Lawson v Executor of the Estate of Dawes (Deceased)

This is an unusual case in a number of respects, not least because one of the participants in the central events died about three months afterwards and has not been able to give his account of those matters which remain the subject of dispute. There was apparently some account of events in existence before he died, in the form of statements made to his legal advisers, but privilege has not been waived.

On the most important issues, therefore, I am left mainly with the evidence of the Claimant herself, which I shall have to assess largely in the light of the inherent probabilities and the surrounding circumstances. She is Amanda Lawson who sues the estate of Christopher Dawes in respect of allegations of multiple rape, attempted rape, indecent assault, the forced administering of crack cocaine and false imprisonment over the period 23 to 26 December 1998. The Claimant was then aged 34 and is now 42.

The Claimant seeks general damages (including aggravated damages) for assault and false imprisonment, and also special damages in respect of lost earnings (past and future), claiming to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and to have been thereby rendered incapable of earning a living for the rest of her life.

Mr Kelsey-Fry QC, who has appeared at the trial on behalf of the estate, has been in a delicate position. He has sought to test the claimant’s evidence in cross-examination and made vigorous submissions as to the implausibility of her account. He put the position squarely in his opening note: “The defendant’s position is that the Claimant pursues these allegations falsely for gain and that she does not have and never has had any psychiatric illness attributable to her encounter with Mr Dawes. The primary issue for the court is therefore whether she is telling the truth”.

In accordance with the pleaded defence, there was also advanced a positive case that sexual intercourse and the other activities occurred during the relevant period with her consent, although this was not actually expressly put in cross-examination.

I turn to the Claimant’s case. A friend called Sarah Jack (whose statement was read to the court) told Ms Lawson that Christopher Dawes was looking for someone to front a modelling agency and that it might prove to be the “opportunity of a lifetime” for her. Ms Jack seems to have been impressed by his wealth and what she understood to be his business reputation. She said: “He seemed to be a real mover and shaker”. She and her former husband had been contacted originally by a man called John Doyle who was a friend of hers, and also an employee or associate of Christopher Dawes, with a view to looking after Mr Dawes’ flat in Chelsea Harbour. This they agreed to do towards the end of 1998.

It seems that Ms Jack and her husband cleaned the flat, did some minor repairs and occasionally picked Mr Dawes up from Battersea heliport. She had chatted to him on two occasions and, although recognising that he was rather eccentric, nevertheless formed the impression that he was “very charming and very friendly”. The examples of eccentricity which she offered were that he wore black nail varnish on his toes and that he often arrived at the flat with “an entourage”. On one occasion, she noted four bodyguards one of whom carried a holster.

Ms Jack sometimes spoke to Christopher Dawes’ personal assistant, and on one occasion in her presence she mentioned that he wished to break into the fashion industry and “might want to do something with a modelling agency”. The proposal, as she understood it, was that it would be “internet based”. She had also been told (whether accurately or not) that well known models such as Naomi Campbell and Kate Moss had been approached in connection with the idea.

Ms Jack said that she was present with a group of people when this was being discussed and they were asked if they knew of anyone “in the modelling industry or the beauty industry”. It was at this point that she mentioned the name of Amanda Lawson whom she knew was a hairdresser and had been recently doing “some quite exceptional work in the evenings at session shoots” (that is to say, preparing hairstyles for models prior to photographic sessions). Having mentioned her name, Ms Jack was asked to approach her to see if she would be interested.

According to the evidence of Ms Lawson herself, she only knew about Mr Dawes what she had been told by Sarah Jack, who described him as “a genius who had the Midas touch with business”. She was also told that Naomi Campbell was already “on board” but this was “very hush hush”. Ms Lawson apparently became quite excited about the prospect of running or managing a model agency and discussed it with her then partner Mykal Pinder. They decided that it would be possible for her to carry on with her “session hairdressing” and run the model agency, with staff running her own salon, which she had opened ten years before under the name “Headquarters”.

On 23 December 1998 she found a message on her mobile phone from Christopher Dawes asking her to ring him back. Before doing so, however, she contacted Sarah Jack who told her that they wished to give her an interview. When Mr Dawes said “jump”, she would have to say “how high?”. Miss Jack agreed to contact Mr Doyle on her behalf while she went about her work in the hairdressing salon. Later that day Mr Doyle telephoned her and asked if she would be interested in coming for an interview, to which she agreed. At this stage, she was assuming that it would take place after the Christmas holiday.

At about 1 p.m. on the same day Christopher Dawes telephoned Ms Lawson and asked her about her work experience, saying that he had an intention to start a modelling agency but did not know whether it would be based in London or in Alderney. He asked her to come over to the island that day and, although reluctant to do so, she did not wish to appear unprofessional. She made clear, however, that she would have to be at work on the following day, and he replied that this was “fine”. She had a heavy list of bookings in her hairdressing salon, and it had also become the custom on Christmas Eve to offer drinks and mince pies to her customers. She was looking forward to these festivities, as well as to Christmas itself which she was intending to spend with her family and Mykal Pinder (with whom she had been living since the previous spring or early summer).

Christopher Dawes arranged for Ms Lawson to come over from Battersea heliport in his privately owned helicopter, flown by a member of his staff called John Paul. It was to leave at about 3 p.m., and the journey would be via Cardiff where some other passengers were to be collected. She packed an overnight bag in case she would not be able to return until the next day. She also took with her one of her smartest items of clothing for the interview which she was supposed to be having. (She told me that it was a Vivienne Westwood suit.)

Before leaving, she phoned Sarah Jack who told her again that Mr Dawes was highly intelligent and very demanding. On this occasion she also warned her that he was a bit of a “ladies’ man”. Ms Lawson treated this light-heartedly, and replied that so far as she was concerned it was “strictly business” and that she actually thought that Mr Dawes would have his French girlfriend (called Marlene) with him. She promised to call Sarah Jack later that evening to let her know how the interview had gone.

Unfortunately, as soon as she arrived in Alderney she was told that the airport was then closed for Christmas. She was naturally concerned about her return journey.

She had travelled from London with a woman and a girl of about 13, who it later emerged were the wife and daughter of a man called Janusz who worked for Mr Dawes. They stopped at Cardiff to pick up two teenage girls called Katrin and Bridie who, she later discovered, were the daughters of Mr Doyle (to whom I have already referred). On arrival in Alderney she was driven with the others by Janusz in a black people carrier. Ms Lawson found all this rather strange, and formed the impression that Mr Dawes had quite a number of people on his staff. On arrival at their destination, which Ms Lawson described as “a bit of a dump”, she was left alone in the reception area with a man she found rather “menacing”. Shortly she was joined by Christopher Dawes who was bare footed (thus displaying his black nail varnish) and wearing black leather trousers and a see through vest. She had apparently been expecting a silvery haired businessman in his 60s and was rather shocked to meet someone who “looked more like an ageing rock star”. No interview, as such, ever took place and there is no evidence to support the proposition that Christopher Dawes had any substantive plans for a modelling agency at all.

It seems that he had purchased four properties in Alderney, including two hotels called the Devereux and the Chez André. The former (which was the “dump” where Ms Lawson was delivered on her arrival and was then being used as a private residence by Mr Dawes) is in a fairly isolated spot, but the latter is in the town of St Anne, and is surrounded by other buildings including, a stone’s throw away, the local police station. Over the next couple of days, until she made contact with police officers on Boxing Day, Ms Lawson was ferried about by Christopher Dawes between the Devereux and the Chez André, and also on other trips including an alarming coastal ride in a vehicle which, according to her, he was driving while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

According to her evidence Christopher Dawes forced Ms Lawson to smoke crack cocaine (which she had never tried before) and, while she was under its influence and unable to offer any effective resistance, had sexual intercourse with her on a number of occasions and submitted her to other indignities. The case put on behalf of the estate was simply that she knew perfectly well what she was doing and was a quite willing participant.

In determining where the truth lies, as I have indicated, it will be necessary for me to consider the surrounding circumstances, as well as the evidence of a number of witnesses who were present at various points during the period in question. I shall turn first to the surrounding circumstances, as to which the facts are either agreed or not seriously challenged.

Amanda Lawson had a book full of appointments for 24 December at her salon which she was intending to fulfil. I have seen the relevant extract from the salon appointment book. She had arranged to spend Christmas with Mr Pinder and her family. In particular, she had purchased a present for her two year old niece, of whom she was very fond, and Mr Pinder had hired a Santa Claus costume to wear on Christmas day. She was looking forward to seeing her niece opening her present, as this was the first Christmas which she would be old enough to appreciate. These arrangements were confirmed by Mr Pinder who, in the event, was called on behalf of the estate. He also confirmed that he had discussed the proposed trip and interview with Ms Lawson and encouraged her to go since it sounded, from his point of view, an exciting opportunity. He took her personally to the heliport for her departure and was expecting to see her, at the latest, on the following day.

