GERARD PATRICK McMEEL v SIAN GISSING-McMEEL

This is an application by Gerard McMeel (the applicant) for the committal of his former wife, Sian Gissing-McMeel (the respondent) to prison for contempt of court for a number of alleged breaches of court orders made in 2021. I also have in front of me an application to commit the respondent for contempt in the face of the court in relation to a hearing on 5^th October 2021.

The parties were married and separated last year. They have a number of children between them. At the time of separation various sets of proceedings were issued, both under the Family Law Act 1996 and the Children Act 1989.

The sequence of orders made in the proceedings were as follows

5^th October 2021 - DJ Watkins.

14 October 2021 - Her Honour Judge Cope

There are affidavits of service with respect to all the above orders. The order of 12^th August was served on the same day. The orders of 24^th August were served on 2^nd September although I note that the respondent attended that hearing. The orders of 14^th October were served on 17^th October (the respondent did not attend that hearing).

This application was made on 27^th October 2021. It was listed at Bristol on 29^th October. The respondent did not attend and it was adjourned to 6^th January. Once again, she did not attend and it was relisted for 1^st March 2022.

Meanwhile, an application was made for committal for contempt in the face of the court, drafted by DJ Watkins stating that the mother informed the court during the hearing on 5^th October that she was recording the proceedings. This was listed for 1^st April 2022 alongside the other application. The hearing was in fact vacated and on 23^rd March it was allocated to Roberts J and then in April to me. The first hearing was listed on 18^th May, and I adjourned the committal hearing for a week.

I had intended the hearing to be in person and had so ordered. In a number of emails, the respondent said that she could not come to court because she was abroad, and that she was abroad because she feared for her safety. She repeatedly said that she wished to join the hearing remotely. The applicant said that he was concerned that the wife would record or even live stream the proceedings if she was permitted to attend remotely, but I decided, in the context of proceedings that are heard in public and the need to ensure that the wife could participate, that I should permit her to join by video link on CVP. This she did. She gave me an assurance that she was not recording and would not record the proceedings. I have seen nothing to suggest she has broken that assurance.

I should note that the respondent chose to represent herself during the proceedings, although she had been informed on the face of several orders that she was entitled to legal aid and to be represented. When I explained to her that, were I to make findings, I would adjourn the case for her to consider things and to obtain representation, she said to me that she appreciated that, but she continued to be content to represent herself.

Yesterday, the respondent informed my clerk that she wished to obtain legal representation and had ordered a transcript of the committal proceedings. She said she did not consent for the hearing to go ahead (which was for me to give judgment) as it would place her under duress. She said she needed legal counsel to which she was entitled, and that the hearing must be adjourned to allow her her rights. She has declined to attend this hearing despite knowing it was going ahead and being informed she should attend (remotely) if she wished to apply for an adjournment or to call witnesses.

I refuse to grant an adjournment of today’s hearing. The respondent has had ample opportunity to be represented for these committal proceedings and made a clear decision to represent herself. The case has been heard and all that is left is for me to give judgment, and if relevant, to deal with the issue of penalty. There is nothing that I have read from the respondent or heard from her that leads me to believe that the witnesses she wishes to call are relevant to the issues I have to decide.

The applicant has represented himself.

The committal application alleges numerous breaches of court orders by the applicant. The orders and paragraphs breached are set out therein, and the orders are appended with the relevant parts highlighted in yellow.

First there is an allegation that the respondent removed the children from the applicant’s care from the family home on 23^rd October 2021 until the execution of a collection order made by me on 29^th October. This, it is alleged, was in breach of the order of DJ Watkins dated 12^th August 2021, paragraph 6, which (as set out in the order of HHJ Cope dated 14^th October) remained in full effect on that day. It is alleged that the respondent took the children from the family home without the applicant’s consent, driving her vehicle at the applicant when he attempted to prevent her from leaving with the children. The evidence in support was given by the applicant in his affidavit dated 20^th October 2021.

Second, it is alleged that the respondent breached the non-molestation orders of District Judge Watkins dated 24^th August 2021, renewed by Her Honour Judge Cope on 14^th October which very specifically ordered her to remove any photographs, videos, images or other posts which refer to/include/identify Gerard Patrick McMeel from social media platforms (paragraph 1), and prohibited her from posting any such material thereon (paragraph 2). It is also alleged that she breached paragraph 3 which prohibited her from disseminating on the internet or by any other means documents or material from the proceedings (save as permitted by FPR 2010), and a mirror paragraph in Children Act proceedings made on the same date.

