G (A Child : Fact-Finding Hearing)

In July 2017, I conducted a fact-finding hearing in these care proceedings concerning a 12-year-old girl, hereafter referred to as G, which arose out of a very long-running and bitter private law dispute between her two parents. At the conclusion of the hearing, I adjourned for written submissions. During the summer vacation I handed down a document summarising my findings to facilitate the ongoing work with the family as described below. This judgment sets out the reasons for those findings.

G’s mother is now aged forty-one. She has an older child, a boy hereafter referred to as W, now aged twenty. His father has played no part in these proceedings. The mother’s family background has been examined and considered in various documents filed in these proceedings, in particular the reports of Dr. Gardner, consultant clinical psychologist. It is unnecessary to add to the length of what will unavoidably be a long judgment by setting out that background in any detail. Suffice it to say that the mother sadly lost her father when she was very young, and was then brought up by her mother who subsequently remarried. The mother remains close to her mother and stepfather and they have played a significant role in these proceedings as summarised below. They are the fourth respondents to the application and are hereafter referred to as the maternal grandparents

G’s father is now aged forty-three. He also has an older child, hereafter referred to as J, now aged eighteen. The father’s family background has also been analysed and considered in various assessments carried out in the course of these proceedings, including by Dr. Gardner. Again, I do not think it necessary to recite that history in any detail. It is notable, however, that he too did not have a father for part of his childhood – in his case because his father left the family before he was born. Thereafter, the father was raised by his mother until she remarried when he was a teenager.

The father was in a relationship with J’s mother, hereafter referred to as D, for a number of years in the late 1990s. In February 2000, D obtained an emergency ex parte non-molestation injunction against the father, coupled with a power of arrest. Prior to the return date, the father was arrested for breach of the injunction and at a further court hearing on 16 February 2000 he admitted the breach whereupon the court imposed a further injunction for a period of six months. Subsequently D made a further application alleging the father was in contempt of court for a further breach of the injunction. At a hearing on 4 July 2000, the father admitted breaching the injunction by intimidating and shouting at D, including threatening to break down the door to her property. The court made an order committing him to prison for fourteen days but suspended the sentence for six months and imposed a new injunction for the same period. On New Year’s Day 2001, the father telephoned D in breach of the injunction, whereupon he was arrested, brought before the court and remanded in custody for four days. At a further hearing on 9 January 2001, he admitted the breach, and was remanded on bail until 12 January. A further non-molestation injunction was granted for a period of twelve months. At the hearing on 12 January, the court found that the father had committed a number of further breaches of the injunction, including threatening violence towards D by shouting “I have a gun in my pocket, I’m gonna kill you” and threatening D that he would “stretch your neck” and “break you in half”. The court committed him to prison for eight weeks, suspended for a further fourteen months provided that the father complied with a fresh non-molestation order which not only prohibited him from using or threatening violence against D, or intimidating harassing or pestering her, or going to or within 100 m of her property, but also prevented him from contacting her in any way except through solicitors or his parents, save in the event of an emergency during his contact with J.

Documents disclosed in these proceedings demonstrate that the father continued to harass D for some time. In September 2002, D was granted a further non-molestation injunction against him. In December 2003, he was arrested by the police and cautioned for harassment following an allegation by D that he had made several threatening telephone calls to her, forced his way into her property and shouted at her for over two hours. In July 2004, D alleged that, on returning J after contact, the father had slammed her car door into a lamp post and said “you’ve got it coming to you”. He was issued with a harassment warning. Notwithstanding this series of repeated incidents of harassment and threats, it seems that the father continued to have contact with J on a regular basis. There were various court hearings concerning contact but it is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to set those out in any detail here. Suffice it to say that the father continued to have regular contact with his son, including staying contact and, when he was aged about 15, J moved to live with the father.

Meanwhile, the father had met the mother in 2003 and they had entered into a relationship, although they never lived together. The mother says that she was “truly in love” with the father whom she found charming and charismatic, but also describes him as controlling, drinking excessively and “using a lot of cocaine”. In 2004, the mother became pregnant. She alleges the father urged her to have an abortion but she refused and gave birth to G in February 2005. The baby was registered with the name “M…. G….” Throughout her life the parents have been at loggerheads over the issue of the child’s name. The father has persisted in calling her “M” whereas the mother has preferred the name “G” and as she has grown older the child has herself indicated a preference for “G”.

The mother alleges that, on 16 March 2005, when G was six weeks old, the father became angry, smashed items of furniture at her property including a chest of drawers, cot and high chair, and then strangled her until she passed out and dropped G on the bed. It is the mother’s case that she had bruising on her neck as a result of this incident. The father strongly denies behaving in the way alleged by the mother and this incident has been the subject of oral evidence at the hearing before me. The mother went to stay with her parents for a period but then returned to her home and resumed her relationship with the father. She alleges, however, that he continued to behave in a controlling and occasionally abusive manner towards. She asserts that in about June 2005 when G was three months old, he dragged her upstairs by her hair when both J and W were in the house. She further alleges that he was aggressive and physically abusive to her on other occasions in the autumn 2005, culminating in an incident in December 2005 when she alleges he threatened her with a knife. On 27 December 2005, the mother telephoned the police and reported that the father was abusing and threatening her following the breakdown of their relationship. A police log dated 16 January 2006 recorded that the mother as saying that there was no corroborating evidence of the injuries, “either medically or via third party”, that she had been in communication with the father after reporting the incident in order to arrange contact with G which she was happy should continue, and that she did not wish to pursue a complaint against the father but wanted him to be given strong words of advice about his behaviour. The police log records that words of advice were given to the father but adds “formal harassment warning considered inappropriate in the circumstances”. A few weeks later, in February 2006, the mother reported further incidents of harassment and, on one occasion, violence. A police log disclosed in the current proceedings includes a note stating “victim does not wish to pursue any complaint in relation to this matter, a retraction statement has been provided to this effect”. A further police record, however, reveals that on 21 February 2006 the father was given a harassment warning in respect of text messages sent to the mother.

In November 2006, the father met his present partner, K, with whom he has now been in a relationship over ten years. In June 2007, the father filed application for a contact order in respect of G. This was the start of the proceedings which have continued more or less uninterrupted for the past ten years. There have been a great number of hearings and orders in the ensuing decade and in this judgment I shall only refer to those that are relevant for the purposes of my decision. On 30 July 2007, an interim contact order was made providing for the father to have contact on alternate weekends Friday to Sunday with telephone contact on the alternative weekend. That order was subsequently set aside having been made without notice to the mother, but at a hearing on 3 October 2007 the order was confirmed and the case adjourned generally with liberty to restore. Over the weekend of 12 to 15 October, the mother did not make G available for contact because she was unwell. The father then sent a number of abusive phone and text messages to the mother, who duly reported the matter to the police. A police officer listened to the phone messages and confirmed the mother’s allegation, that the father had called her “a prick” and “a fat ugly bitch”. On 15 November 2007, the father was arrested on suspicion of harassment. In his police interview, the father admitted sending the messages, stated he was angry and upset about not seeing his daughter, and apologised, accepting that he had “overstepped the mark”. On 23 November 2007, the father pleaded guilty to a charge of harassment and was made the subject of a restraining order prohibiting him from contacting the mother, save through legal advisers and for the purpose of telephone contact with G.

Thereafter, G remained in the care of the mother, who for a time was approved as a foster carer. The father’s contact with G proceeded in accordance with the order, although the mother continued to have concerns. On 3 October 2008, she telephoned the police alleging that the father had said that he would be present at the handover that weekend, in breach of the restraining order. When the police spoke to the father, he told them that he drove to the handover but waited in the car while his partner K collected the child from the mother or the maternal grandparents. The police concluded that the circumstances did not amount to a breach of the restraining order. According to the police record, the mother was unhappy about this conclusion.

On 28 October 2009, District Judge Wainwright made a further contact order providing for the father to have contact with G on alternate weekends from Friday to Sunday, one week’s staying contact during the summer and one day’s contact in other holidays, together with telephone contact every Tuesday.

In August 2010, the mother alleged that the father had broken the terms of the restraining order by undertaking the handover himself, telephoning her direct, and sending her text messages. In September 2010, she suspended contact, stating though solicitors that she was concerned that the father was using drugs and proposing that contact be reduced to visiting contact only on a supervised basis. In February 2011, the father wrote a note in the contact book (in which the parties recorded messages about contact) asking to take G on holiday for a week. He wanted to take her to Disneyland Paris. The mother responded that G was only happy to stay with him for three nights at a time but would be happy to stay for 6 nights if it included the Disneyland trip. The father made arrangements to take G to Disneyland in August 2011, but the trip did not go ahead because (according to the father) the mother failed to provide G’s passport. The father then filed an application seeking an order for enforcement of the contact order. On 13^th September 2011, that application was adjourned for five weeks but an order made that the weekend contact as per the order of 28^th October 2009 should resume. On 19^th October, the court confirmed that the October 2009 order should resume and listed the matter for a review after 1 May 2012. At the next hearing on 14 May 2012, the court made further directions including ordering a CAFCASS report. That report, dated 17 August, recommended that the existing order should continue.

During the Summer 2012, the father and K took G to Disneyland Paris. Following this trip, it is alleged that G told the maternal grandmother, and also the mother, that she had seen the father strangling K. Subsequently the mother said that G started self-harming, biting, scratching, banging her head on walls, and threatening suicide. The mother said that G told her she was scared for herself, K, and the baby that K was then expecting. The mother took G to see the GP whose note reads inter alia:

“Every other weekend she goes to her dad’s….She gets sad when she goes there as she is worried her dad is being violent to his girlfriend and she is pregnant and she is worried about the baby. Said he has never hit her or been violent towards her. Does shout at his girlfriend but not at her.”

The GP referred G to CAMHS. The mother then suspended contact again. On 21 December 2012, K gave birth to a daughter, A.

The matter returned to court on 7 January 2013 when an order was made requiring the mother to bring G to the paternal grandmother’s home for supervised contact on alternate weekends. On 29 January the CAMHS initial assessment took place. The “summary of discussion” in the assessment record stated:

“G appears to be a child who is finding it difficult to cope with moving to and fro between her parents. She is trying hard to understand and please her father. His behaviour may be contributing towards a deterioration in G’s emotional health and well-being. She appears to feel upset and ‘in the middle’ in this situation. The behaviour problems and self-harm may be a result of distress post contact. It may be helpful to review contact. Witnessing domestic violence in utero and as a baby will have had an impact on G’s health. [The mother and primary school headteacher] are very supportive and helpful adults in G’s life. G informs me that she can talk with them about her problems.”

On 6 February 2013, the court directed that a children’s guardian be appointed under FPR 16.4, and CAFCASS allocated JB, who had previously acted as the court reporter, to act in that capacity. The guardian first met G on 8 March 2013. In a later report, he recorded her she had been happy to meet him on that occasion, and had asked him unprompted when she could go and stay with her father again. The guardian said to her that her mother had told him that G had been worried about her father becoming angry sometimes and scaring her. G explained that this had only happened once a long time ago. When the guardian asked her if there was anything worrying her about seeing her father now, G said there was not anything worrying her and she missed not staying overnight at her father’s. The guardian’s report then added:

“[G] told me that she had lost her crystals and appeared perturbed by this as she did not know which crystals will write she explained that her grandmother’s crystals had told her that she would never go and stay with her father again, although her own crystals had told her she would.”

