Matthew Walker v Mersey Care NHS Foundation

On 1 August 2018, the appellant, Mr Matthew Walker, was working as a nursing assistant at the Scott Clinic in Rainhill, at St Helens. This is a medium secure mental health unit. Mr. Walker was asked to participate in a game which he referred to as ‘soft touch’ football. There were 11 patients plus three members of staff. One member of staff was the referee, and the two others played. Mr. Walker, who was playing in goal, sustained a serious fractured radius when, he said, he protected his face from the ball kicked hard by a colleague Mr Dennis Callaghan. The medical experts agreed that Mr Walker suffers, as a result, from a restricted range of movement, loss of function and difficulty in power work and heavy bimanual work, which will interfere with manual physical activities such as restraining patients at work.

Mr. Walker brought an action against the Mersey Care NHS Trust (‘Mersey’), on the basis that Mr Callaghan, for whose actions it was common ground Mersey were vicariously liable, had kicked the ball hard and high, and had failed to follow the rules of the soft touch football game. It was common ground that if this had been an ordinary game of football, what happened to Mr Walker would properly be seen as an unfortunate accident which would not have given rise to a cause of action. Mr Walker’s case was that this was different: this was soft touch football with its own rules. It was materially different from five-a-side football and the key pleaded rule of soft touch football was that the football was not to be kicked hard or above chest height.

On the morning of trial, taking place on 17 August 2023 before Recorder Kennedy KC in the Liverpool County and Family Court, Mersey sought to amend its Defence. The key amendment was set out at paragraph 3. It stated:

The amendment was resisted on the basis that, as Mr Bennett, counsel for Mr Walker contended, although the substance of the amendment had indeed been within the witness statement of Mr Callaghan served nearly a year previously, the case was not a pleaded one. It was accepted in front of the Recorder by Counsel for Mersey, Mr Sandiford, that the amendment was late. There was a debate about the proper interpretation of the pleadings, and whether or to what extent the new plea should be seen as bringing the pleadings in line with the witness evidence. The Recorder allowed the amendment, and refused the following application for an adjournment in a reasoned judgment (‘the Application Judgment’). It is this case management decision that lies at the heart of the first part of the appeal before me.

Recorder Kennedy then proceeded to hear the trial. He gave judgment on 18 August 2023 (‘the Main Judgment’). This found, centrally:

Mr Walker also appeals against the Main Judgment.

Permission to appeal was granted by Order of Mr Justice Ritchie dated 16 October 2023. Mr Justice Ritchie considered that the Grounds did not comply with CPR r52 PD 52B paragraph 4.2(d), in that there are no clear and simply expressed numbered Grounds. Instead, the Grounds were intermingled with the Skeleton Argument. Nevertheless, Ritchie J gave permission on 4 Grounds as extracted from the material. The first three relate to the Amendment Judgment and the fourth to the Main Judgment.

Given the application central to the first part of the appeal, it is necessary to set out the pleadings in more detail.

The Particulars of Claim included the following averments:

These paragraphs were responded to at paragraph 3 of the Defence:

Just as this paragraph uses the phrase ‘soft touch football’, the phrase was used a number of other times (eight in total), in particular in paragraph 6 of Defence which purported to set out Mersey’s positive case:

The defendant pleads a positive case as follows:

I have set out the key paragraph of the amendment sought, above. There was also amendment sought to paragraph 6(e) of the Defence in the following terms:

The reference to the Joint Statement refers to the medical evidence before the Court that ‘The description of a football being kicked at the wrist would imply a relatively high velocity impact to the right wrist’.

The witness statements were served in September 2022, almost a year before the trial.

Mr Walker stated, in relation to soft touch football and its rules:

No other witnesses for the Claimant gave evidence that related to the existence of soft touch football or its rules. However, Mr Walker said:

Mr Callaghan’s evidence in his witness statement relevant to soft touch football and its rules was as follows:

Of the other witnesses for Mersey, Ms Weston used both the phrase ‘soft touch football’ and ‘football’, somewhat interchangeably in paragraph 6 of her statement. Ms O’Shea stated:

The first part of the appeal relates to the case management decision of the learned Recorder. As made clear when Ritchie J gave permission, appeals from case management decisions have a high threshold test, see Royal & Sun Alliance PLC v T & N [2002] EWCA Civ 1964, Chadwick LJ ruled as follows:

In Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, at [52] the Master of the Rolls said:

In Clearway Drainage Systems Ltd v Miles Smith Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 1258, the test. in considering an appeal against a decision of this nature was neatly encapsulated by Sir Terence Etherton MR at paragraph 68:

The second element of the appeal relates to factual findings by the learned Recorder. The law and relevant key cases were recently summarised in Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings [2023] EWCA Civ 191:

The leading authority is Caldwell v Maguire and Fitzgerald [2001] EWCA Civ 1054; [2022] PIQR P6. In this case the jockey was seriously injured in the course of a race. A steward's enquiry into the incident found that Maguire and Fitzgerald had been guilty of careless riding. The injured jockey sued them. The trial judge dismissed his claim, finding that the threshold for liability to be inevitably high. It was not enough to show an error of judgment or momentary lapse in skill when subject to the stresses of a race. This meant it might be difficult to prove a breach of duty in the absence of reckless disregard for the safety of a fellow contestant.

The Court of Appel upheld the judgment. Judge LJ emphasised at [37] that in the context of sporting contests, a distinction needs to be drawn between “conduct which is properly to be characterised as negligent, and thus sounding in damages, and errors of judgment, oversights or lapses of attention of which any reasonable jockey may be guilty in the hurly burly of a race”. Overall, Judge LJ found that the “threshold of liability is a high one. It will not easily be crossed”.

This principle has been applied in a number of cases, including Fulham FC v Jones [2022] EWHC 1108 KB, in which Lane J upheld an appeal against the Recorder’s decision that the defendant had been negligent in a tackle. The Judge found that “The error lies in the recorder treating certain breaches of the Rules of the Game as being ‘very likely’ to amount to negligence.”

At paragraphs 23-25 of the Appellant’s skeleton argument a number of points are advanced procedurally and substantively against the learned Recorder’s decision to permit Mersey to amend its Defence on the morning of trial.

Paragraph 23 contains matters of procedure (in slightly different order to that set out): the absence of a formal application, the absence of a signed version of the amended defence until the end of trial, the absence of a reason for the delay and the absence of any explanation as to how the original defence came to accept and use the term ‘soft-touch’ which was disavowed in the amended pleading.

Paragraph 24 contends that the learned Recorder was wrong to hold that ‘soft touch’ was an ambiguous term, which (it is said), it was defined by paragraph 4 and admitted by paragraph 6(e) of the Defence.

Paragraph 25 contends that the learned Recorder was wrong in law to conclude that the original Defence did not comply with the CPR, and that there was no prejudice to the Claimant. Prejudice is dealt with, further, in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Skeleton Argument, in which Mr Bennett argues that significant prejudice existed because of the resiling from ‘significant admissions of fact’, and without explanation from those responsible for signing the statements of truth.

The legal directions the learned Recorder reminded himself of and sought to apply on the application to amend were, first, upon the approach of Carr J (as she then was) in Quah Su-Ling v Goldman Sachs International[20156] EWHC 759 (Comm) at paragraph 38, where she set out as follows:

Both counsel also referred to the judgment of Henshaw J in Toucan Energy Holdings Ltd & Or v Wirsol Energy Ltd & Ors [2021] EWHC 896. Mr Bennett, through the judgment, drew my attention to the reference to CIP Properties (APT) v Galliford Try Infrastructure Limited [2015] EWHC 1345. In particular, Mr Bennett relied upon the distinction by Coulson J (as he then was) between amendments which can be regarded as ‘late’ if it could have been advanced earlier, or duplication of effort or the revisiting of steps. It would be regarded as ‘very late’’ if permission to amend threatens the trial date, even if the application is made some months before trial (as was the case in CIP). At (c), Coulson J considered:

Mr Williams, who represented Mersey before me (but who did not do so at trial), noted that at (c) from Carr J’s summary in Quah Su-Ling, the Judge described a ‘very late amendment’ as one made when the trial date has been fixed and where permitting the amendments ‘would cause the trial date to be lost’. From a linguistic perspective, this might be said to be different from the language of Couslon J who uses the phrase ‘threatens the trial date’. However, in substance it is clear that Coulson J meant that the (‘threatened’) amendment would, if granted, mean that the trial date would have to be adjourned so that the amendment could be fairly to be dealt with, or that it would, by reason of its proximity to trial, cause an unfair imbalance between the parties in their preparation (as was the case in Bourke and another v Favre and another [2015] EWHC 277 (Ch) in which Nugee J refused the amendments some months before trial because of the “significant pressure” that having to deal with the new claim would put on the defendants). Despite the slight difference in language, I do not therefore identify a material difference in principle between the concepts involved in (relative) lateness considered by Coulson J and Carr J.