There is no doubt either that on 26 December, as a result of various rather mystifying phone calls which he had received over the previous two days, Mr Pinder alerted the police in Alderney who attended at the Devereux hotel at about 10 a.m. to enquire about her well-being. Since she could not be found at the Devereux, the police officers then attended at the Chez André to make similar enquiries. At about 11 a.m. that morning Ms Lawson walked into the police station and complained of rape and the supply of crack cocaine, telling police accurately where the drugs and paraphernalia were to be found. She was given a medical examination the same day and swabs were taken in the usual way. On a later occasion she also had an Aids test.

Evidence was given by Inspector Michael Brown of the Norfolk Constabulary, who at the time was a police sergeant serving with the Guernsey police and stationed in Alderney. He said that he had been alerted on the morning of Boxing Day by a telephone call from Mykal Pinder who identified himself as Ms Lawson’s boyfriend and expressed concern as to her welfare. This was prompted by a telephone call Mr Pinder had received from Ms Lawson.

Mr Brown was unable to track her down either at the Devereux, which he had attended with PC Zierlinger, or at the Chez André, and therefore returned to the police station. At about 10:40 a.m. he there received a telephone call from Christopher Dawes who wanted to know why the police were interested in Ms Lawson. Inspector Brown said that he was evasive when asked for information about her and refused to answer the question whether she was with him or not. He said that he would speak to his solicitor and call back. Shortly afterwards, however, Ms Lawson walked into the police station in a distressed and emotional state. She was described as being on the point of tears.

At the time she told Mr Brown that she had been “virtually a prisoner” and described Christopher Dawes as a “control freak”. She also claimed to have been forced to take drugs (“crack”) and that she had sexual intercourse on at least two occasions without her consent. She just wanted to go home. She was offered the opportunity of a medical examination, to which she consented, and it was carried out by Dr Cooper.

She stayed the night of the 26 December in a different hotel on Alderney, with the reassurance of a police officer staying in the next room.

At about 1:10 p.m. on the same day Mr Brown attended the Chez André with a search warrant, together with other officers, and went to the top floor of the hotel to room 11. Christopher Dawes was there, who appeared to be “shocked and vacant in his attitude, … as if intoxicated”. Cocaine was found and various items of drug paraphernalia.

At about 2:50 p.m. a further search was carried out of Mr Dawes’ accommodation at the Devereux hotel. Various items were seized there also. The following day interviews were conducted with Christopher Dawes, his response being generally “no comment”, and he was charged at 3:10 p.m. on 27 December 1998 with possessing a Class A drug. He was never charged with rape, although the matter was still being investigated at the time of his death three months later, on 21 March 1999.

Unchallenged evidence was given by various people who knew Ms Lawson before and after these events, and who say that she underwent a personality change. From having been a “bubbly”, energetic and forthcoming person beforehand, she had become withdrawn and lacked confidence. A very significant factor is that she did not return to her hairdressing salon and left her inexperienced assistant (Kelly Hickson, who also gave evidence) in charge. The business rapidly dwindled and was in serious trouble by March or April 1999. Although Ms Hickson was interested in trying to raise funds to purchase the business, she was unable to do so and, in any event, the established customers were primarily interested in having the services of Ms Lawson because of her flair and experience. It had gradually been built up by her since 1988 and was apparently flourishing.

Ms Lawson had previously been enthusiastic and ambitious and, as I have noted already, she was beginning to break into what was called “session work”, which required specialist skills. Evidence was given that she had a rare talent in this field and a promising future, although matters had not yet developed to the stage where she was being paid. She had been building up her experience and two witnesses spoke (without challenge) as to her exceptional talents and potential. One was Ms Patricia Tavakkoli (known as “Pigalle”) who was “very impressed by her originality and creativity and hired her straight away” for a show which had been held in November 1998 at Bagleys studios. She added this:

“I would say … that Amanda showed great promise and I was sure that she was going to achieve great success. She showed remarkable talent and potential matched with an extremely professional approach.

I started my label in 1998, the same time that Amanda was building up her portfolio. Since then my career and those that were working with me from then, such as models, make up artists, photographers have gone from strength to strength. I now sell to shops world-wide and have features in magazines such as Vogue, GQ, Timeout. I am sure that Amanda would very quickly have made a good name for herself and would

have commanded quality work for high financial awards”.

Ms Tavakkoli made the following comments as to her demeanour after the events of December 1998:

“Amanda sounded extremely traumatised by the events. She sounded like a completely different person. She seemed very depressed and deeply upset. As a result of these serious changes in her I felt I was unable to offer her any work. The fashion industry is very fast paced and demanding. It is only individuals who are focussed and professional that can be relied on to produce the highest standard of work that is required. I felt that Amanda was unable to cope with any of these demands or pressures and felt that she had lost her focus and ambitions. I was concerned as well that she had appeared extremely withdrawn and would be unable to cope with working with a team of people on various jobs”.

Evidence was also given by Ms Angela Papadopoulos, via video link, to the effect that Ms Lawson was “one of the most creatively and technically minded stylists that I had come across in a very long time.” She stated that she had been named as one of the top ten hairstylists in the United Kingdom by Maybelline, which she described as “verification” that she was well on her way to great success. She made the following comments:

“Whilst developing her portfolio, Amanda executed her work with the utmost professionalism, responsibility and maturity. She was dedicated and highly motivated, and was determined to prove that she could develop ever increasingly creative styles. She was a pleasure to work with and was well liked and respected by those around her, including the models, make up artists, stylists and photographers.”

There was a similarly supportive statement from Shelly Manser-Cavanagh, a freelance makeup artist who had worked with Ms Lawson in 1998 on three fashion shoots. It was she who had recommended her to “Pigalle”. She recalled her impressions of her as “very bubbly”, “innovative in her ideas” and “very inspiring to be around”. She was then expecting her to be a very successful session stylist.

All this came to an end after December 1998. That such a change took place could not be challenged, but it is the Defendant’s case that, however it came about, it was not caused by any wrongdoing on the part of Christopher Dawes.

It is Ms Lawson’s case that she felt unable to work after her encounter because she was traumatised and distressed by those events. She stated in her evidence that Christopher Dawes knew where her business was at that time and she feared reprisals from him or from his associates. This was another reason why she feared to go back to her salon and carry on with her life. This appears to be consistent with her evidence that she and Mr Pinder, very shortly after her return to London, began looking for a home in Scotland or Wales to try and avoid these perceived dangers. They were still actively pursuing the Scottish option in March 1999, but shortly thereafter the relationship broke down and nothing came of it.

From this general description of the circumstances during the period in question, the inference appears to me to be overwhelming that some distressing and traumatic experience took place in Alderney and that it had a fundamental impact, for whatever reason, on Ms Lawson’s life and in particular her professional activities. I need next, therefore, to focus on the evidence relating to the days in question and to make findings as to what did or did not take place.

Amanda Lawson’s evidence is to the effect that she was terrified of Christopher Dawes and that he dominated her by veiled threats and what she called “mind games”. She felt trapped, because she could not leave the island once the airport had closed, and was also wary or frightened of the security staff or other employees who appeared to be part of his “retinue”.

She was clearly, despite her relatively mature years, in some respects a rather naive and impressionable woman. He told her, for example, that Hitler had stayed at the Devereux Hotel and signed “the treaty that brought about the end of the second world war”. Ludicrous though this was, Ms Lawson said she knew so little about the war that she had no reason to doubt him. He also told her later that Hitler’s ghost haunted the premises. She noticed from the outset that his eyes looked red and tired and that he was “distant”. She assumed at first that he had been busy working, but it soon became apparent to her that he was regularly smoking crack cocaine and drinking vodka. He was undergoing mood swings and behaving, as she described, like Jekyll and Hyde.

After she first arrived, she described being taken up to the top of the Devereux to a small landing which was “completely isolated from the rest of the hotel”. She was invited to follow him into a room which was filthy and full of ash trays which were spilling their contents. There were bottles of vodka, dirty glasses, dirty clothes and odd scraps of paper lying around. He lay back on a bed and asked her to sit down at the end of it. When she tried to speak, to explain for example that she had not eaten or had a chance to change, she was told to be quiet until he had finished speaking. He explained to her that all the telephones in the hotel were “bugged”, that there were cameras in every room and that he had ex-SAS security guards dotted around the hotel “as there were people out to get him”. He also told her that she could not leave the hotel without being seen and that any phone calls she made would be overheard.

In these circumstances, she felt “totally controlled” and “trapped”. He also told her that if people tried to harm him he could arrange “accidents” for them without being traced, and that he had done this in the past. He claimed that he could plant thoughts in her head and had the previous day, when he had telephoned her, planted a dream about an attic in her mind. Every time she asked to make contact, for example with Sarah Jack or Kelly Hickson, he ignored her or told her to be quiet. On one occasion he allowed her to use his mobile phone (supposedly the only one that was not “bugged”) in order to ring Kelly Hickson but, by that time, there was no reply.

At times he became violent, threw things around the room and fantasised about Hitler and “soldiers running up and down the road outside”. He took her into a small room with a large pair of binoculars on a stand pointing out of a window and told her that this was the room that Hitler had stayed in. She could see nothing outside as they were in the middle of the countryside and no lights were visible. She felt frightened and, effectively, at his mercy.