Following this interview, the guardian recommended that there should be a restoration of the contact arrangements as set out in the order of 28 October 2009. On 20 March 2013, District Judge Waterworth gave directions for the guardian to obtain information from CAMHS and adjourned the matter for a further review hearing at the end of April, directing that in the interim contact should continue to take place in accordance with the order of 7 January 2013. On 10 April 2013, the mother applied for variation of the contact order seeking an order for professionally supervised contact. At the next hearing on 29 April 2013, District Judge Waterworth made an order for two sessions of contact to be supported and observed by the guardian, and listed the matter for a further review at the beginning of June. At the next hearing, on 7 June 2013, the guardian reported orally as to his observations about contact and maintained his recommendation that the arrangements set out in the 2009 order should be restored. In the event, the district judge set aside the 2009 order and provided for there to be visiting contact on alternate Saturdays with staying contact to resume from 27 July 2013, initially for one night only but moving to alternate weekends from the end of August 2013. The mother did not make G available for the first contact session following this hearing and on 5 July the father applied for enforcement of the order. The mother filed an application for permission to appeal against the order and applied for a stay pending appeal. The application for a stay was refused and the permission application listed for hearing in August. Meanwhile, apparently without giving prior notice to the court or the guardian, the mother had arranged for G to meet a worker at the Domestic Violence and Abuse Service. The worker’s note of the meeting on 1 August 2013 recorded that G had told her that she felt confused about going to her father’s house as she does love him but is scared of him and misses seeing other members of his family. The note also recorded that G talked about the time the father had strangled his partner and was scared that he would get angry with her and said that she would like to see her father at a contact centre where she would feel safer. The note also records: “G said that she feels guilty for causing the trouble between the families. I asked G why she felt that it was her fault. G said that she must have chosen who she was born to and so this makes it her fault as her mum had told her that her dad didn’t want her when she was born.” A further meeting took place on 8 August 2013.

On 14 August the guardian filed his report in which he set out his account of his meetings with G. Noting the allegations of domestic abuse, and the father’s denial of those allegations, the guardian recorded that he had witnessed the father shouting in the background during a telephone conversation he had with K. The guardian commented: “He used offensive language at that time and was clearly angry and frustrated. If you behaved like this when angry, it would not be surprising if [G] witnessing this might be frightened or distressed.” The guardian further observed that the

“pattern of intermittent contact will have undermined [G’s] confidence in both parents’ capacity to ensure uneventful and enjoyable contact taking place consistently and regularly. Given the difficulties she has faced throughout her life, it would not be surprising that [G] might find avoiding the ‘problem’ of contact easier than facing the continued difficulties which arise when contact occurs.”

The Guardian further noted that the conflict which G had witnessed would have taken its toll on her and noted that it was concerning that she was reported as blaming herself and wishing to hurt herself. He observed:

“it is highly possible, in my view, that [G’s] emotional response to her circumstances is as a result of a combination of factors including both parents’ behaviours at different times. Neither parent [has] been able for any sustained period of time to demonstrate to [G] that they are capable of resolving issues which arise from contact which is likely to leave [G] feeling powerless to effect any change for the better and vulnerable to further conflict where she perceives herself to be the cause.”

In view of the discrepancy between G’s various comments about her wishes and feelings, the guardian proposed that he should meet her again before he made any further recommendations to the progress of contact.

The mother’s appeal against the order of 7 June came before HH Judge Tyzack QC on 16 August 2013. The appeal was dismissed and the court ordered that contact should resume in accordance with the previous schedule, namely three sessions of daytime contact followed by three weekends of overnight contact from Saturday to Sunday, to be followed by contact on alternate weekends, with seven days’ contact in the summer holidays and telephone contact each Wednesday. A family assistance order was made in favour of Cafcass for six months. The father was given permission to withdraw his application for enforcement of the earlier order.

The mother failed to make G available for the first contact session under Judge Tyzack’s order. G attended further sessions at the Domestic Violence and Abuse Service. The mother’s son W sent an email to the Service worker expressing his concern that G was being made to have contact against her wishes. The father applied for the matter to be restored to court. At a further hearing on September, Judge Tyzack made a residence order in favour of the father, but suspended the order on condition that the mother make G available for two periods of contact with the father to be observed by the guardian, and also for an interview by the guardian. A penal notice was attached to these conditions. The matter was listed for a further review of the end of October 2013.

The two periods of observed contact with the father and members of his family duly took place. The guardian observed that they passed uneventfully and were demonstrably enjoyed by G. The guardian also interviewed G who told him that she enjoyed the contact sessions but wanted to see her father at a contact centre. In his report, the guardian observed that the most significant risk of harm to G was the emotional distress from her awareness of the ongoing conflict between her parents about contact. He also expressed concern that the “strangling” incident that had allegedly taken place between the father and K had taken on a greater significance than it previously had. He recommended there be two further sessions of visiting contact, and then a progression towards staying contact. At the next hearing on 28 October, which the mother did not attend, claiming to be unwell, Judge Tyzack duly ordered to further sessions of visiting contact.

In fact, however, far from being unwell, the mother had made arrangements to leave the jurisdiction with G and on or around the date of the hearing they flew to Dubai. They stayed there for some weeks and were apparently visited by the mother’s son W and by a man with whom she had been in a close relationship, hereafter referred to as JD. At some point in early 2014, the mother and G moved onto Vietnam and then at a later date to Cambodia. None of the countries to which she travelled is a party to the Hague Child Abduction Convention. The father reported the mother’s actions to the police who started a criminal investigation.

Meanwhile, on 31 October 2013, Judge Tyzack ordered that the suspended residence order should come into immediate effect and transferred the case to the High Court. The judge further declared that G’s removal from the jurisdiction was unlawful, ordered the mother to return her to this country forthwith, and made a tipstaff passport order to ensure that her passport was seized in the event that she returned to this country. On 6^th February 2014, Judge Tyzack, now sitting as a deputy High Court judge under s.9, made G a ward of court and made a further order directed to the maternal grandparents, JD and the mother’s son, W, for disclosure of information concerning her whereabouts, along with other orders for disclosure of financial information under s.33 of the Family Law Act 1986. At the next hearing on 27 February 2014, Judge Tyzack ordered the maternal grandparents and JD to provide the court with details of the mother’s whereabouts as soon as they became aware of them and details of any communications received from her immediately upon receipt. By a further order, the judge prohibited those persons from providing the mother with any money and required them to lodge their passports with the court. The judge also ordered W to attend court to provide information as to his mother’s whereabouts and to lodge his passport with the court. A further hearing took place on 28^th March 2014 at which Judge Tyzack made a series of further orders directed at the grandparents, JD and W. Subsequently, W, who was aged 16 at the date of that order, appealed against Judge Tyzack’s decision and all orders against him were discharged, Pointing out that Judge Tyzack, in his judgment, had made the passport order to induce L and, for that matter, the maternal grandmother, to put pressure on the mother to return to the jurisdiction, Sir James Munby, President, held that this amounted to an impermissible coercion and that Judge Tyzack had therefore been wrong to make the passport orders, not only in respect of W, but also in respect of the other individuals, including JD. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to refer to this aspect of the case in any further detail. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reported as Re B (A Child) [2014] EWCA Civ 843. In May 2014, JD and W travelled to Vietnam and stayed with the mother and G for several weeks. JD made a further visit to Vietnam in November 2014, staying for three months.

Following Judge Tyzack’s retirement, the case was allocated to me. There followed a number of hearings at which various steps were considered as a means of securing the return of G to this country. The police took part in some of the hearings and gave details of their ongoing investigations. In March 2015, the mother sent a long letter by email to the President of the Family Division, setting out her version of events, explaining her reasons for removing G from the country, and concluding:

“There’s a fantastic, incredible little girl here, who still needs protection from her abuser: her violent dad. G and I would very much like to come back home, with our family, friends and familiarity. What can you do about this? And, more to the point, what are you going to do about this? How can we get a decision-maker to look at the facts and evidence from our case?”

On 11 March 2015, I directed the guardian to write to the mother (with the President’s approval) stating that, if she returned with G to the jurisdiction by no later than 13 April 2015, they would be permitted to enter the country without being separated and the mother would be permitted to continue to care for G until further order. I made further directions, including an order that, following the mother’s return, the case would be listed for a directions hearing. In the letter to the mother, the terms of which were approved by the court, the guardian indicated that it would be open to the mother to apply for a fact-finding hearing, as she had indicated she wanted in her letter to the President.

The mother replied to this letter indicating that she would not return but that she wished to participate in a hearing by telephone. After hearing submissions from the other parties, I agreed to this proposal and a further hearing took place on 11 June 2015 with the mother attending by telephone from an undisclosed location in the Far East. The father confirmed that his wish was to resume contact with G and he would not press for a change of residence. The mother stated, however, that she had no intention of returning until things were resolved and would continue to remain in non-Hague Convention countries. At the conclusion of the hearing, I made an order (with the consent of the father and guardian) that, in the event that the mother agreed to return the child to this jurisdiction on or before 15^th July 2015 and that she would not thereafter remove the child from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without further order of the court, the following directions would apply (1) upon the mother and the child returning, the child would live with the mother at an address to be disclosed to the court and the guardian; (2) there would be no contact or communication indirect or direct between the father and G until further order of the court; and (3) the case would be adjourned for a case management hearing to take place on a date to be notified to the parties in mid-January 2016. I further ordered that, if the mother did not return G to this country by 15^th July, the case should be restored for a further telephone hearing. In the event, the mother did not return G by the prescribed date.

Meanwhile, the father had filed an application for the committal of JD to prison for breach of the order preventing him providing financial support and assistance to the mother. On 26 June 2015, I listed that application for a hearing and further ordered the maternal grandparents to attend the hearing after the father and guardian drew attention to evidence that they and JD had information about the mother’s whereabouts. I also made a passport order directing the tipstaff to seize JD’s passport. In contrast to the passport order made earlier by Judge Tyzack, this passport order was not made in an attempt to coerce Mr Dixon into disclosing information, but rather because of prima facie evidence that he was actively involved in assisting the mother to retain G outside the jurisdiction and, given his frequent trips to Vietnam and Cambodia in the previous 12 months, prima facie concerns that he was a flight risk and without a passport order would fail to attend the hearing on 21^st July to answer the committal application and give information as to the mother’s whereabouts. This order was thus consistent with the permitted scope of such orders as explained by the President in his judgment in Re B, supra. When served with the passport order on 4^th July 2015, JD falsely informed the tipstaff that his passport had been held by the court since February 2014. The tipstaff checked with the court and found that it did not hold the passport, and also discovered that JD had travelled abroad on three occasions since that date. When challenged, JD then produced his passport and surrendered it to the tipstaff.

The application for JD’s committal was heard by the court on 22 July 2015. JD accepted that he had been in breach of the passport order by (a) failing to surrender his passport when served with the passport order on 4 July 2015 and (b) falsely stating that the passport was held by the court. I found that he was in breach of the passport order and thereby in contempt of court and imposed a sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months. At the hearing, I made further orders directed to the maternal grandparents, JD and W (who had by that stage attained the age of 18) requiring them to produce information about the mother’s whereabouts.