On the basis of CIP, Mr Bennett submitted that the absence of good reason for the delay, in circumstances where the amendment was ‘very late’, was necessarily fatal to the application. The reference in the passage quoted above from Coulson J to ‘Brown’ is a reference to Andrew Brown & Ors v Innovatorone [2011] EWHC 3221 (Comm) in which Hamblen J, as he then was, identified that ‘parties to litigation have a legitimate expectation that trials will be conducted on the dates fixed for trial by the court and that the trial will not be put back or delayed without good reason’ i.e. explicitly in the context of the trial date being put back. In the context of an amendment which would have the effect of the trial date being lost, there may be (as Coulson J said at [19(e)] in CIP) ‘an overwhelming reason to refuse the amendments’ even if there is a good reason for the amending parties’ delay. Absent a good reason, the circumstances in which a party would successfully amend where there is no good reason for the delay and the trial date would be lost will be, if not non-existent, vanishingly rare. However, I reject the contention advanced by Mr Bennett that even in circumstances where the trial can proceed, notwithstanding the amendment, the absence of a good reason for the delay will itself be fatal to the application. This puts the point too high. Indeed, in CIP, the absence of a good reason (as found by Coulson J: see para [58]) was not stated as being determinative in that case. Instead, the ‘single most important factor militating against allowing this amendment’ was the loss of the trial date if the amendment was allowed [see para 62].

Mr Williams also drew the following passage from Toucan to the Court’s attention as being of relevance in the present case:

Before turning to the Grounds of Appeal, I start, as did the Recorder, with an analysis of the pleadings and the issues as they stood as at the first day of trial, absent the amendment. The learned Recorder’s analysis, which is the subject of criticism, was as follows:

Paragraph 3 of the Defence clearly put the Claimant to strict proof as to the substance of paragraphs 3 to 8 of the Particulars of Claim. This included paragraph 4 in which the rules for ‘soft touch football’ were set out. When the Recorder stated that there was no definition of ‘soft touch’ in the Particulars of Claim, he was plainly referring to the absence of any particular definition of ‘soft touch’ (i.e. what might constitute a ‘soft’ touch). The Recorder was entirely cognizant of the fact that the Claimant had set out the rules for ‘soft touch football’, which is made clear from the following sentence in which he explicitly referred to paragraph 4, in which the rules were set out, and explicitly recited the rule (as pleaded) that the parties should not kick the ball ‘hard’. He did not overlook the existence of the pleaded rules. The Recorder correctly identified that paragraph 4 was not admitted: it plainly was not.

Mr Bennett argued, as he did before the Recorder, that the rules of ‘soft touch’ pleaded at paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim had been admitted in paragraph 6(e) of the Defence. This sub-paragraph states: ‘The simple fact the claimant sustained injury blocking the football, does not mean his colleague failed to follow the rules of soft football.’ This sub-paragraph has to be read as part of the pleading as a whole in which the Claimant is put to proof as to what the rules of soft-touch football were. However, on any view the pleading does appear to accept in terms that (a) there was such a game as ‘soft [touch] football’ and (b) it was a game which had rules. From these two aspects, the only sensible inference is that it was a game that had some rules somehow different to that from ordinary football, but nowhere does the pleading set out positively what those rules were. However, unsatisfactory though it was (as the Recorder pointed out – the pleading was ambiguous and confusing), I do not consider that the Recorder was wrong when, in light of the clear first sentence of original paragraph 3, he concluded that there was no clear admission of what the rules of soft touch football actually were.

