs making allegations about the Claimant’s conduct with regard to the constitution:

“9.20

In the period after the Claimant claimed to be the successor, he made efforts to convince the congregations of the Gurdwaras in Birmingham, Bradford and High Wycombe that he was the true leader when in fact he was an impostor.

9.21

The Claimant’s actions led to disputes and splits on all three committees and within the Sikh congregations of the towns, especially when he sought to change the constitution. On 8 February 2004, there was a meeting of all three committees in Oldbury, Birmingham and a new constitution produced in 2003 was passed. Only the trustees of the Bradford Gurdwara accepted this new constitution. This constitution was not agreed by all members of the other two committees or (since he had died) been approved by Holiness Sant Baba Gian Singh Ji Maharaj or his lawful successor. It was, therefore, null and void.

9.22

The new unlawful constitution sought to:

9.22.1

change the aim and objective about Sikh doctrine to include an additional heretical clause that the preaching would be under the spiritual guidance of the Claimant [clause 2(a)]…”

I now turn to sub-paragraphs 9.26 and 9.27:

“9.26

The Claimant, in June 2006, sought by deed, to appoint new trustees to the Birmingham Gurdwara in accordance with his unlawful 2003 constitution. This was improper. The Claimant knew that he had no power to issue this deed or attempt to supplement the Trust Deed dated 15^th January 1991 when the question of succession was a pending matter before the Indian court. This was, therefore, not an authentic or lawful Deed of Appointment. Further, the Claimant’s first action, through his attorney, was to demand that the accounts were passed over by the true trustees to his appointees, Harkewal Singh, Gurjeet Singh and Jasbir Singh. This further demonstrates that the Claimant’s main intention is to profit from his actions.

The reply joins issue with many matters. Again, I will be selective in those that I refer to.

In dealing with paragraph 4 of the defence (at paragraph 3 of the reply) the following allegations are pleaded:

“4.1.4

The Claimant is the true successor to His Holiness Sant Baba Harbhajan Singh Ji (Varkat) Maharaj. The litigation in India has been instigated by a few individuals who oppose the Claimant in comparison to thousands of followers worldwide who support the Claimant.

4.2

The first part is denied. The Claimant is the Holy Master of Nirmal Kutia Johal and has all the responsibilities attached to this office. The Claimant has a following of a large number of Sikhs in this country and around the world ...”.

Paragraph 9.5 includes the following:

“…The Claimant is the Head of the Nirmal Kutia Johal, a religious institution which follows the teachings of the Nirmala Sikh faith. The Nirmala sect is not a ‘cult’ but was established by the Tenth Guru of the Sikhs, Sahib Sri Guru Gobind Singh Ji 1690s. The beliefs and teachings of the Nirmala faith are entirely consistent with the Sikh doctrines that have been followed for hundreds of years.”

Paragraph 9.5.2 of the reply contains the following sentence:

“9.5.2

…According to the Sikh faith Sikhs are not restricted to praying in Gurdwaras but are permitted to worship in the privacy of their own homes, in Deras and Ashrams”

Paragraph 9.6 asserts:

“9.6

…The Claimant is a true and practising Sikh who follows closely and strictly the teachings of the Sikh Gurus, the Holy Scripture Shri Guru Granth Sahib Ji Maharaj, as well as the teachings of his predecessors.”

Paragraph 9.8 contains this passage:

“…The Second Defendant’s case is contradictory. He accepts that the First and Second Holy Saints were lawfully appointed and accepted as true Sikhs who preached and followed the Sikh faith. He does not accept the status of the Claimant or his teachings when in fact the Claimant is simply continuing the same traditions as his predecessors.”

Paragraph 9.11 asserts the Claimant’s authority and status:

“Save that the Claimant was appointed as the lawful successor and was already acting as a nominee successor in the lifetime of His Holiness Sant Baba Harbhajan Singh Ji (Varkat) Maharaj, admitted.”

Paragraph 9.12 contains the following:

“The Claimant was properly installed as the Third Holy Saint and Head of Nirmal Kutia Johal on 20 March 2002 following an ordination ceremony which was also attended by members of the Second Defendant’s family including his father Daya Singh Sahota. The ordination ceremony was conducted by some of the highest religious Saints belonging to the Nirmala Sect which resulted in the lawful and proper appointment of the Claimant ... Given the Claimant’s dedication to Nirmal Kutia and the Second Holy Saint the Claimant was chosen as the nominee successor by the Second Holy Saint during his lifetime. After the death of the Second Holy Saint and in keeping with tradition and the wishes of the Second Holy Saint the Claimant’s appointment as Head of Nirmal Kutia Johal was confirmed and he was officially named as the Third Holy Saint ... The ordination ceremony was conducted with the same formality and tradition as has been afforded to the Claimant’s predecessors and was attended by thousands of followers which was publicly announced and reported in the media...”