Ms Lawson said that she was afraid of Christopher Dawes because he was behaving irrationally and unpredictably. He had given her a very large and strong vodka and tonic which she tried to avoid drinking as much as possible, just taking the odd sip from time to time. She concluded that he was trying to get her drunk. He was himself drinking and smoking heavily throughout. Every time he left the room to obtain more alcohol, she wanted to leave but believed that she was under surveillance and had nowhere to go in any event. She added:

“I was panicking. I just wanted to get out of the situation but I could see no way out. I was really scared. I remained cool on the outside while inside every cell in my body was on red alert”.

Eventually he came up behind her on the bed and placed a small glass pipe in her mouth and told her to draw on it, while he lit the white substance in the pipe. It is important to note what she said in her statement about her reaction:

“I didn’t want to smoke from the pipe but I was already terrified of him and the situation that I found myself in, so I sucked a tiny bit on the pipe. I thought that if I didn’t he would become violent again, hit me and force me to smoke the pipe anyway”.

She said that the effect of the drug (crack cocaine) was immediate and drastic. She felt that she had to lie down, whereupon he forced her to drink three cap fulls of neat vodka. She concluded that his periodic absences up to that point meant that he had been consuming crack cocaine throughout, and that this would account for his alarming behaviour. She added:

“I wondered how much of that stuff he had taken, and also wondered how dangerous he was. I felt like a fly in spider’s web”.

He put his arms around her and shortly afterwards raped her. Her evidence was that she repeatedly told him to stop, but that she felt like “a rag doll” and was unable to move a muscle in her body or offer any resistance. She said that he held her arms down and she felt helpless and trapped.

After this first rape, Christopher Dawes told her that there was something special about her, that he had really wanted to meet her after their first telephone conversation, and even that he would have children with her. This very odd aspect of his behaviour is of some significance because, according to the evidence, it seems to be part of a pattern (as confirmed by Victoria Marks, to whom I shall return in due course). Sometimes he would talk about their future together, having children, and then the mood would change suddenly and he would become threatening.

In the course of the evening he also offered her a job as his personal assistant (at £40,000 a year). This again appears to have been a ploy which he used with other women. He already had a personal assistant, and there was no job vacancy. His changes of mood were also illustrated by the fact that he would sometimes say that she would have to stay with him over Christmas to show her loyalty whereas, shortly afterwards, he would reassure her that she would see her family for Christmas because he had a helicopter on standby at the airport.

At some point, in the course of the evening, Ms Lawson asked if she could have a bath and went into the bathroom to consider her plight. Apart from everything else, she was concerned because he had ejaculated inside her, having earlier told her that he liked using prostitutes and having “unprotected sex”. This was a further source of anxiety. Against this background, the fact that she chose to have a bath is not necessarily to be interpreted, as Mr Kelsey-Fry rather suggested, as evidence that she was relaxed and enjoying herself. At all events, when Christopher Dawes decided to join her in the bath, she got out and left him there.

By this time it was about 11:30 p.m. (on 23 December) and Ms Lawson hoped she would now be left alone and allowed to go to sleep in the room which, she thought, had been allocated to her. Unfortunately, however, Mr Dawes returned in a bad mood and “became very paranoid and very aggressive”. He then accused her of stealing a bag which apparently contained more drugs. He then told her that he had contacts in South London and threatened her. The threats ranged from planting drugs on her, throwing her off the rocks around Alderney, damaging her business, to running over her cats. He also said that it would be a shame if something happened to her boyfriend or her family. She added: “He kept making it clear to me that he had information about my life that I hadn’t told him. I found this very chilling”.

She had to search for some time to find the bag, but eventually he suggested that it might have been stolen by Hitler’s ghost. He demanded her passport and then told her to get out of his sight. She handed him her passport and then went to bed in her room. She hoped that she would be left alone, but he returned more than once and then, having found the bag that had gone missing, he became elated and pulled her out of bed and back to his own room. He went on smoking from the pipe and, from time to time, forced her to smoke “crack” as well. He told her that he could read her body as well as her mind and had pretended that she had stolen the bag purely to test her reactions. He raped her twice more in the course of that night.

At 4:00 a.m. (on 24 December) he forced her to get up and dress, although she was on the point of collapse. He insisted on waking up Janusz because one of the cars was not working. He then made Ms Lawson get into a black Range Rover and drove her along the coast line “like a mad man”. He stopped on the journey and took more crack cocaine. He also told her how treacherous the currents were and what a “long swim home” it would be. She thought that he was trying to scare her and to make it clear that she was in his power.

When they returned to the Devereux, Christopher Dawes climbed on to the roof and left Ms Lawson outside because he did not have his keys. She eventually found her way to the front door. She found him inside gathering items together and on this occasion he showed her one of his phone bugs. He then drove them both to Chez André, where they arrived at 6:00 a.m. They were greeted by Mr Andrew Vaughan, one of his former employees who gave evidence in the course of the trial. He said “Your room is ready, sir”. He had obviously been telephoned in advance to prepare the room. She was then taken up to room number 11. He smoked more crack cocaine and held Ms Lawson down, attempting yet again to rape her, but without success. She lay awake for a while worrying about her position, and in particular whether she could escape and whether or not he might carry out threats to her business or family. She eventually dropped off to sleep for about two hours between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m.

She was woken with the glass pipe being thrust into her mouth and Mr Dawes saying “Interesting way to wake up, eh?” Ms Lawson says that he then raped her again. Afterwards, he fantasised about setting up a world wide modelling agency and filling all his homes with young models. He also rang Mr Doyle to tell him that Ms Lawson was now his personal assistant and that she was to be “put on the payroll”. He asked for her bank details, despite the fact that she said she had no intention of working for him.

While they remained at Chez André, Christopher Dawes continued to smoke the pipe and to rape Ms Lawson on further occasions. He then decided that it was necessary to drive back to the Devereux “to fool them”. Ms Lawson did not know what was meant by this.

Having returned to the Devereux, Mr Dawes called his helicopter pilot and told him to go home for Christmas. He thus demonstrated to her that he had complete control over her and that she had no chance of leaving the island to return home for Christmas. Her reaction was that she became “really scared, angry and upset”.

Yet again they returned to Chez André and, on the way, a visit was paid to an estate agent called Mr Simonet (who provided a statement which was read in the course of the trial). They then drove to a ruined property by the sea. This was apparently a disused fort known as Fort Tourgis. Why they were visiting the place was never explained, but eventually they returned to Chez André and Mr Dawes and the Claimant went to room 11. She was anxious to telephone her family and was allowed to use Mr Dawes’ mobile phone for that purpose, although he said that the battery was running out and she could only speak to them for a short while. He had to remain in earshot of what she was saying.

She was able to telephone her sister to say that she would not be able to come home in time to visit her for Christmas and also spoke to her mother. When she said “I can’t get off the island”, in order to explain why she would not be there for Christmas, Mr Dawes became angry and said that she was not to say that. He then grabbed the telephone and spoke to her mother, saying that he was giving her an opportunity to further her career and unfortunately it meant that she would have to miss Christmas. Ms Lawson said that she was choking back tears during these telephone conversations.

She also managed to phone Mr Pinder briefly, who said that “something didn’t feel right” and that, unless she returned home, their relationship was over. At this point she said:

“I felt so alone and desperate. Things had hit rock bottom. I gave Mr Dawes his phone back and went into the en suite bathroom and cried my eyes out”.

Mr Pinder rang back twice, and Ms Lawson heard Christopher Dawes tell him that she did not wish to speak to him. Then he terminated the call.

Later they returned again to the Devereux to pick up further items of clothing and, at that point, Mr Dawes offered the Claimant £50,000 a year to be his personal assistant, to which she made no reply.

They then drove back to the Chez André where Mr Dawes put his clothing in room 11 and, when Ms Lawson asked if she could have her own room as she needed to sleep, she was told there were none available. He made her go downstairs for drinks in the bar, although she was at this point still very upset because she thought her relationship with Mr Pinder was over. She noticed that one of the girls from the helicopter trip was in the bar. This was Mr Doyle’s daughter Bridie and, while Mr Dawes was talking to someone else, Ms Lawson asked her to telephone Mr Pinder “…. to tell Mykal that I loved him and that it was not as it seemed, and that there was more to it”. Bridie did in fact manage to ring Mr Pinder with the message. He confirmed this in his first witness statement:

“She told me that Mandy was unable to call me herself as she was being watched. The distinct impression I got was that Mandy was in some kind of trouble and that Bridie was calling me because Mandy could not speak freely on the telephone. I didn’t know what to think but this obviously sounded quite serious.”

At this point, apparently, Hannah Roberts comes into the story. Ms Lawson noticed that Mr Dawes was talking to her in the bar. It was she who suggested that there should be a celebration drink in an adjoining room to mark the birthday of the accountant’s son, who also worked at Chez André. Ms Lawson attended this and, for the first time, was able to obtain something to eat. At some point she was left alone at the table with the accountant and her husband. She told them, she says, that she had only come for an interview and had not been able to get away from Mr Dawes. She was not sure whether she could trust them enough to tell them all that had happened to her. She added:

“It was the combination of the drugs and Mr Dawes’ mind

controlling games. My head was in a complete mess”.

The accountant’s husband apparently told her that he had a plane at his disposal and that he could fly her home tomorrow if Mr Dawes was not prepared to arrange it. She thanked him and agreed to this but never saw him again. This is a point of criticism made by Mr Kelsey-Fry because, he submits, she had a perfect opportunity to escape but did not make any arrangements to take advantage of it. She said that she had no means of contacting him.

Eventually, at about 1:00 a.m. on Christmas Day, Ms Lawson was the last one left in the bar. Sometime earlier Mr Dawes had gone upstairs with Hannah Roberts, and she was glad to be shot of him. On the other hand, she had nowhere else to sleep herself. She therefore went up to room 11.

Ms Lawson found Mr Dawes and Hannah Roberts sitting on the bed, fully clothed, drinking and talking. She asked if she could ring Mr Pinder and tried to give him cryptic clues about what was happening. As she believed the phone to be bugged, she was unable to speak freely. In any event, Ms Roberts and Mr Dawes were in the same room with her. Mr Dawes called Ms Lawson into the bathroom and she left the phone behind. During this gap Hannah Roberts apparently spoke to Mr Pinder as well. While she was in the bathroom he put the pipe to her lips and told her to smoke the drug. He then groped Ms Lawson and tried unsuccessfully to have sexual intercourse with her.

By the time Ms Lawson returned to the room from the bathroom, she found Hannah Roberts trying to persuade Mr Pinder on the telephone to come to Alderney. She thought this was pointless since the airport was closed but the explanation may be that Ms Roberts, on her own admission, was drunk at all material times. Then Mr Dawes and Ms Roberts lay on the bed and started kissing. He motioned to Ms Lawson to join them. She lay on the bed, fully clothed, turned her back on them and faced the wall. She had, after all, apparently nowhere else to sleep. She had the impression that Mr Dawes “wanted sex with both Hannah and me at the same time”, but she managed to go downstairs to get a drink and to talk to Ms Roberts on her own.

Ms Roberts, it seems, rather liked Mr Dawes and told Ms Lawson that she had been having a “relationship” with him for a few weeks. Ms Lawson reassured her that she was not interested in Mr Dawes and that she had only come there for work purposes. Nevertheless, they returned to room 11. According to Ms Lawson, she was keen to keep out of Mr Dawes’ way and lurked in the bathroom with her drink. He insisted that she come back on to the bed with Ms Roberts, who became upset and left the room.

When Mr Dawes followed her, Ms Lawson rang up Mr Pinder and simply said: “The phones are bugged, but I don’t care any more. I am sick of this and I need help”. She then put the phone down so as not to be caught. After this telephone call, she was reasonably optimistic for a time that perhaps Mr Pinder would get the message and call for help. By this time breakfast was being laid downstairs and she went down to obtain some coffee. After a while, she took coffee up for Mr Dawes and Ms Roberts and then slipped into the bathroom to keep out of their way. Yet again, however, Mr Dawes came into the bathroom and climbed into the bath. She got out, but again he attempted to have sexual intercourse with her against the wash basin. He also forced her to inhale more crack cocaine. Thereafter, she fell asleep until about midday.

At this juncture all three left Chez André and, after dropping Ms Roberts off at her home, Mr Dawes then drove Ms Lawson to the Devereux. While they were there Bridie Doyle brought up some Christmas presents for Mr Dawes and stayed in the room with them. Ms Lawson tried to keep Bridie in the room for as long as possible. When Mr Dawes slipped next door to smoke further crack cocaine, Ms Lawson was able to telephone her family and have a word with them in turn. Once again she burst into tears after the call was over. Mr Doyle’s other daughter brought up some food and the four of them had something to eat while sitting on the bed, although Mr Dawes continued to leave the room from time to time to smoke his crack cocaine. After this he forced Ms Lawson to smoke some herself and also insisted upon oral sex. The phone rang and there was a message that Christmas lunch was available downstairs, but Mr Dawes was not ready to go down for another half an hour.

By this time the food was cold and Ms Lawson was not hungry any way. Over the meal he proposed that they should go to Amsterdam the next day, as he wished to meet Marlene there, and suggested that Katrin and Bridie should also come. This depressed Ms Lawson as she realised that she was not going to be released to go home.

At about 5:00 p.m. they returned to Mr Dawes’ room, where he panicked because he heard dogs barking outside which he thought were “sniffer dogs”. He then hid some cocaine inside two cigars and put his paraphernalia in a cupboard behind the bed. He then emptied a bottle of vodka around the room because it “hides the smell”.

After they went downstairs the panic was over. It was discovered by Mr Doyle and Janusz that it was simply a case of ordinary people walking their dogs outside. Shortly afterwards, it was decided that they should go back to the Chez André and Mr Dawes told Ms Lawson that he had “an imaginary friend in his head” who told him that the Devereux was going to be raided by the police or the customs on Christmas day.

While she was there Ms Lawson told Mr Dawes that there was a party at Hannah Roberts’ house and asked if she could go. She said that her reason for doing this was because she “wanted a lot of people around me so that I wouldn’t be alone with him”. Once at Miss Roberts’ house, Ms Lawson managed to get away from Mr Dawes into Ms Roberts’ bedroom and then to speak again to Mr Pinder. Ms Roberts stood on guard at the door to warn her if Mr Dawes was coming. She managed to tell Mr Pinder that she was going to Amsterdam the next day and that she was not able to talk to him for very long. She then had to put the phone down because Mr Dawes came on the scene.

Then he took Ms Roberts and Ms Lawson, yet again, back to the Devereux. On arrival, Mr Dawes walked straight upstairs but neither Ms Roberts nor Ms Lawson followed him, and they went together into the lounge. After a while he came downstairs and it became clear that he was angry with them both and demanded that they go back to the Chez André.

Having arrived they went again to room 11, and Mr Dawes climbed on to the bed with Ms Roberts. Ms Lawson refused to join them and went into the annex room next door where she slept on some cushions with her coat over her. She was woken by the sound of the telephone (by this time on 26 December). Shortly afterwards Mr Dawes came into the bedroom smoking on his pipe and told her that the police had been in touch. He asked her if she was a criminal and if she was “wanted” back home. He advised her to go to the police station and just say “no comment”. Then he instructed her to come back straight away “or else”. Ms Lawson left and went to the police station as I have already described.

Evidence was given by two women about experiences with Christopher Dawes shortly before the critical events in this case. Both were called by the Claimant.

Miss K gave evidence (in private) about what happened to her over the weekend of 31 October to 1 November 1998, when she was taken to Milan and Amsterdam by Mr Dawes because he was supposedly interested in buying an aeroplane through her agency. It is to be noted that in the course of the weekend he also offered her a job as his personal assistant (as, of course, he later did with Ms Lawson). Over the weekend he plied Miss K with cocaine and had sexual intercourse with her to which, she said, she did not consent.

Miss K was a regular user of cocaine and Mr Kelsey-Fry suggested that she knew perfectly well what she was letting herself in for. She also said at one point in her evidence that it had all been an “error of judgment” – a phrase to which he attached significance as constituting an admission that she had indeed consented, at the time, but may have regretted it subsequently. I think that this is to read too much into her choice of phrase, as she emphasised at the same time that she did not find Christopher Dawes at all attractive and did not wish to have sexual intercourse with him. She was aware of what he did to her but was not in a position to resist because she was, in her words, “high as a kite”.

Whether she did or not consent, however, does not seem to me to matter greatly for present purposes. I do not need to enter into that debate. Her evidence shows a comparable pattern of behaviour on Christopher Dawes’ part. He lured her to various hotels on the basis of some business purpose and, while she was on unfamiliar territory, took the opportunity to drug her and have sexual intercourse. She was in due course rescued by her parents and gave a statement to the police in the immediate aftermath of her experience. That seems to me to support Ms Lawson’s account of his modus operandi.

There was also evidence from Ms Victoria Marks (by video link from Canada) who had visited Christopher Dawes on his cruiser on 13 April 1998 with two other people while it was moored in Alderney. On that occasion he had approached her with the line that he was a mind-reader and that she would bear his children (also common features of Ms Lawson’s experience). All this was said whilst sitting beside her on a bed. Fortunately for Ms Marks, she was not in an alien environment, or alone with him, as she had friends nearby and within call. Miss Marks thought all this “very odd” and that is why she has remembered it. It tends to bear out some of the “very odd” aspects of Ms Lawson’s evidence and significantly undermines the Defendant’s case that her account of Christopher Dawes’ behaviour was inherently implausible. Instead, it appears to form part of a coherent pattern.

Later, in August 1998, he appeared one evening at the Chez André (where she had lived for some years with her parents before they sold it to Christopher Dawes) and asked Ms Marks to accompany him to New York the following day. This offer she declined.

The combination of the evidence of these two witnesses seems to me overwhelmingly to confirm Christopher Dawes’ predatory behaviour towards women and his being “a control freak”.