In August 2015, a letter was sent, allegedly by G, to the Prime Minister asking for the family court to be made more open ‘because if no one knows about what is going on, if the family court make a mistake then no one will be there to tell them they are making that mistake just like what is happening to me and my family…” At a later date, an email was sent to the police via an organisation called Families4Justice allegedly from G in which she stated amongst other things: “my biological father strangled my step-mum “ and “the main thing is that my biological father uses the family court to control me, my mummy and my whole family’s lives”. Many other documents were generated by the mother while she was abroad, including postings on the internet, in which she set out her allegations and complaints. Amongst the documents produced in this period was one headed “My Story” which purportedly was written by G. It started “I love him (my dad) but I do not understand why he hurt me, Mum, J, J’s mum and K” (although K’s name in the document is incorrect) and proceeded to set out many criticisms and accusations levelled against the father. On another occasion, a crime report was filed on line, apparently by G, in which she said inter alia “I watched my biological father scare and bullying me, my step-mum, my two brothers and Daddy J [JD] a lot, and my mum every day. He has RUINED my life by putting me on the missing persons list which means I cannot travel to most countries in the world”. Later in the document, it is stated: “My biological father strangled my step-mum and I wanted to kill myself so mummy took me to the doctors ….”

On 19 October 2015, the mother filed an application for a child arrangements order for G to live with her, a specific issues order permitting her to change G’s name, an order for no contact between G and her father, discharge of the wardship, and an order under s. 91(14) precluding the father making further applications. At my direction, her application was listed for hearing on 8 December. The mother again participated in the hearing by telephone. She indicated that she wanted a fact-finding hearing and proposed that she participate in the hearing by telephone from abroad. I indicated that I was not prepared to hold a hearing on that basis, repeated the earlier proposal about the terms on which she could return to this country, and adjourned her applications with liberty to restore. The mother still did not return G to the jurisdiction. On 16 May 2016, having heard further submissions at a hearing not attended by the mother, I made further directions, including an order that the mother file a schedule setting out the findings she invited the court to make. I indicated in the order that, after the schedule had been filed, I would consider what further directions to give, including whether there should be a fact-finding hearing.

Meanwhile, the local police in this country, assisted by the National Crime Agency, had been attempting to secure the return of the M and G to this jurisdiction. Various court hearings took place, some on notice but others without notice to either parent, at which the police updated the court as to the progress of these efforts and the court made further orders to facilitate G’s return. Eventually, officers travelled to Cambodia where the authorities revoked the mother’s visa and she and G were deported. They travelled back to the UK accompanied by British police. On arrival at Heathrow on 14 July 2016, the mother was arrested and, pursuant to a collection order which the court had made a few days earlier, G was placed into the care of social workers from the local authority for the area where she and the mother had previously lived in this country who in turn placed her with foster parents. At a further hearing on 18 July 2016, attended by the mother via video link from prison and by the father and maternal grandmother and JD in person, a direction was made for the preparation of a report by the local authority pursuant to s.37 of the Children Act, and G was placed under an interim care order.

On 8 September 2016, further directions were given for the appointment of a new guardian, the instruction of Dr. Freda Gardner to carry out a psychological assessment, the completion of assessments of the father and the maternal grandparents. The mother was again directed to prepare a schedule of findings which she wanted the court to make. On 3 October, the local authority filed an application for a care order under s.31 of the Children Act. On 10 October, the mother, who had been in custody continuously since her arrest and had pleaded guilty to a charge of child abduction, was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. On 31 October, contact took place between the mother and G in prison for the first time since their return from Cambodia. On 16 November, the court made an interim care order, on the basis of a care plan that G remain in foster care for the time being, and gave further case management directions, including the disclosure of police records about the father’s history of domestic abuse. At a further hearing on 6 December, the court made further case management directions in preparation for a fact-finding hearing in July 2017 (that being the earliest date on which it was possible for me to conduct such a hearing.) Having heard submissions, I gave a preliminary indication of the level of contact which I thought the local authority should arrange between G and various family members, including the mother, maternal grandparents, W and members of her paternal family including her half-brother J, the father’s partner K, and A, the 4-year-old daughter of the father and K, but not, at that stage, the father himself. I made a separate order on an application by the mother for disclosure of papers from the earlier proceedings between the father and J’s mother, D.

On 9 January 2017, the father was sent to prison for ten months for an offence of fraud arising out of his building business activities. In the event, he was released in April 2017.

At the next hearing on 17 February 2017, I made a series of further case management directions which it is unnecessary to recite here. I approved the local authority’s plans for interim contact, including a plan for a contact visit between G and her father (with other members of the paternal family) after his release from prison. I also had a meeting with G herself, who had expressed a wish to meet me. I suggested to her that the purpose of the meeting was so that she could meet the person who would be making decisions about her future, and not to get evidence from her. She told me how she was getting on in her foster home and the contact she had been having, all of which she said she was enjoying. I explained in outline how I would make decisions about her future and what the law said should be taken into account. We agreed that, now she had met me, it would probably be better for her to write to me if she wanted to tell me anything, although the guardian, who was present in the meeting, would pass on her wishes and feelings.

The contact between G and he father was arranged for 21 April. Prior to the visit, the mother made a further application to the court seeking an order to prevent the visit going ahead. That application was considered and refused at a hearing before HH Judge Robertshaw. The visit duly went ahead as planned.

A further case management hearing took place on 12 May 2017. Several of the parties for various reasons expressed the view that a fact-finding hearing was not necessary. I remained convinced, however, that such a hearing was necessary, although agreed to adjourn a decision as to the scope of a hearing to a further hearing later that month. At the hearing, the local authority indicated that it intended to proceed with one contact visit for the father before the fact-finding hearing. The mother indicated that she was opposed to such an order, but I gave my approval.

Further directions were given at a case management conference and an issues resolution hearing, and the fact-finding hearing finally took place in July 2017.

In its “threshold document” setting out the findings on which it contended that the threshold criteria for making an order under s.31 were satisfied at the relevant date (which it asserted to be 14 July 2016, the date of G’s return to this country and her reception into care), the local authority invited the court to make the following findings:

The father broadly accepted that the threshold under s.31 was crossed and agreed with the findings sought by the local authority, save that he did not accept that he was responsible for the emotional harm, asserting that he had always sought to protect G from the conflict between her parents. The mother accepted that removing G from the country for nearly three years caused her emotional harm in that she was removed from friends, family and familiar surroundings. She did not, however, accept that the removal caused G significant harm, nor did she accept that the care she gave G was not such as it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give. On the contrary, she asserted that what she did was the least bad alternative in that she removed G from a situation in which, because of the father’s behaviour, G was frightened, self-harming and talking about killing herself. She denied that she had consistently and inappropriately attributed responsibility to G or allowed her to accept responsibility for what had happened. She denied that she failed to promote a healthy relationship between G and her father, asserting that such a relationship had not been possible because of the father’s conduct and that G’s own experiences of him were that he was frightening. She therefore asserted that, if G suffered significant harm, it was because of the father’s behaviour and personality, not because the mother had failed to protect her from parental conflict.

In respect of the maternal grandparents, the local authority, supported by the father, asserts that they agreed and colluded with the mother’s narrative that she had no realistic option in October 2013 other than to remove G from the jurisdiction: failed to encourage her to return here; have a wholly negative view of the father and consider that he is solely responsible for G’s emotional distress, and have no understanding of or insight into the significant psychological and emotional harm caused to G through her sudden removal from the UK and separation from family friends and school and the impact on her of her life “on the run”. In response, on behalf of herself and her husband, the grandmother agreed that she had said that she felt that the mother had no option but to remove G from the jurisdiction, but she and her husband did not support that decision and did not collude with the mother. They had supplied information when requested to do so by the court. They denied that they had failed to encourage the mother to return. The grandmother stated that she and her husband do not have a positive view of the father’s behaviour. Whilst not considering that he is solely responsible for G’s emotional distress, they stated that they believe that he has contributed to it significantly in the light of what they have been told by G herself and by Dr. Gardner. They did not accept that they lacked insight as asserted by the local authority.

In her schedule of findings sought against the father, the mother in summary relied on the history of convictions, non-molestation orders and findings against the father in proceedings involving D, the mother of his son, J. In respect of the relationship between G’s parents, the mother asserted that on numerous occasions he had been physically abusive and threatening to her either by assaulting her or damaging furniture or throwing items and that he had demonstrated coercive and controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour through verbal abuse and critical or derogatory language and other actions. Specific allegations relied on included that the father had demonstrated jealous and possessive behaviour isolating her from friends, applied pressure on her to have an abortion, subjected her to verbal abuse using derogatory names especially when drunk, enforced rigid house rules about trivial matters, and insisted on calling and registering the child with the name “M”. She asserted that, following the breakdown of the relationship in about October 2005, he had made abusive and threatening phone calls and sent abusive text messages, as a result of which he had been convicted of harassment, that he had regularly breached the restraining order and intimidated the mother by attending contact handovers contrary to arrangements ordered by the court, that he had assaulted his current partner K by strangling her in the presence of G and her half-siblings and that he had applied inappropriate pressure to G by questioning her or making her fearful about expressing her true feelings about contact.

The father filed a detailed response to the findings sought by the mother. In summary, he accepted the fact of the convictions, orders and findings made in proceedings involving D, but denied the factual basis on which the orders had been made, in particular the allegations of violence which led to the first non-molestation order, and asserted that they were historic offences with no relevance to the current proceedings. He absolutely denied all allegations that he had been physically abusive or threatening to the mother, or that he had demonstrated coercive and controlling behaviour through verbal abuse and critical or derogatory language and other actions, or made abusive calls. He accepted that he had not been ready to become a father again and had asked her to have a termination but denied subjecting her to pressure about this. He asserted that the mother had been fully involved in the choice of the baby’s name and had called her “M” for many years. He accepted that he had been convicted of harassment as a result of repeatedly contacting the mother when she had “disappeared” with G in 2007, and that a restraining order had then been imposed. He denied breaching the order and asserted that he always kept to the agreed arrangements about contact handovers. He denied that he had ever been abusive towards K, or that he had inappropriately questioned G.

In determining the issues at this fact finding hearing, I apply the following principles. First, the burden of proof lies with the party making the allegations. In care proceedings, it is the local authority that brings these proceedings and identifies the findings they invite the court to make. Therefore the burden of proving the allegations rests with them. In addition, in this case, the mother seeks various findings against the father. In respect of those matters, the burden of proof rests with her.

The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities ( Re B [2008] UKHL 35). If the party on whom the burden rests proves the allegation on a balance of probabilities, this court will treat that fact as established and all future decisions concerning their future will be based on that finding. Equally, if the party on whom the burden rests fails to prove the allegation on a balance of probabilities, the court will disregard the allegation completely. As Lord Hoffmann observed in Re B :

When considering cases of suspected child abuse. the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. As Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P observed in Re U, Re B (Serious Injury: Standard of Proof ) [2004] EWCA Civ. 567, the court “invariably surveys a wide canvas.” In Re T [2004] EWCA Civ 558, [2004] 2 FLR 838 at 33, she added:

Amongst the various strands of the evidence, that of the parents is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability. They must have the fullest opportunity to take part in the hearing and the court is likely to place considerable weight on the evidence and the impression it forms of them (see Re W and another (Non-accidental injury) [2003] FCR 346).

When assessing the evidence of a witness, it is important to bear in mind that all or part of it may be unreliable for various reasons. It is common for witnesses to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720). A further important point was made by Mostyn J in Lancashire County Council v R [2013] EWHC 3064 (Fam)

“The assessment of credibility generally involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour' which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. With every day that passes the memory becomes fainter and the imagination becomes more active. The human capacity for honestly believing something which bears no relation to what actually happened is unlimited. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance”.

