James Fisher Everard Ltd & Ors v European Diesel Services

I would also observe that, although all court orders mean what they say, and must be complied with even if made by consent, there are some orders relating to the completion of specified stages in preparation for trial (such as disclosure, the exchange of witness statements or a timetable for expert evidence) where there may still be so many imponderables when the order is made that the date for compliance cannot sensibly be regarded as written in stone. Everything will always depend on the circumstances of the particular case, and the stage in the proceedings when the order is made, but in many such cases it should be understood that there may be a need for reasonable extensions of time or other adjustments as the matter develops. It would, I think, be unfortunate if the new and salutary emphasis on compliance with orders were to lead to a situation where, in cases of the general type I have described, a reasonable request for an extension were to be rejected in the hope that the court might be persuaded to refuse any extension at all."

In the case of Summit Navigation Ltd & Anor v. Generali Romania Asigurare Reasigurare SA Ardaf SA & Anor [2014] EWHC 391, Leggatt J, as he then was, not in the context of an application for an extension of time but an application for the lifting of stay and security for costs that had not been provided in time, criticised the defendants for seeking to rely on Mitchell v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ. 1537 to turn to their tactical advantage to claim a short delay in providing security by arguing that the action should be permanently stayed. At [53] he referred to the defendants as not having adopted a constructive approach but having, "cited Mitchell and cried foul."

In the case of Re Guidezone Ltd, as I have referred to, at [49], Nugee J said this, and I quote:

In that case Nugee J also said, amongst other matters, as follows at [69]:

Dealing first with the underlying facts of the dispute, before turning to the chronology and the application for an extension of time, this action concerns two vessels, the Mersey Fisher and the Thames Fisher which, per the Particulars of Claim, the first and second claimants were the registered owners of, with the Thames Fisher being on bare boat charter to the first claimant from the second claimant. It is said that the third claimant was the technical and crew managers of the vessel. They are fitted with diesel engines and manufactured by Ruston Diesels. It is said that the defendant was, and/or held itself out to be, a specialist in the maintenance and/or repair and/or supply of spare parts for engines manufactured by Ruston Diesels.

In short, in 2016 there were failures following renewal of a lubricating oil pump and associated gearing of the Mersey Fisher, and then a further failure of the Mersey Fisher in April 2016. Repairs were carried out by the defendant and a pump was replaced. There are issues as to the precise terms on which such repair works were carried on. But in any event on 11 May 2016, whilst in service in the Cromarty Firth, there was a failure of the main engines and it is alleged that either the parts that were supplied were defective and/or there was a lack of skill and care in relation to the installation of such parts on the part of the defendant.

Similarly in relation to the Thames Fisher, there had been a replacement of a seawater pump by the defendant in February 2016; again there are issues as to the precise terms on which that was carried out. But in July 2016 the seawater pump failed on that vessel whilst the ship was on a voyage from Fawley to Aberdeen. Again the allegation is that there were either non original parts or defective parts, or there was a failure to exercise proper skill and care in relation to the installation of such parts.

It will be seen, therefore, that the issues that arise include issues on which expert evidence from a marine engineer will be needed. Indeed, there have been metallurgical analyses in relation to the gears supplied by the defendant and that has led to the allegations that they were not original manufacturing parts and also had not been heat treated in accordance with the manufacturer's requirements.

It will be apparent, therefore, that no doubt in order to properly plead the claim in relation to the Particulars of Claim and also to properly respond thereto, it will be necessary for expert evidence to be obtained, albeit, no doubt, that the defendant as a company which specialises in such areas will have some expertise of its own. So that in essence is the nature of the claim set out in the Particulars of Claim.

In terms of the history of the matter, between 6 April 2018 and 15 February 2019 the parties engaged in pre-action correspondence. The last aspect of that from the claimant was on 12 December 2018, although there was a subsequent letter from the defendant on 15 February 2019 in which further information and documentation was sought. That letter was not responded to at that time and such correspondence would appear to have petered out, with the defendant subsequently saying that it closed its file in due course. It was after two years, almost, that, as I say, on 7 December the claimants emailed the defendant's solicitors

It is fair to say, therefore, that the defendant faced something of a standing start having not been forewarned that the issuing of proceedings was intended and imminent. In any event, by 23 December the defendants had written to the claimant expressing surprise about the claim having been served, as it is put now "out of the blue," and particularly in the context of the fact that the letter on 15 February 2019 had not been responded to. It was said that the defendant's expert would need to undertake investigations before a meaningful defence could be prepared, and the defendants proposed a three months stay from service which would be to 14 March 2021 - we are now of course on 19 March 2021 - for the parties to exchange information and conclude the protocol identifying that thereafter a further extension of time might be required before a defence could be settled. In the meantime the defendant asked the claimant to agree to extend the time for the defence by the 28 days that is contemplated in the Commercial Court Guide.