What then is there to be set in the scales against Amanda Lawson’s account?

First it is said that she is a “drama queen” and prone to exaggeration. I believe that she does tend to dramatise events, but it has to be said that what happened to her over the relevant period was, by most people’s standards, dramatic. The question is not so much her dramatic mode of expressing herself in her witness statements, but whether she has simply invented the essential elements of her story.

More significant, perhaps, is the striking fact that within the week following Christopher Dawes’ death Ms Lawson arranged through a publicist (Mr Max Clifford) to sell her story to the Mail on Sunday for £16,000. It was published on 28 March 1999 under the headline “I was raped and held prisoner for four days by the ‘Man in Black’”. There is what is effectively a sub-heading above a large photograph of Christopher Dawes: “How this woman’s terrible ordeal led to drugs charges for the millionaire computer whizkid killed in a car crash”. There is underneath the photograph a caption: “EVIL ‘GENIUS’: Dawes, above, had created a fortune. Now he craved drugs and his own harem. Right, the hotel where Angela (sic) was held”. (I imagine that the heading and captions were drafted by a sub-editor rather than Ms Lawson.)

There is an even bigger photograph of Ms Lawson, wearing a sleeveless dress and reclining on a bed. The caption is: “SAFE AT LAST: Angela (sic) at home after her escape from Dawes. She cried with relief when he died”. There are also cross headings, alleging “He wanted to set up a private harem” and “I hated the man for what he did to me”.

This article is relied upon primarily on the issue of whether Ms Lawson suffered from PTSD (an issue to which I shall return), since the Defendant’s medical expert, Professor Maden, is strongly of the opinion that someone genuinely suffering from this disorder simply could not have drawn herself to public attention in this way, and it is quite inconsistent with the “avoidance” which is a central feature of PTSD. It is also relevant here, however, as an example of self-dramatising. It is right to put it in context. Ms Lawson told me that it was her sister who suggested that she approach Mr Clifford and sell her story. When she did make contact, his assistant told her that she might as well do so because the story would get into the media any way. Why that should be so is unclear, but it matters not for present purposes. The fact is that she went ahead.

The money was paid directly to her mother, and was intended to be a part repayment of the £25,000 she had earlier lent her to invest in her salon. At that stage, it seems, selling the story (however distasteful it may seem to some people) was the only method available to her of honouring her debt (at least in part) to her mother. Her business was by then on the point of collapse, since Kelly Hickson had not managed to keep it going without Ms Lawson. It is fair also to point out, when one comes to consider the charge that she “pursued these allegations falsely for gain”, that the first demand for compensation from the estate came towards the end of 2000. She did not take the opportunity in the immediate aftermath of his death. The claim form itself was not issued until December 2001.

Next, Mr Kelsey-Fry points out certain apparent inconsistencies between her evidence to the court and her account to the police in her written statements made in January 1999. He put to her that she had “beefed the story up” by adding elements, several years afterwards, which had simply been missing in her nearly contemporaneous accounts. The motive, he suggests, whether it be conscious or unconscious, was that she needed to make it more convincing because, according to her understanding, there was not enough in her original statement to justify a prosecution for rape. As a matter of fact, as I have said, the allegation of rape was still being considered at the time of Christopher Dawes’ death, and no firm decision had been taken. But in this context it is her belief that matters, and she had gained the impression that there was to be no charge of rape. This, and her tendency to gild the lily, might have encouraged her to tell a more compelling story. What then are the supposed inconsistencies?

Mr Kelsey-Fry drew particular attention to the absence in her police statements of any reference to being held down by Christopher Dawes while she was raped; or to violence, shouting or threats; or to her saying “No” when he tried to have (and sometimes succeeded in having) sexual intercourse. It seems to me that the central fact is that she did complain of rape, and did so at the first practical opportunity.

Moreover, in order to test how much there is in these points, it is worth setting out some brief extracts from her statement of 8 January 1999:

“The effect of the drugs on me was dramatic and my memory of this time is blurred and very sketchy. I remember … feeling like a rag doll. … He was pulling down my grey trousers. I just lay there and he was kissing my lips, he raped me, he ejaculated inside me. The drugs rendered me useless and I could do nothing to fight him off.”

Later she said that he had a Jekyll and Hyde character that he became aggressive. She added:

“I was terrified and realised I was dealing with a mad man … He said to me ‘I’ve spoken to a couple of friends in South London’ and he also mentioned that I had a couple of cats. I was terrified and knew that he was threatening me. He asked me if I had a good insurance cover on my shop. He kept making threats against me and then changing the subject.”

In these circumstances, I am unable to conclude that there is any significant inconsistency.

Much emphasis was placed by Mr Kelsey-Fry on the proposition that drunken or drugged consent is nonetheless consent. He referred to Archbold 2006 at paras 19-168 and 19-170 and also to s.75 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, dealing with evidential presumptions about consent in the criminal law context.

Ms Lawson does not accept that she did, at any stage, give her consent. Her case is, in effect, that she was in Christopher Dawes’ power and that there was nothing she could do to stop him. She described herself as feeling like a “rag doll”; in other words, an inanimate object without a will of its own. There is a difference between giving consent while under the influence of drink or drugs and, on the other hand, having the experience of watching oneself being assaulted or raped – without the power to do anything about it.

A variation on Mr Kelsey-Fry’s argument (addressed more in relation to Miss K rather than to the Claimant) was that if a person willingly takes drugs in the first place, thus voluntarily lowering her defences, she may be taken to have consented to what takes place in consequence. That argument, whatever its validity, would be relevant if Ms Lawson had indeed taken crack cocaine willingly (as had Miss K). But she denies this.

It is in this context that it becomes important to consider the second witness statement of Mykal Pinder, her former partner. His story changed quite significantly between his first statement, taken by the Claimant’s solicitors in January 2006, and his second which was given in October, just before the trial, to those acting for the estate. In the second, for whatever reason, one has the distinct impression that Mr Pinder has decided to “put the boot in”. What prompted this change of heart is unclear. He was asked, of course, in cross-examination. His reply was not very enlightening. He said that he wanted to find out, all these years later, what had actually been going on in Alderney. That obviously is not an answer to why he had chosen, when interviewed by a solicitor from Davies Arnold Cooper, suddenly to paint Ms Lawson in an unflattering light.

He accepted that he had been jealous at first, because he suspected that Ms Lawson had simply succumbed to the attentions of a man with infinitely more wealth and decided to ditch him. That suspicion never quite dissipated because he was not given the full story. He also seemed resentful of the fact that the police had never taken a statement from him (presumably as to the telephone calls he had received over the Christmas holiday, which led to their involvement on Boxing Day).

At all events, one of the most significant changes in Mr Pinder’s story is that he threw in for the first time, in October 2006, that Ms Lawson had a cocaine habit prior to visiting Alderney. He said also that she was “adventurous” sexually and enjoyed going to fetish clubs where cocaine was available. There is no doubt that the second statement gave the clear impression that these were the establishments where she took cocaine.

On the other hand, shortly before he went into the witness box, the story changed again, this time to the effect that he and she had both regularly taken cocaine at the house of some friends who lived near her salon (but not at the fetish clubs). They were called Claire and Kim, and they had two children called Tilly and Zak (the Claimant apparently having been godmother to the boy Zak). Ms Lawson had fallen out with them years ago, and they had moved away and become untraceable. Ms Lawson hotly denied the new story and confirmed that she had never taken cocaine, but it was impossible to get to the bottom of the allegations given their late emergence. In any case, it is not suggested that Ms Lawson had ever taken crack cocaine before she was given it by Christopher Dawes.

The purpose of introducing this new material, at so late a stage, was presumably to lend credibility to the proposition that Ms Lawson, having an “adventurous” attitude to sexual encounters, and being used to the pleasures of cocaine, would readily have succumbed to what was on offer in Alderney. This was never put directly, however, and seems to have been left to insinuation. One of the factors which may have motivated Mr Pinder to produce this material was that he was told by the Davies Arnold Cooper representative (I am not sure in what terms) that there had been a “three in a bed” episode while Ms Lawson was in Alderney. This, of course, related to the involvement of Hannah Roberts. I have the strong impression that this revelation stung Mr Pinder into thinking that he had been misled over the years, not least by Ms Lawson’s not giving him a full picture.

Whether this is why Mr Pinder was persuaded to put Ms Lawson in an unfavourable light, so shortly before the trial, I cannot know. Nor can I determine where the truth lies about a previous cocaine habit. In this context I need to bear in mind that Mr Pinder also mentioned that Ms Lawson had taken ecstasy on a number of occasions during their relationship, which she now accepts is true. She had always maintained until recently that she had never touched any hard drugs, although acknowledging that she had been a long term user of cannabis (“to help her unwind at the end of the day”). She denied hard drugs, for example, when interviewed by the medical experts. She now says that she had forgotten about the ecstasy and had only remembered it earlier this year, when Mykal Pinder mentioned some photographs to her. (This was not pursued any further.) She said that she would have corrected her statement in this respect, even if Mr Pinder’s second witness statement had not been produced. I did not find this very convincing.

