Murtaza Ali Shah v Mohammad Imran & Ors

Introduction

This claim for defamation arises from six publications, namely, (i) a petition which was first published by the First Defendant on the Change.org website on 30 March 2020 (‘the Petition’); (ii) a video which was published by the First defendant on YouTube and Facebook on 31 March 2020 (‘D1’s First Video’); (iii) a video which was published by the First Defendant on YouTube and Facebook on 29 April 2020 (‘D1’s Second Video’); (iv) a Tweet published by the Second Defendant on 18 April 2020, quote tweeting Saif Chaudhury (‘D2’s first Tweet’); (v) a Tweet, also published by the Second defendant on 18 April 2020, quote tweeting Faisal Khwaja (‘D2’s second Tweet’); and (vi) a video which was published by the Third Defendant on Facebook on 20 April 2020 (‘D3’s video’). The Petition and two Tweets were in English; the three videos were in Urdu.

I have set out the publications or, in the case of the videos, the English translation of the transcripts of the publications, in the Appendix to this judgment.

The Claimant describes himself as a Pakistani journalist resident in London, and as the UK and Europe Bureau Chief for the Pakistani television channel Geo News and the Jang Group of newspapers. The Defendants describe themselves as political activists. At the time of the publications, the First, Second and Third Defendants held the positions, respectively, of President, General Secretary and Additional General Secretary in the North West UK regional chapter of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (‘PTI’), the political party which was led, at the time of the publications, by the (then) Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan.

This judgment follows a trial of three preliminary issues, identified in the order of Master Eastman dated 16 June 2022 in the following terms:

“(a)

the meanings of each of the publications complained of;

(b)

whether each of those meanings is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion; and

(c)

whether each of those meanings is defamatory of the Claimant at common law.”

The Claimant was represented by Counsel, Mr Jacob Dean. The Defendants represented themselves. At their request, and with my permission , with Ms Saddique taking the leading role in making oral submissions on behalf of all three Defendants, supplemented by oral submissions made by Mr Imran, (at their request and with my permission).

I adopted the standard preparatory approach to the determination of meaning in a defamation claim of viewing/reading the material complained of, and forming a provisional view about its meaning, before considering the parties’ pleaded cases and arguments about meaning.

As in Shakil-ur-Rahman v ARY Network Limited [2015] EWHC 2917 (QB), the task of forming an initial impression of the videos was made more challenging by the fact that they were broadcast in Urdu. The parties have agreed transcripts of the words spoken, and English translations of those transcripts. In this case, in respect of each video, I first watched it once through, to get an impression of genre and tone, and a clear view of the video images, then read the relevant translation, before watching the video again with the translation to hand, to get an overall impression of meaning. I have sought to avoid an over-literal approach but, as Haddon-Cave J observed in Shakil-Ur-Rahman, I have necessarily had to approach the task of ascertaining the meaning of the videos through the filters of, first, a transcript of what was said orally, and secondly, a translation of that transcript. I did not have the benefit of gaining the immediate impression which the words spoken would have had on the hypothetical viewer of the videos, who would have understood Urdu.

The Pleadings and Meaning Documents

The Claim Form was issued on 29 March 2021. Particulars of Claim were served on the Defendants on 19 July 2021. The Claimant has pleaded the meanings he relies on, and asserts that the statements complained of are statements of fact, and they are defamatory at common law.

On 3 September 2021, the Defendants filed a Defence. In the Defence, the Defendants denied the Claimant’s meanings reflect the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of, but did not plead what the Defendants assert the meanings to be.

When setting down these preliminary issues for trial, by an order dated 16 June 2022, Master Eastman required each Defendant, not less than 28 days before the trial of the preliminary issues, to serve a document on the Claimant

“stating clearly, in relation to each of the publications complained of in the Particulars of Claim, the Defendant’s case as to the following issues

a.

the meaning which the Defendant contends the publication bears;

b.

whether the Defendant contends that the publication contains an allegation of fact or an expression of opinion; and

whether the Defendant contends that the publication is or is not defamatory at common law.”

Each Defendant served a document but it is evident that they did not understand what was required of them and, consequently, those documents only partially comply with the order. In particular, the position remains that none of the Defendants have pleaded the meaning that they contend any of the publications bear, although they maintain their denial of the meanings pleaded by the Claimants. It is, however, clear that they contend the publications contain statements of opinion and that they are not defamatory at common law.