The claimant was not prepared to agree a stay, a stance it was entitled to adopt, and the matter proceeded with the instruction of an expert, I am told, on 10 December. The expert was asked what documentation would be needed and the like. The Christmas period intervened and then unfortunately the expert had to have emergency surgery, which took matters to the middle of January, and I was told that by the end of January the expert had responded in relation to what information was required.

It will be seen, therefore, that some seven weeks on, as at 19 March 2021, no overt progress had been made in terms of advancing the defence and, as I say, what is sought now is an extension of time until 17 May. Although the application is supported by a witness

Mr Land, who appears for the defendant, was therefore asked by me to take instructions from his clients as to what steps had been taking place and what time was needed time between now and when a properly particularised defence could be served. This fact in itself, I consider, illustrates that more information could have been provided as contemplated by Nugee J in the case that I have cited. Indeed had this matter proceeded, for example by way of consent or indeed by way of a paper application, which is another route that could have been adopted, then the judge considering either a consent order or a contested application, but on paper, would have requirde such information as well.

In short, I am told that the documentation is still being collated. There have been difficulties because two of the main individuals involved have been working abroad, and also two members of staff have had to self-isolate. The position therefore is that the bundle of material the expert requires is still not ready. It is thought that up to another two weeks are needed to assemble that material. It is then said that the expert will need three to four weeks in order to provide an expert's report, following which Mr Land considers realistically that he will need another seven days in which to finalise the defence. Mr Land made clear that he is working on the defence in the meantime, and there are clearly other aspects of the defence which can be worked on in the meantime.

For her part, Ms Paruk, who appears on behalf of the claimant, says that the defendant has not been acting expeditiously, that there was an initial extension of 28 days and that by the time that extension had expired the defendant should have been in a position to serve its defence. She says that in response to a point that the court made - which I am going to come on to in a moment - which is essentially that what the court wants is a properly particularised defence so that the issues can be crystallised, and a proper list of issues and case memorandum can be drafted so that an effective case management conference can take place without further pleading stages, she submitted , "Do not let the best be the enemy of the good." In other words it ought to be possible to prepare a properly particularised defence without holding out for extra time to give the utmost level of particularity.

She also submits that the requirements of the CPR are there to be complied with and in terms of the amount of time that is contemplated under the CPR, what is contemplated is 28 days for a defence with the opportunity to agree a further 28 days, which was agreed to. If you want any more time than that you really have to justify why it is you require any more, still less substantially more.

I have some sympathy with the position of the claimant in terms of the amount of time that has passed, and also in terms of the very limited progress that seems to have been made in relation to the service of a defence. I have no doubt that a short form defence could be put in within relatively short order, which would be sufficiently CPR compliant not to be capable of being struck out.

However, that is not what the Commercial Court would want, or expect, of a defence. The

Whilst I have full regard to the passage of time that has already taken place, I consider that I must look at what time is now necessary in order for a properly particularised defence to be provided. In the light of the information that has been provided to me orally at this hearing, I consider that the defendant should be given a short further period of time, during which to obtain the material, to which then should be added a period of time for the expert to respond with the expert's comments. I agree with Ms Paruk that time for service of a full report is not needed. What is needed is commentary from the expert in sufficient detail in order for the defence to be properly particularised, and then a short period of time for the defendant's counsel to finalize the defence.

I consider that all those three stages - i.e. the obtaining of the material for provision to the expert, the expert providing his comments and a defence, and a properly particularised defence being provided, ought to be capable of being dealt with within five weeks, set against the backdrop of the delay in progressing the defence to date.

Accordingly, I am prepared to extend the time for service of the defence until a date five weeks from today, which I will confirm with the parties in a moment. I will not make that an unless order. But I will make clear that in my view one would need a change of circumstances to arise for there to be a justification for any significant extension thereafter.

Accordingly, for those reasons, I accede to the application for an extension of time but