I am naturally very suspicious about Mr Pinder’s second statement, coming as late as it did. It even tried to downplay the significance of the telephone calls he had received over Christmas. He no longer referred to Ms Lawson being “in some kind of trouble” or to it “sounding quite serious” (see [57] above), but instead went so far as to say:

“Everything seemed fine and she led me to believe that she was working hard on a business plan. I had no concerns for her safety then.”

That I simply disbelieve. He does not offer any explanation in the second statement as to why he had received the telephone call from Bridie Doyle.

On the other hand, I do not need to come to a conclusion on the conflicting evidence about cocaine use. Who is telling lies on this particular topic is not critical to the task. Even if Ms Lawson had used cocaine before, as well as cannabis and ecstasy, it would by no means follow that she stayed voluntarily with Mr Dawes over the Christmas period, or that she willingly took crack cocaine or consented to sexual intercourse with him. It would be a very big step to decide that she made the whole thing up.

Evidence was introduced by the Defendant, late in the day, from Mr Andrew Vaughan, who had been manager at the Chez André at the material time. Apparently he had read some account of this trial in a newspaper, and volunteered himself to Davies Arnold Cooper because he did not wish to see “an injustice” perpetrated. As far as he was concerned, it would be preposterous to claim that Ms Lawson was held in Alderney against her will.

By the time he arrived in the witness box, Mr Vaughan was altogether more cautious. He could not say what went on upstairs at the Chez André, still less at the Devereux, and was only able to speak directly as to Ms Lawson’s demeanour on one occasion which he recalled. He described sitting on some steps with her near the bar in the Chez André and “chatting” while she ate a sandwich. According to him, she seemed relaxed and expressed no anxiety about her supposed plight.

Ms Lawson said not only that she did not recall that episode but that it never happened. Her only positive recollection of Mr Vaughan was at 6:00 a.m. on Christmas Eve when he opened the door at the Chez André to greet them and said “Your room is ready, sir”. Whether she had a sandwich in his presence is ultimately neither here nor there, since she readily accepts that she would not have revealed what was going on to the various people in the Chez André, because she did not know whom she could trust and who were loyal “retainers” of Christopher Dawes. Mr Vaughan clearly was on his staff, and he told the court that he respected Mr Dawes and had no complaints about him.

I did not find that Mr Vaughan’s evidence in any way undermined Ms Lawson’s account.

There was also evidence from Hannah Roberts whose statement was placed before the court but who did not attend for cross-examination. The essential point seemed to be her impression that Ms Lawson was a willing participant in whatever she did – at least in Ms Roberts’ presence. Even she, however, in her police statement of 29 December 1998 described her as “a bit down in the dumps”. She frankly admitted that she was drunk at all material times, and in those circumstances little weight can be attached to what she had to say. I accept that she may well recall certain events, but her capacity for interpreting them and seeing matters in context is fundamentally flawed by her condition.

It is also to be borne in mind that Ms Roberts for some reason rather liked Mr Dawes and, as she told Ms Lawson at one point, had been having a “relationship” with him for several weeks. Ms Lawson clearly formed the impression that Ms Roberts was resentful, or perhaps jealous, over her involvement and that is why she tried, to an extent, to stay out of the way when they were together. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this attitude, combined with her excessive drinking, would have rather coloured her attitude towards Ms Lawson and her role during the visit to Alderney.

For example, she apparently told Christopher Dawes that Ms Lawson was only there for the money (whatever that was supposed to mean) and this caused him to raise the subject with Ms Lawson. For all I know, it may be that this was Ms Roberts’ distortion of the information given her by Ms Lawson (i.e. that her only reason for coming to Alderney was for a job interview). At all events, it is clearly consistent with a desire to put her in a rather bad light.

She was curiously reticent on Mr Dawes’ use of drugs. In a statement of 3 February 1999 she said: “I have never seen him with drugs or anything which would lead me to feel that he uses drugs”. On the other hand, in her statement of 29 December 1998 she admitted: “On Christmas Eve night I remember Chris using a lighter for a very long time but he had his back towards me and was very secretive. I do remember his toilet behaviour was odd. He would go maybe three times an hour, when he would go he was fidgety but when he came back he was bubbly. Sometimes I would ask why he was so long and he said I didn’t need to know”. She then went on to say that she had never seen cocaine but understood that it was a white powder. I did not find this naiveté compelling.

All in all, I did not find that Ms Roberts’ untested evidence assisted me one way or the other in resolving the central issues in the case.

Next I must shortly address the evidence of Mr Simonet, the Alderney estate agent. He confirmed that he had gone with Ms Lawson and Christopher Dawes to Fort Tourgis, although what was the purpose of the visit remains unclear.

Near the fort Mr Simonet and Ms Lawson got out of the vehicle because Mr Dawes wanted to drive over a pile of rubble. This was irrational behaviour and would at least be consistent with the evidence (to borrow a phrase from Miss K) that he was “high as a kite”. Mr Simonet thought it “a little dangerous”. The reason he was called was to illustrate how relaxed and uncomplaining Ms Lawson was in Dawes’ company. She did not complain to him or seek his help because, she says, she was wary of him as he appeared to be in Dawes’ camp It is marginally worth noting that he put up £10,000 bail for him following the arrest and must have thought him trustworthy and respectable. He was probably not a likely candidate, therefore, to be of help to her. Suffice to say, I did not think his evidence shed much light.

A useful definition of false imprisonment was cited to me from Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19^th edn) at para 15.23:

“The prisoner may be confined within a definite space by being put under lock and key or his movements may simply be constrained at the will of another. The constraint may be actual physical force, amounting to an assault, or merely the apprehension of such force”.

From the account she has given, and which I have cited extensively above, it seems to me clear that Ms Lawson was constrained by the apprehension of violence, and that she was falsely imprisoned “at the will” of Christopher Dawes from shortly after her arrival during the afternoon of 23 December until she found her way to the police at 11:00 a.m. on 26 December 1998. I find that she was held against her will and that she would have wished to return to London on 24 December to her salon and to see her family over the Christmas holiday. She did not abandon those plans voluntarily, as the Defendant’s case would imply. I consider that she was scared of Mr Dawes and lost her capacity for rational independent decision-making.

I find also that she was sexually assaulted and raped on a number of occasions between the late evening of 23 December and the evening of Christmas day. She had no wish to have a sexual relationship, either short term or otherwise, with Christopher Dawes. She did not at any time consent. Some argument was directed to where the burden of proof lies in this respect, but I wish to make it clear that my conclusion is unequivocal and does not turn on that legal issue. I believe Ms Lawson on that point.

Moreover, the drugs which were administered to her over this period were not taken voluntarily. She went to Alderney for one purpose only, namely to have an interview for a possible job with a rather ill defined role managing a modelling agency (which never materialised). My conclusion is consistent broadly with what she told the police on 26 December as soon as she could realistically make contact with them. Likewise, her total change of attitude to her business, which she had built up quite successfully over many years, is only explicable by her having been significantly traumatised while in Alderney. It seems to me wholly contrary to the probabilities that this story was simply made up – still less made up to obtain a financial “killing” (for which she made no claim until her letter before action nearly two years later).

In these circumstances, I have found no difficulty in concluding that Ms Lawson was entitled to succeed on the issues of liability.

One of the principal areas of dispute between the medical experts was whether or not the Claimant’s symptoms can be characterised as attributable to the disorder known as PTSD. This is a matter to some extent of subjective assessment and judgment – in two senses. Not only does the individual expert have to apply a degree of subjective assessment in the light of the available information, but much of that information derives in turn from the completion of self-assessment forms by the Claimant. It seems to be accepted that it is relatively easy for professionals to be misled into a false diagnosis of PTSD; in particular, by inaccurate self-reporting on the part of the patient concerned. Whether this happens honestly or dishonestly is to a large extent beside the point. The questionnaire process is, certainly in the view of the Defendant’s expert, Professor Maden, inherently unreliable. It is notable, for example, that the forms consist of a series of quasi-leading questions. A whole list of symptoms is set out, some of which may not even have entered the individual patient’s head until he or she sees them set out on the page. On the other hand, the Claimant’s expert, Mr Dykes, relied inter alia upon the Beck Depression Inventory, in which he has confidence, and the reliability of which was recognised at one stage in a paper recounting a study of Vietnam veterans (referred to as the Frueh paper). Of course research is one thing, but self-assessment from people who are in the throes of making claims for financial compensation is quite another. To put it no higher, it is difficult to retain one’s dispassionate objectivity.

Professor Maden is Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at Imperial College, and he was in my judgment the more impressive of the two as a witness in this case. Even so, he did not present a wholly consistent or coherent picture with regard to this Claimant in which one could have complete confidence. Mr Dykes, who is a chartered clinical psychologist, seemed to me to lack objectivity and declined to accept some points put to him in cross-examination which were plainly valid. His analysis was, I thought, somewhat rigid and dogmatic. Also, in certain respects, most notably regarding the “clinician administered scale”, he presented his conclusions without being able to back them with the evidence on which they were based, whether by notes or otherwise, or an account of the reasoning processes which led to them.

