Leicestershire County Council v AB & Ors

I am concerned with three children, GH who is 8 years of age, IJ who is 4 years of age, and KL who is 2 years of age.

The mother of GH is the First Respondent, AB. The mother of IJ and KL is the Second Respondent, CD. The father of all children is the Third Respondent, EF.

The Applicant local authority, Leicestershire County Council, issued these public law care proceedings in respect of all three children on 30^th May 2017. The children were accommodated pursuant to the provisions of s.20 Children Act 1989 on 15^th May 2017 consequent upon the arrest of CD and EF. They were each made the subject of interim care orders on 5^th June 2017. The children have remained living with foster carers since they were received into care on 15^th May.

On 13^th November 2017 CD pleaded guilty to an offence of Modern Day Slavery contrary to s.1 of the Modern Day Slavery Act 2015. On 19^th January 2018 she was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 4 years.

On 14^th November 2017 EF (hereinafter referred to as ‘the father’) pleaded guilty to an offence of Modern Day Slavery contrary to s.1 of the 2015 Act and to 5 counts of rape. On 19^th January 2018 he was sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment of 23 years.

In consequence of the convictions and custodial sentences of the mother and the father, both concede to the threshold criteria of s.31(2) of the Children Act 1989 are satisfied. The father :

CD, the mother of IJ and KL:

AB, the mother of GH:

The Children’s Guardian supported the local authority’s care plans of placement for adoption of IJ and KL and placement in long term foster care for GH.

The local authority invited me to make a number of findings of fact in respect of allegations made by GH which were not the subject of criminal proceedings brought against the father or CD. When considering the evidence and whether to make the findings sought I have well in mind that (a) the burden of proof is borne by the local authority and (b) the standard of proof is the simple balance of probabilities.

I give myself a revised Lucas direction that I should only take account of lies told by a party if there is no plausible or credible reason for the witness lying and that, in any event, the finding that a witness has lied cannot, of itself, constitute proof of the disputed fact or facts.

In considering the care plans for the children I take full account that the welfare best interests of all three children are my paramount consideration: s.1(1) Children 1989 and I have had regard to the provisions of s.1(3) 1989 Act – the welfare checklist. In respect of IJ and KL I have also taken account of the provisions of ss1(2) and 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002: in particular that I must have regard to their welfare best interests throughout the whole of their respective lives.

When considering the applications for placement orders in respect of IJ and KL I take account not only of the provisions of ss1(2) and 1(4) of the 2002 Act but also of the provisions of s.52 of the Act and whether I am satisfied that the welfare of each child requires me to dispense with the consent of the mother and father to the adoption of both children.

I must undertake an holistic and not linear evaluation of the realistic options for the future care of the children as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in first Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146 and then in subsequent judgments of the Court of Appeal.

I have had regard to the Art 6 and Art 8 rights of each child and of each parent: most especially whether the placement of IJ and KL for adoption is (a) a proportionate and necessary step in light of the circumstances of the case and the risks of harm identified and accepted by the court; and (b) nothing else will do in the interests of both of these children.

When considering the Art 8 rights of the children and of the parents, I bear in mind that where there is a tension between the Art 8 rights of the children, or one or more of them, on the one hand, and the Art 8 rights of a parent, on the other, the rights of the child prevail Yousef v The Netherlands [2003] 1 FLR 210.

AB has an older child from a previous relationship prior to her relationship with the father. This child lives with his father. During her relationship with the father GH was born. Subsequent to the breakdown of their relationship GH went to live with the father. AB had not seen GH for some 18 months prior to the local authority issuing these proceedings.

The mother, CD, has an older child of a previous relationship. This child has lived with his father following an allegation that EF had hit him.

The father, EF has two other children born during a relationship he had in between his relationship ending with AB and commencing with CD. These children live with their mother. He has no contact with them.

GH was the subject of a child protection plan before her birth under the category of physical abuse which was revised to one of neglect when she was 7 months of age as a result of her parents’ chaotic lifestyle.

AB and the father separated in January 2010.

GH remained on a child in need plan between February 2011 to May 2011 when her case was closed. As a result of various issues in AB’s life, GH remained the subject of scrutiny by social services.

The father separated from his partner who was the mother of his two other children in March 2013. Almost immediately afterwards he commenced a relationship with the mother. Within weeks of that relationship commencing the mother’s son alleged EF has assaulted him. Social services were involved and this child moved to live with his father where he remains to date.

In July 2013, the mother was pregnant with IJ. A pre birth assessment was undertaken and the unborn child was placed on a child protection plan under the category of neglect. In December 2013, because of the positive engagement with the social workers by the mother and father, the plan became one of a Child in Need. IJ was born in February 2014 and the Child in Need plan ended in June 2014.