I sought to explore with the Defendants during the hearing the meanings that they contend the publications bear. However, to a large extent their submissions addressed matters such as what they had intended, what viewers/readers had in fact understood the publications to mean, and evidence of surrounding matters, all of which is inadmissible.

The Law

There was no dispute as to the law and the applicable principles are well established. Nevertheless, to assist the unrepresented Defendants, Mr Dean referred to the authorities I have set out below in some detail at the outset of the hearing.

The Court’s task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. The focus is on what the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader of the Petition and Tweets, or viewer of the videos, would consider the words to mean. That is the touchstone. The Court must avoid undertaking a lawyerly analysis.

The key principles derived from the authorities were helpfully distilled and re-stated by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 at [12] (and approved by Warby LJ in Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19, [8]):

“i)

The governing principle is reasonableness.

ii)

The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.

iii)

The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.

iv)

Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.

v)

Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.

vi)

Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.

vii)

It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.

viii)

The publication must be read as a whole, and any 'bane and antidote' taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).

ix)

In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.

x)

No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.

xi)

The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.

xii)

Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.

xiii)

In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning).”

It is also necessary to have regard to the “repetition rule”, namely, that “where an allegation by a third party is repeated by the defendant, the words must be interpreted by reference to the underlying allegations of fact. Context nevertheless remains critical”: Koutsogiannis, [15].

The observations of Saini J in Ware v French [2021] EWHC 384 (QB), regarding political speech, are also of relevance in this case:

“9.

Leading Counsel for Mr French was right to submit that although political speech does not require special rules of interpretation, a political context nevertheless has an impact on the way in which the question of meaning must be approached. I accept that reasonable readers understand that political discourse is often passionate and is not as precise as, say, financial journalism. There is a particular need to avoid over-analysis when determining the meaning of political speech.”

As Nicklin J observed in Koutsogiannis at [16] (cited with approval in Millett v Corbyn at [12]):

“when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points:

(i)

The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.

(ii)

Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation etc.

(iii)

The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.

(iv)

Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, ie the statement is a bare comment.

(v)

Whether an allegation that someone has acted ‘dishonestly’ or ‘criminally’ is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.”

As Warby LJ observed in Millett v Corbyn at [17] when considering the defence of honest opinion:

“The statutory test refers to the ‘statement complained of’, not the meaning of that statement, or the imputation it conveys. It is common ground that for this reason the wording of the preliminary issue in this case was not quite right. Btu Mr Hudson accepts that the judge asked himself the right question: whether the words used were a statement of opinion or of fact.”

In this case, too, the second preliminary issue is not quite right, as it asks whether each of the meanings is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion. In determining whether each of the statements complained of was a statement of fact or opinion, I have focused on the words used rather than the single meanings that I have ascertained.

The relevant common law test for whether a meaning is defamatory is uncontroversial. As recently summarised by Warby LJ in Millett v Corbyn at [9]:

“At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as ‘the consensus requirement’, is that the meaning must be one that ‘tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally’. The judge has to determine ‘whether the behaviour or views that the offending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society’: Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB); [2017] 4 WLR 68 at [51]. The second requirement is known as the ‘threshold of seriousness’. To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a ‘substantially adverse effect’ on the way that people would treat the claimant: Thornton v Telegraph Media Group [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB); [2011] 1 WLR 1985 at [98] (Tugendhat J).”

The Petition

The Petition consists of a photograph of the Claimant at the top of the page, with words in Urdu superimposed over the photograph, followed by the text in English. I have set out the text in paragraph 1 of the Appendix to this judgment, with paragraph numbers added for ease of reference. In the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant complains of all the words in English, that is, the whole of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4. However, Mr Dean made clear that no complaint is made about the statement that he “is biased” ([2]), or that he is seeking to “create a following that is anti Gov.of Pakistan” ([2]), “fuelling prejudice and hatred against Gov. of Pakistan” ([3]) or that he is “fighting for his boss Mr Shakil ur Rehman” ([4]). In addition, he does not complain of the words in Urdu.

The Claimant’s pleaded meaning is:

“the Claimant has been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself.”

In support of this meaning, Mr Dean emphasises that the Petition is presented as an urgent call to action, from the capitalisation of the word “STOP” ([1]) to the exhortation that the Claimant “must be stopped immediately” ([3]). There is no equivocation in presenting the reasons for the call to action; no suggestion that this is one side of a story on which reasonable people could disagree. Instead a series of factual allegations about the Claimant are made, on the basis of which the reader is urged to sign the Petition. Mr Dean draws attention to the unequivocal language used, such as the words “is misusing” and “has misused” ([2]), and “consists of allegations which are baseless”.

