Stellar Shipping Co Llc v Hudson Shipping Lines

Stellar Shipping Co LLC (“Stellar”) apply under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 challenging the Award and Amended Award of Kenneth Rokison QC, Christopher Moss and Mark Hamsher (“the Tribunal”) dated 14 May 2010 and 12 August 2010 respectively on the grounds that the Tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction because no arbitration agreement was ever entered into between Stellar and Hudson Shipping Lines (“Hudson”) in respect of an alleged guarantee by Stellar, of the obligations of Phiniqia International Shipping Co (“Phiniqia”) under an alleged Contract of Affreightment between Hudson and Phiniqia.

The essential issue before the Court can be shortly stated:

“Did Stellar enter into an arbitration agreement with Hudson in respect of the alleged contract of guarantee between Stellar and Hudson?”

If it did not then the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, and Stellar are entitled to the relief sought in the Claim Form. If it did then the challenge to jurisdiction fails. Stellar contend that no such arbitration agreement was entered into because (1) no contractual relationship of any kind was entered into between Stellar and Hudson and (2) if it was it did not include any arbitration agreement. Hudson questioned whether the first ground was open to Stellar on this application but I am satisfied that it is part of the general challenge to jurisdiction which they are entitled to make.

It is well established that the application under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996is a re-hearing and not an appeal or review - See, for example, Electrosteel Casting Ltd v Scan-Trans Shipping & Chartering [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 190, 197 and the authorities there referred to by Gross J. Accordingly it is for the Court to decide afresh whether or not there was a concluded arbitration agreement between Hudson and Stellar giving jurisdiction to the Tribunal.

This application challenging the Tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction arises out of the arbitration commenced by Hudson against Stellar, which is itself effectively an accessory arbitration to one ongoing between Hudson and Phiniqia. In the Hudson/Phiniqia arbitration Hudson claim some US$3.4 million from Phiniqia alleging that Phiniqia agreed to enter into what was expressed in the contemporary correspondence as a charterparty between owners and charterers (but in terminology terms is more accurately characterised as a Contract of Affreightment ) (“COA”) for four voyages, and failed to proceed after the first voyage. Phiniqia contend that there never was a concluded COA - “subjects” were never lifted, accordingly that tribunal lacks jurisdiction. If there was a COA, Phiniqia say that their failure to proceed with later voyages was not culpable - owing to severe whirlwind damages force majeure prevented further liftings, or the COA was frustrated. In addition they contend that Hudson failed to provide a valid nomination for the second lifting. There are also issues as to the quantum of Hudson’s claim.

Phiniqia are not party to the arbitration out of which the arbitration application before the Court arises, and accordingly are not before the Court. The tribunal in that arbitration (the same constitution as the Tribunal) has yet to rule on Phiniqia’s defences including jurisdiction. In such circumstances it should be made clear that no findings I make affect other parties (and other contracts) which are not before the Court.

The Hudson/Stellar arbitration comes about because Hudson allege that Stellar guaranteed Phiniqia’s obligations under the alleged COA. There are a large number of issues in play in the Hudson/Stellar arbitration including whether either of the people at various times alleged to be Stellar’s agents for the purpose of (i) concluding the guarantee and/or (ii) providing a memorandum of it (Mr Habib of Phiniqia’s chartering arm, Stellar Chartering and Mr Michalopoulos of Velos) had authority.

The arbitration had a complicated procedural history that culminated in a ruling by the Tribunal that the following issues be determined as preliminary issues:

These issues formed a combination of jurisdictional issues ((2) and (3)) and substantive issues ((1) and (4)) which had the common factors that (i) they could be determined on the basis of the documents attached to the submissions, and (ii) if any of them was found in Stellar’s favour they would be determinative of the arbitration in Stellar’s favour. The Preliminary Issues proceeded on the basis of the assumption (contrary to Stellar's case) that Mr Habib had authority to act on behalf of Stellar (which was left over for future determination). This meant that whatever the findings of the Tribunal on these issues, important matters would remain for future determination (including on questions of authority) and thus as to whether there was in fact a binding COA between Phiniqia and Hudson, and a binding guarantee between Stellar and Hudson (whatever prima facie findings were made).