In August 2014 GH was on her second child protection plan with Warwickshire County Council’s Children’s Team because of her mother’s neglectful care. The father removed GH from the care of her mother, AB, in October 2014 and Warwickshire County Council completed a s.37 report. The father secured a child arrangements order in his favour in respect of GH in November 2014.

Consequent upon her move to live with her father, Leicestershire County Council became the responsible local authority. She was placed on a child protection plan under the category of neglect.

GH made an allegation of sexual abuse against her mother’s then partner in December 2015. The father stopped all contact with the mother. The child protection plan came to an end as a result of an absence of any issues about the care afforded to GH by her father and CD.

KL was born in August 2015.

A referral was made to the local authority in October 2016 because GH had been seen with bruising to her face and ear. A s.47 investigation was undertaken and GH underwent a medical examination. The mother and father’s explanation of an accidental injury was accepted.

Nevertheless issues remained and increased about the lack of parental supervision and a failure by the parents to meet GH’s emotional needs, which led to a decision to convene an Initial Child Protection Case Conference in December 2016. This resulted in GH being placed on a Child in Need plan – neither IJ nor KL were made the subject of a Child in Need plan. GH’s plan came to an end on 5^th April 2017 on the basis that (a) the issues had been addressed through work done with the family and (b) the school would continue to monitor GH and her school attendance.

On 28^th April 2017 the Leicestershire Police made a referral to the local authority on the basis that GH, IJ and KL may have been exposed to domestic violence between the father and a young female living with the family.

Prior to this referral the local authority had no knowledge that this young person, MN, had been living at the family home. On those occasions when social work professionals had seen her at the parents’ home, she had been introduced as a family friend. Neither the mother nor the father had hitherto disclosed that she was living with them.

On 4^th May 2017 MN underwent an ABE interview with the police. During this interview she alleged that:

On 5^th May 2017, the police notified the local authority that the mother and father were suspected of offences contrary to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. In consequence of which the local authority decided to undertake a s.47 assessment on 8^th May.

On 15^th May social workers and the police attended the family home as part of a planned police operation. The father was immediately arrested and removed from the home. The mother was then arrested. She gave consent for IJ and KL to be accommodated pursuant to s.20 of the 1989 Act. All 3 children were taken by Social Workers and placed with foster carers. Later whilst in police custody the father gave his consent for all three children to be accommodated by the local authority.

The local authority issued these proceedings on 25^th May 2017. All three children were made the subject of Interim Care orders on 5^th June 2017.

During the course of the police interviews the father denied all of the offences, denied having had sexual intercourse with MN or of sexually abusing her and denied she had ever lived in the family home.

During the police interviews the mother denied all of the offences, denied any knowledge of the father’s abuse and maltreatment of MN but did confirm that she had been living in the family home.

On 19^th June 2017, MN gave further ABE interviews in which she gave graphic details of the sexual abuse and maltreatment to which she had been subjected. She gave accounts of numerous occasions when she had been vaginally and anally raped by the father.

One significant piece of evidence was a video recording taken by the father on his mobile phone. MN was engaged in a sexual act and was being assaulted by the father. It is clear that the mother, IJ and KL were present in the same room during which these events occurred.

On 30^th June 2017, GH underwent an ABE interview. She gave divers accounts of the physical abuse she suffered in the family home and of seeing the mother and MN engaged in sexual activity with the father.

As set out above, in November 2017 the father pleaded guilty to an offence of Modern Day Slavery and five counts of rape in respect of MN. The mother pleaded guilty to an offence of Modern Day Slavery. On 19^th January 2018, the father was sentenced to 23 years imprisonment and the mother was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.

The father, as I have mentioned, did not wish to take any part in this Hearing either by attending in person or by video link from prison although on the second morning of the hearing he did appear by video link but solely for the purposes of giving instructions to his counsel and solicitor.

The mother initially took a more equivocal stance. Just prior to the commencement of this hearing I was told by those representing her that she did not wish to attend this hearing in person. Accordingly, a video link was arranged for her to give oral evidence to the Court by video link from her prison. I was subsequently informed that she did not wish to give oral evidence. Accordingly she appeared by video link from prison yesterday to hear counsels’ submissions in respect of IJ and KL and, most especially, to hear the submissions of her Counsel, Ms Cranny.

No party sought to call any witness to give oral evidence and neither AB, CD or the father sought to cross examine any witness. CD and the father had confirmed at an earlier Directions Hearing that neither wished GH or MN to be called to give evidence.

GH and MN gave clear and detailed accounts of the severe and regular physical abuse GH had suffered at the hands of her father. They gave detailed accounts of the inappropriate sexual conduct to which GH and/or IJ and/or KL were exposed. GH had alleged CD was, on occasions physically abusive towards her. She described one occasion where CD woke her up by grabbing her throat and shouted in her face because she had used some of CD’s perfume.

GH has subsequently spoken to her carers and to some of the professionals involved with her of the abuse she suffered from her father and CD. She has been consistent in her accounts save for one matter. She alleged that her mother’s partner had assaulted her. GH has recently said this was untrue and she had only made the allegation because her father had told her to do so.

I do not propose to set out GH’s allegations in any greater detail.

The father denied he had physically abused or ill treated GH at all. In contrast CD accepted there were such occasions and she should have acted to protect GH but she did not do so.

CD denied assaulting GH and in particular denied she had grabbed GH by her throat and shouted at her. In contrast the father accepted that such an event took place.

In the context of the fact finding aspect of this case and of the welfare issues it is instructive to consider some of the comments and responses made by the father when seen by Dr Blyth, the forensic psychologist, and some of her conclusions and opinions

Neither the father nor CD have fully accepted the allegations made by GH of the ill treatment and abuse she suffered at their hands. I note that having initially denied the entirety of MN’s allegations in respect of their abuse and ill treatment of her, by their guilty pleas they respectively admitted the truth of what she had alleged.

MN, quite independently of GH, gave accounts to the police of GH’s abuse and ill treatment by her father and by CD which mirror and, in my judgment, corroborate the allegations made by GH in her ABE interview with the Police.

On the totality of the evidence I am wholly satisfied of the following matters and make findings of fact that:

I propose to consider the case of GH separately from that of IJ and KL.

The father recognised and accepted that he cannot now and will not be able to care for GH in the future. AB, GH’s mother, similarly recognised and accepted, albeit for very different reasons from the father, that she is not and will not be able to care for GH. No other family member or person is put forward by either of them to care for GH, save that at one stage the father put forward his mother. The viability assessment of the paternal grandmother was negative: neither the father nor the paternal grandmother sought to challenge the conclusion of this assessment.

Accordingly, given her age, I am left with only one placement option for GH, namely long term foster care. The local authority are hopeful that GH will be able to remain in her current foster home. It has been GH’s consistently expressed wish to remain in foster care and not to return home to the care of her mother, or CD or her father.

This plan will lead to the separation of GH from IJ and KL. It will also lead, if the Court approves the plan for the placement of IJ and KL for adoption, to the possible termination, for the foreseeable future, of direct contact between GH and IJ and KL. The local authority will explore the possibility of ongoing direct contact but, understandably to some extent, will need to prioritise the stability and confidentiality of the two younger children’s potential adoptive placement.

Whilst I very much hope it will prove possible to continue and promote regular direct contact between GH and her half siblings, I consider it prudent to consider the proposed care plan for GH on the basis that it will not prove possible to maintain direct contact between her IJ and KL, albeit I very much hope this not to be the case.

On the basis that such contact will occur, I note that Dr Blyth, a consultant clinical psychologist advised in her report of 11^th February 2018 that GH should be placed separately from IJ and KL because (a) GH requires a great deal of one to one attention and (b) she needs to be the youngest child in her long term placement by at least 5 years because of the significant demands she is likely to place on her carers.

She recommended that GH should continue to have direct contact with IJ and KL at a level of between 4 and 6 times per year for between one and two hours on each occasion.

I note the care plan for GH, dated 5^th March 2018, proposed that ‘consideration’ will be given to GH maintaining contact with her half siblings and that “it may be felt to be appropriate for them to have direct contact once or twice a year” in addition to indirect letterbox contact.

I consider this to be (a) far too woolly and (b) in the light of Dr Blyth’s opinion, fails to explain why there may be contact once or twice a year as opposed to the 4 to 6 times a year which she recommended. In my judgment it is in the welfare best interests of GH for the care plan to reflect that it is in her interests that

So whilst I am of the clear view that such contact is in the best interest of GH, I remain satisfied that, even if it proved not to be possible for such contact to take place, it is overwhelmingly in the welfare best interests of GH to be made the subject of a care plan for her to remain placed in long term foster care.

Very sadly GH’s initial foster placement broke down in October 2017. After a very brief period in a respite foster placement, GH was placed with her current foster carers. Happily she settled with them very quickly. The social worker observed that GH craves love and feeling part of a family unit. GH has shared that she wishes to stay with her current carers because “they are kind to her, take good care of her and feed her.” I very much hope this proves to be achievable for GH’s ultimate benefit and wellbeing. I note the local authority, by its Head of Service, has given an assurance that all will be done to secure this placement for GH and financial issues will not be a relevant factor.

GH has consistently said that her father threatened to kill her if she ever told anyone about his behaviour towards her. This is a threat she believes he had the capacity to carry out. She has started writing letters to her father but she is not yet ready for them to be given to him. She does not wish to see him.

In the premises I am wholly satisfied that it would be contrary to GH’s welfare best interests for there to be any contact between her and her father. She is simply not, given the abuse she has suffered, emotionally or psychologically robust enough to cope with any such contact. I shall return to the issue of the father’s contact later in this judgment.

In respect of GH having any contact with the paternal grandmother, I note that GH has told the social worker that (a) she feels let down by her paternal grandmother because she never believed her when ‘the bad things were happening’ and (b) she does not want contact with her. In more recent times she has expressed different views. It is now proposed that contact should take place between GH and her paternal grandmother six times a year in the school holidays. In my judgment this contact must be very closely supervised, be the subject of a very tight and clear written agreement and must be regularly reviewed. The grandmother must not be permitted to discuss the father, his feelings towards GH or his incarceration with GH. If she were to do so the contact session must be immediately terminated and the benefits for GH of future contact must be reviewed.

Similarly GH has previously been consistent that she does not wish to have any contact with her mother. Once again she has changed her mind in more recent times and now wishes to see her. The mother and the social workers are working co-operatively together to come to a point where direct contact will be resumed in the near future.

The options for IJ and KL are (a) to remain in foster care until their mother is released from prison when theoretically they could be returned to her care or (b) placement for adoption.

The only other option of long term fostering which was not advanced by any party would in my judgment to be wholly inimical to the welfare best interests of IJ and KL. They are only 4 and 2 years of age. It would not be in their interests to be cared for by the state for 14 and 16 years respectively.

I readily recognise that a plan of adoption against the wishes of a parent is the most draconian order a Court can make. I have intense regard to the fact that I must consider the impact of the adoption of IJ and KL throughout the whole of their respective lives.

The father consents to placing the children for adoption.

The stance of the mother is that the children can wait in foster care until she is released from prison next August, at the earliest, and that it is not too long a time for them to wait to be rehabilitated to her care. Ms Cranny, on behalf of the mother, reminded me in submissions of some of the mother’s positive qualities as reported in the parenting assessment. She emphasised that the mother loves the children and IJ and KL love her. She wants the chance to be able to care for the children upon her release from prison and she wants the children to know that she fought to have them returned to her care.

Whilst I do not doubt that the mother loves her children and that they love her and I accept those submissions prayed in aid on behalf of the mother, her stance is utterly fanciful and bears no relation to reality whatsoever.

The period of her incarceration and the date of her release from prison is just one fact which I have to take into account in considering the welfare best interests of these two very young children. The mother is, in my judgment, being totally disingenuous. I have to have regard not just to the length of her incarceration but the reasons for the same.

The judge in his sentencing remarks commented that she had voluntarily associated herself with her father and observed that she was not the victim she was portraying herself to be. Further he did not accept that she did not know about the sexual abuse of MN. He said she was complicit and although enthralled by the father, she did nothing to support MN nor to end the exploitation she knew was being perpetrated.

I respectfully agree. The evidence in support of those comments and observations is overwhelming. Furthermore, in light of my own findings of fact, the mother was an active participant in the abuse of GH. Therefore, although the mother may correctly assert that she was a victim, in some respects, of the abuse and controlling behaviour of the father, that does not begin to explain, let alone excuse, the abusive acts of the mother toward GH, her failure to protect her and for her failure to take any steps to protect or prevent the abuse of MN by the father. Still less does it explain or excuse the readiness of the mother to permit or allow IJ and KL to be present and to witness the controlling, and/or physical and/or sexual abuse by the father of MN. Nor does it explain or excuse why the mother permitted or allowed IJ and KL to be present during or to witness the fathers and/or her abuse or mistreatment of GH.

The mother appeared not to recognise or accept any of the foregoing.

In the premises, the jobs she has secured in prison and the classes she has embarked upon may well be beneficial for her own long term wellbeing and she is to be congratulated for engaging in the same, but they have, in my judgment, no impact on the mother’s ability to care for these children on the facts of this case.

The mother’s failings as a parent, as set out above, are so grave that the prospect of the mother being able to parent IJ and KL in a safe, nurturing and positive manner is, whether now or in the future, remote in the extreme.

The fact that the mother does not even begin to acknowledge the seriousness of her failings as a parent, preferring to see herself as a victim, demonstrates that the prospects of the mother changing so radically as to be able to be a safe parent are very poor.

If I were to approve a future rehabilitation of the children to the mother it would have the benefit of them living with their mother once more. The singular disadvantage is that it would expose IJ and KL to a very high risk of suffering yet further serious and significant emotional and psychological harm.

The disadvantage of the adoption of IJ and KL is the termination of their relationship with their mother and their father and their status as children of the parents. This will have an impact on them for the whole of their respective lives. The advantage is that they will both have the best possible opportunity to live in a loving and stable home with dedicated and committed carers which will enable them to achieve their full potential in their lives.

The children’s guardian in her helpful and clear final report reached the same conclusions.

The only option which meets the welfare best interests of IJ and KL is for them to be placed for adoption. This plan is a wholly proportionate course to take when balanced against the very real risks of serious harm if the children were to be rehabilitated to the care of the mother.

I will make a care order in respect of GH and I approve the plan for her to remain in long term foster care as supported by both her mother and father. The issue of whether GH will remain in the care of her current foster carers as a long term placement must be resolved immediately and without any delay whatsoever. It is vital that this young troubled and vulnerable girl knows where she is going to live and who is going to care for her long term.

I am pleased to hear that GH would like to see her mother. The mother accepted that direct and indirect contact with GH should only take place if and when the professionals judge it to be in her welfare best interests. Accordingly it is agreed I do not need to consider making a s.34(4) order in respect of the mother.

The issue of GH having contact with her father demands the very closest examination and consideration. He, as I have found, had repeatedly physically abused GH and has caused her grave emotional and psychological damage for which he accepts no responsibility whatsoever. GH blames herself for her father’s abuse. He denied and denies he has done so and, as set out above, he blamed GH for being exposed to adult sexual activity “it was her own fault”. This is a truly shocking and troubling stance for this father to take. Unless there is a fundamental and genuine change in his thought process and acceptance of his abusive actions and his responsibility, I do not see how contact, in any form, would be in the welfare best interests of GH.

GH’s expressed wishes, which may include a wish to see her father, must be carefully considered in the context of the grave emotional and psychological harm she has suffered. I respect Dr Blyth’s opinions on the issue of contact but part company with her on the issue of GH having contact with her father, after I have taken account of the totality of the evidence.

Initially the local authority did not seek a s.34(4) order in respect of the father. On further reflection, it has changed its approach and yesterday invited me to make this order. Mr Jones, on behalf of the father, opposed the order on the basis that, taking account of the provisions of s1(5) of the 1989 Act an order was not needed and that the position of the father’s contact could be the subject of an appropriately worded recital. This would reflect the father’s current stance that contact should only take place when the professionals consider it is in her welfare best interests and GH wants to see her father.

I disagree. In my judgment the father is a dangerous and manipulative man. He accepts no responsibility for his abuse of GH. In denying the truth of her allegations he is, in effect, accusing her of lying. I have no confidence that his current apparent co-operative and reasonable stance on the issue of contact with GH will be maintained in the future. An order under s.34(4) is a permissive order. My concerns about the father having contact are so grave that it is wholly appropriate for me to relieve this local authority of its statutory duty to promote contact between GH and her father. I am satisfied that the social workers will remain alive to this issue and if the time comes when it is considered to be in GH’s welfare best interests to have some form of contact with him, they will arrange the same.

I note the criminal trial judge in his sentencing remarks described the father “as a dangerous offender who is a risk of committing further serious offences in the future” (I acknowledge these remarks were made in the context of the charges which related to MN).

The father consents to the adoption of IJ and KL; the mother does not. Although the father consents to the making of placement orders and consents to them being adopted, he has not signed the requisite consent forms. Accordingly all counsel agreed, including counsel for the father, that if I approved the plans of the local authority and considered making placement orders, I should consider formally dispensing with the consent of the father pursuant to s.52 of the 2002 Act. For the reasons given above I am in no doubt that the only appropriate and necessary plan for IJ and KL is one of adoption. Accordingly, I am wholly satisfied it is in their welfare best interests that I:

The father did not seek a farewell contact with the children. The mother did and the local authority agreed to make arrangements for a farewell contact visit in the family room at the mother’s prison.

The neglect and later abuse of GH took place when Warwickshire County Council and Leicestershire County Council were involved with GH and her family. In respect of the latter this involvement covered the period when MN was seriously abused over a lengthy period of time in the family home. The children’s guardian suggested in her report that this case should be the subject of a Serious Case Review. The local authority agree. So do I.

I wish to express my grateful thanks to Counsel and to their instructing solicitors for their conduct and presentation of this case which has been immensely helpful to the Court and entirely proportionate.