Corey-Lee Styles v South Wales Police

This judgment deals with two matters. First, an application made by the Claimant by an Application Notice, dated 21 April 2023, for various orders, including an injunction. Second, of the Court’s own initiative, consideration of whether to impose a civil restraint order on the Claimant.

There have been two hearings, both conducted in the Port Talbot Justice Centre, at which the Claimant has attended in person. Although both Defendants have been notified of these hearings, and the fact that the Court would be considering whether to make a civil restraint order, neither Defendant attended the hearings or was represented.

I need to set out details of the previous litigation that the Claimant has brought in the High Court (of which I am aware) and what has happened in these proceedings. The Claimant has brought the following civil claims in the High Court.

South Wales Police

A claim against South Wales Police (QB-2017-006753; formerly HQ17X01210). The claim has been struck out. The brief history of the claim is as follows.

The Claim Form was issued on 5 April 2017. In the section of the Claim Form requiring brief details of the claim, the Claimant set out:

“(1)

Breach of police protocol and human rights, intimidation and harassment;

(2)

Destruction of property. Removal of car, licence, wrongly;

(3)

Obtaining evidence whilst breaching code of practice;

(4)

False imprisonment/detainment;

(5)

Unfair treatment;

(6)

Entering property without a warrant;

(7)

Assault;

(8)

Slander and defamation of character;

(9)

Neglect of duty.”

The value of the claim was stated to be £55,000.

The Claimant did not file Particulars of Claim. The Defendant filed an Acknowledgement of Service indicating an intention to defend the claim, received by the Court on 10 July 2017. An email sent to the Court noted that although the Claim Form had been issued on 5 April 2017, it was not sent to the Defendant until 26 June 2017.

On 10 July 2027, the Defendant issued an Application Notice seeking an order that the Claim Form be struck out for failure to provide Particulars of Claim.

It appears that, on 15 August 2017, Master Thornett made an Order. A copy of that Order is not available on the Court File, but it appears (from the later order of HHJ Moloney QC – see [10] below) that it imposed a stay on the claim and required the Claimant to apply, by 25 September 2017, to lift the stay together and to supply Particulars of Claim.

The Claimant sent an Application Notice to the Court dated 5 October 2017 (which appears to have been received on 9 October 2017) seeking, amongst other things an injunction to restrain alleged harassment and intimidation (“the First Injunction Application”). Filed with this Application was a document that is described in the body of the document as “particulars of claim”.

On 18 December 2017, the First Injunction Application was listed before HHJ Moloney QC, sitting as Judge of the High Court. The order recites that neither the Claimant nor the Defendant attended the hearing, but that the Judge had considered the papers available on the Court file. HHJ Moloney QC made the following order:

“1.

The Claim is struck out for failure to comply with Paragraph 3 of the Order of Master Thornett dated 15 August 2017.

2.

Further or in the alternative, the Application [for an interim injunction] is dismissed as being totally without merit.

3.

The Claimant shall pay the Defendant’s costs of its Application dated 10 July 2017, summarily assessed at £500, not later than 18 January 2018.

4.

This Order having been made without a hearing, either party may apply to the Court to vary it or set it aside. Any such application must be made not later than 11 January 2018 and must be accompanied by a signed witness statement explaining:

(a)

why the applicant did not attend the hearing on 18 December 2027 at the Royal Courts of Justice;

(b)

why the applicant had a good prospect of success in respect of the matters before the Court on that hearing.”

The Order contained the Judge’s reasons, as follows:

“1.

The Master’s said Order stayed the claim and required to apply by 25 September 2017 to lift the stay. No application was received by the Court until 5 October 2017 at the earliest.

2.

That delay might have been the subject of an extension of time. But more seriously, the Master’s Order also required the Claimant to accompany the application to lift the stay with draft Particulars of Claim complying with Part 16 of the Civil Procedure Rules and its accompanying Practice Direction. Part 16.4(1) requires ‘a concise statement of the facts upon which the claimant relies’.

3.

The document attached to the application notice is not headed as Draft Particulars of Claim but describes itself as an application. It says at para.5: ‘There is a statement of facts with the details of account to follow this particular of claim which will be produced on request of the courts.’ No such document has been served with the application.

4.

The document which is attached refers to various apparently serious allegations against the police, but does not contain one single date, time, or place or other fact which would enable the police or the Court to identify and deal with the substance of the Claimant’s allegations. In other words, it does nothing to remedy the defects in the Claim Form which were clearly identified in the police’s application to strike out, even though the Master’s Order was plainly designed to give the Claimant a last chance to do just that.

5.

In the above circumstances:

(a)

The claim stands struck out for failure to comply with the Master’s Order;

(b)

The application is totally without merit and would have been dismissed in any event even if the Master had not imposed the sanction of striking out.”

No application was (or has been) made by the Claimant to set aside or for permission to appeal the Orders of Master Thornett and/or HHJ Moloney QC.

Bro Morgannwg Trust

A claim against Bro Morgannwg Trust (QB-2017-003838; formerly HQ17C01209). The brief history of the claim is as follows.

The claim also appears to have been commenced in April 2017.

On 16 June 2018, Master Cook transferred the claim to Swansea County Court, where it was given an action number of E90SA116.

There are no other details about this claim available to me on High Court file and I have not requested the file from Swansea. The designation “C” in the original action number suggests that it was originally classified as a clinical negligence/personal injury claim. At the hearing, the Claimant confirmed that the claim was for clinical negligence. She told me that the action may well have been stayed or dismissed. It has not led to a trial or any order or judgment in the Claimant’s favour.

Bridgend Local Authority

A claim against Bridgend County Council (QB-2017-002781; formerly HQ17M01212). The claim has been struck out. The brief history of the claim is as follows.

The Claim Form was issued on 5 April 2017. In the section of the Claim Form requiring brief details of claim, the Claimant set out:

“* Civil Part 8 and Human Rights Breach.

* Breach of Data Protection Laws

* Slander and Libel

* Defamation of Character

* Wrongful removal of Children/Abduction

* Harassment, causing miscarriage.”

The value of the claim was stated to be £85,000.

On the reverse of the Claim Form the Claimant stated the following:

“I have had Social Services spread slander and defamation of character against myself. Refused to correct factual inaccuracies of health care and housing situation regarding myself and my children. Have intimidated me and disclosed private and sensitive information about me, causing harassment. Placed me in a situation that caused me a physical miscarriage. A miscarriage of justice has occurred.”

The Claimant did not file Particulars of Claim. Nevertheless, on 21 May 2018, the Court received a request for default judgment from the Claimant dated 17 May 2018.

On 5 July 2018, Master Davison made an order in the following terms:

“Unless the Claim Form and Particulars of Claim were served within 4 months of time (sc. issue), the validity of the Claim Form has expired. The Claimant must make an application to extend the time for service under CPR r7.6. If no such application is made by 4pm on 27 July 2018 the claim will stand as struck out”

On 10 October 2018, the Court received an application notice from the Claimant, dated 25 July 2018, seeking an extension of time to file Particulars of Claim.

On 16 October 2018, the Court sent a letter to the Claimant advising her that she had not made an Application by 27 July 2018 as required by the Order of 5 July 2018 and so the claim had been struck out.

No application was made by the Claimant to set aside or for permission to appeal the Order of Master Davison.

Bro-Morgannwg/Cwm Taff University Health Board and Bridgend Local Authority

A further claim against Bro-Morgannwg/Cwm Taff University Health Board and Bridgend Local Authority (QB-2020-000642). This claim was stayed. The history of the claim is as follows.

At some point, in early February, the Claimant sent to the Court a Claim Form together with an Application Notice (which was dated 5 February 2020) seeking, without notice, an interim injunction to restrain (amongst other things) alleged harassment, intimidation, and the spreading of libel and slander by the Defendants (“the Second Injunction Application”). There is no sealed copy of the Second Injunction Application on the Court file, but the Claimant has shown me a copy stamped by the Court (see [33] below).

It appears that initially the Court refused to issue the Claim Form. The Claimant has provided me with a copy of the letter from the Court, dated 6 February 2020. It included the following:

“Upon receipt of your claim form, this was referred to Master Sullivan who has directed to return your claim form for the following reasons:

(1)

The brief details of claim are unclear as to the statement of case. The Master has directed that the particulars of claim should be succinct an in numbered paragraphs…

An injunction order form was handed in with your claim form and particulars. It does not appear to be a form issued by the high court and the claim number stated as ‘linked’ means we cannot accept this. The court has retained the fee remission certificate submitted with this form … [which] expires on 4 March 2020”

The Claimant appears to have resolved the issues with the Claim Form and it was issued by the Court on 17 February 2020. In the section of the Claim Form requiring brief details of the claim, the Claimant set out:

“(1)

I was wrongly diagnosed in Sept 2000, resulting in future mistreatment, continuation of wrong diagnosis and mistreatment.

