Jacqueline Kirk & Anor v Culina Group Limited & Anor

a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit for driving;

cocaine at four times the legal limit for driving;

Benzoylecgonine at seven times the legal limit for driving; and

THS (the active ingredient of cannabis) at four times the legal limit for driving.

failing to keep any or any adequate lookout;

driving too fast;

failing to stop, slow down or swerve to avoid the Deceased;

failing to observe or heed the presence of the Deceased as a pedestrian on or in the vicinity of the carriageway;

failing to have any or any sufficient regard for pedestrian traffic that he might expect to be in the vicinity of the Belfry;

failing to brake in time or at all so as to steer or control the HGV, to avoid the Deceased; and

failing to take all appropriate care in the prevailing conditions.

the area where the Collision occurred was poorly lit;

the lorry ahead of the HGV did not swerve in response to the presence of the Deceased;

a reasonable motorist would not have anticipated a pedestrian being in the carriageway or on the verge of the A446 to the nearside of the HGV, on the opposite side of the road to the footpath; and

Mr Witkos was driving within the speed limit.

failing to keep any adequate lookout as he proceeded along the unlit carriageway;

proceeding along the carriageway or unlit verge adjacent to the carriageway rather than on the footpath on the opposite side of the carriageway;

if it is found that the Deceased stepped onto the carriageway, then failing to make any adequate checks before doing so;

failing to monitor the traffic on the carriageway;

if attempting to cross the A446 attempting to do so when it was unsafe, because of the presence of the HGV, to do so;

failing to see or hear the HGV or note its headlights;

if the Deceased fell or stumbled into the carriageway, then walking along the unlit verge, when intoxicated and unable to walk in a safe or controlled manner;

becoming so intoxicated that he was unable to walk safely in the vicinity of the highway;

moving into the path of the HGV; and

in the circumstances failing to exercise any or any reasonable care and attention.

he was driving the HGV, in the centre of the lane, with his headlights dipped, the road was unlit;

whilst in a statement to the police he said that he could see ahead for 20 - 25 m, having checked on Google he thinks that it is more likely that he could see ahead for 40 – 45 m;

his recollection is that there was a lorry in front of him, but he understands that the CCTV Footage shows that this was not the case and he accepts that there was no lorry in front of him;

he did not see anything or anyone in the road prior to the Collision;

he heard a bang and thought it must be an animal; and

he has seen that Mohammed Iqbal told the police, on 19 January 2018, that he heard one of the lorry drivers saying “I hit somebody, he came out of the bushes, could you call emergency services”. He assumes that Mr Iqbal is referring to him as he remembers asking Mr Iqbal to call the police, but he cannot recall the details of any conversation with Mr Iqbal. He did not say that he saw someone come out of the bushes, because he did not.

collision reconstruction:

accident and emergency medicine:

there is a single joint expert on toxicology, namely Dr Jenkins, a forensic toxicologist, who prepared a report dated 31 January 2023 and a supplemental report dated 7 February 2023.

the orientation of the Deceased at Impact;

how far ahead of the HGV, the road would have been illuminated by the HGV’s headlights;

how conspicuous the Deceased would have been to Mr Witkos, driving the HGV; (d) Mr Witkos’s perception response time (“PRT”) if he had seen the Deceased prior to Impact;

how much time or distance Mr Witkos would have needed to swerve to avoid the Deceased; and

whether Mr Witkos had sufficient time to avoid the Deceased had he seen him

have been dealt with by me separately. I have done this because of the importance of these issues and because the opinions of Mr Boulton and Dr Ash, upon those key issues are more complex than simple agreement or disagreement.

bodily fluids were found 71 m to the south-east of the centre line of the T Junction and the Deceased’s body 27 m to the south-east of that same centre line. The HGV stopped 38 m to the north-west of the centre line;

the Deceased was hit by the front nearside of the HGV cab a short distance from the southern verge of the A446, at a point likely to be a little before the location of the bodily fluids;

the Deceased would have been able to see the HGV coming towards him, at a distance of around 200 m, from the point of Impact;

Mr Witkos’s line of sight was restricted to the distance illuminated by the headlights of the HGV;

the height of the damage to the front nearside corner of the HGV indicates that the Deceased was relatively upright at Impact;

there was no evidence that the HGV had mounted the curb;

the tachograph of the HGV showed that it was travelling at 43.5 mph at Impact (within the 50 mph speed limit for that part of the A446); and

the HGV started braking about 31 m beyond the first area of bodily fluids, which, at 43.5 mph would take 1.6 seconds to travel.

the Deceased first walked from the Belfry exit road, at the T Junction, right along the A446 in a north-westerly direction but then walked back to the T-junction about 3 minutes later, stopping at the Belfry entrance road and then walking in a south-westerly direction along the A446 on the same side of the A446 as the Belfry entrance road, apparently on an asphalt footpath. He was last seen approximately one minute and 15 seconds before the Impact;

between 1:13:43 and 1:13:51, four HGV’s passed the T-junction going in a South East direction along the A446;

at 1:13:47 a car went along the A446 past the entrance road to the Belfry going north west, about 15 seconds ahead of the HGV driven by Mr Witkos;

at 1:13:56 a car using the Belfry entry/exit road approached the T-junction intending to turn right onto the A446. The car waited whilst the HGV driven by Mr Witkos approached from its left;

the HGV driven by Mr Witkos entered the CCTV camera view at 1:14:02 and came to a halt at 1:14:11; and

the four HGV’s travelling South East along the A446 (in the opposite direction to Mr Witkos) leave the CCTV Footage between 19 and 11 seconds before the HGV driven by Mr Witkos enters the CCTV Footage. Those four HGV’s will have travelled past the point of Impact, past the Deceased and past Mr Witkos’s HGV. A simple calculation shows that the last of those HGV’s will have passed Mr Witkos’s HGV around 3 seconds before the Impact. Both experts accepted that the 3 seconds was an approximate figure and the actual figure would depend on many variables.

as the Deceased’s injuries were predominantly on the left side of his body it was likely that he was facing the southern verge of the A446 at Impact; and

marks on the nearside of the HGV cab and the fact that the Deceased’s body came to rest on the grass verge indicated that the Deceased was moving in the direction of the southern verge at Impact.

it was dark;

there were no streetlights at the point of Impact;

there were Christmas lights at the entrance to the Belfry ahead which might distract Mr Witkos;

the car turning right at the T-junction might distract Mr Witkos;

the four lorries which passed the HGV going in the opposite direction shortly before Impact could have distracted Mr Witkos with their headlights;

Mr Witkos was unlikely to have any expectation of pedestrians being where the Deceased was;

the Deceased was wearing dark lower clothing; and

it is unknown when the Deceased first entered the headlights of the HGV.

the Christmas lights should not have distracted Mr Witkos as he could see them 200 m before the T-Junction;

the car turning right and the possibility that it might pull out in front of the HGV should not have taken precedence over looking ahead;

the oncoming four HGVs passed the HGV between 3 and 11 seconds before Impact and should not have affected Mr Witkos’s vision; and

the Deceased was wearing a light top.

dipped headlights do not cause glare;

Mr Witkos was sitting high above the lights;

the A446 is a wide road at the relevant point, lessening any glare;

he has visited the site of the Impact at night and observed no problem at the relevant point with glare from four HGVs coming in the opposite direction; and

the Impact took place three seconds after the last of the HGVs had passed which is long enough for Mr Witkos’s eyes to adjust.

it is not known how far before the first area of bodily fluids the Impact actually occurred;

Mr Witkos’s reaction time to a sound may be different to his reaction time to seeing a pedestrian; and

due to the unfavorable conditions Mr Witkos’s PRT would be expected to be longer.