Linked to this is the observation of Peter Jackson J (as he then was) in Lancashire County Council v The Children [2014] EWHC 3 (Fam), para 9, where he note the need to bear in mind the possibility of

“faulty recollection or confusion at times of stress or when the importance of accuracy is not fully appreciated, or there may be inaccuracy or mistake in the record-keeping or recollection of the person hearing and relaying the account. The possible effects of delay and repeated questioning upon memory should also be considered, as should the effect on one person of hearing accounts given by others. As memory fades, a desire to iron out wrinkles may not be unnatural – a process that might inelegantly be described as ‘story-creep’ – may occur without any necessary inference of bad faith.”

Finally, at the heart of this case lie allegations of domestic abuse. It has been a feature of the mother’s argument for several years that the court at an earlier stage in these proceedings did not treat the allegations made against the father with sufficient seriousness. Indeed, it was this concern which, she claims, led her to take the step of removing G from the jurisdiction unlawfully. Courts have increasingly recognised the dangers posed by domestic violence and abuse to the welfare of children. This is reflected in Practice Direction 12J headed “Child Arrangements and Contact Order: Domestic Violence and Harm”. The version of the Practice Direction in force at the time of the proceedings before Judge Tyzack in 2013 was introduced at the time of the implementation of the Family Procedure Rules in 2010. Subsequently, public concern at the perceived failure to treat allegations of domestic violence with sufficient seriousness in family proceedings has led to a new version of the Practice Direction, which comes into force on 2 October 2017, shortly before this judgment will be handed down. The version of Practice Direction 12J in force at the time of the hearing before Judge Tyzack, and indeed still in force at the time of the hearing before me in July 2017, defined “domestic violence” as including “any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive or threatening behaviour, violence or abuse”, adding that “this can encompass, but is not limited to, psychological, physical sexual financial or emotional abuse”. The Practice Direction further identified a number of general principles, including the following:

“4.

The family court presumes that the involvement of a parent in a child’s life will further the child’s welfare, so long as the parent can be involved in a way that does not put the child or other parent at risk of suffering harm.

5.

Domestic violence and abuse is harmful to children, and/or puts children at risk of harm, whether they are subjected to violence or abuse, or witness one of their parents being violent or abusive to the other parent, or live in a home in which violence or abuse is perpetrated (even if the child is too young to be conscious of the behaviour). Children may suffer direct physical, psychological and/or emotional harm from living with violence or abuse, and may also suffer harm indirectly where the violence or abuse impairs the parenting capacity of either or both of their parents.

6.

The court must, at all stages the proceedings… consider whether domestic violence is raised as an issue, either by the parties or by Cafcass … and if so must

•

identify at the earliest opportunity … the factual and welfare issues involved;

•

consider the nature of any allegation, admission or evidence of domestic violence or abuse, and the extent to which it would be likely to be relevant in deciding whether to make a child arrangements order and, if so, in what terms;

•

give directions to enable contested relevant factual and welfare issues to be tried as soon as possible and fairly;

•

ensure that, where violence or abuse is admitted or proven, any child arrangements order in place protects the safety and well-being of the child and the parent with whom the child is living, and does not expose them to the risk of further harm. In particular, the court must be satisfied that any contact ordered with a parent who has perpetrated violence or abuse is safe and in the best interests of the child; and

•

ensure that any interim child arrangements order (i.e. considered by the court before determination of the facts, and in the absence of admission) is only made having followed the guidance at paragraph 25 to 27 below.

7.

In all cases it is for the court to decide whether a child arrangements order accords with s. 1(1) of the Children Act; any proposed child arrangements order, whether to be made by agreement between the parties or otherwise, must be scrutinised by the court accordingly ….

8.

In considering, on an application for a child arrangements order by consent, whether there is any risk of harm to the child, the court shall consider all the evidence and information available ….”

The revised version of the Practice Direction in force from 2 October 2017 reiterates these principles in very similar terms and makes a number of procedural changes designed to buttress these principles and ensure that they are properly applied by the courts. It uses the term “domestic abuse” in place of “domestic violence” but defines “domestic abuse” in the same terms.

These principles are clear and mandatory and have been in the forefront of my mind during the hearing and considering my judgment.

The hearing took place over 5 days between 17 and 21 July 2017. At that stage, the mother was still in prison and it was expected she would be released in October. The father had been released from prison and had one contact visit with G. Other contact sessions had taken place with the mother, maternal grandparents, W, and members of the paternal family including J, K and A. Dr. Gardner had carried out extensive inquiries and made some provisional recommendations, contingent on the court’s findings following the hearing. There was an urgent need for ongoing assessments to determine where G should live. All parties recognised that in the short term (i.e. for next few weeks) G should remain in foster care while further assessments were completed. The medium-term options were (a) placing her in the care of her maternal grandparents or (b) directing that she remain in care under a care order. The mother expressed the hope that G would return to her care at some stage following her release, or alternatively that her care would be shared with her grandparents under an arrangement to be decided after the assessments. The father recognised that realistically he could not care for G at this stage and focused his case on the extension of contact, whilst not ruling out the possibility that she might live with him in the long term.

For the hearing, the court was supplied with 6 lever arch files of documents including not only statements and reports prepared specifically in these proceedings but also extensive police disclosure, contact logs, and documents disclosed (by order of this court after hearing representations) from the earlier proceedings between the father and D. Oral evidence was given by ten witnesses in the following order: Dr Gardner; GR (a neighbour of the maternal grandparents who was said to have witnessed the mother after an alleged assault by the father); the mother; W; the father; a social worker LB; K; J; the maternal grandmother; and the guardian. No party applied for G to give evidence, nor was I asked to see her again at this hearing. I did, however, receive a letter from G in which she said that if possible she would love to live with her maternal grandparents until her mother is out of prison, adding “then I obviously want to live with her!” She continued: “I won’t be seeing my dad until I’m in a stable home living with who I want to live with!” In a postscript, she added “the reason I wanted to write to you is that you know this is coming from me and no one can say this isn’t what I want because it’s in writing.”

There was insufficient time for submissions at the conclusion of the evidence and it was agreed that the parties would therefore deliver written submissions by 25 July, and that the court would then set out a summary of its findings as soon as possible, with a full judgment to follow later. In the interim the court approved the local authority’s ongoing plan for G to remain in foster care, but agreed to a further review hearing in September. It was anticipated that, by that stage, the grandparents would have completed some therapy as recommended by Dr. Gardner and she would have evaluated, in the light of my findings and the progress of the therapy, whether there should be any alteration in the arrangements for G’s care or contact at that stage. The local authority devised a plan for interim contact which the court approved.

It can be seen from the summary of recent events that some of the issues between the parties as to G’s future care have narrowed. It was for that reason that the parties raised again on more than one occasion the question whether a fact-finding hearing was necessary or proportionate. Dr Gardner expressed the view that such a hearing was unlikely to be in G’s interests because the schedules of findings which the parents would seek would be extensive and preparation for the hearing was likely to fuel the emotional charge in this case and increase the intensity of the conflict and animosity. She added that, although the court would be able to protect G to some extent, there was a danger that she would feel a further emotional burden which would undermine the psychological recovery that she has been able to achieve in recent months.

I considered these arguments with care, as I have to and the case management responsibilities required under the Public Law Outline. Ultimately, however, I declined to follow the course proposed by Dr Gardner on this point. I decided that it was in G’s best interests for the fact finding hearing to proceed. These parents have been at loggerheads for years, and at the heart of the dispute are contested versions of the history of their relationship and events that occurred after they separated. The mother’s professed reason for removing G from this country and keeping her out of the jurisdiction for several years was that the family court had not treated her allegations with sufficient concern. The mother and G herself (albeit under the influence direct or indirect of her mother) wrote to a number of people complaining about this failure, including the President of the Family Division and the Prime Minister. In my judgment, this court now needs to establish once and for all the truth of what happened between the parents as the basis for future decisions concerning G’s future.

I shall therefore consider the issues arising at this stage under the following headings:

Dr Gardner carried out an extensive psychological analysis of the mother in which she explored aspects of her own childhood. Although the mother described her childhood as happy, Dr Gardner concluded, after interviewing the mother, G and the grandmother, that the mother’s childhood was not idyllic but rather complicated by emotional and cognitive difficulties and by grief. It became evident to Dr Gardner that the mother had not received emotionally warm parenting and care from the grandmother. The mother was unable to provide any real detail of her emotional experiences as a child and specifically about her emotional relationship with the grandmother. Dr Gardner recorded that the mother described herself as having been “emotionally devastated” when her father died when she was only ten years old and that the grandmother had then become absorbed in her own grief and “emotionally removed”. Dr Gardner’s conclusion was that they are both very intelligent women and that their relationship, although close, was not emotionally warm so that, as a result, the mother’s internalised model of parenting depends largely on her cognitive understanding of what it is to be a parent rather than being based on a long experience of internalised emotional care. Dr Gardner advised that the mother requires emotional based counselling to help her recover and process memories from childhood and specifically her relationship with her mother and the feelings associated with the loss of her father. She advised that this would help the mother recover from the complex emotional experiences that she has had and facilitate the development of insight into G’s emotional needs.

Dr Gardner carried out psychometric testing of the mother and identified the presence of histrionic personality pathology. She advised that histrionic individuals are prone to manipulating events and thereby maximising the attention and favours they receive and avoiding the indifference and disapproval of others. Such behaviour gives the experience of inner confidence and independence of insurance, although underneath lies a fear of genuine autonomy and the need for repeated approval.

Dr Gardner’s analysis of the mother accords with my own observations in a number of respects. I found the mother to be a plainly intelligent and articulate person who expressed strong feelings and views about G and believes that she has at all times acted in accordance with what she considers to be G’s best interests. But her actions in removing G from the jurisdiction for several years (considered in more detail below) demonstrate her firm belief that she knows what is in G’s best interests and a refusal to accept the contrary views held by anyone else, including the court. In the course of a series of hearings conducted when the mother was abroad, she demonstrated her absolute certainty as to the rectitude of her convictions and actions, coupled with a determination to remain firmly in control. She wanted a fact-finding hearing to vindicate her position, but only on her own terms, namely that the hearing should take place while she and G were outside the jurisdiction. It was evident that the mother had no intention of returning unless and until the court conducted a fact-finding hearing and reached findings that the mother considered to be correct.

During the hearings, both on the telephone and subsequently after her return to this country, the mother repeatedly interrupted with observations of her own, some relevant, others not. During her oral evidence, the mother often evaded the question and made observations which did not immediately address the question she had been asked but which she thought relevant to the case that she wanted to put forward. In short, the mother’s conduct during these proceedings has provided further evidence of her need to be in control.

Dr Gardner described the father as being “a complex character”. She said that she had seen him at his most charming, reflective and emotionally regulated, presenting himself as kind, thoughtful, sensitive and gentle. She concluded, however, that the father’s self-analysis and capacity to reflect was very limited.

It is notable that both parents lost their fathers during their childhood. In the father’s case, his own father left before he was born and Dr Gardner describes how he assumed the role of male in the household until his mother met his stepfather when he was twelve years old. Dr Gardner comments that “such premature maturation is inevitably fragile and his experiences of being parented together with the status he achieved at school did not sufficiently foster the maturity (or the capacity to develop it at that stage) to manage coherent interpersonal relationships.” As result, he was unable to commit and in Dr Gardner’s view unable to manage adequate affect regulation when he became frustrated and/or out of control.

When challenged by Dr Gardner about the evidence about his behaviour, he replied “I love my family, I am a family man, I am loud, I am a builder, I’m loud, I like a beer”. Dr Gardner observes that this was the extent of his insight. Dr Gardner reached the conclusion that his psychological functioning is very complex and he has little insight with regard to his emotional dysregulation and aggressive behaviour. On two occasions in his life he has been separated from a child, an event which has triggered complex and otherwise repressed feelings that he himself had as a child. Dr Gardner’s opinion is that, when these feelings are reactivated, he feels out of control, overwhelmed with anger, and reacts in an instinctive and largely primitive manner. She believes that he is not always conscious of his aggression because of the suddenness of the affective charge and because thereafter his affective state reverts to normal. The abnormalities in his psychological functioning contribute to his feelings that it is others who are aggressive and not him. He appears not to believe that he can be aggressive and justifies his behaviour as a reasonable response to the abnormal and controlling behaviour of others. Cross-examined by Mr Fuller on behalf of the mother in her oral evidence, Dr Gardner described the father as out of control when unable to understand an emotionally complex situation.

In Dr Gardner’s opinion, he did not appear to have any insight into the impact of his behaviour on children. He thus continues to pose a significant emotional risk to G and it is Dr Gardner’s view that it is not in G’s best interest to live with him.

Dr Gardner’s psychometric testing of the father, carried out before her third report in these proceedings, suggested that he was at times under-reporting symptoms and not always frank in his answers, which made it difficult to assess those answers with confidence, although Dr Gardner did not think he had a severe personality pathology.

Dr Gardner reached the conclusion that the father requires a package of therapeutic intervention to address his problems including emotional-based counselling and affect regulation (anger management). Dr Gardner also expressed the view that the father should complete a domestic violence perpetrator programme. Whether or not the father in fact requires to attend such a programme depends, of course, on my findings as to his behaviour.

Dr Gardner’s analysis of the father’s personality again accords with my own observations. The father has been entirely cooperative with the court process and very patient with efforts made to persuade the mother to return to this country. He has acted reasonably in accepting that re-establishing contact with G will take time. At the same time, however, I have found that he lacks insight into aspect of his own behaviour, his relationship with D and the mother, and the impact of his behaviour on G, and other matters. This lack of insight was demonstrated at a number of points in his oral evidence, for example when answering questions from Mr Fuller about his past behaviour towards D, or his conviction for affray, or his past excessive drinking.

One further blatant example is his attitude to G’s name. The name which parents choose to give to their children is, generally speaking, not a matter on which a court is required to express a view, save in exceptional circumstances (see for example Re C [2016] EWCA Civ 374). In this case, however, I consider it is appropriate for the court to pass comment. Few parents would consider the name given to the child in this case beginning with “M” to be appropriate. More importantly, however, I am satisfied that G has a strong antipathy to the name. It may be that she has formed that view to some extent under the mother’s influence, but I am satisfied, on the basis of observations made by several professionals, including the guardian, that G has a strong aversion to being called by the name beginning with “M” and wants to be called “G”. The father’s continuing insistence on wanting to call her “M”, and referring to her by that name on several occasions during his evidence, showed a lack of sensitivity to her wishes and feelings, and a lack of insight into the impact of his attitudes and behaviour on G. In his oral evidence, he demonstrated the beginnings of some insight, stating “in my mind, she’s called ‘M’, I accept is a problem for her and I totally respect that”. But to my mind it is very far from a full recognition of the harm which could be caused to G if he persisted in using the name to which she has a clear aversion.

The bare facts of the various court proceedings involving allegations of domestic abuse perpetrated by the father against D have been summarised above. The history of court proceedings represents a serious level of domestic abuse.

The father did not dispute that the orders listed above had been made. But he seeks to minimise the significance of the history in several ways. First, while accepting the orders were made, he disputes the “factual basis on which they were made”. Secondly, he puts much of the blame at the door of D, and her history of personal problems including excessive drinking. To that end, Mr. Cranfield on behalf of the father relied on the observation made by J in his evidence that described his mother as someone who was difficult and unreasonable to the extent that he no longer wishes to see her. Thirdly, in so far as he accepts that he was at fault, he uses language that plays down the seriousness of his conduct. He used the phrase “heavy-handed” to describe his actions on one occasion. He accepts that he was wrong to break the restraining order but says he did so because D invited him to the property and then called the police – in other words, asserting that he was entrapped or tricked in some way. He says that he was acting out of concern for J.

When speaking to Dr Gardner, the father spoke of D in very negative terms, describing her as controlling, emotionally difficult, physically abusive, mental and obsessive. He described how D had used J against him to hurt him mentally. When Dr Gardner asked him about his understanding for the basis of the conflict between them, he replied that he believed it was to do with her history. At the time of her report, Dr Gardner did not have access to detailed information from court records or other documents about the relationship between the father and D. She concluded, however, that his behaviour during that relationship, at the end of it and during the conflict with regard to contact thereafter, was consistent with the abnormalities in his psychological functioning.

Mr. Cranfield understandably relied on the fact that that court has not heard from D and submitted that the father’s account of the nature of the relationship cannot therefore be properly challenged nor a positive account to the contrary put. He therefore argued that any findings on this aspect are limited in their relevance and significance.

In her principal report, Dr Gardner concluded that the emotional and other difficulties that the mother and father experienced rendered them both vulnerable as adults and profoundly vulnerable within their relationship. Within that relationship, each of them became driven by complex anger, sadness and insecurity that they had experienced as children. Those previously repressed feelings emerged with full affective force and acted out in the context of their interaction, causing emotional charge and high levels of distress. As a result, their relationship became increasingly toxic. Neither parent was able to understand or cope with the behaviour or functioning of the other, and their functioning as individuals also deteriorated.

It is Dr Gardner’s view that neither parent has had any coherent insight as to the profoundly negative impact the conflict has had on G or the psychological harm she has suffered.

It is plain from the evidence of both parents that there was an initial strong attraction. Dr Gardner described it in this way – that the father was able to charm the mother and she found him attractive, cool and charismatic. There is evidence that the father initially found it rewarding to be able to help look after W. Dr Gardner believes that he genuinely enjoyed making a significant contribution to W’s life. After this early positive experience, however, both parties found the relationship increasingly difficult. The mother described the father as being really possessive and controlling. The father described the mother’s life in her head as chaos. The relationship deteriorated when the mother became pregnant. Dr Gardner links this deterioration to the psychological difficulties that both parents suffered from as a result of their own childhood experiences. When pregnant, the mother wanted and needed a supportive and loving relationship. Instead, she perceived the father as being horrible to her and trying to force her into having a termination. The father accepts that he was not ready to become a father again, and tried to talk to the mother about the possibility of a termination, although denies putting any pressure on her. He asserts that, when the baby was born, he adored her from the start. He asserts, however, that the mother’s behaviour became volatile angry and unpredictable. Dr Gardner observes that the toxic relationship originated at this time and continued and intensified thereafter. She expresses the view that it has been acted out in front of G, rehearsed and discussed by both parents, and she has witnessed and experienced the abnormalities in the functioning of both parents.

Given the parents’ respective personalities and backgrounds, and the very strong antipathy between them, it is difficult to envisage them ever having been together in a stable relationship. Whatever the immediate attraction, it is plainly true that the relationship did indeed deteriorate when the mother became pregnant. They never lived together and never really acted together jointly as parents to G. The whole of G’s life has therefore been under the shadow of disagreement and antipathy between her parents. Each of her parents has up to now found it very difficult, if not impossible, to cooperate with the other. Each is a strong character, holding a firm belief that he or she is right and the other parent wrong.

The mother alleges that, on numerous occasions, the father was physically abusive or threatening towards her, either by assaulting her or by damaging furniture or throwing items. On occasions, one or more of the children was present or in the home. The mother identifies three specific occasions. First, she asserts that, on 16 March 2005, the father smashed several items of furniture and put his hand around her neck and strangled her until she passed out, causing bruising to her neck. The mother alleges that at the time she was holding G, who was then aged only six weeks. In support of her allegation, the mother relies on the evidence of the maternal grandmother and her lodger, GR. The grandmother described how the mother had arrived at their house in March 2005 with the two children, distressed and shaken with visible bruising around her neck. She said that the father had strangled her until she became unconscious. The grandmother in her statement said that her lodger, GR, had spoken to the mother over the next few days because he was concerned about how emotional she was at what had happened, and about the hand marks on her neck. GR provided a statement for this hearing, and gave oral evidence. He confirmed that the mother had been distressed having apparently left her address in a hurry and had visible marks on her neck which appeared to him to be four finger-like bruises. On behalf of the mother, Mr Fuller, whilst acknowledging that the grandmother could be considered a partial witness, submitted that no such criticism could be levelled at GR whose evidence he described as clear, thoughtful and compelling.

Secondly, at the end of May 2005, it is alleged the father assaulted the mother in the presence of J and W by pulling her upstairs by her hair. The mother’s account is supported by W. Mr. Fuller submitted that W was a well-rounded, careful, balanced and honest witness who, while corroborating his mother’s evidence was nevertheless able to say positive things about F and did not resort to hyperbole in the negatives.

Thirdly, in October 2005, the father damaged several items of furniture and was physically and verbally abusive to the mother at a point when G and W were in the property. Following this incident, the mother left and took the children to stay with the grandparents.

The father denies all these allegations of violence. In respect of the first incident, Mr. Cranfield relied on the uncertainty as to the date in March 2005 and also on a discrepancy as to the date on which the mother reported the matter to the police. In her statement, she said that she reported it in March shortly after it happened but there is no record of any report until December 2005. In oral evidence, the mother corrected her account, accepting that she had not reported it until December 2005. Mr. Cranfield submitted that the fact that the mother did not report the incident to the police until December 2005, over nine months later and, having done so, sought to retract the allegations shortly afterwards and did not support the father being given a harassment warning, undermined the credibility of the allegation. Given the mother’s subsequent history of reporting and complaining, he submitted that this refusal to proceed with her complaint casts considerable doubt on the truthfulness of the allegation. It was further submitted that GR’s evidence is unreliable. Mr. Cranfield submits that GR’s account of recalling this incident after more than twelve years is simply not credible. He points out that GR was not identified as a witness in the police investigation that took place in December 2005 when it was noted that there were no independent witnesses. There was also some inconsistency, or at least uncertainty, as to whether GR had discussed the matter with the grandmother at the time in March 2005.

In his statement and oral evidence, the father referred to an incident that occurred when G was only a few weeks old i.e. about the same time as the incident alleged by the mother. On the father’s account, the mother became very angry, “flipped” G across her chest roughly onto the mattress, from which G fell onto the floor, and then threw the television set out of the window into the street below before running out of the house and driving off in her night clothes.

As for the second incident, it is submitted by the father that W’s account is not supported by J who did not recall the incident in his evidence. Mr. Cranfield submitted that it is inconceivable that J would not have recalled such a serious incident even after twelve years. Mr Fuller submitted that, even if J is being truthful, it does not follow that the incident did not occur but rather that either he did not see it or does not remember it.

In addition, the mother asserts that, throughout the relationship, the father demonstrated coercive, controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour through verbal abuse and critical or derogatory language and other actions. As already stated, she alleges that he attempted to pressurise her to have an abortion. After G was born, he was unsupportive. He insisted on calling the baby by the name “M”. She alleges that he used verbal abuse and derogatory names, particularly when under the influence of drugs or alcohol, referring to her as “a slut”, “stupid”, and “fat”. He enforced rigid house rules about trivial matters and told her she would never get away from him. In her statement, the grandmother stated that the mother had told her on many occasions during her relationship with the father, and afterwards, about the father’s abusive behaviour.