(2)

In 2004 I was misdiagnosed and this continues to be the case in 2005, 2010 and 2012. Resulting from negligence and treatment for an illness wrongly diagnosed on breach of data circumstances.

(3)

Reports were done on my historical file that passed incomplete and inaccurate information, including information sensitive in nature to people/members of the public. This information has also been used as a method … to remove my children.

(4)

I have been forced treatment between 2000 and 2018 and suffering harassment.”

The value of the claim was stated to be £275,000.

Attached to the Claim Form were a further 9 pages of handwritten information about the claim. This included a statement from the Claimant together with a one-page summary of the claims that she wished to bring against the two defendants. As against the First Defendant, these were identified as:

“(1)

wrongful removal of children:

(2)

breach of data protection

(3)

harassment and pestering

(4)

sexual harassment

(5)

threatening life and liberty

(6)

emotional and physical harm of my children

(7)

fabricating documents

(8)

slander, libel, defamation of character

(9)

hearsay”

As against the Second Defendant, these were identified as:

“(1)

misuse of private information

(2)

malicious falsehood

(3)

breach of privacy

(4)

tampering with evidence

(5)

medical discrimination and biasness

(6)

causing conflict with personal relationships and using this to evidence allegations of negative effects of history of abuse and wrong diagnosis.”

Filed with the Claim Form was a 21-page document headed “Particulars of Claim”.

On 23 March 2020, Master Yoxall considered the Particulars of Claim filed by the Claimant. He decided that the statement of case was impossible to plead to. The Master made an Order (unfortunately, due to lockdown, not sealed until 24 April 2020) which stayed the claim (“the Yoxall Order”). The Yoxall Order provided:

“1.

There be a stay of proceedings until further order. Note: this stay does not restrict the Claimant from applying, if so advised, to a Judge for an injunction as she apparently wishes to do.

2.

Any application to lift the stay must be supported by draft Particulars of Claim which comply with CPR r.16.4. The Particulars of Claim (using numbered paragraphs and dates) must include:

(1)

A concise statement of the facts on which the Claimant relies.

(2)

In so far as the clinical negligence claim is concerned: (a) the duty of care owed; (b) particulars of the alleged breach of duty; (c) particulars of the personal injury, loss and damage alleged to have been caused by the breach of duty

(3)

A specific paragraph giving particulars of the following alleged wrongs:

(a)

Breach of Data Protection;

(b)

Harassment;

(c)

Sexual harassment;

(d)

Threats to life and liberty;

(e)

The fabrication of documents;

(f)

Malicious falsehood;

(g)

Breach of the Claimant’s privacy;

(h)

Tampering with evidence.

The Claimant must identify to which Defendant these allegations relate.

(4)

As to the defamation claim:

(a)

As to the claim in slander, the Claimant must as far as possible set out the words complained of and to whom they were spoken and when;

(b)

As to the claim in libel, the publication complained of must be identified

(c)

The Claimant must specify the defamatory meaning which she alleges that the words conveyed; see further the Practice Direction to Part 53 of the CPR.

3.

The application to lift the stay must be made within 56 days of service of this order.

4.

A copy of this order is to be served with the Claim Form

5.

The Claimant may apply to set aside or vary this order within 7 days of service.”

The Claimant did not apply to set aside or vary the Yoxall Order.

After the Yoxall Order, there is a copy of a letter from the Court to the Claimant on the Court file, dated 24 April 2020, in the following terms:

“Thank you for the contact you have made with the court.

Upon issue of the claim form, I advised that this would be referred to a Master for consideration prior to being released for service.

I then sent an email asking for a copy a signed second page which I did not received (sic). I can see that you submitted an electronic version of the claim form, however this was not signed.

Before the court closed, I referred the matter to Master Yoxall to consider the claim without the second page. He returned a direction, however, the court offices closed and we were unable to forward this to you.

Today, I was able to attend the court and I received the court file in your case. Master Yoxall has made an order in this case dated 23rd March 2020. As per the directions the Master gave, a copy of this order and the claim forms have been prepared for return to you by post. Your documents will be sent out next week and I hope that they will arrive with you in the next 7-10 days.

The Master has given his permission for you to serve the claim form on the defendants along with a copy of the order.

The court offices remain closed at this time in line with Government Guidelines relating to Covid-19.

There are no updates as to when the court will re-open and no staff will be returning to the court in the interim. Though post is being accepted, it is not being processed. If you have any queries, please send these to QBEnquiries@justice.gov.uk.”

The Claimant did not make any application for the stay to be lifted and she did not provide a revised Particulars of Claim as directed in the Yoxall Order. Before the hearing today, the Claimant has provided me with a copy of an Application Notice, dated 29 May 2020, in which she sought “an extension of time to comply” following the birth of her daughter, who had been born on 10 May 2020. The Application Notice is not stamped and there is no record of it on the Court file. The Claimant told me at the hearing that she had sent this to the Court. If she did, there is no record of it being received and, indeed, no reference to any follow-up by the Claimant to see what had happened to it.

At the hearing, the Claimant maintained – and she firmly believes – that the Court granted her an injunction following submission of the Second Injunction Application. Following submission of the Application Notice, and a separate handwritten document headed “Order Sought”, to the Court she received copies of these documents duly stamped by the Court, bearing the date of 17 February 2020. As the Claimant accepts, there was no hearing (whether in person or conducted remotely). The Claimant has not provided a copy of any injunction order granted by the Court, and there is no such order on the Court file.

Having carefully considered the documents that the Claimant has provided to me, and the documents on the Court file, I am quite satisfied that she is mistaken about an injunction having been granted. She has misunderstood the process whereby the Court provides a stamped copy of an Application Notice (indicating that it has been received and filed) with the Court granting an injunction order. There was no hearing of the Second Injunction Application, and no injunction order was granted in February 2020. That conclusion is reinforced by what happened next in the proceedings.

On 13 May 2020, having considered the Claim Form, Particulars of Claim, the Second Injunction Application and the Yoxall Order, Warby J made an Order, without a hearing, transferring the claim to the Media & Communications List. He also directed that the Second Injunction Application Notice should be put before a Judge of the Media & Communications List for directions, such directions to be made without a hearing if the Judge considered that it would be inappropriate to hold a hearing.

On 9 June 2020, and as recorded in the Order of the same date, I considered (1) the Claimant’s Claim Form issued on 18 February 2020 and Particulars of Claim, dated 5 February 2020; (2) the Second Injunction Application; (3) the Yoxall Order; and (4) emails sent by the Claimant to the Court dated 19 March 2020, 22 and 24 April 2020, 6 May 2020 and 8 June 2020. I noted, in the Order, that a stay of proceedings had been imposed (not including any application for an injunction), and that the Claimant had been directed to make an application to lift the stay within 56 days, supported by revised Particulars of Claim, an order with which the Claimant had failed to comply. Having reviewed the available documentation, I decided that the matters complained of did not appear to be urgent, or not sufficiently urgent that they justified hearing the Second Injunction Application before the Claimant had complied with Master Yoxall’s order and provided revised Particulars of Claim. Further, there was no justification for not giving notice of the Second Injunction Application to the Defendants, particularly having particular regard to s.12 Human Rights Act 1998. Finally, having reviewed CE-File, it appeared that there had been previous litigation involving the Claimant and the Defendants (but which were paper files pre-dating CE-File which were unavailable to me during the lockdown). The order I made was as follows:

“(1)

Unless the Court otherwise directs, no application for an interim injunction will be considered by the Court unless and until the Claimant has applied to lift the stay imposed by the Yoxall Order and the said stay has been lifted.

(2)

An application for an interim injunction must be made on proper notice to the Defendants, with the Claimant providing evidence to the Court of proper service.

(3)

By 4.30pm on 30 June 2020, the Claimant must notify the Court in writing of any other civil claims she has brought against the Defendants (or either of them) by providing details of the Court in which the claim was brought and the Claim or Action number.”

As it was made without a hearing, my Order of 9 June 2020 advised the Claimant that she could apply to vary or discharge the Order by making an Application, by 23 June 2020. The Claimant made no application to vary or discharge by the deadline provided. The Claimant also did not comply with Paragraph (3) of that Order, she made no application to lift the stay and she did not provide Particulars of Claim as directed by the Yoxall Order.

In early September 2021, the Claimant submitted a further application for an interim injunction (“the Third Injunction Application”). It was dated 23 April 2020. It sought orders against both Defendants, but also against South Wales Police, in the following terms:

“(1)

Not remove new born Styles from Miss Styles’ care or cause others to do so.

(2)

Not harass or force medical procedures or treatment including assessment

(3)

[Not to] pester, harass, create or falsify statements or evidence including fabrication of documents…”

The Claimant provided no additional evidence in support of the Third Injunction Application.

On 6 September 2021, Tipples J dismissed the Third Injunction Application without a hearing. She noted my Order of 9 June 2020, that the Claimant had failed to make any application to lift the stay imposed by the Yoxall Order and had failed to provide evidence that she had served the Third Injunction Application on the Defendants (or South Wales Police). The Judge recorded that the Third Injunction Application was totally without merit and provided the following reasons:

“From the papers before the Court, it is wholly unclear as to why the Claimant is seeking to make an application for an injunction over 16 months after it was signed. In any event, by an order dated 9 June 2020 Nicklin J set out a clear procedural framework identifying the circumstances in which the Claimant would be entitled to make an injunction application in the Claim No. QB-2020-000642 to the court. It is plain that those criteria have not been complied with. Accordingly the Injunction Application must be dismissed and is totally without merit.”

As it was made without a hearing, the Order of 6 September 2021 advised the Claimant that she could apply to vary or discharge the Order by making an Application by 17 September 2021. The Claimant made no application to vary or discharge, whether by the deadline or at all.

On 29 March 2022, the Court received a further Application Notice from the Claimant, dated 7 March 2022 seeking to set aside the 9 June 2020 Order (“the Set-Aside Application”). She provided a note, dated 24 March 2022, explaining the basis of her application. On 27 April 2022, I refused the Set-Aside Application and declared it to be totally without merit. My reasons were provided in the Order:

“(A)

The stay remains in place. There are no proper grounds to set-aside my Order of 9 June 2020 and the application to do so is substantially out of time without any (or any proper) explanation for the delay. The Set-Aside Application is totally without merit.

(B)

I note that the Claimant renewed her application for an interim injunction without having given the Defendants notice (as required by the Order of 9 June 2020) and this renewed application was dismissed by Tipples J by Order dated 6 September 2021 and certified as being totally without merit.

(C)

There will be no progress in this case until the Claimant complies with the Order of Master Yoxall made on 23 March 2020 and sealed by the Court on 24 April 2020 and the stay he imposed has been lifted.

(D)

This is the second occasion on which the Court has declared applications made by the Claimant to be totally without merit. If a subsequent application is similarly declared to be totally without merit, then the Court will consider the imposition of a civil restraint order.

(E)

It is suggested that the Claimant attempts to find some legal advice and assistance. In the first instance, she may find some assistance from a local Citizens’ Advice Bureau.”

Again, as it was made without a hearing, the Order of 27 April 2022 advised the Claimant that she could apply to vary or discharge the Order by making an Application by 11 May 2022. The Claimant made no application to vary or discharge, whether by the deadline or at all.

On 7 March 2023, the Claimant sent a further Application Notice to the Court. It did not identify the Claim number, and the Claimant provided her name as Corey-Lee Cortez. The defendants were identified as the two Defendants and South Wales Police. In the section of the Application Notice asking for details of the order that the Claimant was seeking, she stated:

“Recovery Order. Re-opening of Injunction enforcement order. [Emergency Protection Order]/Court of protection transferal hearing listing”.

From that description, it appeared that the Claimant was seeking orders from the High Court that could only properly be made in family or Court of Protection proceedings. On the reverse of the Application Notice, the Claimant provided the following information/evidence in support of her Application:

“Between 2020 and 2022, I have been subjected to defamation of character by the local authority and South Wales Police. I have been stalked, harassed, had my property damaged and broken into and entered on false allegations made by Bridgend midwifery staff and Council staff to the police, stating I was mentally unfit and unstable, went missing, was neglecting my unborn son’s health care…

6 June 2022. My son was taken at birth with no Court order, no PPO, and held way over two weeks without a Court order, against injunctions orders, I was then falsely accused of child abuse, neglect and abduction, stating I attempted to leave the hospital with my don directly after birth, leading to police being on the maternity ward. Police had harassed me by being on the ward throughout the birth of my son, alleging I was going to kidnap my own new born baby…

I was then physically assaulted and falsely imprisoned by police in January 2023.

Council staff continue to slander and verbally defemate (sic) and make false allegations against me, withholding my son away by force.”

