B v B

This is an application for the summary return of a child, A, a girl who was born on 24 January 2005, to her homeland of Lithuania pursuant to the terms of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980, which has been incorporated into the law of the United Kingdom by the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 and which has been reinforced by the regulation made by the European Council, number 2201 of 2003, which is usually known as Brussels II Revised (BR2).

The Hague Convention of 1980 is arguably the most successful ever international treaty and it has over 90 subscribers to it, over half the countries in the world. The underlying and central foundation of the Convention is that, where a child has been unilaterally removed from the land of her habitual residence in breach of someone’s rights of custody, then she should be swiftly returned to that country for the courts of that country to decide on her long-term future.

There are very few exceptions to this and the exceptions that do exist have to be interpreted very narrowly in order that the central premise of the Convention is not fatally undermined. It is important to understand what the Convention does not do. The Convention does not order a child who has been removed in the circumstances I have described to live with anybody. The Convention does not provide that the parent who is left behind should, on the return of the child, have contact or access in any particular way. The Convention does not provide that, when an order for return to the child’s homeland is made, the child should stay there indefinitely. All the Convention provides is that the child should be returned for the specific purpose and limited period to enable the court of her homeland to decide on her long-term future. That is all it decides.

Where exceptions come into play, such as for example the exception mentioned in Article 13 of the Convention, which is that the child objects to being returned and has attained a degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account her views, the type and nature of the exception has to be examined in the context of the limited objectives of the Convention. It must be a sound, reasoned and mature objection to being returned to her homeland for the sole limited purpose of enabling the court of that country to determine her long-term future. Equally, if the exception that is relied on is that there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place her in an intolerable situation, that again has to be seen through the lens of the objective of the Convention. We are not talking here about long-term risks. We are not talking here about long-term harm. We are talking about risks and harm that would eventuate only in the period that it takes for the court of the child’s homeland to determine her long-term future and to impose the necessary safeguards, if necessary, in the interim.

That particular exception has been heavily qualified by Regulation 11(4) of B2R which provides that it does not operate if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the protection of the child after her return. That in turn is strengthened yet further by the fact that both Lithuania and the United Kingdom are active subscribers to the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children.

By Article 11 of that Convention, the authorities of any contracting state in whose territory the child is present have jurisdiction to take any necessary measures of protection and, by Article 23, those measures shall be recognised by operation of law in all contracting states. In a case where a risk of harm under Article 13 of the 1980 Convention is suggested, if the countries in question are both subscribers to the 1996 Convention, measures can be ordered here - and I will do so in this case - which provide the necessary protection and which, by operation of the Council Regulation, remove the availability of that defence.

Having made those preliminary remarks, I turn to the facts of this case. The mother and father were married in Lithuania on 5 December 2004. They are both Lithuanian, although I have read in the papers that the mother is of Russian origin but she has confirmed to me she is a Lithuanian citizen. Their daughter, as I have said, was born on 24 January 2005. The parties were divorced on 24 January 2011 and a final order was made by the Ukmerge District Court on 22 May 2013 which granted the mother, to use the old language, custody and which granted the father, to use the old language, access. It is apparent that an earlier order was made on 22 December 2010 to the same effect.

There has been a dispute between the parties as to whether that order granted the father rights of custody within the terms of the 1980 Convention and the mother has told me that she has been told by a lawyer and indeed by a judge that the terms of the order gave her the unrestricted right to remove their daughter to this country. However, the only expert evidence that has been permitted by the orders of this court is that which was procured from Mindaugas Vaiciunas of the firm Vaiciunas & Vaiciunas, who has produced a report of 31 March 2014, in which he confirms in para.37 that:

In para.41, he says:

According to the expert, the operative decision which granted and dealt with custody and access in the manner which I have described, is the order of 22 December 2010.

Following the separation, the mother lived in her own apartment in which her grandmother lived as well. She is the lady referred to as “Bubba” in the papers with whom the child,has a good and happy relationship. The mother came to this country unilaterally on 16 December 2013. That was two days after the last occasion on which the applicant had contact with his daughter. The father made a complaint to the police after the removal, but the police concluded, in a decision dated 29 November 2013, that no crime had been committed and declined to start pre-trial investigations against the mother.

The mother alleges that the father agreed to her coming to this country.

It is plain that the reason she came to this country was as an economic migrant and of course, had their daughter not been involved, that would have been entirely within her rights under the freedom of movement guaranteed by the common membership of this country and Lithuania of the European Union.

She says in her statement to the court dated 22 February:

She also says she informed the school in Lithuania that she was going to come and live in this country to work. In his statement in reply, the father says this:

Thus, the first defence is raised by the mother. The Convention, as I have already stated, gives the court a discretion to refuse to return a child for the purpose enshrined in the Convention if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained the age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of her views.

Having regard to the competing accounts of consent and dispute of consent,

In my judgment, the mother does not satisfy me, in circumstances where the burden is on her, that the father consented. On the contrary, the father’s subsequent conduct is at complete variance with consent. The first thing that he did after having discovered that the mother had left was to report the matter to the police on 19 November 2013. Secondly, he promptly made this application for the child’s return. Thirdly, if this was a true, consensual situation, one would have expected the mother to have been far more open with the father about where she was and what she was doing, but in fact, until these proceedings were commenced, her activities were shrouded in secrecy. Fourthly, following the removal, the mother did not supply the father with her address or contact details or even a telephone number, so far as I am aware. This is inconsistent with a consensual arrangement.

In my judgment, the evidence here comes nowhere near establishing that this was a situation of consent and so that defence is rejected. The next defence, is the question of the child’s objections. The objections in question must be of appropriate maturity having regard to the terms of the Convention and they must be an objection to being returned to the homeland for the purposes of the courts there working out as soon as may be possible what is in the child’s best interests. That is not the same as an objection to being returned to Lithuania per se, let alone is it the same as an objection to being returned to the care of the other parent.

In this case, the child’s objections have been the subject of a report from

Para.28:

In para.35, Mr. McGavin said

At 36:

In his oral evidence to me, Mr. McGavin said that it was very difficult to form a proper conclusion and he was satisfied that A was not able to understand the subtleties and nuances of the objection contemplated by the Convention, namely an objection to being returned for a specific limited purpose and period to her homeland for welfare adjudication there. He stated to me that, at all times in the interview, she was very anxious and there was a significant lack of substance to her objections.

In my judgment, the objections such as they are of A as recorded by

The third defence is that the child would be exposed to an unacceptable or intolerable risk of harm, physical or psychological, or otherwise. In this regard, the defence is taken off the table and becomes unavailable if, as I have mentioned, under Article 11.4 of the Brussels II Revised Convention, I am satisfied there are sufficient safeguards in place on the return.

Here, as I have mentioned, it is possible for me, under Article 11 of the 1996 Convention, to impose those very safeguards. The safeguards which I will impose will ensure that there is no risk as mentioned in Article 13(b), so that defence will not be available.

It therefore follows, the defences not being available and I being satisfied that the removal was in breach of the father’s rights of custody, that an order for the return of A forthwith must be made. It is perhaps of some interest that the Convention does not specify a minimum or maximum time period within which a child should be returned, but uses the ambiguous phrase “forthwith” instead.

In my judgment, it is reasonable to give the mother three weeks to return - that is, until 10 June - for a number of reasons. She will need some time in order to arrange her affairs here, perhaps to seek to negotiate a sabbatical from her job, to let A down gently, to arrange for her schooling to be brought to a temporary end. Beyond that, it is necessary for the mother to have sufficient time to instruct a lawyer in Lithuania to take proceedings there on her behalf seeking what she should have done in the first place, namely permission from the court in Lithuania to relocate to this country. The mother should understand that that is the steps that she should have taken. She should have proceeded lawfully rather than unlawfully in the first place. Beyond that, three weeks may give the mother an opportunity to obtain an urgent interim hearing in the Lithuanian court before 10 June which allows her to stay here.

I cannot consistently with the terms of the Convention, which requires a forthwith return, go longer than three weeks, but within three weeks it may be possible for the mother to instruct a lawyer and to get before the Lithuanian court, seeking an interim order permitting her to stay in this country until the final decision is made. If that order is made, then of course the order for return that I am going to make will be superseded. The order that Mr. Hames will draw up will specifically provide for that.

If no order is made by the Lithuanian court permitting the mother to stay here, then she must return with A on 10 June 2014. However, I will make orders pursuant to Article 11 of the 1996 Convention in the following terms:

Those are the orders which will be made against the father. There will be an order made against the mother that she will not remove A from Lithuania pending an order from the Lithuanian court.

Those are my rulings.