Professor Maden in his original report of October 2002 formed the view that the Claimant presented as a straightforward woman who was attempting to be honest about her experiences and her symptoms. He concluded that the diagnostic criteria for PTSD were indeed fulfilled, although she was not suffering from a depressive illness. Nevertheless, he had some reservations about her symptoms:

“1.2

The Claimant’s presentation is unusual in that her problems appear to have had relatively little impact on her desire and ability to form intimate relationships, although I note the diminished enjoyment of sexual activity. I would have expected an assault of this type to have its main impact on the Claimant’s personal life, rather than her work life, yet she reports the opposite.

1.3

The Claimant’s appearance and demeanour at interview were rather better than one would have expected, given the range and severity of the problems she describes. There are some contradictions in her symptoms. For example, her expressed optimism about making a living from painting does not sit well with her complaints of depression.”

In a second report dated 19 June 2006, Professor Maden expressed the view that the Claimant no longer suffered from PTSD, having apparently responded to treatment. He seemed to put the point of recovery as early as the close of 2003. This clearly recognises, consistently with his first opinion, that Ms Lawson had suffered from PTSD for some years. The report contains, however, the following significant passages:

“7 … The Claimant has a tendency to link every subsequent adverse event to the assault by Dawes, but there is no medical basis for that belief. Her account of the last few years amounts to a description of normal reactions to the normal experiences of life. …

10.

The ongoing legal proceedings are contributing to the Claimant’s preoccupation with events in the distant past. There should be an improvement once those proceedings are concluded, for two reasons. First, one source of stress in her life will have been removed; and second, she will no longer automatically relate all problems in her life to the alleged assault. However, I do not expect any dramatic change. I believe that the Claimant’s current presentation is probably consistent with her normal personality.

11.

Habitual use of cannabis is probably making the problems worse. She describes a moderate to high level of regular consumption. Cannabis has been linked to an amotivational syndrome in regular users. If she wishes to get on with her life and get back to work, the best simple mental health advice would be to cease the regular use of a sedative drug that causes apathy and lethargy”.

Three months later, however, in a letter of 13 September 2006, the Professor had come to a different conclusion; that is to say, that she had never suffered from PTSD in the first place. Despite his experience and undoubted distinction, this changing picture makes it difficult to identify a clear and convincing conclusion on his part about causation in this case.

By 20 October, a joint statement had been produced. It seems that the experts felt inhibited in coming to firm conclusions because they were unable to accept as a datum the proposition that the allegations of rape, assault and false imprisonment were true. This is simply because they were recognising that it was the court’s function to decide that. Accordingly, Professor Maden was asked in cross-examination to address the hypothesis that her account of those events in 1998 was essentially accurate. On that scenario, he accepted that the symptoms she described could well have been a direct consequence.

I have now concluded that Ms Lawson’s story was in essence true. Some of the uncertainty has, therefore, been removed for the purpose of the present exercise. As I have already noted, one of the most compelling factors in the case is the sudden collapse in Ms Lawson’s capacity and enthusiasm for the business she had built up. I can find no other plausible explanation than that she suffered disabling trauma and psychological symptoms as a direct result of what happened in Alderney. Whether it is right to attach the label PTSD is perhaps less significant than to assess the symptoms she actually suffered herself (even if they do not necessarily correspond completely to those incurred by other people who have been diagnosed with PTSD).

I accept in particular that there were periods of anxiety, flashbacks, poor sleep patterns and a degree of reluctance to meet people – which led to some withdrawal from social activity and an inclination to fall back on her own company or that of her immediate family. Her diaries demonstrate, however, and she did not suggest otherwise, that the withdrawal was far from complete and, as Professor Maden put it, she did not suffer from anhedonia (i.e. a lost capacity for enjoyment). I accept also that she does not suffer from clinical depression.

I am prepared to accept Professor Maden’s opinion that it is unusual to find that the primary impact of such a trauma has been upon the patient’s working life rather than, at least on the surface, her capacity for sustaining social and personal relationships. But, if I may say it without intending any disrespect, so what? The point may be relevant to whether the label PTSD should be attached, but it does not of itself undermine the genuineness of her symptoms.

The impact on Ms Lawson’s life at that time was profound. It is easier to conclude in her case than it might be with a plodding and unenthusiastic employee that she was not “swinging the lead”. She gave up quite suddenly the business she had built up over the previous decade when things were apparently going well. She also stopped doing her “session work” before it had got underway and when she was clearly receiving encouragement and plaudits. She would not have given up unless, in the immediate aftermath of the assaults, she felt quite unable to carry on.

It is right that I should set out certain paragraphs from the joint statement of the experts, which encapsulate the persisting differences between them:

“3.

We disagree as to her present psychological condition. Prof Maden believes there is no current psychological damage. Mr Dykes believes there is a persistent, but varying over time, residue of symptoms.

4.

Prof Maden believes there was inconsistency at both his interviews with he Claimant and exaggeration of symptoms at the second; Mr Dykes cannot comment upon the content of those interviews, but notes a tendency towards consistency in his contact with Miss Lawson.

5.

We agree that the Claimant has suffered a series of recent life events, including bereavement, miscarriage and the breakdown of a relationship that would have been sufficient to cause depression or other psychological problems in an average person irrespective of any previous vulnerability.

6.

Prof Maden believes that the current psychological symptoms could be explained by these life-events without reference to the initial events because there was evidence of normal functioning between the evidence. Mr Dykes maintains that the vulnerability after such an initial event makes reaction to later events more problematic.

7.

Prof Maden believes that the Claimant’s regular use of cannabis is contributing to her problems. Mr Dykes believes the use of the drug is ill advised but common in such circumstances. We agree that abstinence would be necessary before attempting any treatment and that treatment would be less likely to succeed without abstinence.

8.

Prof Maden did not know when he prepared his first report that the Claimant had sold her story to a newspaper. He sees this behaviour as incompatible with the avoidance that characterises post traumatic stress disorder. Prof Maden’s experience is that victims of sexual assault commonly experience profound feelings of shame and are therefore reluctant to discuss their experiences with anyone including doctors and therapists. Mr Dykes has known this to occur on some occasions (and therefore rarely) in his experience”.

Mr Dykes did not reveal in how many instances he had “known this to occur” or how comparable the circumstances were.

The Claimant was not completely “put off men” and was not so traumatised by her experiences that she was unable to face sexual activity (as sometimes happens with rape victims), but she did say that she was primarily looking thereafter for intimate companionship rather than purely sexual gratification. She said that she found that she really needed a drink or two before having sexual intercourse (which had not been the case beforehand). She also found that day to day relations with other people became more difficult, which she contends is one of the main reasons why she gave up the brief periods of employment that she undertook. It seems reasonably clear to me that her experiences did affect her social and personal relationships, although not perhaps as drastically as happens with some other victims.

After her relationship with Mr Pinder terminated, she formed some other relationships with men which led to positive and apparently happy experiences, recorded in her diary, and as one might expect, also, unhappy periods following break-downs in such relationships. In one case, she was planning to have a baby but sadly suffered a miscarriage. This tends to illustrate that some of her recorded unhappiness was related to normal life-events rather than to the continuing effect of the Alderney trauma – though it no doubt did continue to have an effect. I also note that Mr Dykes in cross-examination accepted that it would be unusual to observe in a PTSD patient what he had recorded in relation to Ms Lawson; namely, that having improved by their second meeting her symptoms became worse again. This too is consistent with the fluctuations being explained in terms of the ordinary “ups and downs” of life, to which most people are subject.

As I noted earlier, Professor Maden found the Mail on Sunday story to be quite inconsistent with the “avoidance” which is generally so characteristic of PTSD and also with the general trend for such victims to hide themselves away from public gaze. This appears to have led him to doubt his earlier diagnosis because the pattern of symptoms relayed to him may not have been accurate. Given the significance Professor Maden attached to this, it is unfortunate that he did not explore it with her to find out the motivation. Perhaps he thought that his inferences would still be valid. Nevertheless, if the incident is to be relied on as evidence that her symptoms were fabricated, it would surely have merited some discussion.

Two other factors are difficult to assess. First, the long term reliance on cannabis. I accept Professor Maden’s view that it is contributing to her problems, and it certainly pre-dated the traumatic experiences. It is inhibiting her rehabilitation. That is a relevant consideration on whether the Claimant has mitigated her loss.

Secondly, the litigation has been a source of uncertainty and additional stress for a number of years - longer than necessary. As Mr Soole put it, her previous solicitors did not cover themselves with glory. Indeed, at one stage the claim had actually been struck out by the Master as a result of inactivity (albeit reinstated by the Judge on appeal). I am prepared to accept Professor Maden’s view that this incubus has also inhibited progress and, as regularly happens, that there is reason to suppose that once it is out of the way she should be able to approach her life more constructively.