Paragraph 9.13 contains the following passages:

“…Since its formation hundreds of years ago Nirmal Kutia Johal has always been recognised as a Dera or the residence of the Sadhus ... Personal profit is entirely contradictory to the concept of a Holy Saint and the contrary suggestion is grossly damaging to the Claimant.”

In paragraph 9.28 there is this passage:

“….The interfaith dialogue was organised by the Second Defendant without the prior approval of the President of the High Wycombe Gurdwara as is required pursuant to the 2003 Constitution. The Second Defendant who is not a Committee member sought to disregard procedures for organising events at the Gurdwara. His disregard for the Management Committee of the Gurdwara and the 2003 Constitution has caused or provoked discord.”

From that lengthy citation it would thus appear, certainly at first impression, that issues of a religious or doctrinal nature permeate the pleadings in this case. I need to say a little more about the legal background. Reference has been made to a number of cases from various periods, several of them relatively modern. Mr. Hill cited the decision of Simon Brown J (as he then was) in the case of R v Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of Great Britain and the Commonwealth Ex p. Wachmann [1992] 1WLR 1036, which contained the following passage:

“... the court is hardly in a position to regulate what is essentially a religious function - the determination whether someone is morally and religiously fit to carry out the spiritual and pastoral duties of his office. The court must inevitably be wary of entering so self-evidently sensitive an area, straying across the well-recognised divide between church and state.

One cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that if judicial review lies here, then one way or another this secular court must inevitably be drawn into adjudicating upon matters intimate to a religious community”.

In the case of R v The Imam of Bury Park Jame Masjid Luton & Ors. ex parte Sulaiman Ali (unreported) on 13^th September 1991, Auld J (as he then was) followed the approach of Simon Brown J and said, crisply,

“In short, the issues raised involve an examination of religious law and the custom and traditions of a particular local religious community which the court is not competent to undertake”.

That judgment was ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeal reported at [1994] COD, page 142.

More recently, there is the decision of Gray J., to which reference has been made by both counsel this morning, in Blake v Associated Newspapers [2003] EWHC 1960 (QB). At paragraph 21 the learned judge said this,

“It is well established ... that the court will not venture into doctrinal disputes or differences. But there is authority that the courts will not regulate issues as to the procedures adopted by religious bodies or the customs and practices of a particular religious community or questions as to the moral and religious fitness of a person to carry out the spiritual and pastoral duties of his office”.

There is also a decision of Munby J (as he then was) in Sulaiman v Juffali [2002] 1 FLR 479, at paragraph 47, where he said this:

“Religion ... is not the business of government or of the secular courts. So the starting point of the law is an essentially agnostic view of religious beliefs and a tolerant indulgence to religious and cultural diversity. A secular judge must be wary of straying across the well-recognised divide between church and state. It is not for a judge to weigh one religion against another. All are entitled to equal respect, whether in times of peace or, as at present, amidst the clash of arms”.

In the light of those and other authorities, Mr. Hill QC, on behalf of the second defendant, makes the following submissions. He says that a non-justiciable issue lies at the heart of this case, as the Claimant asserts that he was installed as the Third Holy Saint and head of the Nirmal Kutia Johal religious institution. This is not admitted and it is expressly denied that the Claimant is the true successor to His Holiness Sant Baba Harbhajan Singh Ji (Varkat) Maharaj. The latter died intestate without naming an heir and accordingly a vacuum arose in this succession (such as it is) both in terms of the ownership of real and personal property and in terms of spiritual leadership. The Claimant makes detailed and technical reference to some form of “ceremony”, the nature, authority and effect of which, in terms of mainstream Sikh doctrine and practice, is in dispute. All the other matters raised by the Claimant flow from this primary averment which falls entirely within the territory that the court will not enter. It therefore follows, he submits, that these proceedings should be stayed.

He also refers to the following issue, namely that the Claimant is not what he presents himself as being. It is said that his personal conduct is inconsistent with the tenets and doctrines of the Sikh religion and that he and his limited followers are outside the mainstream of Sikhism. He notes that the Claimant makes positive averments to the contrary in various passages of the reply which I have earlier recited.

Mr. Hill goes on to submit, more particularly, that the second Defendant’s case is that the Claimant is not a true saint and is improperly passing himself off as the true heir to His Holiness Sant Harbhajan Singh Ji (Varkat) Maharaj. His purported appointment is said to be irregular and of no effect and his claim to be the true successor untrue and without foundation. Detailed averments about the ordination ceremony are made in the reply and I have cited certain of those passages.