After some detective work, based on the parties and the address given by the Claimant, it was established that the Application Notice, dated 7 March 2023 related to QB-2020-000642. It also appeared that the Claimant was seeking relief against South Wales Police (QB-2017-006753). The Application was referred to me. On 19 April 2023, I made an Order refusing the Application, declaring it to be totally without merit and directing a hearing take place to decide whether the Court should make a General Civil Restraint Order (“the GCRO Hearing”). The Order contained my reasons:

“(A)

The Application Notice does not identify the Claim Number. The Claimant has also stated in the Application Notice her surname to be Cortez. However, from consideration of the address given on the Application Notice, the details of the Defendants and the subject matter of the claims, and the other documents submitted by the Claimant with the Application Notice it appears that the Application relates to these two claims, in which the Claimant’s surname has been recorded as ‘Styles’.

(B)

As to these two claims, Claim QB-2017-006753 was struck out by Order dated 18 December 2017. Claim QB-2020-000642 was stayed by the Order of Master Yoxall made on 23 March 2020 and sealed by the Court on 24 April 2020.

(C)

In my Order of 27 April 2022 in QB-2020-00642 I noted (Reasons paragraph (D)):

‘This is the second occasion on which the Court has declared applications made by the Claimant to be totally without merit. If a subsequent application is similarly declared to be totally without merit, then the Court will consider the imposition of a civil restraint order.’

(D)

I have now declared a third Application to be totally without merit. The Court’s resources are limited. They cannot be wasted on dealing with repeated Applications in relation to cases that are not active. I have therefore directed a hearing to take place on Friday 9 June 2023. To assist the Claimant, I have directed that it will take place at the Port Talbot Justice Centre, which I think will be the Court most convenient to the Claimant. Details of the Court can be found here: http://sscs.venues.tribunals.gov.uk/venues/Cardiff/porttalbot_JusticeCentre.htm

(E)

Details of what a General Civil Restraint Order is can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/civil-restraint-orders--2

(F)

The Defendants in both actions are not required to attend the Hearing, but, as they have an interest in whether a General Civil Restraint Order is made against the Claimant, they can attend and make submissions if they wish.

(G)

Finally, insofar as the Claimant wishes to raise issues in relation to the Court of Protection, she will need to make an Application to the Court of Protection (although I make clear that I am not encouraging her to do so).”

In response to that Order, on 21 April 2023, the Claimant filed a further Application Notice (“the Fourth Injunction Application”) seeking:

“Injunctive relief, finding of fact, further protective provisions, compensation claim, recovery of children order. Dismissal of orders between June 22-23 and prevention of further actions taken by the local authority and others inline with Anti-Harassment stalking and equality law, ordering them to abide and refrain from further acts of discrimination, abduction and emotional and psychological harm, securing the home and aiding the return of children allowing assessments if the Cortez family request support services under children in need provisionary (sic) services”

The Fourth Injunction Application Notice was supported by a document headed “Order Sought” (misdated 20 May 2023) and a “statement of facts” (dated 20 April 2023). The statement of facts refers, principally, to the Claimant’s long-standing complaints about the family proceedings relating to her children, complaints about the police and the local authority (some linked to the family proceedings) and others regarding medical treatment.

By further Order dated 25 April 2023, I directed that the Fourth Injunction Application would be considered at the GCRO Hearing. I also directed that, pending that hearing, the Defendants in both claims did not need to respond to the Fourth Injunction Application and that the Court would decide, at the GCRO Hearing, whether any or all of the Defendants should be required to respond to it: “until the Court has considered whether the Claimant has clarified what order she is seeking, against whom, on what grounds and on the basis of what jurisdiction”.

The GCRO Hearing was originally listed on 9 June 2023. It was adjourned to 26 June 2023 at the Claimant’s request. At the hearing on 26 June 2023, the Claimant provided me with some further documents, and showed me various other documents on her computer. I adjourned the hearing, until 17 July 2023, to enable her to provide me with copies of all documents which she wanted the Court to consider. She provided a large number of documents to me, by email, prior to the hearing. Although I may only have referred to some of them in this judgment, I have read them all.

Logically, I need to deal with the Fourth Injunction Application before turning to consider whether to impose a Civil Restraint Order.

This is the fourth occasion on which the Claimant has sought an interim injunction against the Defendants. As against South Wales Police, the original claim (in which she sought similar relief) was struck out for non-compliance with the Court’s order and the First Injunction Application was dismissed. The Claimant did not seek to set aside or vary HHJ Parkes QC’s Order (or Master Thornett’s Order before that). Therefore, strictly, the Claimant has no pending claim against South Wales Police in which to make any application for an injunction. I would not refuse relief on this basis alone, if she otherwise had a viable claim and a proper basis on which to seek an injunction, but it is symptomatic of the Claimant’s approach not to be concerned about the necessity to establish that she has a viable cause of action before seeking relief from the Court.