Mr Dean submits that the pleaded meaning closely reflects the words used. In this regard, he draws attention to the allegation of misuse of his position which is made expressly three times (“misuse of news reports” ([1]), “misusing these news platforms” ([2]); “misused his reporting” ([2])); and reflected in the questioning of his “professionalism” as a “reporter” ([4]). The phrase “false news” is used twice, as well as the word “baseless” to describe his reporting. And the Petition states in terms that his purpose was to “mislead and create personal attention”.

Mr Dean acknowledges that the words “which he knows to be”, which appear in the Claimant’s meaning, do not appear in terms in the Petition. But he submits this would clearly be inferred by an ordinary, reasonable reader of the Petition as a whole. The Petition refers to the sole purpose being “to mislead” and refers twice to propaganda, while on the other hand there is nothing to suggest that the (alleged) Claimant’s reporting of false or baseless news is inadvertent or careless. He submits that the statement complained of was a statement of fact and that it was defamatory at common law.

Ms Saddique submitted that in the Petition the First Defendant was seeking to convey that this was a serious matter which, in his opinion, ought to be looked at by the Government of Pakistan. She said there was a history behind the Petition, of which an ordinary reader may or may not have been aware. The First Defendant was portraying not only his own opinion but that of others, too.

Although in their pleadings the Defendants had denied the meaning pleaded by the Claimant, during the course of the hearing Ms Saddique and Mr Imran submitted that they agreed with the meaning of the Petition pleaded at paragraph 7 of the Particulars of Claim (as set out in paragraph ‎22 above). However, they maintained that it was a statement of opinion and was not defamatory.

The view of the meaning that I had formed as a matter of first impression essentially corresponds to the Claimant’s meaning, broadly for the reasons outlined by Mr Dean which I have summarised above; and, in circumstances where the Defendants agreed with that meaning in their oral submissions, I conclude that the meaning of the Petition is:

The Claimant has been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless with the aim of misleading his audience and garnering attention.

In my judgment, the words in italics reflect a statement of opinion as to the Claimant’s purpose and as to how his conduct should be characterised. These would strike the ordinary, reasonable reader as deductions from the (wholly unequivocal) statement of fact that the Claimant has knowingly been reporting false news and baseless allegations.

In my judgment, the statement is defamatory at common law. I agree with the Claimant that an unequivocal allegation that a journalist has knowingly publish false or baseless reports strikes at the heart of their professionalism, and undoubtedly meets both the consensus requirement and the threshold of seriousness. The statement of opinion that he has been misusing his professional position for his own purposes also meets those requirements. These are serious allegations to make against a professional journalist.

D1’s First Video

D1’s First Video was posted on YouTube and Facebook. I have set out the agreed translation of the transcript of D1’s First Video, with paragraph numbers added for ease of reference, in paragraph 2 of the Appendix to this judgment.

The words selected for complaint by the Claimant are those shown underlined in §§3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 20, together with §§1-4 of the Petition.

The video lasts 9 minutes 32 seconds. The visual format remains largely the same throughout, with the viewer watching and listening to the First Defendant as he speaks directly to the camera in Urdu, with a wallpapered wall in the background. Nearly 4 minutes into the video, the screen changes to show a tweet in Urdu (other than the words “aggressive testing” and “isolate” which appear in English) and a tweet in English, while in a voiceover the words at §9 of the translation are spoken in Urdu. While the voiceover moves onto the words at §10 of the translation, a photograph appears on one side of the screen of Imran Khan and another man, with the words “FRAUD” (in English) superimposed, and next to it there is a photograph of the Claimant holding a microphone, superimposed over a photograph of a hand holding US dollars. There are words in English above the photograph (which do not fully fit onto the screen) referring to a “million scam in Saqib Nisar’s Dam UK campaign”, and other words below the photographs in Urdu. Further tweets are shown in a combination of English and Urdu, while the voiceover continues, and then the visual image returns to the First Defendant speaking directly to camera. While speaking the words at §8 of the translation, the image cuts to the First Defendant standing up rather than sitting, against the same background as before. He continues speaking directly to camera until the end of the video. The general impression conveyed is that the First Defendant is speaking calmly about a matter that he considers serious and important.