In support of these allegations the applicant produced a number of internet posts which are set out in the committal notice and exhibited and produced at pages C5 – 12 of the bundles of documents. In the application itself and the affidavits there were many more breaches alleged in relation to the respondent posting numerous videos on you tube and Facebook, but due to the sheer number of these and for the sake of simplicity he has concentrated on the screenshots of alleged postings on social media. Working from the Committal Notice under (h) (which was intended to be a brief summary of the facts alleged to constitute a contempt, set out numerically in chronological order as set out in Rule 37.4 FPR), he relied on the following paragraphs:

which corresponded to the screenshot C5 - number 1

which corresponded to the screenshot on C6 – number 3

which corresponded to C7 – number 7

which corresponded to C8 – number 8

which corresponded to C9 and C10 – number 9

which corresponded to C11 number 14.

The detail of the screenshots above are set out below.

On 13^th October a notice was put on the respondent’s Instagram account (C5), under a forum called wampafac

On 14^th October another post (C7) was put on the same forum (C6) which included a document apparently filed by the respondent in the Occupation Order proceedings stating that she did not consent to engage with the ‘Family Fraud Courts’, and that the court was engaging in ‘Legal Entrapment’ through deception, misrepresentation and fraud. She named the applicant as the applicant in the case and accused him and his lawyers of fraud, deception, harassment and bullying.

On 15^th October it is alleged the respondent posted screenshots of messages (C8) between the applicant and another person, and accused them both of ‘Freemasonry Collusion’. She said, ‘Gerard prefers to collude in conspiracy to defraud me instead of speaking to our children at breakfast’. She posted other messages as well between herself and the applicant with commentary on the side to the effect that his ‘brethren’ came before herself and the children.

On the same day it is alleged she posted a copy of a C1A Form in the Children Act proceedings which she said was blank because it was fraudulent (C9 and 10).

Further it is alleged that the respondent breached Children Act orders dated 12^th August 2021, 24^th August 2021 and 5^th October 2021 prohibiting her from disclosing the names of the children and the parties publicly without the permission of the court.

The evidence in support of this are screenshots said to be dated 17^th October which include the case number of the non-molestation (not the Children Act) proceedings and include the names of the children and their dates of birth. The screenshots (C11) are of messages to the court at Bristol naming the judges Watkins and Cope and stating that ‘legal entrapment is unlawful and a crime’. There is also a screenshot dated 18^th October which stated ‘Revoke all your consent to family courts. Do not give them joinder to take your children. No services required!. Stand in your own authority and stand in your power. Show no fear to these evil Machiavellian narcissistic parasites!’ and then went on to give the names and dates of birth of the children, followed by ‘Revoke any and all deceived consents and do not contract any one has with my children named above’.

In addition to the committal notice which set out the allegations, the applicant filed two affidavits with exhibits, dated 20^th October 2021 and 28^th October 2021. He filed a note with the court in advance of the hearing (and sent it to the respondent). He gave oral evidence. He confirmed his affidavits and said that whilst he could not remember the precise dates now of the postings, that they were on or around the dates set out on the documents.

The respondent sent a number of emails to the court and to my clerk during the week between the hearing on 18^th May and the next one. In at least one of them she asked me to recuse myself from hearing the case.

On 19^th May, the respondent sent a further email. I set it out in full below (save for some names which I have anonymised and put in square brackets) because it encapsulates her case before me: -

The respondent also provided two notes in advance of the hearing and several emails between hearings. She also said that she had produced a bundle, although this had not been received by the court or the applicant. She said that it was not crucial, and did not either resend it or invite me to read it. She chose to give oral evidence.

The notes provided by the applicant refer to the Civil Procedure Rules and claim that the applicant did not serve her the documents within 7 days of receipt. She states that he attempted service abusing his position. She makes numerous claims about the applicant’s deceit and states that the application has arisen as a result of fraud, and that all orders made arising out of fraud (which she says is the case here) are ‘null and void’. She also suggests that the court has before it applications to set aside the original orders and applications to strike out the first application on the basis that it is an abuse of process.

The respondent wished to ask the applicant numerous questions and did so. Her focus was not on the terms of the orders or the allegations made but on other matters, such as the breakdown of their relationship, why he had chosen to go to court on 12^th August when she had come back with the children and was home. She asked him questions about AB and whether he had had an intimate relationship with her, and about fraud and freemasonry. She also asked him about how well he knew District Judge Watkins. It was difficult to get her to focus on the allegations themselves, and some questions I stopped, such as when she asked the applicant when they had last had sex. At times she made speeches, the substance of which related to her belief that there has been a fraudulent conspiracy between a variety of people in the case, and that the orders made were all the product of fraud.

She suggested to the applicant that he was in breach of court orders himself and should be committed for contempt. She also said on several occasions that it was in the public interest for her to bring attention to corruption and misfeasance in public office.

When she gave her evidence, she said that the applicant was dishonest and thought he was above the law. She said he was concerned with his corrupt friends. She said the orders were fraudulent and that orders arising out of fraud are null and void.

She did not give any evidence about the social media posts although she said obliquely at some point that the applicant and a friend of his ‘had good access to social media accounts’.

She did not ask to call any witnesses, and on the second day of the hearing (where I had intended to give judgment but decided to adjourn for a longer period to do so), I asked her if she wanted to call any witnesses, and said to her that if so, I would make time for this. After some thought she asked to call six witnesses who included the MP referred to above, District Judge Watkins, His Honour Judge Wildblood, Her Honour Judge Cope and District Judge Brown. She also wanted to call two other individuals who she considered to be part of a conspiracy of fraud along with the MP and judges. I refused her application to call all these witnesses as I did not consider the allegations of fraud and conspiracy that she wished to cross examine them about to be relevant to the issues I have to decide.

In the week following the hearing the respondent said she wished to call a Mr. Millinder who, she said works with her at an organisation called Intelligence UK. She says she is a journalist investigating corruption within the police and judiciary for the protection of the public. Mr. Millinder is said to have helped her draft her applications to court to try and safeguard her from the corruption ‘via Mr. McMeel and his friends’. I refused this application also as it seems to me, again, that his evidence is not relevant to the issues I have to decide.

Today my clerk received a further email from the respondent asking to call her mother and four other people to give evidence. She also asked me to recuse myself and again and for an adjournment to obtain legal representation.

As I have already said, I am not prepared to adjourn the case again for Ms Gissing McMeel to obtain legal advice before giving my judgment. She has had ample opportunity to do so before but has declined. Indeed on the last occasion in court she said she thought she had done a good job in representing herself and that she did not need a lawyer.

There are affidavits of service in relation to all the relevant orders in the bundle, and I accept that they were served on the respondent.

With respect to the application that I recuse myself from hearing this matter, the test to be applied is well known and set out in the case of Porter v McGill [2001] UKHL 67, namely whether a fair minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude there was a real possibility of bias. The case that the respondent refers to was very different to this; as the Court of Appeal judgment demonstrates. If I had to recuse myself from this case as a result, it would apply to every case heard by me.

Although the respondent has not advanced this as an argument, I am conscious that I made a collection order with respect to the children in October 2021 when I was the urgent applications judge. This was without notice to the respondent. The children were collected in accordance with the order I made. In making the order I did I was relying on the fact that there was an order that the children should be in the care of the applicant, and I did not make any findings at that very short hearing. I do not consider that the fair minded and informed observer would also not conclude there was a real possibility of bias in relation to that.

I therefore refuse the application to recuse myself.

When determining the application for contempt I must apply the criminal standard of proof, that is that I must be satisfied so that I am sure that orders have been breached before making any such finding.

I do not accept the respondent’s submissions that the orders are fraudulently obtained. The emails above, and some of her posts online suggest that she has developed a baseless obsession about a conspiracy involving a number of people including the applicant, an MP who is a long standing friend of his, and all the judges who have dealt with her case. It leads her to conclude she does not have to abide by court orders. It is completely wrong and very sad. No doubt it has affected her ability to engage in the proceedings concerning her children which are of great importance to them, and her too.

Whatever the respondent believes about the orders, unless or until they are set aside or successfully appealed they remain in force and must be complied with. Whilst she is entirely right that she has the right to freedom of speech (including the right to criticise judges, the legal system and freemasonry) this does not include the right to breach an existing court order requiring her to do, or prohibiting her from doing, a particular thing.

Having considered the requirements of Part 37 Family Procedure Rules 2010, particularly Rule 37.4 (these rules having come into force on 1^st October 2020) I have concluded that the notice of application was compliant with the procedural requirements. There were a significant number of allegations so that the application and accompanying orders had to be read very carefully but I consider it was clear to the respondent what orders she was said to have broken and how. I am also satisfied that the contempt application was served personally on 20^th December as set out in the affidavit of service at D1-2 of the bundle as required by Rule 37.5.

Rule 37.2 states that a penal notice means a prominent notice on the front of an order warning that if the person against whom the order is made disobeys the court order, the person may be held in contempt of court and punished by a fine, imprisonment, confiscation of assets or other punishment under the law. In the case of Re Dad [2015] EWHC 2655 (Fam) , which was dealt with under the previous Rule 37.9, Holman J concluded that the standard form of collection order at that time, with the penal notice on the fifth page of the order, simply did not comply with the rules. As a result the standard forms have been changed so that the orders are prominently on the front. In that case, Holman J declined to waive the procedural defect as he did not consider he could be satisfied there was no injustice.

It seems to me that similar considerations arise here in relation to a several of the orders which I have cited above.

Having heard and read all the evidence, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent removed the children from the care of the applicant on 23^rd October without his permission, by putting the children into the car and driving away from the home so that he could not stop them. I note, however, that on the order the penal notice was on page 2 of 3 rather than on the front which does not comply with Rule 37.2. Despite the submissions of the applicant, I am not satisfied that no injustice arose as a result, and as a consequence I do not find that the respondent is liable to committal for contempt of court as a result. I know that she is able to quote legal authority and research, but her posts, emails and documents suggest her understanding of legal issues is very superficial.

Having heard and read all the evidence, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent posted all the material set out at paragraphs (h) 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 14 and 24 of the committal notice on her Instagram account under the forum wampafac. I am also sure that the material was posted after 2^nd September, the date on which she was served with the order. Although the applicant does not now remember the dates on which the material was posted, his affidavit, produced much closer to the time (20^th October), gives the dates clearly. The respondent’s statement in the occupation order proceedings at E10 of the bundle is dated and signed 14^th October. The post at E17 is clearly dated 14^th October. The evidence is very clear indeed, and I note that the respondent did not deny creating the posts or give any explanation for what she had done save to say that she had a right to freedom of speech and that the orders were fraudulent. By doing this, she was in clear breach of the terms of the order of 24^th August because the posts refer to the applicant . There was a warning on the front page of the order that if it was not obeyed, Ms Gissing McMeel would be in contempt of court, and this was repeated in capital letters at the top of page two. Whilst it might have been better if the words in capitals on page two were in the same form on page one, I do consider that the requirements of Rule 37.2 are met, and in any event that Ms McMeel cannot have been in any doubt about the consequences of breach in relation to this order. It was this order (which did not have a time limit) that she was in breach of, as the order of 14^th October was not served on her until 17^th October. The order of 17^th October stated that ‘the paragraphs 6 to 8 are already effective against Ms Gissing McMeel as they were made by order of this court ‘on 24^th October’. It is unfortunate that it states 24^th October instead of 24^th August, which is clearly what it means, but I do not think that is material as it is an obvious typographical error.

I therefore find beyond reasonable doubt that Ms Gissing McMeel is in contempt of court in relation to these matters.

I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent named the children on at least two posts. One of them was linked to the Family Law Act 1996 proceedings and the other, whilst not naming the case, clearly referred to family court proceedings involving them. There were another two posts following (appearing at E18 and E19 of the bundle) where she referred to the Children Act proceedings although she only named one child by her first name and not her date of birth. The order of 12^th August prohibits the public naming of the children without an order of the court, but there is no penal notice attached to that provision and indeed it seems to me that this is likely to be a warning notice pursuant to s 111 Children Act 1989 (as discussed by Baker J in CH v CT [2018] EWHC 1310 (Fam)).

The order of 24^th August is more specific in that in paragraph 4 there is a prohibition on her disclosing to third parties or disseminating on the internet documents or material from the proceedings. The order is on page three of the order and is followed by a penal notice which starts with capital letters. The penal notices do not conform with Rule 37.2, and despite the applicant’s submissions I am not satisfied that no injustice is caused as a result, so cannot waive this procedural defect. Accordingly, I do not find the respondent in contempt of court in relation to these orders.

As I have set out above, there is also an application for the respondent’s committal for contempt in the face of the court by informing District Judge Watkins at the hearing on 5^th October that she was recording it. Given that this is now seven months ago, and that there is no evidence that she actually did record it apart from her statement, or that she has posted this anywhere, I do not find her in contempt of court in relation to this.

In all the circumstances, I find the respondent in contempt of court for breaches of the non-molestation order made by District Judge Watkins on 24^th August by posting material on social media referring to, including, and identifying the applicant as follows: -

I will adjourn this case for a short period for determination of penalty and to enable the respondent to obtain legal representation for that hearing.