Lincolnshire County Council v M & Ors

I am concerned with a little girl AB who was born on 23 January 2018. Lincolnshire County Council seek care and placement orders in respect of AB with the intention that she should be adopted. AB is represented by her Guardian, Katya Mitchell and Ms Hunt, counsel. AB’s mother, MM, has been present at court supported by a friend throughout this hearing and is represented by Ms Williams, counsel. AB’s father, F, has not been present during these proceedings he having travelled to Australia on or about 6 August of this year. He has been represented by Mr Ashworth, counsel. The local authority are represented by Mr Kirkwood, counsel.

AB has six older siblings. Following care proceedings in 2015/16 her five oldest siblings went to live with their paternal grandparents. Following care proceedings, in July 2017 AB’s older brother CD was taken into care and has been placed for adoption. The decisions in both of those cases were essentially based on the risk posed by the father to the children either directly or indirectly by exposure to abuse of the mother or violence to third parties and the mother’s inability to prioritise her children and to separate from him. By that time the mother was about three months pregnant with AB. In response to the removal of CD the mother was still not able to separate from the father and through the autumn pre-birth child protection procedures were followed with the intention of seeking to remove the unborn child from the mother were she to remain in a relationship with the father. The mother’s and father’s response to this was to decide to decamp to Europe in order to fight to keep AB through the European courts. So in late December 2017 they travelled to Ireland and then in early 2018 they travelled on to France, Holland, Germany and Belgium. AB was born in a hospital in Holland on 23 January. On 24 January 2018 a call was made to the local authority notifying them that AB had been born. On 25 January I made AB a Ward of court and ordered that she be returned to England. Lincolnshire social workers and police travelled to Belgium and in a paradigm example of the co-operation between the justice systems of EU member states and the child protection authorities of EU member states brought about by EC regulation 2201/2003 the Belgian courts by 31 January 2018 had delivered a judgment which supported my order and required that AB be placed in the care of Lincolnshire social services. Later that day AB, the mother, social workers and police officers returned to England. What might have occurred had that level of cooperation between the judicial and child welfare systems not been possible does not bear thinking about given the risks to AB and the mother. The father had returned before the mother and AB. On their return the mother and father’s passports were surrendered to police.

Following their return proceedings were transferred to the Family Court at Lincoln and Nottingham and from 1 February through to September matters were progressed there.

At various hearings throughout the proceedings indications were given to the court that either the mother wished to separate or that the parents recognised that they should separate. However no separation was effected and assessments were commissioned from an independent social worker on the basis that the mother and father intended to seek to remain together and to bring AB up in their joint care.

Given the history, the local authority made a part 25 application to instruct a psychologist to carry out assessments of the mother and father. However both the mother and father opposed the instruction of a psychologist (the guardian understood they refused to engage with one) and so the application was not pursued. The absence of a psychological assessment of the father and of the mother is unfortunate; particularly from the mother’s perspective given the situation that developed.

On 8 June the report of the independent social worker was provided. The contents of those reports contained only bad news for the mother and father. The father was assessed as continuing to provide a medium risk of violence to the mother and AB. The mother was assessed as remaining unable to accept the father posed a risk and unable to separate from him. On 18 June 2018 the mother approached social services saying she wished to separate and was placed in a refuge. However she left the refuge and returned to the family home within three days. Within those three days a court hearing took place on 20 June and the independent social worker was tasked with providing an addendum report addressing the question of whether following the separation of the parties the mother’s protective abilities had changed. The addendum was provided on 28 June 2018.

At the issues resolution hearing on 13 July 2018 both the father and the mother said they were separated and that the father was not seeking care but supported the mother as a sole carer for AB. The father said he wished to travel abroad for the summer in order to seek employment in Spain and to demonstrate that he and the mother had truly separated. His Honour Judge Rogers refused the father’s application for the return of his passport and adjourned that to the final hearing. However the father’s passport was returned to him by mistake and on 6 August 2018 the father left the UK. He is now in Australia.

The final hearing was listed before me commencing 29^th of October 2018. At some point during the week of 22 October 2018 the court received a communication from the father’s lawyers asking whether the court was content for the father not to attend. That also indicated that the father had lost his passport since his arrival in Australia but would need an emergency travel document if necessary. Due to a communication breakdown a message was sent indicating that the court was so content. That was unfortunate. The father has not been present for this hearing.

The mother has been in attendance throughout this hearing. She is currently about 30 weeks pregnant with her third child with the father. She has been supported by a friend. She gave evidence extensively on 30 October. She has conducted herself with dignity and say for one brief emotional outburst when she thought the Guardian was criticising the attachment between herself and AB has remained calm and focused and provided instructions to her counsel. During the hearing I have also heard from the social worker, the independent social worker who carried out risk assessments on the mother and the father and from the Guardian.

I have been provided with six lever arch files of documents and have read the list of essential reading together with various other documents. I have been provided with position statements or skeletons from each of the parties which have been of considerable assistance and on 31 October I was provided with a chronology by Mr Kirkwood.

I’d like to express my thanks to all involved in the preparation of this case and to the witnesses for the assistance they have given me.

The threshold document relied on by the local authority is dated 6^th of July 2018 and is found at A39 of the bundle. It is a very lengthy and detailed document. The father’s response is dated 13 July 2018. The mother’s response is dated 26 October 2018. The composite of those three documents is as follows. In the course of closing submissions I was referred to an amended threshold document. In the time that has been available to me I have not been able to contrast the two documents to any detailed extent. I shall refer to the differences which have been highlighted to me that when I refer to the parties submissions.