On the face of the pleading, Mersey was entitled to, and had, therefore put Mr Walker to proof as to what the rules of softtouch football were, and how it was said that Mr Callaghan was in breach of them. This analysis is supported by Mr Bennett’s own Skeleton Argument in the trial below, in which he identified that ‘some judicial determination will be required on matters upon which the Defence puts the Claimant to proof, but where the Defendant’s witness evidence now seeks to put forward alternate and positive case’. The first of these related to the rules of ‘soft touch’ football. In argument, Mr Bennett contended that implicit within the name ‘soft touch’ itself was the requirement not to hit the ball hard. However, I agree with Mr Williams this is not necessarily the case. It is not a recognised term of art, the same way that the game of ‘touch rugby’ would generally be understood as a recognisably modified version of full contact rugby. Indeed, the latter illustrates the ambiguity: ‘touch’ in ‘touch rugby’ does not refer in any way to the kicking or passing of the ball, but to the level of contact between the players. Without further definition by reference to rules (which were pleaded at paragraph 4 but not admitted), ‘touch’ could by itself refer to the type of tackle and contact, the type of kicking, or both. It does not, for example, suggest the necessity for slow play, as alleged, which also demonstrates that relying upon the phrase ‘soft touch’ by itself to glean the rules would be insufficient.

In addition to the non-admission as to what the rules were, the original Defence also denied negligence (at paragraph 5) and also put the Claimant to strict proof in respect of the assertions at paragraph 10(a)(i) and (ii): these assertions were that Mr Callaghan ‘(i)kicked the ball hard and high, at the Claimant’s face’ as well as ‘(ii) failed to follow the rules of ‘soft touch football game’. It can be noted that, in light of the authorities, a breach of the rules of ‘soft touch football’ (i.e. 10(ii)) alone would be insufficient to establish negligence. It was necessary to establish, beyond mere breach of such rules as may be established, that Mr Callaghan’s actions were not an error of judgment or a miscalculation but negligent.

In light of the somewhat unsatisfactory and confusing Defence, it is clear that insofar as Mersey intended to advance its own case as to what the rules were (as it ultimately did), and align the pleading with the evidence of their central witness Mr Callaghan, it was necessary to amend the non-admission into a denial and averment. This is what the amendment sought to do. The Recorder was therefore correct to identify that contrary to the original Defence, a clear positive case was articulated in the draft Amended Defence. This asserted the positive case (for the first time in a pleading) that there was no rule tempering the level of force with which the ball was to be kicked, and that over and above that it was a friendly game in general terms and there should be no aggressive tackles.

The consequence of refusing the amendment would have been that Mr Callaghan’s evidence, where he engaged in a description of the rules and/or his lack of awareness of the term ‘soft touch football’, would not have been relevant to any pleaded case and, strictly, inadmissible. However, it would still in these circumstances have been necessary for the Claimant to prove to establish in particular 10(a)(ii)) that the rules of ‘soft touch football’ included a rule about the strength or velocity of shots and that Mr Callaghan breached that rule; and, as set out above, particular 10(a)(i) such that from all the surrounding circumstances it was possible to characterise Mr Callaghan’s action not as an error of judgment or a miscalculation but of negligence.

Against the background of this pleaded position, the Recorder considered, one by one, the factors set out in Quah Su-Ling.

In relation to factor (b), the Recorder identified that it was not ‘fully’ right to describe what was being put forward as a new case as it encapsulates what has been dealt with in the evidence already. This was entirely fair. Mr Walker himself described the rules in his evidence (and notably, perhaps, did not in fact allege (inconsistent with his pleading) that one of the rules related to the strength with which the ball was, or was not, to be struck). Mr Callaghan’s evidence also dealt with ‘rules’, and the new pleading essentially reflected his evidence. Prior to the amendment, Mr Walker had to establish the rules applicable to the game that was being played, that Mr Callaghan went beyond the rules which the court may find were in place; and then, whether there was sufficient evidence from all the surrounding circumstances to characterise that not as an error of judgment or a miscalculation but of negligence. This remained fundamentally the case.

The Recorder, critically, formed the view that there was no reason why the trial could not proceed if the amendment was granted. This determination was plainly central to the Recorder’s decision (as it was, having determined the opposite, for Coulson J in CIP).

On the facts before the Recorder, this conclusion was within the bounds of his discretion and cannot properly be described as irrational. Key to this decision were the facts, which it was open to the Recorder to conclude, that (a) the question of what the rules were was in issue on the original pleadings (ambiguous as they were); and (b) the witnesses had already given evidence directly as to this issue, and it was clear from the service of witness evidence that Mr Callaghan did not accept that any rule included a restriction on the strength of kicking the ball. The Claimant had already effectively engaged in the point, as Mr Walker’s evidence advanced his positive case as to what the rules were.

