David Uyi v Osamudiamen Abraham (aka John Imade, aka Pastor Osas Osakue of Light of Life Church)

By this claim, issued on 2 July 2021, the Claimant alleges that the Defendant made statements that were defamatory of him in a video posted on the Defendant’s Facebook and You Tube channels on 18 August 2020.

The Claimant is a pastor of the Gospel Church, Benin, Nigeria. The Defendant is a former member of the Gospel Church, London branch. From 2018 he has been a Pastor in the Light of Life Church, London SE13 7BN. The video features the Defendant giving a speech in the style of a sermon, including making various references to parts of the Bible.

On 25 January 2024 Senior Master Cook order a trial on the papers of the following preliminary issues: (i) the meaning of each of the four statements complained of in paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim (“POC”); (ii) whether each of those meanings is a statement of fact or opinion; and (iii) whether each of those meanings was defamatory at common law.

It is well established that a judge seeking to determine meaning should “capture an initial reaction, before reading or hearing argument…” see, for example, Hijazi v Yaxley-Lennon [2020] EWHC 934 (QB) at [8] and Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19 at [8]. I performed this task by reading the words complained of in the Particulars of Claim and watching the video, without reading the competing cases or submissions on meaning, thereby forming some initial views on meaning. I then read the statements of case and considered the written submissions made by both parties.

As well as conducting the trial, by order of Mrs Justice Steyn dated 7 May 2024 I was required to consider whether the Claimant should be granted permission to amend his POC in the form he had served in draft on 5 February 2021, if required.

The Claimant does not need such permission because on 16 May 2024 correspondence was received indicating that the Defendant consented to the amendments. Accordingly CPR 17.1(2)(a) applies.

However I direct under CPR PD 17, paragraphs 2.2-2.4 that the Claimant provide a fresh version of the Amended Particulars of Claim (“APOC”) showing the amendments in red, underlined text so that they can be more easily identified. The original text need not be shown.

At paragraph 4 of the APOC the Claimant complains that four statements made by the Defendant were defamatory. He numbers them I, II, III and IV. The statements were made during the course of a video that runs for just over 1½ hours. The content of the video is very discursive, repetitive and at times hard to decipher.

At paragraph 3 of the APOC the Claimant cites 16 extracts from the video, from which the four statements are drawn. These extracts are set out at Appendix A to this judgment.

After filing the bundle for the preliminary issue trial, the Claimant provided a full transcript of the video. I am conscious that this has not been agreed by the Defendant.

Without the transcript it would have been impossible to identify where in the video the statements complained of occurred, not least because (i) neither paragraph 3 nor paragraph 4 of the APOC contain any time markings for the passages referred to therein; and (ii) paragraph 3 of the APOC does not set out the extracts relied on entirely chronologically, in that the 16^th pleaded extract in fact occurs on the video between the 11th and 12^th pleaded extracts.

For these reasons I order the Claimant to amend the APOC further, to add in to paragraphs 3 and 4 the precise time markings in the video where each of the statements occur. These amendments should also be made in red, underlined text.

The Defendant should also indicate whether the transcript of the video is agreed and if not in what respects he disputes the Claimant’s version. If there are disputes as to what has been said, I direct that the parties provide a composite version of the transcript setting out the competing versions.

Finally, the APOC should be endorsed with the statement required by PD 17, paragraph 2.1, to the effect that they have been amended under CPR 17.1(2)(a).

The Defendant has permission to file an Amended Defence in light of the APOC if so advised.

The amendments do not relate to the issues for the preliminary issues trial such that they can be determined without sight of any Amended Defence.

The Court is not determining what the statements relied upon could plausibly mean, or the range of meanings that different people might take from them, but their single true meaning: Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593 at [34]; see also Neville v Fine Art and General Insurance Co [1897] AC 68 at [73].

The single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear: Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 173D–E, per Lord Diplock.

In Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 at [12], Nicklin J distilled the principles from the caselaw as follows:

Counsel for the Defendant emphasised the following further principles, which I have borne in mind:

The Defendant submitted that before analysing each of the four statements of which the Claimant complaints, I should consider the publication as a whole and to read the extracts from the transcript pleaded at paragraph 3 of the APOC. I have done so.

The Defendant contended that to the ordinary reasonable reader, casually watching the whole publication once, it is frankly incomprehensible. It is full of Biblical and culturally-specific references that an ordinary reasonable reader would find difficult to understand. The speaker uses so much metaphorical language that it is often difficult to tell which parts are metaphorical, and which parts are intended literally. The speaker refers to so many different people and past events so quickly, with so little context, that the story is hard to follow. The speaker speaks very angrily, and very quickly. The rhetoric and tone is so overblown, and so extreme, that it is difficult to take any of it seriously.

He argued that in that context, all the ordinary reasonable reader would take from the publication as a whole is that (i) the speaker clearly hates the person he is talking about and (ii) the speaker and the other person have religious differences. Neither of those imputations are defamatory, and indeed both are true. Beyond that, the ordinary reasonable reader would struggle to say what, exactly, the speaker is talking about.

He submitted that the Claimant is effectively inviting the Court to take particular phrases from the video out of context, and “finely-parse” their words in the calm and quiet of the courtroom, in a manner that is artificial. It is simply not how the ordinary reasonable reader would view the publication.

I cannot accept that submission. It is true that the video contains many Biblical references and metaphors and that the Defendant speaks angrily and quickly at times. On occasion it is not clear when a Biblical reference has ended and when conventional rhetoric has resumed. However in my judgment an ordinary reasonable person watching the video would understand that one of its central messages was to be highly critical of the conduct of a particular person, identified later in the video as the Claimant (by reference to his church) and to make a series of serious allegations about him. While the language is, at times, repetitive and florid, I conclude that an ordinary reasonable person would understand the broad thrust of what the Defendant was saying. That was the provisional view I had formed when watching the video during the process set out at [4] above.

The first statement relied on is that the Claimant “came forth as Elder David but he’s a false pastor he’s a false pastor of the seed of Belial”.

The Claimant’s case is that the meaning of these words is that he “was intentionally and/or recklessly, grossly manipulating his congregation and the public in general, and employed the use of voodoo and fetish powers to charm and mislead his congregation, take advantage of them, and at the same time suppressing them by virtue of his rule”.

I agree with the Defendant that it is not reasonable to derive reference to manipulating or supressing people or using “voodoo” or “fetish powers” from Statement I: none of these words feature in, or can be readily understood from, it.

I also accept the Defendant’s submission that an ordinary reasonable reader would be unlikely to understand what “Belial” means. The Defendant contends that this is a Hebrew word for the devil, but that the Claimant has not pleaded and proved that the statement was communicated to someone who understood Hebrew or the Old Testament references.

Further, I agree that describing the Claimant as “the seed of Belial” - presumably the son of the devil - does not convey that he is literally the son of the devil: it is simply a generalised assertion that he is some kind of bad person without asserting in what way he is. On that basis I accept the Defendant’s submission that this element of Statement I is vulgar abuse and not a defamatory imputation of fact.

In respect of the description of the Claimant as a “false pastor”, the Defendant suggests that to a pastor of one religious belief, a pastor of another different religious belief is a “false pastor”, in the sense that the first pastor believes the second’s religious belief is false. That is not necessarily defamatory of itself – simply having religious differences (which the speaker believes are “false”) would not necessarily disparage the Claimant in the eyes of an ordinary reasonable reader in a modern, multi-religious society.

I do not accept that this is what an ordinary reasonable person would conclude was the meaning of “false pastor” in this video. This description of the Claimant is repeated throughout the video. The Defendant repeatedly says that the Claimant has worn “sheep’s clothing”, presumably a reference to the “wolf in sheep’s clothing” expression. This generally means someone whose pleasant and friendly appearance conceals the fact that they are evil. Throughout the video the Defendant makes a series of specific and very serious allegations about the Claimant with respect to his conduct towards his wife, and people within his congregation, notably women and young girls.