It was highly unlikely that the bodily fluids would be thrown very far forward;

he did not consider that the points made by Dr Ash about unfavorable conditions were good points; and

if Mr Witkos had seen the Deceased, prior to the impact, he should have identified the Deceased as a pedestrian, in his headlights and reacted at least as quickly as he did to the sound of the Impact.

Mr Boulton suggests a lower range of PRT than the Krauss and Muttart survey suggests;

based upon Mr Boulton’s table, only if Mr Witkos’s PRT was 1 second and he noticed the Deceased, for the first time, at 59 m, would Mr Witkos have as much as 2 seconds to take evasive action and a 1 second PRT is outside even the quickest of the PRT times suggested by the Krauss and Muttart survey and is unrealistic, given the prevailing conditions;

2 seconds or less would leave little time for Mr Witkos to steer in order to avoid the Impact;

Mr Boulton has produced no calculation of how long it would take to steer to the right in order to avoid the Collision. Mr Witkos would have had to move the HGV sufficiently to the right for the rear of the HGV trailer (16.5 m long) to miss the Deceased and in Dr Ash’s view the time left to Mr Witkos to steer the HGV, to avoid the Impact would have been insufficient to enable this to be done.

the Krauss and Muttart survey was looking at PRTs for cars, not HGVs;

the trailer to a HGV would take a shallower route than the cab, if the cab missed the Deceased, the trailer would too; and

if the court accepts that the HGV headlights lit the road for 45 m and a PRT time of 1.6 seconds then, at 43.5 mph, the HGV would travel 31 m during that PRT, leaving 14 m to steer to the right and avoid the Deceased.

intoxicated;

had no reason to cross the road from the side which had an asphalt footpath;

was not wearing reflective clothing;

was wearing black trousers;

would have had a clear view of the lights of the HGV 200 m away;

was relatively upright at the point of Impact, but had an abnormal posture at impact and may have stumbled into the path of the HGV at the last moment, given his position at Impact, according to the medical evidence; and

appears to have taken action which brought him into conflict with the HGV and gave Mr Witkos a limited amount of time to react.

the medical evidence is of such poor quality that he is unable to provide an indication of the orientation of the Deceased at the point of the Impact;

most injuries are to the left side, suggesting the Deceased’s left side was orientated towards the HGV and the damage to the HGV is consistent with the Deceased being upright at Impact;

although the post-mortem report does not mention a base of the skull fracture, he believes that this was the cause of death, in this respect he disagrees with the post-mortem report’s conclusion that death was due to “multiple injuries”;

it is not possible to determine from the base of the skull fracture, which he believes existed, how the Deceased was orientated at Impact;

the left lower tibial fracture in the mid-shin area, referred to in the post-mortem report, could have been caused by Impact with the HGV, being run over by the HGV or impact with the ground;

the remaining superficial injuries are consistent with Impact to the left side, but they could have been caused by the primary impact or, equally likely impact with the side of the HGV; and

he agrees with the police report that the Deceased was likely to have been vertical at Impact, but this is based on his “lay” interpretation of the photographs.

he made measurements of a HGV similar to the HGV, and compared his measurements to the police photograph of blood marks on the HGV, he expresses the opinion that these are consistent with the Deceased being upright at Impact;

the injuries described in the post-mortem report and the CCTV Footage of the Deceased’s movements in the grounds of the Belfry suggest that the Deceased struck the nearside corner of the HGV when he stumbled and fell or overbalanced, while on the carriageway or verge because:

agree that:

disagree about the following:

the Deceased had a blood alcohol level of 192 mg%, which is five times the legal driving limit. At that level the effects, Dr Jenkins says, are likely to be drunkenness, slurred speech, a staggering gait, impaired coordination, drowsiness, exaggerated emotional responses, dizziness, nausea and disorientation. Consuming a large amount of alcohol in a short period would exaggerate those effects;

the Deceased had 43 ng/M1 of cocaine in his bloodstream which is over four times the legal driving limit of 10ng/M1 and 368 ng/M1 of Benzogleganine which is over seven times the legal driving limit of 50 ng/M1. At that level, in the short term (30 minutes to an hour) the effects would be euphoria, excitement and feelings of self-confidence and strength, increased risk-taking and the inability to concentrate, raised blood pressure, irregular heartbeat, increased body temperature and pupil dilation affecting vision. Once the stimulant effects wear off, depression, fatigue, disorientation and anxiety, with impaired concentration and coordination, delayed reaction and poor decision-making for 12 - 24 hours; and

the Deceased had almost two times the legal driving limit of cannabis in his blood sample. Its effects are maximised over 20 - 30 minutes, decreasing over 3 to 4 hours and include a sense of well-being or euphoria often feeling relaxed and drowsy, loss of coordination, memory, concentration, judgement and sense of time, impairing estimates of distance and decision-making.

what duty of care did Mr Witkos owe to the Deceased in driving the HGV at about the time of the Collision;

did Mr Witkos breach the duty of care that he owed to the Deceased;

if Mr Witkos breached the duty of care that he owed to the Deceased was such breach of duty a substantial cause of the Collision (it being common ground that the Collision caused the Deceased’s death); and

if Mr Witkos breached the duty of care that he owed to the Deceased and that breach of duty was a substantial cause of the Collision, then did the Deceased contribute towards the causes of the Collision by his own negligence and if so by what percentage should the Claimants’ entitlement to recover damages/losses be reduced as a result of that contributory negligence?

whether I found Mr Witkos, as the only factual witness, to be an honest and reliable witness;

whether I found the evidence of each expert witnesses to be credible and reliable and where the experts disagreed on issues, which expert’s opinion on each issue I prefer and why; and

make such factual finding as I can.

in cross examination, Mr Witkos accepted that he was in shock, certainly after he found the Deceased lying at the side of the road, he accepted that he could only remember some things;

Mr Witkos says in paragraph 19 of his witness statement that he recalls another HGV travelling in front of him, prior to the Collision, but he says that he has been told by the Defendants’ solicitor that there was no such HGV and he accepts that he was mistaken in his recollection of this. However, in cross examination Mr Witkos said that he had a clear recollection of a HGV travelling around 100 m in front of him. At first it appeared that he no longer accepted that he was mistaken about this, but ultimately he did accept, but only when reminded that the CCTV footage showed otherwise, that he must be mistaken;

Mr Witkos could not recall passing four HGVs travelling in the opposite direction shortly before the Impact. It is clear however, from the CCTV footage, that four HGVs will have passed the HGV driven by Mr Witkos from around 11 seconds to around 3 seconds before the Impact; and

Mr Witkos’s misconceptions about travelling around 100 m behind a HGV, prior to the Collision, are repeated, in the short police witness statement that he signed on 16 December 2017 and in the information that he gave to the police in interview on 18 January 2018. In the police interview, Mr Witkos not only said that he recalled a lorry travelling around 100 m ahead of him but, prompted by the police, he provides details of his journey behind the lorry and said that it had a “Long Vehicle” sign on the back of it. Mr Witkos clearly has therefore a strong but mistaken recollection of a HGV travelling 100 m in front of him which has persisted from immediately after the Collision to the present day, when the CCTV Footage clearly shows that his was not the case;

he was keeping a proper lookout and that he would have seen the Deceased (if he were there to be seen) in the HGVs headlights;

he used dipped headlights, rather than full beam, because there was enough ambient light from the entrance to the Belfry to make the use of full beam unnecessary (this is contrary to the agreed opinions of the accident reconstruction experts) and in my judgment, Mr Witkos has no recollection of why he was using dipped headlights at the time of the impact; and

in cross-examination, in response to a suggestion that he ought to have slowed down, when approaching the entrance to the Belfry, Mr Witkos said that he had slowed down (this is contrary to the tachograph record which shows no evidence of Mr Witkos slowing down). Ultimately however, after I asked Mr Witkos whether he really recalled slowing down, rather than thinking that that was what he should have done, Mr Witkos accepted that he could not recall whether he had slowed down, when approaching the Belfry entrance or not.

