Gloucestershire County Council v M

In proceedings that were started on 14^th November 2013 Gloucestershire County Council seeks care and placement orders in relation to Ch, who is nine months old having been born on 13^th August 2013. Both of Ch’s parents have parental responsibility for him and, therefore, the Local Authority also applies to dispense with the consent of both parents to Ch being placed for adoption on the grounds that Ch’s welfare so requires.

Ch’s mother is F who is aged 25 having been born on 1^st December 1988. His father is F who is aged 29 having been born on 9^th May 1985. Ch is currently in the interim care of the Local Authority and living with foster carers. Prior to the 16^th April 2014 he had been living with his mother under interim care orders in a joint foster placement after the ending on 26^th February 2014 of a residential assessment with his mother at Crown House in Malvern.

This final hearing started on 1^st April 2014 but exceeded its time estimate and therefore resumed on 7^th May 2014 for a further five days. There have been many changes in the evidence and in the parties’ positions as this case has developed.

Summary of the case – F and M remain married to each other but are currently separated and, M says, will be divorced. A report by a psychologist, Dr Hutchinson, was filed part way through this hearing and identified that F suffers from autism spectrum disorder. The facts of the case reveal behaviour by him that is a very clear manifestation of that disorder, behaviour which in an unaffected individual might be labelled as being immature, obsessively self centred, extreme and without social boundaries. The facts of the case also reveal M to be an untruthful woman who lacks emotional fortitude and adherence to truth and who also has a tendency to follow the paths of immediate convenience and expediency (as the guardian agreed in her oral evidence).

Four years prior to Ch’s birth F had pleaded guilty to two offences of downloading child pornography. He had also admitted that at the age of 15 he had sexually abused his 8 year old step-brother (for which he was not prosecuted). As a consequence the parents did not live together immediately after Ch’s birth because the Local Authority wanted to obtain a risk assessment from a Mr Steven Lowe in order to decide whether it would be safe for Ch to reside with both of his parents. And so, for nearly three months after his birth, Ch was in the sole care of M. The assessment of risk, which has been shown by subsequent events to have been lacking in its analysis, suggested that the parents could safely reunite and care for Ch together. On 11^th November, four days after the risk assessment report was written and 6 days after the parents reunited, Ch was brought to hospital having suffered non accidental bruising to his face. Neither parent suggested any particularly level of discord between them during those six days; however the father accepts that he left the video recording mechanism on a phone running in the spare bedroom on 11^th November when he left the house because he feared that the mother would engage in sexual activity there with another man.

On the fourth day of this hearing (7^th May) and after being given very clear warnings by me throughout my involvement with this case of the need to tell the whole truth about the events of 11^th November 2013, the mother filed evidence suggesting that she caused the bruising. She suggested that she did so by turning Ch’s slightly plagiocephalic head with her hand in a firm grip; that suggestion by her had begun to develop in a fourth statement that she filed on the 2^nd April 2014 in which she said that she could not remember turning Ch’s head on the 11^th November but might have done so, albeit without excessive force.

The mother’s account of the bruising came after the lead expert, Dr George Rylance, had given evidence and written a number of reports to the effect that the injuries were non accidental and must have occurred within a timeframe that put the responsibility for them firmly on the mother. Her fourth statement, when it arrived, was sent to Dr Rylance (who had by then finished his oral evidence) and he rejected it as providing any plausible explanation for the injuries; by then the mother had also given a number of previous suggestions about possible causation which, too, were rejected with ease. The doctor further made it plain that it was not plausible to suggest that the injuries occurred before 6 a.m. on 11^th November (from which time Ch was in the sole care of the mother until brought for medical attention that day).

Prior to the hearing and unavoidably the parents both accepted that the bruising was non accidental and suggested in court and on paper that the other parent must have been responsible. The mother’s response to the threshold document said that she accepted that the injuries were non accidental and were caused by one or other of the parents and that she was therefore ‘driven by logic’ to say that the injuries must have been caused by F.

Thus the mother’s account on 2^nd April and in May was late, in contradiction to the way that she had presented her case before the hearing started and also arose only after the expert had given evidence. What is more, her account of how she caused the injury (firmly turning his head) was obviously untrue, I find; it did not stand up to any scrutiny when it was tested in typically skilful cross examination by Mr Farquharson on 8^th May 2014. On the evidence of Dr Rylance (and in all common sense), her actions as described from the witness box would not have caused this bruising; she suggested gentle and guided turning of his head. Given the timing and her admissions of responsibility it is equally plain that she did cause the bruising and that she did so non-accidentally.

Of course the burden of proof is on the Local Authority and the standard of proof required is the civil standard – the balance of probabilities. But the position is so obvious that, on the evidence that I have heard, I am satisfied well beyond the civil standard of proof that M caused the bruising and did so non accidentally. I give more details of the evidence about the bruising later in this judgment. The precise mechanism of injury cannot be stated (and it is not for anyone to guess) but it involved the use of excessive force and would have resulted in distress that she would have observed in Ch. Since 11^th November she has known precisely how the injury happened and, persistently, has given untruthful evidence about it.

Thus the immediate reason for the issue of the proceedings was non accidental injury caused to this child by the mother. Her attempt to blame the father for the bruising and her misleading of so many people in the face of clear warnings from me about the need to tell the truth add significantly to the reasons for professionals to say that she cannot be trusted. Further, by failing to tell the truth and her past attempts to deflect responsibility on to F, M has left him with a very strong and justifiable sense of grievance; that has served to fan his obsessive behaviour and lack of engagement with the court and professionals (because he knew, of course, that he could not have caused the injury for which the mother was attempting to blame him for much of these proceedings).

Following a contested hearing on 23^rd December 2013, mother and child went to Crown House in Malvern. The mother told the workers there that she had separated from F and complained to them about his behaviour. In fact, during the placement there, their commitment to each other continued and they engaged in an attempt to deceive professionals about their relationship – the mother presenting herself as a victim of F’s approaches and harassment whilst, on the other hand, encouraging those approaches in her very frequent communications with him. In her oral evidence in May 2014, the mother continued to give a false and contradictory account of her relationship with F whilst at Crown House. She sought to revert to suggesting that she was a victim of F’s harassment whilst there, whereas her own written evidence, admissions at and after an interim hearing on 7^th January 2014 and text messages make it plain that she was collusively and deceptively encouraging his attentions.

The placement at Crown House ended with a recommendation that Ch should not return to the community with M and that alternative arrangements should be made for his care. That recommendation was made as a result of five main things. First, the constant and destructive interference by F with Crown House and with the mother (in particular his harassment of workers by email and telephone). Secondly, the deception perpetrated by the parents about their relationship that ultimately became known with the result that the assessment only just continued after 7^th January. Thirdly, the failure of M to work honestly with professionals generally. Fourthly, the likelihood that they would not work with professionals in the future. Fifthly, the unresolved injury to Ch.

After the breakdown of that placement it was agreed that mother and baby should go to a foster placement pending the final hearing. There the mother’s care of Ch was good but there was a constant barrage of destructive behaviour by F towards the mother and the Local Authority. Injunctions prohibiting him from contact with M were ignored by F and, consistently with his disorder, he showed no appreciation of the consequences of his actions for Ch and the mother. He tracked her down whilst there although, once again, the parents maintained an exchange of affection through text messages and meetings and intended that their relationship should continue.

On 25^th March 2014, M announced without forewarning to F that the marriage between the parents was at an end and thus their proposal to care for Ch jointly ended also. That announcement came seven days before this hearing began; the evidence leaves me entirely unpersuaded that there can be any certainty that these two parents will maintain separation in the future, for reasons that will become apparent.

In a statement filed shortly before the hearing started in April [C362], M said that she believes that ‘there is a real risk’ that F will use any opportunity that he can to harass her. That assessment by her is plainly right if they do remain apart save that, for the words ‘real risk’ the words ‘very strong probability’ must be substituted.

In the lead up to the final hearing on 1^st April 2014, the Local Authority was proposing that Ch should reside with his maternal great aunt, D, under a special guardianship order. However, in the light of the increasingly disruptive behaviour of F, and D telling the social worker on the Friday before the hearing started on Tuesday 1^st April 2014 that she wished to withdraw, the Local Authority concluded that care and placement orders should be made. Thus the care plan changed just before the case started – an example of the suddenness of this is that no placement application had been made before the case started on 1^st April 2014 (although it has now).

Over the weekend before the case started D considered her position further. She attended the court at the start of the hearing on 1^st April and said that, after all, she did wish to be considered as a carer of Ch. I made her a party. She remained in court and participated in the hearing, having told me that she had spoken to her solicitor. Ms Claire Rowsell, counsel, attended on 2^nd April 2014 to represent her. I gave an opportunity for D to discuss matters with Ms Rowsell on 2^nd April. On the afternoon of that day D indicated that she was retiring from the case and was not wishing to pursue any applications in relation to Ch. In the light of what she heard and knew about F’s behaviour it was not remotely surprising that she did so; D has other responsibilities – she cares for her 22 year old (who has learning difficulties) and also for her seven year old child, E. She is involved in unresolved financial remedy proceedings and has been involved in private law litigation over E. The court was told by Ms Rowsell that D accepted that she ‘could not keep Ch safe’ and that she would ‘never be free’ of F. D told me directly (in April) that she was 100% sure that the decision that she was making was correct.

However, D came back into the case because, by May 2014 when the case resumed, it had become M’s case that she should care for Ch with the assistance of D and other members of her family. D filed a statement (now at C507) setting out her support for M (who is now living with her). She said that, since M began to live with her on the 16^th April, she (M) has changed considerably. She said that she thinks that M has not done anything wrong; she may have told a few lies, D said, but was in shock. D said that M may think that she caused the injury but that is a matter of her putting two and two together based on the medical evidence. D made her own doubts about the causation of the injury by M very clear in her evidence. She suggested that M would continue to work and that she, D, would assume responsibility for Ch for much of the time (and could share parental responsibility under a suitably worded child arrangements order). For reasons that she herself identified in April, there are obvious and profound limitations in the effective support that she would be able to offer. When faced in cross examination with the difficulties that would arise if Ch lived with her, she recognised them but said that she wished to be able to say that she had done everything that she could to keep Ch in the family.

Following the first three days of the hearing and faced with the evidence of fact about F’s behaviour, it was plain that there must be some underlying cause for what he was doing. Sensibly the guardian sought permission under Part 25 of The Family Procedure Rules 2010 for the joint instruction of a psychologist. Mr Hutchinson was instructed and, shortly before the hearing resumed, wrote reports on the parents.

His report and oral evidence in relation to F was very strong. Not only did he identify that F suffers from Autistic Spectrum disorder but he also recommended strongly that Ch should not be committed to F’s care. In relation to M, Mr Hutchinson concluded that she could offer Ch good enough parenting subject to two things: i) M’s ability to avoid the more extreme and foreseeable behaviour of F and its consequences for Ch and ii) M’s ability to work honestly and effectively with professionals. Those two qualifications are plainly interlinked since, if M were to care for Ch, she would need to remain apart from F and would need a very strong and effective body of professional support to deal with the foreseeably destructive behaviour of F (although Mr Hutchinson’s evidence was that even such a body of support and imprisonment for injunctive breach might well not be sufficient to deter F). The two qualifications raise issues of fact for me to decide on evidence.

The Local Authority, Crown House workers and guardian are not convinced that she will maintain the separation from him. If she does, they both consider that M has demonstrated very clearly that she cannot avoid F’s behaviour or work honestly with professionals. Her untruthfulness about the bruising and also during the Crown House assessment being clear examples. They contend accurately that she continued with that untruthfulness in the witness box on a wide range of issues.

The Local Authority and guardian both stress that the dynamics between these parents have already led Ch to move frequently and experience considerable disruption. He moved from his parents to foster care, then to D for a short while then back to foster care, then to Crown House with the mother, then to a mother and baby placement with the mother before moving to another foster placement without the mother on 16^th April. If left in the care of the mother that pattern is very likely to continue, they say. Further, the mother’s evidence about the bruising has been so untruthful that it is not possible to gain an understanding as to why she should have injured him; therefore predictions about how she would avoid similar events in the future are severely hampered.

Ch’s move to foster care on his own on 16^th April arose at a hearing that was listed because F, during the period of adjournment of the final hearing and without any justification, gave notice that he opposed the renewal of the interim care order. At the resultant hearing it became very apparent that F would not comply with the injunctions and was continuing to harass M (he was arrested that day at a station for doing so). At that hearing the Local Authority and guardian pursued arguments that mother and child must be separated pending the final fixture and, after the social worker had given evidence, M agreed.

As a result of the absences within the evidence and the changes in the positions of other parties, the guardian’s report only became available when the hearing resumed on 7^th May 2014. By then, all the necessary applications and evidence had been produced, there were no positive viability assessments of third parties and no applications by third parties to intervene either. The guardian then filed her report in which she supported the Local Authority’s current position.

Evidence was given by a Mr Steven Lowe who had engaged in the provision of cognitive behavioural therapy for both parents. For reasons that I make plain I found his opinion in this case about the extent of positive benefit and impact of therapy for these parents to be inadequate and his assessment of risk in the past and in the future to have been lacking.

Resolutions - Mr Hutchinson suggested that a Resolutions type programme might be considered. Mr Farquharson submitted, that such a programme a) has not been examined with Resolutions (the organisation in Bristol) or other organisations and there is no evidence about it beyond Mr Hutchinson’s remarks, albeit that the nature of this locally created programme is well known to the court and everyone in it; b) requires an effective supportive network which is absent in this case; c) is a lengthy process; d) involves yet further delay in a delayed case; e) would only be directed to part of the case (the injury), whereas this is a multi issue case; f) is patently unnecessary since there is a wealth of evidence already available upon which the court can and should make its determinations – the court has seen the mother’s proposals and suggested support network tested in evidence following the evidence of Mrs G (M’s mother) and D. Those submissions were mirrored in the guardian’s evidence and formed part of the Local Authority’s formulated position in this case.

Options - On the first day of the hearing (and again on the 7^th May 2014) the parties identified the options for Ch that they were proposing. The Local Authority seeks care and placement orders. The guardian supports this proposal.

The mother’s proposal is that Ch should be in her care with the assistance of her family (either as a shared care arrangement or on the basis that she would have the primary care of Ch with their support). She suggested that she would accept supervision and proposed injunctive relief in an attempt to ensure that F did not undermine her care. On the third day of the hearing I attempted to gain an understanding of where the mother said that she would live and what arrangements she was proposing in relation to F. This had not been thought through. Eventually a statement was produced from D expressing her intentions to support M and D gave evidence on 9^th May 2014.

The father’s proposal has been that he should be the sole carer of Ch. He said that he would remain in his current accommodation and care for Ch there. In evidence he said that he had the support of his two sisters; I specifically raised whether I was being asked to see them in evidence and was told that I would not but that they would support F. Cross examination revealed that he had given no realistic thought to how he would care for Ch. His suggestion that he would accept Local Authority supervision and would work with the Local Authority does not bear a moment’s scrutiny; I am in no doubt at all that he would not do so.

By the time of the resumed hearing F said that, if Ch cannot be with him, Ch should be placed with M; in that event, he said, he would want contact as often as possible (at least two hours twice a week). In his statement at C348 he had said that, if he could not have Ch, then M should not have him – ‘I feel no longer able to support M as a sole carer for Ch. I feel that M cannot be trusted and is not able to put Ch’s interests first. She has lied to me about our relationship, she has lied to Crown House and has lied to other parties in these proceedings about things. I am concerned that she has also therefore lied about having caused the injuries to Ch. I do not think it would be safe for her to care for Ch and to be trusted in being open and honest with professionals and putting Ch’s best interests first’.

Ultimately, the father’s proposal that he should care for Ch on his own is one that is easy to deal with. All of the evidence points very firmly to its obvious lack of merit, although I will still set out in full the evidence relating to it and my reasons for accepting the Local Authority’s case in relation to him. His lack of understanding of the emotional demands of parenting, his very limited ability to care for Ch physically, his lack of engagement with professionals and profound personal, emotional and behavioural limitations make it unthinkable that this child could possibly be left in his sole care with or without his sisters’ help. The evidence demonstrates very clearly indeed that no amount of services, support or therapy would enable him to adapt his functioning to a level that left him able to care for Ch in the foreseeable future. In his care, Ch’s emotional and physical care would be neglected and he would be constantly exposed to the manifestations of his father’s disorderly behaviour.

The mother’s position is much more complex and requires very careful and full analysis. She has been Ch’s primary carer for almost all of his life (there were two periods of interruption of her care – one prior to the move to Crown House and the other since 16^th April 2014). Unlike the father, she is able to offer Ch adequate parenting subject to the two important qualifications identified by Mr Hutchinson. Added to those qualifications are: a) the fact that she caused the injury to Ch and has repeatedly lied about how and why she did so and b) the possibility that the parents may resume their own emotional relationship with each other.

Re B and Re B-S – The case of Re B [2013] UKSC 33 lies at the heart of the jurisprudence concerning the making of care and placement orders and is thus of fundamental importance to this case. Ch should not be deprived of the right to an upbringing with a natural parent unless, as a last resort, there are exceptional circumstances demonstrating that no other solution compatible with his welfare is available. Of the dicta in Re B the President, Sir James Munby, said as follows in Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146: ‘The language used in Re B is striking. Different words and phrases are used, but the message is clear. Orders contemplating non-consensual adoption – care orders with a plan for adoption, placement orders and adoption orders – are “a very extreme thing, a last resort”, only to be made where “nothing else will do”, where “no other course [is] possible in [the child’s] interests”, they are “the most extreme option”, a “last resort – when all else fails”, to be made “only in exceptional circumstances and where motivated by overriding requirements pertaining to the child’s welfare, in short, where nothing else will do”: see Re B paras 74, 76, 77, 82, 104, 130, 135, 145, 198, 215 [22]’.

Fact finding and threshold - Although a separate fact finding hearing was originally ordered to take place, it proved more sensible for the factual and welfare issues to be heard together in a composite hearing. That is what has taken place. It is agreed that the threshold criteria in section 31(2) of The Children Act 1989 are fulfilled in the terms that I set out later.

The relationship between F and M –F and M began their relationship in April 2009. They married in August 2010. In March 2011 they separated; M admits that she had a relationship with another man at the time. During the period of separation she obtained an injunction against F, alleging that F harassed her. They resumed their relationship in May 2011. I have already described the events of November and December 2013 and the apparent decision on 25^th March 2014 by M to separate from F.

M has sought to portray herself as a constant victim of F’s domestic abuse and harassment. As the chronological account of the evidence will show it is beyond doubt that F has harassed her repeatedly and profoundly despite discouragement, agreements, rules and injunctions. However, it is also plain that M has not been consistent in, or truthful about, her attitude to F at least prior to 25^th March 2014 (which was a week before the hearing started). As I set out later, she says herself that she has contributed to the negative dynamics of the relationship. The guardian did not agree with the suggestion that the mother is simply a victim and said that the mother had contributed significantly to those dynamics. The Local Authority and Crown House are of the same opinion. So am I.

As a result she has caused F’s disorderly behaviour to be worse. For a long time she blamed him for the bruising knowing that she had caused it herself. She professed her commitment to him when at Crown House whilst repeatedly portraying herself as his victim to Crown House workers and the Local Authority. On the 24^th March she and F met happily and went shopping together; on the next day she told him that the marriage was over.

To Crown House M said [E105]: ‘I am not as controlling as F but I am a real head worker. I will say, ‘no one else will have you, other women would run from your past…you are lucky to have me…I am the queen of the castle…it was hard to accept that I am abusive in our relationship as well. I make excuses about checking on his phone, I excuse my behaviour but I do it. I do have a way of setting [the father] off, but I did not realise that I was doing it’. I find that she has continued to ‘set him off’ for much of these proceedings, professing her commitment to him on the one hand and, on the other, seeking to present herself as his victim when it was convenient to do so.

In evidence she sought to suggest that she had been in complete denial of his behaviour in the past and that she had minimised his obsessional behaviour when speaking to professionals. She suggested that the CBT that she had undergone with Mr Lowe had made her able to identify the damage of his behaviour. She said that, on 25^th March 2014, she decided to end the relationship with F because she had reviewed the paperwork and realised that she was sick of it; her decision was not based on any particular event. I do not accept that her commitment to separation or her analysis of F’s behaviour has been anything like as profound or strong as she suggested. I think it far more likely that, by 25^th March 2014 and faced with the strength of evidence against her, she chose to portray her position in this way.

At paragraphs 4.6 - 4.8 of his report (dated 25^th April 2014) at E300 Mr Hutchinson recorded:

[4.6] M states that the couple separated in 2011 following which F broke into her home and she gained a non molestation order. This separation occurred because F was controlling of her behaviour and if she did not do as he wished he would throw things, tell her that no one would want her, become angry if she wanted to visit her mother or go out with friends, and insisted upon managing the family finances.

[4.7] The couple reconciled and were then in a relationship between May 2011 and December 2013 when M separated from F and went to live with her aunt.

M reports that during this 30 month period F tried to dictate the clothing that she would wear, would become angry and broke things in the home, stopped her seeing her family and friends and would lose his temper if things were not as he wanted them to be. He would often make negative comments about M. M left in December because she had had enough of F’s ‘behaviour to everybody’.

This is very different to the account that she gave to Mr Lowe when he was preparing the important report of November 2013 – in that report she is recorded as saying: ‘He can be hard work but I love the challenge of having a debate and seeing things from a different perspective. He keeps you on your toes and you have to work on the relationship all the time, you can’t get complacent’. Mr Lowe went on: ‘As she spoke of F it was clear that she felt some considerable affection for him and indeed as she spoke of F her demeanour changed and she was clearly enjoying talking about him’. She did not alert Mr Lowe to anything like the degree of difficulties in the relationship that she was suggesting to Mr Hutchinson – if she had done so it is inconceivable that F and M would have resumed cohabitation with Ch in their care.

In his evidence F rejected that account of the relationship. Specifically he said that paragraph 4.8 is not true. He said that he thought that she was separating from him because it would improve her chances to have Ch. He still loves her, he said. He said that he does not know whether she really wants to be apart from him. At C389 he had sent a text message to her saying: ‘I require a conversation with my wife. I am never going to walk away or be forced away like your father was. I am not giving up on someone I love because of all of this shit’.

It was very clear that F still holds very strong feelings for M. I think it beyond doubt that he will try to persuade her to come back to him. He continues to think that the best solution would be for the two of them to discuss things and to parent Ch together. He is firmly opposed to Ch being adopted. In an email dated 6^th May 2014 he said: ‘finally the only way he is adopted is if I’m dead, just to make that perfectly clear’. He explained that when giving evidence, saying that he would pursue every legal remedy to prevent Ch being adopted and the only way that he would be stopped fighting for his son is if ‘they take me out’ [C500]. He also made it very plain indeed that he would not accept limitations on his contact with Ch.

For reasons that will become apparent, I accept that F has made some very extreme remarks at times to M about what would happen if she separated from him (e.g. Ch would be adopted and he would kill some of her family’s horses). However I also find that M has behaved in this relationship in the way that I have already described.

M – As a child M lived with her mother who was a single parent for much of the time. She has no siblings. She met her father once, when she was aged two. She has 8 GCSE’s and, for the past three years, has worked as a technical assistant. She was assessed by Mr Hutchinson as having an IQ of 118.

In her position statement of 6^th May 2014 she said that she had engaged with a GDAS (local Domestic Abuse Service) worker, Sarah Stephenson and would commence the ‘Freedom Programme’ (which provides education on the avoidance of domestic abuse) on 28^th May 2014. She also said that she would wish to continue with therapy now that the initial course with Mr Lowe had ended. Although she has engaged with Mr Lowe other professionals have encountered repeated difficulties in securing any form of effective engagement from her largely because it is very difficult from her what is true and what is not.

The opinion that I have expressed about M’s untruthfulness and expediency is also expressed by those who have assessed her. I agree with the Crown House assessment at E127 that ‘instead of accepting responsibility for something, M tends to give a different account of events’. At C105 they said: ‘It would appear that M’s lack of clarity in relationships is to an extent linked with a perceived need to keep people happy and she feels that separating from F was what her family, and in particular her mother, wants to happen. We went on to speak about where in her history this comes from and M gave a series of statements with regard to her relationship with her mother’.

M accepted in oral evidence, herself, that because of events in her childhood she has a tendency to say to people that which she thinks they want to hear. In evidence she accepted that she had not been frank with the Local Authority professionals in the past but said that she now wished to draw a line in the sand and start afresh with them. The difficulty is that her untruthfulness continued in her evidence before the court as I set out in this judgment. As Mr Hutchinson, the psychologist said at E280: ‘she has some difficulty in expressing her anger and in being assertive. M has had a need to try to keep her husband and her mother happy. This has been at the expense of her known ability to assert herself which has resulted in over control of her own angry feelings’. Mr Lowe, the psychotherapist said at E260: ‘As we have continued to explore this M has developed her understanding both of her need to please others and of her willingness to be deceitful in order to achieve what she wants most, custody of her son. It is of note that she has been able to identify also her need to keep everyone happy has worked against her and made it less likely that a court would grant her custody’.

In oral evidence Ms Millington, of Crown House, said that it was very difficult to know what M genuinely felt about things because she tended not to be communicative and was often contradictory. Ms Millington and other staff at Crown House gained the impression that M was desensitised, meaning that she did not display emotion appropriately. At E190 there is the following passage from the Crown House report:

M clearly loves Ch and her basic care for him has been largely good. However, as the assessment has progressed, her motivation to play with him and not allow herself to be distracted by using her phone or watching television has lessened. She has also prioritised spending time with F around court hearing times above returning to Ch or even making any enquiries about his well-being on one occasion’.

M minimises the extreme nature of F’s behaviours towards professionals, despite this mirroring his behaviour towards her during a previous period of separation. She also minimises the importance of his behaviours and the risks these pose to others and to Ch. M has displayed poor empathy in a variety of situations: regarding Ch’s marks/bruises, her mother’s feelings when F was trying to break in to the house; K and the abuse he suffered, children subjected to abuse in the pictures viewed by F, staff and residents when F was attending Crown House over the New Year, and Ch in general in terms of the potential impact upon him of F’s behaviours. This heightens concerns that she would fail to protect him adequately in the community’

M’s family - Her mother is Mrs G, who gave evidence and who filed a statement at C207. The family all live within reasonably close proximity to each other.

Mrs G said that she saw M three or four times a week when Ch was in her care prior to the injuries occurring in November; she said that she could not fault M as a mother.

Mrs G gave oral evidence about extreme threats that she suggested that F made in 2011. She said that F would engage in shouting, swearing, threatening other family members and also making threats against the animals. She said that she was told by M in 2011 that F threatened to kill the cats and the horses by cutting their throats. She said that he was abusive to her and made threats against the children of D and also against Mrs G’s elder sister H. Mrs G said that the threats were made by text messages that were sent to both her and also to M.

When M gave evidence she said that she had told her mother these things and that F had said them. F denied having said any of them but accepted that he may have threatened to release the horses and may have said that the gypsies might get them (implying that the horses would then be eaten). He said that he probably said that he would sell off the cats that he and M owned so that M would not see them again.

In the light of things that I find F said on 25^th March 2014 I find that there is clear evidence showing that F has a propensity to make threats to harm the cats and horses in the manner suggested. I note from C39 that, on the 27^th March 2011 F was recorded by the police as making ‘all sorts of threats’ (that note is wrongly dated 27/11/10 on that page). I find that he did make these extreme threats against the horses, cats and members of the mother’s family. I accept, of course, that he did not carry out those threats but their making shows the extreme ways in which he can behave when he feels under pressure. I am not remotely confident that he would have not have attempted to put at least some of these threats into practice if he and M had remained in conflict in 2011.

Mr Carron’s submissions – I have recorded various other aspects of his submissions elsewhere in this judgment. Mr Carron submitted that the Annex B report reveals that Ch is developing as a happy, gurgling baby. M has given Ch adequate physical care and, in her individual relationship with him, has shown deep love and strong emotion for Ch. The risk arising from the bruising and the difficulty that the court has in identifying what preceded it should not disqualify her from caring from Ch. The bruising may have occurred: a) either in way that she knows and about which she has not told the truth; b) in the way that she has said and c) in a way that she does not fully remember. He urged me to say that the mother’s account of the injury is credible and given honestly (i.e. turning of plagiocephalic head with a firm but non-intentionally abusive grip); it is not.

The suggestion that developed (from the mother’s evidence) that she had not remembered how the injury occurred until after hearing the evidence of Dr Rylance is manifestly unsustainable. For reasons that will be apparent from this judgment I am left in no doubt that M has not told the truth about this injury. I am not able to find exactly how she caused it. Her lack of truthfulness, the evidence of Dr Rylance, inevitable inference about her many suggestions about caution and the circumstances of the injury demonstrate very clearly that this was non accidental injury which she caused. It also demonstrates beyond doubt her persistent lack of truthfulness.

Mr Carron urged the benefits of the arrangement whereby the mother might care for Ch with the assistance of her family. The fact that the mother caused the bruising would not render her future care unsafe especially with her family’s assistance, he submitted. Further protective provision could arise if the ‘Resolutions’ approach were to be adopted – that approach is to adopt the model used by the well known Bristol organisation of establishing a supportive and safe network within the community to reduce risk levels. So, Mr Carron submitted, a shared arrangement between the mother and D combined with a supervision order and a Resolutions style approach would be the correct solution for Ch whilst still maintaining him within the family. Where there is a solution that is susceptible to protective court orders the court should enforce its orders; thus if F needs to be ordered to keep away from M and Ch and cease to harass them the court must enforce its orders. The solution to enforcement is not removal of the child, he submitted.

F – F lived with both parents for the first 7 years of his life. He has been assessed by Mr Hutchinson as having a full scale IQ of 130. He was expelled from school in year 7 but returned to main stream education and later attained three GSCE’s. He is reported as having been unable to make friends at school. He left college without completing the course and then has had a succession of low skilled jobs in which he has encountered repeated difficulty arising from complaints about his behaviour (see Mr Hutchinson’s report at page 30).

He has two older sisters. His parents separated in 1992, when F was aged 7 years. His father remained in this country and his mother moved to France in 2007. F’s father’s new partner had two children, one of whom was K who was seven years younger than F.

In November 2000 to about September 2001 F sexually abused K; F was then aged 15 to 16 and K was aged 8 to 9. The abuse involved kissing, masturbation and oral sex committed by each upon the other. Although the police were involved there was no prosecution. In evidence F said that, at the time that he was involved sexually with K, he was aroused by the images that he downloaded of boys of a similar age but said that there is ‘nothing on this planet’ that would make him behave in this way again; Mr Hutchinson described that assertion by F as naive in the extreme

In July 2009 F received a community order with supervision requirements (3 years), registration on the sex offender register (5 years) and a sexual offences prevention order (SOPO) (initially indefinite, subsequently varied on 23^rd October 2013 to 5 years) for two offences of making indecent images or pseudo-photographs of children between 1^st January 2003 and 30^th April 2008.

He attended 60 sessions of the Thames Valley Sex Offender program between 25^th January 2010 and 17^th August 2010. F apparently began to access pornography on the internet in 2000, when he was aged 15 years. He said in evidence that he now accesses adult pornography for about two hours a day but that there were times of stress when he was watching it for as much as twenty hours a week. He denied any current use of child pornography.

His parenting has been assessed by a Mrs Hart. She gave evidence, which I detail later, of his serious lack of parenting ability. I also read evidence from the supervisors of his contact (the notes are in enclosure G). Ms Mather, one of the contact supervisors, gave evidence. Ms Mather said, prior to the separation of the parents in March 2014, the parents had contact together and, on the whole, there was minimal interaction between F and Ch during contact although he did express love. In the contact on Friday 28^th March 2014, which was the first contact session that he attended on his own following the separation, he showed more interaction as he has done in the contact thereafter (as the guardian recognised when giving evidence and as is demonstrated in the subsequent contact notes – G90 onwards). Ms Mather was not as negative about F’s parenting abilities as Ms Hart although she also noted the lack of interaction between father and son.

On his behalf, in her helpful closing address, Ms Knowles said that any sexual risk that F might represent is a) strongly denied and b) in any event, assessed as ‘low’. Therefore he cannot be disqualified from caring for Ch on the basis of sexual risk alone. Ms Knowles submitted that, as to the risk that he might represent from the point of view of his parenting, the evidence is weak and contradictory; the Local Authority’s evidence from the parenting assessment is not mirrored to the same extent in the reports of contact. Further feedback was not given whilst the parenting assessment was underway and so there is no knowing whether F could learn to improve his emotional responsiveness to Ch. The physical risk depends upon the court’s findings and there is no reason to suggest that it would be directed to Ch. He did not cause the bruising to Ch and the true dynamics of the complex relationship with M provide an invalid basis for suggesting that he poses any physical risk to Ch.

M’s acceptance that she caused the bruising is such a statement contrary to her interests that she must be assumed to have been the sole perpetrator. When associated with the evidence of timing, I accept that submission as being entirely correct. Ms Knowles went on to submit that this is therefore a case where the proceedings started on the basis of bruising that he did not cause and a sexual risk that would not disqualify him from caring for Ch. His post litigation conduct must be seen in the context of his autistic spectrum disorder and the pressure of, and reaction to, hostile litigation. Remove the adversity of litigation and there is nothing in his conduct which would disqualify him either.

Although I recognise the undoubted and skilful compression of Ms Knowles’s advocacy it could not surmount the considerable burden of evidence that was lined up against her submissions. I have already expressed my overview of his position which reflects the unanimous body of opinion advanced by each professional in this case. The evidence of Mr Hutchinson was particularly definitive.

Mr Hutchinson’s core evidence specifically about F - In relation to F Mr Hutchinson said: ‘F presents with above average cognitive abilities, Autism Spectrum Disorder, a medium risk of perpetrating violence or harassment, a low risk of sexual offending, anger management difficulties and pathological anxiety. F is currently, and for the foreseeable future, unable to provide safe and good enough parenting to his son, Ch’.

Mr Hutchinson did not think that CBT would get anywhere near dealing with the manifestations of F’s autistic spectrum disorder (‘ASD’) even if CBT might help him deal with his anxieties; people with ASD are unlikely to recognise the benefits of CBT – Mr Hutchinson foresaw F’s likely reaction to be: ‘why should I recognise the input from anyone else?’. He said that ASD is a lifelong condition. Although it would be unusual now for a child to have ASD without that disorder being identified as a child, in the past it would not be uncommon for the disorder to go unidentified.

Mr Hutchinson said that he is ‘unequivocal’ in his view that F is not an appropriate carer for Ch. He thought that, in relation to F, any contact with Ch would have to be supervised by a responsible adult who is not intimidated by his behaviour as he foresaw inevitable conflict between F and anyone that he perceived to be in authority.

This is what Mr Hutchinson had said about F in his report:

It is clear from F’s history that this developmental disorder has been present since childhood and was having an adverse effect on his behaviour and social relationships when he was in primary school. This adverse effect is increasing as he experiences an increased demand for social communication that exceeds his limited capacity for reciprocal social interaction.

[para 3.3] - F’s ASD will cause him to have difficulty making friends; to respond in a literal manner to what is said to him; to have difficulty conversing because he does not actively listen to those conversing with him; to have difficulty understanding the social rules of behaviour; to frequently experience conflict with authority figures; to feel anger and be aggressive when things do not happen in the way that he wants and to be extremely sensitive to actual or perceived criticism.

[3.10] He idealises and overvalues his positive relationships to such an extent that when he feels these relationships are at risk of breaking down he engages in behaviours that maintain contact with the individual (persistent texting, waiting for the person, not allowing the person personal space, using electronic means to track the person) in the mistaken belief that this type of behaviour will maintain the relationship. The recipients of this type of behaviour will find it harassing and distressing. Everyday social sanctions will have no impact upon this type of behaviour and it has been necessary to apply a Non-Molestation order and a Restraining Order. F has not complied with these Orders because he considers them to be unfair.

[3.11] F’s behaviour will, at times, cause exasperation in those with whom he is interacting and at other times they will find it to be abusive. He will not perceive his behaviour in his intimate relationships to be abusive but his intimate partner will, at times, consider him to be psychologically and emotionally abusive and controlling. The HCR-20 V3 is a good predictor of domestic and intimate partner abuse. It should, therefore, be expected that at the present time an intimate partner will experience periodic domestic abuse in the form of expected adherence to routines, controlling behaviour, psychological and emotional abuse arising out of F’s need for constant reassurance, and harassment if F believes the relationship is becoming unstable or may end. F is unlikely to be physically abusive to an intimate partner, but he is likely to damage property and to be perceived as being intimidating’.

[3.12.4] F continues to use pornography as an aid during masturbation. He admits to spending 1-2 hours per day using pornography and when particularly stressed he was viewing pornography for 3-4 hours per day. He is currently aroused by adult female images that are similar to his wife’s physique.

[3.13.2] As a consequence of his ASD F will have great difficulty in developing ‘sensitive responsiveness’ (Crittenden 2008) to Ch. This will result in F and his son communicating in a way that is not emotionally reciprocal. Both F and Ch are likely to develop strong feelings of negativity, anger, fear and a desire for comfort. This will probably occur because during Ch’s early years he will be on a schedule of unpredictable, intermittent, positive reinforcement of negative affect when in the care of his father. This can lead to a type C (Ambivalent) attachment disorder.

[3.13.3] F has difficulty expressing emotions that are appropriate to a specific situation and difficulty comprehending Ch’s non-verbal and oral expression of emotion and need in a way that enables him to respond to Ch’s emotional needs in a pro-active and timely manner. In this situation, parents and their children do not communicate reciprocally. F has great difficulty having reciprocal interactions with adults as a consequence of his ASD.

3.14.1 F is currently receiving CBT for anxiety. This therapy will have little, if any, effect on his risk of sexual offending. It will not address issues related to harassment or the risk of aggressive/violent behaviour that he poses. F has great difficulty making the link between thoughts, feelings and behaviours that is necessary for the successful application of CBT.

[3.14.2] F is currently ambivalent about his ability to change. This ambivalence may, in part, result from the high expectations he has of the CBT and the limited success that it is achieving.

Gloucestershire County Council – The Local Authority social worker, Ms Kimberley Hughes gave very impressive and considered evidence. She qualified as a social worker in 2013 but has experience as a teacher and a family support worker. This is a case where it would have been very easy for the social worker to have been drawn into conflict with the parents and to have responded to the mother’s untruthfulness with irritation. I find that Miss Hughes has acted with exceptional professionalism and with appropriate detachment from the difficulties that these parents have presented. Ms Hughes has worked on this case jointly with the social worker Ms Debbie Preedy since January 2014 and Mrs Preedy has also shown impressive professionalism in her dealings with this family. Both social workers have maintained their focus on the paramountcy of the welfare of Ch and I wish to record the very high quality of their work.

On the 14^th May 2014, just before closing speeches, Mr Carron asked Ms Hughes to give evidence to explain the amount of support that might be offered in relation to F’s contact if Ch were to be living with her. Ms Hughes stressed that the Local Authority does not support the rehabilitation of Ch to M. However, in response to the questions asked of her she said that the Local Authority would need a supervision order and would then recommend contact once a month for the period of one year. At the end of the year there would have to be a review and the following questions would have to be considered: i) should an application be made for the supervision order to be extended? ii) should Ch be regarded as a child in need requiring services under Part III of the 1989 Act? and iii) should services be provided to continue with the supervision of contact?. It is very difficult to see how, if that were to be the solution to these proceedings, the answer to each of those questions could be other than ‘yes’.

Mr Farquharson’s closing speech - The mother caused the injuries and has not told the truth. No credible explanation has been given for them by M. She must know exactly how the injuries were caused and has advanced a large number of accounts that she knows to be untrue. Precisely what caused her to behave in this way is speculative.

The mother’s untruthfulness is not limited to the bruising. It is a current and continuing theme. It makes the prospect of her acting to protect Ch against F and accepting any working and longstanding involvement from the Local Authority or her family highly improbable.

The court must conduct an holistic overview of risk. In this case the overview of risk arising from F shows that it flows from his underlying disorder and behaviour. The overview demonstrates that his behaviour is governed by what he wants and is not limited by usual social boundaries. So he bombards social workers and others with critical communications, breaks court orders, undermines the mother in her care of Ch, lacks empathy, has poor emotional interaction with Ch and is unlikely to develop emotionally to a point where he could care for Ch. It is plainly contrary to Ch’s welfare for Ch to be committed to the care of F, he submitted.

As to M, in addition to the fact and consequences of the injury there are the two qualifications expressed by Mr Hutchinson. The Local Authority does not accept that it can be stated with any reliability that F and M will remain apart. If they do, enforcement of injunctions by repeated committal is not a sensible or effective solution. If it is foreseeable (as it is) that enforcement will be necessary on a repeated basis then it is not in the interests of Ch to live in an environment where that level of harassment and enforcement is occurring. It will require M to be the instigator of enforcement and, given her lack of fortitude, that is unlikely to be a sustained feature of any arrangement for Ch. Finally, her lack of truthfulness makes enforcement in that way unreliable. How can she be trusted to act protectively when she has not acted in that way in the past and has misled people persistently and with complexity? There is obvious strength in those submissions. So, too, was there obvious strength in the submission that, after the harassment has occurred (and it may well involve Ch) enforcement by committal would be punitive and not preventative or protective.

Mr Farquharson submitted that the written record that M made of extreme threats made on 25^th March is plainly reliable for the reasons advanced by Mr Carron (i.e. that M made the notes at a time when she thought they would be compared with the recording which had not then be erased by F). That lends strong support to the threats that M says were made by F in 2011 due to their similarity in content. I accept that is so.

He submitted that, if the court finds that the 2011 threats were made, it must take into account that the parents resumed their relationship afterwards despite the extreme nature of what had occurred between the parents. That being so, he submitted, there must be a very real risk that if Ch is with the mother the magnetic effect of F’s wish to share in Ch’s care and the parent’s past emotional connection would lead to a resumption of the relationship (which is said only to have ended 7 days before the hearing started). F’s behaviour is not just litigation reactive; it is based upon his personality, background and disorder. Again there is obvious force in those submissions.

Any effective therapeutic progress would have to come from both parents if their combined behaviours are to be mitigated. It is highly unlikely that this will occur and certainly will not occur within Ch’s timescales.

Ms Clutterbuck – the guardian - In her careful closing speech Ms Scammell expressed her support for the Local Authority’s applications. The guardian has filed reports which contain her reasoning and gave evidence that she did not regard this case as finally balanced but one in which the only solution commensurate with Ch’s welfare is placement for adoption. Ch has moved six times within these proceedings. At the age of 9 months he needs permanence now.

D was entirely wrong to suggest in her evidence that the difficulties in this case arise from F alone. They do not. They result from a folie à deux submitted Ms Scammell.

Ch – Ch has now been in interim foster care since 16^th April (for 29 days) and has contact with both parents separately. He has spent most of his life in the primary care of M. He is described as a seemingly happy child. The adoption medical contains two particular points:

‘Ch’s head circumference is greater than his other growth parameters. His anterior fontanelle is also widely patent and he has some flattening of the back of his head. It will be important to monitor whether his head continues to grow along this centile which can be undertaken by the Health Visitor. However in view of his head circumference when he was admitted at 3 months of age was on the 25^th centile this shows a crossing up of the centile. However his head CT scan was normal in November 2013, I will therefore arrange for Ch to have a skull x-ray to look at the growth of the bones in his skull and will await the outcome of the head circumference monitoring by the Health Visitor over the next 3 months before deciding whether to undertake any further cranial imaging’.

‘Aspergers is the mildest form of Autistic Spectrum Disorder which means that a person can function independently, succeed in mainstream education but will have difficulties with social interactions and the nuances of language such as humour, sarcasm and so on. This condition tends to cluster in families and Ch is therefore at a theoretical risk of himself having Aspergers. He is obviously too young for any assessment to be made with regards to this at the moment’.

Mr Carron sought to suggest that the matters raised in relation to Ch’s head circumference might deter potential adopters. I regard that as very unlikely. I do not feel able to entirely discount the possibility that the mention of hereditary autistic spectrum disorder might possibly affect some potential adopters but I share the views of the social worker and also of the guardian that there is nothing in the adoption medical report that would be likely to any material degree to affect the availability of adopters for Ch.

Chronology - This has been a very untidy hearing with a number of procedural difficulties and evidential deficiencies. Those difficulties have not been the fault of the advocates in any way but have resulted from the large amount of evidence that exists and the changing nature of the case. I am very grateful to each of the advocates for the help that they have each given and the strength and skill with which they have each represented their respective clients; had it been otherwise this case could have been very difficult to try.

Although I have summarised much of the evidence I now wish to set it out in more detail. The only way to make sense of the case has been to build up a chronology of events that have occurred. Therefore, having read the bundle and heard a very large amount of evidence I have pieced the evidence together in chronological form. I will set it out now.

13^th July 2013- The Local Authority became involved prior to Ch’s birth and, on the 13^th July 2013, put in place a child protection plan in anticipation of Ch’s birth. That action was taken because of F’s past sexual misconduct.

The police officer in charge of ensuring compliance with the notification provisions and supervising the sexual offences prevention order is PC Barfoot, who gave evidence. In his statement he said that he had difficulty managing the risk that F represented. In evidence he said that he would have grave concerns about F’s ability to co-operate with protective orders and thought that there was a real risk that F might do ‘something rash’. He said that it was not possible to arrange for unannounced visits to F because the door to the house was not answered (despite the officer suspecting that there was someone in the house – C91). In evidence F denied that he had failed to cooperate with PC Barfoot; I accept the evidence of PC Barfoot and that PC Barfoot has found it very difficult to attract F’s co-operation.

On 28^th August 2013 F concealed his ownership of an internet enabled smart phone [C91], as F accepted in evidence. At times F bombarded PC Barfoot with hostile emails and, in one email, threatened to cease all compliance with the officer. F sent ‘dozens’ of blank emails to his work address with nothing but the word ‘phone’ written upon them’ [C92]. On 20^th September 2013 F pleaded guilty to breach of the SOPO and was fined [C92].

F’s probation officer was Valerie Powell. She has filed a statement at C256. She says that F attended the Thames Valley Sex Offender programme but only made fairly limited contributions to the group sessions. Ms Powell suggests that F was sexually immature and ‘was meeting his sexual needs by masturbating to pornographic images…His behaviour does not suggest that he has a sexual preference for children’. At C258 she says: ‘I remember F as an immature young man who adopted an adversarial stance towards those in authority’. I find that that oppositional stance has plainly continued and there is no likelihood of that changing.

Following Ch’s birth the supervisory plan was put into place. It involved an agreement that F should not have direct or indirect contact with Ch whilst assessments were conducted. The agreement is at C6 of the bundle and is dated 14^th August 2013. Both parents accept that they did not keep to it (see the threshold document that I set out later).

On 5^th November 2013 the Local Authority agreed to F living with M and Ch. It did so knowing the positive results of the assessment that had been carried out by Steven Lowe. Miss Hughes, the social worker, gave evidence that F had been pressing the Local Authority for a decision about when the parents might resume cohabitation.