Turning to the substance, although, as a result of the passage of time, some of the acts complained of now against South Wales Police have occurred since those proceedings were dismissed, the broad nature of the complaint would encompass acts that were originally covered by the first claim and First Injunction Application. From the evidence the Claimant has provided, it is impossible to identify the acts of South Wales Police that are said either to give rise to a cause of action or amount to a credible threat that, if not restrained, South Wales Police threatens to commit a civil wrong against the Claimant in the future. The key concerns of the Claimant appear to be the dissemination by South Wales Police – and the other Defendants – of information which the Claimant contends is inaccurate. The principal focus of that complaint is dissemination of information about the Claimant’s mental health and treatment. The other complaint made about South Wales Police is that they have wrongfully entered her home without having a sufficient legal basis to do so.

Turning to the two other Defendants, parties to the proceedings that have now been stayed for over 3 years, the principal focus of the claim against the local authority is that it has been responsible for the “wrongful” removal of her children, harm to those children, and disseminating information about her which is inaccurate. The Health Board is alleged to be responsible for misdiagnoses and associated harm.

It is impossible for the Court to resolve claims that are brought based on broad generalities. Clear allegations must be made. That was the purpose of the Yoxall Order. It set out clearly what the Claimant needed to provide in her Particulars of Claim. To take an example, in respect of alleged dissemination of inaccurate information, a claimant must identify precisely what information has been disseminated, by whom, when and in what respects it is alleged to be inaccurate. Depending on what is alleged, the dissemination of inaccurate information may amount to a civil wrong, either defamation or under the relevant data protection legislation, but the Court requires precise allegations not broad and generalised claims that make it impossible to assess whether there is a real prospect of demonstrating that any civil wrong has been committed. Likewise, an allegation that the police have, effectively, trespassed by entering premises without a lawful basis for doing so, require the precise circumstances to be stated.

The Claimant’s evidence, against the Defendants and South Wales Police, contains not a single specific incident of alleged wrongdoing. There are no details of the date on which the alleged wrong took place, who is alleged to have done the act and how it is alleged to be wrong. In paragraph 19 of her witness statement, for example, the Claimant simply alleges “I have had my data protection breached continually between 2000 and 2023”. The Court cannot begin to assess a claim brought on such an unfocused basis over a 23 year period.

In addition to the civil claims that the Claimant has brought – and I am aware that the Claimant has also brought several County Court civil claims in addition – the Claimant is also involved in proceedings in the family courts. At the hearing, the Claimant estimated that there had been nearly 40 hearings in the family court. The last hearing was in October 2022. The Claimant complained that the family court has declined to deal with some of her continuing concerns and has refused further hearings. I am in no position to assess that claim. Respecting the privacy of the Claimant and others involved in those proceedings, I am limited in what I can and should say in a public judgment about the family proceedings. I must also be cautious what I say because I have not had access to any of the Court documents from these proceedings and am wholly dependent on what the Claimant has told me about them. What I can say is that, from what the Claimant has told me about the issues, there appears to be a clear and significant overlap between many of the issues that the Claimant seeks to complain about in these civil proceedings and the issues that are properly the province of, and to be determined by, the family courts; in particular in relation to matters concerning the Claimant’s children. The family courts are the proper place to resolve those concerns. It is not permissible to bring claims in the civil courts that seek to attack or undermine the decisions of the family courts.

During the course of the hearings on 26 June 2023 and 17 July 2023 I have listened carefully to the Claimant’s concerns. I have looked at all the documents that she has asked me to consider. I do not doubt the sincerity with which she feels that she is a victim of wrongdoing. It is largely that which has driven pursuit of these various civil claims. I have tried to explain the steps that the civil courts require litigants to take and the limits of the jurisdiction of the civil courts where there are concurrent proceedings in the family jurisdiction. I have taken time to go through the history of the various High Court civil claims the Claimant has brought and explained what has happened to them and why.