In argument, Mr Bennett said that prejudice was caused to the Claimant because the issue of ‘soft touch football’ had not been the subject of disclosure, and ought properly have been. It is not clear why disclosure had not encompassed the question of what the rules were of ‘soft touch football’, as this was an issue in the case and the Claimant was entitled to press for disclosure in respect of this. By definition, any document responding to this issue would respond to the implicitly prior question of the existence of ‘soft touch football’ at all. In reality, this would pick up risk assessments relating to any form of football to be played and any rules which did or did not apply. No detail of how disclosure was in fact dealt with was provided, and it is also relevant to note that it was not argued before the Recorder that prejudice sprang from disclosure related issues.

Mr Bennett also placed significant emphasis on the absence of an explanation for how the original pleading came to accept, as I have set out above, the existence of the term ‘soft touch football’, which acceptance was then flatly withdrawn in the Amended Defence, both documents being signed by the same claims handler for the Defendant. At times, in argument, Mr Bennett elided the requirement for a good reason forthe delay in seeking permission to amend with the requirement for a good reason for the amendment itself. Obviously, the amendment was sought to bring the pleaded case in line with the witness evidence of Mr Callaghan, which had been served 11 months previously. This ‘reason’ for the amendment was plain. That there was no good reason for waiting until trial to do so was a separate factor. As to the circumstances in which the original pleading set out a case inconsistent with Mr Callaghan’s evidence, this was a matter which (as the Recorder pointed out) could be explored with the witnesses, and would be the subject of submission seeking to argue that inferences should be drawn, as would be normal. The precise circumstances of the pleading and instructions given at that time would be privileged, and it was not clear what particular avenues Mr Bennett could legitimately have sought to explore (and whilst the unsatisfactory nature of the change of position was clearly argued, none were identified in argument before the Recorder as a reason why an adjournment would be necessitated).

The final aspect of prejudice, which was relied upon in argument, was that Mr Walker had been deprived of the opportunity of seeking evidence from colleagues saying that they do recognise the term ‘soft touch football’ and that they do recognise the rules set out at paragraph 4 of the particulars of claim and which, as it was said, the Defence appeared to accept existed. It is right that the Amended Defence put the existence of a game recognised as, ‘soft touch football’ formerly in issue but, as the analysis demonstrates above, the Recorder was justified in concluding that what the rules were always had to be proved. The Claimant knew this and Mr Walker himself led evidence on it. Moreover, Mr Walker’s own statement made clear that other members of staff who may have had relevant knowledge had already been contacted and had not wished to provide evidence because they were concerned about their jobs. It is correct that considerable latitude ought to be given to the potentially prejudiced party in applications to amend, and it is plainly not the case that such a party has a burden of establishing that particular enquiries they wish to pursue (on the basis of the new case) would necessarily be fruitful. However, the Recorder was within his powers to conclude on the material before him that the parties had already engaged to the extent they were ever going to be able to in the factual question of the existence of the game and what the rules were in their respective evidence.

Factors (c) and (d) relate to lateness. The Recorder explicitly based his balancing exercise on the basis that the amendment was ‘very late’, but again came back to his judgment that allowing the amendment would not stop the trial from proceeding as a key factor.

Factor (e) focuses on the insufficiency of the absence of prejudice ‘save as to costs’. This is a reference to the impact upon the administration of justice as a whole, in circumstances where the payment of costs inter partes (e.g. on an adjournment to permit the amendment to be dealt with) is insufficient to deal with this. In circumstances where, as here, the Recorder was entitled to conclude that an adjournment was not required, the factor has more limited relevance.

Factor (f) relates to whether there was a ‘good explanation’ for the delay. The Recorder rightly identified that there was not a good explanation for why Mersey had not sought to ‘regularise the pleading situation’, a reference to the fact that the pleading sought to align itself with the evidence as served (which included a positive case as to the rules, as opposed to a non-admission). He stated that he factored this into his balancing exercise. Insofar as it was suggested that the absence of good reason by itself must be fatal to a late amendment, I have set out why this is not correct. It should be factored in to all the circumstances. It is an important factor, but it is only a factor.