On 7^th November 2013 Steven Lowe signed off his risk assessment which was then released to the Local Authority and to the parties. In it he expressed the opinion that the level of risk that F might represent to Ch could be managed through professional intervention [C71]. At page 39 of his report he said: ‘M has also shown a very clear wish to place Ch’s needs above any relationship needs that she might have and, with some assistance, she will in my view be a protective parent…If Ch were placed in her care whilst she was in a relationship with F then both she and he would need to engage in some form of intervention…’. At page 37 he said: ‘F does not in my view pose a direct threat to his son until he reaches pre-pubescence. However, it is important here to add that with therapeutic intervention any risk could be managed’.

Mr Lowe’s assessment of M’s ability to put Ch’s needs first has to be viewed now in the light of what occurred at Crown House where the mother engaged in collusive and deceptive behaviour in relation to her relationship with F, knowing (as she must have done) the consequences of her doing so. The consequences are also clearly demonstrated by what did occur after that collusion and deception became revealed; the placement at Crown House very nearly ended. Mr Lowe’s assessment of risk was also negated by the events that occurred on 11^th November.

On 11^th November 2013 – This was the day upon which the bruises were found to Ch’s face. It is also the day upon which F had left an active video recording device in the spare bedroom because he was concerned that M might be having a sexual encounter with another man there. It has not been possible to gain an understanding of what was occurring within this household during the six days after F and M began living with each other again. The evidence that the parents gave was so conflicted by untruthfulness that it would be a guessing game to try to gauge the level of tension that existed at the time that Ch was injured. Neither parent suggested that there were any particular rows that day, although the actions of F in recording events in the spare bedroom signal a clear distrust between them.

At mid-day on 11^th November 2013 M telephoned the GP’s surgery. The GP, rang her back after a few minutes. The exchange of calls took place very close to mid-day Much of the GP’s oral evidence related to the condition of Ch when he was brought to the surgery. However, as the evidence developed and the mother’s evidence unfolded, a detailed account of her evidence has become unnecessary. I was very impressed, however, by the quality of the evidence of the GP and the care with which she had noted events that day.

Ch was brought to the hospital by the parents. The injuries to Ch’s face can be seen on the body map at H34, which was prepared by Dr Chandler. They were described as three areas of bruising involving i) 1.5 x 1cm purple lesion, non blanching bruise on right temple; ii) 0.5 x 0.5 cm purple lesion, non blanching bruise on left temple and iii) 1 x 1 cm purple non blanching bruise, also on left temple. An area to the right of his nostrils was also marked ‘Discrete 1.5 x 1 cm excoriation of broken skin and erythema (redness)’ [H37]. X-rays and a CT scan of Ch’s head showed no other abnormality. On 12^th November photographs were taken of the bruises and can be seen at E72.

In a statement dated 2^nd December 2013 M suggested a number of possible explanations for the bruising: Ch may have banged or pressed his head against the cot, Ch may have caused it on his travel mat, Ch may have hurt his face on the poppers of his baby grow or hit his head against a toy or some keys, the cat might have caused it, Ch might have caught his face on F’s collar bone, the stubble on F’s chin could have caused it when F kissed Ch, Ch might have eczema or some other skin reaction and the buttons of F’s shirt might have caused it.

F filed a statement on 9^th December 2013 saying that he only noticed a red birth mark over Ch’s eye and a red mark above his nose; F suggested two possibilities – the cat jumping on the pram and Ch catching his face on F’s shirt buttons. In his report Dr Rylance expressed the opinion that none of these suggestions provided a plausible explanation for the injuries.

Dr Rylance, in his report dated 9^th February 2014 [E59], said as follows:

Ch’s bruises are described as purple in colour. Because these don’t appear to have significant yellow or green elements, it is more likely than not that these were caused by trauma within the period of 76h prior to the examination description by Dr Candler at about 15.50h on 11.11.13. [E79];

Most bruises begin as red marks…when a bruise develops from a red mark, the darker colour change and failure to blanch under sustained pressure which is characteristic of a bruise will take place in almost all developing bruises by 12h and in the great majority by 4h. Occasionally, it may take 24h for bruises to become apparent as such [E80].

Ch’s bruises were described by his mother before going into hospital as red marks and she first saw these at about 11.20h on 11.11.13. If her testimony is accepted and that of first seeing bruising about 20 minutes after arriving at the hospital, it is likely that the trauma that caused them occurred in the previous 12h, i.e. after 01.00h on 11.11.13 but it could possibly, but much less likely, be from 13.00h on 10.09.13 [E80];

The position of the bruises – those on the left side of the forehead are quite separate from the one on the right and the skin between covers a convex area of the forehead – suggests that the trauma causing these groups of bruises was separate [E80];

[As to the area to the right of the nose] The appearances on the photographs suggest that the area is excoriation or an abrasion. It would not be due to scratching by Ch but I am unable to state the likely cause from the appearances [E81].

Ch’s bruises almost certainly occurred as a result of direct impact by a relatively flat unyielding firm object [E84].

The force required to cause this bruising is significantly in excess of normal handling [E85].

[As to whether there might be a medical explanation for Ch’s bruises]: I have considered this in paragraphs 49-57 above. There is none known to me from my perusal of the available records. A temporary or chronic inherited disorder of coagulation would be extremely unlikely [E90].

Ch’s only injuries were bruises and these were on his forehead. These would almost certainly have been caused by impact against a relatively hard and unyielding object. He couldn’t have caused the bruises himself without a carer being aware of the specific circumstances. Unless Ch were to have a rare inherited coagulation disorder, the cause is extremely likely to be trauma of non-accidental origin [E91].

The injuries occurred whilst Ch was in the care of his parents, at a time when Ch was three months old and when F had only been living in the household for less than a week. Nothing in Mr Lowe’s report alerted the Local Authority to any risk of such an event occurring and the occurring of the injuries was very much contrary to any risks that Mr Lowe identified.

In evidence M said that she turned Ch’s head that day in a way that she had done on numerous times in the past. She thought that she would have held his head in a tight grip for a couple of seconds whilst doing so. She sought to demonstrate what she meant during the course of evidence – what she demonstrated was quite plainly not the sort of action that would cause bruising. Further, she said that Ch did not cry as a result of what she did. She accepted that Dr Rylance’s evidence was that the carer would have immediately realised that the child had been injured (as common sense plainly demands).

M said that she had not thought that her action could have been the reason for the bruising until she heard Dr Rylance giving evidence and then realised that she must have caused it in this way. She said that she did not exert the grip out of temper. None of her evidence on this issue stood up to any scrutiny. She confirmed to me that she was absolutely sure that no one else cared for Ch that day and that Ch remained in her sole care throughout that morning and only her hand came into contact with Ch’s head.

13^th November 2013 - After the bruising was found Ch was taken into police protection on 13^th November 2013 and placed with Local Authority foster carers. Ch had been in the almost exclusive care of M up to this point.

14^th November 2013 – These proceedings were issued (initially as an application for an emergency protection order). The parties have agreed that it is on this date that consideration must be given to the issue of whether the threshold criteria under section 31(2) of The Children Act 1989 are fulfilled. On the 8^th May 2014 it was finally agreed that the criteria are fulfilled and that the terms in which that arises are as follows:

The relevant date is 14 November 2013, that being the date on which the proceedings were issued.

As at the relevant date Ch was suffering and was likely to suffer significant harm attributable to the care given to him, or likely to be given in the absence of an order, not being what it would be reasonable to expect a parent to give him. In support of that assertion the Local Authority rely on the following:

Ch suffered non accidental injuries whilst in the care of his mother

F has convictions for downloading two indecent images of children and admitted sexually abusing his step brother when he was 15 and his stepbrother was 8

M was reluctant to accept that F presented any risk to Ch

Both parents failed to follow LA advice regarding contact between F and Ch before being given permission to move back into the family home on 5 ^th November.

On 15^th November 2013 a hearing took place on the Local Authority’s application for an emergency protection order; the parents and the Local Authority entered into an agreement under which Ch was accommodated under section 20 of The Children Act 1989. However, three days later F wrote to the Local Authority withdrawing his consent to accommodation. As part of the agreement that had been made, the parents agreed that they would not seek the whereabouts of Ch [C71].

19^th November 2013 - At a further hearing on 19^th November 2013 the parents once again agreed that Ch should be accommodated until 25^th November 2013.

21^st November 2013 - The application by Gloucestershire County Council for a care order was made.

On 25^th November 2013 an interim care order was made by Recorder Dowell [B20] and interim care orders have remained in place since.

On 28^th November 2013 PC Barfoot was contacted by the foster carer to say that, following a contact session between the parents and Ch on 18^th November 2013, a mobile phone had been found on 28^th November 2013 sewn inside a teddy bear that M had given for Ch at the contact session. The phone was a Sony Xperia which has a location facility which operates via the 3G system. F said in evidence that he did not tell M that he had put the phone into the teddy bear and that he had put the device in the bear because he wanted to know where Ch was. This was in direct breach of the agreement that had been made on 15^th November (three days before the contact session on the 18^th).

29^th November 2013 – Ch moved to live with Ms D. The move arose because the foster carers felt that they could no longer care for Ch due to the father’s actions with the tracking device. However, D had difficulty coping with him and was not able to sustain her care of him for more than two weeks (despite the family support that she had).

10^th December 2013 - HHJ Marston heard a further case management hearing [B82]. He ordered the report to be filed by Dr George Rylance (consultant paediatrician) and also ordered a further report from Mr Steven Lowe.

13^th December 2013 - Ch moved from D’s care and returned to the same foster carers until placed with M for residential assessment.

On 23^rd December 2013 Ch and M went to live together at Crown House Family Assessment Centre in Malvern. Their ‘key worker’ there was Ms Katy Millington. F did not live with them there but contact with Ch was initially arranged to take place four times a week. This move followed a contested hearing before HHJ Marston that day. The learned Judge ordered that the assessment at Crown House should take place and refused permission to the Local Authority to appeal [B87a].

On arrival at Crown House, M informed staff that she did not intend to live with F in the future and did not want to speak to him [C128]. In patently untruthful oral evidence at this hearing she said that she had decided that she would separate from F when she arrived there. The regularity and collusion within their text exchanges are apparent from C226 to C240. Untruthfully in her oral evidence M said that she agreed to contact him initially in order that he might be informed of what was happening but then decided to cut off contact with him.

The text messages show the extent of her untruthfulness. She knew that he was outside Crown House when she was texting him on 23^rd December [C229]; she knew that he was asking where the cameras were [C229]; she told him that the staff were checking her emails and that he should only text her [C235], explaining this in evidence as resulting from her wish to ensure that Crown house did not know about their communications. At C228 is a text message from F: ‘your out of data on O2, text the orange number and put it on the tariff that gives you data when you top up £10’; M replied: ‘Takes 24 hours to move across. Could of txt u on my other phone but they don’t know about this one’ [C228].

F also made repeated and obsessive telephone calls to Crown House and emailed M repeatedly [C128]. He telephoned during the night repeatedly causing disturbance.

F says in his statement at C345 that M sought to conceal that they were in a relationship at this time. In her own statement at C359 M accepted that she was not truthful about the relationship and said: ‘I regret that I did not tell Crown House or the social workers the truth about our intended continuing relationship at the end of December and start of January’. Mr Lowe records at E260: ‘M was open in saying that she had lied to the authorities with regard to her relationship with F in December and that she had done this in an attempt to please all of those around her’.

Thus a charade developed of M pretending to the Local Authority and the staff at Crown House that she intended to remain separate from F and that she did not welcome attention from him. Her complaints about his behaviour were also part of that charade. The next few entries in the chronology have to be read together with the events of the 7^th January when, despite everything that is recorded, M said that she wished to continue in her marriage to F and accepted that she and he had been in collusion.

On 29^th December 2013 - It is also apparent that, at some times during the period at Crown House, M did not respond to F’s communications. On 29^th December 2013, F began sending a series of text messages to M saying that, if M did not contact him, Ch would have to go back into foster care [C130]. It is said that M had 68 missed calls on her phone [C130] He also sent her text messages which included: ‘I’ll give you three hours and then tomorrow Ch unfortunately will have to go back into foster care. I don’t want him to but clearly you do or I would have heard from you now…shall I just ring the landline through the night again and annoy everyone, I have an app for that. I will make sure I speak to you tomorrow one way or another’.

On 30^th December 2013 the telephone calls and messages from F continued. F came for contact and refused to leave Crown House and telephoned M repeatedly [C131]. He said that he would continue to call Crown House [C132]. He tried to place things secretly for Ch into his changing bag and became angry when he was asked to remove them – he was raising his voice and swearing at Crown House workers

On 31^st December 2013 a letter from F was pushed through the window of M’s bedroom at Crown House; in it F said that he wished to be in a relationship with M [C132]. He accepted in evidence that he had put the letter through the window.

Crown House then decided that it would cancel his contact and informed the Local Authority of this [C132]. A text message was sent to F informing him of this and, shortly afterwards, he arrived in anger at Crown House, pulled the Christmas wreath from the front door, kicked over a wheelie bin and shouted verbal abuse. Ms Millington said that she could hear F screaming ‘M’. He was saying that he would make sure that the manager of Crown House lost her job and that Ch was removed from Crown House and returned to foster care. The police were called and gave F an harassment notice. Following that F raised a string of complaints against Crown House and told them that they should ‘consider themselves sued’.

2^nd January 2014 – M went into Malvern with a member of staff from Crown house. F was there. He pulled her by her handbag and told her ‘ignorance is bliss, you can’t keep ignoring me’. After M returned to Crown House she received an email from F which said: ‘wtf you clearly have something wrong with you so I am going to get Ch returned to foster care, sorry you give me no choice and I did not break the rules as I was told not to go to the property , which I didn’t’.

That day there was a bombardment of emails from F to Crown House. They are set out at E216 and their flavour can be gained from the following extracts: ‘I am going to social services …now and I am requesting my son be removed as a majority of your staff are rude, avoid answering some questions and say one thing one day and then completely disregard it the next…I have no choice but to get my son removed today as I cannot trust your staff or my wife around my son, if they can’t stay there then he can’t either’.

3^rd January 2014 – The Local Authority applied for permission to refuse contact to F [B89]. At the time the Local Authority was unaware of the charade that was being played out by the parents. In the application the Local Authority stated: ‘The Local Authority is concerned that F’s seeming need to control situations has led to his behaviour escalating and becoming more unpredictable and out of control. As a result the Local Authority does not believe it is safe for Ch to have contact with his father for fear of what action he may take in order to gain some contact with his wife, who he believes is being stopped from contacting him. Therefore the only way to adequately protect Ch from his father’s behaviour is to cease contact’ [B90].

7^th January 2014 – The case was listed before me to decide upon the level of interim contact that should take place between F and Ch. My order states that the father had been recording court hearings and contact sessions and was warned that the taping of court hearings without permission was contemptuous [B92a].

As is said in the Crown House report at C152: ‘During the day it transpired that M had deceived all of the professionals involved. She had in fact been in contact with F whilst she had been at Crown House and they had arrived on the train to Bristol together that day. It became clear at this point that although F’s behaviour towards Crown House staff was completely inappropriate, M had fuelled this situation…Crown House gave consideration to whether M should continue her assessment however it was decided it was in the best interests of Ch that M should be given a chance to continue’.

Agreement was reached at court that F would have contact for two hours on each Tuesday and Thursday at the offices of the Local Authority. On her return to Crown House, M told staff that she did want to continue in a relationship with F and care for Ch together [C152]. Ms Millington said in evidence that M spoke strongly of her commitment to F after this and would become animated when talking about him. Ms Millington said that she told staff at Crown House that she wanted to have both F and Ch.

13^th January 2014 – F filed a statement [C136] in which he said that he remained committed to his marriage to M and hoped that they would be able to parent Ch together.

On 18^th February 2014 Mr Lowe wrote a further report [E100]. In it he concluded as follows:

I do not believe that M would compromise the safety of Ch as a result of her lack of clarity, as she clearly acted in the best interests of Ch when she felt that she was unwell, however the bruises / marks were caused. At that time she took Ch for help she did not try to disguise or wait until bruising went down etc. She also contacted F who went with her to the hospital.

Both F and M can act covertly and cover up things that they don’t want professionals to know about, as we have seen in particular recently when M failed to declare her contact with F, and when F concealed a phone in a teddy bear prior to that.

To be clear the additional information with regard to F does not alter my view of him or of my recommendations for work with him.

With regard to M I am also clear that my view of her has not changed, except to say that there is some additional work that needs to take place with regard to her self esteem and openness in relationships ore generally.

Of F he said at E113: ‘F will be highly mistrustful of others as his behaviour overall indicates and he clearly struggles with managing his anxiety. These issues are amenable to therapeutic intervention and my view remains that F will need to engage in and satisfactorily complete such therapy if he is to be considered safe as a parent in the long term’. Nothing in Mr Lowe’s report alerted anyone to the disorder from which F suffers and, I find, did not begin to address the depth of difficulties that he faces. Mr Lowe’s views about the impact of therapy for F did not reflect the evidence from Mr Hutchinson about the complexity of autistic spectrum disorder or the limited impact that any short term therapy might have. Further, Mr Lowe’s report did not adequately address the risks arising from the bruising to Ch or the mother’s collusive untruthfulness.

On 20^th February 2014 Ms Alex Clements of Crown House wrote a long and unstructured report; in it she expressed the opinion that M had maintained the basic care of Ch to a high standard but that her care of Ch was undermined by the controlling, immature and abusive behaviour of F. Thus Ms Clements said:

[E124] ‘M has remained on 24 hour supervision however it was agreed during the last review meeting on 28^th January 2014 that M could move on to spot checks for bottle feeding, nappy changing and bathing. She also remained on spot checks for sterilising and making up feeds. Overall M has completed all of these tasks to a good standard. However, there has been a noted decline in other aspects of her care of Ch. M has become distracted, her interaction with Ch has been limited and she has not responded to him at times.

[E124] ‘Two areas of concern were raised at the Midway Review Meeting. These were M and F’s relationship and F’s inappropriate behaviour towards Crown House and M’s ability to work honestly and cooperate with professionals. These concerns remain. In addition there are concerns about M’s ability to protect Ch, the possible non accidental injury to Ch and M’s ability to identify a suitable support network. M has completed a number of sessions to address these areas of concern but she has largely minimised the risk issues associated with F and their relationship making it impossible for us to be confident that she would protect Ch.

Following the court hearing on 7 ^th January 2014 it was agreed that F would not contact Crown House and would not come to Malvern. F kept to this for a few weeks but then he started contacting Crown House again and also sent an abrupt email for the attention of the health visitor in Malvern. M has been informed of this and she has expressed her annoyance with F. M has informed staff that she has given him an ultimatum stating that this behaviour must stop otherwise she will leave him on 3 ^rd March when her assessment is due to end.

We are concerned that M’s motivation in making this statement is simply to have a suggested separation from F as an insurance policy in the event that professionals say that she cannot have Ch in her care. We do not believe that M is committed to maintaining a separation from F’.

[E127] ‘we feel strongly that M would struggle to manage the risks associated with F in the community or that she even accepts the extent of the risks. This in turn makes it very difficult for M to protect Ch…we feel the information collated during this assessment is sufficient evidence to show that Ch would be at significant risk if he were to return to the community with M. Therefore our recommendation is that Ch should not return to the community with M and alternative arrangements should be made for his care’.

On 20^th February there was a contact session which was supervised by Ms Mather. At G78 Ms Mather said that, at the end of the contact session ‘F and M had a long lingering kiss and F departed’. Further, text messages were being exchanged between the parents that recorded their expressions of love for each other. It is quite apparent that, until very shortly before 25^th March F thought that she and M remained committed to each other and also that M had not decided to separate from him.

On the 25^th February 2014 a meeting was held at Crown House. By this time the report of Crown House had not been revealed to F and M. Three members of the social work team met with members of the assessment team from Crown House. The members of staff from Crown House felt that they could not ensure the safety of Ch once the contents of the report were made known since it recommended that M and Ch should be separated. The social work team were told that the placement at Crown House would be ended on 26^th February 2014.

Of particular concern were the threats that F had made that he would remove Ch from the Local Authority care if there were to be suggestion that Ch would not continue in the care of his parents. Mrs Preedy gave evidence that she heard F say this. I have no doubt at all that Mrs Preedy is correct in her evidence.

At E164 there are the following reasons given by Crown House for their recommendations:

F and M’s volatile relationship and apparent inability to protect Ch.

F’s inappropriate behaviour towards Crown House;

F’s ability to work honestly and cooperate with professionals.

The possible non accidental injury to Ch.

F’s ability to identify a suitable support networks.

Of those concerns, Ms Millington said in evidence, the last four remain. In response to a question from Mr Carron, she agreed that anyone who has the care of Ch would need substantial protection from F; I agree.

On the 26^th February 2014 the social worker Kimberley Hughes filed a statement expressing her concerns for Ch’s welfare. She said that F is persistently controlling of M, the Local Authority and health professionals. She said that M subordinates herself to F and that, together, they are unable to work with professionals. She also recorded her concern about F’s threats to remove Ch from Local Authority care if he was not returned home at the end of the Crown House assessment on 3^rd March 2014. I accept her analysis.

On that day also F and M were informed about the results of the assessment by Crown House. M became very upset and F became very assertive saying that he did not ‘give a crap’ what the court decided as Ch and M would not be separated. Crown House were not prepared to have Ch and M in their home for another night and so the Local Authority made arrangements for the case to be listed urgently before me the next day and found a mother and child foster placement for that night. The Local Authority was placed in a very difficult position that day and responded quickly and well to the emergency that arose. It was agreed between the Local Authority and M that F would not be informed of the whereabouts of the foster placement.

That evening F made 22 telephone calls to the social worker, Ms Hughes. He told her that she was ‘fucking ignoring him’ and that the only option was for Ch to return home. When the social worker took M and Ch to Crown House to collect their things, the staff at Crown House would not allow M into the premises even though it was dark and Ch needed a feed. Further, F telephoned to say that he and his father were on their way to Crown House; as they were not allowed to be there the police were called. By the time that F arrived, M had left with the social worker and Ch to go to the new placement. The police were called and supervised F’s departure from Crown House. On the way to the new foster home, F and M were in frequent contact by mobile phone.

27^th February 2014 – HHJ Rutherford made an order excluding F from ‘[a specific area], so that the child may continue to live there, consent to the exclusion requirement having been given by the mother, F and the foster carer’. A power of arrest was attached to the order [B105]. The learned judge also gave other directions [B109].

F then set about to do his best to trace where Ch and M were living. He discovered that it was near to a Tesco supermarket in X town and was close to a specific street. He said that he worked this out on the basis of ‘logic’. He accepted that he had told the social worker, Ms Hughes, that he could find out where Ch was at any time he wanted to.

At C383 there is a text message with a photograph that F sent to M. The photograph has a message under it: ‘[Number plate…Name of a road]- in evidence he said that he believed that this was where the foster carers lived. He said that he found the photograph (which is of a house) by searching on the internet and did not take it himself. The next message reads: ‘It’s a very small Tesco but well stocked, I left the Cesar wrap in case you popped in’. In evidence he said that he deliberately made it appear that he had visited the Tesco store whereas he had not. He said that he saw a picture of the bus stop on M’s phone and managed to find that bus stop by doing a search on Google Earth.

I think that it is highly likely that he knew exactly where they were living and used his undoubted computer skills to find them. He certainly knew the neighbourhood in which they were living. I accept that he did not seize Ch but, at the time, he and M were still professing their intentions to remain together (this was before the 25^th March). I accept that he has threatened to abduct Ch on a number of occasions and those threats have to be taken seriously, particularly where the arrangements for Ch are in conflict with what F wishes to achieve.

28^th February 2014 - The social worker Kimberley Hughes filed a statement on 28^th February 2014. In it she expressed the increasing concerns about the behaviour of F and his ability to undermine the care that M gives to Ch. Further, Ms Hughes considered that M had not been truthful in the past about her contact with F and had broken agreements with the Local Authority. She stated that the Local Authority sought to place Ch separately from M pending the final hearing. When the case came before the court, that aspect was not pursued and Ch and M remained together at the foster placement in the light of the proximity of the final hearing.

3^rd March 2014 – I gave further directions. I made injunctions in the High Court [B114] with a view to ensuring that F did not attend the foster home or harass M or the foster carers. I directed that a report by Dr Liesner, paediatric haematologist, should be filed by 4 p.m. on 25^th March 2014. I directed that the final hearing should remain listed on 31^st March 2014.

The injunctions that I made are set out at B114. The first six paragraphs were intended to ensure that F was not told the location of the foster placement and did not cause difficulties with that placement. However, paragraph 7 of that order stated: ‘Both Mrs M and Mr F are forbidden to contact each other than text and phone calls on the following mobile numbers: …..save for when they have face to face contact twice per week for 2 ½ hours directly following contact with Ch during which they are of course permitted to communicate in person’. In the light of subsequent events it is very plain that this order was breached.

6^th March 2014 – the Local Authority filed the report by Susan Hart of the parenting assessment that had been carried out in relation to F [C259]. At C264 it concluded: ‘Throughout all the sessions it doesn’t look as though F takes pleasure from being with Ch; he is tense, holds Ch awkwardly and only when necessary i.e. feeding, rarely talks to him and makes no effort to engage him in any significant play. F was very matter of fact in his approach to Ch; there was no warmth toward or bond with him…F did not respond to Ch’s cues re being hungry and continually asked him ‘what’s the matter then? When Ch cried…F is very authoritative and opinionated abut things such as dummies…However F’s lack of knowledge about child development showed in assessment…F went through the parenting motions wit little emotional warmth towards Ch’.

Ms Hart gave oral evidence. There were three two hour sessions with F and Ch in the family home and a fourth involving both F and M. That last session is described at C261 where it is said: ‘F and M were observed to bicker to one another when they talked. F was observed to say critical comments to M about her eating habits, her clothes and comments that she made about Ch, for example she mentioned that Ch has a dummy at night, F said ‘that will change, I don’t want him having that’. M responded sharply by saying ‘well he won’t sleep without it’. M and F continued to be snappy in their communication with one another and did not show any affection or warmth to one another during the session’.

Ms Hart accepted that her assessment, which was based on observation without feedback, was entirely negative. Her particular concern was the complete lack of emotional content that she saw in his relationship with Ch; ‘you can teach a person the basics of parenting but you can’t teach someone how to bond,’ she said. Given Mr Hutchinson’s evidence of F’s autistic spectrum disorder the results of this assessment are not remotely surprising.

11^th March 2014 – F wrote an email directly to Dr Liesner, the haematologist. He told the doctor that there was a dispute about the blood tests and that the appointment with Dr Liesner was cancelled. He had no right to behave in that way at all. He should not have emailed her. On 14^th March he wrote a further email to Dr Liesner saying that he understood that the appointment had gone ahead and so, he said, he would be putting in a complaint with the ‘GMC’. I wish to record that Dr Liesner behaved entirely appropriately and as directed by the court. There is no valid basis whatsoever in F’s complaint. I ask the Local Authority to ensure that Dr Liesner is informed that I have made the above remarks.

12^th March 2014 – Debbie Preedy and Miss Hughes, social workers, went with M to London for the appointment with Dr Liesner. Mrs Preedy has filed a statement, dated 31^st March 2014 in which she gives an account of F repeatedly telephoning and texting Miss Hughes and also M. M co operated well with Dr Raina Leisner. On the journey back there was a telephone call between M and F in which M ‘made no attempt to conceal the private contents of this conversation from myself or Miss Hughes (says Mrs Preedy). Mrs Preedy also says: ‘When the call ended M reported that F had acquired access to her private email account and discovered her email seeking advice about a divorce. M was unable to explain how F was able to access her email account’.

Dr Liesner emailed me directly on 24^th March 2014 to ask whether she should reply to F. I asked the court office to respond to Dr Liesner in these terms: ‘The Judge has seen your fax. He has forwarded a copy of it to the solicitor for the guardian and asked her to send copies of it to all other parties. There is a hearing in this case next week. I will ask that the guardian's solicitor should raise with me in court the appropriateness of F emailing Dr Liesner in the terms that he did. I do not think that Dr Liesner should engage in correspondence with F. I will also ask the guardian's solicitor to send to Dr Liesner my judgment on whether F should have emailed Dr Liesner’.

On 27^th March 2014 Dr Liesner, wrote her report. In it she said:

The investigations we have done on Ch have excluded all the severe disorders that can occur and also all the mild deficiencies of clotting proteins. They have not excluded minor disorders of platelets for reasons explained above but one would not expect infants with such conditions to develop bruising during normal day-to-day handling. If it so happened that there was an infant who was a very easy bruiser and bruised on normal handling then this would have been present from birth until the present day and one would have expected frequent episodes of bruising to have occurred following normal handling by the age of 6 months.

Therefore in addition to the laboratory evidence of normal haemostasis or blood clotting in Ch we also have clinical evidence that there is normal haemostasis; there are no reports of any excess bruising or bleeding associated with procedures that breach the skin such as vaccination, blood taking and the Guthrie heel prick test done in the 1 ^st week of life and there are also no reports of bruising during normal daily life apart from those documented on 11/11/2013.

Conclusion - My instructions were to consider the report of Dr Rylance and carry out the relevant tests which I have done and commented on them as detailed in the sections above. I agree with the opinion expressed by Dr Rylance in his report dated 09/02/2014.

11^th March 2014 – The guardian applied for ‘permission to instruct a psychologist to provide an expert opinion on the parents’ [B119]. This was not pursued until the end of the first three days of the hearing in April (and I do not record this as a criticism because so much was changing in the case at the time).

14^th March 2014 – The social worker Kimberley Hughes filed her fifth statement [C269]. In it she expressed the Local Authority’s then plan to recommend that Ch should be placed with D under a special guardianship order.

It is on this day that Steven Lowe held the first two out of six sessions of CBT with both parents separately [E255].

15^th March 2014 – M sent a text message to F [C319] in which she said: ‘we all good. Ch fast asleep...hope you had a good day. Night xxxx’. That is the last text message in a set of messages that have been printed off and placed in the bundle at C292 to C319. The general nature of the messages from M is that she loves F (e.g. ‘I will say goodnight now. Love u so much baby xxx’).

19^th March 2014 - Steven Lowe held the next two out of six sessions of CBT with both parents separately [E255]. M told him that ‘she felt that she had to make a decision before court …about whether or not she was going to remain in a relationship with F’.

21^st March 2014 – F filed a position statement which was based on the premise that he and M wished to care for Ch together – A28.

24^th March 2014 – F and M met and went shopping together. The evidence from both of the parents was that there was nothing in that meeting that would have forewarned F that M would tell him next day that the marriage was over. Since then, F says, he has been unable to discuss with M that decision to end the marriage; his conduct thereafter must be viewed in that light. The very real difficulty that this type of behaviour by M represents is that it is a continuation of her behaving in one way with F whilst behaving differently when under professional scrutiny.

25^th March 2014 - The case was listed for further directions on 25^th March 2014. At that hearing M announced that she was separating from F. In May, I asked M to explain how events moved from the affectionate exchange shown in the text messages ending on 15^th March 2014 to the events of 25^th March. M said that, during this period she thought carefully about the relationship and decide that it could not continue. Her decision to separate, I accept, came as a surprise to F. At C345 F said: ‘this came as a shock to me as until just the day before the issues resolution hearing, M had been reassuring me that our relationship was fine and there were no problems’. At C359 M said: ‘at court on 25^th March, I told F that I was separating from him. I appreciate this came as a shock’.

There was a great deal of tension at that hearing and F at one point suggested that he knew the location of the foster placement but then said that he had made this suggestion as a means of getting back at M for saying that she was separating from him and anticipating that the Local Authority would remove Ch from M. During the negotiations that day F was repeatedly phoning and texting M. It appears that F had been contacting M on a mobile phone which was not one of the phones specified in the injunction. F’s solicitor informed the Local Authority that the parents had met each other the day before after meetings with their respective solicitors.

After leaving court F approached M at the train station and told her that, if she did not return to him, he would turn up at her appointments with Steven Lowe and that Ch would be adopted. M says that she taped what he was saying on a mobile phone and reported his behaviour to the police that evening (25^th March); Mrs Preedy said that this was only after the foster carer encouraged M to do so. The police have apparently listened to the tape recording but did not keep a copy. Thus the injunction that I made on 7^th January 2014 did not avoid any of this.

Mrs Preedy was asked about these events when she gave evidence. She said that the Local Authority does not think that M could be relied on to bring about enforcement of an injunction and, she thought, injunctions are punitive after the event and not preventive before the event. What is more, Mrs Preedy said, F has stated and made it plain by his actions that he has no regard for orders of the court and would abduct Ch.

Subsequently, F demanded that the phone bearing the recording should be returned to him. The phone was returned to him and he then wiped the recording from it. When asked why he had done so he said that he had been told that, since I had said that there should be no recordings of contact or court hearings, he took the view that it was wrong for M to record him and therefore wiped the recording from the phone.

However, M has produced a written record of what she says was on the recording. Those notes are at C520 and were written, she says, before the recording was wiped from the phone by F. I accept that they are notes of what F said. The typed version of the notes (helpfully prepared by Mr Carron) contain the following:

‘How does it feel to be completely dishonest person…I would not suggest turning up to any of Steve Lowe appointments, I’ll make sure I’m there every single time’;

‘You know whatever bullshit your barrister/solicitor feed you know you ain’t gonna fucking be with him right. He ain’t gonna go D’s either. Guarantee it. Must be boring. Must be boring. No ability to actually defend myself whatsoever. Lying Deceitful Woman.

Guarantee it you won’t fucking see him beyond his first birthday. And that’s not a threat that’s a promise. You had a lot of chances if you stayed with me but there you go. All these efforts I was making to sort out a home for him…I’ll take whatever actions are necessary to make sure he doesn’t stay with you ever’;

Don't plan on having any more kids coz I’ll make sure you can't . Thought I'd bring that up. See why there’s a reason why we struggled. Nature didn’t want you to do it.

Cause this means I can no longer feed the cats. So there gunna have to all be put down aren’t they. Which is extended to Archie [Mrs G’s horse] and the ponies [Mrs G has a Shetland and her ‘nan’ has two such ponies] I’ll be able to do that myself though.

Oh look horse, wonder what one of those looks like, then think of the Godfather. It's alright I won’t kill ‘em I’ll just give ‘em to some Gypseys or summit. Drake (cat) on the other hand I'll just have to starve him as I can't afford to feed him.

Let’s see how you cope with four visits a year shall we. How much he changes in 3 months and each time he forgets you even more. Till I’m forced to a place where I take him and leave the country and you never see him again full stop’.

The mother made that record of the conversation at a time when the recording was still in existence (the father retrieved the phone later). That being so, I accept Mr Carron’s skilful point that the court can confidently rely on her note, prepared by her at a time when she must have thought that her note would be compared against the recorded original.

The notes made by M did not come to light until after F had given evidence (Mr Carron had received this document but, through oversight, did not disclose it). I therefore suggested that F should be recalled to deal with it. With two exceptions, he accepted that he may have said the things recorded against him. However, he said that he did not make any threats against the cats or horses but may have said it would be difficult to feed them given the demands of paying rent. He also said that he did not threaten to take Ch out of the country or to make sure that she can’t have more children.

There is a straightforward disagreement between F and M about this. I believe M.

In her statement M said this of the events at the station and on the train [C360]: ‘From 4.40 p.m. until I met with Stephen Lowe on 26^th March at 10.20 a.m. I had received approximately 93 calls and 4 text messages from him, and continued to receive calls until 28^th March at 10.58 a.m., but have had 4 texts since 28^th March. Before I received all of these calls he met with me at the train station at Bristol and proceeded to talk to me which I recorded as he was using emotional blackmail and threats. I contacted the police and I made a statement on the evening of the 25^th March and was given the incident number 343. The police also listened to the recording. The types of threats F was making on the platform at the station were that I either stayed with him or Ch would be adopted; he would turn up at all of my appointments with Mr Lowe; and then he continued his behaviour when he got on the same train as me. He threatened that he would take whatever action was necessary to make sure that Ch doesn’t stay with me. He has threatened to take Ch and leave the country so that I will never see him again. He also went so far as to say that if he got caught he would give Ch to family and keep running to keep them on his tail. F also told me to make the most of these nights as at some point I would be crying myself to sleep with a picture of Ch and thinking what did I do wrong. He continued to say any other children I have will be taken into care as well because of how I failed with the first one. He also remarked that I would be like my mum in her 40’s living alone, with no partner but loads of cats, a horse and no money’. There is a list of the calls that F made to M at C445.

Further, F sent a number of text messages and made a number of calls to Miss Hughes. Miss Preedy says in her last statement: ‘F was generally polite and expressed that he would do anything necessary and work with services to ensure that Ch was returned to his care; he advised that he was going to apply for sole residence of Ch’.

26^th March 2014 - Steven Lowe held the next two out of six sessions of CBT with both parents separately [E255].

28^th March 2014 – Mr Lowe wrote a further report which is at E254. By the time of the report he had carried out six sessions of cognitive behavioural therapy with F and M separately. He reported that both parents had committed to the process of therapy. He said that M has been thoroughly engaged in the process and has done the homework that has been set for her. He said that both parents clearly have more work to do and he would not expect their behaviour to have changed yet. He said that he had not seen any changes in their behaviour yet.

At E262 Mr Lowe said: ‘I am clear that provided F and M successfully complete the work as outlined in previous reports, work that they have both completed 6 sessions on, then they are able to manage any risk. There is clearly an added complication in that it would appear that the parties are to separate / have separated and if care were given to one party then there would in my view need to be an agreement about contact for the other. This is something that could feature in the planned 2 days work with M after she has completed her CBT. I suggested that F should join for part of that work and that the focus of his involvement would alter depending upon the decision of the court’.

In oral evidence Mr Lowe said that M had a very significant difficulty with her self esteem. If someone in an apparently dominant position says something to her she will tend to comply with it without thinking what she thinks is right. It is evident in her relationship with F and also the Local Authority, he thought.

Mr Lowe said that it appears to be anxiety that leads to F behaving in the negative way that he does. At E256 Mr Lowe said: ‘the primary reason for him needing to make changes is that his strategies for dealing with anxiety have worked against him rather than in his favour’. That does not reflect what is now known about F following the report by Mr Hutchinson.

He said that, when he used the phrase that ‘M would not compromise Ch’s safety’ he had meant Ch’s physical or sexual safety. I asked him whether it was right to advance that opinion before the court decided how the bruising occurred in November; he accepted that it had not been right for him to do so. I do note that it is only after I raised that very obvious point that Mr Lowe recognised it. I think that his opinion at C115 was also invalid when he said: ‘I do not believe that M would compromise the safety of Ch as a result of her lack of clarity, as she clearly acted in the best interests of Ch when she felt that he was unwell, however the bruises / marks were caused. At that time she took Ch for help, she did not try to disguise or wait until bruising went down etc. She also contacted F who went with her to hospital’.

Mr Lowe’s opinion in his first report was demonstrated to have been over confident in two very obvious respects. First, within four days of the report being written the bruises were caused to Ch by one or other of the parents. Second, the parents behaved as they did at Crown House with the very obvious consequences that it put at significant risk the continuation of M’s care of Ch. Nothing in Mr Lowe’s assessment foresaw that behaviour.

Further, his consistently expressed suggestion that M would not compromise the safety of Ch could not be validly expressed before the cause of the bruising was identified. Further still, his view that after the proposed sessions of CBT ‘they are able to manage any risk’ was a very significant over statement. He told me in evidence that he had meant ‘any risk’ including emotional risk. The facts of this case and the behaviour of the parents invalidate his opinion.

1^st April 2014 – The hearing started before me. As part of his journey to court F travelled via X station. By the injunction he was not permitted to enter X. That breach of the injunction is, I think, technical and I do not attach significance to that particular breach. However he then followed M out of the station at Swindon (where they had to change for a connecting train to Bristol). He then removed a Samsung phone from her and took the memory card out. He harassed her on the journey to Bristol and removed all the recordings from the phone. She says that he also showed her a video on a ‘porn site’ which appeared to be of her (see para 14 of her fourth statement). In the course of dealing with these events when asked by Mr Carron, F confirmed that he thought it more important that he should be able to sort things out for his son than comply with court orders.

3^rd April 2014 - F says that he saw M on the train and talked to her on the way to court. He should not have done so.

4^th April 2014 – it was discovered that F had taken money from M’s bank account. He accepted in evidence that he bought things from Asda and Amazon using M’s bank account details – this led to M having to cancel her bank card.

10^th April 2014 - F confronted her at a bus stop after M had attended a meeting with Mr Lowe. F was travelling for his appointment. F got on the bus with M for a few stops, taking him away from where the appointment was. On the 25^th March 2014 he had told her that he would attend every appointment that she made to see Mr Lowe (see C512).

12^th April 2014 – text messages were sent by M repeatedly. They are copied at C378 to C421. They include the following:

C394 [13 ^th April 2014] – I don’t care if this constitutes as harassment, as if I didn’t do it I’d be a fool, I can not and will not give you up’;

C394 [13 ^th April] I will fight through every force against me to have my son at home and preferably with you as well;

C395 [14 ^th April] I may have this thing, I may not have this thing that the psychiatrist thinks I may have but one thing I can guarantee is that I am not a risk to my son that people keep saying I am and if not more person says I am they will regret it;

[C396] – 14 ^th April – I have never done anything to hurt my son so restrictions on my movements and who can I can contact be damned.

In evidence I asked F if he meant what he said in that last text message (it is on the transcript for 8^th May at 11.20 a.m.). F made it quite plain that, if Ch were to be living with M and orders were in place that prohibited him from seeing Ch, he would not accept that arrangement and would not accept that he should not see his son. I was left in no doubt at all that he meant what he said – the evidence clearly demonstrates this and his intent was perfectly clear from what he said.

16^th April 2014 – F decided that he would not consent to the renewal of the interim care order. As a result a hearing had to be arranged to decide whether the order should be renewed. Due to the deteriorating position in relation to F undermining the mother’s care of Ch and the other circumstances of the case, the Local Authority and guardian argued that the interim care order should be renewed on the basis that M and Ch should be separated. That very day F approached M at X station and was arrested. Ultimately, after the social worker had given evidence to the effect that M could not keep Ch safe from F, M accepted that, pending the resumption of the final hearing, she and Ch should not remain together. As a consequence, she left the foster placement and Ch moved to another location.

Since then, the guardian says: ‘Ch is developing well and has settled with his new foster carer. He continues to have contact with his mother three times a week. F’s contact was reduced to once a week following the hearing on 16th April 2014. This reduction was to allow Ch time to settle within his new placement whilst retaining a bond with his mother who had been his primary carer prior to the move’.

17^th April 2014 – F sent a message to D via Facebook [C501]. In it he said: ‘Recent events have been unfortunate but she has now experienced Karma as a result of her action. If she wants her son back then all that she needs to do is remove the non molestation order and the harassment complaint and call her husband. Also she has till Saturday to return the Samsung as she doesn’t use it and it is in her husband’s name’. In evidence he accepted that he sent this and said that he did not intend that this message should be passed on by D to M; the evidence of his intention is patently untrue. It is plain that he wrote this so that it would be communicated to M.

18^th April 2014 – F sent another message via Facebook to D saying [C502]:’I do not blame her for the bruises and will stand by her to stop it from happening providing she drops the harassment complaint and get the non molestation order removed then comes home so we can get him back’. In evidence (at 11.30 a.m. on 8^th May) he made it plain that he still believes that this is what she should do. The best thing, he said, was for them to get back together and care jointly for Ch. He made it plain that he regards these proceedings to have been started because of something for which he was not responsible – the bruising and that absent the bruising there would be no reason for these proceedings.

21^st April 2014 - F sent further messages to D [C502] on this day and on later dates. As to the 22^nd April D said at C503:’ I received another message from F on Facebook. The message accused M of not caring for Ch as she needs to remove the order. The message had a particularly distressing ending – ‘SEE paragraph 3 on the order, technically if I were my own solicitor….this was a reference to the non molestation order in which paragraph 3 states that F is not to contact M save through a solicitor. I fear that he will use manipulative ways to harass her’.

24^th April – a further message was sent to D ‘referring to the phone and also rent’. D said at C503: ‘I believe all of the messages sent to me were done so with the intent of them reaching M and causing her upset’. D is plainly correct.

25^th April 2014 - Mr Roger Hutchinson (the psychologist) wrote his two reports. They are at E276 (M) and E312 (F). In relation to M he said in his summary: ‘M is a person of above average cognitive abilities. M does not present with any significant psychological pathology which will adversely affect her ability to provide safe and good enough parenting for Ch. M will require support to ensure that she is not subjected to harassment or abuse directed towards her by her husband from whom she has separated and is going to seek a divorce’.

Mr Hutchinson also recommended a number of interventions and resources to assist M if she retains Ch’s care. These included the Freedom Programme and CBT for post-traumatic stress disorder. Mr Hutchinson considered that the CBT provided by Mr Lowe has been beneficial to M. His overall opinion, as expressed by him in evidence and as is apparent at E285 is that M has the ability to care for Ch adequately subject to her ability to protect Ch from F and her ability to act co-operatively and openly with professionals – the two qualifications that I mentioned earlier (to which the fact of the bruising and M’s associated untruthfulness must be added).

He said that, in dealing with F as a person with autistic spectrum disorder, M may have behaved in ways that could be perceived as abusive – playing with his emotional vulnerabilities. However he did not think that it was right to attempt to slot that conduct under a label of her being ‘domestically abusive’– she responded as she did when faced with the manifestations of F’s autistic behaviour and within the dynamics of the relationship (see paragraph 3.5 of his report).

He said, on the information that he had seen, M did not feel safe in Crown House; if she did not feel safe even there, it demonstrates that she would need a significant amount of support if caring for Ch.

Although he said that M would be no less able to protect Ch in the community than anyone else when faced with F’s more extreme behaviour, I do not agree with him and this is the one point upon which my opinion departs from his. On this aspect I depart from his reasoning because:

Other people in the community would not have been married to F and would not have the same past emotional entanglement with him. Thus, part of his ability to harass M is for the very reasons that she is his wife and they are both parents of Ch. He would have no such emotional pull or means of entry into the lives of third parties;

He has an established pattern of behaviour between himself and M. He does not have that pattern with third parties.

She now bears the guilt of having caused the bruising and having attempted to blame F. I have no doubt that he will use that as part of his means of attempting to harass her. He has done so consistently during the course of these proceedings and perceives the bruising as the reason for the Local Authority’s intervention. He will not have that same basis of justification against a third party (although, I accept, will still see them as wrongly interfering with his rightful parenting);

Many more protective steps could be taken to prevent him interfering with a third party’s care of Ch (e.g. confidentiality of location and identity).

Mr Hutchison accepted that it was entirely possible that M would be subjected to considerable manipulation by F. The past defines the probable future. He thought that M would have significant difficulty in dealing with F’s more extreme behaviour. If M has responsibility for Ch and F does not it would be expected that his behaviour would increase to a level of obsessional harassment. If that type of harassment does develop, there is a significant risk of harm to the person who is harassed – 30 to 40% of people who are obsessionally harassed suffer physical harm, he said. Where there is a former intimate relationship, the likelihood of harm increases significantly once the relationship ends. Further, women are much more exposed to that risk of harm when the relationship ends than men. Only time will tell whether she is genuinely able to separate from him, Dr Hutchinson thought.

Any support from M’s family members would have to be extremely strong to serve as sufficient protection against F’s foreseeable conduct if Ch was in the care of M. Whether, for instance, D could do this must be ‘questionable’ on the basis of the evidence that he had read. He said that, if M is obsessionally harassed, it would make no difference if she moved away from the area; indeed the more difficult it becomes for the harassed person to be accessed, the more the person harassing may take extreme measures. F has a particular ability with electronic and digital equipment and so it would be extremely difficult, if not possible, to avoid him becoming aware of Ch’s whereabouts.

Mr Hutchinson added to his opinion that F has already stated that he will not comply with any restrictions to his contact and will not accept supervision. In his report at E283, para 3.19 he had said: ‘F stated that he would be unlikely to comply with any restrictions related to contact or supervision. Until such time as he moderates his behaviour it is unlikely that M (or any other carer), assuming that she maintains her separation from F, will be able to protect Ch from the consequences of F’s behaviour without significant additional help provided within a restrictive legal framework. F has been assessed as being a medium risk of exhibiting aggressive or violent behaviour. F is aware of the nature of his behaviour and although ASD may be a mitigating factor, it does not provide an excuse for abusive behaviour’.

He said that M had told him that she wished to be divorced from F but that she recognised that F would not accept this. He said that it would be necessary for M to have no direct contact with F if Ch were to be living with her; should she become the resident parent of Ch she should have no responsibility for maintaining contact between F and Ch, he said. If Ch and the mother were living in the same area as F he had difficulty seeing how F’s behaviour could be regulated.

Imprisonment for breach of injunctions would be unlikely to impress itself on his mind as a deterrent and could result in an obsessional response driving him to more misconduct. If compelled under a term of licence on release from prison to undergo therapy this might have an impact but would require that level of compulsion. For any term of imprisonment to have any impact, allowing for a significant amount of directed therapy under licence, it would have to be a long sentence – he said a sentence of at least 3 years resulting in 18 months imprisonment. Without the long term therapy it is likely that there will be explosive incidents which would put M at risk if exposed to F. A short sentence of imprisonment would not have an effect since, with F, there is a disconnect between the act committed and the punishment; he would not accept the reason for the sentence. ASD sufferers are recognised as being poor responders to prison since they do not recognise its purpose or reason.

It would also be necessary for M to have a full understanding of the risks that F represents, including the sexual risk. He said that a ‘low sexual risk’ such as that which has been stated in relation to F means that there is a 30% chance of re-offending and this does not appear to be understood by M. There are parents who are classified as a low risk of offending who parent their children adequately with appropriate support and engagement, he said; however, that engagement and support is unlikely to be a feature of F’s functioning.

Further, given the nature of his condition, F would not understand the consequences of the risk that he poses and does not have an awareness of self protective behaviours. His behaviour will cause some people to think that he is ‘odd’ and, in the context of other children, other parents and children may think that his behaviour is strange and may lead to allegations against him. There was no evidence that he had any understanding of the need to avoid this type of allegation. He did not understand his offence ‘pathway’ – how he ended up committing an offence. He did not get out of the Sexual Offenders treatment Programme what he might have done and so did not develop the understanding that he might.

F appears to think that his sexual offending is a past aspect of his life but for the avoidance of future offending there has to be an understanding of past offending, Mr Hutchinson said. F was not aware that there could be any risk that he might represent to Ch – it was then that Mr Hutchinson said that F’s belief that he represented no risk to Ch was ‘naive in the extreme’ given his past history.

Subject to the court’s findings particularly about the bruising, he did not regard M herself to be a direct risk to Ch. He thought that, if the court finds that M caused the injuries, it might be possible for a Resolution type set of strategies to be put in place and then it might be possible for a report to be obtained in relation to this in 12 weeks. He was concerned, however, that M can minimise problems and any strategy would require her honest co operation. He said that he is aware that there is a strong body of evidence that M has not worked honestly and openly with professionals in the past. If there was any evidence that M was not doing everything that she could to distance herself from F that would place Ch at risk.

Mr Hutchinson’s evidence was highly professional and informative. He came across as an exceedingly wise and patient man who is highly skilled in his profession. As I have explained, I have departed from his views on one point based on my own analysis of the evidence. However, beyond that, I accept his analysis of F. I consider that he identified the two interlinked qualifications relating to M correctly (can she keep Ch safe from F and can she work with others to safeguard and protect Ch’s welfare). I think that he was also correct to acknowledge that the court’s findings in relation to the bruising also involve specific consideration when analysing whether she can care for Ch safely in the future.

1^st May 2014 – F was arrested on the basis that it was alleged that he had broken the non molestation order by indirectly contacting M through his use of D’s Facebook site between the 17^th and 24^th April. At C497 F expresses his untruthful denial that his intention was to communicate with M. He was released and I do not know whether prosecution is intended.

6^th May 2014 – The guardian filed her reports. They arrived on the morning that the hearing resumed on the 7^th May 2014. In them she said:

Mr Hutchinson’s report about F is clear, detailed and helps the reader to understand F’s behaviour. Mr Hutchinson’s report about M is less detailed and, in my view, there are some issues that require further exploration.

I am still unable to recommend that either or both of Ch’s parents have the capacity to meet his short/mid or long term needs if living in the community.

Mr Hutchinson is clear that F is not able to parent Ch within a timescale that is appropriate for Ch’s urgent need to be settled with permanent carer(s) with minimal delay.

Mr Hutchinson considers that M has the capacity to provide good enough care for Ch if she is protected from F’s harassment. This observation is broadly congruent with the opinion of Crown House and the foster carer who provided a mother and baby placement for Ch and M.

The issues that continue to concern me when considering the advisability of Ch being returned to his mother’s care are outlined below. In relation to the forehead bruising suffered by Ch when he was three months old, Dr Rylance advises that it is extremely likely that it was caused nonaccidentally.

Both parents continue to deny causing that injury or being aware of how it was caused. Until there is clear and credible information to the contrary I still consider that Ch would be at risk of harm in the un-supervised care of either parent. F has helpfully provided evidence from his employer that he arrived at work at 7.00 am on the morning that Ch was injured and this should assist the court in its deliberations to identify the perpetrator of the injuries. If the court finds that M caused those injuries and has continued to deny doing so, I would not consider it safe to place Ch back in her care.

Considerable emotional harm has been sustained by Ch as a result of the number of changes of carer he has had. He is also likely to have been emotionally harmed by being physically hurt by one of his parents. Before Ch’s birth M was aware that F posed a risk of sexual harm to children but chose to continue the relationship. M has not acted protectively towards Ch in the past and I am not at all confident that she could do so within a timescale that is appropriate for him.

M has not been honest about her relationship with F throughout most of these proceedings. She has been very reluctant to separate from him and at times has pretended to separate from him whilst continuing with the relationship. Especially in view of this history, it is difficult to have confidence in M’s recent resolve to separate from her husband or of her ability to work openly and honestly with the local authority. The decision to separate appears to have been made to increase the possibility of Ch being returned to her care and not because she wished to end the relationship with F. M appears to have been ambivalent about reporting incidents of harassment to the police and continued to use a mobile phone that she knew could be monitored by F. Mr Hutchinson advises that M is of above average cognitive ability and in my view she would have understood that F would continue to try to track her and contact her.

Mr Hutchinson considers that M is a victim of domestic abuse. I agree that this is the case and recognise the difficulty that individuals in abusive relationships have in separating from their partners. However, Ch’s wellbeing and safety is the overriding issue. I remain uncertain about M’s motivation to separate from her husband and of her commitment to/ability to remain separate from him. M reports in her recent position statement that she has begun to act upon the recommendations made by Mr Hutchinson. This is positive action but it is not within Ch’s best interest to wait for several months whilst his mother’s capacity to change is further assessed.

M appears not to have understood or taken seriously the injunctions made at court during the hearing of 1-3rd April, and is reported to have met with F at times that were not agreed. Although M now appears to be fully compliant with the injunctions and expectations of her, this has been achieved only under considerable pressure and with the prospect of Ch being placed for adoption. I am not confident that M would be able to or would wish to continue to be separate from F if Ch were in her care and the court proceedings ended.

In relation to the risk that father may pose due to his history of a conviction for accessing child pornography and acknowledged sexual abuse of an eight year old step brother. Independent social worker, Mr Lowe, indicates that F will not be a sexual risk to Ch until he is pre-pubescent. This is puzzling in view of the age of F’s step-brother at the time of the abuse. I consider that Ch would be at risk of sexual harm in the mid to long term care of his father. The sexual abuse of F’s step-brother occurred in a relationship of mutual emotional dependency. A similar emotional relationship between Ch and F would be likely to occur if Ch was in the sole care of his father’.

In evidence Ms Clutterbuck said that, during the evidence, she had become increasingly concerned about M – M does not appear to be honest or thinking things through. She said that she thinks that D is in an impossible position – she tried to care for Ch but could not cope in November and December and then applied to be a special guardian of Ch but withdrew. This repeated change of position and her hesitation in oral evidence show the anguish of her position. She would have to cope with F and M and it would be too difficult for anybody to do so, she thought. Ch cannot wait whilst the parents take up therapy; he has already suffered a number of placements and must now find a permanent home.

Ms Clutterbuck said that she does not regard this as a finely balanced case; it is her firm and clear recommendation that the orders sought by the Local Authority should be made. In the light of the evidence of the parents and their attitude to any attempt to place Ch for adoption there could not be post adoptive direct contact without seriously compromising his welfare.

She said that she has read the statement of Kimberley Hughes about the support that the Local Authority could make available if Ch remained with either of their parents. Ms Clutterbuck said that she agreed with the analysis of the social worker. The social workers have tried very hard to keep Ch with the mother and every possible alternative to adoption has been considered. The Local Authority’s opinion that there is no solution other than adoption is one with which she would agree.

7^th May 2014 - The hearing resumed. In the week before the hearing M requested through solicitors that F should return her clothing. In evidence F confirmed that he responded to this request by selling it. Various documents came into being that morning. I received two reports written by Mr Lowe. In relation to M he concluded that she had engaged well with the therapy and was now better able to act protectively in relation to Ch. In relation to F, Mr Lowe was of the opinion that, although he had attended and benefited from the therapy, his progress was limited and he continued to ‘use old ways of coping’.

Law - I remind myself of the following principles of law:

I must apply the relevant statutory and Convention provisions and must do so in accordance with the guidance given by the higher courts - EH v Greenwich [2010] EWCA Civ 344 "…the best guidance which in our judgment this court can give is to advise Judges to apply the statutory language with care to the facts of the particular case. The message is no doubt, prosaic, but the best guidance, we think, is as simple and as straightforward as that."

In relation to the application for a care order, I must first consider whether the threshold criteria in section 31(2) of The Children Act 1989 are fulfilled. In this case it is agreed that they are.

Where the threshold criteria are fulfilled it is necessary to consider the provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and section 1 of the Children Act 1989 when deciding whether to make the care order sought.

In relation to the placement application I must consider the terms of section 52 (1)(b) and section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The welfare checklist in the 1989 Act is not the same as the checklist in the 2002 Act. Article 8, of course, is also further and significantly engaged in relation to the placement application.

The court must conduct a global, holistic approach to welfare issues weighing up the various available options before it. The court must avoid a linear analysis of those options because that can lead to the piecemeal elimination of the least interventionist solutions, leaving the most interventionist solution of a placement order as the only remaining solution - Re G (A Child) [2013] EWCA Civ 965, paras 49-50;

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that: ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society …for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’

Care orders amount to a very significant invasion of the rights encapsulated within Article 8(1). Placement orders amount to an even more significant invasion of that right than care orders. For such orders to be justified they must satisfy the provisions of Article 8(2) and therefore must be: a) in accordance with the law (here the Convention compliant 1989 and 2002 Acts); b) necessary for the protection of the rights and freedoms (i.e. welfare) of others (i.e. the child) and c) proportionate.

Welfare issues must be based on the totality of information available to the court and, unlike threshold issues, it is necessary to conduct a contemporary evaluation of what is best for the child concerned.

By section 1(1) of the 1989 Act the welfare of Ch is the court’s paramount consideration when considering the making of orders under that Act following the satisfaction of the threshold criteria;

Section 1(3) of the Act contains the welfare checklist. It provides that, in making welfare decisions under the 1989 Act, a court must have regard in particular to —

the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding);

his physical, emotional and educational needs;

the likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances;

his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant;

any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering;

how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs;

The range of powers available to the court under the Act.

As to the 2002 Act, children may not be placed for adoption under placement orders without the consent of the parents unless "the welfare of the child requires the consent to be dispensed with" (section 52(1) (b) Adoption and Children Act 2002). The core statutory provisions in relation to placement orders are therefore sections 52 and 1 for the purposes of this judgment (although there are of course many other provisions in the Act relating to such orders).

The case of Re P (children) (adoption: parental consent) [2008] EWCA Civ 535 , [2008] 2FCR 185 provides useful guidance in relation to applications for placement orders. The main and relevant principles for these purposes are set out in paragraphs 119 to 154 of the judgment of Wall LJ. Those principles are summarised in the case of EH v Greenwich [2010] EWCA Civ 344. I wish to mention the following three points that arise from Re P (although I have considered the case as a whole):

In considering the provisions of section 52 I must consider section 1(4) of the 2002 Act (as explained in EH v Greenwich);

The word ‘requires’ in section 52 is ‘plainly chosen as best conveying the essence of the Strasbourg jurisprudence’. That is, it implies an imperative rather than something that is merely optional or desirable. Ryder LJ summarised the position in the case of Re R [2013] EWCA Civ 1018: ‘So far as section 52 of the 2002 Act is concerned, the judge had to be satisfied that the welfare of each of the children required their parents’ consent to be dispensed with. In other words, their welfare necessitates adoption and nothing else short of that will do’.

Section 1(4) of the 2002 Act is not the same as section 1(3) of the 1989 Act. The welfare checklists are different in several important respects, especially s 1(4)(c) and (f). The court should therefore work through section 1(4) of the 2002 Act when considering whether to make a placement order.

The relevant parts of Section 1 of the 2002 Act provide as follows (I have not included ss 5):

This section applies whenever a court or adoption agency is coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child.

The paramount consideration of the court or adoption agency must be the child’s welfare, throughout his life.

The court or adoption agency must at all times bear in mind that, in general, any delay in coming to the decision is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare.

The court or adoption agency must have regard to the following matters (among others)—

the child’s ascertainable wishes and feelings regarding the decision (considered in the light of the child’s age and understanding),

the child’s particular needs,

the likely effect on the child (throughout his life) of having ceased to be a member of the original family and become an adopted person,

the child’s age, sex, background and any of the child’s characteristics which the court or agency considers relevant,

any harm (within the meaning of the Children Act 1989 (c 41)) which the child has suffered or is at risk of suffering,

the relationship which the child has with relatives, and with any other person in relation to whom the court or agency considers the relationship to be relevant, including—

the likelihood of any such relationship continuing and the value to the child of its doing so,

the ability and willingness of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, to provide the child with a secure environment in which the child can develop, and otherwise to meet the child’s needs,

the wishes and feelings of any of the child’s relatives, or of any such person, regarding the child.

…

The court or adoption agency must always consider the whole range of powers available to it in the child’s case (whether under this Act or the Children Act 1989); and the court must not make any order under this Act unless it considers that making the order would be better for the child than not doing so.

In this section, “coming to a decision relating to the adoption of a child”, in relation to a court, includes—

coming to a decision in any proceedings where the orders that might be made by the court include an adoption order (or the revocation of such an order), a placement order (or the revocation of such an order) or an order under section 26 (or the revocation or variation of such an order),

coming to a decision about granting leave in respect of any action (other than the initiation of proceedings in any court) which may be taken by an adoption agency or individual under this Act,

It is of fundamental importance that there is discipline in the approach to welfare issues in care and placement proceedings. The court is not a court of social engineering. The court does not decide welfare issues by considering whether, on an individual judge’s analysis, a child might be considered to be ‘better off’ in care or adoption. Nor does the court apply a test of whether a child will receive ‘optimal care’ with a given parent since there would be many parents who would fail that test. Thus the court must not approach a case such as this by asking whether, on balance, a given child would be better off with adopters or with a parent.

The dicta that I have already set out from Re B-S (and which have their basis in the judgments of Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Neuberger in Re B [2013] UKSC 33) must be applied. For myself I find the passages from the judgment of Lord Neuberger in paragraphs 77 and 78 of particular assistance. They include the following at paragraph 77: ‘It seems to me to be inherent in section 1(1) that a care order should be a last resort, because the interests of a child would self-evidently require her relationship with her natural parents to be maintained unless no other course was possible in her interests. That is reinforced by the requirement in section 1 (3)(g) that the court must consider all options, which carries with it the clear implication that the most extreme option should only be adopted if others would not be in her interests’.

Although care proceedings are quasi inquisitorial (see Re W [2013] EWCA Civ 1227), it is for the Local Authority to justify its applications and to substantiate its proposed care measures on evidence – P, C and S v United Kingdom [2002] 2 FLR 631.

No party suggests that long term fostering presents itself as an option for Ch. I agree that that is so. Black LJ said as follows in the case of Re V [2013] EWCA Civ 913:

[95] My difficulty with that is that I do not think that fostering and adoption can, in fact, be equated in terms of what they offer by way of security. I do not intend to embark on a comprehensive comparison of the two arrangements, merely to highlight some of the material differences. What I say should not be taken as a substitute for professional advice to the court from social services and/or the guardian in any case in which this is a significant issue.

[96]. With that caveat, I make the following observations:

Adoption makes the child a permanent part of the adoptive family to which he or she fully belongs. To the child, it is likely therefore to "feel" different from fostering. Adoptions do, of course, fail but the commitment of the adoptive family is of a different nature to that of a local authority foster carer whose circumstances may change, however devoted he or she is, and who is free to determine the caring arrangement.

Whereas the parents may apply for the discharge of a care order with a view to getting the child back to live with them, once an adoption order is made, it is made for all time.

Contact in the adoption context is also a different matter from contact in the context of a fostering arrangement. Where a child is in the care of a local authority, the starting point is that the authority is obliged to allow the child reasonable contact with his parents (section 34(1) Children Act 1989). The contact position can, of course, be regulated by alternative orders under section 34 but the situation still contrasts markedly with that of an adoptive child. There are open adoptions, where the child sees his or her natural parents, but I think it would be fair to say that such arrangements tend not to be seen where the adoptive parents are not in full agreement. Once the adoption order has been made, the natural parents normally need leave before they can apply for contact.

Routine life is different for the adopted child in that once he or she is adopted, the local authority have no further role in his or her life (no local authority medicals, no local authority reviews, no need to consult the social worker over school trips abroad, for example).

Core factual analysis – The evidence that I have heard and read leads me to conclude:

M caused non accidental bruising to Ch’s head on 11^th November 2013. She has given many different explanations and suggestions about how the injuries might have been caused. None of those explanations and suggestions has been true. She caused the bruising by the application of excessive force to the area that was bruised. Ch would have been distressed when he suffered the injuries and M would have known that she had hurt him as a result of her actions. The precise mechanism of injury cannot be stated but the suggestion that she exerted accidental finger tip pressure to his head whilst turning it firmly is untrue. There are therefore two distinct features of this finding: i) she caused the injury and ii) she has persisted in giving false accounts in relation to its causation. I am confident in those findings and thus I record them on the basis that the Local Authority has proved its case on these issues well beyond the balance of probabilities;

There is no doubt at all that F cannot meet the emotional and physical needs of Ch. In his care Ch would suffer profound emotional and physical neglect which would be highly damaging to his welfare. Nothing realistic or effective could be done, by way of therapeutic or other services, to mitigate or avoid that damage

If Ch lives with M:

There is no prospect at all of F accepting or complying with any restrictions on his contact with Ch. Extreme and punitive enforcement measures would not cause him to stop attempting to contact Ch in any way that was available. Mr Farquharson ’s submission that enforcement of injunctions by repeated committal would not be a sensible or effective solution was supported by rock solid reasoning which I have set out and adopt.

F is highly likely to seek to restore his relationship with M.

It is possible that M may stick to resolve to separate from F. It is equally possible that she will not. It is not possible to be predictive on this issue given the past.

If the relationship is restored an environment will be created which is entirely alien to the welfare of Ch. On the last occasion that all three lived together it took less than a week for F to be filming the house to see if M was having an affair and for Ch to be non accidentally injured. The dynamics of their relationship (and, in particular, F’s disordered behaviour) make it obvious that Ch would be seriously neglected and unsafe in their combined care;

If the relationship is not restored, I consider it to be highly improbable that M will have the fortitude, long term motivation or ability to regulate F’s behaviour towards her or Ch. It would take a woman of exceptional strength to withstand the sort of bombardment from F that would inevitably arise and M is, I am afraid, on the opposite end of the spectrum of fortitude.

At every major juncture of these proceedings M has been very seriously untruthful. She told a succession of lies about the bruising. She perpetrated a complex deception when at Crown House. She encouraged F in the belief that their relationship would continue until she announced on 25^th March that she was apparently ending it. By doing so she has seriously undermined any working relationship with the Local Authority social workers and she did the same at Crown House. It is highly improbable that she would develop any form of working, reliable or long term relationship with any officer (e.g. social worker) of the Local Authority. I recognise that she developed a working relationship with Mr Lowe (although there are deficiencies in his analysis and reports) but in matters of her own conduct, relationship with F and response to supervision she has been profoundly untruthful. I cannot see any realistic prospect of any working relationship developing under which there could be any effective supervision of her care of Ch. Given her behaviour it would be a very long time indeed before any social worker would ever trust her again and that would be for very good reason;

The help on offer from D and other members of M’s family is very well meaning. But I have no doubt at all that there is nothing within that support that could mitigate the consequences of the findings that I have made above. D has withdrawn her own wish to care for Ch twice because she knows that she ‘could not keep Ch safe’ and that she would ‘never be free’ of F. That still remains the position. To that must be added the inability of the family to dissuade M from continuing the relationship with F in 2011 and when she was at Crown House. So, too, must the difficulties that M’s untruthfulness would represent for the family as well. I am afraid that D’s suggestion that these proceedings have been brought because of F’s behaviour alone is obviously wrong.

Holistic analysis of options – Adoption is no panacea. Of the available options, it is the outcome that is the most invasive of the rights enshrined in Article 8(1) of the Convention. Nature, law and basic common sense demand that it be recognised that the best and correct place for a child to live is with a natural parent unless proven and proportionate necessarily demonstrates that is not possible. A child has a natural and profound need to be brought up within his own natural family, a need which persists throughout his life, works up and down the scales of familial generations and which can only be displaced justifiably when all else fails. Every individual seeks, if possible, the comfort, self identity and security of remaining within his natural family and environment because that is where he belongs. The natural bond and shared identity between parent and child should reinforce the developing relationship between them to create an individual’s completeness. Adults trace back their ancestry in order to understand themselves better; people who have been adopted may seek access to their files for the same reason.

Ch has an established relationship with his mother in particular. Except for two short periods he has always lived with her. She is his primary carer and loves him. As a child of nine months age he has an observable attachment to his mother. For a child of that age to be denied the right to an upbringing with his primary parent is the most emotionally invasive thing that could be done to him. For M to be denied the right to care for her child is the most emotionally invasive thing that could be done to her – what loving parent would think otherwise? The orders that the Local Authority seek have lifelong consequences for them both and amount to profound changes in the circumstances of both of them. Adoption may leave an individual with a sense of loss both as a child and as an adult due to the magnetism of nature and the quest for self understanding (the Delphic maxim was purposeful: γνῶθι σεαυτόν – know thyself).

However, there are circumstances where all of those fundamental, legal and natural arguments for a child to remain with a natural parent have to be displaced because, for one reason or another, some parents cannot look after their children. It is only where the inadequacy of parents reaches a level where there is no alternative to adoption that this most invasive solution can meet the demands of law and nature.

Of course adoption bears with it a number of inherent positives. It would mean that Ch was cared for within a carefully selected family (which, by law, might now comprise of a single adopter, of course). There are never any absolutes in relation to human relationships but it is highly likely that, if adopted, he would have an upbringing in which he was loved and properly cared for. All that is perhaps commonplace and no more than generalities.

But what is of very real and specific importance is that it is highly unlikely that, if adopted, Ch would suffer the serious neglect and chaos that he would experience in the care of either of his parents. With an adoptive family he would also be highly likely to experience stability, stable parenting and a child focussed upbringing all of which his parents are not able to give him. He would be loved in an adoptive relationship as well. Ch is of an age where he cannot be left in any form of interim arrangement. Long term emotional damage is likely to occur to him if he does not settle into his permanent home in the very near future. He has moved far too frequently already.

F certainly does not have the ability to care for him and will not develop an ability to do so, at very least for a long time. If M could have shown an ability to establish, regulate and maintain an effective separation from F and also an ability to accept and respond truthfully to effective help in caring for Ch it might have been possible for her to retain his care. It is deeply regrettable and thoroughly disappointing for all who observe her to see that she does not possess those abilities and has not been able to develop them over the nine months of Ch’s life.

During the time that I have been hearing this case I have tried to picture what life would be like for a nine month baby in his parents’ care. It is very easy to picture the inadequacies of care that would arise if Ch lived with his father or with both of his parents together. I have no doubt at all that it would be utterly irresponsible for a child to be committed to an upbringing in that environment and, in any event, it would not last because further intervention would follow very swiftly.

If his mother maintained an emotional separation from F and Ch lived with her, he would be exposed to the obsessive and harassing behaviour of F, would see his mother unable to cope with F’s behaviour, would not be able to be supported by social workers because of his mother’s untruthfulness and would be exposed to the significant risk of further physical harm from his mother. He would also be exposed to the very real risk of abduction by his father; I accept that F has made previous threats to abduct Ch and, given his disorder, would not have the usual self regulation to recognise the harm caused to Ch if he did so.

I also consider that Ch would not be emotionally safe in his mother’s care. If one surveys the events of the past six months a very clear picture emerges of this mother being unable to safeguard and promote his welfare. She injured him at three months, exposed him to two temporary arrangements until entry to Crown house. At Crown House she comprised his welfare by seriously undermining the genuine and necessary efforts of those who were attempting to help her with his care. Throughout this case she has been untruthful about important matters relating to his welfare. Despite the events of 2011 and her own evidence of F’s past and extreme conduct, she has not acted to protect Ch from F at least until the week before this hearing started; to suggest that this is because she has been a victim of domestic abuse is simplistic, factually naïve and invalid. Her future resolve to maintain separation from him is doubtful and her ability and commitment to protect Ch from F if she does separate from him tenuous.

Due to the inability of anyone to understand how or why she injured Ch on 11^th November 2013 I am far from confident that he would be physically safe. The good reports of her physical care of him arise from the very protective environments that they shared when together after the 11^th November (i.e. at Crown House and then in the mother and baby foster placement).

Thus the picture that emerges of life with either or both parents for this young boy is plainly intolerable despite everything that I have said about the importance of him remaining with a natural parent. To the question: ‘How could parents of this intelligence behave in this way when they both knew of that importance?’ the simple and sad answer must be: ‘Because of who they are’.

By way of summary and holistic overview, if Ch lives with either of his parents he will not have his needs met and he is likely to suffer long term and significant harm through neglect of his emotional and physical welfare. He also will not be safe. If he lives with adopters it is highly likely that his emotional and physical needs will be met albeit with the inherent long term emotional consequences of any adoptive arrangement. There is simply no basis upon which Ch could be exposed to an upbringing with either of his parents on that analysis and an adoptive placement is the only available solution. I accept Mr Farquharson’s submissions in relation to a Resolutions type approach that I have set out in paragraph 27 of this judgment; they do not need to be repeated save to add that, in my opinion, the mother’s support network could never meet the demands posed by F’s behaviour, M’s untruthfulness and lack of fortitude, the risk of harm from both parents and the risk of abduction by F.

The welfare checklist – In the light of the above analysis the welfare checklist factors are already apparent but I will work through them swiftly by reference to the 2002 Act, mentioning the 1989 Act checklist factors where they differ.

At nine months age Ch’s wishes and feelings cannot be ascertained beyond the feelings of attachment to his mother that I have already considered and which I have acknowledged to be of fundamental importance. If he lives with either or both of his parents his emotional and physical needs will not be met. Adoption will not meet his need to be part of his natural family but his need to be physically and emotionally safe entirely overshadows that– how could a nine month child be committed to an upbringing with parents who would not meet his emotional or physical needs and with whom he would not be safe?

The effect on him of having ceased to be a member of his natural family and having become an adopted person will be that he will have the chance of a child focussed upbringing in which his needs are met through adoption. Adoption will have long term consequences for him through the loss of his natural family but care by his parents would have much more damaging consequences in the short and long term. Therefore the effect of being adopted for this child, and the change of circumstance (s 1(3) (c) of the 1989 Act) that will arise if he is adopted, will be necessary, protective and beneficial.

Ch is young but has moved too often and must find his permanent home urgently if he is to avoid long term emotional harm through infantile disruption. The fact that Ch was only three months old when these proceeding started makes it all the more troubling that the parents should have behaved as they have whilst bearing the responsibility for such a vulnerable child. Ch has suffered physical harm through the bruising that occurred on 11^th November and is it is highly likely that he would suffer further emotional harm and be exposed to the very real risk of physical harm in the care of either or both of his parents. Neither parent nor other relative would be able to offer him the care that he needs or a ‘secure environment’ despite the genuinely expressed wishes of the mother, father and D that they should do so.

Conclusion - I therefore conclude that the only orders that I can make consistently with Ch’s paramount welfare are as follows:

A care order to Gloucestershire County Council based on the care plan, which I approve;

An order dispensing with the consent of both parents to the placing of Ch for adoption on the grounds that his welfare so requires ( section 52(1)(b) of the 2002 Act);

A placement order.

Ancillary issues - I delayed the publication of an anonymised version of this judgment in accordance with the transparency provisions because of the risk of criminal investigation into the bruising and my wish not to cause any difficulties within any process. However, it has always been my intention that this judgment should be placed on Bailii in anonymised form once that process was either resolved or abandoned. It now has been; the mother has received a caution for child cruelty.

Unless I hear contrary argument and make contrary order, the Local Authority may disclose the contents of this judgment to the police and Crown Prosecution Service as from 4 p.m. on Wednesday 21^st May 2014 (thus allowing time for applications to be made if necessary). Such disclosure would be consistent with PD 12G of the amended Family Procedure Rules 2010 and I cannot envisage arguments that would render it inappropriate.

The parents must each keep the Local Authority and the court informed of their current addresses. Notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings may be given by sending that notice by first class post to the parents’ last known addresses. I would ask both firms of solicitors to ensure that they make a written record that the parents have been told of this stipulation.

Any adoption application must be pursued with the utmost care to ensure that confidentiality is maintained. In this case that bears a very particular importance for obvious reasons. Consideration must be given as to where any such proceedings should be issued. It seems to me that it would be appropriate for them to be issued in a location that does not reveal where any adopters may be living.

This is a judgment that will have a devastating effect on the parents but most particularly on the mother. I very much regret that. I would ask her solicitor to ensure that she is aware of the facilities that exist within the community for people facing such profound distress to be supported. These are young parents and I hope that both of them will develop in a way that brings them to lives that are happier than those revealed in this judgment.

Finally, I would wish to repeat my thanks to the legal representatives in this case. The demands of analysis in complex and important family cases such as this require skilful, mature and intelligent representation of all parties. It has been my privilege to witness the excellence and strength of representation that each advocate has shown and also to be the recipient of their unwavering courtesy and guidance.