Thus the threshold was largely agreed. Issues remained in relation to:

The local authority’s position was set out in their case summary submitted at the commencement of the hearing. Unfortunately Mr Kirkwood was taken ill overnight and so was unable to make submissions at the close of the case. It was agreed that the case should proceed on the basis of the written submissions made in the case summary. The local authority submitted that even on an agreed basis the threshold was made but in particular in relation to items i, ii and iii) above that the court could be satisfied that the threshold was established. Based on that threshold the local authority submit that AB’s best interests require that a care order be made and that given her age a placement order should be made so that she can be placed for adoption. The father does not seek to care for AB and so has ruled himself out. The local authority submits that I should rule out the mother as a realistic option as a carer for AB because her track record over the last four years demonstrates convincingly that she is unable to separate from the father and that she is unable to recognise the risks that he poses to her or to AB and that she prioritises her relationship with him over AB’s need for her to separate. The local authority invite me to conclude that very little weight can be placed on the recent physical separation of the parties. Without a convincing demonstration of physical and emotional separation which could only arise from a combination of the passage of time, the carrying out of extensive psychotherapeutic and other work with the mother and the translation of that work into palpable evidence of a permanent separation and transformation in the mother’s functioning and vulnerability to abusive relationships the local authority submit that the mother poses as much of a risk today as she did in 2014, 2017 or May 2018. They submit that in order to achieve that level of convincing evidence of separation would involve a process of not less than one year. At the moment they submit that even if the mother were to fully engage in the process the outcome would be uncertain. They submit that given the mother’s historic level of dishonesty, and her distrust of the local authority the chances of her fully engaging are limited and so the prospect of a process culminating in a successful outcome for the mother are minimal. That being so at the end of a year the chances are that the mother would still not be in a position to offer a home for AB and AB would then face separation from her foster carers after two years of attachment and making a transition to adoption with all of the psychological harm that would then entail. They therefore submit that given the very remote prospects of success in the mother putting herself into a position to care for AB that the court must grasp the nettle now. In the absence of any other realistic options for AB care and placement for adoption are the only realistic option. No family members have put themselves forward.

The mother’s case was set out in the position statement filed on her behalf at the opening of the hearing. It has been supplemented by submissions by Ms Williams today.

In relation to the threshold the mother submits that prior to AB’s birth she was clear during the pre-birth procedures that her plan was to leave the jurisdiction to have the baby in Europe. She does not accept that they gave misleading information about their whereabouts. Most importantly she did not accept that she was unable to protect AB from her father. She maintains that she was aware that he was a risk although he was not violent and that she had encouraged him to seek help. However it is fair to say that her principal focus was on the outcome given that she accepted the threshold was crossed on the basis of the findings made in 2017.

Her principal aim was to be reunited with AB as soon as possible. In pursuance of this Ms Williams drew attention to the following:

On behalf of the father Mr Ashworth accepts that in the absence of the father his instructions are somewhat limited and his non-attendance to give evidence inevitably will limit the courts ability to assess his evidence. However they have been in contact by phone. The father focuses principally on the threshold inviting the court to conclude that:

In relation to the outcome Mr Ashworth submitted that there was material which should lead me to conclude that there was now much about the father that was positive. He submitted that I should conclude that the father’s motives in leaving for Australia were well intended and designed to assist the mother in regaining care of AB and to demonstrate that they were truly separated. He said it was positive that the father was prepared to accept orders made against him that would limit contact if that supported a placement of AB with the mother. Mr Ashworth noted that Ms Boardman accepted that he had cooperated with her assessment notwithstanding it encroached upon sensitive areas and that the father had cooperated with the drug hairstrand testing

He submitted that the reduction in offending behaviour since 2015 does evidence a change in the risks and that Ms Boardman concluded that the risks from the father were only medium.

Mr Ashworth submitted that the father was committed to AB and that the intensity of his commitment to her was illustrated by how hard he had fought in these proceedings to gain contact. The father submits that the local authority had ruled him out and hence they maintained that no contact was possible. However contact did take place and the contact records whilst they showed AB was distressed this was not to be surprised given that she did not know her father. The evidence of his interactions with AB show that he behaved appropriately and lovingly with her.

Ultimately Mr Ashworth submitted that the father felt he had not been given a fair opportunity by the local authority and that they saw nothing good and everything bad in him. Hence they sought to place weight on the allegation of rape of which he had been acquitted and they interpreted any evidence in a way which was most detrimental to him. The suggestion that his departure to Australia having had his passport returned to him that this was an example of his disregard for authority and his determination to thwart the system is illustrative of that says Mr Ashworth. In fact he left on his own making no attempt to take the mother still less AB with him.

On behalf of AB through her children’s Guardian Ms Hunt made common cause in most respects with the local authority’s position. She pointed out that the mother has referred to the father raping her on two occasions and has subsequently withdrawn that. She invites me to conclude that the mother has said this albeit she acknowledges that plainly the court cannot go further than determining what was said.

The Guardian was keen to emphasise that the evidence supports the conclusion that the mother’s basic parenting capacity exists. The history of her older children and the observations of her care of CD support this conclusion. However the very significant deficit in her parenting capacity is her emotional availability to the children and their protectiveness. In this case those are both very highly relevant and make it clear beyond any argument that she cannot at present meet AB’s needs. The Guardian question is whether the separation is genuine or not given the history. She also notes that the mother has failed to engage throughout these proceedings with the local authority and the services they could offer. Even since August the Guardian notes that the mother has taken no real steps to engage with the local authority or to access the support that she says she now recognises she needs. Her previous engagement has to be viewed in the context of the dishonesty that underpinned the engagement. The conclusion of His Honour Judge Parker was that the parents’ relationship had continued although Ms Hunt acknowledged that there may have been a window of time when the relationship may have ended. Overall the Guardian clearly has concluded, submits Ms Hunt, that the mother has only just begun to embark on the journey to making the changes that are so needed. She is so far away from making progress and the prospects of success are so speculative that AB simply cannot wait until then. The idea that she would be reunited with her mother and then potentially separated again or that she would tread water whilst her mother attempted to make the changes would be highly detrimental to her ability to develop a secure attachment to a primary carer. In the circumstances the Guardian is clear that nothing else will do for her than care and placement orders.

In order to make a care or any public law orders, the Local Authority must prove that the situation justifies the intervention of the State. This means that the Local Authority must establish the statutory threshold set out in s.31(2) of the Children Act 1989:

“A court may only make a care order or supervision order if it is satisfied-

(a)

that the child concerned is suffering, or is likely to suffer, significant harm; and

(b)

that the harm, or likelihood of harm, is attributable to-

i.

the care given to the child, or likely to be given to him if the order were not made, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give to him.”

It is for the Local Authority to prove that the threshold is crossed. To the extent that the threshold is not accepted the burden of proof lies squarely on the local authority to establish on the balance of probabilities that the facts which are alleged to support the threshold. All the evidence is admissible notwithstanding its hearsay nature, including Local Authority case records or social work chronologies which are often second or third hand hearsay. However, the court should bear in mind that it is hearsay and give it the weight it considers appropriate: see Section 96.3 of the Children (Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence) Order 1993 and Re W (Fact Finding: Hearsay Evidence) [2014] 2 FLR 703.

When I come to assess the evidence, I bear all of those factors in mind in reaching my conclusions on the threshold and the outcome.

In considering the Local Authority’s application for a care order, I must have regard to s.1 of the Children Act and since the plan is for adoption, also to the welfare checklist in s.1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002: see Re C (A Child) (Placement for Adoption: Judicial Approach) [2013] EWCA Civ. 1257 and Re R [2014] EWCA Civ. 1625. I note that in Re W-C [2017] EWCA Civ250 Lord Justice McFarlane said it was not necessary in a case such as this to consider the case through the prism of the s.1(3) welfare checklist but rather should focus on the ACA s.1(4) welfare checklist. Likewise, I must treat as my paramount consideration in accordance with s.1(2) of the 2002 Act, the child’s welfare throughout her life.

Section 1(4) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 provides:

“The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among others)-

(a)

the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding),

(b)

the child’s particular needs,

(c)

the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person,

(d)

the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant,

(e)

any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41)) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering,

(f)

the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant including

(i)

the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so,

(ii)

the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop and otherwise to meet the child’s needs,

(iii)

the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives or of any such person regarding the child.

In respect of placement, s.21 of the Adoption and Children Act and s.52 apply to that application. Section 52(1)(b) provides:

“The court cannot dispense with the consent of any parent or guardian of a child to the child being placed for adoption or to the making of an adoption order in respect of the child unless the court is satisfied that-

(b)

the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with.”

In this case, both the mother and the father have parental responsibility and so fall within the definition of a parent within the meaning of s.52(6).

In Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent) [2008] 2 FLR 625, the court of Appeal held that the word “requires” has a connotation of the imperative (i.e. what is demanded rather than what is merely optional or reasonable or desirable). What has to be shown is that the child’s welfare throughout her life requires adoption as opposed to something short of adoption. The child’s circumstances may require statutory intervention, perhaps may even require the indefinite or long term removal of the child from the family and his or her placement with strangers, but that is not to say that the same circumstances will necessary require that the child be adopted. The question at the end of the day is whether what is required is adoption.

It is for the Local Authority, since it is seeking to have AB adopted, to establish that nothing else will do: see Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, Re B-S (Adoption: Application of s.47(5)) [2013] EWCA Civ. 1146 and Re R. As Baroness Hale of Richmond said in Re B:

“…the test for severing the relationship between parent and child is very strict: only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child's welfare, in short, where nothing else will do.”

This echoes what the Strasberg Court said in Y v. The United Kingdom [2012] 2 FLR 332:

“…family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family. It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for his upbringing. However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained.”

The judicial task is always to evaluate all the options and undertake a holistic evaluation of the child’s need. In Re B-S, the Court of Appeal stressed the following three points:

In Re B-S, the court held that the following two elements are essential when the court is being asked to approve a care plan for adoption and make a non-consensual placement order or adoption order:

In Re M-H (a child) [2014] EWCA Civ 1396 the Court of Appeal considered the test for dispensing with consent and the ‘nothing else will do’ test. Lady Justice Macur observed that that phrase was often taken in isolation from the preceding words referring to exceptional circumstances and the overriding requirements of the child’s best interests. She noted that:

“It stands to reason that in any contested application there will always be another option to that being sought. In some cases the alternative option will be so imperfect as to merit summary dismissal. In others, the options will be more finely balanced and will call for critical and often anxious scrutiny. However, the fact that there is another credible option worthy of examination will not mean that the test of “nothing else will do” automatically bites.

The “holistic” balancing exercise of the available options that must be deployed in applications concerning adoption is not so as to undertake a direct comparison of what probably would be best but in order to ascertain whether or not the particular child’s welfare demands adoption. In doing so it may well be that some features of one or other option taken in isolation would produce a better outcome in one particular area for the child throughout minority and beyond. It would be intellectually dishonest not to acknowledge the benefits. But this is not to say that finding one or more benefits trumps all and means that it cannot be said that “nothing else will do”. All will depend upon the judge’s assessment of the whole picture determined by the particular characteristics and needs of the child in question no doubt often informed by the harm which she has suffered or been exposed to.”

It is always important to bear in mind what Mr. Justice Hedley said in Re L, which was that:

“Society must be willing to tolerate very diverse standards of parenting, including the eccentric, the barely adequate and the inconsistent. It follows too that children will inevitably have both very different experiences of parenting and very unequal consequences flowing from it. It means that some children will experience disadvantage and harm, while others flourish in atmospheres of loving security and emotional stability. These are the consequences of our fallible humanity and it is not the provenance of the state to spare children all the consequences of defective parenting. In any event, it simply could not be done.”

That approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Re B, where both Lord Wilson and Baroness Hale emphasised the very diverse range of parents and the diverse standards of parentings that society must be willing to tolerate:

“The State does not and cannot take away the children of all the people who commit crimes, who abuse alcohol or drugs, who suffer from physical or mental illnesses or disabilities, or who espouse anti-social political or religious beliefs.”

Sir James Munby, in Re G, emphasised the task of the court in relation to carrying out the global holistic evaluation and the need to undertake a multi-faceted evaluation of the child’s welfare taking into account all the negatives and positives, all the pros and cons of each option. To quote Lord Justice McFarlane:

“What is required is a balancing exercise in which each option is evaluated to the degree of detail necessary to analyse and weigh its own internal positives and negatives, and each option is then compared side by side against the competing option or options.”

I must take into account AB’s welfare throughout her life: the short, medium and long term welfare interests. I approach it on the basis that, if adopting a solution of permanent separation from his parents, it is on the basis that “nothing else will do” and that if a placement order is to be made that his situation requires it rather than it being only desirable. Delay is likely to be prejudicial to his welfare, although planned and purposeful delay may be appropriate.

I take account of the Article 6 and Article 8 rights of AB and the parents. I remind myself that, where there is a tension between the Art.8 rights of the parents on the one hand and the Art.8 rights of the child on the other, the rights of the child prevail: see Yusuf v. The Netherlands.

In determining what order to make, to the extent that it infringes the Art.8 rights of the mother and the father, the court must be satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate. Any conflict between the interests of the child and that of the parents should be resolved in favour of the solution which best promotes the child’s welfare. In determining the proportionality issue, I approach it on the basis that if, on welfare grounds, the option of placing the child with a parent is only marginally outweighed by placing them away from the parent, that may be disproportionate. Conversely, if the option away from the parent is clearly more likely to promote the child’s welfare that will be a proportionate interference.

In carrying out the assessment, plainly some factors will carry far more weight than others. The balance sheet approach advocated by Lord Justice Ryder, whilst helpful, cannot convey the relative importance of any particular issue. The holistic evaluation is not a map without contours, but rather one in which there are very significant features on the landscape which may ultimately come to dominate the outcome.

Set out below is a chronology drawn from the previous judgments of the court, the statements of the parties, the reports and the other records contained within the bundle. Insofar as any matters of fact are in dispute the chronology records my conclusions in respect of them.

Norma Grove’s evidence is set out in her statements dated 24 January 2018, 5^th of February 2018, two statements of 5^th of July 2018, the care plan, and supplemental statements dated 22 October and 29^th of October 2018. Much of her evidence as to the factual background and her dealings with the mother and father is rehearsed in the chronology. Some of the key points of her evidence are as follows:

Ms Grove is also the author of the care plan. It is for adoption. AB will remain in her current foster placement until an adoptive placement is found. Timescales are not given in the plan. CD’s adoptive parents are not in a position to care for AB. She will retain contact with her parents via Letterbox. There may be some sibling contact with her old 5 siblings and with CD and EF. A plan sets out the changes in contact with the mother. That has been superseded by the reduction initiated by the mother.

Alison Boardman an independent social worker was instructed to carry out risk assessments in relation to the mother and father. An independent social worker was instructed to undertake this work which would usually be carried out by the in-house social worker because the father and the mother claimed that the local authority were corrupt and biased. Her report on the mother and the father and her addendum are detailed and thoughtful assessments. In her oral evidence she was considered and measured. The following are in my view some of the key points from her evidence.

The mother gave evidence over the course of half a day. She has a limited criminal history for minor offences of violence. Her most recent conviction was on 8 July 2016 when she pleaded guilty to battery. I’m not sure of the circumstances of that. She has no history of dishonesty. She gave a vivid account of her childhood and early life experiences including physical and sexual abuse by her stepfather which led to her being removed into care at about the age of 12. Thereafter she described an extraordinarily disrupted adolescence comprising as she said some 30 foster care and residential home placements until she was about 15 when she moved to live with a sister and subsequently a private foster carer BX. She described her relationship with Mr G and how that had on occasions featured physical abuse linked to the consumption of alcohol and drugs. She clearly carries a huge burden of guilt having left him (I think for the father) and his subsequent death in an accident at his new place of work. I’m not sure if he changed jobs in order to look after the children but it appears that the mother was blamed by his family for what happened and she still carries great guilt herself. Thereafter she returned to look after the children together with the father which resulted in care proceedings being taken when she broke a written agreement which prevented the father having contact with her children; this being in the context of him being on bail for the alleged rape of a 15-year-old. She clearly carries a huge distrust of social services and the courts in this country feeling that she has been let down; she said she doesn’t believe the local authority give you a fair chance. The prospect of her working cooperatively with the local authority in the intensive way that she would have to do in order to both undertake the counselling and other support work but most importantly to demonstrate that she has changed through frank and honest discussions about her state of mind and allowing social services into her life to demonstrate that the pattern of her life had changed is remote. She appeared to show relatively little insight into her own responsibility for the situation she finds herself in now and in relation to CD and in relation to her five older children. She had a tendency to shift responsibility; she was sick, a taxi didn’t turn up, trains were late, her phone wasn’t working, the refuge was like a children’s home, she wanted to minimise AB’s distress. I detected little if any true acceptance of her responsibility for the situation. She was genuinely distressed I think at the impact on her children but has still failed to grasp the nettle of the risk that the father poses and the risk of her embarking on another abusive relationship. At various points during her evidence she said certain points in time had been eye openers for her and she had realised the problem was the father. The problem was that this ranged from the father’s actions in January 2017 through to losing CD in July 2017, through to the father taking her to the contact centre in March 2018, through to receiving the parenting assessments in July 2018. She said that F past was the problem. She appeared not to realise that it is his present which is also a problem. I got the very clear impression that she was holding back much in relation to the nature of her relationship and abuse she had experienced with the father. She was prepared to say that he had been controlling of her. On being pressed by me she was prepared to accept that he had demonstrated highly aggressive outbursts of temper. At one point she appeared about to reveal more information but held herself back. This is consistent with her having made complaints about the father in particular on a couple of occasions referring to him having raped her but then saying that she had been misunderstood. She has also on occasions phoned the police or social services in order to talk about her experiences for instance in September when she spoke to the social work team manager but then on being contacted by the social worker herself declined to speak further. She said at the conclusion of her evidence that “sometimes it is easier to shut yourself down than to deal with your emotions”. I have no doubt that this is what has happened. I have no doubt that there is much more that she could say about her experiences at the hands of the father but she is not in a place emotionally where she is yet able to open up about that. In that sense she is not an honest witness because she will not speak the truth about the father and minimises his responsibility for issues. Her starting to use cocaine was because it was everywhere not because the father was using it. Nor is she honest in other respects; the most obvious example being her description of what occurred on the evening of 21 June 2018. The clear picture which she had given was that on that evening the father had arrived to inform her that her friend was suffering from breast cancer and they had gone to visit her. That was in line with what the police had been told when they spoke to her on 22 June. However on further explanation she revealed that they had left the property in a hurry because she had told the father that she had texted her mother to call the police and he therefore wished to make himself scarce before they arrived. In fact they travel to St Albans she said to visit friends of his; although I note the police account is that they went to a house that the father had bought. She then said that they had visited her friend in Peterborough who had breast cancer the next day. Her account appeared to me to be largely fabricated and was an attempt in some way to provide a reason why she had spent time with the father that night when only three days before she had told the social worker that she was ready to leave him and had been placed for a brief period of time in a refuge. That is not to say that there were not times during her evidence when she was telling the truth. The fact that she disclosed what actually happened on 21 June suggests that she is not dishonest and manipulative in the way the father seems to be. However she is very far from giving a full and frank account of the relationship.

The father did not give evidence. He says that he has lost his passport since arriving in Australia. I do not believe that for one moment. His communications with the court last week suggesting that he would return if the court wished him so to do were disingenuous at best. Given that he said he had lost his passport he was in no position to travel, notwithstanding that he said he would seek an emergency travel documents, and this was simply an example in my view of him seeking to manipulate the process. Given that he has not her attended to give evidence either in person or by making arrangements to attend by video or telephone link his recent statement has not been tested. Given his track record and the assessment of Ms Boardman and others it seems most unlikely that he has gained any genuine insight into his behavioural any genuine acceptance of his responsibility for the situation. It therefore seems unlikely that there has been much shift in his attitude towards the mother or his desire to be in a relationship with her to meet his own needs. The physical separation is of course a good thing but it is easily reversed. His decision not to pursue contact and to support the mother’s application is a good thing but I cannot give them father that much credit for it given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that demonstrates the sort of risk that he poses to the mother and AB and the absence of any change in him over the years.

His criminal record is appalling with numerous convictions for offences against the person, motoring offences including dangerous driving, breaches of suspended sentences, non-molestation orders, curfew orders and the like. Mr Ashworth is right that it has reduced recently which may be a small sign of maturity. However he clearly still has a hairtrigger temper as evidenced by his outburst in July 2017. His manipulation of the mother in January 2017 but also in persuading her to decamp to Europe, to oppose a psychological assessment and to maintain their relationship all show that he remains controlling and manipulative. I note that he told Ms Boardman and/or the Guardian that he had been diagnosed with a personality disorder at some point. Whether this is true or not his behaviour at times is extremely worrying, has been long-standing in its nature and has not been addressed by the sort of intensive psychological interventions that was identified as necessary in 2017 and which is reinforced by Ms Boardman’s assessment. No doubt the father also has positives. He is said to be a hard worker. He loves his child and is able to behave in a child appropriate way within the heavily monitored conditions of contact.

However it is also clear that he remains a risk to any woman he is in an intimate relationship with, any child who is a part of that relationship and indeed to third parties. It is blindingly obvious and has been for many years that he is the barrier standing in the way of the mother caring for their children. He prioritises his need for a relationship with her over the children’s needs. His behaviour in January 2017 when the mother threatened to separate from him and he responded by telling the local authority that they were in a relationship was a despicable example of putting his needs first. Had the mother been able to separate then there was a chance that CD would have returned to her care and would have been looked after by her. Instead the father’s actions destroyed that chance and resulted in his own son being taken into care and placed for adoption. That is a dreadful example of his self-centred and narcissistic behaviour. He has no respect for authority and it would appear little respect for any other individual; least of all those close to him such as the mother or his sister or his nephew. I have no reason to suppose that the conclusions reached by His Honour Judge Parker are not as valid now as they were then. The fact that he has not been convicted of any further violent offence since gives me no cause for confidence in him. I have little doubt that he is the one with control in the relationship with the mother. I have little doubt that he led the way both in terms of the deception of Wirral social services and the plan to decamp to Ireland, France and Germany 2018. His reasons for leaving this jurisdiction are more likely to be linked to his seeking to avoid further castigation in the court proceedings although they might also be explained by his punishing the mother for her saying she wanted to end the relationship. His nature appears to me to be far more likely to react spitefully to such a decision by her and one way of doing that would be to move to the other side of the world in effect to punish her for her decision; he well knowing how emotionally dependent she is upon him. He is clearly a deeply unpleasant and dangerous man for anybody involved in an intimate relationship with him. The power he has managed to gain over the mother is an indication not so much of her weakness or susceptibility although no doubt it is a function of that, but of his manipulation and intimidation which still exerts considerable power over the mother even from 13,000 miles and three months away her inability to open up about his true nature in their relationship speaks volumes about the extent to which she was under his control.

The Guardian’s evidence is contained within her report dated 13 July 2018 and supplemented by her oral evidence. Some of the key points of her evidence are as follows

The hairstrand drug testing reports show:

It is clear from the order of May 2016 that the central issue in relation to the mother's ability to care for children was the risk posed by the father and her inability to separate from him. This remained the case in 2017. The judgment of His Honour Judge Parker of 7 February 2017 concluded that the mother and father had conspired to keep their relationship secret and had presented a dishonest account both to the local authority and to the court in pursuit of their attempt to keep CD with them. The fact that the pair adopted this approach reflects their acceptance that from the perspective of the court and the local authority it was the relationship that prevented the mother being in a position to care for a child and that it was the risk presented by the father that was at the root of the concern. At the conclusion of that judgment the judge noted unless there was a sea change in their approach it would hamper the court’s ability to perform any reliable assessment of them. The judgment of July 2017 was again built on the risk that the father posed to a child and the fact that the mother and father continued to be in a relationship. The court rejected the mother’s and the father's case that they were no longer in a relationship but were simply friends and concluded that the mother could not live with the father but could not live without him. The judge noted that she had known for months that her relationship was critically damaging and a toxic feature of her life in relation to her being able to care for her son. The judge described it as an abusive relationship and noted that he was deeply troubled by the incident where the mother sought to get out of the father's car whilst it was travelling at speed on the M6. He concluded that she was unable to protect CD from the risks posed by the father. At that time the father was still misusing cocaine as was the mother. The judgment criticised both parents but in particular the father for his propensity to unpredictable, sudden, intimidating, aggressive and violent behaviour, his lack of respect for authority and his failure to take any responsibility for his own actions. The court noted that both the mother and father sought to shift blame and to place it on others. Even the father agreed in cross examination that he potentially posed a risk to CD and the mother and that he could slip at any point.

It is therefore abundantly clear that since May 2016 the mother has been fully aware of the risk that professionals and the courts have found that the father poses in respect of any child. Even prior to that though she prioritised her relationship with the father over her children when she allowed him to move back into the family home following his arrest on suspicion of raping a 15-year-old. That meant that her children could not return to live her with her but remained with the paternal grandparents. What the courts have concluded though is almost by the by because the mother herself has lived with him for that period of time and has experienced first-hand on a number of occasions his unpredictable and violent nature. She witnessed him assaulting his nephew. She has seen him and been subjected to his extreme outbursts of temper. She knows he is controlling and manipulative. His behaviour in contacting social services in January 2017 and telling them that they had been in a relationship was I'm satisfied prompted by her saying that she wished to separate and is a shocking example of his manipulative behaviour towards her. Given that it was bound to lead to the abandonment of the rehabilitation plan and this must have been known to him, his spite towards the mother and desire to exact revenge upon her is quite extraordinary or to create a situation where she would not leave him but put his own needs before those of his child. I believe that the mother’s assessment of why the father did what he did at this time is correct. What is more surprising is that it did not result in her seeing his true nature but continued a relationship with him.

All of this the mother has known for many years. After the February 2017 judgment she chose to become pregnant with the father for a second time. After the judgment in July 2017 she chose to go on the run with the father to Europe in order to keep AB with her and the father. This was a clear rejection of the court’s determination that the father posed a serious risk to their child. However it is clear that the father still poses a serious risk to the mother and to AB. Although he has not been convicted since early 2016 of an offence and the behaviour dates back to 2015 it is clear that he is still prone to behaving in an intimidating aggressive and manipulative way. His outburst in court in July 2017 illustrates vividly the nature of his temper. If he is capable of that in a court setting what is he capable of in a domestic setting; particularly under the influence of drugs? He has behaved in a manipulative and controlling way towards the mother. I accept her evidence of his behaviour in this regard. I am satisfied that it it was he who led the way into camping to Europe, and in opposing the need for a psychological assessment. I’m satisfied that it is he who has acted in such a way as to maintain the relationship throughout putting pressure on the mother and persuading her that they could buck the system somehow. He has not undertaken the intensive psychological work that was identified in 2017 and is further supported by Ms Boardman. I accept that he has involved himself in some work in prison and part completed a building better relationships programme. However that is only scratching the surface of the work that he needs to do. His solicitor’s invitation to the local authority within these proceedings for access to support might be thought to indicate a willingness on his behalf to undertake that work. Perhaps if it had been made available he would have undertaken. However his failure to undertake work in the course of 2017 or subsequently but rather to reject that approach and to fight the system provides a far more compelling indication of his rejection of the need for him to undergo that work. Events of the last year taken together with the failure to pursue any work confirmed that the father poses as serious a risk today as he did in earlier years. I do not consider that is the local authority’s responsibility that the father has not accessed the resources needed to address his problems. As a last resort he could have commissioned a psychologist himself, he having access to the financial resources so to do. The apparent reduction in offending behaviour and the indications in his statement of some acknowledgement together with his actions in withdrawing to Australia and supporting the mother might be genuine. However they might also be the product of another strategy to mislead the professionals and the court. Given the father’s track record it is more likely to be the latter than the former. Whilst I hope that it is the former, if it is it is change in its most embryonic stages and is effectively of no relevance for the purposes of this hearing.

Following their return the mother was unable to separate from the father. In March she was offered a get out but was unable to accept it. In June she was unable to accept a get out and was unable to make any progress. She returned to the house she shared with the father by at the latest 21 June and on that day went on a road trip with the father in order to avoid the police. Thereafter she continued in a relationship with him. I accept that in a coercive and controlling relationship that separation is hard. I’m prepared to accept indeed that it is a process where a step forward may be accompanied by a step back. The more enmeshed and dependent on the relationship the harder the process of separation is likely to be.

She stated a number of occasions in her evidence that various points in time were eye-openers for her or wake-up calls. In fact she said that the judgment of July 2017 was one of those but plainly it was not given her subsequent decision to remain with the father and have further children with him. Following receipt of the parenting assessments the mother again said this was a wake-up call for her. And yet in August when she says she was separating and following an argument with him when she phoned the police she chose to return to the family home with him and to spend the night with him there. Again I’m prepared to accept that separating is not easy and that the resumption of relationships spending time with each other does not automatically mean that there is a relationship and no separation. In relationships of this sort and separation being a process there will almost certainly be periods of time and perhaps lengthy periods of time when the relationship is still ongoing but a separation is being sought. The precise nature of the relationship may ebb and flow. It may eventually reach the point of full physical and emotional separation but before that point is reached it will neither be a full relationship or a full separation. At any point prior to that full emotional and physical separation there will be a risk that the process will go into reverse and the separation elements will take second place or going to abeyance whilst the relationship elements will take precedence.