The father again denies all these allegations. He accepts that, when the mother first became pregnant, he was not clear he was ready to become a father. He accepts that he asked about the possibility of abortion but denies putting pressure on the mother to go through with a termination. He says that, after the birth, at which he was present, he provided entirely appropriate support. He says that the mother was fully involved, and in agreement with, the choice of names, and used the name “M” without objection for many years. The other allegations are all denied. In closing submissions, Mr. Cranfield submitted that the picture painted by the mother of the father exercising control was implausible, given the mother’s strong character and her own behaviour as described by the father. The father suggests it was M who was volatile and controlling, unwilling to accept that he did not share her idealised view of what she wanted the relationship to be.

The mother further alleges that the father abused and harassed her after the relationship ended. She asserts that he sent abusive and threatening telephone calls to her directly and via the maternal grandparents, including a threat to petrol bomb the house. She relies on the text messages particularised above for which the father was convicted of harassment and placed under a restraining order. The father denies ever making threatening calls as alleged. He accepts that he pleaded guilty to a charge of harassment and was made subject to a restraining order after sending the abusive texts summarised above in which, amongst other things, he had referred to the mother as “a prick” and “a fat ugly bitch”. His explanation was that he had been frustrated when she first disappeared with G in 2007, denied him contact and refused to communicate with him or disclose her whereabouts. During the course of cross-examination in the hearing before me, he accepted that on occasion he tended to respond to life’s frustrations by being aggressive, threatening and frightening, and that this was an example of that sort of conduct. In closing submissions, Mr. Cranfield submitted that, whilst the texts were inexcusable, this incident should be seen as someone trying to resolve contact issues who then becomes frustrated with the mother’s responses and swears and was not evidence of a wider pattern of threats and harassment.

The father’s general case on the mother’s allegations is that the mother has made numerous allegations against him across the course of these proceedings, which have been exaggerated and overplayed as the years of proceedings passed. The mother began to lose control of court proceedings and thus, it is argued, felt compelled to shift the focus from her conduct and seek to justify her indefensible position in respect of contact. It is submitted that the mother’s history of taking decisions about G without reference to the father, and repeatedly obstructing contact, is inconsistent with the picture of someone who was frightened of the father.

Dr Gardner concluded that G has always had a positive relationship with her mother. During her assessment, G consistently described to mother in a loving and affectionate manner. Dr Gardner also found evidence that G has a secure internalised model of attachment and that she had the emotional competence to transfer her expectations of security onto another primary caregiver when she was received into foster care.

Notwithstanding these positive observations, Dr Gardner concluded that the relationship has a primary cognitive focus. The mother is very clear that G needs to know and understand issues, and that her views and the views of others are essential to G’s understanding and development. As a result, G has been exposed to an adult-like relationship from early on in her childhood in most areas of experience. Dr Gardner expressed the view that the mother had largely transferred own experience of cognitive parenting onto her daughter while she continued her own emotional development in her role as therapeutic foster carer.

Dr Gardner described one specific example of this from her interview with the mother. Towards the end of the assessment, the mother stated that “someone has to tell G exactly why I am here. That it was her father who got her sent to prison”. Dr Gardner commented that it was evidently the mother’s view that it was in G’s interest to know the details that led to her prison sentence. She added that there was no evidence of any balance to this view, nor any consideration of whether or not it was appropriate for G to be made fully aware of details, and the anger and resentment that continues to exist between her parents.

The consequence for G, as is evident from a number of conversations she has had with professionals, including the social worker and guardian as well as Dr Gardner, has been that she has become aware of too much adult information. Dr Gardner considers it clearly established that the mother has provided G with too much information and in a manner that has been unhelpful to her. This is also apparent from G’s adult-like verbal ability. At other times, however, particularly when feeling vulnerable, G has a tendency to put on a very childlike voice. Dr Gardner describes this behaviour as being typical of a child who has not had their emotional needs consistently or appropriately met and as a result their emotional maturity has been inappropriately fostered, and is therefore fragile, so that the child seeks to return to a much younger period of childhood in the hope of eliciting emotional care at the developmental stage they are imitating.

Dr Gardner concludes that the mother has a clear intellectual understanding of G’s needs for permanent and secure parenting. On the other hand, she does not have sufficient insight into G’s broader emotional and other needs. Dr Gardner predicts that the mother’s ability to develop further insight, and to place G’s needs before her own, will be contingent on her willingness to consider the deeper emotional issues which have affected her capacity to provide emotional care in the context of parenting intervention and emotional-based counselling.

Dr Gardner noted that G is able to express ambivalence towards the mother. On the one hand she described very positive experiences and feelings, but she was also able to tell Dr Gardner that she accepted that her mother is complicated and needed help. G told Dr Gardner that she believed her mother would benefit from an intervention such as the play therapy that she had received so that she could get in touch with their own feelings. In saying that, G was well aware that her mother had herself had a difficult childhood and a poor relationship with her own mother.

The father and K have been in a relationship for over ten years. They have a daughter, A, born December 2012 and therefore now aged rising five. They each described their relationship in very warm terms. The father described K to the social worker as strong, beautiful and thoughtful and as someone who put “everyone first”. Kay told the social worker that the father has a heart of gold and is a soft and gentle person with so much love to give. All the evidence suggests that A is thriving in their care. The social worker stated in her report that she appreciated that strong independent women can be victims of an abusive relationship and that domestic violence is, to a large extent, a hidden crime. Having met the couple on several occasions, however, the social worker found no evidence that they were in an abusive relationship.

Apart from statements made by G, which I consider below, the only independent evidence to suggest any difficulties in the relationship between the father and K came from the former guardian, who on one occasion witnessed the father shouting and using abusive language during a telephone conversation with K. The father accepts that he used the language described, and says that he immediately apologised for his behaviour.

A central feature of this case has been the allegation made by G that she witnessed the father strangling K. It seems that this allegation, alongside the mother’s discovery of details about the father’s alleged abuse of D, was instrumental in leading the mother to restrict contact in 2013, which in turn led to the series of court orders culminating in the suspended residence order, which in turn prompted the mother to remove G from the jurisdiction.

The mother’s case is that G first made this allegation following the trip to Disneyland Paris in the summer of 2012. The allegation was first made to the maternal grandmother who describes the conversation in her statement:

“G said ‘Dad said that I didn’t see it but I know what I saw’. G talked about the time she witnessed her dad with his hands round K’s throat, strangling her. She got very upset. I said ‘what did you so then, darling?’ G replied ‘I pretended I didn’t see it and went into the garden and J brought out my toys’ I calmly said ‘thank you for telling Grandma, darling.’ She then continued ‘that’s not the only bad thing I’ve seen at Daddy’s but I can’t talk about it’. G then started really sobbing and said ‘daddy’s not a bad man, but some of the things he does is bad’ When he is busy, or when K or nanny [paternal grandmother] is there, he doesn’t ask me so many questions. It’s not good to tell lies, but I have to so daddy stops asking me questions’. I then comforted her and changed the subject because she was becoming very distressed.”

The grandmother passed on the information to the mother who spoke to G herself. G repeated the allegation. In oral evidence, the mother said that, after hearing that G had said that her father had “strangled” K, it was a “Eureka moment”. (Another Eureka moment for the mother had been discovering the details of the father’s behaviour towards D.) G’s account made the mother realise that K was perhaps experiencing some of the other behaviour the father had shown in the past.

These conversations took place in the early Autumn 2012. It was some time, however, before G repeated her allegations to a professional. In November 2012 the mother told the GP that ‘one time a couple of years ago’ G had seen her father put his hand round K’s throat. Yet G herself did not mention this allegation to professionals when she had the opportunity to do so on several occasions - to the GP on 23 November 2012, when she met with the CAMHS worker on 29 January 2013 or the guardian on 8 March 2013. On this last occasion, the guardian mentioned that her mother had told him that G had been worried about her father becoming angry sometimes and scaring her. G explained that this had only happened once a long time ago. It was only at a later date that G mentioned the strangling allegation - to the DVAS case worker Liz Billings on 1 August 2013 and the guardian in September 2013. In March 2013, G asked the guardian when she could go and stay with her father again and said that she missed staying overnight with him. It was not until later that G’s alleged fears about the father’s treatment of K were said to lead her to be reluctant to have contact.

The father and K firmly deny that any such incident had occurred. In her statement, K said that she would not tolerate any hint from the father of any abusive or controlling behaviour. She accepted that they have disagreements “like any other couple” but stated that if a conflict arises they generally manage to talk it through.

On behalf of the mother, Mr Fuller submitted that K and J have presented an idealised and misleading picture of life in their family unit, and that F did (as reported by G on a number of occasions) on one occasion do something akin to strangling K and that he has resorted to shouting at her. Mr Fuller submitted that it is unlikely that the father’s dysregulated behaviour has resolved without professional help.

The local authority submits that the allegation that the father strangled K in the presence of G has not been proved on the balance of probabilities. If G said something to her grandmother about such an incident, the local authority considers it more likely that this was an expression by G of what Dr Gardner referred to as her ‘generalised anxiety’ in the context of her being caught in the middle of a ‘toxic’ relationship between her parents. The local authority contends that whatever G said at the time was unquestioningly accepted by the mother and the grandmother and was adapted to fit their already well-formed view that the father was abusive and dangerous. In oral evidence, Dr Gardner suggested, that in view of G’s generalised anxiety as a result of the conflict between the parents, it does not follow G was scared of her father just because she said she was – it is a statement of loyalty to her mother (and grandmother) and an expression of her emotional turmoil.

The basic facts about the abduction – that the mother unlawfully removed G from the jurisdiction in October 2013, retained her in a series of foreign countries which were not parties to the Hague Child Abduction Convention, and with which this country has no extradition treaty, refused to return her despite repeated the encouragement of professionals and this court, and only returned here having been deported from Cambodia – are undisputed. The issues for this court when considering the abduction are the reasons for the mother’s actions, the impact upon G, and whether the mother has any understanding of that impact.

The father’s case, as summarised by Mr. Cranfield in closing submissions, is that the mother’s removal of G from the jurisdiction was wholly planned, and was designed purely to frustrate the contact process, which as far as M must have been concerned was moving in a direction she did not want, nor one which she could control. It is apparent from the evidence of pre-planning (for example, the fact that non-Hague Treaty countries were chosen), that this was not a spur of the moment decision based on what was perceived to be urgent grounds.

The local authority submits that the abduction must be considered in the context of the mother’s dismissive attitude to the father’s involvement in G’s life. In particular, there is a considerable amount of evidence that the mother would at times stop contact between G and her father for what the local authority describes as spurious reasons and for protracted periods. One example was mother‘s failure to make G available for the agreed holiday to Disneyland Paris in the summer of 2011 because the father had failed to give her a month’s notice of the proposed travel arrangements despite knowing that G had been looking forward to the holiday. It is the father’s case that this was but one example of the mother’s attitude to contact. He and K both describe how the mother would cancel contact with little notice or with little or no explanation. The contact book in which the parties recorded arrangements about contact demonstrates that the mother changed arrangements at short notice. A statement provided by the father’s stepfather similarly describes the mother cancelling contact at short notice. The father alleged that the mother had behaved in a similar way at an earlier stage if W’s father failed to comply with time arrangements for contact. At an earlier stage, the mother had taken other steps in G’s life without informing or consulting the father, for example arranging for her to be christened, moving schools and home. In closing submissions, Mr. Cranfield on behalf of the father argued that the evidence demonstrated that the mother had sought to improperly frustrate and prevent contact between him, the wider paternal family and G from at least 2007 onwards and that she had exposed G to an unjustified, prolonged and ongoing maternal narrative which is wholly negative of the father. The abduction was motivated by her opposition to the father having any involvement in G’s life.

The mother maintains that her abduction of G was, in Mr. Fuller’s phrase, a case of “Hobson’s choice”, in the light of a combination of factors, including G’s increasingly severe and prolonged levels of significant distress, the mother’s serious concern about F’s behaviour towards her, the information received from D in February 2103 about F’s earlier behaviour, and the order for unsupervised contact and the suspended change of residence order which the mother strongly felt had been made without proper consideration of the allegations of domestic abuse and the effect of that abuse on G. In her threshold response, and in closing submissions filed on her behalf by Mr Fuller, the mother conceded that the abduction had caused G harm, although I was unsure during her oral evidence whether she really accepted this.

In any event, the mother contends that she took all possible steps to mitigate any harm that might have been caused by the abduction. She arranged visits from G’s brother, W, (who visited three times, for several weeks on each occasion) and also by JD with whom G is said to have had a good relationship. She took steps to ensure that G received a good education – school reports from Cambodia were disclosed. She ensured that G had plenty of social opportunities locally and maintained regular contact with maternal family by phone and by Skype. She continued to attempt to engage in the court proceedings with a view to bringing about a result that could enable then to return home.

In her oral evidence, the mother was unapologetic about her actions in taking G abroad. She saw nothing wrong in the various documents she had sent while she was away, nor in the documents purportedly written by G, for example the document headed “My Story” or the crime report. As to the latter, the mother insisted that it was written in G’s own words and that the mother had not been involved in writing it, although she accepted that she had submitted a crime report at the same time. She described G’s crime report as “a snapshot of G’s anger about the situation she finds herself in”.

Dr Gardner concluded that there was a very significant psychological impact on G associated with a sudden move out of the country away from her friends, family and school, and very limited insight into the psychological cost associated with G’s need to develop strategies and defensive functioning to adjust to the demands of the situation. Dr Gardner anticipates that the mother does not accept this analysis, arguing that the court orders left her with no choice and that it was entirely in G’s interests to be removed from the country. Dr Gardner comments that the mother did not and does not understand at any level the psychological cost of that action or the longer term consequences of separation from family, friends and wider social groups. Furthermore, the mother has no insight as to the difficulties G experienced in being aware that her mother was acting against a court order, of having to live in countries where extradition was not possible, or the burden of the fear that she experienced in relation to the possibility of being discovered and returned to this country. Perhaps most importantly, it is Dr Gardner’s view that the mother does not understand the burden of guilt that G now experiences because she firmly believes that the actions that her mother took were entirely her fault and that, if anyone should be punished, it should be her.

As far as the maternal grandparents are concerned, the local authority, in seeking the findings against them as summarised above, relies on comments made during the viability assessment of the maternal grandparents and on the maternal grandmother’s two statements which contain many examples of her strong views of the father and her endorsement of the mother’s complaints. In the viability assessment, the social worker reported that the grandparents believed that the father has exposed G to significant harm in witnessing domestic violence. As these allegations were not being regarded as serious, the mother was left with no alternative other than to flee the country. The social worker describes the grandparents as being consistent in saying that the mother was left with no choice other than to take the action she did to safeguard G’s well-being. They felt the trauma of separation – describing is as like a “bereavement” – but did not identify any negative emotional impact on G as a result of being removed from the familiarity of home, school, friends and family. The social worker described then as unable to understand the possible detrimental emotional impact through G’s eyes. On the contrary, the grandmother said that she felt he time abroad would have been an “adventure” and a positive experience for G which would have benefited her development.

In her statement, the grandmother put forward the same views. She described a loving family which the father had torn apart.

“We felt deeply bereaved that G and her mother had to live on the other side of the world, but were hugely relieved that they were safe and happy and had made a good life for themselves …. We now feel that we have the worst fight of our life on our hands. Our daughter is in prison for protecting her daughter from a violent and abusive man …. My faith now rests with the Family Court. I hope and pray the court can see through [the father’s] catalogue of lies and abuse and can see that [the mother] acted out of utter desperation to keep her beloved daughter safe.”

The statement continued with a list of examples of what the grandmother contends is the father’s controlling and abusive behaviour. She was deeply critical of professionals, particularly the former guardian, for failing to accept the truth of G’s statement. She spoke very positively of G’s experiences in Cambodia.

Dr Gardner observed that G has had positive experiences with both sets of grandparents and has good relationships with them. Much of the focus of the evidence of this case has been on the actions and attitudes of the maternal grandmother. In passing, Dr Gardner observes that G is closer to her maternal step-grandfather. Dr Gardner describes him as a very gentle and emotionally warm person who is able to provide attuned emotional care for G and has made good some of the deficits in her emotional care.

In her oral evidence, Dr Gardner agreed that the maternal grandmother had taken her views about issues from the mother and that her statement filed in these proceedings continued to show that she lacked insight into the mother’s behaviour, and lacked a full understanding of the complexity of G’s position. Dr Gardner thought that the grandmother needed, first, to understand her own emotional functioning, then the mother’s functioning, and then the impact of the mother’s parenting on G, and the complex narrative G has provided to justify her own emotional experiences. Dr Gardner concluded that there needed to be a shift in the grandmother’s understanding before G could be placed to live with her.

In her oral evidence, the grandmother continued to adhere to her position of supporting the mother’s actions in removing G from this jurisdiction. When it was put to her that she was fiercely loyal to the mother, she replied that she would hope she was, but added that she had a mind of her own. She stood by everything she had written, although she then added, “but everyone’s changed”. In cross-examination, the grandmother was able to acknowledge that both parents had caused emotional harm to G. She accepted in principle that the father should have contact with G, but added that it should take place in a controlled way that G would accept.

This evidence, which came at the end of the hearing, hinted at a slight change in the grandmother’s position. In her closing submissions, however, she reverted to unqualified support of the mother.

“A mother’s basic instinct is to love, nurture and protect her children, and to that end, rightly or wrongly, that basic instinct to protect G kicked in and led her to take her child more than 3,000 miles away in an attempt to do just that, and to that end gave G three years of carefree childhood without the fear of being forced to live with her father and suffering the disastrous effects his behaviour had on her.”

The grandmother was critical of the previous judge for not agreeing to a fact-finding hearing. She suggested that, if the truth about the father’s past had been exposed, the problems of the past 4 years could have been avoided.

In her preliminary psychological assessment of G carried out in November 2016, Dr Gardner found no evidence of gross disturbance or significant abnormality in mental health functioning. There was, however, evidence of low mood and generalised anxiety, with what Dr Gardner described as very robust defensive functioning. Dr Gardner concluded that there was evidence that G had suffered psychological harm affecting her emotional development and functioning. She has had a protracted experience of anxiety and her mood has been significantly negatively affected. In November 2016, Dr Gardner concluded that previous separation from family members, together with the current separation from her mother, contributed to the harm that she was suffering and the defensive functioning that G had developed as a result. Another striking feature emerging from Dr Gardner’s assessment was that G’s social, intellectual and educational development were not consistent with her chronological age. There was evidence that she developed competences beyond what would be expected of a child of her age. In describing the events of her life, and in particular the previous three years, Dr Gardner noted that G was able to provide information without evidence of any narrative or script. It was Dr Gardner’s view that the memories and feelings disclosed by G were consistent with her own independent experience. As she explained in oral evidence, however, it did not follow that the statements made by G were true.

In her second, main report in January 2017, Dr Gardner was able to place her psychological assessment of G in the context of her other assessments, including those of the parents. She concluded that it was evident that G has witnessed and experienced abnormalities in the functioning of both her parents. Dr Gardner concluded that G has been profoundly affected by the psychological functioning of both her parents and suffered significant emotional harm as a result of the abnormalities in their functioning, their toxic relationship, the conflict between them, and the extensive litigation. The separation and loss that G has experienced has also contributed to the harm she has suffered.

Dr Gardner found that G knows a great deal about the proceedings and about the views of her parents about each other. Dr Gardner described her as evidently burdened by the information and feeling overwhelmed by guilt. She concluded that her guilt was rather like her anxiety – intense and generalised. She noted that G generated multiple and varied reasons to account for the intensity of the feeling. In reference to her mother, G said: “I did not do enough for her, I should have done more, I should have helped more”. It is G’s belief that it is her fault that her mother is in prison, saying “she did it for me, she did what I wanted, I couldn’t live with him”. Dr Gardner described how, when G speaks of her guilt, she becomes overwhelmed with distress and is completely unable to rely on her normal robust defences.

Although G has reached competence beyond her chronological age in a number of respects, Dr Gardner concluded that her apparent maturity is very fragile. As already described, she frequently resorts to a “baby voice” to elicit the emotional care of a much younger child. Dr Gardner spoke positively in her second report of the quality of care G had received from her foster carer. As a result, she has achieved some level of psychological recovery. Despite this, Dr Gardner noted that G has become more able to express distress and the reported level of anxiety and low mood had significantly increased when she saw her in January.

Dr Gardner’s conclusion is that G will require a very high level of emotional support, with a significant level of emotional warmth, if she is to be protected as much as possible from further harm. With ongoing emotional support, and in the context of psychological intervention, Dr Gardner believes that G’s false perceptions about her responsibility for what has happened can be corrected. The aim of all intervention would be to help G develop additional adaptive coping strategies and resilience, and address the abnormalities in her emotional development and functioning and help her recover memories and process feelings associated with them.

Dr Gardner’s assessment of the emotional harm that G has suffered, coupled with the lack of insight she has identified in both parents, will impinge upon plans for her long-term placement. Dr Gardner concluded that, given the harm that G has now suffered, if her emotional needs cannot properly be met by her mother, it will not be in her interest to return to her full-time care. Dr Gardner is, however, optimistic that the mother will understand her advice and make every effort to engage in the help she requires - parenting intervention to help her fully understand the emotional needs of her daughter and emotional-based counselling to help her recover and process memories from her own childhood and specifically her relationship with her mother.

Dr Gardner reports that G now expresses the need and desire for contact with her father. That contact will depend, however, upon the father’s capacity to develop insight and to address his own psychological issues. He needs to learn to control his affective response and fully understand the impact that his dysregulated emotional behaviour has had and will continue to have on G. Dr Gardner advises that contact will therefore need to start to develop therapeutically, in the presence of a trusted adult. Dr Gardner has identified a package of intervention that the father requires – emotional-based counselling, affect regulation, and domestic violence perpetrator work.

In her letter to the court, G stated that she did not want to see her father at the present time. In her evidence, Dr Gardner agreed with a suggestion from the court that the fact that G says she does not want to see her father for the time being is her way of reconciling her competing emotions. She added that we have to be very careful to understand her statements, acknowledging her words but looking beyond what she actually says.

In analysing the evidence, I apply the legal principles summarised above. This case is another illustration of the important principle that each piece of evidence must not be considered in isolation but, rather, in the context of all the other evidence.

Apart from her view as to the need for a fact-finding hearing, I accept the analysis provided by Dr Gardner. The complex relationships in this case as manifested over a number of years called for an assessment of the highest quality. Fortunately, Dr Gardner was able to provide just such an assessment. This court is deeply grateful to her. I accept her psychological assessment of the mother, father and G.

Dealing first with the allegations of domestic abuse against the father arising out of his relationship with D, I bear in mind that the burden of proof on this issue lies on the local authority. On a number of occasions other courts have made findings that the father was abusive towards D. I take into account that the allegations in respect of D have not been fully litigated before me. D did not give evidence at the hearing before me so I have not heard her respond to the father’s assertions and explanations. I also take into account that the incidents occurred over 10 years ago. Nonetheless, I find the father’s evidence about his behaviour and his attempts to explain and minimise his conduct wholly unconvincing. I see no reason to doubt that the orders made in the various proceedings dealing with his conduct towards D were properly made. I find on a balance of probabilities that the father was abusive and on occasions threatened and/or used violence towards D on a number of occasions over a period of several years.

With regard to the relationship between G’s parents, I accept Dr Gardner’s assessment of the relationship, her description of it as “toxic”, and her penetrating analysis of the causes which lie in the psychological history of the parents. In particular, I accept her assessment that neither parent was able to understand or cope with the behaviour or functioning of the other and that their functioning as individuals also deteriorated. I also accept her assessment that neither parent has had any coherent insight as to the profoundly negative impact the conflict has had on G or the psychological harm she has suffered. The whole of G’s life has therefore been under the shadow of disagreement and antipathy between her parents. Each of her parents has up to now found it very difficult, if not impossible, to cooperate with the other. Each is a strong character, holding a firm belief that he or she is right and the other parent wrong.

In considering the allegations of domestic abuse against the father arising out of the relationship with the mother, I do not accept the mother’s written evidence that she reported the “strangling” incident in March 2005. But the fact that she has given untrue or inaccurate evidence on this point does not mean that the whole of her account is untrue or unreliable. The fact that the allegation was apparently reported several months later is not, in my judgment, significant evidence that it was untrue. Allegations of domestic abuse often go unreported. The fact that the mother has fought her case so tenaciously in recent years does not, in my judgment, necessarily mean that she would have reported the incident in March 2005 immediately after it happened. Similarly, it is not surprising that the mother subsequently sought to retract the allegation. It is a feature of allegations of domestic abuse that they are made and then retracted. I accept the evidence of the grandmother and GR as to the bruising seen on the mother’s neck. I have considered carefully the submission that it is inconceivable that an independent witness such as GR is alleged to be would not have been identified in the police investigation in 2005. But listening to his evidence, I found GR to be a clear and persuasive witness. Having heard GR’s evidence, I conclude that he is telling the truth about what he saw in March 2005.

On the second incident relied on – the so-called “hair-pulling” incident – I accept the evidence of the mother and W and reject that given by the father. I found W to be a truthful witness who was not speaking merely out of loyalty to his mother. It was notable, for example, that he agreed that during arguments he would hear shouting from both the father and the mother. The fact that J was unable to recall the incident does not mean, in my judgment, that it did not happen. On a balance of probabilities, I find that it did.

The evidence as to the third incident relied on is not in my view sufficient to lead to a specific finding. But I do find that during the relationship the father demonstrated controlling and emotionally abusive behaviour, and that this continued for a period after the relationship had broken down. I accept that the mother was herself acting unreasonably in seeking to restrict his involvement in G’s life, but in my judgment that cannot excuse his abusive behaviour. I reject the submission that the text messages which led to the father’s harassment conviction in 2007 cannot be regarded as indicative of his behaviour. On the contrary, looking at the evidence as a whole and not in isolation, I find that they are indicative of the way the father behaved. They were inexcusably abusive. They are consistent with the pattern of the father’s behaviour towards D and the mother over a number of years between 2000 and 2007. As Practice Direction 12J makes clear, courts need to be alert to patterns of behaviour. Such patterns are likely to indicate a tendency to abusive behaviour which will impinge on the welfare of the child in future.

I turn to consider the allegation that the father was violent to K in G’s presence. Although this is only one incident, it has assumed very considerable importance for the reasons set out above. It is important to bear in mind that the context in which this allegation arose included the toxic relationship between the parents as described by Dr Gardner and, as Miss Bond on behalf of the local authority described, a prolonged period during which the mother was obstructing the father’s involvement in G’s life. I accept the evidence and submissions on behalf of the local authority and father that for several years between 2008 and 2013 the mother had a cavalier and dismissive attitude towards the father and his involvement in G’s life. She took decisions about G without consulting the father. I find that she cancelled contact with little notice and no good explanation on a number of occasions. The planned trip to Disneyland Paris in 2011 did not take place because of the mother’s unreasonable attitude, which caused G great disappointment. All this is evidence of the mother’s controlling attitude and extreme reluctance to accept that anyone but she has the right to decide what should happen with regard to her daughter. In 2012, the dispute over contact escalated. I find that G was caught in the middle of the toxic relationship, on the one hand enjoying contact when it took place but on the other being unable to acknowledge her enjoyment of contact when talking to her mother. As Dr. Gardner describes, this predicament placed her in a state of generalised anxiety.

I accept that the maternal grandmother is telling the truth when she alleges that she had a conversation with G in the course of which G said something about witnessing the father with his hands around K’s neck. I do not believe that the grandmother has fabricated her account. I also accept that G has referred to this incident on other occasions. I accept that the father has been violent and abusive to other women on other occasions, including one occasion when he assaulted the mother by putting his hands round her neck. On a balance of probabilities, however, I do not find that he assaulted K in the way suggested, for the following reasons.

First, the only evidence that he did assault K comes from the statements made by G. Those statements were not made in the context of a formal ABE interview, or subject to any of the safeguards which are applied to such interviews. The initial statements were made to the grandmother and then the mother. There are no complete contemporaneous records of the conversations. It is well recognised that statements made to family members have to be scrutinised carefully, particularly when alleged to have occurred in the context of disputes about child arrangements. In this case, there was a bitter ongoing dispute between the parents. Furthermore, the mother and grandmother had fixed views about the father’s past conduct. It is to my mind highly likely that G was well aware of the dispute and the views held by her mother and grandmother.

Secondly, in the initial conversation, there is no context provided by G about the incident. There is little experiential detail which is relied on to provide context to the allegations.

Thirdly, the allegation is firmly denied by the father and by K. I have found the father to be an unreliable witness about his past abusive behaviour towards D and the mother. But I found K to be a truthful and reliable witness. Although she is loyal to the father, I do not think she would lie about this important matter. I accept the evidence of the father and K about their relationship. The father described it as “fantastic – very happy”. It is plain from that evidence that their relationship is completely different from the father’s previous relationships with D and the mother. Their relationship is plainly much more harmonious.

It is the evidence of the mother and grandmother that, in the course of 2013, G’s emotional state deteriorated further. Their interpretation is that this was attributable to being forced to have contact with her father against her wishes and about being exposed to her father’s behaviour. I accept the interpretation offered by Dr Gardner, however, that any statements G made which may have suggested that she witnessed acts of violence between her father and K were an expression by G of what Dr Gardner referred to as her ‘generalised anxiety’ in the context of her being caught in the middle of the toxic relationship between her parents. Such statements were unquestioningly accepted by the mother and the maternal grandmother and were adapted to fit their already well-formed view that the father was abusive and dangerous.

For these reasons, I conclude that the mother has failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the father has assaulted K.

It does not, however, follow from the fact that the father has not been abusive in their relationship that he was not abusive in earlier relationships which were plainly not harmonious at all. I accept Dr Gardner’s analysis that the father gets out of control when unable to understand an emotionally complex situation. His relationships with the mother and, before that, with D were emotionally complex, his relationship with K seemingly not. The evidence indicates that, in the past, when the father was in a difficult relationship, he resorted to abusive and occasionally violent conduct either in an effort to get his own way or out of frustration at difficulties in the relationship. It may be that to some extent those difficulties were caused by the other person – D or the mother – but that cannot excuse the father’s abusive behaviour.

I turn next to the abduction. I find that the actions the mother took in removing G from the jurisdiction and endeavouring to keep away in a country where she thought the authorities would not take steps to return G to this country took were wholly disproportionate and unreasonable and have caused G significant emotional and psychological harm. I firmly reject the submission that the mother had no alternative – that she was faced with “Hobson’s choice”. The mother’s legal options had not been exhausted, and it was her responsibility to comply with court orders, not put herself and her child outside the reach of the court.

Miss Bond is right in saying that the abduction must be considered in the context of the mother’s dismissive attitude to the father’s involvement in G’s life. In his closing submissions, Mr. Fuller argued that, if the court finds that the mother was not acting reasonably in taking and keeping G abroad, the court should also find that she acted as she did out of a strong desire to protect her daughter, not to spite the father. I do accept that she thought she was protecting her daughter, but in thinking that she was seriously mistaken. There is considerable evidence that the mother frustrated contact over a period of years. I accept that G was displaying signs of significant emotional harm during 2013, but those were not attributable simply to concerns about contact and the father’s behaviour but rather to the fact that she was caught in the middle of the toxic relationship between her parents.

The mother insists that she made sure that G realised that the responsibility for the fact that they were out of the jurisdiction lay with the mother rather than with G. The evidence suggests, however, that G feels a heavy responsibility for what has happened. Mr. Fuller suggested in closing submissions that, in so far as G does feel guilt, this is a function of her generalised anxiety and, perhaps, of feeling punished by being placed in care when she very much wants to be with her maternal family. I find, however, that the mother does indeed bear a substantial share of the responsibility for G’s feelings of guilt. Although the mother purported to accept responsibility for the fact that they were abroad, I find that she has in fact acted in a way that led G to believe that the responsibility lay with her. I also find that the documents and statements made by G, in the period leading up to the abduction and while she was abroad, including the documents headed “My story” and the “crime report”, were drafted under the mother’s direct or indirect influence. By encouraging her daughter to write these documents, the mother was enlisting her support in her actions and adding to G’s sense of responsibility.

In closing submissions, Mr. Fuller urged the court to conclude that, whatever its findings as to the circumstances and reasonableness of her past conduct, there is no risk of the mother abducting G again. I am unable to say that there is no such risk. Although the mother stated in evidence that she would not abduct G again, the court is unable to evaluate whether there is a risk that she may do so, or take other steps to obstruct the father’s contact, until she has indicated whether she accepts the court’s findings and judgment, and undergone the therapy proposed by Dr. Gardner.

Finally, I turn to the position of the maternal grandparents, and in particular the grandmother. In my judgment, there is insufficient evidence to lead the court to conclude that the grandmother actively colluded with the mother to facilitate the abduction of G from the country. It is clear, however, that she, and seemingly her husband, fully supported the mother’s decision, and continue to believe it was the only option open to her. In this regard, they are in my judgment profoundly mistaken. As I have observed above, the mother’s legal options had not been exhausted, and it was her responsibility to comply with court orders, not put herself and her child outside the reach of the court. Furthermore, in asserting that G’s three years abroad amounted to “an adventure” and focusing only on the positive experience, the grandmother is ignoring the evidence that G suffered emotional harm from being uprooted from friends, family, school and life in this country and forced to lead the life of a fugitive. I accept that the mother took steps to ensure that she received a good education, and that she was well cared for and made friends in Cambodia, but that is obviously only part of the picture and ignores the emotional harm which G plainly suffered. The fact that her grandmother cannot recognise this is a matter for concern.

In the course of the hearing, it was plain to me that the grandparents were listening carefully to the evidence, notably that given by Dr. Gardner. This is reflected in the grandmother’s final submissions, in which she observed that “G could have a wonderful relationship with her father if he sincerely engages in all the work that has been recommended.” There is therefore in my judgment some hope that the grandparents will accept the findings of this court and adopt a less intransigent position. Overall, however, the grandmother’s attitude towards the father’s contact with G remains ambivalent.

Dr Gardner in oral evidence identified further therapeutic work that she felt would assist the grandmother come to terms with G’s emotional needs. I accept Dr Gardner’s assessment that the grandmother is committed to complete the work which Dr Gardner has proposed. I hope that, with therapeutic assistance, she will develop the necessary understanding and insight so that she can provide her granddaughter with the emotional support she needs.

In summary, therefore my findings are as follows: