Doncaster Metropolitan Borough Council v Haigh & Ors

I am giving this judgment in open court.

The principal application with which I have to deal in this case is, in my experience, unprecedented. Doncaster Metropolitan Borough authority (“the local authority”) seeks to put into the public domain aspects of care proceedings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989, which, in accordance with normal practice, were heard in private.

There is a second application made by the local authority, which is supported by both the father of the child concerned and her guardian in the proceedings, for an order against the mother under s.91 (14) of the Children Act 1989, designed to prevent any application by the mother in relation to the child under the Act without the court’s permission for a period of two years. I will deal with that application at the conclusion of this judgment.

The local authority’s principal application is supported by the father of the child and by the child’s guardian, albeit with the important exception that in any publication of material the prohibition against naming the child herself should be maintained. This was the prohibition imposed by Baker J., sitting in the High Court earlier this year. During the course of argument on 15^th August 2011 when I heard the case it became apparent that differences between the local authority and the guardian on this point could be accommodated, with the result that the order I propose to make at the conclusion of this part of my judgment will preserve the child’s anonymity. I will amplify my reasons for taking this course later in the judgment. I propose, accordingly, to call the child “X”.

X’s mother is Victoria Haigh. She told me on 15 August 2011 that she now lives in the Irish Republic. Although it has been held that supervised contact between Ms. Haigh and X is in the latter’s interests, Ms. Haigh has declined to take up the local authority’s offer of such contact and has thus not seen X since X was removed from her care. The local authority now has an order under s.34 (4) of the Children Act 1989 permitting it to refuse to allow contact between Ms. Haigh and the child. The absence of any contact between X and Ms. Haigh is thus entirely the mother’s choice and is an illustration of her inability to act in the child’s best interests.

I recognise, of course, that many people know who X is. She goes, for example, to a local school. For the purposes of this judgment it is sufficient for me to say that X will be 8 later this year. She is currently in the care of the local authority and living with her father, Mr. David Tune. This is in accordance with the local authority’s care plan which has been approved by the court. X is thus likely to be cared for by her father during the rest of her minority.

X’s case has been before the court on a number of occasions. Two are of particular significance. The first is a finding of fact hearing conducted by His Honour Judge Robertshaw over a period of 10 days in January 2010. X was then 6. The principal issue before the judge was whether or not X had been sexually abused by her father. In a long and careful judgment the judge found not only that X had not been sexually abused by her father but that the allegations of abuse which she undoubtedly made, notably in two ABE interviews, had originated in the mind of the mother and were false. As Judge Peter Jones was later to summarise the position, Judge Robertshaw found the following (this is from Judge Jones):

“Put shortly, the learned judge found that the father had not sexually abused X at all, nor had he behaved in a sexually inappropriate way towards her, but allegations of sexual abuse were first made by the mother and not by X. These were false and the mother knew them to be false. In 2009, X was coached by the mother to make a false allegation of sexual abuse against the father, which originated in the mind of the mother. As a result of inappropriate pressures and prompting, X came to make and believe the allegations. The mother used allegations of sexual abuse manipulatively as part of her irrational and longstanding hostility to contact which she sought to obstruct.”

As will be apparent, Judge Robertshaw rejected the mother’s conclusion that what the child was saying represented her own attitude and perception. He found the mother unconvincing and, at times, evasive as a witness. He rejected the submission made to him by counsel for the mother that she was seeking to distance herself from the allegations of sexual abuse and was not in fact seeking a finding that Mr. Tune had sexually abused the child. He did not, however, change X’s residence. She continued to reside with her mother. Judge Robertshaw concluded his judgment with the following words:

“Those who are charged with the task of advising the court as to orders necessary to promote X’s welfare in the future bear a burden more onerous than I have had to discharge at this hearing. The weapon of last resort, changing X’s residence, will obviously need to be considered and a balance struck between the risks involved in that course against the risk of mother continuing to frustrate and impede contact in a way that will inevitably be emotionally damaging to X. Frustration at her past deplorable conduct must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the issue is welfare and that there are undoubtedly risks in employing the weapon of last resort.

Direct contact will now need to be reinstated in some form. It will have to be regulated, not because of any risk posed by the father but simply because of the time that has elapsed since it last took place and, for the time being at least, to safeguard him from further allegations of abuse. Time alone will tell whether the mother is now able to embrace the letter and spirit of the principle that contact with a non-residential parent promotes the well-being of a child of separated parents. Any indication that she has not must involve the case being returned to me on short notice so that whatever steps may be appropriate, however draconian, can be taken.”

The mother did not seek permission to appeal against Judge Robertshaw’s order.

The second key judgment is that given by Judge Peter Jones on 22 November 2010. By this time Judge Robertshaw had retired. Like Judge Robertshaw, Judge Jones gave a long and careful judgment. At its conclusion he decided that X should be the subject of a full care order and that she should move to her father’s care. Once again, the mother did not seek permission to appeal against that order.

As I propose to release both judgments, suitably anonymised, into the public domain, I will give only short extracts from the second judgment:

“The mother’s stance has, of course, severely circumscribed the arguments which could be deployed on her behalf, and counsel, who has put the case fully and in a measured and realistic fashion on her behalf, conceded as much in argument, accepting that the mother had to grasp at any straw in presenting her case … This is a mother who has been found to have caused her daughter emotional harm by the making of repeated, false allegations of sexual abuse which she knew to be false at the time she made them and, subsequently, to have coached X into making a false allegation which she knew to be untrue. She has also used those allegations manipulatively in the course of the family proceedings …

Over several years the mother has made a number of allegations against the father, with the result X has been subjected to four medical examinations, police interviews and has had numerous contacts with professionals. Despite the court’s findings, the mother accepts no responsibility for this state of affairs, complaining instead of the local authority’s ‘negligence’ and that her treatment has been incredibly harsh ‘with no-one really explaining the reasons why’. I am quite satisfied that this intelligent woman knows exactly why X was removed from her care in January 2010 and why the professionals continue to take the view that X would suffer further emotional harm if rehabilitated to her. In addition, sadly, while professing her concern for X’s well-being, the mother consistently prioritises her own needs over those of her daughter …

I have carefully considered all the papers. They make for rather depressing reading. The mother appears to be convinced that she is the only person in the right and everyone else involved with her and her family are wrong. As recently as 6^th September 2010, she wrote in an email that she had made her decision and no amount of therapy would change her opinion of something she did not believe in. She accuses the guardian of bias and the local authority of negligence and, as recently as 8^th November, of ‘tyranny, scare tactics and bullying methods’……

I am satisfied it would not be in the best interests of X to delay making a final decision in this case for further work to be done with the mother or with X and her father. In the light of the findings of Judge Robertshaw and all the evidence before this court, there are no good reasons why there should be any further delay in X moving to live permanently with her father, who I am satisfied is fully capable of meeting all her needs, including that for ongoing contact with her mother. I am equally satisfied that it would be contrary to X’s best interests to move either now or in the foreseeable future to the full-time care of her mother, given the harm that she has already caused her daughter and the harm she will be likely to cause if X were placed in her care. I believe the mother does need help and she would be well advised to seek it out …

I invite the mother to consider my judgment carefully with her legal advisors. I do not believe that my decision will come as any surprise to her, though I ask her to take time to reflect on the reasoning behind it. Her intransigent response to the court’s findings in January 2010 and her intemperate reaction to the local authority’s involvement provided her with little room for manoeuvre in the context of these proceedings. I have no doubt that she cares for X deeply, but she is demonstrating little insight into X’s real needs and is failing to prioritise those needs over her own. If she continues on her present course, she runs the risk of alienating her daughter and permanently damaging their relationship. This would be a great loss for X, as everyone, including the father, acknowledges, and I hope it is a consequence which the mother, on further reflection, will seek to avoid.”

As Judge Jones stated, Miss Haigh has not been able to accept the findings of either judge. What renders the case unique, however, is that Ms Haigh, aided and abetted by one Elizabeth Watson, is not only unable to accept the judges’ findings but has put into the public domain the false allegations that she has not had justice and that X, contrary to both judges’ findings, has been sexually abused by her father. Those allegations have been posted on the worldwide web and are in the public domain. In addition, the mother has circulated the allegations to the parents of X’s school and to Mr. Tune’s fellow employees at his place of work. All this, of course, has been done illicitly and in breach of orders of the court.

The hyperbole which has been employed by Ms. Watson might, it could be thought, categorise the allegations made by her and the mother as “absurd”. I will give a flavour of these in this judgment. I will give more detail in the judgment I propose to give later in relation to the local authority’s application to commit Ms. Watson to prison for contempt of court. All the statutory authorities, they say, are “corrupt” and are only in it for the money. The police are “negligent and incompetent”. The local authority is “motivated by financial gain and peopled by those whose sole aim is to snatch children from right-minded parents”. The list is endless and extremely dispiriting.

In its skeleton argument prepared for the hearing on 15 August 2011 the local authority puts its case in the following way:

“Doncaster shares parental responsibility with the mother and father in respect of their daughter X. At eight years of age X has lived virtually all her life in the centre of litigation and conflict. For the past 18 months, her mother, Victoria Haigh, has conducted an internet and media-based campaign designed to highlight what she now contends is a miscarriage of justice, namely, the court approved decision to place X in her father’s care. In consequence of the mother’s campaign the local community in which X lives has been made aware that Victoria Haigh accuses David Tune of being a paedophile, a rapist and of sexually abusing his daughter …

For X and her father the present situation is intolerable: (1) the police have been called to X’s school to protect her; (2) parents at [the school] are concerned about the information they have been sent by the mother and its significance in terms of the protection of their own children; (3) David Tune has been accosted in the street and called a ‘paedophile’; (4) David Tune’s work colleagues have had material sent to them both in a public forum and on their own Facebook pages, the contents of which have been to render David Tune’s livelihood vulnerable and therefore his capacity to provide for his daughter.

Though the allegations are all false, neither David Tune nor Doncaster have felt able to respond publically to them. The local authority is pursuing the mother and her fanatical campaigners by way of injunction and committal proceedings. It has not been possible, despite Doncaster’s best efforts, to persuade the domain holders, voluntarily, to take the offending sites down or to close the relevant email accounts.

The present situation is self-evidently damaging to X and her father. The local authority, however, is also extremely concerned about the future. It will not be long before X and her school friends uncover the material which is presently on the internet. X’s school, her social worker, if we may say so, and her father has all worked tirelessly and sensitively to shelter X from the allegations her mother makes. They have been broadly successful to date. However, it is beyond any doubt that if, and, perhaps now inevitably, when, that information comes to X’s attention it will be extremely distressing to her. The repercussions are easy to predict. It is likely to impact on X’s relationship with her peers and adults. It may destabilise her security at home with her father. It will be emotionally very confusing to her.

Even if the local authority was ultimately to remove the information from the internet, the fact remains that the mother’s accounts have already been widely circulated and in a manner targeted to cause most damage to X and her father. This is a situation the local authority finds very difficult to manage. On the one hand, it seems clear that the false and tendentious material in the public domain must at least be counterbalanced by accurate and truthful information being made available to those who receive the mother’s account. On the other hand, it must be recognised that information placed in the public domain cannot easily be regulated thereafter. There is a risk of widespread media interest that may have the consequence of making life for X and her father even more uncomfortable, particularly in the short term. Any course the court takes must, in our submission, contemplate both these possibilities.

Accordingly, the local authority has tried to evaluate the utility of taking no action at all on the issues and responding as best it can to events as they unfold, supporting X and her father with access to counselling services and practical help. Ultimately, the local authority has concluded that it would be failing in its obligations to X not to correct the false allegations and rumours that surround her. The real harm from the mother’s actions, we would respectfully reiterate, has been to target her campaign, and so specifically, to those directly involved in her child’s life.”

By way of strategy the local authority suggest the following:

“The local authority would propose that its information document, a document it has prepared, is incorporated into a public judgment which addresses the reasons for the release. It may be that the court will wish to vary the contents of the document perhaps, even to expand its ambit. The contemplated judgment would be a document in the public domain, and, as such, the local authority recognises it will have no control over its dissemination. It is proposed, however, that the social worker, the head teacher and Mr. Tune’s employer should work together in managing the release of the judgment to those concerned locally in a way that would be most sensitive to X. This, of course, can only be a strategy.”

The particular mischief of what the mother and Ms. Watson have done is, of course, that the internet providers, as the local authority points out, are not necessarily within or amenable to the jurisdiction of the court.

At the hearing on 15 August 2011 Ms. Haigh sought to distance herself from Ms. Watson’s actions. In addition, she indicated to Baker J. on 13^t April that she would abide in future by all orders in force and would email Ms. Watson to advise her to cease acting on Ms. Haigh’s behalf. However, it seems to me, that Judge Robertshaw’s assessment of Ms. Haigh is amply borne out by the documents Ms. Haigh gave me on 15 August 2011, in which she admits making both “a false statement” of her disbelief of the allegations against Mr. Tune and also of making an “insincere apology” to him. Although she assured me that she was not in contempt of court, it is plain to me that she remains with a fixed and unaltered view that Mr. Tune is a paedophile.

The question which thus arises is easy to state but more difficult to answer: what is to be done?

It seems to me this is a case in which it is necessary to go back to first principles and to state clearly what the law of England is. Parliament has passed the Children Act 1989. Parliament has decreed that courts hearing cases under the Children Act may sit in private. The object endorsed by parliament is to protect the confidentiality and the identity of those involved, particularly the confidentiality of children. The power to sit in private has, furthermore, been tested in Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights has upheld it (see B v United Kingdom[2001] 2 FLR 261 and Pelling v Bruce-Williams (Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs Intervening) [2004] 2 FLR 823).

If parents cannot agree about an issue by negotiation, mediation or any other form of ADR (alternative dispute resolution), they take that issue to court. The judge then decides it. As a matter of English law, an event either occurred or it did not; there is no halfway house: see the decision of the Supreme Court in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] UKHL 35 on the internet and in Re B (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) [2008] 2 FLR 141 in the specialist law reports.

In the instant case two judges have decided that Mr. Tune is not a paedophile and that he has neither sexually abused X nor behaved inappropriately towards her. That is the end of the matter. Mr. Tune is not a paedophile and X has not been sexually abused. That is the position which needs to be placed on record and in the public domain.

The disappointed party in English law is not left without a remedy. Ms. Haigh has a number of avenues open to her, by means of which she can complain. The Family Proceedings Rules (now the Family Procedure Rules) were specifically amended to allow people in her position to do so. Moreover, she has the right, or had the right, to apply for permission to appeal against either order. Nothing, however, alters the rule that no party is entitled to breach the confidentiality of the proceedings by illicitly putting into the public domain material which is confidential to those proceedings and which, moreover, the judge in this case has ordered not to be published.

Judges of the High Court also have the power to make restraining orders in family cases. Mr. Justice Baker plainly had the power and the jurisdiction to make the order of 25^t February 2011 which forbade the mother and Ms. Watson “from communicating via the internet or otherwise to the world”.

I will read the relevant part of the order at this point. The order made by the judge against the world at large particularly prevented both the mother and Ms. Watson, whether by themselves, individually or together or by instructing any other person:

“… from communicating to any media outlet, including to the makers of any television programme or radio programme or the publishers of any newspaper or magazine, or representatives of the same, or any digital media or via the internet, any information relating to any proceedings under the Children Act concerning X, namely, proceedings [and the number is then given] …”

Ms Haigh and Ms Watson were forbidden from communicating the name of the child, the name of the child’s parents, the name of the grandparents, the local authority, the school, the employees of the local authority. They were forbidden from distributing any picture of the child, any particulars or information related to the child and/or her parents or wider family members and the name and address of the guardian. This is a standard order and was clearly made within the powers of the judge.

It follows that Baker J., as a Judge of the High Court, had the power to make his order on 25 February 2011. That proposition is plain. The contrary was not argued on 15 August 2011 and could not, in my judgment, be properly argued.

Why did Baker J. make the order? He did so to protect the anonymity of the child and those caring for the child. His order has not been appealed, and it stands.

We live in a society which prides itself on the rule of law. Orders of the court are there to be obeyed. If they are wrong, there is a mechanism for putting them right. But whilst they stand - and Baker J.’s order still stands, as do the orders of Judge Robertshaw and Judge Jones - they are to be obeyed. As I said during the course of argument on this case, quoting a famous dictum much favoured by Lord Denning, “Be you never so great, the law is still above you”. This applies to me as much as it applies to everyone else.

In the skeleton argument counsel for the local authority referred to the fact that parliamentary privilege has been invoked in this case:

“A member of parliament has, on the basis of inaccurate and misleading information supplied to him, deployed parliamentary privilege to highlight the case. We would respectfully encourage the court to deprecate the use of parliamentary privilege in that way in circumstances where there is inevitably incomplete material available and the privacy of a child is threatened. It is perhaps helpful to emphasise that s.97 (2) of the Children Act 1989, which protects the privacy of children in the currency of proceedings, was enacted by parliament itself, not by judges. Indeed, it may be apt to observe here that the 2010 Act (Children, Schools and Families Act 2010) appears to impose a tightening of privacy principles in children cases, reversing the progress towards transparency made in the case of Clayton v Clayton [2006] EWCA Civ 878, [2007] ` FLR 11.”

I have, of course, considered that submission very carefully, but I do not think it would be appropriate for me to become involved in matters which (a) are not my province, and (b) are not necessary for the proper resolution of the case before me.

What I think I can properly say is that orders of the court are not made capriciously and any disobedience of them is to be deplored. If a judge wishes to preserve the anonymity of a child and so orders, that order must be obeyed.

The nearest my researches have enabled me to come to the present position is to be found in an article in the Family Law magazine for August 2003, [2003] Fam Law 594, by Mr. Timothy Scott QC. He recounts a case in which parents were accused of abusing their child and vindicated by the court. They wished to publicise that vindication since they had been the victims of the “no smoke without fire” school of thought and had suffered an amount of local abuse. The matter was dealt with by consent, and the article does not relate what order the judge made. But, in my judgment, the situation is analogous. I anticipate that what happened is that the parents were permitted to publish the fact that they had been vindicated.

The researches of the guardian, his solicitor and counsel have revealed a New Zealand case reported at RR v EE [1999], case number 000621, in which a newspaper wanted to publish the name of a child. That application was refused. Mr. Perkins accepts, however, that, whilst interesting, the case is illustrative rather than authoritative. It certainly does not bind me.

This leads me, however, to a second equally important point. Any person who embraces one party’s version of events and treats it as the whole truth is making a serious mistake. In most family cases the version given by one side is partial and tendentious; on any view it does not give the other side. The only sensible course is to see what the court says in a judgment on all the evidence. Hence, the rule in English law that a court’s judgment is authoritative, based as it is on all the evidence, is not only sound in law but founded in good sense.

In English law, therefore, issues between parties are decided by the courts, and in our courts are decided by judges. That is the system which operates.

There is, sadly, a tendency for those who wish to criticise the family justice system to publish the leaked version put forward by one side and to ignore any corrected version, notably the judgment given by the judge: - see, for example, the recent case of Re L (A Child: Media Reporting) [2011] EWHC B8 (Fam) in which a journalist published one side’s version and ignored what the judge said about it. I called attention to the dangers of this course a long time ago: - see my reported decision of Re H (Freeing Orders: Publicity) [2005] EWCA Civ 1325, [2006] 1 FLR 815. I do so again. Ms. Watson, for the reasons I will give later in my judgment, on the application to commit her for contempt, has fallen into this trap. She has publicised a tendentious version, which two judges, on investigation, have found to be untrue. In so doing, moreover, she has breached the court’s order.

It follows, in my judgment, that the record must be put straight. How is this to be achieved? It is, I think, trite law that I have the power to release information into the public domain. Judges regularly do so, for example, when an abducted child needs to be traced. My personal experience of this has been entirely positive. I have found the media helpful and cooperative, and, with their assistance, the child has usually been found. Here, of course, the situation is different. There is, however, a need to put material into the public domain. It is important for the world to know that two judges have found that Mr. Tune is not a paedophile and that it is in the interests of his daughter to live with him. It is also important for me, having examined the record, having read all the papers in the case, to state that I have reached the same conclusion.

Since there is already much information about X in the public domain, including the names of her parents, why am I forbidding future publication of her name? The answer is not, I think, far to seek, and I have already touched upon it. Above all, I adhere strongly to the principle that children should not be named in Children Act proceedings. Children are nearly always the victims of their parents’ misbehaviour. In this case the mother happens to be the abusive parent, but the principle is firm; the child should be protected as much as possible.

X, through her guardian, submits that the family justice system should maintain that principle. I agree with him. In his submission on this point Mr. Perkins quoted from the Guardian and his solicitor when submitting the following:

“[The children’s guardian] is instinctively opposed to the release of information regarding X into the public domain. He has, throughout this case, supported the local authority in fighting to preserve her anonymity by way of injunctive measures and committal proceedings. He feels strongly that a child’s interests are best met by her identity being kept confidential and likewise information which would tend to identify her as being the subject of proceedings, as it is enshrined within the Children Act 1989.

The guardian feels, however, that this case is exceptional. The campaign conducted by Ms. Haigh and her supporters has put an erroneous view of the court proceedings regarding X into the public domain. The impact of that has been immense on X, impacting on her day-to-day life and making her fearful. It is not clear whether, at the present time, she has any understanding that people in her school have knowledge of her situation, albeit knowledge of incorrect facts, but this could only be harmful to her as she grows up. The impact of the campaign being run by Ms. Haigh and her supporters is affecting Mr. Tune, and X is conscious of that.

The guardian is also conscious that, in addition to the internet campaign waged by Ms. Haigh and her supporters, there is evidence that the more mainstream press has shown interest in X’s case. A Member of Parliament has chosen to assist Ms. Haigh by speaking of this case in the House of Commons, having alerted X’s solicitor to his intentions and to the fact that he could not be prevented from this action. Again, this makes X’s case very different from any other case the guardian has encountered.

Due to the very specific circumstances of this case, the guardian has reluctantly come to the position there should be disclosure of the true facts of X’s case into the public domain. He has read the document prepared by leading counsel for the local authority and, whilst he would make some amendments to it, as shown in the attached document, he agrees to there being disclosure. He very strongly argues, however, that X should not be named. It could be argued that X can be easily identified because the parents are named and that refusing to name the child is therefore illogical. The guardian would argue that there is no necessity to name the child because clarity is achieved by naming the parents. Whilst for those familiar with this case it would be simple to identify X, the principle of a child’s confidentiality should be maintained by those in the family justice system. Research evidence strongly suggests that children do not wish for their identities to become known, or indeed for their family details to be disclosed. The guardian would submit that X should not be named so that the document, if it is released by the court in its current form or an amended version, should not, in itself, come back to haunt X in the future.

The guardian will not support release of the document, therefore, as drafted by the local authority, and if the court were to countenance its release he would wish it to be clear that he has opposed it. The guardian believes that were X’s name to appear publically it is important that the local authority takes immediate action to pursue an immediate remedy through the court. The guardian reaches this position after much thought. He remains concerned this case could open the floodgates to other breaches of children’s confidentiality. He is clear that requests for release of information, as being considered here, should remain the exception, rather than the rule.”

I accept the guardian’s submissions. It does not seem to me that the court should be seen to derogate from the principle I have enunciated, whilst at the same time it criticises others for doing so. In one sense this case is no different from others. There are always people “in the know”. There are always people who know who the parties to confidential proceedings are. Those people, however, will not be at liberty to publish X’s name, nor will the media, in any way in connection with these proceedings. I propose to release both the judgment of Judge Robertshaw and Judge Jones into the public domain, and both will be placed on the BAILII web site. As far as Judge Robertshaw’s judgment is concerned, the child’s name, whenever it appears, will be replaced by the letter “X”. The names of the individuals (apart from those of the mother and the father, which can remain) should be replaced with their positions, i.e. the head teacher who is named can be called “the head teacher” and so on. Similarly, the social worker who is named can be “the social worker”. As far as Judge Jones’s judgment is concerned, similar considerations will apply. The named psychologist who gave evidence before Judge Jones can be called “the psychologist” and so on. Amendments will, I am afraid, have to be made by the local authority.

The local authority, as I have already indicated, has also prepared a document which it calls “the information”. This document has been amended by the guardian. It contains the information which, in the view of the local authority, should be in the public domain. As originally drafted, it named X. For the reasons I have already given, I do not think X should be named. I have taken, therefore, the opportunity to alter the document myself, to anonymise it and to expand it. It will be attached to this judgment in the form in which I have drafted it. It will then be in the public domain in the form in which I have approved it.

In my papers there is also a statement from the head teacher of X’s school. He is plainly a person of the highest respectability and responsibility. I propose to read substantial portions of his statement into this judgment. This is what he says:

“I am the teaching head at the local school. I have been head teacher at the school for a year. I have been the head teacher for the last year and, prior to that, I was employed as a class teacher for the previous six years at the same school. I make this statement based on my knowledge of X, who has attended the school since March 2008 to the current date. I also make the statement based on discussions with X’s class teachers, teaching assistants and from referring to school records in relation to X……

This is a small local school with [a number less than 200] pupils, [a number less than 10] class teachers and [a number less than 10] teaching assistants. It is located in the heart of a village. The village consists of two pubs, a hairdressers, a church and no other local amenities. Children attending the school come from throughout the local geographical area. It is a closely knit community, with many of the families of children attending at school knowing each other extremely well, including knowing X and her parents, Ms. Haigh and Mr. Tune. Ms. Haigh is known in the local area …..

In terms of X’s educational attainments her assessment scores show that she is currently meeting age-appropriate milestones for a child her age. However, X presents as a child who is extremely bright and, in my opinion, should be achieving over and above her age-appropriate milestones. X has many friends within her school and is a popular child with her peer groups. X has plenty of friends within school, but I am unsure as to what friends she has contact with outside of school hours……

With regard to X’s emotional presentation at school, in my opinion, X is quieter this year than she has been in previous years, though she does not present at school as an unhappy child. In terms of her demeanour, she appears to be a more reserved child than in previous years and gives the impression she is capable of masking any emotional difficulties or concerns that she may have to professionals…..

At the time the allegations were made by X there were several remarks that she made to teaching staff recorded in the concerns book. The concerns book is a document that is held within the school in which members of staff note their concerns in respect of any particular child at any one time so that I may consider the same to assess what is required or actually needed, or whether or not any support is required …

I do have some concerns with regard to X’s ability to keep things to herself, which may cause her some emotional difficulty. For example, I was informed at a recent Looked After Child’s review that X had begun to build herself a hiding place in the family home in the event that her mother attempted to come and remove her from home, from her father’s care. I was concerned to learn that a child of X’s age had the forethought to be able to formulate such a plan, which clearly had been given consideration for some considerable period of time……

I am of the opinion that if X did have some significant difficulties or concerns at a particular time she would report the same to one of the teaching assistants, and, as a result, they would bring it to my attention, but that, of late, no such discussions have taken place between X and any members of staff. I am clear that X is under a significant amount of pressure at this time. She appears to be a child who has the weight of the world on her shoulders. In the light of this, her educational attainments at this stage are not of any particular surprise to me, and I think she is coping extremely well with her current circumstances involving her mother……”

Under the subheading “Mr. David Tune” the headmaster comments:

“I am aware that Mr. Tune or his mother would be responsible for dropping off and collecting the child on a daily basis. I regularly meet with Mr. Tune with regards to concerns and anxieties that he express in relation to X and the ongoing situation with X and Ms. Haigh. Mr. Tune himself appears to be under an extreme amount of pressure at the present time and … struggling to come to terms with the nature and extent of the material which is presently on the internet about him, which I have observed first hand by looking at the same on the internet. Mr. Tune always presents at school as extremely concerned for X’s emotional welfare and relies on the school for a significant amount of support in protecting her whilst he is at work and X is at school. Mr. Tune does talk to me about discussions he has had with X and her views with regard to having contact with her mother, although it has to be said that X herself has not spoken with regard to any of these issues. I am aware that a member of the public has recently approached Mr. Tune and asked him whether or not he is a paedophile, which the internet reports refer. I am aware that such contact with Mr. Tune further places more stress and anxiety upon him.”

Under the subheading “Ms. Victoria Haigh” the headmaster comments as follows:

“I have known her since the summer of 2010. Following the orders having been made by the court in November/December 2010, I was, of course, informed by the children’s services in Doncaster that Ms. Haigh was not to have direct or indirect contact with the child unless authorised by the local authority and such an order was in place to keep Ms. Haigh away from the school, away from X and away from her family home. Since that time Ms. Haigh has sent presents for X at Christmas, has sent a school magazine with letters written inside, has emailed me photographs of her new baby directly to my email address at school, and packages of clothes, DVDs, CDs have also sent by Ms. Haigh to be passed on to X. None of the above had been passed on to X by the school. They have been passed to children’s services to assess how and when, if at all, the same could be forwarded to X for her attention. I have historically received emails from Ms. Haigh via her iPhone, making requests for contact between herself and X, contact between her family members and X and making requests to attend school at the various school events, including the nativity play and, more recently, the sports day.

“Ms. Haigh has recently emailed requesting a thorough report with regard to X. I confirmed that her report would be provided, as it would be provided to any non-resident parent, and that her emails concerning contact, or attempting to contact X via the school, should be forwarded to children’s services for them to consider.”

Under a subheading “The position of the school” the headmaster writes:

“I am aware that some, if not most, of the parents whose children attend the school have an understanding of the allegations made by Ms. Haigh that are placed on the World Wide Web. None of the parents of the children have spoken to me with regards to any material that they have seen on the internet or have overheard in the community. However, on 27^h May 2011, Ms. Haigh emailed several of the parents whose children attend the school, having obtained the contacts list, inviting them to visit her web page. Following that, an email having been sent, I understand that some of the parents may have followed the invitation, and have accessed the material on the internet. Some of the parents have spoken to me with regard to concerns regarding the content of the material on the webpage and the internet regarding X. However, none of the parents has made enquiries with regard to allegations made against Mr. Tune by Ms. Haigh.

In terms of the current proceedings and Ms. Haigh’s contact with the school, I have had, now on several occasions, to contact the local police with a view to seeking support from them following attendance by Ms. Haigh at school …

Ms. Haigh sent the email to the parents at the school, linking them to a petition and material on the internet concerning X.”

The head teacher then deals with a number of incidents in which the police have been called to the school. He goes on:

“As a part-time teaching head, I am a class teacher for two and a half days a week. Whenever a particular incident takes place - for example, when Ms. Haigh sent the email via the school web site to the parents of children at school, the entire day was spent liaising with Nottinghamshire children’s services, Nottinghamshire legal services, South Yorkshire Police, Doncaster MBC children’s services, liaising with the social worker, with the father and briefing members of the teaching staff at school as to advise them of the situation. The actions of Ms. Haigh seemed to be made without any consideration for X, for Mr. Tune or for the school itself. The resources which have been deployed in an attempt to keep the children of the school away from the material on the internet is having an adverse effect upon them, is significant and of monumental importance. Teaching time is affected as a result of the actions taken by Ms. Haigh on the basis that I am responsible for ensuring the safety of the children. It is my paramount concern whilst at school that if my attentions are directed towards issues concerning X’s welfare other members of staff have to resume my responsibilities on a particular day.

I am of the opinion the current proceedings and the actions of Ms. Haigh in terms of the material which is on the internet are extremely damaging for a child of X’s age. It is fortunate that at this time X is not yet of an age when she is likely to locate the information about her and her family on the internet and that none of the children within her peer group at school also have access to the material. There will, however, come a time when that material will be available to X, which I am of the opinion is extremely damaging. The impact of the current situation on Mr. Tune is clearly impacting on him greatly and in turn his … his presentation at the present time is also likely to affect X.”

It would be difficult, I think, to have a more responsible person showing how irresponsibly the mother and Ms. Watson have behaved. I find it an intolerable situation for a responsible person such as the head to be in. He will therefore be in a position to use the document which I have approved as he thinks fit. I hope he will use it to dispel any lingering suspicions there are about Mr. Tune.

The order made by Baker J. on 25^th February 2011 will, accordingly, continue. It will, however, be amended in para.3 to delete subparagraphs (ii), (IV) and (VI). These deal with X, her parents and, I think, the school. I would be grateful if counsel would look at the order and make the necessary amendments.

Finally, I turn to the application under s.91(14) of the Children Act 1989. The leading authority on the point is a case of which I am very familiar,Re P (A child) (Residence Order: A Child’s Welfare) [1999] 2 FLR 573. It was an appeal from a decision of mine, and I took the opportunity in the judgment at first instance to go into s.91 (14) in considerable detail. The subsection reads as follows:

“On disposing of any application for an order under this Act, the court may (whether or not it makes any other order in response to the application) order that no application for an order under this Act of any specified kind may be made with respect to the child concerned by any person named in the order without the leave of the court.”

I plainly thus have jurisdiction to make an order under s.91(14). I do not propose to go through the criteria identified by Butler-Sloss LJ. in Re P, although I bear the criteria very much in mind.

In essence, my view is that this is a wholly exceptional case. What the child and her father need above all is a period of respite from litigation. The mother recently applied for an emergency protection order. It was dismissed by the local Justices, with an order for costs made against her. It had, however, to be dealt with and no doubt caused considerable disruption. I am, therefore, entirely satisfied that an order under s.91(14) is justified, appropriate and proportionate. The mother is not prevented by it from negotiating contact with the local authority. If she has a reasonable application to be placed before the court, she will be heard. Thus, although the order represents a breach of her ECHR rights, I am satisfied that in the interests of X a respite of litigation is required and the order is proportionate.

I will, therefore, make an order under s.91(14) forbidding any application by the mother without the court’s permission for a period of two years. That permission, in the first instance, is to be sought from me in writing without notice to the father. I will reserve the case generally to myself if available.

Ms Haigh, who was present on 15 August, argued that, as the child’s mother, she should be entitled to make any application she liked about X. That, of course, would be the normal position. I am satisfied, however, that this case is exceptional and therefore an order under s.91(14) is called for.

Victoria Haigh and David Tune married in May 2003 and their daughter, X was also born in that year. X appeared to have every advantage in life. The parents had both enjoyed successful sporting careers, they had a comfortable home and X was greatly loved by both of them. Sadly, by 2004 the parents began to experience difficulties in their marriage. In January 2005 Mr Tune vacated the former matrimonial home. At the early stages of the separation X had the benefit of frequent contact with her father, including overnight stays. In March 2005 Mr Tune began employment in Brussels but returned each weekend in order to exercise his overnight contact with X. X and her father also spoke daily on the telephone.

By August 2005 Ms Haigh sought a reduction in contact and in the Spring of 2006 she stopped contact altogether claiming that X was being emotionally affected by her contact with her father. A series of court orders made throughout 2006 sought to restore the contact in line with the expectations of both parents. The attachment of a penal notice to a Court order of 8 December 2006 evidences that the mother was still resistant to the Court ordered contact regime. She in fact assaulted the father at that Court hearing for which she received a formal caution.

On the day of that hearing Ms Haigh also made the first allegation of sexual abuse by Mr Tune against his daughter to Doncaster Social Services, followed 12 days later by a fresh application to the Court for permission to deny contact whilst her allegations were investigated. Thus began a continuing series of similar allegations. Each was taken seriously by the guardian ad litem, the Local Authority and the Court. Each was investigated by either Doncaster or Nottinghamshire social workers under their Child Protection procedures alongside the Police. Each time a fresh allegation was made by Ms Haigh, X’s contact with her father was either suspended or only took place supervised by a social worker. On each occasion the investigations provided no evidence of sexual abuse but following the reinstatement of the father’s contact a fresh allegation was in due course forthcoming from the mother resulting in a further period of contact suspension and a new investigation. In addition, Ms Haigh was invited, on three occasions, to present evidence for her allegations to be investigated by the court but on each occasion she either did not attend or did attend but produced no evidence. Ms Haigh has, however, not always been consistent as to her own beliefs. She has in the past told the Court that she was “totally wrong about the sexual abuse allegations”, claiming that she may have overreacted to innocent or innocuous behaviour. She now tells me that this was untrue.

In due course and after many investigations, including four medical examinations of X herself, the case was heard before His Honour Judge Robertshaw concluding on the 29^th January 2010. At that hearing, which lasted two weeks, the mother was represented by Counsel. It is important to note that the mother’s own case was not that X had been sexually abused but that allegations of sexual abuse, by this stage coming from X herself, were a reaction to the stressful relationships around her. In terms it was submitted, on the mother’s behalf, X was saying things “she thinks the adults want to hear”. By the adults, this, of course, could only have meant the mother. The Judge at that hearing gave Ms Haigh every opportunity to present a case that X had been abused, if that was what she believed, but Ms Haigh chose not to.

His Honour Judge Robertshaw rejected her analysis as put by Counsel on her behalf. He found Ms Haigh had been disingenuous in the way she ran her case. It was, he said, pursued to achieve ‘tactical advantage’. The Judge found that Ms Haigh had ‘coached’ X into making her allegations of sexual abuse. Specifically, the Judge concluded that the allegations originated in the mind of the mother and were false allegations. Such was the evidence available to the Judge that he was able ‘inevitably’, as he termed it, to conclude that X had not been sexually abused.

The Judge found Ms Haigh had been motivated by her desire to obstruct X’s contact with her father about which she had developed “a longstanding and irrational hostility”. X as the Judge found, had been ‘excessively’ and ‘inappropriately’ questioned about possible abuse which actually sent unmistakable signals to X that ‘disclosure’ would be something that would please her mother. The Judge found undoubted influence of the mother in some of X’s statements. Analysing the chronology of the allegations over a three year period, the Judge found that they correlated closely with the course of the protracted legal proceedings and had been deployed by the mother “manipulatively to support her case”. The consequence, the Judge concluded, was that X had repeatedly incurred unnecessary and ‘potentially distressing’ intrusions into her life by professionals. The allegations had resulted in a cessation of X’s contact to her father and the process had, in this way, been emotionally harmful to her.

Notwithstanding his findings His Honour Judge Robertshaw did not make immediate provision to transfer of X’s care to the father. Rather he adopted a holding position of X living with her grandmother. Whilst viewing the mother’s conduct as ‘deplorable’, the Judge was careful to recognise that the paramount concern of the Court was X herself. The responsibility and privilege of caring for her was not to be determined on the basis of a reward for unimpeachable parental conduct nor withdrawn as a punishment for a parent who had caused harm to a child. It was to be determined, as it always is in the Family Court, by reference to the welfare criteria in section 1(1) and .1(3) of the Children Act 1989 where the interests of the child remain the paramount consideration. As the Judge put it, in terms easily accessible to the parties themselves, “Frustration at her [the mother’s] past deplorable conduct must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the issue is welfare”. The Judge made it clear, however, that X had a right to a relationship with both parents and that ultimately the Court might view it as necessary to transfer X’s care to the parent who would allow her a relationship with both. This observation could not have been clearer or more child focused.

At no point has the mother sought to appeal the Judge’s findings. However, Ms Haigh has been unable to accept the findings, despite her ambivalence as to their reliability within the litigation itself. In due course His Honour Judge Jones was asked to determine the question as to where X should live following a full assessment of both parents including a psychological assessment of Ms Haigh. In his Judgment of the 22^nd November 2010, Judge Jones found Ms Haigh to be ‘untruthful’ and ‘entrenched’ in her position. He also found that the mother had continued to influence X and to manipulate her feelings whilst in effect ‘placing her own as the priority’.

The Judge concluded that it would be contrary to X’s best interest for her to live with her mother and that were she to do so, she would be likely to suffer further emotional harm in her care. The mother, Judge Jones found, had been “intransigent” in her response to the Court’s findings and “intemperate” in her reaction to the Local Authority’s involvement. He recognised that Ms Haigh “cares for X deeply” but emphasised “she is demonstrating little insight into X’s real needs and is failing to prioritise these over her own”. Foreshadowing the difficulties that were to come, the Judge observed if she [Ms Haigh] continues on her present course, she runs the risk of alienating her daughter and permanently damaging their relationship”. The Judge considered “that would be a great loss for X (as everyone, including the father, acknowledges)” and expressed the hope that it would be a “consequence which the mother, on further reflection will seek to avoid”.

During the course of the Judgment, HHJ Jones recorded his personal instinct that Ms Haigh needed “professional help”. The mother advised the Court that she had sought out and received extensive therapeutic counselling, though no evidence of it was placed before the Court on her behalf. In her own account in evidence she said that at times during the litigation she recognised that she had been “a very poorly lady”.

In the period that followed the original fact finding hearing before His Honour Robertshaw, the mother’s professed ambivalence about the abuse hardened to become a certainty which she expresses dogmatically. This, of course, reinforces the Court’s own conclusion that the mother’s position during the litigation had itself had been disingenuous and tactical. Following the transfer of X to her father’s care, Ms Haigh became fixated on what by now had plainly become, in her own mind, a profound injustice.

Despite all that had happened Social Services considered that it was important to try to promote the relationship between X and her mother and provided contact facilities with that objective in mind. Inevitably, in the light of the Court’s findings, that could only take place with a Social Worker present. It requires little imagination to recognise that contact for parents in such circumstances may be very difficult and artificial. From the child’s perspective, however, it may prove to be reassuring and comforting. Parents who are able to appreciate this can, even within these limitations, contrive to ensure that contact is an enjoyable experience. Ms Haigh was unable to do this and decided that she would not see X at all in these circumstances. The Social Services wrote to Ms Haigh informing her of X’s wish to see her mother and her concern that contact was not occurring but Ms Haigh’s view was fixed and contact ceased.

Ms Haigh’s attention then turned towards a media and internet based campaign designed to remedy what she claims to be a miscarriage of justice. She is highly critical of the child’s Guardian, the police, the Social Workers, the teachers, the Judges and the lawyers (including her own). She has recruited a number of individuals to assist her in that campaign and there is much information on the internet about X which is in breach of the injunctive remedies the Court has put in place in its concern to protect X’s privacy.

On the 1^st May the mother e-mailed X’s school with a document styled as a letter to X. In that email she observes

“I am famous again darling, but this time it is not because I am a model or racehorse trainer. It is because I have fought my way to the top people in the country, to give me my daughter back and I will not stop until they do … when I see you I will keep all of the newspapers that I have been in and if you want to look at them you can. I have been in over 7 newspapers and I am going to be doing television programmes very soon”.

That e-mail may illuminate something of the mother’s true motivation.

Ms Haigh has also contacted the father’s employers through the Company’s website and through the personal Facebook accounts of members of staff. Those communications have involved countless documents stating that Mr Tune is a paedophile and a rapist. They also assert an alleged conspiracy through the Court process, the police, all professionals and the Judiciary. Though his employers have been supportive to Mr Tune, they are anxious about the damage done to the reputation of their business and accordingly Mr Tune’s livelihood and thereby his capacity to provide for X, is jeopardised.

Perhaps most disturbingly Ms Haigh has caused profound difficulties for X at her school. The school has informed the Court that some, if not most, of the parents whose children attend X’s primary school have an understanding of the allegations made by Ms Haigh that are placed on the web. On the 27^th May 2011, Ms Haigh emailed several of the parents whose children attend at that school via the school contact list, (which she had obtained) inviting them to visit her webpage. This is a website primarily devoted to this case. It directs the reader by hyperlink to X’s police interviews with the heading: VICKY HAIGH: REQUESTING HER DAUGHTER TO RETURN FROM HER PAEDOPHILE FATHER AND DONCASTER “SOCIAL” SERVICES . The site also extends it scope to a campaign against “secrecy” in the Family Justice System. Ms Haigh has started a petition on this issue which as of the 11^th July had 594 signatures. It seems some of the parents may have followed the invitation and have gained access to material which includes extracts of X’s interviews to the police. The school informs the Court that the resources which have been deployed in an attempt to keep the other children away from the material on the internet has been significant and indeed of “monumental proportions”. Teaching time has been considerably affected as a result of the actions taken by Ms Haigh and great pressure is placed on staff. The Head Teacher has expressed the view that the current proceedings and actions by Ms Haigh in terms of the material that is on the internet, is extremely damaging for a child of X’s age:

“It is fortunate that at this time X is not yet of an age were she is likely to locate the information about her and her family on the internet and that none of the children within her peer group at school also have access to that material. There will, however, become a time when that material will be available to X, which I am of the opinion is extremely damaging”.

The extracts from X’s police interviews contain the false allegations. In addition to the direct harm that causes to X and her father, it is perhaps important to remember that the material will be read by many different people with differing motivations. There are those who will read it for their own sexual gratification, victimising X in the process. The mother seems to be entirely unable to understand or empathise with the consequences to X of these actions. Her ability to focus on her child’s needs have, in the Local Authority’s analysis, been thoroughly exploited by a number of fanatical campaigners with whom the mother has been in contact.

On two occasions the school has had to call the Police both at the School Sports Day, when the mother despite her threats did not attend and at a Christmas Concert when the mother attended and had to be removed.

Such is the extent of the false, unauthorised and tendentious material now placed in the public domain that the Local Authority, who would otherwise be striving to protect the privacy of X, have concluded that the balance has shifted and that in this particular case ,X’s best interests is served by the true facts being made available. This position has been supported by the Children’s Guardian although he does not agree to X being named. It is ironic, of course, that the mother has complained about the privacy of the Family Court process and has historically argued for greater openness. Realising that the professionals in the case would be bound by their respect for X’s privacy, the mother has utilised this to promote her own distorted view of the case which she has been able to advance thus far, unopposed by the true facts.