Bearing in mind that context, in my judgment the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the Defendant’s description of the Claimant as a “false pastor” to relate to a suggestion that his conduct was not what one would expect of a genuine pastor, properly conducting themselves.

Specifically, I find that the meaning of the first statement was that “the Claimant was intentionally and/or recklessly misleading his congregation and the wider public”. This was part of the Claimant’s case on the meaning of this statement, and the Defendant’s alternative case on the issue, and I accept it.

The second statement relied on by the Claimant is that “we are saying an anti-Christ now in a sheep clothing in the name of David to deceive God’s children”.

The Claimant’s case is that the meaning of these words is “that the Claimant was intentionally and/or recklessly, grossly manipulating his congregation and the public in general, and employed the use of fraudulent and crafty means to disguise himself in order to derive some favours from the congregation and portray himself in a way that he is not”.

The Defendant’s primary case is that the statement conveys no defamatory meaning of fact at all: calling a person the “anti-Christ” is, to an ordinary reasonable reader, simply vulgar abuse that amounts to a suggestion that they are generally immoral, rather than literally suggesting they are the Biblical Antichrist. I accept this submission insofar as it relates to the word “anti-Christ” in isolation.

The Defendant suggests that the phrase “deceiv[ing] God’s children” when said by a preacher of different religious beliefs could be an expression of religious difference and thus not defamatory: a Catholic priest might similarly regard an imam who converts one of their congregation as “deceiving God’s children”. As the Court cannot decide which religious belief is objectively correct, such a statement would necessarily be a matter of opinion.

Seen in context, I do not consider that an ordinary reasonable reader would understand the meaning of this phrase to reflect religious differences between the Defendant and the Claimant.

Rather, given the contextual matters referred to at [32] above, I accept the Defendant’s alternative case that this statement is an imputation that the Claimant was acting in a dishonest fashion. In the context of the remainder of the video, I conclude that an ordinary reasonable reader would understand that the meaning was that the Claimant was behaving in this fashion towards members his own congregation.

The third statement relied on by the Claimant is as follows:

The Claimant pleads that the meaning of these words is “that the church which the Claimant founded from scratch was stolen property, and consequently, the Claimant, who was the founder, a thief” and that the Claimant is “equally crafty and not straightforward”.

The Defendant submits that the Claimant is interpreting the reference to having “stole[n] the church” too literally. Insofar as any meaning can be taken from this statement, he contends that it is effectively describing a power struggle between two rival pastors for the following of a religious congregation. The “church”, in this context, is not the physical bricks and mortar of a church building: it is the belief of the congregation. It therefore simply means that the Claimant has supplanted the existing pastor; and to say that a person has won such a power struggle is not necessarily defamatory.

I agree that an ordinary reasonable reader would not understand the meaning of this statement to be that the Claimant had dishonestly appropriating moveable property belonging to another. However, seen in the context of the video as a whole, I consider that an ordinary reasonable reader would understand its meaning to refer to something more than an uncontroversial transition of power between two pastors: I accept the Defendant’s alternative case, to the effect that this passage means that the Claimant had “supplanted the previous pastor by discreditable means”.

The fourth statement relied on by the Claimant is as follows:

The Claimant pleads that the meaning of these words is that that he is a “murderer and a serial killer known for employing several means to kill his members with whom he might have some conflict or dispute”.

However this is an extreme allegation that is simply not in the text. I do not consider that the ordinary reasonable reader would elicit it from the words of the statement.

The Defendant contends that such a reader would likely find the combination of references to people who they have never heard of, and metaphorical language of “blood…on your hands”, in the context of an invocation of “the God that made the heavens and the earth”, totally incomprehensible. Accordingly, it conveys no defamatory imputations of fact at all.

I cannot accept this submission. Seen in the context of the other allegations made about the Claimant’s conduct, I accept the Defendant’s alternative case that an ordinary reasonable reader would understand the meaning of this statement to be that the Claimant had moral responsibility for the safety of his congregation, and had questions to answer about whether he failed in that moral responsibility by allowing members of the congregation to come to harm (not necessarily fatally).

I accept the Defendant’s submission that this is the meaning of the fourth statement because (i) the words refer to moral judgment by “Almighty God”, not legal judgment; (ii) having “blood…on your hands” is not only consistent with murder in the legal sense, but also with moral responsibility for harm coming to people in other ways; (iii) the speaker does not say in terms that the Claimant is responsible in this sense but merely asks the question “What happened to them? How did they pass on?”; (iv) to say that the Claimant has “questions to answer” is not the same as positively asserting that he has failed in his moral responsibility; and (v) having a person’s blood on one’s hands is not only consistent with the person being dead but can refer to harm short of death.

In Koutsogiannis at [16], Nicklin J held that when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the Court will be guided by the following points:

Further, as Warby LJ explained in Blake and others v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000:

Counsel for the Defendant contended that while the line between fact and opinion is sometimes difficult to draw, one helpful indicator is whether the issue is ultimately a value judgment, about which reasonable minds may differ: see British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2010] EWCA Civ 350, [2011] 1 WLR 133 at [26].

Statement I to the effect that the Claimant was intentionally and/or recklessly misleading his congregation and the wider public is, in my judgment, one that the ordinary reasonable reader would understand to be a statement of fact: it is a bare comment that indicates that the Claimant has acted in a certain way but does not give details of the allegations (see Koutsogiannis at [16]iv)] and it gives no indication of or reference to any supporting facts (see Blake at [24]).

I reach the same conclusion, for the same reasons, in respect of Statement II to the effect that the Claimant had acted in a dishonest fashion towards members his own congregation; and Statement III, to the effect that Claimant had supplanted the previous pastor by discreditable means.

I take a different view in respect of Statement IV, to the effect that the Claimant had moral responsibility for the safety of his congregation, and had questions to answer about whether he failed in that moral responsibility by allowing members of the congregation to come to harm (not necessarily fatally). I consider that this is a matter of deduction and inference, akin to a value judgment, and would thus be understood by the ordinary reasonable reader as a statement of opinion, rather than fact.

At common law, an imputation will be treated as defamatory if “the words complained of fall within one, or more, of the several tests that have, at various times, been offered by the Courts. That is to say the imputation must be to the claimant’s discredit; or to tend to lower him in the estimation of others; or cause him to be shunned or avoided; or expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule”: Gatley at 2-001.

In Blake at [26], Warby LJ reiterated that a statement is defamatory if it (a) attributes to the claimant behaviour or views that are “contrary to common shared views of our society” and (b) would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the Claimant: see also Millett at [9]

Counsel for the Defendant emphasised that whether the true meaning is defamatory depends on whether it tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of members of society generally; and a statement will not be defamatory “merely because it tends to disparage the claimant in the eyes of a particular class or group of persons”: Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240 and Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (20th ed) at [13-007]. Further, “vituperation” of the claimant (so-called “vulgar abuse”) is not actionable: Thorp v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000, [2024] EMLR 2 at [27].

In my judgment the meanings of all four of the statements was defamatory of the Claimant at common law. They alleged, respectively, that he was intentionally and/or recklessly misleading his congregation and the wider public; was acting in a dishonest fashion towards members his own congregation; had supplanted the previous pastor by discreditable means; and had questions to answer about whether he failed in his moral responsibility for the safety of his congregation by allowing members of the congregation to come to harm (not necessarily fatally).

These were all attributed behaviours that were to the Claimant’s discredit; would tend to lower him in the estimation of others; were contrary to the common shared views of our society; and would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the way that people would treat him. I did not understand the Defendant’s alternative case with respect to each of the meanings, which I have accepted, to suggest otherwise.

For all these reasons I conclude that: