A Local Authority v M & Ors (Fact Finding) (Rev 1)

I am concerned in this case with the welfare of the 4 children of M and F. They are all British citizens. They range in age from 13 years to 5 years old. They were made Wards of Court by Cobb J on 1 September 2015. The parents who are married are first cousins and therefore share many relatives, many of whom live in the UK.

Part of the history is already in the public domain in that the events which I relate below were well publicised at the time when the story broke in the national media, and subsequently when M stood trial for child abduction. She was convicted and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment.

This case involves important questions: firstly in relation to the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction, being the latest in a series of cases concerning the abduction, or alleged risk of abduction, or suspected attempted abduction, by parents with their children to Syria. Secondly whether, and in what circumstances, the religiously motivated views of a parent or parents are so harmful that the State should intervene to protect the child.

In June 2014 a Jihadist group, Islamic State, burst onto the international scene, having seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. The group (ISIL) formally declared the establishment of a “Caliphate”, a State governed in accordance with Islamic law or Sharia. Amongst the many declared demands were that Muslims should swear an allegiance to the then leader of that establishment. Amongst its several aims it sought to eradicate all obstacles to restoring God’s rule on earth and to defend the Muslim community against infidels. As is well known, it has welcomed the prospect of direct confrontation with the West, which has included acts of terrorism, two such committed during the currency of these proceedings – Paris and Brussels. The events of 2014 were of great interest to the mother and her sister B.

The Family Courts have had cause to consider a number of “radicalisation” cases since 2015. I note amongst them in particular Re M (Children) [2014] EWHC 667 (Fam), [Holman J]; Re M [2015] EWHC 1433 and [2015] EWHC 2933, [Hayden J]; Re X (Children); Re Y (Children) [2015] EWHC 2265 (Fam) [P]; Re X (Children); Re Y (Children) [2015] EWHC 2358 [P] and Re X (Children)(3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam) [P], there are others. As Hayden J recognised in TowerHamlets v M and others [2015] EWHC 869 (Fam):

“[57] The Family Court system, particularly the Family Division, is and always has been in my view in the vanguard of change in life and society. Where there are changes in medicine or in technology or cultural change, so often they resonate first within the family. Here the type of harm I have been asked to evaluate is a different facet of vulnerability for children other than that which the Court has had to deal with in the past.

[58] What, however, is clear is that the conventional safeguarding principles will still afford the best protection.”

Every person in this jurisdiction has the inalienable right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: the freedom to believe whatever one wishes, to be able to express those beliefs, to manifest them in every aspect of life, including to associate with others who hold similar beliefs; additionally, self-evidently, the right to bring up their children within those beliefs and the right not to be treated less favourably than others because of those beliefs. Those rights have long been recognised in our society and are enshrined in our law (Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and enacted in the Human Rights Act of 1998). This case, in common with other similar ones, confronts not just behaviours but, as I recorded earlier, whether and in what circumstances the religiously motivated views of parents are so harmful to their children that the State should intervene to protect the child. All families are free to bring up their children as they see fit, provided of course, that within a wide ambit they do not cause them harm. But the question in this and in other cases is under what circumstances might the parents’ religious views and activities result in harm to the children’s physical and emotional health and wellbeing.

The Government’s Prevent Strategy and the radicalisation of some parents and of their children has brought this issue very much to the fore; it challenges the tolerance and neutrality between different religions and perspectives, in particular denying the opportunity to individuals to prevent hatred (and thus extremism). It goes to the very root of democratic and jealously guarded freedoms. Self-evidently the State cannot place limitations on beliefs that are held by a private individual. It can, however, place limitations on the manifestation of those beliefs if that limitation is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, which in these circumstances would be protecting public order, health, morals, freedoms or rights of others, generally or individually.

On 25 August 2015 the mother, in unusual circumstances, travelled from London to Europe with her 4 children; C, a boy aged 13; D, a boy aged 12; E, a girl aged 9 and; F, a boy aged 5. She travelled on return tickets for which she paid cash the day before at a travel agency in East London. Her normal mobile telephone number was deactivated the previous day, 24 August. A new number was activated for her on the day of departure. She gave that number to only one person, her sister, N, from whose home the children and the mother departed to the airport. That number was never passed to her husband, the police or any other family member.

The children and the mother arrived in Europe at 17.30 hours on 25 August on a return ticket. They then travelled onwards to Istanbul, arriving later that day at 23.35 hours. They had all travelled on single fare tickets. The following day the mother took the 4 children by train from Istanbul to Konya, in South Central Turkey, where they stayed overnight in the private house of a woman whom they had met on the train. The train journey was about 700km. The next day they travelled by bus and train from Konya to Adana in Southern Turkey where they stayed for 2 nights in a hotel which had been booked for them by the mother’s sister, B. (B had fled to Syria with her husband and children in September 2014. B’s husband was on police bail at the time for suspected terrorism offences). On 29 August the mother travelled by taxi with the children from Adana to Kilis City which is on the Turkish Syrian border. The taxi was also arranged by B. Kilis City is an area of Turkey which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office strongly advise British citizens not to visit. It is, I am told, one of only two border crossings between Syria and Turkey which still remain open. The distance travelled from Adana to Kilis City is about 300km.

When the mother and the children arrived in Kilis City they were no longer in possession of the very substantial luggage which had accompanied them all the way since leaving London some days before. The children later told the police that their luggage had been taken to their aunt B (in Syria) separately from their travel with their mother. The mother and the children were apprehended by the police in Kilis City at approximately 23.00 hours and were detained by the Turkish police. That detention was as a result of the extremely close and effective collaboration between the authorities here, internationally and specifically Turkey. The convoluted path of travel to the Turkish border followed precisely the “textbook” advice given to individuals in publications such as “the Hijraj” for those wishing to travel to Syria undetected (for example the first leg of travel as a return ticket, the rest on single fares).

Back in London, on 25 August 2015, the father had arrived home from work as usual. The mother and children were clearly not at home. The father reports that he had gone to bed but became worried later that evening when he realised that the family had still not returned home, and was sufficiently concerned to contact members of the maternal family. The father was visited by his father-in-law, two sisters-in-law and an aunt. There was apparently much discussion about the whereabouts of the mother and the family. There is a substantial conflict of account as to what was said by the maternal family and the father, who maintained that he wished to contact the police immediately but was dissuaded from doing so by the aunt and the two sisters. Unusually, the father, who was very distressed, was persuaded to stay the night at the aunt’s home (it is said to give him comfort and support, although having heard the aunt I find that implausible). The father maintains that he was strongly persuaded not to call the police by the maternal family. It appears that it was whilst at the aunt’s house the father was finally able to contact his own brother who strongly argued and persuaded the father to report the disappearance of the family to the police, he did not do so until mid morning the next day.

The maternal grandfather and the father finally both spoke to the operator on a 999 call at 10.40am on 26/8/15. As a result 2 police officers attended the family home. I heard one in evidence, a most impressive and perspicacious witness. Towards the end of the interview between the family and police, it became clear to the police (from the grandfather and the father) that there was a possibility that the mother might have travelled to Syria. There was widespread media coverage. With the assistance of Interpol and the Turkish police, as I have already recorded, the children and the mother were located in Southern Turkey late on 29 August 2015. They were subsequently held in a detention centre before being deported to this country.

Whilst in some cases, especially early on when attempts were being made to grapple with the very difficult and complex issues which arise in a case such as this, there has been considerable and justified criticism about the absence of cooperation between police and local authorities; this case demonstrates precisely the opposite. The Local Authority were informed by the counter terrorism police that the children had been found and detained, but that High Court Wardship and Return Orders would be required in order to persuade the Turkish police to return the children to this jurisdiction. The Local Authority immediately convened a strategy meeting, sought and obtained without notice orders that day. I have already referred to the orders made by Cobb J on 1 September 2015. Since that time there has been close, collaborative and constructive working between the public authorities, not just in the safe return of the family to which I have just alluded, but also in the prompt disclosure of key materials (both in the sense of the police counter terrorism work, and the concurrent criminal proceedings) which have been of such enormous assistance to the Court. The matter was particularly raised by Hayden J in London Borough of TowerHamlets v M and others [2015] 2FLR and commented upon by the President on 8 October 2015. I especially want to record and praise the close level of intelligent cooperation and co-working which has been provided by the Metropolitan Counter Terrorism Police and the local authority in this case. It has been a model of its kind and has enabled the Court in a sensible and pragmatic fashion to review a wide canvass of materials held by the police and evaluate the very fundamental issues which arise in this case.

The mother and the children were returned to this jurisdiction on 3 September 2015. The mother was arrested, and the children were placed in police protection. They were and have remained placed together in foster care.

The without notice orders granted by a High Court Judge on 1 September 2015 were considered inter partes on 4 September 2015 when interim care orders were made and the wardship orders discharged. There had been enormous publicity over the disappearance of the mother and the children in the national newspapers and media, and as a result Cobb J issued a short press statement confirming that the children had returned, that there was Local Authority involvement and that the children’s welfare was being dealt with by a High Court judge.

Three of the children have significant health issues, the most serious being unresolved breathing difficulties. Three suffer with asthma. Additional urgent eye surgery at Moorfields Hospital has been necessary for two of the boys who were suffering from Keratonus. The children now are in good health, their medical needs being attended to.

Within the criminal proceedings the mother eventually filed a defence statement in the middle of February which asserted knowledge and consent of her trip to Turkey on the part of the father. She also asserted that the purpose of the trip was to “rescue” B and her children (who had left the UK in September 2014) from Syria and importantly that her family knew about the expedition (including her father and sister J). As I have already recorded the mother was convicted of child abduction and sentenced to 3 years in custody. During the currency of the care proceedings the mother has played a minimal part, not really engaging in the proceedings at all. I am satisfied having listened to mother with great care that that lack of engagement was nothing to do with her being in custody and everything to do with her approach not just to this case but more importantly to the issues raised within it. Whilst it is true that the mother filed a very short statement and response to the threshold triggers on 1 October 2015, it was only on the Friday before this hearing was scheduled to start that the mother filed a rather more extensive document. That document came about as a result of the Court being involved in arrangements for the mother to spend time with her legal team in the prison. Subsequently, during her evidence the mother contradicted many important passages in the statement. In any event, as a result it was essentially unknown what case the mother would be advancing for this hearing, and additionally the case advanced by the mother at trial has been different to that foreshadowed even in that most recent statement.

The Local Authority’s position before the Court when the first application was made was that the mother was engaged in a covert plan to remove the children from the jurisdiction, most likely to Syria, in pursuance of her fascination with radicalised Islamic thought and activity in Syria. The mother’s sister, B, left this country with her husband, Siddhartha Dhar, who it is said is a notorious ISIS fighter, and indeed is apparently known as the “new Jihadi John”. The Local Authority have produced, for example, a photograph of him identified in the British media in Syria in a provocative pose holding an AK47 in one hand and his newborn 5^th child in the other. The disclosure of information both from the children themselves, the police and the information and material supplied by them has led to a much more sophisticated and evolving schedule of findings now sought by the Local Authority, involving the mother’s political activities in the years leading up to her journey to the Middle East. Their evidence includes:

The evidence demonstrates that the mother has been involved for many years with groups who actively support the goals of ISIL. She is one of the leaders of a closed secretive group of British Muslim women who actively promote the political beliefs of ISIL. Until her departure from the UK last August the mother was one of the co-ordinators of the women’s supporters who organise pro-ISIL demonstrations and seek to recruit others to their cause. The mother took the children to demonstrations and “Islamic Roadshows” at different public venues around London where they were variously photographed in the presence of Siddhartha Dhar and Anjem Choudary and many other known political extremists. She was, in short, intimately connected with so-called “hate preachers”. The demonstrations (between October 2011 and May 2014) include demonstrations at the Syrian Embassy, the French Embassy, the Central Mosque, the Indian High Commission and Brick Lane.

Accordingly, the Local Authority seek to establish the following extensive findings of fact, which, because of their importance, I set out fully in Annex A to this judgment.

There is no doubt or dispute about the law to be applied in this a fact finding hearing. I apply Re B [2008] UKHL 35 and Re S-B [2009] UKSC 17. The principles are conveniently set out in the judgment of Baker J in Re L and M (Children)[2013] EWHC 1569 (Fam). For present purposes Baker J said:

"First, the burden of proof lies at all times with the local authority.

Secondly, the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

Third, findings of fact in these cases must be based on evidence, including inferences that can properly be drawn from the evidence and not on suspicion or speculation …

Fourthly, when considering cases of suspected child abuse the court must take into account all the evidence and furthermore consider each piece of evidence in the context of all the other evidence. The court invariably surveys a wide canvas. A judge in these difficult cases must have regard to the relevance of each piece of evidence to other evidence and to exercise an overview of the totality of the evidence in order to come to the conclusion whether the case put forward by the local authority has been made out to the appropriate standard of proof.

Fifthly, … Whilst appropriate attention must be paid to the opinion of … experts, those opinions need to be considered in the context of all the other evidence. It is important to remember that the roles of the court and the expert are distinct and it is the court that is in the position to weigh up the expert evidence against its findings on the other evidence. It is the judge who makes the final decision.

Sixth, … The court must be careful to ensure that each expert keeps within the bounds of their own expertise and defers, where appropriate, to the expertise of others.

Seventh, the evidence of the parents and any other carers is of the utmost importance. It is essential that the court forms a clear assessment of their credibility and reliability.

Eighth, it is common for witnesses in these cases to tell lies in the course of the investigation and the hearing. The court must be careful to bear in mind that a witness may lie for many reasons, such as shame, misplaced loyalty, panic, fear and distress, and the fact that a witness has lied about some matters does not mean that he or she has lied about everything (see R v Lucas [1981] QB 720)."

In the present case, this last point is of particular importance. I add to those points the amplification by the President in Re X (Children) (No 3) [2015] EWHC 3651 (Fam):

“First, that the legal concept of proof on a balance of probabilities "must be applied with common sense", as Lord Brandon of Oakbrook said in The Popi M, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds, Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Fenton Insurance Co Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 948, 956.

Secondly, that the court can have regard to the inherent probabilities: see Lady Hale in In re B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) (CAFCASS intervening) [2008] UKHL 35, [2009] 1 AC 11, para 31. But this does not affect the legal standard of proof, as Lord Hoffmann emphasised in the same case (para 15):

"There is only one rule of law, namely that the occurrence of the fact in issue must be proved to have been more probable than not. Common sense, not law, requires that in deciding this question, regard should be had, to whatever extent appropriate, to inherent probabilities. If a child alleges sexual abuse by a parent, it is common sense to start with the assumption that most parents do not abuse their children. But this assumption may be swiftly dispelled by other compelling evidence of the relationship between parent and child or parent and other children. It would be absurd to suggest that the tribunal must in all cases assume that serious conduct is unlikely to have occurred. In many cases, the other evidence will show that it was all too likely."

Thirdly, that the fact, if fact it be, that the respondent (here, the mother) fails to prove on a balance of probabilities an affirmative case that she has chosen to set up by way of defence, does not of itself establish the local authority's case. As HHJ Bellamy recently said in Re FM (A Child: fractures: bone density) [2015] EWFC B26, para 122, and I respectfully agree:

"It is the local authority that seeks a finding that FM's injuries are non-accidental. It is for the local authority to prove its case. It is not for the mother to disprove it. In particular it is not for the mother to disprove it by proving how the injuries were in fact sustained. Neither is it for the court to determine how the injuries were sustained. The court's task is to determine whether the local authority has proved its case on the balance of probability. Where, as here, there is a degree of medical uncertainty and credible evidence of a possible alternative explanation to that contended for by the local authority, the question for the court is not 'has that possible alternative explanation been proved' but rather it should ask itself, 'in the light of that possible alternative explanation can the court be satisfied that the local authority has proved its case on the simple balance of probability'."

The issue and the forensic context in that case differ from what confront me in the present case, but the point identified by Judge Bellamy is quite general, as exemplified, for example, by what Lord Brandon said in The Popi M, 951:

"… the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the ship was lost by perils of the sea, is and remains throughout on the shipowners. Although it is open to underwriters to suggest and seek to prove some other cause of loss, against which the ship was not insured, there is no obligation on them to do so. Moreover, if they chose to do so, there is no obligation on them to prove, even on a balance of probabilities, the truth of their alternative case."

All the above principles were reiterated by Munby P in the recent Syria related case In the matter of Re Y (No 3) [2016] EWHC 503 (Fam).

As is apparent, the Local Authority seek to establish the threshold triggers by relying principally on two aspects of the mother’s conduct: firstly, her involvement, association and activity with a) ISIL supporting groups and ideologies and b) associated individuals and demonstrations, thereby directly exposing and involving the children in those activities and ideologies: what has become known as “radicalisation”; secondly, the trip to Turkey and onwards to Syria (of itself) and as evidence of the first broad general category, the increased risk of harm being caused to the children by travelling to and intending to live in a “war zone”.

The mother contends that her activities were simply a result of her devout faith, and a belief in freedom of speech and expression (as well as the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations), she denies exposing the children to radical views (whether by her own conduct, beliefs or actions, or by association either whilst attending groups or demonstrations or through schools). It is therefore necessary to examine what is meant by the terms “extremism” and “radicalisation”.

“Extremism” in this context has been defined as … “the vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.” (“Channel Duty Guidance” pub. April 2015).

“Radicalisation” has been defined as “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extreme ideologies associated with terrorist groups”. (“Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales” pub. 16/7/15).

Each case must be decided on their own particular facts (para 64) Re X and Y (No 1) Munby P. As Holman J said in Re M (Children) 2014 EWHC 667 (Fam):

“The intended focus of the fact finding hearing this week was upon the physical treatment of the mother and the children while they were in Libya and in the early period after their return. There was no focus, as I have said, on this issue of "radicalising". "Radicalising" is a vague and non-specific word which different people may use to mean different things. There is quite a lot of material in this case to the effect that the elder of these children are committed Muslims who like to attend, and do attend, at a mosque and wish to display religious observance. This nation and our culture are tolerant of religious diversity, and there can be no objection whatsoever to any child being exposed, often quite intensively, to the religious practices and observance of the child's parent or parents. If and insofar as what is meant in this case by "radicalising" means no more than that a set of Muslim beliefs and practices is being strongly instilled in these children, that cannot be regarded as in any way objectionable or inappropriate. On the other hand, if by "radicalising" is meant, as appears in paragraph 12 of the draft addendum report that I have already quoted, "negatively influencing [a child] with radical fundamentalist thought, which is associated with terrorism" then clearly that is a very different matter altogether. If any child is being indoctrinated or infected with thoughts involving the possibility of "terrorism" or, indeed, hatred for their native country, which is England, or another religion, such as Christianity which is the religion of their grandparents and now, again, their mother, then that is potentially very abusive indeed and of the utmost gravity.”

“The interest of the individual child is paramount. This cannot be eclipsed by wider consideration of counter terrorism policy or operations, but it must be recognised that the decision which the Court is being asked to take can only be arrived at against an informed understanding of that wider canvass. It is essential that the Court be provided with that material in appropriate detail” (para 18, TowerHamlets v M and others [ibid, Hayden J).

Here, as I have already recorded, the Court has been enormously assisted by the close cooperation, intelligent and sensitive stance taken by the police and counter terrorism police in making available a significant quantity of focused, highly relevant material. In such cases it is absolutely essential that that is so to be able to properly understand and appreciate what has in fact occurred. The significance of such evidence cannot be overstated. As Hayden J said in Re Y (A Minor: Wardship) [2015] EWHC 2099 (Fam):

“Here we are concerned with 'distorted belief' but it is nonetheless pervasive and challenging to resist. In these circumstances therefore with a high risk of serious outcome it seems to me that the court is entitled to use the fullest measures at its disposal.”

The hearing has spanned several days; the Court hearing evidence from uniformed police who attended the home when the children first went missing, five members of SO15, Counter Terrorism Command, family members, two sisters, an aunt, the grandfather, the mother and the father. I have read the very substantial volume of papers and watched the two Channel 4 programmes: British Women Supporters of ISIS Unveiled (which the mother now accepts is about her very own women’s group) and Jihadis Next Door: both I believe have been broadcast recently. The Court has been especially assisted by the focused, skilful and helpful conduct of the advocates. Ruth Kirby with Zoe Taylor for the Local Authority have marshalled the considerable materials and set out their contentions in the Schedule of Findings (ibid), supplemented by focused written submissions.

The mother, through Richard Doman, does now accept in oral evidence that prior to September 2014 she had religious beliefs that could be categorised as “extreme” or “radical”. The mother does not accept, however, many of the resulting concomitant contentions made by the Local Authority. Specifically, the mother denies that the children were inappropriately exposed to or aware of the teachings ofSiddartha Dhar (or indeed the many other figures identified in this case). So whilst the mother cannot but acknowledge that the children have indeed attended demonstrations with her, she denies that she was aware, at all I think, but certainly as to the detail of their backgrounds and antecedents, and especially their views. Mr Doman submits that, whilst the mother acknowledges her membership of the sisterhood (as portrayed in the Channel 4 documentary British Women Supporters of ISIS Unveiled), she does not agree that she was a co-leader, nor that their activities were subversive. The text evidence from the mother’s phone and from the phone of another leading member of the sisterhood strongly suggests a leading role from 2009. An aspect of the case against the mother has been home schooling in conjunction with attendance at various academies (a further aspect it is contended of her extremism and radicalisation). The mother contends that her school choices were reasonable tuition centres, supported by her enquiries, believing them to provide a balanced curriculum, primarily motivated by their teaching of the recital of the Quran by native Arabic speakers,

Mr Doman strongly argues that the evidence (including that presented in the criminal trial) supports the mother’s contentions that there was a longstanding plan, developed by several family members (or in any event they knew), that she and the children would travel to meet B, with the aim of persuading her to return either to the UK or possibly Pakistan. The mother contends (as she said in her defence in the criminal trial) that the father knew of the planned trip. The mother strongly denies that her intention was to enter Syria. Mr Doman submits that the evidence relied on by the Local Authority (the mother’s beliefs, her actions, and her evidence) is insufficient for the Court to be able to conclude that the mother was indeed destined for Syria.

Ian Peddie QC submits that the father is an unsophisticated, poorly educated traditional man, from Pakistan, who, whilst a practising Muslim, is not devout. Their marriage was from his perspective a traditional one. The father does now acknowledge that the mother was devout and interested in all things Islamic, but did not know at the time that she was radical. The father says he rejects the views of radicals and support for ISIL. He agrees that the mother did from time to time ask to be permitted to attend Islamic meetings but that he had no idea of what in fact the mother was up to. Mr Peddie relies on the mother’s evidence that she became more radical and extreme between 2007 and 2014 and “got carried away” in her quest to please God and learn about religion. The father says that he was unaware of the mother’s fundamentalist views, or, importantly, that the children were exposed to them. Mr Peddie argues that the Court should accept the father’s evidence that he was unaware of the mother’s intentions or desire to remove the children to either Turkey or Syria. The father said:

“I trusted my wife, she’s lost that trust. She’s done something very wrong. She took my children to a warzone. I do not accept this.”

Mr Peddie makes the forceful point that, but for the father’s involvement of the authorities, it is likely that they would have crossed into Syria and may never have been returned.

Tara Vindis, on behalf of the children’s Guardian, submitted that neither parent demonstrated honesty in much of their evidence. She maintained short, focused and highly pertinent cross examination during the case, reflected in her helpful closing submissions.

I have already commented on the exceptional quality of the police evidence in this case. On 26 August 2015, as a result of the 999 call made that morning, police officers attended the family home. PC X was a remarkably impressive officer. He knew nothing, of course, at all about what had happened, or the family background. He was clear, however, that he was not getting proper answers from the father or grandfather, and had a strong impression that they did not want to assist the police, and were not telling everything, even to the extent that the grandfather omitted to mention one of his children, his daughter, B, who had gone to Syria. The father for his part was anxious to give the impression that the mother was not especially religious and spent most of her time at home.

Other evidence from counter terrorism officers explained the background and details of the men and women associated with the mother. In particular concentrating on the demonstrations attended by the mother or her group (they standing to one side, so that there was no “free mixing”), the demonstrations led by well known political activists (assisted on the front line by the children with whom I am concerned). Other attendees would frequently be the English Defence League, Britain First, and of course the Police in large numbers. The atmosphere no doubt was tense and highly charged, whipped up by political activists and so called hate preachers.

I rely on the comprehensive evidence produced to me, portraying as it does the backdrop to the mother’s historic and specific activities. It would to any ordinary citizen be alarming in the extreme.

I record some of the evidence simply to give a flavour of the character of each witness.

The mother’s sister, J, gave evidence. She detailed the especially close relationship between the mother and her sister B. She was aware of their closeness in ideology, detailing their regular attendance at the same women’s group. She was reluctant to talk about the parents’ marriage but did disclose that the parents argued about the mother attending outside events, sometimes the mother would ask permission to go, sometimes she would not. She was very clear that on their visit the night before to see the recuperating father (he had had an operation) she did not know that the mother was about to go to Turkey. Subsequently the father told her that the mother had wanted to go to Syria but he had refused her permission.

Overall I found J to be a reliable witness, her evidence was internally and externally consistent. She held herself apart from the complicated and unreliable family web. She was reluctant to talk about the dynamics between the mother and father, but overall I am satisfied that was in keeping with her wish to distance herself from the family generally.

The mother’s sister, Y, gave evidence. Her evidence from the very start was completely different to that of her sister, J. She was immediately and demonstratively evasive and reluctant. I bear in mind that she is yet the subject of an incomplete policy enquiry. Nonetheless I found her evidence unimpressive. She claimed that she did not know if the mother and family had left her house to go to the airport. (She thought that they might have been going shopping). When it was put to her that the taxi driver described suitcases she did not confirm it: “I saw no luggage”. Nor could she account for the taxi driver’s description of a black 5 seater Vauxhall parked outside her address, which she denied, she maintaining that he was mistaken; it was only much later that it emerged under cross examination by Ms Vindis that Y did in fact drive a black 5 seater, not of course a Vauxhall but something similar. She was unable to explain how the taxi driver could have recorded her address. Asked about B’s departure to Syria – she said she knew little or nothing about it – she was “busy with her own life and did not have the time to know”. She was “surprised and shocked” when she was told that the mother had not returned home. She was unable to offer any explanation about the mobile phones (other than she had helped the mother activate a new phone). She was completely unable to explain why she did not (at any time) give the father the telephone number which only she had (as she knew). The above are merely examples of her evidence. Overall I am satisfied that almost the entirety of what she had to say was evasive, improbable and untrue. Although she denied it, Z was the vital link in assisting the mother in her exit from this jurisdiction. A transcript of her evidence should be provided to the police for consideration along with their enquiries.

The maternal grandfather’s evidence (MGF) was heard with some difficulty. He was either late, or did not attend, kept the Court waiting and, when he finally did attend, was, to be blunt, awkward and shifty when answering any questions, very keen in fact to avoid any question put to him. Any difficult question would be met by “it’s out of my knowledge” or when asked about his daughter’s religious beliefs “it’s up to her”. He was not able to identify any particular problem with his grandchildren attending demonstrations (on being shown the photographs standing shoulder to shoulder with known terrorists), indeed rather took the view that it was the British Government who was at fault for permitting the demonstrations to occur in the first place. Whilst this is not a matter for the Court, let alone the MGF, I am told that it is something which might be revisited by the Government. My focus is the appropriateness or otherwise of the children attending such demonstrations and being exposed to such extreme influences. The mother describes the demonstrations as having a carnival atmosphere; a more inapposite description is difficult to imagine. I had to remind myself that the grandfather is a sophisticated and highly successful businessman. His evidence was unedifying, but was the clearest example that no one in this family was actively prepared to condemn the mother in her beliefs or actions, the repeated refrain being “it’s up to her, I have no direct knowledge”. It is in that way that the very extreme views of the mother can be said to have been nurtured, never once challenged or checked by those around her.

Overall, I find that the grandfather knew and knows very much more than he’s prepared to say. He was a poor unreliable witness.

The maternal great aunt gave evidence. She knew that the mother and her sister B were religious and had been politically active for 15 years. She was phoned by the father on the evening of the children’s disappearance and immediately went to him with two maternal aunts, J and Y. At no time did the sister, Y, say she had seen her that day (nor that she had her telephone number). Notwithstanding the thought that the mother may have gone to Syria, the MGA persuaded the father not to call the police in case for example, the family had visited a hospital in an emergency. She had not known that the grandparents were in touch with B (nor the mother), indeed had asked her to try and find out how B was, and the mother said she “didn’t know”. When she visited on 24 August (to see the recuperating father) there was no sign of any suitcases or packing. The great aunt told me that her sister lives in Dubai, which is surprising since the best information (from the police intelligence and one of the counter terrorism officers) is that she too is in fact in Syria. I had a strong impression that overall the great aunt was trying to be truthful, but that she was now (as she was last August) under pressure from the family. She thought that the mother had gone to Syria, that no doubt is why she asked the father to check for the (missing) passports. Whilst I do not doubt her charitable offer that night of a refuge for the father was fuelled by the father’s overwhelming distress, on balance it was also strongly fortified by the family desire (for different reasons) to prevent the father from involving the police in order to give the mother as much time as possible to make good her escape. It directly led to a delay of 11 hours, which might have been crucial in tracing, locating and apprehending the family before it was too late. Precious time was therefore lost.

The mother was in the witness box for a long time. I take into the fullest account the strain of these proceedings and of giving evidence, her forced separation from the children and her incarceration (a sentence of 3 years imprisonment). Today she is still torn between her undoubted love for the children on the one hand, and the drive of her beliefs. The mother now agreed that her mission had been political and extreme, but on the other hand maintained that she had since September 2014 substantially moderated and altered her views. I do not think that is so. She rejects democracy but accepts the paradox of attending marches (which she now acknowledges were radical) which preach hate (for example, “Democracy go to hell” and other very extreme proclamations) and is a fundamental tenet of the very society in which she lives, the very society which enables her the right to have those beliefs, teach her children those beliefs, express those beliefs publicly and dress as she chooses.

Whilst she was wedded to the ideal of an Islamic marriage, in practice it was little more than lip service. The father told me he had loved his wife. She did not repay the compliment, she had not loved him. She is strong willed, and evidently had little or no respect for him either. That she had no opinion of him whatever, is in part how her extremism was able to develop. Her interest had started years ago following the teachings of Omar Bakri, an interest she shared with her sister, B. By 2007 or 2008 in her own words she “got carried away”. She became a prime mover in the sisterhood, a clandestine exclusive group of pro-Sunni women organising “talks” and “coffee mornings”. But lest this might be likened to something akin to the Women’s Institute, nothing could be further from the truth. This was a highly organised group of focused women, with deliberate protective strategies organising, usually on short notice, less than 24 hours (to avoid the unwelcome gaze of others) attendance at extreme demonstrations or gatherings; the mother described the demonstrations as like a carnival, but as I have already commented, such a description is at best inapposite. The full measure of these occasions can be easily understood by just a few examples: promoting “Burn America Flag Day”, a lightning protest when in 2010 Omar Bakri was arrested in Lebanon, such was the collective outrage; or demonstrations (outside Belmarsh prison) and collecting funds to support Abu Hamza (subsequently convicted on 19/5/14 of terrorism offences in the US and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole). In fact, at the forefront of most of their gatherings were political activists (frequently Anjem Choudhury), most individuals charged or cautioned with serious criminal offences of violence (racially aggravated), seeking support for Islamic State, seeking money to be used for terrorism, inciting terrorism, soliciting murder (with a religious justification), engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts and many more. (The “dramatis personae” of 4/3/16 provided by the Local Authority helpfully records them and many other references). The mother says that all changed when B left for Syria in September 2014. The evidence however suggests otherwise, a lessening public role perhaps, but talks were still being delivered by the mother even in April 2015.

The mother now also says, under pressure, that the remarkable photographs of these young children at demonstrations angrily proclaiming hate were not in any event harmful, since the children did not and would not understand. Asked how she would view the children holding hands with known terrorists the mother blandly replied “I do feel bad”. The reality is evidenced by the extreme things said by the children whilst in foster care. The mother was unable to explain why in her statement signed the day before the hearing she completely denied exposing the children to radical views, but in evidence did now accept it.

A central issue is not the mother’s involvement in this group, which operates just below the legal threshold, but to what extent, if at all, the father knew. There is no evidence at all that he was involved. The mother says she asked her husband if she could attend: “I must have told my husband, I’m pretty sure I did”. The evidence supports the view that on occasion she did seek permission. But equally on many occasions she did not, either she saw no need, or she left from her parents’ home. On balance, partly through indifference and partly because she knew the father would disagree (as she said “I think my husband fundamentally disagrees with my views”). Weighing her evidence with his, I am satisfied that the father did not know the quantity or composition of the gatherings, and if he did, since it’s inescapable that the children must have said something (especially as C has frequently spoken since about their attendance and participation in such gatherings) was too weak to do anything about it.

In relation to the preaching of Anjem Choudary (the husband of Um Luqman who ran the sisterhood), the mother, realising the significance of his views and teachings (he is a founding member of ALM), replied “I must have heard him, but I’m not sure if I understood what he was saying, but I do know his views which are political to establish a caliphate worldwide”, an aspiration she shared, “it would be best for everyone. Sharia should be all over the world”. The responses were similar in relation to one of the talks she attended on the subject of homosexuality, describing it as a sin. When asked whether she agreed with or condemned the murder of homosexual individuals by ISIS, the mother responded “that she would need to look into it.” She was unsure, if the children attended secular schools, whether they might “catch it”, that is homosexuality. “It was a practice encouraged in the Western World”.

The mother’s extreme views shortly illustrated above were reflected in the education provided to the children, who were “home educated”. One of the children, D, has never been to school, and has led a sheltered, contained existence. The mother endeavoured to persuade me that he had not been so isolated since the child did sometimes meet other children (through knitting or Arabic classes) and they had additionally made educational visits to museums where they saw children. These children were deliberately kept apart from wider society. The other children had attended not schools but tutorial centres, one such being the Sideeq Academy run by Mohammed Rahman, convicted of soliciting murder (with a religious justification) and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment on 18 July 2007. The point about these establishments is not just their emphasis on Islamic studies (which could have been provided in the traditional state sector, supported out of school by the mosque) but also importantly they were not subject to the same checks as other schools, since they only provided “support” to home tuition. It was a perfect way of circumventing both the system and any awkward questions, and the mother knew it. In their turn they contributed to the children’s isolation and radicalisation. The children had a long and difficult journey to get there each day. The mother says she consulted the father in all things educational, but it is abundantly clear that she saw no reason to fully explain or justify her decisions, and her husband did not ask.

The mother was firm that B’s departure caused her (and her mother) much distress and she determined to rescue her; B, she said, had shaken her beliefs. The mother kept in touch with B (as had her parents, although they told almost no one). The mother said her purpose was to go and see B, and once she had seen her and the children, “B’s heart would melt and that would be enough” (to persuade her to return either to the UK or go to Pakistan). The mother was unable to adequately explain, or explain at all, the complicated, arduous and expensive journey taken. She was unable to explain why it was so surreptitious. The surrounding detail given by the mother was almost all in conflict with all the other evidence, whether it be who was told or who knew, her use of the telephones or even the contradictory, ludicrous and so obviously untrue evidence given by the mother of the father saying “goodbye” to the children before they left London on their long trip to Turkey. The mother was particularly vehement that she was not going to enter Syria. It was an area upon which she clearly felt most vulnerable; she was happy discussing religion or the sisterhood or the marches, the truth of which (as opposed to its interpretation) was not largely in issue. Her evidence on this aspect was noticeably different.

The mother is tough. Her evidence was uncompromising. She was a poor witness. The accounts mentioned are just a few examples of almost each area of her evidence. I do not consider her an accurate, reliable or truthful witness.

I confess to have found the father’s evidence troubling and disappointing. It was, to be blunt, difficult to discern the truth, to decide what was reliable and what was not. It is difficult to believe that the father was so disengaged in family life that he really had no idea what the mother was up to (as he says). He says that his wife’s overwhelming interest in matters Islamic had grown over the last few years and that he “was only told she was going to Islamic gatherings”. Having regard to the mother’s all consuming obsession and focus, and her barely concealed contempt for the father (as an individual), and her determination and will, on balance I find it more likely than not that he was infrequently consulted and almost certainly not told in any detail of the mother’s political activity. In his case a combination of a general reluctance to censure, let alone condemn, extreme beliefs (a common theme in this case), together with the most unequal and skewed marital dynamic, persuades me that it was so. Such factors understandably underpinned the father’s attitude and involvement in relation to home schooling and attendance at, for example, the Sideeq Academy. The father says he had to agree. He was on this area particularly convincing, his manner and responses being entirely different to much of the rest of his behaviour. I am sure on this aspect he was truthful.

The father is essentially a decent man, but weak. His wife (and family) have trampled all over him. His behaviour at the time of her departure (when he actively delayed (and misled) the police is strong evidence of this.

I do not, however, believe the father when he says that he did not know of the mother’s radical views. Whereas, I am sure she did not frequently speak about it to him (she says he would strongly disapprove), nonetheless he knew of her closeness to B (he says she was alright when she went to Syria in September 2014). I also take into account J’s evidence where the father (according to her) had refused permission to the mother to go to Syria. He knew where they had likely gone, hence his hysteria that night.

Having listened closely to the father, whilst in relation to some areas he was obviously untruthful (doing his level best to persuade me that he was never at home), I was left with additional underlying anxiety, about which there has already been some enquiry, about his level of cognitive functioning. The father needs assessing again, perhaps by someone who is culturally and linguistically able to evaluate his responses.

This case came to the attention of the authorities because the police were notified by the father that the mother and the children had gone missing. The prompt and cooperative action of the international agencies identified the family at the Turkish border with Syria and amidst much publicity they were retuned to the UK. Only subsequently was the fuller picture about the mother revealed, as a result of the “intelligent cooperative working” of the Metropolitan Police and the Local Authority. Much of that background (about the mother) is essential to an understanding of the core dispute, was the trip to be to Turkey or Syria? And what were the mother’s intentions? Much of the background and the consequent findings sought by the Local Authority can not be denied, apart from detail or emphasis.

The root of the mother’s ability to pursue her increasingly consuming interest in all matters Islamic founds in the unequal relationship between the mother and the father; she educated and articulate, brought up in the UK: he a much simpler man, brought up in Pakistan. Whilst they shared ideas, whether religious or cultural, their perception of a “traditional marriage” was at odds. The mother adhering to the ideal, only infrequently applying it to the reality of her marriage (she having little respect for her husband in fact); whereas the father’s traditional perspective, founded in his upbringing and background, permitted the mother to, in effect, run rings around him, much as she has endeavoured to do with the Court, rarely answering any question which she saw as damaging to her case directly.

The mother does now accept (but only from the witness box) that her beliefs could be described as “extreme” or “radical”. That she attended many demonstrations, and publicised or disseminated information about others cannot be disputed, as the evidence produced by the counter terrorism and police so vividly demonstrated. The mother has been a follower of Omar Bakri for upwards of 15 years (something she shared with her sister B), (she referring to him as “the noble Sheikh”). He was a founder of ALM. Generally, however, her interest, indeed all consuming focus and passion, appears to have really gathered momentum from 2007 or 2008. In evidence the mother admitted that the undercover Chanel 4 documentary “British Women Supporters of ISIS Unveiled” was indeed of the very women’s group in which she played either a leading role or at least a prominent one. It is worth reflecting on the information which is available (which in reality may only be the tip of the iceberg); the demonstrations were spearheaded by well known terrorists or suspected terrorists (so called “hate preachers”), for example promoting the demonstration outside the Lebanese Embassy after the arrest of Sheikh Omar, or the organised protest (by the sisterhood) outside Belmarsh Prison upset at the arrest of Abu Hamza.

The photographs and evidence illustrate angry protests outside variously the Syrian, French, Iranian and Saudi Arabian Embassies. Many of the sisters are married to prominent politically active leaders. The evidence shows that Um Luqman was a prominent figure (the leader?) in the sisterhood, she is married to Anjem Choudhury; both figures have featured prominently in the mother’s life. The evidence from the text messages supports the contention that she and the mother had prominent leadership responsibilities in the sisterhood. The eldest son, C, said he had attended thousands of demonstrations. In evidence the mother endeavoured to distance herself from those, and other figures, and the messages which they conveyed by shying away from the ideologies or methodology, but her support for the teachings of Omar Bakri and Anjem Choudary is clear. The photographs speak for themselves, and for what the mother clearly believes, “Islamic State the only solution for Syria” and “Muslims will destroy the crusade and establish the Islamic State”. The mother attending, and the children playing a central role. At the vanguard of many marches and demonstrations, many of which she helped organise, were men actively preaching support for ISIL and its achievements, often accompanied by the IS flag and flanked on many occasions by the children with whom I am concerned, even on occasion holding their hands.

That the mother has shared her extreme beliefs with the children there can also sadly be no doubt either. C, in foster care, expressed terrible views about, for example, the Paris attacks. The 9 year old, E, when asked about Syria said “And that’s where I’m dreaming to live cos its all the Muslims”, “a plan to try for Syria one day” and also said “trying to avoid England cos England has been harsh to Muslims and the police can like track you down or something”. “I think the government blocked her phone”. The mother got A to write to Simon Keeler in prison. (He had been convicted of offences arising from demonstrations in support of ALM). Keeler responded that he missed “the brothers” and asked A to pass on his wishes to them.

Part of the children’s isolation and radicalisation has been nurtured by the mother (and before she went to Syria, the maternal aunt) being able to have tutors, with little or no effective supervision or oversight from the education authorities. The mother was involved in the establishment of the Sideeq Academy and two of the children attended until it was closed. D has never attended an outside establishment. (The Academy was able to run with little or no inspection because it supported home tuition and was not classified as a school).

Overall therefore I am satisfied that up to the point of Siddartha Dhar’s escape in September 2014 the mother, through her interest and involvement in the group, and by virtue of her close family relationship, through her sister (who held similar beliefs) was well aware of, and took an active part in, the political Islamic movement spearheaded by these well known individuals referred to earlier in this judgment. There is no evidence that the mother became less religious after September 2014; the father denied that she was upset at B’s departure and B apparently claimed (at least according to the mother and the grandfather) to be very excited, content and happy in her new environment. I therefore find 1-3 of the Findings sought established. Except that whilst a traditional man I do not find that the father shared the mother’s extreme views and will comment on that later. I do not find that the mother herself was a co-leader of the sisterhood. Her role might be more accurately described as a prominent lieutenant.

I have little doubt that the departure of B to Syria (the mother’s sister, pregnant with her fifth child) was a great event in the family. There is a fascination by this family with Syria. The evidence suggests that the Great Aunt’s own sister also fled to Syria in 2014. Her evidence that her sister lived in Dubai was frankly as implausible as it was untrue (even C at 12 was clear that he looks forward to seeing his Great Aunty (and B (in Syria) as soon as they are able to travel; indeed that he was saving money for a future trip to see his cousins).

The mother still maintained that the trip (partially organised by B) was a “rescue mission”, probably not to the UK, where B would likely face arrest and imprisonment, but more likely to Pakistan. The difficulty with that unlikely plan, apart from its sheer improbability and indeed impracticability, is that every other piece of evidence strongly points to a wholly different conclusion.

Had this been a rescue bid, the mother would have discussed it with her family (whom she claims were distressed at B’s departure); sought financial assistance from them; taken a direct route; not taken quantities of luggage (including winter clothes); would not have taken the children and put them at severe risk (possibly even of death); would not have activated a new “dedicated” and secret phone; would have said goodbye, or left a note, and in any event would have notified someone of her safe arrival. When stopped she said “I am in Turkey and I have been caught/arrested”, pointing at least to one interpretation or translation that she had in fact “been caught”.

The mother was especially forceful about not intending to enter Syria. I have concluded ultimately that that was because it went to the very root of her purpose.

The mother has run the care case (and it seems the criminal case) “to the wire”, all documents were served at the 11^th hour; not only were her witness requirements not known until the first day of the hearing (including continuing uncertainty until 9 March as to whether the children would be required to give evidence), but her case set out in her witness statement (prepared the day before the hearing) was significantly at odds with the case presented at trial. The mother is tough and uncompromising. She has little or no opinion of people who do not share her views (including the father). Her arrogance is matched by that displayed by her own father. The mother’s evidence has demonstrably been inconsistent, such that I am sure that she has told many lies, as I set out below.

Simple examples, amongst many, are the assertions that the father knew of the trip and elaborate evidence of how and when the children said goodbye to him. All the evidence shows precisely the opposite as the mother was forced to admit. I have little doubt that the father knew she wished to go to Syria, but do not conclude at all that he knew of her plan. Early on in her evidence she endeavoured to deny her later clear beliefs in the establishment of a caliphate governing the world under Sharia law, and the abolition of democracy.

Pulling those strands together, the mother’s explanations are completely implausible and improbable. Taking account of the unlikelihood , conflict and inconsistencies in her accounts, all those factors point to the clear conclusions that she has not told the truth. Of course I remind myself (as in R v Lucas) that untruthfulness might conceal some other explanations, shame, loyalty, panic, fear, embarrassment or distress, all of which could apply here; it does not mean that the mother has lied about everything. However, bearing those possibilities in mind, I nonetheless conclude that she has lied for one purpose, to disguise her real intentions. At each stage, she has sought to minimise her role (for example, in the sisterhood), has sought to distance herself from the preachers and leaders with whom she was intimately connected (and whom she obviously supported). Almost all of her evidence in relation to the trip to the Middle East was inconsistent, unreliable, contradictory, and against all reason or sensible explanation. I have come to the clear conclusions that the remaining findings sought in relation to the mother (paragraphs 3, 5, 6 and 13) have been made out both in relation to her actions and in exposing the children to her radical views (whether it be free mixing, alcohol, homosexuality, democracy, Judaism and more worryingly how and in what way Sharia and the caliphate should be established across the world). M’s views about the Paris murders are chilling. There is the clearest, strong evidence (whether it be from the photographic evidence, all the way to what the children have said whilst in foster care) that they have been exposed to such thoughts and have adopted them. The mother’s explanation that M had assimilated all those views from a glancing look at a television programme one evening is simply ludicrous. It follows therefore that I also find in relation to the mother paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 established.

I have already expressed my disappointment and anxiety about the father’s evidence, he was an unsatisfactory, impenetrable and largely unconvincing and I am afraid untruthful witness. Whilst he did not avoid answering questions, his responses were not illuminating. I am still not convinced that was in some way not contributed to by his mode or level of functioning.

It is perfectly obvious that on the night and following morning of his family’s disappearance he was persuaded to delay and delay. He deliberately lied and misled the police, valuable time was, as a result, lost. Was that because he was part of the plan, or supported the plan, or was he suborned by the maternal family, who are of course his own relations?

There is no evidence at all (apart from the mother’s which I reject as all the evidence asserts the opposite) that he was “in it” or supported it, and I am sure that the actions of the family (and the great aunt in taking him to her house) were designed to give the mother as much time as possible. They knew completely what was involved, having been through it twice before. The father’s proper instincts were again suborned by the maternal family, not because his mind “wasn’t working” (as he repeatedly maintained from the witness box), but because he is essentially weak. His extreme distress was founded in his belief that the family had gone to Syria (she had previously asked him according to the sister). He has still failed to give a plausible explanation for his prevarication.

The wider family were well aware of the mother’s extreme and developing views. I have little doubt that the father knew too, no doubt that was why he told the Police Constable at least initially, that the mother was not religious, it is inconceivable that he did not know of the mother’s perspectives. I do not equate that however to necessarily being in sympathy with those views. The mother was sure he did not share her views, there is no evidence that he did. All the evidence points to a weak man, overwhelmed by his wife, her family and her circumstances. His attempts in evidence to limit the time he spent at home was unconvincing, it was plainly untrue (even in the first exchanges). He very obviously did spend time with the children, he is a kindly and interested man, it is inconceivable that they in turn would not have said something to him about the demonstrations (the children have never asserted that they could not/must not discuss demonstrations). It is equally inconceivable (having regard to what the children have said since) that they would also not have expressed extreme thoughts and ideations.

The father has not told me the truth. I am uncomfortable and suspicious of his motives, but I cannot rule out the distinct possibility that he is unquestioning, unimaginative and accepting, borne down by the mother who is tough and focused. There is a significant cultural (as well as ideological) gap between the parents. The father has turned a blind eye (to that limited extent paragraph 12 is made out). He is responsible by association, knowing of the mother’s extreme beliefs, but allowing her, unchallenged, to make and implement all the educational decisions; paragraph 10 is established in that way. He has abdicated his responsibility for the children; the delay was only one small example of that. I do not find paragraph 14 established, except to the extent that the father has constantly lied, and misled the police, the authorities and the Court about his knowledge of the mother’s radical views. I am unable at this stage to say why that might be.

I remind myself that the burden in every sense falls on the Local Authority. In relation to finding 2, the father knew the mother held extreme views, but there is no evidence that he shared those views. In the broadest sense he was responsible and knew (but I doubt he knew the full extent) of the mother’s involvement, with whom they were associating, or their beliefs. It was incumbent on the father to protect his children, whilst his conduct in common with many in this case seeks to avoid condemning the mother’s attitudes and beliefs; that does not absolve him. I find paragraph 4 of the Findings established.

All the evidence demonstrates the father knew the mother wished to go to Syria. There is no evidence that he knew that she was going to do so, or that he was part of any planning process. I find 8b made out against the father and taking into account his evidence, paragraph 9.

This is not the end of the story. The father needs to reflect on the Court’s findings. He needs to be clear about his priorities above all, he needs to tell the truth. Until he does so, any hope that the children can be returned to his care becomes more remote. There needs to be further urgent assessments of the father.

The mother has lied to professionals and the Court as to

The father has lied to the police, professionals and the court as to

On 29 September 2015, the SENCO at F’s school reported that F had been yelling a word which meant ‘shame’ whenever he saw a woman in a dress.

On 16 November 2015, following the mass shootings in Paris, C told his teacher that he believes

On 6 January 2016, C sent a letter to his mother expressing a strong desire to see his cousins who live in Syria with Siddartha Dhar and maternal aunt B. He also wished to see MGA2’s children (MGA’s sister’s children).