Mr Boulton makes a positive assertion, in his primary report that there is no pavement at or about the point of the Collision. He does so, even though PC Dumbleton’s police report upon the Collision confirms that there is a footpath on the Belfry side of the A446;

Mr Boulton does not refer to any research in coming to his estimated PRT of 1 - 1.5 seconds. In cross-examination he suggested that research papers by Muttart, David Krauss (“Krauss”) and Olson supported his conclusion that the range of PRT timings was generally from 1 - 1.5 seconds). However, Mr Boulton had to accept, when taken to papers published by Muttart and Krauss that they do not support an upper limit for PRT of 1.5 seconds;

in the joint statement, Mr Boulton said that the PRT was 1 - 2 seconds. In cross-examination, Mr Boulton said that he had spotted his mistake (in saying that the PRT was 1 - 2 seconds, rather than 1 - 1.5 seconds) however, Mr Boulton was invited, before his cross examination to say if he wished to alter anything in his reports and he said he did not wish to do so;

in the joint report, at paragraph 113, Mr Boulton says “depending on his PRT and the distance the lights lit the road ahead, there may have been up to 2 seconds for him to take some form of evasive action”. At paragraph 117 of the joint report, Mr Boulton is recorded as saying that he does not use a PRT of 1 second and that 2 seconds is certainly long enough to take action. But, says Mr Jones, the table produced at paragraph 112 of the joint report, by Mr Boulton, shows that 2 seconds would only be available to take and complete evasive action at the highest distance (at which the Deceased was visible) of 59 m and a PRT of 1 second. Mr Boulton was therefore using a PRT 1 second in commenting that 2 seconds or up to 2 seconds was available for Mr Witkos to take evasive action;

in cross-examination, Mr Boulton was asked to confirm whether he had taken into account what he considered in his primary report to be the right to left movement of the Deceased at the time of the Collision, in saying that he believed that Mr Witkos could have swerved to avoid the Deceased. Mr Boulton said he had not, but then he was taken to his primary report, where he says, at paragraph (ix) “His movement, to the left, coupled with the driver steering right would mean, had the driver seen him at the first opportunity in his headlights, he had sufficient time to steer right and it is highly unlikely this collision would not have occurred”;

in the joint report, paragraph 114 Mr Boulton says it is “highly possible he could have missed Mr Jones” and at paragraph 134 that “Mr Boulton had always been of the opinion that Mr Witkos could have steered right and avoided Mr Jones, and if he saw him at the first opportunity, it is highly “possible” he could. Mr Boulton was unable to explain why he used the word “possible” when he says that his opinion is that Mr Witkos probably would have had time to steer to the right to avoid the Deceased; and

paragraph 138, the last paragraph of the joint report, appears to included matters concerning the Deceased which are agreed between Mr Boulton and Dr Ash and it says, about the Deceased, “These actions brought him into conflict with Mr Witkos’s HGV and gave Mr Witkos a limited amount of time to see and react to him, and insufficient time to avoid him”

whilst the content of paragraph 113 is factually correct, it gives the impression that Mr Boulton considers that a PRT of 1 second is at least a real possibility. Paragraph 117 contains a contradiction in saying that Mr Bolton does not use a PRT of 1 second but then goes on immediately to say that 2 seconds is certainly long enough to take action when 2 seconds would only be available for action, if the PRT was 1 second;

I find the content of the final paragraph of the joint report, which appears to be agreed between Dr Ash and Mr Boulton (or if it is not, then it is not clear that it is not) surprising in that it directly contradicts the opinion of Mr Boulton, that the Collision could have been avoided by Mr Witkos steering to the right.

the precise location of the Impact;

the likely headlight range of the HGV and how conspicuous the Deceased would be in those headlights;

was Mr Witkos affected by glare:

should Mr Witkos have switched the HGV’s headlights to full beam, before the Collision;

the theoretical PRT of Mr Witkos, had he seen the Deceased before the Collision; and

what time or distance it would have taken Mr Witkos to swerve to the right to avoid the Deceased. The experts also give opinions as to whether Mr Witkos would have had time to swerve to avoid the Collision, but I will deal with those opinions, when considering the issue of causation.

the first physical evidence of the Impact is an area of bodily fluids approximately 71 m from the centre line of the T Junction;

the Impact would have taken place prior to that first area of bodily fluids, because those bodily fluids will have been carried forward, for a distance from the point of impact; and

they could not say how far, prior to the first area of bodily fluids, the Impact had taken place.

PC Dumbleton who suggested, in his report, that the HGV’s dipped headlights would have illuminated approximately 45 m ahead of the HGV;

Mr Witkos said that, following the Collision he Googled the range of dipped headlights of HGVs and found that they would illuminate the road ahead for around 40 m (not the 40 - 45 m suggested by Mr Boulton in the joint report); and

the CCTV Footage shows the Deceased illuminated in the headlights of a HGV travelling South East on the A446. Mr Boulton calculates that, if that HGV were travelling at 50 mph, then it illuminated the Deceased at a range of approximately 45 m.

Dr Ash says that it is not possible to tell how far ahead of the HGV the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos and that the range 39 - 59 m should be used, if I find that the Deceased was located to the nearside of the HGV and a range of 26 - 44 m, if I find that he was located to the offside of the HGV, consistent with Muttart’s research for pedestrians dressed all in grey. As to Mr Boulton’s suggestion that a range of 45 m is the consensus and might be used, Dr Ash says:

while she agrees that the Deceased was not dressed all in black, she is not sure if his shirt was completely or only partly light blue in colour and whilst she agrees that a mixture of white and black clothing may be visible at a similar distance to someone who is dressed all in grey, the different coloured trousers and top may make pattern recognition more difficult;

PC Dumbleton gives no reasons for his estimate of the range of the HGV’s dipped headlights at 45 m and Mr Witkos does not name the sources that he found on Google which suggested a range of 45 m;

as to the CCTV footage, Dr Ash says that it is not possible to know how fast the HGV was travelling and how the illumination provided by the dipped headlights of that HGV compared to the illumination provided by the dipped headlights of the HGV; and

the factors mentioned by Dr Ash in the joint report (see paragraph 42 above) would reduce the visibility of the Deceased to Mr Witkos and she notes that in the Muttart research the drivers of the cars were expecting a pedestrian to appear, whereas Mr Witkos could have had no expectation of a pedestrian being present on his side of the A446.

PC Dumbleton does not explain how he arrives at his estimate of 45 m for the range of the HGV’s headlights and I am unable therefore to understand whether this estimate has any objective justification. PC Dumbleton also does not distinguish between headlight range to the nearside and offside of the HGV, but Dr Ash and Mr Boulton agree that there is a significant difference between the range of the headlights to the nearside and offside and Muttart’s research also shows that the difference is significant;

Mr Witkos’s Google research is, in my judgment, of no value because Mr Witkos has given no indication of the source or sources from which he derived his estimated range of the HGV’s headlights at 40 m;

whilst the lights of the other HGV do appear to illuminate the Deceased on the CCTV Footage and I accept Mr Boulton’s calculation that, if the HGV was travelling at 50 mph, then the CCTV Footage suggests that the Deceased was illuminated approximately 45 m ahead of the HGV:

PC Dumbleton’s estimate of 45 m and Mr Witkos’s Google research which he says suggests a distance of 40 m, only relate to the range of the HGV’s dipped headlights. Those estimates do not take into account how visible the Deceased would be to Mr Witkos. It is the visibility of the Deceased to Mr Witkos which determines the point in time at which Mr Witkos could have seen the Deceased and which the Muttart research is aimed at establishing; and

I accept that the matters identified by Dr Ash (see paragraph 42 above) (other than the Impact taking place at night, as the research conducted by Muttart was conducted at night) are likely to result in the visibility of the Deceased to Mr Witkos being reduced. In particular the drivers taking part in the Muttart research were expecting a pedestrian to appear in their headlights, whereas Mr Witkos will not only not be expecting a pedestrian but, in my judgment, would reasonably expect any hazard to appear from the other side of the road, where the Belfry complex and pavement were located.

if the Deceased was positioned ahead of and to the nearside of the HGV, in such a position that he was within the beam of the HGV’s dipped headlights, at the limit of their range, then he would have been visible to Mr Witkos at a range of not less than 41, nor more than 59 m; and

if he was positioned ahead of and to the offside of the HGV, in such a position that he was within the beam of the HGV’s dipped headlights, at the limit of their range, then he would have been visible to Mr Witkos at a range of not less than 28, nor more than 44 m.

the use of a range of distances, rather than a definite distance is appropriate because Mr Boulton accepted that a range was appropriate, only putting forward 45 m as a “consensus figure”. For the reasons I have given I do not accept that the “consensus figure” of 45 m can be treated as the distance at which the Deceased will have been visible to Mr Witkos; and

as Dr Ash accepted, the lowest figures in the two ranges of 39 m for the nearside and 26 m for the offside, may not be appropriate, because they apply to a pedestrian wearing all black and the Deceased was wearing black shoes and black trousers, but a light blue top. For that reason, I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos at a distance which is less than the minimum distance measured in the Muttart research for the nearside and offside, where the pedestrian was wearing all black. I do not consider it appropriate however to reduce those minimum distances significantly, given that: (i) in the Muttart research, whilst it was dark, none of the other factors identified by Dr Ash (see paragraph 42 above) as reducing the visibility of the Deceased to Mr Witkos were present; (ii) the drivers in the Muttart research, unlike Mr Witkos, were expecting a pedestrian to appear in their headlights, Mr Witkos was not and it would be reasonable for him to consider that any hazard was more likely to come from the opposite side of the road than his side of the road (for the reasons I have already explained); and (iii) the effect of glare from the four HGVs headlights, which, for the reasons explained next would mean that Mr Witkos’s eyes would take a short period of time to adjust to the unlit road.

the headlights of the HGV’s were dipped and dipped headlights do not, in his opinion cause glare;

when he drove along the index section of the A446 at night in November and December 2022 he was not dazzled by oncoming headlights at all. He attributed this to oncoming headlights being dipped and to the width of the road, at about 10 m, which he considered reduced the effect on his eyes (and on the eyes of Mr Witkos) of any oncoming traffic;

Mr Witkos was sitting high up in the cab of the HGV and, as a result any glare would be reduced;

Mr Witkos did not mention being dazzled by the oncoming lights of the HGVs; and

the Impact took place 3 seconds after the last of the four HGVs had passed, which is long enough for Mr Witkos’s eyes to adjust.

the headlights of the four HGVs would, in my judgment, in quick succession, have (even if not shining directly into Mr Witkos’s eyes, because Mr Witkos was sitting high above the road and the road at that point is relatively wide) nonetheless at least have created bright ambient lighting that contrasted sharply with the unlit road after he passed the fourth HGV. The experts agree that the lights at the entrance to the Belfry would have provided no ambient light at that point on the A446 and there was no other ambient light. It seems to me self-evident, in those circumstances that Mr Witkos’s eyes would take a limited amount of time to adjust, affecting his vision, albeit not significantly for the period of that adjustment. Mr Boulton seems at least implicitly to accept this in the joint report when he says that 3 seconds was long enough for Mr Witkos’s eyes to adjust;

when Mr Boulton wrote the joint report with Dr Ash in April 2023 it was 4 - 5 months after he had driven the index section of the A446, at night. The issue of glare was not addressed in Mr Boulton’s primary report, dated January 2023. It seems to me unlikely that Mr Boulton would have recalled any minor effect that the dipped headlights of oncoming vehicles may have had upon his vision when he drove the index section of the A446, 4 - 5 months earlier, when he does not suggest that it was an issue that he was considering at the time. Dr Ash does not suggest that glare is a particular issue on that section of the A446 as opposed to any average unlit road (far from it, she accepts that glare from oncoming traffic would be reduced because of the width of the road at that point and because Mr Witkos was sitting high up in the cab of the HGV); and

as for Mr Witkos not referring to being dazzled by the oncoming HGVs I have already explained why Mr Witkos’s evidence as to the circumstances of the Collision is unreliable. In any event Dr Ash was not suggesting (and I am not accepting) that the effects of glare from the lights of the four HGVs was in any way exceptional.

Dr Ash - that Mr Witkos would not have been able to use full beam, due to the car turning right at the T Junction;

Mr Boulton - that the last of the four HGVs passed Mr Witkos around 3 seconds before the Impact and he could have switched the lights of the HGV to full beam at that point. As to the car turning right at the T-junction, it was not relevant, because it was not moving, so there was no chance of the driver of that car being blinded by the headlights of the HGV, if they were on full beam;

Dr Ash - that the South - East bound HGVs would have prevented Mr Witkos from using full beam until around 3 seconds before the Impact and the car waiting at the T Junction would have prevented him doing so thereafter. The fact that the car was stationary at the T-junction is irrelevant, if its’ driver looked in Mr Witkos’s direction and the HGV had its full beam headlights illuminated they would have blinded the driver, whether moving or not; and

Mr Boulton - the driver of the car could have simply looked away, and the headlights of the HGV being on full beam therefore presented no danger to the driver.

the Highway Code says that drivers must not use their lights in such a way as to dazzle or cause discomfort to other road users and switching the headlights of the HGV to full beam would at least have caused discomfort to the driver driving the car stopped at the T-junction;

in cross-examination, Mr Boulton appeared to initially stop short of expressing the opinion that Mr Witkos ought to have switched his headlights to full beam, after the fourth HGV past him; and

PC Dumbleton, in his report, expressed the view that Mr Witkos would not be expected to have his headlights on full beam due to causing dazzle to the driver at the T-junction.

I have already decided to disregard Mr Witkos’s suggestion that he used dipped headlights, rather than full beam, because there was enough ambient light from the entrance to the Belfry, to make the use of full beam unnecessary, for the reasons explained in paragraph 67 (b) above;

Mr Marwick refers to “flicking on” the HGVs lights to full beam when Mr Witkos had passed the last of the four HGVs. In my judgment, exercising reasonable care, Mr Witkos ought to have looked ahead to see if there was any reason not to switch the headlights of the HGV full beam;

whilst I accept that the car may well have been a few yards away from the T Junction, rather than stopped at the T-junction, at the moment that Mr Witkos passed the fourth HGV, I am satisfied that Mr Witkos would have been able to see the car approaching the T-junction ahead of him when he passed the fourth HGV. Mr Witkos ought to have anticipated, when he passed the fourth HGV, that the car would be at the T Junction within a second or so and the driver of it would potentially look left before they got to the T Junction, or as they got to the T Junction;

whilst the driver of the car could, as Mr Boulton suggested, looked away if he was dazzled by the headlights of the HGV, on full beam, Rule 114 of the Highway Code states “you MUST NOT use any light in a way which would dazzle or cause discomfort to other road users, including pedestrians, cyclists and horse riders”. Mr Boulton seemed to concede that, if Mr Witkos had switched the headlights of the HGV to full beam, the driver of the car at least might suffer discomfort if they looked in the direction of the HGV, even if the use of full beam would not be dangerous to that driver, because they could look away;

PC Dumbleton, in his report, expressed the view that Mr Witkos would not be expected to have his lights on full beam due to causing dazzle to the driver at the T Junction, and other road users;

Mr Boulton’s opinion was somewhat equivocal on the question of whether Mr Witkos ought to have switched his headlights to full beam, at first saying that he could have done so and then saying, if pressed, that he should have done so; and

in any event, the question of whether or not Mr Witkos should, consistent with the duty of care that he owed to other road users, have switched the headlights of the HGV to full beam is, it seems to me, a question for me to decide. In circumstances where, had Mr Witkos switched the headlights of the HGV to full beam, immediately after passing the fourth HGV, this would be likely to at least have caused discomfort (contrary to the guidance in Rule 114 of the Highway Code) to the driver of the car approaching the T-junction. I am not satisfied that Mr Witkos breached the duty of care that he owed to other road users by not switching the headlights of the HGV to full beam as soon as he passed the fourth HGV.

detection, that is the amount of time that it takes the driver to see the hazard, which is within their field of view;

identification, that is the amount of time it takes the driver to identify what the hazard is;

decision, that is the amount of time that it takes the driver to decide what to do, about the hazard; and

response, that is the amount of time that it takes the driver to start to take action to avoid the hazard.

in her opinion the range 1.39 - 2.81 seconds is appropriate, based on research by Krauss and Muttart;

if Mr Witkos’s attention was focused on the entry road to the Belfry, then his PRT will increase; and

it was put to Dr Ash, in cross examination, that in paragraph 112 of her primary report she accepted that Mr Witkos may potentially have reacted more quickly to seeing a pedestrian hazard than he did to the sound of the Impact. Dr Ash suggested that paragraph 112 was concerned with how hard Mr Witkos might apply the brakes of the HGV, in response to his seeing a pedestrian hazard, as opposed how hard he applied the brakes after hearing the sound of the Impact, not Mr Witkos’s PRT

asserted that research by Krauss and Muttart supported his range of 1 - 1.5 seconds for Mr Witkos’s theoretical PRT. He accepted however, when taken to the research papers published by Krauss and Muttart that they do not support an upper limit for PRT of 1.5 seconds but rather an upper limit of 2.81 seconds;

agreed that the fact that the Impact took place in the dark and the fact that the presence of the Deceased ahead of the HGV would be unexpected, would add to Mr Witkos’s theoretical PRT;

said that Mr Witkos should not be distracted by the lights at the entrance to the Belfry, he should have concentrated on looking ahead;

agreed that he made an error in the joint report in stating that his range for Mr Witkos’s PRT was 1 - 2 seconds, when, in his opinion it is 1 - 1.5 seconds;

repeated that Mr Witkos’s reaction time to the sound of the Impact is a good guide to the time that it would have taken Mr Witkos to react to seeing the Deceased ahead of the HGV; and

said that, on the basis that the Impact happened about 2 m before the first area bodily fluids, Mr Witkos’s reaction time to the sound of the Impact would be increased by 0.15 of a second to 1.75 seconds.

Mr Witkos’s actual reaction time to the noise of the Impact was between 1.6 and 1.75 seconds from the point of Impact;

in her primary report, Dr Ash seemed to accept that Mr Witkos would arguably have reacted more quickly to seeing a pedestrian in front of a HGV than he did to the noise of the Impact;

Dr Ash accepted that Mr Witkos’s reaction time to the noise of the Impact is within the range of PRT identified by Krauss and Muttart in their research;

1.6 seconds is consistent with the highway code which suggests PRT times of 1 - 1.5 seconds; and

Muttart’s research on the distances at which pedestrians would be visible to the driver of a car, in that car’s dipped headlights, includes reaction time and therefore there is an element of double counting in fixing the range at which a pedestrian would be visible to the driver of the car (which includes a reaction time) and then including a figure for theoretical PRT. Mr Marwick suggests that Dr Ash was unable to explain, in cross examination, why there would be no element of double counting in using Muttart’s figures on the visibility of pedestrians in the headlights of cars and then adding a PRT.

the night-time conditions compared to daytime conditions;

the unlit road, such that Mr Witkos was reliant on the range of his dipped headlights for his view of the road ahead, compared with a lit road or one with ambient lighting;

Mr Witkos was not able to use his full beam headlights;

the low expectation of a pedestrian in the road at this location;

an unlit pedestrian with non-reflective clothing and dark lower clothing compared with lit, reflective or lighter toned clothing;

more conspicuous objects within the field of view, namely the Christmas tree lights at the entrance to the Belfry and the car at the T Junction;

four HGVs passing the HGV, shortly prior to Impact;

no other vehicle was taking avoiding action in response to the Deceased; and

the limited time for which the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos.

PRT only applies from the moment the driver sees the relevant object/person, therefore the fact that the road was unlit and Mr Witkos’s vision was limited to the range of his dipped headlights and the Deceased not wearing reflective clothing or lighter toned clothing are not relevant to PRT;

Mr Boulton disagrees that Mr Witkos was not able to use his full beam headlights;

Mr Witkos should not have been distracted by the Christmas tree lights or the car at the T-junction, he should have looked at the road ahead;

the last of the four HGVs passed Mr Witkos a minimum of 3 seconds before the Impact which was enough time for Mr Witkos’s eyes to adjust; and

the fact that no other vehicle took avoiding action in response to the presence of the Deceased is immaterial.

Dr Mackenzie believes that the Deceased was facing the HGV at Impact. Mr Zoltie’s opinion is that the orientation of the Deceased immediately prior to Impact cannot be determined from the Deceased’s injuries; and

Mr Zoltie believes that the Deceased suffered a base of the skull fracture which was the cause of his death. Dr Mackenzie believes that, if a base of the skull fracture had been present it would have been noted during the post-mortem and mentioned in the post-mortem report and therefore there was no base of the skull fracture.

Mr Zoltie thought that the force of the impact would cause a base of the skull fracture and given the inadequacies in the post-mortem report, the fact that that report did not mention a base of the skull fracture did not cause him to revise that opinion; and

Dr MacKenzie noted that, in carrying out the autopsy, the brain of the Deceased was removed and in his opinion any base of the skull fracture would have been visible, following removal of the brain and referred to in the autopsy report. I believe that he accepted that the force of the Impact was at least capable of causing a base of the skull fracture.

he made no reference, in his primary report, to the CCTV Footage of the Deceased, but in the joint report he agrees that the CCTV Footage shows the Deceased suffering from significant gait ataxia and truncal instability and that he tripped and fell to the ground;

in the joint report, he agrees that there is no evidence of a major force being applied to the Deceased’s chest, abdomen and pelvis, but he does not mention these matters in his primary report;

he did not mention in his primary report that the Deceased had an abnormal posture at Impact, but then accepts this, in the joint report; and

in his primary report he says that he could come to no conclusion as to whether the Deceased’s head injury was caused by impact with the HGV, or the road, or other hard surface, but in the joint report he agrees that the head injury was caused by Impact with the HGV.

he did not consider that the Deceased behaviour, before the Collision was relevant to his assessment of the Deceased’s injuries;

he dealt with the injuries that, in his opinion, were relevant to the cause of death, namely the Impact on the neck causing a base of the skull fracture. He did not deal with the absence of injuries but he accepted that a collision between a HGV and a pedestrian would normally be expected to cause significant injuries to a pedestrian’s torso and it was relevant that, in this case there were no such injuries to the Deceased’s torso. He went on however to say that he was concerned that the post-mortem report may not be accurate and merely because it did not mention any injuries to the chest, abdomen and pelvis was not reliable evidence that they were not present;

as to Mr Zoltie not mentioning (in his primary report) that the Deceased had an abnormal posture at Impact, but then accepting this in the joint report, Mr Zoltie said that he did not consider it relevant to the question he was asked about the orientation of the Deceased, prior to the Impact; and

finally, Mr Zoltie said that he was not able to conclude, in his primary report, whether the Deceased’s injury was caused by impact with the HGV, or the road or other hard surface, but once he saw the accident reconstruction expert reports he was able to come to the conclusion that the head injury was caused by Impact with the HGV.

the behaviour of the Deceased, as shown in the CCTV footage, is potentially of relevance to his orientation, because Mr Zoltie ultimately agreed, in the joint report, that the Deceased would have been suffering from significant gait ataxia and truncal instability at the time of the Impact and this suggests that the Deceased’s movements are likely to have been erratic, unpredictable and clumsy which may be relevant to orientation (at least in the sense that they make orientation more difficult to predict);

the problem with Mr Zoltie’s explanation, that he did not deal, in his primary report, with the absence of injuries to the torso of the Deceased is that if he was concerned that the absence of them being mentioned in the autopsy report was not reliable evidence that they were not present, this is inconsistent with his agreement in the joint report that there were no injuries to the chest, abdomen and pelvis of the Deceased, based upon the autopsy report;

as to the Deceased’s abnormal posture, I accept that posture at Impact may not be determinative of orientation but again, just like gait ataxia and truncal instability, the Deceased’s abnormal posture, on Impact may be relevant to orientation and Mr Zoltie agreed that the Deceased had an abnormal posture at Impact in the joint report, with no suggestion that it was irrelevant; and

finally, in my judgement, Mr Zoltie was unable to explain how the contents of the accident reconstruction expert reports enabled him to conclude that Impact with the HGV had caused the Deceased’s head injury (as opposed to the road or other hard surface) which he had been unable to conclude in his primary report.

there were no material injuries to the Deceased’s torso, with the principal impact injuries being to the head, face, neck and upper chest. This, says Dr Mackenzie suggests that the Deceased lent or stumbled into the HGV, this leaning or stumbling, accounting for his abnormal posture ; and

Dr Mackenzie analysed the characteristics of an abrasion on the Deceased’s neck which he said, because; (i) the front of the abrasion was not as deep as the back of the abrasion; and (ii) there was bunching of the skin at the back of the abrasion, suggested to him, based on his clinical experience, that front to back forces were applied in creating the abrasion. Those front to back forces would only be applied if the Deceased was broadly facing the HGV at Impact.

Dr Mackenzie has considerable experience in pre-hospital accident and emergency care. That is he goes to the scenes of accidents to provide emergency medical care to casualties. Mr Zoltie accepts that all of his experience is hospital-based. Dr Mackenzie will therefore have experience of seeing injuries that are suffered by accident victims “in situ”, where he can see what has caused the injury. That means, in my judgment, that Dr Mackenzie’s experience is more relevant than that of Mr Zoltie’s to determining whether front to back forces or other factors caused the neck abrasion suffered by the Deceased;

Mr Zoltie accepted that the application of front to back forces was a reasonable explanation for the pattern of the abrasion on the Deceased’s neck. Whilst he suggested that there were other reasonable explanations for the pattern of the abrasion, he did not, when I invited him to do so, identify any explanation which he was prepared to say was more likely. This contrasts with Dr Mackenzie’s explanation that front to back forces were the most likely explanation for the pattern of the abrasion; and

as I have already said, in my judgment, Dr Mackenzie’s primary report was more comprehensive than that of Mr Zoltie. Dr Mackenzie considers wider issues than just the injuries suffered by the Deceased, in coming to his conclusions (including the injuries he did not suffer). I consider that that more comprehensive approach is more likely to result in a reliable opinion as to the orientation of the Deceased at the point of the impact, than Mr Zoltie’s more narrow approach, at least in his primary report.

whether the Deceased was on the carriageway or on the grass verge at the point of impact;

the likely explanation for the Deceased’s abnormal posture at impact; and

whether the Deceased was stationary or moving.

they both agreed that the Deceased was not standing straight upright, but generally upright but with an abnormal posture, which could have been due to him stumbling into the Impact or to his truncal instability more generally;

Dr Mackenzie thought it more likely that the Deceased was moving rather than stationary, however this opinion was what he referred to as a “lay” opinion, by which I took him to mean that the CCTV footage showed the Deceased generally moving although in an unpredictable manner, prior to leaving the Belfry grounds and that he was likely to have continued moving in such an unpredictable manner, immediately prior to the Impact, rather than becoming stationary;

Dr Mackenzie said that, in his opinion, based upon the Deceased’s injuries, the Deceased would have been on the carriageway at the point of Impact, rather than falling into the HGV from the grass verge or leaning into HGV from the grass verge. Mr Zoltie was not asked this question. I accept the opinion of Dr Mackenzie on this point; and

Dr Mackenzie said that, whilst in his opinion, the Deceased was in the carriageway at Impact, he could not say if he had previously been on the grass verge, or had been attempting to get back on the grass verge, in either case, immediately before Impact. I accept his opinion on this point.

“The only point I wish to make is that there is a danger of doing injustice if judges make unwarrantedly precise findings of fact. Of course, if the evidence warrants a precise finding of fact (on the balance of probabilities) that makes the judge’s judgment easier. If there are inherent uncertainties about the facts, as there were here, it is dangerous to make precise findings. This may well mean that the party who bears the burden of proof is in difficulties. But that is one of the purposes behind a burden of proof; that if the case cannot be demonstrated on the balance of probabilities, it will fail.”;

Lunt v Khelifa [2002] EWCA Civ 801 at paragraph 20, in which Latham LJ referred to a motor vehicle being a potentially lethal weapon and that whether or not the driver of a motor vehicle has breached the duty of care that they owe to the injured party should be considered in that context;

Stewart v Glaze [2009] EWHC 704 at paragraphs 5 and 8 - 10 in which Coulson J emphasized that the court should not be too reliant upon the expert evidence of accident reconstruction experts, their evidence should be assessed in the context of the evidence as a whole;

“In motoring cases, it is often suggested on behalf of the claimant that drivers should never drive faster than the speed which enables them to stop within the limits of their visibility. Mr Parry pointed out, this would mean, if followed to its logical conclusion, that a typical vehicle should never travel at more than 27 mph with dipped headlights on an unlit road in order to be able to stop within the 40 m or so of visibility likely to be available”

It would in my judgment, be quite unrealistic to conclude that on an unlit two or three lane dual carriageway or indeed good open lane roads that no vehicles should drive at night on dipped beams at more than 27 mph lest some unexpected pedestrian might sally into their path.

The standard of care expected of a driver is that exercised by a normally prudent competent and capable motorist. There was no evidence to suggest that HGV drivers or other motorists with these characteristics crawl about the dual carriageways of England at night at no more than 27 mph. To suggest that they should would be to conflict dramatically both in common sense and common practice.”

at paragraph 5 said that the court had to be wary about holding the defendant to the standards of the ideal driver, rather than the reasonable driver and not be guided with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight;

at paragraphs 8 - 10 that expert reconstruction evidence is a useful yardstick against which factual evidence and inferences drawn from it can be tested, but should not be elevated to a formula; and

he did find the expert evidence in that case of some assistance on the issues of “….reaction times, stopping distances and the like…”.

Mr Witkos says that he did not see the Deceased prior to the Impact;

the accident reconstruction expert evidence is clear that the range of the HGV’s headlights would have been sufficient to enable Mr Witkos to see the Deceased well before the Collision. Dr Ash appears to accept this, she simply puts forward reasons as to why Mr Witkos may not have seen the Deceased;

Mr Witkos’s lack of attention when driving prior to the Collision is borne out by his inaccurate recollection of the circumstances of the Collision (the Police report records him saying that there was a HGV travelling 100 m in front of him and that he thought that his lights illuminated the road for 20 - 25 m ahead, he now accepts that neither of those points is correct);

(a) - (c) above strongly suggest that Mr Witkos was not keeping a proper look out prior to the Collision;

Mr Witkos should have switched the headlights of the HGV to full beam when he passed the last of the four HGVs; and

Mr Witkos was travelling too fast, he should have slowed down on his approach to the Belfry to his right.

the toxicology report and Accident and Emergency reports all confirm that the Deceased was suffering from significant intoxication at the time of the Collision, with the consequences that he had significant gait ataxia and truncal instability and his balance, mobility and judgement were all significantly impaired;

there was a pavement on the northern side of the A446, but no pavement on the southern side, where there was only a grass verge and beyond that bushes, the accident reconstruction experts agree that there was no apparent reason for the Deceased to cross from the northern, to the southern side;

the reconstruction experts cannot say: (i) what the Deceased’s movements were immediately prior to the Collision; (ii) where the Deceased was when he first entered the HGV’s headlights; or (iii) how far the dipped headlights of the HGV would have lit the road ahead;

it is the Defendants’ case that the Deceased would only have been conspicuous to Mr Witkos for a short distance, having regard to the factors identified by Dr Ash;

I should not therefore conclude that Mr Witkos was not keeping a proper look out, merely because he did not see the Deceased before the Collision;

Mr Witkos should not have switched his headlights to full beam after passing the last of the four HGVs, because: (i) the Highway code says that drivers should not use their lights in such a way as to cause discomfort to other road users; (ii) if he had switched the headlights of the HGV to full beam he would at least have caused discomfort to the driver of the car at or approaching the T Junction to the right ahead of him; and (iii) PC Dumbleton in his report expressed the view that Mr Witkos would not be expected use full beam in the prevailing circumstances; and

Mr Witkos was travelling well within the speed limit, PC Dumbleton did not criticise the speed at which he was travelling and the comments of Charles Harris QC in Walker v Culina Logistics Ltd (see paragraph 143 above) show that the court must take a realistic common sense view of what amounts to driving too fast.

the Deceased was last seen on the CCTV Footage approximately one minute and 15 seconds before the Impact walking in a south-westerly direction along the A446 on the same side of the A446 as the T Junction, apparently on an asphalt footpath;

four HGVs travelling South East along the A446 (in the opposite direction to Mr Witkos) leave the CCTV Footage between 19 and 11 seconds before the HGV driven by Mr Witkos enters the CCTV Footage. Those four HGV’s will have subsequently travelled past the point of Impact, past the Deceased and past Mr Witkos’s HGV. The last of those HGV’s will have passed Mr Witkos’s HGV around 3 seconds before the Impact;

the Deceased was hit by the front nearside corner of the HGV, a short distance from the verge of the A446;

there is no evidence that the HGV mounted the curb;

The HGV was travelling at 43.5 mph; and

Mr Witkos started to brake about 31 m beyond the first area of bodily fluids, at 43.5 mph it would take approximately 1.6 seconds to travel that distance, both experts agreed that the first area of bodily fluids is likely to be a little beyond the initial point of the Impact.

the range of the HGV headlights. They agree that the actual range of the HGV’s dipped headlights is unknown and that separate ranges for the nearside and offside are appropriate, but Mr Boulton suggested that 45 m was the consensus; and

at what distance the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos.

they defer to the Accident Reconstruction experts on the circumstances of the Collision, nature of the collision, Impact speed, movements of the Deceased and the HGV and magnitude and direction of forces;

the Deceased is likely to have been experiencing the issues of significant gait ataxia, truncal instability and impairment of balance, mobility and judgement, shown in the CCTV footage immediately prior to impact;

the post-mortem report provides no evidence of thoracic, abdominal or pelvic injury;

the Deceased was relatively upright at Impact with the most severe forces being applied to his upper chest, neck, face and head;

some injuries may have been caused by secondary impacts;

it is not possible to be certain if the left lower limb fracture was caused by contact with the HGV or bending or twisting forces or impact or landing on the ground;

the injuries are not typical of a pedestrian struck directly by a HGV travelling at 43.5 mph, more chest, abdominal, pelvic and spinal injuries would be expected; and

the Deceased’s body did not fully engage with any part of HGV at Impact suggesting it had an abnormal posture at Impact.

the Deceased had a blood alcohol level of 192 mg%, which is five times the legal driving limit;

the Deceased had 43 ng/M1 of cocaine in his bloodstream which is over four times the legal driving limit of 10ng/M1 and 368 ng/M1 of Benzogleganine which is over seven times the legal driving limit of 50 ng/M1;

the Deceased had almost two times the legal driving limit of cannabis in his blood sample; and

in the CCTV Footage, the Deceased showed significant signs of intoxication, suffering from poor balance and coordination and being unaware of his surroundings (including stepping onto the road in the Belfry grounds, unaware of the presence of two cars that needed to take evasive action to avoid him). In short, from 12:54 am, the Deceased was acting, as Dr Jenkins would expect him to act, based on her analysis of his blood and urine samples.

the Deceased travelled from the T Junction South-East along the asphalt footpath, that runs alongside the A446 on the same side of the road as the Belfry golf complex. The Deceased went out of the range of the CCTV cameras 1 minute and 15 seconds before the impact (these timings are agreed by Mr Boulton and Dr Ash from the CCTV Footage);

at some point before the Collision, 1 minute and 15 seconds later, the Deceased crossed the road to the South-West bound carriageway of the A446, which does not have a footpath next to it (this is uncontroversial and follows from the agreed fact that the Collision took place on the North-Western bound carriageway);

I find on the balance of probabilities, that the Deceased crossed the A446 sufficiently before the first of the four HGV’s travelling Sout-East along the A446 which passed Mr Witkos before the Collision, not to come into conflict with it. I find this because:

I find that, at the time of the Collision, the Deceased was suffering from significant gait ataxia, impairment of balance, impairment of mobility and impairment of judgement, as a result of the alcohol, cocaine and cannabis that he ingested shortly before leaving the grounds of the Belfry Hotel. I find this because: (i) in her first report Dr Jenkins concludes, based upon the Deceased’s blood and urine samples analysed by her, that the Deceased had ingested significant quantities of all three and she provides details of what the effects of ingesting those quantities on the Deceased were likely to be and the longevity of those effects: (ii) having reviewed the CCTV Footage, Dr Jenkins concludes that, at 10:50 pm the Deceased was not showing signs of intoxication, but, at 12:54 am he showed significant signs of intoxication, suffering from poor balance and coordination and being unaware of his surroundings (including stepping onto the road in the Belfry grounds, unaware of the presence of two cars that needed to take evasive action to avoid him); and (iii) Mr Zoltie and Dr Mackenzie agree that the Deceased is likely to have been suffering from the significant gait ataxia, truncal instability and impairment of balance, mobility and judgement, shown in the CCTV footage immediately prior to the Impact;

I am unable to say what motivated the Deceased to cross the road. I find however that, crossing the road, when there was no footpath adjacent to that side of the road and when the accident reconstruction experts can suggest no reason as to why the Deceased may have done so, leads me to conclude that the Deceased had no good reason to do so and that his judgment, in deciding to do so was affected by being intoxicated as noted in (d) above;

I find that the Deceased was in a relatively upright position at the point of Impact and that the point of Impact on the HGV cab was the front nearside corner, consistent with the opinions of both the accident reconstruction experts and the accident and emergency experts;

I have preferred the evidence of Dr Mackenzie to that of Mr Zoltie as to the orientation of the Deceased immediately prior to Impact. It follows that I find that the Deceased was broadly facing the HGV cab at Impact;

I find that the Deceased was in the carriageway at the point of Impact, he did not stumble from the grass verge directly into the Impact with the HGV and nor did he lean out from the grass verge into contact with the HGV (this was the opinion of Dr Mackenzie (see paragraph 138 (c) above, which I have accepted). I cannot say for what period prior to the Impact the Deceased was in the carriageway; and

the Deceased either stumbled or was in an abnormal posture (I cannot say which) so that the dominant Impact was the left side of the head, neck and upper chest, but not the torso (this was the opinion of Mr Zolties and Dr Mackenzie which I accept. I cannot say what direction the Deceased was travelling in and accept Dr Mackenzie’s evidence (and the evidence of the CCTV Footage) that the Deceased’s movements were unpredictable and I would say lacked any logical explanation (given that he had walked in both directions along the A446, from the T Junction and crossed the road for no apparent reason prior to the Impact and his gait ataxia and truncal instability).

41 - 59 m, if the Deceased was ahead and to the nearside of the HGV; and

28 - 44 m, if the Deceased was ahead and to the offside of the HGV.

the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos, at some point prior to the Impact. This follows inevitably, in my judgment, from the following:

when the Deceased was first visible to Mr Witkos, Mr Witkos would have seen the Deceased, if the Deceased was at that time in Mr Witkos’s field of vision and on the balance of probabilities, the Deceased would have remained visible to Mr Witkos from that point until the Impact, if the Deceased remained within Mr Witkos’s field of vision, for that period;

Mr Witkos could reasonably expect that any hazard was much more likely to come from the Belfry side of the road, than his side of the road (particularly the car at or approaching the T Junction). This may have caused Mr Witkos to concentrate on that side of the road, rather than his own side of the road. I find however that Mr Witkos should not have allowed the greater potential for hazards on the Belfry side of the road to distract him from concentrating sufficiently on the road ahead on his side of the carriageway to notice obstructions in it and if he did not do so, then he breached his duty of care;

although I cannot say when precisely the Deceased will have become visible to Mr Witkos, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he will have become visible to Mr Witkos a sufficient period of time before the Collision to mean that, if Mr Witkos was exercising reasonable care to look out for obstructions in the road ahead, on his side of the carriageway, he would have seen him. I find this because:

Mr Boulton suggests a lower range of PRT than the Krauss and Muttart research suggests;

based upon Mr Boulton’s table, only if Mr Witkos’s PRT was 1 second and the Deceased became visible to him, for the first time, at 59 m, would Mr Witkos have as much as 2 seconds to take evasive action and a 1 second PRT is outside even the quickest of the PRT times suggested by the Krauss and Muttart research and is unrealistic, given the prevailing conditions;

2 seconds or less would, in Dr Ash’s opinion leave little time for Mr Witkos to steer in order to avoid the Impact; and

Mr Boulton has produced no calculation of how long it would take to steer to the right in order to avoid the Collision. Mr Witkos would have had to move the HGV sufficiently to the right for the rear of the HGV trailer (16.5 m long) to miss the Deceased and in Dr Ash’s view the time left to Mr Witkos to steer the HGV, to avoid the Impact, had he seen the Deceased, would have been insufficient to enable this to be done.

the Krauss and Muttart research was looking at reaction times in cars, not HGVs;

the trailer of the HGV would clear the Deceased, if the cab did; and

if the court accepts that the headlights lit the road for 45 m and a PRT time of 1.6 seconds then, at 43.5 mph, the HGV would travel 31 m, in 1.6 seconds, leaving 14 m to steer to the right and avoid the Deceased.

Mr Witkos only had to steer slightly to the right to avoid the Deceased and not completely change lanes and so lateral acceleration calculations are not relevant to the manoeuvre that Mr Witkos had to perform;

he accepted that a PRT of 1 second would be extremely quick and said he was not suggesting that Mr Witkos’s PRT would be 1 second, he was simply providing a calculation, in his table, of the time available to Mr Witkos to steer to avoid the Deceased, had his PRT been 1 second;

he agrees that, if Mr Witkos’s PRT was 2 seconds, then, if the Deceased first became visible to Mr Witkos at 39 m, this would not leave Mr Witkos sufficient time to swerve to avoid the Deceased;

he could not give a minimum amount of time that it would take Mr Witkos to swerve to avoid the Deceased. At first Mr Boulton said that he thought that it was possible, if Mr Witkos had 0.3 of a second to avoid the Deceased, by swerving, that he could have done so (which would apply if Mr Witkos’s PRT was 2 seconds and the Deceased was first visible to Mr Witkos at 45 m) but ultimately, Mr Boulton conceded that Mr Witkos would be unlikely to be able to avoid the Deceased if he only had 0.3 of a second to do so. Mr Boulton based his view on his experience as a HGV driver and instructor;

he does not consider that he did rely, in his primary report, on the Deceased moving right to left across the HGV, when expressing his opinion, in that report, that Mr Witkos would have been able to steer to avoid the Deceased; and

he accepts there are many variables that would determine whether or not Mr Witkos could have steered to avoid the Deceased, had he seen him, he cannot say whether all of those variables or sufficient of them would have definitely “lined up” to allow Mr Witkos to steer to avoid the Deceased.

she did not deal with, Mr Witkos’s ability to steer to avoid the Deceased, in her primary report, because it was unclear where the Deceased was, immediately prior to the Collision;

the formula required to calculate lateral acceleration for lane changes does not literally mean that a full lane change must be achieved, merely that the whole of the vehicle must move out of the way of the hazard;

she accepted that she has no HGV driver qualifications but says she has driven HGVs occasionally;

she accepts that the trailer of the HGV would have tracked inside the cab, if the cab turned to the right and therefore, on the face of it, if the cab missed the Deceased, the trailer would have done so as well, but she said that the full length of the trailer would still have to be moved out of the way of the Deceased;

she calculates, using formulas contained in the Jennings paper, that, if Mr Witkos had 20 m left to steer around the Deceased, this would require a lateral acceleration value of 0.4 g which she considers is the limit of what would have been possible. If Mr Witkos in fact only had 0.3 seconds (equivalent to 6 m) to steer round the Deceased, that would require a lateral acceleration value of 0.78 g which she considers to be significantly more than would have been achievable; and

she accepts that Jennings’s research related to cars and not HGVs but considers the calculations of lateral acceleration nonetheless to be applicable to the HGV.

but for Mr Witkos’s breach of duty, in failing to keep a proper look out, he would have seen the Deceased and been able to avoid the Collision by steering to the right;

it is reasonable to infer that, had Mr Witkos kept a proper look out of the road ahead:

the reconstruction experts agree that, even if Mr Witkos had seen the Deceased at the earliest opportunity he would not have had time to brake in order to avoid the Collision. The Claimants therefore argue that Mr Witkos should have steered to the right to avoid the Collision;

Mr Boulton has carried out no calculation as to whether the time left to Mr Witkos to steer in order to avoid the Deceased, would have been sufficient, he could not say what the minimum time required for Mr Witkos to steer to avoid the Deceased was. He only described 0.3 seconds as a possibility. Dr Ash was clear that 0.3 seconds required a lateral acceleration of 0.78 g, which in her opinion was clearly not achievable;

if Mr Witkos had seen the Deceased, prior to the Collision, the court cannot be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he would have had sufficient time to steer to the right to avoid the Collision:

the maximum distance at which the Deceased would have been visible to Mr Witkos is 59 m (see paragraph 182 above);

Mr Witkos’s minimum theoretical PRT is 2.1 seconds (see paragraph 183 above); and

the minimum distance that it would have taken Mr Witkos to steer to the right to avoid the Deceased would have been 20 m ( see paragraph 124 above).

the midpoint of the range of distances at which the Deceased would have first been visible to Mr Witkos is 50 m (the midpoint of 41 - 59 m);

the midpoint of the range of Mr Witkos’s theoretical PRT would be 2.45 seconds (the midpoint of 2.1 - 2.81 seconds); and

the midpoint of the range of distances required for Mr Witkos to steer to the right to avoid the Impact would be 26 m (the midpoint of 20 - 32 m).