Mr. Hill submits that all these matters, upon which there is a joinder of issue, are within the territory of Sikh doctrine and practice, which is non-justiciable. Such witnesses of fact who address the so-called appointment in their statements serve merely to accentuate the spiritual and doctrinal issues concerning the internal regulation of such element of Sikhism as the Claimant and his followers represent and the fitness of the Claimant to fill the position which he purports to exercise. By way of example only, Mr. Hill cites Dr. Sabar, the Claimant’s expert, who places considerable weight on a so-called “turban ceremony”, whereas the second Defendant’s expert, Dr. Indarjit Singh, is adamant in his report that Sikhism criticises such ritual practices as a ceremonial turban tying ritual. Furthermore, Mr. Hill goes on to submit that it is not for the High Court to trespass into this territory within defamation proceedings. Any property disputes will fall to be determined in accordance with the law of trusts in parallel proceedings which certain followers of the Claimant have issued in the Chancery Division and which they continue to prosecute. As Mr. Hill points out, the Claimant had hoped that this action would have been resolved by now but, “unfortunately, that has not proved to be the case”. I may add that there is something of a dispute or misunderstanding between the parties at the moment as to the current status of those Chancery proceedings. There was some stage, apparently, at which the issues were hived off to the Charity Commissioners. It is not at the moment clear to what extent the Chancery Division has resumed its jurisdiction but for present purposes it seems to me that this does not matter greatly.

Those are in essence the submissions made by Mr. Hill on behalf of the second Defendant.

Mr. Newman’s submissions on behalf of the Claimant may be summarised as follows. He says, first of all, that unlike the case of Blake, to which I made reference earlier, in this case the Claimant’s particulars of claim do not contain any doctrinal assertions. The meanings pleaded by the Claimant do not involve resolution, he submits, of any doctrinal issues. As to paragraph 4.3, which I read out earlier, the only issue raised in the pleadings, as regards the blasphemy allegation, is a denial in the defence at paragraph 6.3 that the article bore that meaning. He goes on to submit that the allegation of sexual exploitation of women involves no doctrinal issue.

As to the allegation of sexual exploitation, it is not sought to be justified and the second Defendant rests on the submission that it is not an allegation that it makes against the Claimant. The allegation is to be found in the third column of the article, in very general terms, and it is not part of the second Defendant’s case that the allegation is true of this Claimant.

Mr. Newman goes on to make certain submissions in relation to the word “cult”. He refers to the fact that the Claimant says that a reading of the offending article makes it clear that the second Defendant is using that expression in a derogatory manner. For example, he is accused in the opening words of the article of being “an accused Cult leader”. That clearly, says Mr. Newman, carries a connotation of criminal or otherwise nefarious activities, but he says no doctrinal issues arise for decision.

As to the meaning that the Claimant is an “impostor”, which, of course, is an inferential meaning pleaded by the Claimant rather than one that appears expressly in the article, that word, he submits, is defined usefully in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as meaning, “a deceiver, a cheat, especially a person who assumes a false identity in order to deceive others”. The Claimant, emphasises Mr. Newman, maintains that this is the sting of the article. If such be the finding of the court at the end of the trial, it would not be based on some arid doctrinal dispute. Whether the second defendant is right or wrong in his doctrinal assertions, he argues, is neither here nor there. The concept of an impostor involves an allegation of fraud, without reference to doctrinal differences.

I can only say that I reject those submissions for the reason that it seems to me plain that the allegation of “impostor” cannot be divorced from questions of Sikh doctrine and practice. Of course, I recognise that if an allegation were made of someone, who happened to be a religious leader, that he had his hand in the till, or assaulted a follower, this could be determined separately and without reference to religious doctrine or status, but that is far from this case. The issue whether this Claimant is or is not fairly described as an “impostor” cannot be isolated and resolved without reference to Sikh doctrines and traditions.

Finally, Mr. Newman points to a decision of the High Court in India, currently subject to an appeal, and to which I have been referred. It deals to an extent with the Claimant’s status. Plainly, any decision of the Indian court is entitled to the greatest respect but it cannot be said to represent (as both parties recognise) a res judicata as between these parties on any purely factual issue raised in this litigation. Obviously, the second defendant was not a party to that litigation. If the trial goes ahead, as I say, no doubt the judgment would be paid considerable respect and some weight attached to it, but it is necessary to remember that it is currently subject to an appeal, which may not be resolved for some considerable period of time.

Therefore, I am driven to the conclusion, as it was put by Gray J. in the Blake case, that the issues in this case, “... cannot be adapted so as to circumvent the insuperable obstacle placed in the way of a fair trial of this action by the fact that the court must abstain from determining questions which lie at the heart of the case”. Accordingly, I fear that the action will have to be stayed. I am sorry that this entails that the Claimant cannot have access to the court with a view to obtaining vindication, and I also regret that this issue was not canvassed much earlier, but this unhappy outcome must follow from the doctrine of public policy on which Mr. Hill has placed reliance.