Factor (g) is a broad factor requiring consideration of the purpose of compliance with the CPR. The Recorder noted the approach and made clear he adopted it.

In paragraphs 14 and 15 of his judgment, the Recorder then noted his criticism of the Defendant for the failure, as he identified it, in failing to regularise the pleading situation. However, he also criticised the claim for Claimant for ‘doing nothing when it is clear that the case has changed.’ Mr Bennett is critical of this aspect of the decision.

First, it is important to note that the Recorder’s primary position was that, for reasons that the Recorder was entitled to conclude, no prejudice existed and the trial could proceed notwithstanding the amendment. The Recorder’s remarks about the Claimant’s position were an alternative if, contrary to his primary position, prejudice did exist. Even in this context, I do not read this passage of the Recorder’s judgment as having placed a positive burden on the Claimant, in the first instance, to meet an unpleaded case or to seek further evidence without an amendment to the cost budget. It is plain, however, that by doing nothing, the Claimant was adding to the certainty of a procedural wrangle arising at trial. It is clear what Mr Callaghan’s evidence was going to be for the best part of a year before the trial. Presumably, the Claimant was, once it saw the content of the statement in September 2022, intending to make a submission at trial that Mr Callaghan’s evidence was inadmissible because it did not go to a pleaded issue. . This is something that could easily have been flagged up either in correspondence, to draw the issue out, or (at the very latest) canvassed at the PTR. This would be good trial management and is the sort of approach expected of the parties to litigation in the 21^st century. I take pains to emphasise that it would plainly be wrong to suggest that the burden of applying to the Court promptly when the need to amend arises does not fall squarely on the shoulders of the amending party, and the absence of a good reason to do so will be an important, and sometimes determinative, reason for refusing an amendment. But it would also be wrong to exclude as a matter of principle from those factors which may properly be considered on such an application the extent to which the potential resisting party has sought to engage with trial management issues in a proactive manner if an prospective procedural difficulty looks inevitable. This may, for example, factor into the extent to which a ‘new’ issue can properly be regarded as having taken a party by surprise. Adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach may therefore be an entirely legitimate one, as the Recorder said, but it also may not be entirely irrelevant to the Court’s consideration of the appropriate course of action in all the circumstances of the case.

Finally, the fact that the amendment application was not made formally or the timing of the provision of the signed amended defence do not add meaningfully to the substantive grounds of appeal.

For all these reasons, the Recorder’s decision to permit the amendment and refuse any adjournment (the latter decision not the subject of a separate ground of appeal) fell within the wide discretion permitted to a judge in relation to issues of trial management.

Paragraph 30 of Mr Bennett’s Skeleton Argument asserts that the Judge found that the game was a normal game and gave judgment for the Respondent on this basis. He contends that that this was ‘quite perverse’ but concedes that the Recorder’s decision was ‘arguably a finding of fact open to the Judge, once he had permitted the amended Defence.’.

It is clear that the Recorder dealt carefully with the evidence of each witness. The Recorder weighed the evidence which came principally from Mr Walker and Mr Callaghan. He gave clear reasons for preferring the evidence of Mr Callaghan, whom he found to be an objective careful witness.

The Recorder’s decision was obviously not irrational, and turned on findings of fact which it is not appropriate for this Court to interfere with.

Paragraphs 30(a), (b) (c) and (e) all relate, in essence, to the Claimant’s forensic point arising from the acceptance of the phrase ‘soft touch football’ within the Defence and Ms Weston’s original statement, and the absence of evidence as to how this came about (the inference being it must have been on instructions). These points were taken account of in the Judge’s reasoning (see paragraph 27). It was a matter for the Recorder to determine what weight could be placed upon these matters, and form a view having heard the evidence about the credibility and reliability of the witnesses’ recollections.

Paragraph 30(d) relates to the absence of significance of the non-attendance of Ms O’Shea. Placing no weight on the evidence of a witness who did not attend (and whose evidence was, on paper at lease, unhelpful to Mr Walker) was in no way perverse. Paragraph 30(f) asserts that weight was wrongly placed on the absence of documents, and paragraph (g) asserts that the Recorder should have considered it ‘odd’ that staff would play full force football with dangerous and violent psychiatric patients without any risk-assessment. I have dealt with the related question of disclosure above. The Recorder did not fall into error in this regard.

For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.