Professor Maden thought that Ms Lawson’s preoccupation with the court case and the possibility of obtaining compensation was interfering with attempts at treatment. It is interesting to note that on 27 July 2006 he recorded that Ms Metaxa-Barham of the Traumatic Stress Clinic, who had been treating her, concluded in 2005 that there was no further point in treating her until “the appeal court hearing” was out of the way. I am not sure whether he is attributing too much in this respect to Ms Metaxa-Barham, and I therefore propose to ignore this plank in his reasoning.

I am not persuaded in the light of the evidence that the events of December 1998 have rendered Ms Lawson incapable of working for the rest of her life. That conclusion seems consistent with her demeanour in court to which both counsel referred. I make due allowance for someone putting on a “brave face”, but even so I did not have the impression of a woman incapable of getting on with her life or being unable to communicate with people. She coped well with quite a long period in the witness box.

The psychological symptoms have persisted for some years, and I do not think one can confidently conclude that they came to an end at some arbitrary cut off point (such as December 1993). I do not believe, in this context, that Professor Maden has sufficiently taken into account the treatment given by Ms Metaxa-Barham in 2005, and the nature of the symptoms to which it was directed. She underwent cognitive behaviour therapy and eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR), which are forms of psychotherapy specifically aimed at PTSD (and recommended by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence). This took place initially from March to August 2003. But, although it helped her to cope better and to re-enter the working environment, she remained vulnerable to some extent. Professor Maden is of the view, however, that the particular reasons why she felt unable to cope any further in her two jobs could not be attributed to her Alderney trauma, and there is no solid evidence to gainsay him. Ms Lawson was referred back to Ms Metaxa-Barham by her GP in June 2005 and six one-to-one sessions took place between 6 July and 21 September of that year.

Her evidence, which was read to the court after certain deletions, tends to confirm that Ms Lawson has not been able to put to one side the horrors of her experience altogether: there are still residual symptoms of anxiety and distress. In particular, she remained unable to face an enlarged photograph of Christopher Dawes, which would be too frightening for her. Nor do I find that inherently surprising, given what I have found about the primary facts. So much depends on the resilience of the individual concerned. Nevertheless, I would accept Professor Maden’s view that her continuing symptoms of anxiety are relatively mild and not disabling, and that she was “probably fit for work” at least by June 2006.

Once the claim is disposed of, however, I believe that some form of “closure” will be more readily achieved. The litigation has required having to go on reliving her experience and having to confront it (not least in cross-examination). It is very unlikely that she will be able to resume her business or to break into the session work she was hoping for, but I do not see why such an experienced hairdresser should not be able to find employment where her services would be properly valued.

In these circumstances, it now falls to me to decide what compensation should be recovered. It is not an easy task. In particular, there are very few decided cases which give guidance as to the range of damages appropriate for cases where the assault consists of, or includes, the uniquely terrifying and intrusive criminal offence of rape. Here, I accept, there were at least four or five instances of rape – possibly more – quite apart from the other indecent assaults including attempted rape.

It seems to be accepted by counsel, and I think rightly, that I should approach the assessment of general damages by arriving at a global figure to include all the tortious elements and the aggravation which the circumstances undoubtedly would merit: see e.g. Richardson v Howie [2004] EWCA Civ 1127.

I have been referred to a number of authorities which give such assistance as is available. Although I was shown also awards made by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, I need to be wary of these because different criteria are applied.

I was supplied with a transcript of Griffiths v Williams, an unreported decision of the Court of Appeal, of 21 November 1995, and in particular my attention was drawn to passages at pp. 21-22 (Rose LJ) and p. 28 (Millett LJ). These emphasise how seriously rape had by then come to be treated and, in particular, that it is “in a quite different category from personal injury cases in general”. The overall award in that case, including aggravated damages was £50,000. It was a case, like the present, in which the victim had to go through a trial and deal with an allegation of consent.

Of course, there has been significant inflation since then, and also the impact of Heil v Rankin [2001] QB 272 needs to be borne in mind in making a comparison. Even so, the level of awards contemplated by the courts may be thought by some people not adequately to reflect the scale of wrongdoing and the level of distress generally suffered by rape victims, when compared to some other forms of injury. I can understand that. Nevertheless, I should do my best to adhere to the tariff already sanctioned in the relatively few cases available. Consistency is important, not least because it enables lawyers to advise their clients with a reasonable degree of confidence as to the likely scale of compensation. It is thus necessary for judges to refrain (as always) from giving vent to any sense of personal outrage, while registering of course the impact on the particular claimant’s feelings of each of the individual wrongs committed and the aggravating circumstances. The exercise is that of assessing fair and proportionate compensation and is not punitive.

It seems to me that the justice of the case, having regard to the conventions applied, would be an award of general damages in the sum of £78,500. That may seem high in comparison to Griffiths v Williams, even allowing for the intervening period of inflation, but this is a significantly more serious case, involving multiple rape, and a longer and more terrifying ordeal. Also the lead up to the trial, and the inevitable stress of giving evidence, has been more drawn out. The symptoms, albeit they have improved as time has gone by, have persisted to some extent for six or seven years.

I turn now to the claim for special damages. The first matter to be considered is the extent of the past loss in respect of earnings from Headquarters. The claim for past loss of earnings is put very modestly on the basis of the accounts from 1995 onwards. It is said that the overall pattern (excepting 1997-98) showed a net profit somewhere in excess of £10,000 “probably keeping pace with inflation”. The evidence suggests that over the intervening period (seven years and ten months) the Claimant’s net loss of income would average about £12,000, yielding a total of £94,000.

Naturally, credit will need to be given in respect of the relatively brief periods of employment (in a Mind charity shop and as a manager in a hairdressing business called “Creative Headlines”). That involves a deduction of £8,175. DSS benefits need also to be taken into account. I am told that the correct figure is £29,263. Although it was disputed for a time, it is now recognised that it would be inappropriate to give credit for the £16,000 paid by the Mail on Sunday.

The next head of loss relates to the lost opportunity of paid “session work”. It is submitted on the Defendant’s behalf that this is simply too speculative, especially as the Claimant had earned nothing prior to the events in question. As against that, the evidence as to her talent and commitment is quite compelling. How she would have been able to dovetail such work with her Headquarters business is essentially speculative, since she would probably have needed to find and pay an experienced assistant to keep the salon profitable. Without Ms Lawson, the business rapidly deteriorated. The cost of an additional experienced member of staff would clearly have encroached, at least for a time, on the salon’s profitability. In other words, the evidence would not justify assuming that Ms Lawson’s personal earnings would have continued on a plateau in addition to her receiving fees from “session work”. Possibly it could have been fitted in out of salon hours, but one can only speculate.

I do not think it would be right to put this claim to one side entirely as the evidence of Ms Tavakkoli and Ms Papadopoulos lends considerable support, but I can do no more than make a conservative estimate of a lost chance. It is thus necessary to consider what the court’s approach should be in the light of such cases as Allied Maples v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602 and Doyle v Wallace [1998] PIQR 146, CA.

In Allied Maples Stuart-Smith LJ addressed three different situations (although I do not suppose they were intended to exhaust all possibilities that might arise). The first category would cover cases in which there had been a positive act or misfeasance and the question of causation was one of historical fact, where the test should be on a balance of probabilities. In the second were cases where the negligence consisted of an omission, and it would be necessary to answer the hypothetical question “what would the [claimant] have done if there had been no negligence?” Here the test again would be proof on a balance of probabilities.

In the third category fall those cases where it is necessary to consider the hypothetical actions of a third party; that is to say, where a claimant’s loss would depend, at least in part, upon what a third party might or might not have done. In such circumstances, all that is required is that the claimant can establish a substantial chance that the particular hypothesis would have materialised. Such a chance may be less than likely. It is not necessary to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the third party would have behaved as the claimant suggests.

Here, of course, it is necessary to make some assessment of the potential demand for Ms Lawson’s services from a range of unidentifiable third parties (i.e. potential clients). That inevitably makes the exercise even more uncertain.

As to the lost opportunity of paid session work, I propose to deal with it on a conservative basis by way of a lump sum of £30,000.

The latest schedule is dated 3 October and the counter-schedule 26 July 2006. The claim for future loss of earnings is put at £318,576. That is based on a multiplicand of £22,610 (said to reflect the loss of net income from the salon plus that from “session work”). The multiplier contended for is 14.09.

In the light of the evidence, and my conclusions set out above, this seems to be overambitious. Mr Dykes was not in a position to refute the proposition that there is likely to be a significant improvement once the trial is out of the way. His prognosis is cautious, certainly, but I can find no convincing reasons to suppose that Ms Lawson will be unemployable for the next 18 years. I think it reasonable to allow for one more year at the average annual rate of £12,000 to give a margin for further recovery following the conclusion of this litigation. Beyond that, I do not believe that the case has been made out for continuing loss of employment.

Therefore in respect of the claim for loss of income I award a total of £136,000 (£94,000 + £12,000 + £30,000), from which the deductions I have identified will have to be made. Interest must also be taken into account.

Additionally, there is a claim for the loss of the Headquarters business, effectively as a saleable asset. By March 1999, since Ms Hickson could not gather together the

There are also miscellaneous past losses agreed at £837.50.

No doubt the interest will be agreed and the total award calculated in the light of that.