It is very difficult to know whether the physical separation which has apparently been in place since early August was instigated by the mother or by the father. It is of course the father who has put himself over the seas and thus created a situation of enforced physical separation. Whether this is his way of regaining control-the mother having sought to separate- or whether it is part of a plot hatched by the mother and father to present a picture of separation, or whether it is a genuine response by him to the mother ending the relationship is hard to know. I’m prepared to accept from the mother’s evidence given in court and in her statement that perhaps there is a faint realisation on her part that the relationship she has with the father is indeed abusive and counter-productive for her. Her evidence about putting her children first (I believe in particular she was referring to her children with Mr G) seemed heartfelt. The difficulty is that her track record both of dishonesty in relation to the father but also the intensity of her enmeshed relationship with the father means that if there is a dawning realisation it is very very early days indeed in terms of testing whether that dawning realisation translates into the full sunlight of true acceptance of the abusive nature of the father and the terrible damage that is doing to her and her ability to raise her children. It seems to me that the mother is now beginning to realise and appreciate the father’s flaws and the risks that poses to her and the obstacle it places in her path to caring for her children. However that is a very fragile realisation and could easily go into reverse; particularly were the father to place pressure on her to resume. She is currently far more likely to still trust him or be susceptible to his pressure than to place her trust in social services or others and to resist him and report him.

Her evidence of her childhood experiences of abuse, an extraordinarily unstable period in care, her abusive relationship with Mr G and the guilt she feels in relation to his death combined with the loss of her children to the paternal grandparents and the subsequent loss of CD to adoption are all profound insults to her emotional and psychological well-being. Her historic experiences combined with her dishonesty and her track record in relation to the father all combine to create a situation in which it seems to me the mother will need to demonstrate by many months, probably years of separation from the father, combined by a genuine demonstration of moving on in her life in various ways combined with charted progress in terms of therapy or counselling before anyone could be satisfied that she has not only put the father behind her but has addressed the underlying causes which have led her to embark upon and remain in a highly abusive relationship. Even the psychotherapeutic element of this alone on the evidence would be not less than a year of effective engagement. The mother is not yet at the stage of being able to engage effectively because she is only just perhaps beginning to realise that she needs to deal with these issues. In order to move forward and to gain some trust in those who are willing and able to help her and then to use those resources and to begin to acquire the insight and proactivity that she needs to do to make significant progress is a work in my view of somewhere between one and two years probably closer to two than one.

At the present time and in January 2018 it is beyond argument that the mother is unable to protect AB from the father and the risks that he poses to her. Since 4 August she has made little if no progress in terms of engaging assistance. She seeks to blame the local authority for this and yet it is her case that since 4 August she has finally separated from the father. However she has not done anything like enough to demonstrate this or to call upon the local authority to provide her with services through the Freedom Project or Edan Lincs. It may be a product of the effect of the father’s abuse upon her that she seems in many respects to feel powerless. She is reactive, seeking for others to solve her problems rather than taking ownership of them and seeking to solve them herself. Whether she was like this prior to her relationship with the father I am unable to ascertain. If she wishes to take control of her life and to put herself in a position where she is able to play an active role in the lives of her five older children or to have any hope of playing a role in the lives of her younger children a transformation in her attitude will be needed. I appreciate that, as Ms Williams submitted, she needs somebody alongside her to encourage her to do that work. There is some force in that but the most crucial element is that the mother finds the spark of determination that will enable her to work with someone to access the resource. You can lead a horse to water but you cannot make it drink.

The evidence suggests that underlying her current presentation of a disempowered and repressed woman is a character who may be able to reshape her life. I suspect she was very different 5 years ago. However much she may wish to shift responsibility for that I cannot emphasise strongly enough that ultimately it is down to her, albeit with help, to confront the problems that she has and to begin to take steps of her own making to address those problems.

Although the father accepts that findings have been made against him historically he does not accept the basis of the findings. Hence the dispute as to the threshold in his response. It is clear from the judgment of His Honour Judge Parker of 21 July 2017 that he concluded that the father had long-standing deep-seated issues that will require more than a BBR course to resolve. He concluded that the father would have to engage in lengthy and intensive work to address those issues with a high level of success before he can be trusted by the court with childcare. Against that backdrop and with the evidence that the father has done nothing further to seek or undertake the lengthy and intensive work identified he plainly continues to pose a substantial risk of violence to third parties including intimate partners and thus to any child in either his care or the care of an intimate partner. That the mother has not responded to this is a small illustration of her inability to confront the risk that the father poses to her and to any child in her care.

The mother did not respond to the threshold in relation to the allegation that the father continues to present a risk of engaging in violent aggressive and intimidating behaviour to children and adults. Her failure to address this issue even as late as October is significant. In her evidence the mother accepted that the father was capable of losing his temper in the way described by His Honour Judge Parker in his judgment of July 2017. She said she had witnessed it on a few occasions throughout their relationship. Strangely she described it as being like a child losing their temper which seriously underestimates the nature and likely impact on those around of that sort of behaviour. I conclude it is an example of the mother being unwilling to criticise the father to the extent that objectively would be appropriate. She herself described him as being controlling, always having to have the last word, not letting her speak, it was quite clear from her evidence that she viewed him as being controlling and domineering and that for large parts of their relationship she went along with what he wanted in order to keep the peace. The fact that she was on occasions able to argue with him or otherwise confront him does not in my view detract from the generality of their relationship which in my view was characterised by coercive control, Given the fact that the father has not undertaken any of the intensive work that would be required to address these issues it is clear that he continues to present a risk of engaging in unpredictable, sudden aggressive and intimidating behaviour with the risk of that escalating to physical violence.