The issues were heard on 22 March 2010. Hudson and Stellar were represented by counsel. The Award was issued on 14 May 2010, and after submissions in relation to corrections under section 57 of the Arbitration Act 1996 and rule 25 of the LMAA Rules, an amended Award and Reasons were issued on 11 August 2010. The Tribunal held that “the arbitration agreement was incorporated into the COA and encompassed Stellar’s obligation to guarantee performance by Phiniqia” (para 8(A)(3) of the Award). They gave detailed Reasons for their findings on the preliminary issues (extending to some 66 paragraphs).

A threshold matter arises as to the evidence. Stellar argue that the Court should not look at the run of fixture correspondence but should limit itself to the communications that “crossed the line” between the parties. This was not the position taken by them at the arbitration and its appropriateness is disputed by Hudson. However, in principle I consider that Stellar are correct that an objective approach has to be taken in circumstances where the issue is what was agreed and what is the meaning and the effect of what was agreed and I propose to adopt such an approach.

It would appear that the origin of the fixture was an approach in April 2008 by Vassilis Michalopolous of Velos Chartering (“Velos”) to Jeff Czarnota at Maritime Brokers & Consultants, Inc (“MBC”) in relation to a suitable vessel for the carriage of coal in bulk from Vietnam to Egypt.

It is Hudson’s case that Velos (based in Athens) made the approach for Phiniqia, and MBC (based in Chicago) were the brokers for Hudson (also in Chicago). It was Stellar’s case before the arbitrators that Velos were not brokers for Phiniqia/ Stellar but merely intermediate brokers passing messages up and down the line. The Tribunal did not determine this issue, nor is it necessary to do so for the purpose of the present application.

On 17 April 2008, MBC “bid firm” for the fixture, a COA between Phiniqia as Charterers and Hudson as Owners covering four shipments of 30,000mt 15% more or less “FAIRLY EVENLY SPREAD MAY 2008 – MARCH 2009” of coal in bulk from Vietnam to Egypt at a freight rate of USD 63 per mt. MBC asked Velos to “PLS ADVISE FULL STYLE/ BACKGROUND” for Phiniqia. The firm bid was on the basis of a Gencon charterparty and provided inter alia as follows:

Subsequent emails would similarly refer to “PHINIQIA/HUDSON” as the “Subject” and to “CHRTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI” and Stellar submitted that this made it clear that any reference to charterers in the body of the exchanges was intended to refer to Phiniqia.

On 21 April 2008 Velos responded with an Accept/Except (“A/E”) counter at a rate of US$55. The terms included the following clause on arbitration: “ARB ENGLISH LAW” and attached the requested “BACKGROUND REF”.

The “BACKGROUND REF” was provided as an attachment entitled “Stellar BG”. It stated inter alia:

“Tradeline LLC - Group Profile

Tradeline is part pf the Majid Saif Al-Ghurair group of companies based in the United Arab Emirates. One of the largest chaebol in the middle east region with a history of doing business in the region over a 100 years. Our group also has interests in everything from trading and construction to food processing and mineral water. We are one of the largest conglomerates operating in and around the area.

Since inception in 1989 Tradeline LLC began trading in regular shipments of sulphur and fertilizer raw materials to the Indian fertiliser industry and has over the years successfully emerged as a regional powerhouse in trading of ferrous & non-ferrous metals, bitumen & petrochemicals, agro commodities and minerals. We have interests ranging from Trading, Manufacturing, Crusher, Diamond Jewellery, Construction, Restaurants, Garage, Car Rentals, Logistics and Real Estate.

Tradeline charters an average of 60 handymaxes/panamaxes a year besides employing its owned tonnage. The shipping division of Tradeline was spun-off as an independent identity and Stellar Shipping Co. LLC was incorporated in 1999 to supplement the trading activities with an initial fleet of 8 dry bulk carriers. Tradeline decided to capitalize on its extensive experience in shipping by venturing into shipowning in order to act as a natural hedge to the trading division.

Stellar Shipping Co LLC

Initially, Stellar’s operations were Tradeline focused which was reflected in its original fleet profile ranging from 4,000 dwt to 63,000 dwt. Over the years, Stellar Shipping identified its core competencies and decided to focus only on supramax and panamax vessels, following which the fleet was trimmed to four ships with two new building contracts signed with STX Panocean, China and two more new building contacts with COSCO shipyard, China. Stellar is also investing in five specialized coal carriers from Indonesia which will be pressed into Tradeline’s inter-PG aggregates business.

Stellar plans to acquire three more dry bulk handymax size vessel by the year end. We are aggressively pursuing COAs and other strategic partnerships in order to become the leading ship owners in the middle east region.

Until 2005, all chartering activity was done under the banner of Tradeline which was later changed to Phiniqia International Shipping Co, a fully owned subsidiary of Stellar Shipping Co. For the year 2007, the turnover was well in excess of USD 100 million.

Stellar has exclusive contracts for Iron Ore, Steel, Coal, Clinker, Aggregates, Fertilizers, Sulphur etc.

The usual trading routes are …S.E. Asia – Mediterranean etc.

.....

Stellar is Owner member of Bimco and Member of International Maritime Bureau.

Phiniqia is Entered with Swedish Club for Charterer’s Liability cover.

Our full style:-

Stellar Shipping Co. (L.L.C)

S2 Mezzanine Floor, Al Rigga Palace

Al-Maktoum Road, PO Box No. 55409

Deira, Dubai, U.A.E.

Tel: + 9714 2340090

Fax: + 9714 2340091

Email: shipping@stellarshipping.ae

MBC countered later the same day on an A/E basis at US$63 PMT. It required that Phiniqia’s obligations be guaranteed by Tradeline LLC and called for London arbitration. It stated inter alia as follows:

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING DUBAI - TO BE FULLY GTEED BY TRADELINE LLC (Background provided)...

ENGLISH LAW LONDON ARBITRATION YAR 74 AS AM 90"

The following day, 23 April 2008, Velos responded on an A/E basis at US$57 PMT and deleting the reference to the obligations of Phiniqia being fully guaranteed by Tradeline. There was no comment on the London arbitration proposal, which was therefore deemed to have been accepted.

MBC responded on 24 April 2008 on an A/E basis with an US$63 PMT offer and stating:

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI SUB APPROVAL OF CHARTERERS BACKGROUND (note: owners know the name “phiniqia” and have chartered vsls to “phiniqia” in the past – no doubt this name is very respected in the industry but the background provided by charts mostly focuses on “stellar” and “tradeline”. Can charts pls provide a background for “phiniqia” or obtain a gtee from one of the above. It is corporate policy for Hudson to have a background on file for charts for all long term period vsls and coa contracts.”

Velos responded to MBC on 30 April 2008 with a counter at US$61 PMT. As to the guarantee, Velos said:

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI (IF INSIST ON GTEE, STELLAR WILL DO – BGROUND/ REFS SENT)”.

MBC replied for Hudson on 1 May 2008 on an A/E basis at US$63 PMT but adding the following to the reference to charterers:

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLA [sic] LETTERHEAD.”

The email ended with the following comment:

“- vassilis as mentioned the first laycan above would help owners with their own cgo commitments both ex feast and med/bl sea. Plsd to hear if chrts able to accommodate. If we going to make this small contract work - then owners and charts must be willing to cooperate with one another for both hudsons and phiniqias mutual benefit.”

There was then a month’s break in negotiations which were resumed on 9 June 2008, when Velos countered on an A/E basis at US$62 PMT stating as follows:

“Subject: RE HUDSON/PHINIQIA - OWNERS COUNTER

.....

JEFF/VASSILIS,

FYG, REDISCUSSED WITH PHINIQIA THIS MORNING ABOUT THE MINI C.O.A. AND MANAGED TO OBTAIN THE FOLLOWING.

++

REF TELECON OF TODAY, CHRTS ARE PLEASED TO COUNTER BSS A/E FOR REPLY W/I 1 HR

FRT USD 62.00PMT (DISCRETION TO FIX MAXIMUM AT $63 PMT)”

Hudson’s suggestion that Stellar would guarantee Phiniqia’s obligations under the COA, which guarantee was to be confirmed by wording from Hudson on a letter from Stellar, was accepted:

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLAR LETTERHEAD.”

MBC responded the same day on an A/E basis at US$68 PMT and adding the following comment:

“Vassilis - spoke to owners abt the rate - and they advise that hire rates are up arnd 4k and bunkers up arnd usd $80 pmt since chrts last suspended negotiations. Owners still keen on the biz - pls get chrts to come back firm at something closer to owners no’s.”

There was then a further exchange of e-mails between MBC and Velos on 10 June 2008 about the rate which was eventually agreed at US$64 PMT on 11 June 2008.

On 11 June Velos e-mailed MBC as follows:

“RE: PHINIQIA/HUDSON SHIPPING LINES

FURTHER TO OUR VARIOUS EXCHANGES AND TELECONS HERE’S HOW BUZ IS FIXABLE:

-CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLAR LETTERHEAD.

OWNERS: HUDSON: HUDSON SHIPPING LINES INC.

.....

FREIGHT: USD $64 PMT...

.....

- GA/ARB ENGLISH LAW/YAR 74 AS AM 90

- OTHERWISE SUB OWS REVIEW OF CHRTS PFMA GCN 94 C/P TO BE LOGICALLY AMENDED (PLSE PROVIDE)

- SUB CHRTS APPROVAL TB LIFTED WITHING 24 WRKG HRS AFMT.

ENDS

RGDS

AS BROKERS ONLY”

On 12 June 2008 Velos sent an e-mail to MBC setting out the recap that had been sent to “Chrs” and stating:

“PHINIQIA/HUDSON - RECAP

SENT FOL TO CHRS

RE: PHINIQUIA/HUDSON SHIPPING LINES ....

PLEASED TO RECAP HAVING FIXED AS UNDER SUBJECT TO REVIEWAL OF CHRTS PFMA GCN 94.

.....

CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLAR LETTERHEAD.

OWNERS: HUDSON: HUDSON SHIPPING LINES INC.

.....

FREIGHT: USD $64 PMT...

.....

- GA/ARB ENGLISH LAW/YAR 74 AS AM 90...”

The proforma charterparty was a voyage charter of a vessel named “Silver Star” from Vietnam to Egypt in April 2007 on the Gencon form and included as Clause 19 an English law and London arbitration agreement:

“19.

Law and Arbitration

(a)

This Charter Policy shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English Law and any dispute arising out of this Charter Party shall be referred to arbitration in London in accordance with the Arbitration Acts 1950 and 1979 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. Unless the parties agree upon a sole arbitrator, one arbitrator shall be appointed by each party and the arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a third arbitrator, the decision of the three-man tribunal thus constituted or any two of them, shall be final. On the receipt by one party of the nomination in writing of the other party’s arbitrator, that party shall appoint their arbitrator within fourteen days, failing which the decision of the single arbitrator appointed shall be final.

For disputes where the total amount claimed by either party does not exceed the amount stated in Box 25 the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Small Claims Procedure of the London Maritime Arbitrators Association.”

On 13 June 2008, Velos forwarded comments on the pro-forma charterparty to MBC.

On the same day MBC responded to the recap and the proforma charterparty. The email stated:

“Phiniqia/hudson shipping (details)

.....

Re: Phiniqia/hudson shipping (details)

Many thanks charterers proforma cp. Aside from logical alterations/deletions/additions/insertions/ owners have the following comments:

.....

[a page of comments then followed]

------------------------

with regards to the following cls in the recap “charts: Phiniqia Intl Shipping, Dubai fully gteed by Stellar. Prior to owners lifting subs from their end Stellar to provide letter of gtee as per owners wording on Stellar letterhead”.

without prejudice to this cls in the recap, owners ppose that the cp to be mutually endorsed by Phiniqia and Stellar. The charterparty ofc still to read: “Charts: Phiniqia Intl Shipping, Dubai - fully guaranteed by Stellar Shipping Company LLC”.

If Phiniqia/Stellar are agreeable to the above, owners will have then lifted this sub from their end.”

It is the proposal made in this email of 13 June 2008 which (as agreed for the purpose of the preliminary issue) on 18 June 2008 Mr Habib told Mr Michalopoulos was acceptable.

On 14 June 2008 Velos responded on an A/E basis to Hudson’s comments on the charterparty. No reference was made to the proposal from Hudson that, rather than provide a separate letter of guarantee, Stellar (as well as Phiniqia) would endorse the charterparty.

There then followed a series of exchanges on the charterparty terms between Velos and MBC on 17 June 2008 culminating in an email sent by MBC to Velos late on 17 June 2008 stating:

“Subject: HUDSON/PHINIQIA - DETAILS - owners confirmation

....

Tks chrts below which owners are pleased accept. We are now fixed clean with cp dtd 18^th June 2008. many tks your/charts efforts allowing us to conclude this fixture. Pls send recap at your earliest convenience for owners confirmation”.

On 18 June 2008 Velos sent the requested recap to MBC:

“Subject: PHINIQIA/HUDSON - RECAP

….

PLEASE LET ME KNOW IF WE CONCUR SO CAN SEND TO CHRS

....

PLEASED TO RECAP HAVE FIXED CLEAN AS UNDER WITH CP DATED 18 JUNE 2008

CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLAR LETTERHEAD.

OWNERS: HUDSON SHIPPING LINES INC.

.....

FREIGHT: USD $64 PMT...

[a page an a half of terms relating to charterparty terms follow including:-]

- GA/ARB ENGLISH LAW/YAR 74 AS AM 90.

.....

OTHERWISE FTC BASIS CHRS C/P PFMA DD DUBAI 22 APRIL 2007 WHERE ASIDE FROM LOGICAL ALTERATION/ DELETIONS/ ADDITIONS/ INSERTIONS, OWNERS AND CHARTERERS HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS.

[a page and a half of amendments to charterparty terms follow, ending:]

CLS 45: ADD “GENERAL CLAUSE PARAMOUNT”

----------------

WITH REGARDS TO THE FOLLOWING CLS IN THE RECAP “CHARTS:PHINIQUIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLAR LETTERHEAD”.

WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THIS CLS IN THE RECAP, OWNERS PPOSE THAT THE CP TO BE MUTUALLY ENDORSED BY PHINIQIA AND STELLAR. THE CHARTERPARTY OFC STILL TO READ: “CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI - FULLY GUARANTEED BY STELLAR SHIPPING COMPANY LLC”.

IF PHINIQIA/STELLAR ARE AGREEABLE TO THE ABOVE, OWNERS WILL HAVE THEN LIFTED THIS SUB FROM THEIR END.”

CHARTERERS CAN AGREE TO THE ABOVE

END FIXTURE RECAP”

On 19 June 2008 Velos emailed Mr Habib stating that:

“PLEASED TO RECAP HAVING FIXED CLEAN AS UNDER WITH CP DATED 18 JUNE 2008

CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL. SHIPPING, DUBAI FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR SHIPPING CO. LLC. THE CP TO BE MUTUALLY ENDORSED BY PHINIQIA AND STELLAR”.

On 22 July 2008, Velos emailed to MBC a COA dated Athens, 18 June 2008 to MBC. In Box 4, it named Charterers as “Phiniqia Intl. Shipping Co. P.O. Box 55409 Dubai – U.A.E. fully guaranteed by Stellar Shipping Co LLC” and described the signatory in the signature box as follows: “For Phiniqia Intl Shipping, LLC – Stellar Shipping Co LLC (as guarantors)”. The COA was never signed.

The “Stellar background” document provided to MBC on 21 April 2008 is important contextual evidence. It indicated that the COA coal cargoes were to be lifted under contracts made by Stellar, and made it clear that the chartering of vessels was done “under the banner” of Phiniqia and that Phiniqia was a wholly owned subsidiary of Stellar. The closeness of the relationship between the two companies and their mutual interest in the COA was thereby made manifest.

Having received that document Hudson immediately countered on terms that Phiniqia’s performance of the COA be “fully guaranteed by Tradeline LLC”.

This was deleted in Velos’ response but Hudson countered on 24 April 2008 introducing “approval of Charterers’ background” as a subject and requesting a guarantee from Tradeline or Stellar.

Velos’ response on 30 April 2008 was that “If insist on gtee, Stellar will do”. It was there being stated that Stellar would provide any guarantee required. Although that statement was made in an email countering on COA terms it would reasonably be understood to be a statement made on behalf of Stellar. The guarantee was to be provided by Stellar not Phiniqia and it was for Stellar to state that this would be done. Given the closeness of the relationship between the two companies and Stellar’s interest in the underlying COA business there is nothing surprising about that being done in an email which otherwise dealt with Phiniqia’s position.

Hudson took up that offer and in MBC’s response of 1 May 2008 inserted the term (“the letter of guarantee term”):

“CHARTS: PHINIQIA INTL SHIPPING, DUBAI TO BE FULLY GTEED BY STELLAR. PRIOR TO OWNERS LIFTING SUBS FROM THEIR END STELLAR TO PROVIDE LETTER OF GTEE AS PER OWNERS WORDING ON STELLA [sic] LETTERHEAD.”

This was accepted in the next A/E counter of 9 June 2008. Again it would reasonably be understood that this had Stellar’s agreement as it was Stellar which was to provide the guarantee.

This remained an agreed term and subject of the COA in the exchanges which followed. On 13 June 2008 Hudson proposed an alternative approach which would enable the subject to be lifted without the need for a letter of guarantee (“the endorsement term”). The proposal made was:

“with regards to the following cls in the recap “charts:Phiniquia Intl Shipping, Dubai fully gteed by Stellar. Prior to owners lifting subs from their end Stellar to provide letter of gtee as per owners wording on Stellar letterhead”.

without prejudice to this cls in the recap, owners ppose that the cp to be mutually endorsed by Phiniqia and Stellar. The charterparty ofc still to read: “Charts: Phiniqia Intl Shipping, Dubai - fully guaranteed by Stellar Shipping Company LLC”.

If Phiniqia/Stellar are agreeable to the above, owners will have then lifted this sub from their end.”

This was not directly responded to until Velos’ recap message of 18 June 2008 in which the endorsement term was set out and immediately below it was stated:

“CHARTERERS CAN AGREE TO THE ABOVE”.

Although it was stated that “Charterers” can agree to the proposal made, in context this was communicating an acceptance of the proposal by Stellar, not merely Phiniqia. The request made was for Phiniqia and Stellar’s agreement. The subject was not to be lifted unless this was provided. Only Stellar could agree to guarantee and endorse the COA in the manner proposed. Stellar’s preparedness to provide a guarantee had already been communicated and been the subject of agreement. I find that, as reflected in this recap, it was agreed between Hudson, Phiniqia and Stellar that Stellar would fully guarantee Phiniqia’s performance under the COA, and that both Phiniqia and Stellar would endorse the terms of the COA.

I accept that, as one would expect, most of the references to “charterers” in the email exchanges are referring to Phiniqia. However, the guarantee was for Stellar not Phiniqia to agree. The endorsement term required an agreement to guarantee and endorse the COA, not the provision of a separate letter. That could only be done by Stellar.

Stellar submitted that the term “without prejudice to this cls in the recap” meant that the original term and subject requiring a letter of guarantee remained. I disagree. The whole point of the proposal of the endorsement term was that it enabled the subject to be lifted without awaiting a letter of guarantee. Once the guarantee and endorsement of the COA was agreed by Stellar the original term was superseded. The expression “without prejudice” to the original clause was used because unless and until the endorsement term was agreed the letter of guarantee term remained a term and subject of the COA.

That this was what was understood to have been agreed is borne out by the recap message sent by Velos to Mr Habib shortly thereafter which provided “Charts: Phiniqia Intl Shipping, Dubai - fully guaranteed by Stellar Shipping Company LLC. The charterparty to be mutually endorsed by Phiniqia and Stellar.” It was no doubt envisaged that the endorsement would be carried out through Stellar’s signature of the COA, as was indeed reflected in the COA which was then drawn up.

My conclusion that Stellar entered into a contract of guarantee mirrors that of the Tribunal. They found as follows:

“40.

The Tribunal accepts Hudson’s broad submission…. There was, certainly, an agreement by Mr Habib on behalf of Stellar-chartering that, if and when the Contract of Affreightment under negotiation was concluded, it would be a term of that Contract that performance by the Charterer, Phiniqia, would be guaranteed by its parent company, Stellar. The communications relied on, were, in legal effect, offers, or part of offers, which were confirmed by the later communications relied on, and which were accepted by Hudson when the COA was finally concluded. This is despite the fact that the manner in which the contract of guarantee itself was to be confirmed and implemented changed from the initial proposal (that a separate letter of guarantee on Stellar letterhead should be provided) to the amended proposal, which Mr Habib indicated was acceptable to Stellar, (that Stellar, together with Phiniqia as Charterer should be parties to the COA as guarantor and should endorse the COA accordingly).

41.

In our view (subject to the State of Frauds point which we shall consider hereafter), the Contract of Guarantee came into existence when the terms of the COA were finally agreed in the course of the e-mail exchanges on 17^th June 2008 or the Recap which was sent by Mr Michalopoulos to the respective parties on 18 and 19 June 2008, and was further confirmed by the draft COA which was subsequently sent by Mr Michalopoulos to Hudson and subsequently to Stellar, which named Stellar Shipping Co. LLC as Guarantor and provided for signature on behalf of both Phiniqia and Stellar, although such signature was never forthcoming.”

In common with the Tribunal I accordingly find that (subject to authority issues) Stellar entered into a contract of guarantee with Hudson which involved Stellar’s endorsement of the terms of the COA. I therefore reject Stellar’s case that no contractual relationship of any kind was entered into between Stellar and Hudson.

The next issue which arises, and the central issue on this application, is the effect of that agreement and in particular whether it involved agreement by Stellar to arbitration of disputes arising out of the guarantee in accordance with the COA arbitration clause.

By endorsing the COA Stellar was endorsing and signing up to each of its terms. It was agreeing that if any obligation undertaken thereunder was not performed by Phiniqia then it would be performed by Stellar. However, such an agreement makes little sense in the context of the endorsement of an arbitration clause. If Phiniqia fails to perform its obligations under the arbitration clause Stellar cannot perform those obligations since they are personal to Phiniqia. Stellar’s endorsement of the arbitration clause can only have meaningful effect if it involves Stellar’s own agreement to arbitration in respect of any dispute concerning their own obligations.

I consider that to be both the natural and the commercially sensible construction of Stellar’s endorsement as guarantor of the COA arbitration clause. It is commercially sensible because the parties were entering into a tri-partite relationship enshrined in a single contractual document and would reasonably be expected to intend that all disputes arising out of that relationship be dealt with in a like manner.

In Fiona Trust v Privalov [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 254 at paragraph 13 Lord Hoffmann said:

“In my opinion the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrators' jurisdiction.”

Similar considerations apply by analogy here. Given the close connection between the COA and the guarantee, and between the parties involved, one would expect them as rational businessmen to agree a common method of dispute resolution. It is correct that since there are separate arbitration agreements there would, absent agreement, be separate arbitrations but one would expect, in the interests of efficiency, expediency and costs, for there to be common tribunals, as indeed there are. It would be surprising to find that the parties actively agreed that the COA was to be subject to English law and arbitration but that they wished to have any dispute under the linked guarantee determined by some unspecified court in some unspecified jurisdiction according to some unspecified governing law.

That this is how the endorsement term would be understood by commercial parties in the position of Hudson and Stellar is borne out by the reasoning and conclusion of the experienced commercial arbitrators. As they found:

“60…At the time when the agreement as to the form of the guarantee was made, it had already been agreed that the COA should incorporate a London arbitration clause in the terms of the Charterers’ pro forma provided to Hudson, and in these circumstances it is in our view clear that the mutual intention of the parties was that the guarantee agreement which was part of the same negotiation and was to be contained in the same document should similarly be subject to the same arbitration clause.

61.

Although the outcome of the negotiations was the creation of what, on analysis, were two contractual relationships – one between Hudson as Owner and Phiniqia as Charterer, and the other between Hudson and Stellar as guarantor, those relationships were closely intertwined and the result of the single negotiation and were ultimately to [be] embodied in one contractual document also containing the relevant arbitration clause, under which all parties, Hudson, Phiniqia and Stellar, agreed that any dispute between them should be referred to arbitration in London pursuant to the clause.”

They considered that this was “clear” and they arrived at that conclusion “without hesitation”. This reflects their strong view that any other construction of what the parties were agreeing would not be commercially sensible.

The principal contrary argument advanced by Stellar was that to incorporate an agreement to arbitrate requires clear and indeed express words. Reliance was placed on the cases concerning incorporation of arbitration clauses and the fact that a restrictive approach to incorporation is taken in “two contract” cases – see the authorities referred to and summarised in Habas v Sometal [2010] 1 Lloyd's Rep 661. It was submitted that this was a “two contract” case and that there were not in fact any apt words of incorporation.

Like the Tribunal I do not consider that the incorporation cases accurately reflect the position here. This is not a case of incorporation by reference. It is a case which involves construing what, in context, is the meaning and effect of Stellar’s endorsement as guarantor of the COA in general and the arbitration clause in particular. There were no terms being introduced from some external source. On the contrary, all the terms were being specifically endorsed.

Even if the incorporation cases were of relevance I would regard the present case as being more akin to “single contract” than a “two contract” case. Although there were two contractual relationships which were entered into, they were entered into in the context of a single commercial relationship between Hudson on one side and Phiniqia and Stellar on the other as part of a single package agreed in a single document. It did not involve any agreement with a third party. As the Tribunal stated:

“59.

It was submitted that, if an arbitration agreement is said to be derived from the incorporation of an arbitration agreement in a different contract, clear words are required. That may well be true, but in the view of the Tribunal that is not an accurate way of describing the position in the present case. The question is whether the arbitration agreement which was agreed in the course of the negotiations and confirmed in the Recap and was incorporated in the draft COA was intended to embrace the relationship between Hudson and Stellar as guarantor, where the terms of the COA and the guarantee were negotiated together, in one set of negotiations, through the same chain of agents or brokers, in circumstances where it must have been considered commercially sensible that the collateral contract of guarantee should be subject to the same dispute resolution procedure.”

Stellar further submitted that the various reasons that the courts have given for a restrictive approach to the incorporation of arbitration clauses equally apply here. In Habas v Sometal Christopher Clarke J. summarised these as follows at para. 34:

However, as Christopher Clarke J. made clear, these considerations do not apply in a “single contract” case, which this is most akin to. In any event, I do not consider that any of the considerations have force in the present context. In particular:

As to (a), in circumstances where the arbitration clause is endorsed as part of the agreement to provide the guarantee it may be said that a consensus on it has been sufficiently clearly and precisely demonstrated regardless of whether or not it is germane to the subject matter of the guarantee. Further, this is a case in which most if not of all the terms of the main contract are directly relevant to the guarantee and so there is no general issue of selection.

As to (b), it is correct that arbitration clauses are personal to the parties; that is why Stellar’s endorsement of the clause is only meaningful if it is personally agreeing to it.

As to (c), in the modern pro-arbitration climate I cannot accept that the fact that the court’s jurisdiction is being ousted remains a consideration of weight. It is of course correct that an arbitration agreement has to be in writing, which it was.

As to (d), it was accepted that this was of no relevance here. There is no question of third parties being affected by what was agreed between these parties.

As to (e), it is correct that for the charterparty arbitration clause to apply to disputes in connection with the guarantee one has to add the word “guarantee” to that of charterparty or replace “charterparty” with “agreement”. No other modification is required. However, it is well established that substitution or a degree of verbal manipulation is permissible where the intent of the parties that the arbitration clause should apply is clear. In such a case “to give force to that intention and agreement the words of the clause must be read and construed as applying to those parties” – per Saville LJ in The Nerano “[1996]” 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at p5.

As to (f), the present case raises no considerations of certainty. This was a one off agreement. It does not involve generally used words of incorporation which have a meaning established by authority.

Further, I share Christopher Clarke J.’s apparent misgivings about extending the restrictive approach beyond those cases where its application is already established, let alone extending it into supposedly analogous situations. This is particularly so bearing in mind that, as Christopher Clarke J. pointed out at para. 52:

“…the precise rationale of the rule is debatable; its retention is partly attributable to the desirability of not changing an approach established “for better or worse”; and that the rule is not easily congruent with ordinary principles of construction.”

Stellar’s other main submission was that this is a case of an implied rather than an express arbitration agreement and that the test of necessity for the implication of such a contract is not made out – see Gulf Import & Export Co v Bunge SA [2008] 1 Lloyd's Rep 316, 324-325; Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737; The Aramis [1989] 1 Ll.L.R. 213. However, I do not accept that this is an implied contract case. There is no question of inferring an arbitration agreement from the parties’ conduct. The agreement was made as a result of Stellar’s express agreement to endorse the COA including its arbitration clause as part of its contract of guarantee. Properly construed that involved an express agreement to arbitrate on the terms set out in the COA arbitration clause as appropriately modified.

I accordingly agree with the Tribunal that (subject to authority issues) Stellar did enter into an arbitration agreement with Hudson in respect of their contract of guarantee with Hudson. Although this is a rehearing it turns on the proper construction of the parties’ agreement in its context. As such, the views of the commercial arbitrators should be accorded considerable weight.

For all the reasons outlined above Stellar’s application to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunal must be dismissed.