In the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant has pleaded both a meaning for the video alone and a meaning for the video coupled with the Petition. However, Mr Dean submits the publication must be taken as a whole, which in this instance means considering the Petition and the video together, as the text of the Petition appears in Urdu on the social media page immediately above or below the video. The Claimant’s pleaded meaning is:

“the Claimant has been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself and had been engaged in a filthy campaign of reporting fake news which he knew had no basis in reality, including the reporting of distorted facts and shockingly baseless claims, in breach of the rules of the UK media watchdog Ofcom, and by reason of which he deserved to be exposed, especially in the UK, and action taken against his employers by the Pakistani government.”

The first four lines of the Claimant’s pleaded meaning are identical to the meaning put forward by the Claimant in respect of the Petition. In respect of the video, Mr Dean submits the following features would strike the viewer:

Mr Imran took issue with the part of the meaning in which the words “engaged in a filthy campaign” are used, but otherwise he agreed with the Claimant’s pleaded meaning. He said he was expressing an opinion. He gave evidence for the allegations that he made and, for example, expressed an opinion that the Claimant should be referred to Ofcom and action should be taken against his employers by the Pakistan government.

In my judgment, taking the publication of the video and the Petition as a whole, and applying the principles I have outlined above, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of is:

The Claimant has consistently, over many years, engaged in reporting negative news about Pakistan which he knows to be false, including the reporting of distorted facts and shockingly baseless claims, with the aim of misleading his audience and garnering attention. In doing so, he has misused his position as a journalist, in breach of the rules of the UK media watchdog Ofcom, and it is high time his false reporting is exposed and stopped, and action taken against his employers by the government of Pakistan.

This essentially reflects the meaning I perceived as a matter of first impression. This meaning is largely consistent with the Claimant’s meaning. In the video, together with the Petition, the clear message is given that the Claimant has knowingly engaged in reporting false news and baseless stories, and the First Defendant conveys the impression that the extent to which his writing is divorced from reality is shocking. For example, in the video he refers to “fake news” ([7] and [17]), “false info” [9], “fact distortion” [7], “such baseless things … you will hold your head in bewilderment” [4]); an impression which is reinforced by the Petition. The First Defendant repeatedly expresses his concern that the Claimant is reporting negatively about Pakistan ([3] (twice), [7], [17], [20]). Although the terms “filthy campaign” and “campaign” are used more than once, in my view, the main impression given to a viewer watching the video once would be that the Claimant had been reporting in this way for years, a point emphasised by the First Defendant at the outset ([3]) and which is consistent with the call to report and expose him.

In my judgment, the combination of the video and the Petition is a statement of opinion. The message is clearly conveyed that the First Defendant is a political supporter of the government of Pakistan, and of the Prime Minister, and he is deeply concerned about the stream of negative reporting. Although the First Defendant expresses himself in unequivocal terms, it would strike the ordinary, reasonable viewer that his conclusion that the Claimant has engaged in false reporting is a deduction drawn from the Claimant’s tweets and his Facebook account, to which the First Defendant refers the viewer. The First Defendant provides examples, which the hypothetical viewer would assume are among the best examples, giving the viewer an opportunity to consider whether the First Defendant’s characterisation of the Claimant’s reporting is fair and accurate. The First Defendant’s statements that the Claimant has misused his position, that he should be reported to Ofcom, and that action should be taken against his employer by the government of Pakistan, would all strike the ordinary, reasonable viewer as the First Defendant’s opinion, based on his view of the Claimant’s reporting.

The assertion that the Claimant has engaged in reporting “negative” news about Pakistan is not defamatory, but the remainder of the meaning is defamatory at common law. These are serious allegations to make against a professional journalist. The seriousness is emphasised by the First Defendant’s call to action in terms of the Petition, the need to report the Claimant to Ofcom, and the suggestion that the government of Pakistan should take action against the Claimant’s employer.

D1’s Second Video

I have set out the agreed translation of the transcript of D1’s Second Video, with paragraph numbers added for ease of reference, in paragraph 3 of the Appendix to this judgment. The words selected for complaint by the Claimant are those shown underlined in §§1, 2 and 6.

The video lasts 12 minutes 39 seconds. The visual format remains the same throughout, with the viewer watching and listening to the First Defendant as he speaks directly to the camera in Urdu, whilst sat at a table with a wallpapered wall in the background. The general impression conveyed is, again, that the First Defendant is speaking calmly about a matter that he considers serious and important.

In the Particulars of Claim, the Claimant’s pleaded meaning at paragraph 19 was that “the Claimant had knowingly manipulated his reporting so as to distort facts, including publishing a video which contained many lies”. However, that meaning was based on an earlier translation of the transcript. In light of the agreed translation, the meaning now put forward by the Claimant is:

“the Claimant had knowingly distorted the facts in his reporting, including publishing a video with others which contained many lies.”

Mr Dean submits that by declaring that there was “good news” that the Claimant had done “completely factual reporting” over the last two weeks ([1]), the First Defendant was drawing a contrast with his earlier reporting. That message continues with the First Defendant admonishing the Claimant, “Do not distort the facts” ([2]), from which it would be inferred that was what he had been doing prior to the last fortnight. Mr Dean contends that it is a clear allegation of knowing distortion, as there is no suggestion that the Claimant was being criticised for some action of incompetence or negligence. In [6], Mr Dean submits the allegation of publishing a video which contained many lies comes in. The natural reading of “they”, in context, is that the Claimant made the video along with the other journalists. He also relies on the repeated references in [7] to “all of them”, and on the words “you all ganged up” [13], as supporting the understanding that the Claimant made the video with others.

Mr Imran submitted that in saying there was “good news” he was referring to the period between his First Video and this Video, and expressing an opinion that the reporting had been realistic. He had previously criticised the Claimant’s journalistic work, and was now saying there had been recent examples of factual reporting. He submitted that his reference to a meeting was to one that the Claimant had convened, which had been live-streamed, during which they had discussed his First Video. Mr Imran rejected the Claimant’s meaning, but his key reason for doing so was that the Claimant had not made a video. This was one of a number of occasions where the Defendants sought to introduce inadmissible extraneous material to explain the meaning of the publication.

In my judgment, the meanings of the words complained of are:

(1)

Until very recently, the Claimant’s reporting unfairly distorted the facts.

(2)

The Claimant issued a video report with other journalists, criticising the First Defendant, which report contained many lies.

I agree with the Claimant that a contrast is clearly drawn between the factual reporting of the last two weeks and prior reporting. A viewer would understand that the First Defendant was criticising the earlier reporting as unfair (and so the Claimant was urged to “do fair criticism”) by reason of having distorted the facts (and so the Claimant was urged “Do not distort the facts”). However, I do not accept that an ordinary, reasonable viewer would infer that the Claimant had knowingly distorted the facts. The impression given is that the Claimant’s reporting had been critical of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and it had unfairly overstepped the mark by distorting the facts, but that since the First Defendant had expressed his concerns the Claimant had been more careful to ensure his reporting was fair and accurate.

In relation to the “video”, the First Defendant referred to it as a “video”, then appeared to correct himself to refer to a “report”, before referring again to “those videos” ([6]). Taking the publication as a whole, the impression given is that the Claimant, together with other journalists, issued some form of video report criticising the First Defendant, and their report contained “many lies”, of which no details are given.

Meaning (1) is a statement of opinion. That part of the statement complained of would strike an ordinary, reasonable viewer as being the view of someone who described himself as a political activist about reporting which he regarded as unfairly and inaccurately critical of the political leader he supported.

Meaning (2) is a statement of fact. The statement that such a video report was issued by the Claimant and others is, clearly, a factual statement. The assertion that it contained many lies is a bare comment and, as such, it too is a statement of fact.

In my judgment, the consensus requirement is met in relation to both meanings (1) and (2). The behaviours described, first, as a journalist, unfairly distorting facts, and secondly, lying repeatedly in a report, are contrary to common, shared values of our society. Although meaning (1) is a statement of opinion, on balance, I consider that it meets the threshold of seriousness, given the serious allegation that a journalist has distorted facts in his reporting. I also consider that the allegation of joining with other journalists to lie repeatedly in a video report meets the threshold of seriousness. Accordingly, I conclude that both meanings are defamatory at common law.

D2’s First and Second Tweets

I have set out the words of the two Tweets in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Appendix to this judgment. The Claimants complains of the whole of each tweet. In respect of both tweets, the Claimant’s pleaded meaning is that:

“the Claimant was a corrupt journalist.”

The Claimant’s case, in respect of both Tweets, that a substantial number of readers would have understood them to be referring to the Claimant is not an issue which falls for decision at this stage. As Mr Dean invited me to do, I have determined the meanings without determining the extent to which readers would have understood the tweets referred to the Claimant.

In respect of D2’s First Tweet, Mr Dean relies on the words of Mr Chaudhury’s tweet as republished by the Second Defendant, together with her words of thanks to him and use of a thumbs up emoji. In respect of D2’s Second Tweet, Mr Dean relies on the words of Mr Khwaja’s tweet as republished by the Second Defendant, again together with her words of thanks to him and use of a thumbs up emoji.

Ms Saddique submitted that her intention was simply to share the Petition and support her colleague. The tweets of Mr Chaudhary and Mr Khwaja that she quote-tweeted are simply the opinions of others. She said that she did not say the Claimant was a corrupt journalist, she merely shared the opinions expressed by others. Her submissions ignored the repetition rule (see paragraph ‎16 above) and trespassed into giving inadmissible evidence.

In my judgment, the meaning of each of the Tweets (subject to the reference issue) is that:

The Claimant is a corrupt journalist.

This meaning comes through clearly to the reader of Mr Chaudhury’s message referring to the need to “expose corrupt journalists” and telling the Claimant he “must stop corrupt journalism”. In the First Tweet, the Second Defendant endorses the message by republishing it, thanking Mr Chaudhury and giving an approving “thumbs up”. It is also the meaning that comes through to the reader of Mr Khwaja’s message, referring to “corrupt” media people who should be “kicked out” of journalism. In the Second Tweet, the Second Defendant again endorses the message by republishing it, thanking Mr Khwaja and giving an approving “thumbs up”.

In my view, both Tweets are statements of opinion. Although the allegation that the Claimant is corrupt appears to be a bare comment, the ordinary, reasonable reader would appreciate that it is an opinion based on the Claimant’s reporting (as reflected in the focus in both messages that were quote-tweeted on “journalism”).

It is obviously defamatory at common law to describe a journalist as corrupt.

D3’s Video

I have set out the agreed translation of the transcript of D3’s Video, with paragraph numbers added for ease of reference, in paragraph 6 of the Appendix to this judgment. The words selected for complaint by the Claimant are those shown underlined in §§2, 3, 4 and 5.

D3’s video was posted on Facebook and immediately below the video there is a link to the Petition. The video lasts 5 minutes 35 seconds. For the duration of the video, superimposed above the screen words appear in Urdu, the agreed translation of which is “Stop doing negative journalism, for God’s sake support truth Murtaza – stop misguiding people”. The video takes the form of a head and shoulders shot of the Third Defendant speaking directly to the camera. After about three minutes, the screen splits to continue to show the Third Defendant speaking on one side while showing a photograph of the Claimant on the other side, with words in Urdu superimposed over the photograph which translate as “Murtaza stop misleading people”. The image of the Third Defendant speaking to camera and the photograph of the Claimant is briefly replaced with images in Urdu and English of the Petition. The last 30 seconds of the video consist of a song playing while the camera pans upwards to show a photograph of Imran Khan with the flag of Pakistan flying behind him. The general impression conveyed is that the Third Defendant is speaking calmly about a matter that he considers serious and important.

The Claimant has pleaded that the meaning of D3’s Video (including associated text and images published with it) is that:

“the Claimant had been knowingly misleading people through his journalism and is corrupt and a traitor to his home country of Pakistan.”

In addition, the Claimant has pleaded the following meaning in respect of D3’s Video coupled with the Petition:

“the Claimant had been knowingly misleading people through his journalism and is corrupt and a traitor to his home country of Pakistan and had been misusing his position as a journalist by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless for the purpose of misleading his audience and creating attention for himself.”

Mr Dean submits that as there was a link to the Petition on the Facebook page, it may be necessary when considering the issue of serious harm to consider how many viewers would have clicked on the link to read the Petition. Accordingly, he asks me to determine the meaning of the D3’s Video separately and, alternatively, when viewed together with the Petition.

Mr Dean submits that in the video the Third Defendant speaks calmly and directly, conveying the seriousness of his message, which he describes in terms as “very important”, while disavowing any overtly political approach ([1]). The Claimant is introduced as “a journalist in London” ([4]). But the Claimant’s name appears throughout the video in the message above the screen (see paragraph ‎61 above), and for a significant portion of the video his face is shown along with the words “stop misleading people”. Those words are reflected in the first part of the pleaded meaning of the video. Mr Dean submits that the request to the Claimant to stop what he is doing carries the clear implication that his actions are deliberate and knowing; there is no hint of any allegation of carelessness or recklessness in his reporting.