Although only a small component of the case in her evidence the mother accepts that she has continued to smoke a couple of joints of cannabis on a regular basis in order to alleviate anxiety and help her sleep.

The father’s drug use is a more significant issue. The mother's failure to deal with this in response to the threshold is another example of how she is unwilling to truly confront the issues in relation to the father or to be seen to criticise him on paper. Her response to the threshold is dated 26 October and yet even 2 1/2 months after separation she is unwilling to state that the father was misusing drugs. Given what the mother has said about her own cannabis use and the father's general dishonesty and his admitted cannabis use in February I'm satisfied that the father has used cannabis over the relevant period as well as periodic use of cocaine. It is highly probable that the father's misuse of drugs would contribute to his propensity to aggressive, intimidating and occasionally violent behaviour. His continued use throughout these proceedings notwithstanding a short period when he may have abstained, makes it highly likely that he would be continuing to use in the future and thus would continue to present a heightened risk of aggression, violence and loss of temper. I am prepared to accept that he abstained when he was going to have contact with AB but that hardly forms a foundation for confidence that he will not be using in the future.

Thus in relation to the threshold and attempting to summarise the reasons why AB was at risk of suffering significant harm, that harm being attributable to the parenting that she would have been given, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give I’m satisfied of the following:

Having regard to those conclusions what order is in AB best interests? What will promote her welfare throughout her life? Applying a holistic analysis to the realistic options before the court where do her welfare interests lie? Will nothing else other than adoption do?

In the absence of any family placements the alternatives before the court are either:

The risks of the mother reuniting with the father are of such magnitude and such seriousness that returning AB to her care now would be pregnant with risk. Even the most stringent orders will not prevent reunification with the father if that is what he or the mother want. The mother is not in a position now to work honestly and openly with the local authority. Yes, AB would live with her mother but at what potential cost; exposure to the father and all that risk brings. It would almost certainly end in AB being removed with all the harm that would cause. It is therefore not a realistic option.

Given there is no mother and baby unit or family placement which would form the foundation of the second option, neither of them fall into the category of realistic options which need much further consideration. In any event the reality is that based on the current risk of the mother resuming a relationship with the father and deceiving others about it that the risk to AB of placing her with her mother is simply intolerable. The risk that AB would be exposed to violence, aggression or controlling behaviour by the father to the mother in order to resume a relationship or once a relationship had resumed is unacceptable. Similarly the risk that the placement would breakdown because of either a resumption of the relationship or the mother embarking on another abusive relationship is too high. AB could not be exposed to the risk of transferring her primary attachment from her foster carer to her mother and then having that attachment broken. That is a recipe for lifelong attachment issues with long-term consequences for her emotional well-being and psychological health.

Adoption would probably result in AB being placed with an adoptive family within a matter of months. At the age of 10 months and with no physical or psychological problems accompanying her she falls into the category of children who are most likely to be adopted. At this age the likelihood of her transferring her primary attachment to adoptive carers and that providing her with a forever family with all of the benefits that that brings are at a premium. However it will mean ending her familial links with her mother and father and also the possibility of relationships with her half siblings and her full siblings and other extended family members. If EF were to be adopted there is a possibility that a placement could be found for AB and EF but that is speculative at the moment. It might be possible for AB to have direct contact with her siblings if placed for adoption but it will be a limited relationship.

Placing AB in foster care would have the advantage of keeping alive the relationship with the mother, possibly the father and with the siblings or half siblings. It would have the potential benefit of AB returning to her mother’s care at some point in the future. If she made good progress with addressing her problems that might be in a year. If not at least AB would have a foster placement where she could feel secure and combine that with a relationship with her mother. If the mother had demonstrated good progress to date in addressing the underlying issues, showing insight, demonstrating the separation emotionally and physically was real and working with professionals then the potential benefits would justify a further period of AB remaining in foster care. However the mother is very far from that. Had she separated in January and begun the work we might have been close to being able to give a prognosis of the chances of success. But we are not there. The mother is in the earliest stages of that process and the prospects of success are not good. At present it is more likely that she will resume a relationship with the father or will fail to work with professionals or fail to take up support than that she will. Thus from AB’s perspective she would remain in foster care whilst her mother failed to make progress. Then she would have to be placed having developed a primary attachment for 2 odd years. Yes she might still be adopted – she is under 3 – but what will the consequences be for her emotional wellbeing in the longer term if she has attachment issues? All this risk with no significant prospect of the mother making the change needed.

What if one assumes the mother won’t make progress - what about long term foster care. Children need a secure and stable home that is theirs forever – to have parents who they are attached to and from whom they can derive emotional and psychological wellness. A foster home cannot do that. The foster parents would never be AB’s parents. A long-term foster carer would be unlikely to last for her minority. She would be at risk of the very fractured upbringing the mother herself experienced. I am satisfied that adoption is far better for AB than long-term foster care.

Taking AB’s welfare as my paramount consideration and applying the section 1(4) welfare checklist to her welfare throughout her life and taking a holistic view of the realistic options before the court leads me to conclude that AB needs as soon as possible a forever family through the process of adoption. Balancing all the relevant factors, the most significant features in the holistic landscape are the risks facing AB and the mother’s capability and the effect on AB of change. The risks are currently still very high indeed. The mother’s capability is seriously undermined by the issues to do with her emotional availability and inability to recognise and protect from risk. I hope she will address them but the separation and her response to it and ability to change and evidence that change are so embryonic that there is a high risk that she will fail to make the progress necessary. That process would be 1-2 years and with such a poor prognosis it cannot be in AB’s interests to tread water in foster care whilst the mother undertakes that process. That would be to prioritise the mother over AB.

I am therefore satisfied that the option which will best promote AB’s welfare throughout her life is adoption. I am satisfied that nothing else will do for AB. I am satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate for that order to be made. I am satisfied that I am required to dispense with the parents’ consent.

I will make a care order and a placement order.