When I asked the Claimant, at the hearing on 17 July 2023, what order she wanted me to make by way of injunction against the Defendants. She told me that she wanted an order in the terms of the draft – headed “Order Sought” – that she had filed with the Court on 17 February 2020 in support of the Second Injunction Application. Again, I am limited what I can say in a public judgment about the precise terms of the order that the Claimant sought in that document. Broadly, it reinforces the conclusion that the object of the injunction was – and is – to redress historic wrongs, as they are perceived by the Claimant, rather than to restrain threatened future alleged wrongs. It also demonstrates the significant overlap with the issues that properly fall within the jurisdiction of the family court, and there is at least one direct challenge to a decision of the family court. This document is not available on CE-File. I will ensure that it is uploaded so that any Court that is called upon to revisit this matter will have it available.

For the reasons I have explained in this judgment, the Fourth Injunction Application must be refused. At its most basic, the Claimant has failed to establish, by her evidence, a recognisable civil claim that has a real prospect of success. She has also failed to demonstrate that, absent the grant of an injunction to restrain the Defendants, one or any of them, threaten(s) to commit a further civil wrong against her of a defined type that could be the subject of an injunction. The Fourth Injunction Application is totally without merit.

I have set out the full history of the QB-2020-000624 claim (see [25]-[47] above). As noted, the claim has been stayed since the Yoxall Order. The Claimant has failed to provide proper Particulars of Claim. The time has come to bring this claim to an end. The Defendants are entitled to the certainty of knowing that the claim is not hanging over them indefinitely. This claim will now be struck out as totally without merit.

The following claims/applications made by the Claimant have been dismissed as totally without merit, in chronological order:

Pursuant to CPR 23.12, I am required to consider whether to make a civil restraint order. In my order of 19 April 2023, I gave notice to the Claimant that the Court would, at the GCRO hearing, consider whether to impose a General Civil Restraint Order. The Order provided a link to the explanation of civil restraint orders that the Court can make. The Claimant did not make any submissions to me as to why I should not impose a civil restraint order. At the hearing, I attempted to explain to the Claimant why the Court was considering imposing a civil restraint order against her and what this would mean. At this point, the Claimant became upset and angry. I concluded that proceeding to give an extempore judgment would not be fair on the Claimant and so I indicated that I would provide a written judgment that would explain my decision.

I am satisfied that the Claimant has persisted in issuing claims and making applications which have been found to be totally without merit. Having carefully considered the claims/applications that the Claimant has brought that have been declared to be totally without merit, I am satisfied that they all share the same common theme and have had the same target/object. As such, the appropriate civil restraint order is not a General Civil Restraint Order, but an Extended Civil Restraint Order. I have no evidence that the Claimant has brought proceedings in respect of other civil claims which have been found to be totally without merit. The restriction is needed in respect of these Defendants in respect of the claims that the Claimant has raised in these three claims.

I am aware that the Claimant has brought a claim against her current landlord for disrepair, and he has issued a claim against her seeking possession. Those claims are both pending before the Port Talbot County Court. In my judgment it is not necessary or proportionate to subject the Claimant to restrictions, by way of General Civil Restraint Order, that would restrict her ability to make applications in those proceedings. I had initially considered whether I should grant a GCRO but exempt the pending Port Talbot proceedings from it. However, upon further consideration, the existence of these separate proceedings demonstrates that, at this stage, the correct response is to impose an Extended Civil Restraint Order. If the Claimant were to be found, in the future, to have issued further claims/applications that were found to be totally without merit, it would be at that point that the Court would consider whether to impose a General Civil Restraint Order.

The terms of the Extended Civil Restraint order I impose will:

In simple terms, for the benefit of the Claimant, the effect of this order will be that, for a period of 3 years from the date of the order, without obtaining my permission, she must not issue any further claims or applications against (1) South Wales Police; or (2) Bridgend County Borough Council; or (3) Cwm Taff Bro Morgannwg University Health Board in relation to any of the matters that were the subject of the previous claims that she has brought against these bodies. The restriction will include not only claims or applications against these bodies, but also claims/applications made against any employees, officers, or agents of these bodies in relation to any of the matters that were the subject of the previous claims that she has brought against these bodies.

The Claimant will have the right to apply to the Court for the amendment of the Extended Civil Restraint Order that I impose, but that application will be required to be made to me as the Supervising Judge. The Court may extend the duration of the Extended Civil Restraint Order if it considers it appropriate to do so, but it must not be extended for a period of greater than 3 years on any given occasion.

The Claimant has the right to apply for permission to appeal against the orders I make consequent upon this judgment, including the imposition of the Extended Civil Restraint Order. The Order I make following this judgment will contain information for the Claimant on the route of appeal against my Order and the time limits that apply.