Mr Dean derives the second part of the pleaded meaning of the video from words in [3]. As he acknowledges, general allegations are made in [3] that there are those “who have done much corruption” who “if they are not traitors then what else are they?” Amongst other things it is said that these people “target the army” and “target Imran Khan”. Those words are spoken by the Third Defendant while the Claimant’s name appears in the text above the screen, and immediately after they are spoken the Claimant is named orally. Mr Dean submits that it is clear that the Claimant was being held up as an example of those “who have done much corruption”, which is made plain to the viewer by the allegation that the Claimant “tries somehow to target the army, targets Imran Khan” ([4]). The seriousness of the Claimant’s alleged conduct is brought home to the viewer by the words in [5], particularly the Third Defendant’s statement that “we will expose you and show you your worth”. The allegation of being a traitor is reinforced by the words “If anyone so much as looks at Pakistan with an evil eye” and the allegation against the Claimant that “what you are doing is harming Pakistan” ([5]).

Mr Dean contends that, in context, these would be understood as allegations of fact, and are plainly seriously defamatory of the Claimant, particularly in his position as a journalist.

Ms Saddique submitted that the Third Defendant, as a political worker, was making reference to an array of people working in various sectors, who were doing the things that he describes. He was expressing an opinion that they should not be biased as that can have dire consequences. Ms Saddique said it was wrong to infer that everything the Third Defendant said was referring to the Claimant. He was not referring to the Claimant when he referred to “people doing such activities” as “traitors”; he was referring in general to people who hold influence in Pakistan, and he did not link what he was saying in [3] to the Petition.

In my judgment, the meaning of the words complained of in D3’s Video is:

The Claimant is corrupt and has been harming Pakistan by knowingly misleading people through his journalism.

When coupled with the Petition, the meaning of D3’s Video is:

The Claimant is corrupt and has been harming Pakistan, and misusing his position as a journalist, by reporting news which he knows to be false and making allegations which he knows to be baseless with the aim of misleading his audience and garnering attention.

In my view, the ordinary, reasonable reader would readily infer that when the Third Claimant spoke of those “who have done much corruption” (in [3]) he was including the Claimant amongst those people. That would have been evident from (i) the express reference to the Claimant above the screen throughout the video, indicating this was about him; (ii) the reference to the Claimant by name immediately after speaking about those “who have done much corruption”; (iii) the reference to the Claimant targeting the army and Imran Khan which directly mirrored what the Third Defendant had said about those who he was referring to in more general terms immediately before.

The meaning that the Claimant has been misleading people through his journalism would be apparent to a viewer from the words the Third Defendant used orally together with the words that appear above the screen (“…Murtaza stop misguiding people”) and superimposed over the photograph of the Claimant (“stop misleading people”). The fact that the assertion is of knowingly misleading people would be inferred by the ordinary, reasonable reader because the acts of the Claimant are described in deliberate and purposeful terms (e.g. “tries to”, “targets”, “to save his bosses”), the need to stop and restrain him is stressed, and because there is nothing to suggest that any misleading had been careless.

In my view, the italicised words reflect statements of opinion. Despite the terms in which the Third Defendant spoke at the beginning of his video, it would be evident to an ordinary reasonable viewer that he is a political activist who is supportive of PTI and Imran Khan, and expressing critical views of their opponents. The breadth of the statement regarding the people, including the Claimant, he considers corrupt is indicative that it is a statement of opinion, and it can be inferred that the basis of the allegation that the Claimant is corrupt is the content of his journalism. His view that the Claimant (and others) are harming Pakistan by their actions would also strike the viewer as a statement of opinion. Whereas the assertions of knowingly reporting false news, baseless allegations and knowingly misleading through his journalism were expressed as bald statements of fact rather than opinion. The basis for those assertions would not be apparent to the hypothetical viewer from the video or the Petition.

The meanings are clearly defamatory at common law.

Conclusions

In my judgment, the natural and ordinary meanings of the words complained of are:

The parts of the meanings shown in italics in §‎73 above are statements of opinion; and they are otherwise statements of fact.

The meanings are all defamatory at common law, save for the word shown underlined.