Bramston & Anor v Pye & Anor

This is a misfeasance application brought by the Applicants pursuant to s.212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 against the First Respondent as de jure director of IT Protect Ltd

By their application, the Applicants seek declaratory relief and payment of the sum of £144,613. This sum is said to represent the loss suffered by the Company as a result of a £40,000 monetary penalty imposed on the Company by the Information Commissioner on 11 January 2017 and alleged misappropriations of (or failure to account for) sums totalling £104,613 paid out of the Company’s bank account after the date on which the penalty was imposed.

The First Respondent is a bricklayer who left school at the age of 16. The Second Respondent’s background is largely in catering. The Respondents have been in a relationship since 2007 and have lived together at 34 Stoneage Close, Bognor Regis since 2009. They have two children.

The Second Respondent has an older brother called Steven Montague. Steven was a salesman who had been involved in a number of different business ventures. The Second Respondent described him as ‘an excellent salesman’. The First Respondent described him as ‘very persuasive’.

The Respondents maintain that the Company was set up by and at the instigation of Steven. Their case is that Steven told them that he had a good idea for a new business. He asked the First Respondent to lend him some money to get the business up and running. He also asked the First Respondent to be the director of the Company, explaining that he could not take an appointment himself as he had a ‘bad credit history’. The First Respondent agreed.

The Company was incorporated on 24 October 2013 and commenced trading shortly thereafter as a telephone sales business, selling call-blocking devices to consumers from premises known as 52 High Street, Bognor Regis. The Company usually employed between 5 and 10 call centre staff. The Company operated banking facilities with Barclays plc, account number 33458849, sort code 20-20-67 (‘the Barclays Account’). The Company received revenue into the Barclays Account from Checkout Pay, a payment institution, on a weekly basis.

At all material times, the First Respondent was the Company’s sole director and shareholder. The Company’s registered office was 34 Stoneage Close, the Respondents’ home.

The First Respondent was a director in name only. He admits that he had no involvement in the Company and did not pay any attention to it. As far as he is concerned, he simply helped Steven set it up.

Both the Second Respondent and Steven worked for the Company. The Second Respondent’s role within the Company and the length of time that she worked in that role are in dispute.

Telephone sales is a highly regulated area. Under regulation 26(1) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (‘PECR’), the Information Commissioner is required to maintain a register of individuals who have given notification that they do not wish to receive unsolicited calls for direct marketing purposes. Prior to 30 December 2016, this responsibility fell to OFCOM. The Telephone Preference Service (‘TPS’) is a company set up by OFCOM to maintain this register. Under regulation 21(1)(b), a person is prohibited from making unsolicited calls for direct marketing purposes to subscribers to the register, unless the subscriber has consented to receiving calls from that person. Under regulation 26(3), for payment of a fee, a person can request the list of numbers registered to the TPS.

Between 6 April 2015 and 16 May 2016, the Information Commission’s Office (‘ICO’) and TPS received a total of 157 complaints (35 and 122 complaints respectively) from subscribers to the TPS who had received unwanted calls from the Company. TPS referred the complaints received to the Company and on 69 occasions the Company failed to respond. Some of the complaints alleged that the Company had preyed on the elderly and/or had given the misleading impression that it was calling on behalf of BT.

In January 2016, the West Sussex Trading Standards authority informed the ICO that it was investigating a number of companies (including the Company) selling call blocker and TPS-style products on the West Coast.

On 1 March 2016, the ICO wrote to the Company at 34 Stoneage Close referring to the complaints received from subscribers to the TPS and warning the Company that the ICO could issue monetary penalties of up to £500,000. The ICO sought evidence of the Company’s compliance with the PECR.

Both Respondents maintained that any post for the Company sent to their home address would be passed on to Steven.

Steven dealt with the ICO’s enquiries on behalf of the Company. The information provided to the ICO was limited. In summary:

On 1 June 2016 the ICO compiled a report on the Company. The report raised concerns as to whether Social Talk had obtained the consent of TPS-registered consumers to conduct the initial lifestyle survey. The report also raised concerns about the recording played following the survey, as it did not allow the consumer to consent specifically to the organisations referred to in the recording.

On 14 September 2016, the ICO issued a notice of intent to raise a £40,000 monetary penalty against the Company.

On 11 January 2017, the ICO issued the Company with a £40,000 monetary penalty notice (‘MPN’) for breach of regulation 21 PECR. The penalty was required to be paid by 14 February 2017, and the Company had the option of reducing the penalty to £32,000 if payment of this amount was received by 13 February 2017. The MPN drew attention to the right to appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal (Information Rights). The Company lodged an appeal. Steven dealt with the appeal.

On 10 March 2017, the Company ceased to trade, but continued to receive run-off revenue into its bank account from Checkout Pay until November 2017. A number of sums were paid out from its bank account after cesser of trading.

On 21 August 2017, the Company’s appeal against the MPN was dismissed. On 26 September 2017, the ICO made a further demand for payment of the MPN by 3 October 2017.

On 27 November 2017, the ICO presented a winding up petition against the Company. On 7 February 2018 the Company was wound up.

By the date of winding up, all creditors of the Company (including employees) had been paid except the ICO. At the date of winding up, the Company had nil known assets and its only creditor was the ICO, owed £40,000.

On 20 February 2018, the First Respondent, Second Respondent and Steven attended on the Official Receiver (‘OR’) for interview regarding the Company. On the same day, a Preliminary Information Questionnaire (‘PIQ’) was partially completed; ostensibly in the name of the First Respondent, but in the handwriting of Steven. It was left unsigned. In his interview with the OR, the First Respondent confirmed that he had not completed the PIQ and did not know if the information in it was true.

Shortly thereafter, on 23 March 2018, the Applicants were appointed as joint liquidators of the Company. By letters dated 24 May 2018 and 11 June 2018, the Applicants wrote to each of the Respondents and to Steven requesting inter alia information regarding their roles in the Company. These letters prompted a short email of reply dated 18 June 2018, sent by the Second Respondent on behalf of herself, the First Respondent and Steven.

On 20 July 2018, the First Respondent signed a disqualification undertaking for a period of seven years. The ground of unfitness admitted (for the purposes of the undertaking only) was that between 6 April 2015 and 16 May 2016, he failed to ensure that the Company complied with its statutory obligations under PECR, which led to the ICO issuing a fine of £40,000, which remained unpaid.

On 8 March 2019, the Application was issued against the First Respondent alone. On 24 April 2019 the First Respondent was ordered to file and serve evidence in response by 31 May 2019. On the application of the Applicants, the Second Respondent was joined by order dated 17 July 2019.

The Application has proceeded by application notice supported by witness statement. No pleadings were directed. The application notice has been amended twice, most recently on 3 December 2019.

In its re-amended form, the application notice states that the First Respondent was de jure director of the Company, alleges that the Second Respondent was a de facto director of the same, and seeks the following relief:

For the purposes of this hearing I have read and considered the following written evidence:

I also heard oral evidence from the First and Second Respondents. By a consent order dated 11 December 2019, the Applicants’ attendance at trial (and so for crossexamination) was dispensed with.

The First Applicant, Mr Bramston, ceased to act as a joint liquidator of the Company with effect from 18 May 2020. By his statement dated 15 June 2020, the Second

As a witness the First Respondent was open and straightforward. He freely admitted his lack of involvement with the Company. Whilst he was confused at points about certain dates (he could not recall, for example, precisely when he was told of the ICO penalty), I am satisfied that he did his best to answer questions put to him truthfully and to the best of his ability.

The Second Respondent was in the unenviable position of having to admit that she had lied on two previous occasions. On the evidence as a whole, however, I am satisfied that she came to court wishing to make a clean breast of things. She was very clear in her oral testimony about her role in the Company and the tasks which she undertook. She admitted that she had received a total of £11,000 from the Company after it had ceased trading and explained what tasks were undertaken post-cesser of trading. She accepted the limits of her own knowledge, confirming, for example, that she was not party to the conversations in which Steven had requested loans from the First Respondent and so was not in a position to confirm whether the sums subsequently received by the First Respondent from the Company were in the same amount as the initial loans. She also volunteered further evidence regarding payments made by the Company to Peace of Mind Plans Limited, candidly explaining that she had not included such evidence in her witness statement because, as she put it, ‘I was worried that I might get my brother into trouble’. Overall, I am satisfied that the Second Respondent did her best to answer questions put to her truthfully and to the best of her recollection.

The Applicants’ case against the Second Respondent rests on the premise that she was at all material times a de facto director of the company. At trial I directed that the Applicants could not rely (against either Respondent) upon ss 238 and 239 IA 1986 in the alternative. Whilst mentioned in the letter before claim, ss238 and 239 were not mentioned at all in the application notice, notwithstanding two amendments of the same. A passing reference was made to ss 238 and 239 in Mr Bramston’s third witness statement dated 26 September 2019, but this was evidence in reply. It is unacceptable to raise such matters, which raise a raft of distinct evidential considerations, by way of reply evidence; particularly when the application notice was re-amended on 3 December 2019 (after the reply evidence was served) and made no mention of the same. The Respondents are entitled to know the case they are to meet.

On the approach to be adopted by the court when determining whether a person has acted as a de facto director of a company, I was reminded of (and respectfully accept) the following guidance as set out in the caselaw:

On behalf of the Second Respondent, Mr Cole of Counsel also took me to the guidance given by Arden LJ in Smithton Limited v Naggar [2014] EWCA Civ 939; which again, I gratefully accept. At [33] to [45], Arden LJ put the matter thus:

Mr Bramston’s first witness statement does not address the Second Respondent’s role within the Company at all. Mr Bramston’s second witness statement relies simply upon passages quoted from the notes of the OR’s interviews with the Respondents and Steven Montague. Mr Bramston’s third witness statement again relies upon quoted passages from the notes of the OR’s interviews with the Respondents and Steven Montague, and highlights the fact that the Second Respondent was paid the same (relatively modest) salary as Steven Montague; a factor which, Mr Bramston maintains, ‘would suggest that she held an equal role to Mr Montague in the Company’.

There is virtually no documentation contemporaneous to the Company’s period of trading in evidence.

The Applicants adduced no evidence of interviews with (or enquiries made of) other members of staff (whose names had been provided to them), the Company’s accountant, the Company’s landlord, the Company’s bankers, the Company’s suppliers, or any other third parties, to establish how the Second Respondent was held out by the Company internally and externally and what she actually did in relation to the Company.

On behalf of the Second Respondent, Mr Cole maintains that this was an extremely thin basis on which to mount a case of de facto directorship.

The Applicants sought to lay the blame for the lack of contemporaneous Company documentation at the Respondents’ door, and on that basis to rely upon Re Mumtaz Properties Ltd [2011] EWCA 109 per Arden LJ at [14] to [17]:

“14.

In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its nonproduction, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence.

15.

That was the predicament in this case. The liquidator could not show that Munir and Zafar were de facto directors from the company’s books and papers because the directors had not handed over the necessary documents to the administrators. The judge held, in the context of Munir’s denial that he was a de facto director despite the fact that he had acted as chairman of the meeting convened to pass a resolution for voluntary liquidation, that, had it been necessary to do so, he would have been entitled to draw adverse inferences against the respondents to the proceedings:

‘[26] It is accepted by the applicant [the liquidator] that he can only place this example before the court. However, as regards this, the explanation is quite simple. The company’s books and records are not within the possession or control of the applicant despite his enquiries to ascertain the whereabouts of the books and records, and hence the applicant could only prepare his case on the papers he has in his possession. The respondents each asserted they did not have the books and records and that these were with either the accountant or Kiran Mistry. Both of these individuals, who were witnesses for the respondents, confirmed in cross-examination that any company documents they had, had been passed to the applicants and that they did not have possession of any of the missing books and records and these remained with the company. Therefore the books and records of the company must have remained with the company. The respondents have chosen not to deliver them up to the applicant not to disclose them within the proceedings. The court can draw adverse inferences against the respondents for this but does not need to do so as this single piece of documentary evidence is compelling and, indeed in my judgment, overwhelming’.

16.

The approach of the judge in this case was to seek to test the evidence by reference to both the contemporary documentary evidence and its absence. In my judgement, this was an approach that he was entitled to take. The evidence of the liquidator established a prima facie case and, given that the books and records had been in the custody and control of the respondents to the proceedings, it was open to the judge to infer that the liquidator’s case would have been borne out by those books and papers.

17.

Put another way, it was not open to the respondents to the proceedings in the circumstances of this case to escape liability by asserting that, if the books and papers or other evidence had been available, they would have shown that they were not liable in the amount claimed by the liquidator. Moreover, persons who have conducted the affairs of limited companies with a high degree of informality, as in this case, cannot seek to avoid liability or to be judged by some lower standard than that which applies to other directors, simply because the necessary documentation is not available.”

It will be seen from the passage from Mumtaz quoted above that the judge at first instance had available to him clear evidence that Munir was acting as a de facto director; Munir had acted as chairman of the meeting convened to pass a resolution for voluntary liquidation. The judge at first instance in Mumtaz also had clear evidence, had he considered it necessary, from which to infer that the directors had chosen not to hand over to the liquidators the books and records of the company. The directors had said that the books and records were either with the accountant or with Kiran Mistry, but both of these individuals had given evidence (which appears to have been accepted by the trial judge) that any company documentation they had, they had passed to the liquidators, that they didn’t have possession of the missing company books and records and that these remained with the respondents. It was in that context that Arden LJ said (with emphasis added):

In this case, Mr Cole submits that on the evidence before the court, the court cannot be satisfied that the Second Respondent is responsible for non-production of the books and records of the Company, or any other contemporaneous Company documentation which might otherwise shed light on her role within the Company. I agree.

In his first witness statement (at paragraph 14), Mr Bramston states simply ‘The Respondent [in context the First Respondent] has failed to provide the books and records of the Company to the official receiver or to the liquidator.’ None of Mr Bramston’s statements, as adopted by Mr Harris, address what steps were taken to locate and collect in the books and records of the Company or suggest that the Second Respondent was responsible for their non-production.

In his interview with the Official Receiver (the notes of which the Applicants relied upon in numerous other respects), the First Respondent stated that ‘the Company had an office’ (which it did, a fact readily verifiable from other sources) and that there was ‘no paperwork’ relating to the Company kept at his house.

In her interview with the OR (the notes of which the Applicants relied upon in numerous other respects), the Second Respondent had stated:

In his interview with the OR, (the notes of which the Applicants also relied upon), Steve Montague had stated ‘I still have hundreds of emails with the ICO’ and that ‘The company email was itprotect@gmail.com’ adding:

Mr Cole submitted that the responses given in interview on the issue of the location of the Company’s books and records suggest that the Respondents did not have them, that Steve Montague would provide the OR with access, via a memory stick, to all copies of company records stored on his email, and that the Company’s accountant, Joy Emms, had the ‘physical’ books and records.

In contrast to the facts as presented to the court in Mumtaz, I was taken to no evidence from the Company’s accountant to suggest that she did not have the physical books and records. The Applicants’ evidence did not even address whether they even made any enquiries of Ms Emms, still less what the results of such enquiries were. The Applicants’ evidence did not suggest that Steve Montague had not provided the OR with access, via a memory stick, to all copies of company records stored on his email, as he had promised when interviewed. Indeed, when these issues were explored in submissions, Ms Brooke simply stated on instruction that the Applicants had been ‘unable to contact’ Ms Emms, and that they had been ‘unable to access’ the Company’s email account via the password given.

The follow-up correspondence from the Applicants to the Respondents is also telling.

Such contemporaneous correspondence suggests that, prior to issue of this application at least, the Applicants were not proceeding on the basis that the Respondents were withholding books and records of the Company.

Overall, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the Second Respondent is responsible for non-production of the books and records of the Company, or any other contemporaneous Company documentation which might otherwise shed light on her role within the Company.

I also remind myself that the absence of documentary evidence does not necessarily lead to a default position of liability: see In re Wolverton Investments Ltd (unrep 18 May 2015), Chief Registrar Baister at para 59-60, citing Re Idessa UK Ltd [2012] 1 BCLC 80 at paras 24-28. The court must look at the facts quite closely and in the round.

For all of these reasons, when considering the Second Respondent’s role within the Company, I shall decline to draw adverse inferences against her in light of the paucity of Company documentation in evidence.

I turn then, to consider the Applicants’ case on de facto directorship.

In support of their contention that the Second Respondent was a de facto director, the Applicants rely upon (1) the unsigned PIQ dated 20 February 2018; (2) the Official Receiver’s notes of interviews held with each of the Respondents and with Steven Montague on 20 February 2018; (3) the Second Respondent’s email to the Applicants dated 18 June 2018: and (4) the parity in salaries drawn from the Company by the Second Respondent and Steven Montague. I will deal with each of these in turn.

The PIQ stated (a) that the Second Respondent was a person who acted as a director of the Company between February 2013 and March 2017, as was Steven Montague; (b) that the Respondents and Steven Montague were each paid gross remuneration of £20,000 in 2015; (c) that the Second Respondent and Steven Montague were both signatories to the Company’s bank account and that two signatures were required for the account.

In my judgment very little weight can be attached to this document. Whilst the PIQ bears the name of the First Respondent, it is clear on the evidence (and I so find) that he did not complete it. The PIQ does not bear his signature - or indeed any signature. It is also only partially complete; less than half of the questions have been answered. In his interview with the OR, the First Respondent confirmed that he did not write the answers given in the PIQ and did not know if the information in it was true.

The Second Respondent’s evidence, which in this regard I accept, is that the handwriting in the PIQ is that of her brother, Steven. Whilst in his interview with the OR, Steven stated that he filled in the PIQ ‘with’ the Second Respondent, on the evidence which I have heard and read, it is clear (and I so find) that she did not dictate any of the answers relied upon or play any material part in the completion of the PIQ. It was Steven’s work.

Ms Brooke invited the Court to infer that the PIQ was a joint effort from the fact that the OR’s interview notes include references to the PIQ. I reject that invitation. In my judgment such references are equally consistent with the OR having based some questions in interview on the responses set out in the PIQ. They do not establish on a balance of probabilities that the Second Respondent played any material part in compiling the responses set out in the PIQ or that she had even read the PIQ prior to her interview.

In her interview with the OR, when questioned about certain of the answers given in the PIQ, the Second Respondent actively disagreed with a number of them. Whilst the interview notes do not disclose whether she was questioned about the response given to para 2.2 of the PIQ (which addressed de facto/shadow directors and named her), she rejected the suggestion (at para 2.3 of the PIQ) that the First Respondent was paid a salary by the Company and also stated (contrary to para 8.12 of the PIQ) that she was not a bank signatory and that the First Respondent had to sign the cheques. Quite why, on the Applicants’ case, she would be party to completing the PIQ on one footing, only to reject the answers in the PIQ when interviewed the same day, was never explained.

Some of the responses given in the PIQ are plainly wrong. By way of example:

The Applicants also relied on the notes taken by the OR of interviews conducted with each of the Respondents and with Steven Montague on 20 February 2018.

On behalf of the Respondents, Mr Cole urged caution when considering these interview notes. He submitted that a close textual analysis of the interview notes was inappropriate, highlighting in particular the following factors:

Mr Cole maintained that it was clear from the length of the interview notes when compared with the time spent on each interview that the notes were not a verbatim account. He further submitted that little can be read into the language used by each interviewee without sight of the questions asked; as he put it, ‘the language depends in part on the question’. From a summary note it was also not possible to pick up on the nuances of the conversation, he argued, or where the emphasis lay in any given exchange. Mr Cole went on to submit that little can be drawn from the fact that each interviewee signed the notes of their interview at the conclusion of the same; as he put it: following the interview, they would read through the notes and say – ‘that’s pretty much what I said’. They had no sophisticated knowledge of the legal process, or of the context in which their responses might later come to be read.

I accept that these are legitimate factors to take into account when considering the weight to attach to the interview notes. They are plainly not verbatim accounts and the language of the responses will undoubtedly have been influenced by the questions put.

With these considerations in mind, I turn to consider the interview notes.

On behalf of the Applicants, Ms Brooke drew my attention in particular to the following:

In considering the probative value of these notes, I take into account the factors highlighted at paragraphs 64 to 65 above. I also consider the wider context. On his own admission, the First Respondent did not involve himself with the affairs of the Company and did not understand the business. He also knew nothing of what being a director involved. Against that backdrop, his statement (according to the interview notes) that the Second Respondent and Steven Montague ‘actually ran the company’ can in reality be afforded little probative weight in determining the issue whether the Second Respondent acted as a de facto director.

Moving next to the First Respondent’s comments regarding access to the Company’s bank account: by his written evidence, which in this regard I accept, the First Respondent had confirmed (1) that he had opened the Company’s bank account at Steven’s request and had given the bank card and account details (including log-in codes) to Steven; (2) that he had not personally accessed the Company’s account ‘at any stage for any purpose’; (3) that he had never seen the Second Respondent accessing the Company’s bank account from home and that he ‘never went to the office’. In oral testimony he accepted that he had said in interview that the Second Respondent and Steven both had ‘access’ to the Company’s bank account, but explained that his words were not meant in the way that they were being taken; as far as the Second Respondent was concerned, all that he had meant to convey was that ‘if Dawn needed to pop to the shop she could take a card’.

This testimony was broadly consistent with that of the Second Respondent. Her evidence, both written and oral, was that she did not have online access to the Company’s bank account or her own card for that account; that Steven dealt with all payments from the Company’s account; and that the only time that she had use of a Company bank card was if she was sent out by Steven on an errand, to get petty cash or to buy stationery. On those occasions Steven provided her with the Company’s bank card and she returned it to him after she had used it.

The First Respondent’s comment in interview (according to the interview notes) that he had ‘just signed a load of blank cheques for them’ takes matters little further. The use by the First Respondent (according to the interview notes) of terms such as ‘they’ or ‘them’ does not point unequivocally to the roles adopted by the Second Respondent and Steven in relation to the Company; it may simply reflect the fact that they both worked for the same company. It does not establish that the Second Respondent undertook the functions of a director.

The First Respondent’s comment in interview (according to the interview notes) that ‘Steve and [the Second Respondent] said they were considering shutting the company down’ was also explored in cross-examination. The First Respondent very honestly admitted in cross-examination that he simply didn’t know whether it was ‘a single or joint decision’.

In oral testimony the Second Respondent was adamant that she played no part in that decision, saying ‘It [the interview note] says that, but Steven was going to shut down the Company. He was forced to. We didn’t do it together. He was forced to shut it down.’

Even if Steven had consulted the Second Respondent about shutting the Company down, however, that of itself would not warrant a conclusion that she was acting as a de facto director of the Company. In this regard I remind myself that the mere fact that a person is consulted about directorial decisions does not in general make him a director: Smithton Ltd v Naggar [2015] 1 WLR 189.

Ms Brooke also relied upon the Second Respondent’s interview with the OR, in which she is noted as having said:

Ms Brooke further contended that the language used by the Second Respondent in interview was indicative of the Second Respondent and Mr Montague running the Company together jointly. By way of example: ‘We didn’t know the Company was going to stop’; ‘We had someone from Trading Standards [come to visit] … She said she would be on our side’; We paid top end for all our data’; ‘We got the data by email and printed it off to give to staff to call’.

Ms Brooke also maintained that the fact that the Second Respondent attended on the OR for interview at all was significant, suggesting that the Second Respondent saw herself as occupying an integral role in the Company.

Again, the use by the Second Respondent and Mr Montague of terms such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ does not in my judgment point unequivocally to the roles adopted by each in relation to the Company; it may simply reflect the fact that they both worked for the same company. References to ‘staff’ in context are clearly references to the telephone call operators employed by the Company.

The term ‘run’ is also of little assistance without consideration of the context in which the term is employed. The Second Respondent’s statement (according to the interview notes) that she ‘did the daily running of the office’, for example, does not unequivocally point to a directorial role. As made clear by Millet J in Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180 at pp182-3, to establish that a person is a de facto director of a company

I also remind myself of the guidance given in In re Richborough Furniture Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 507, in which Timothy Lloyd QC (sitting as a deputy High Court judge) said at p524:

The quotes from the notes of the OR’s interview with the Second Respondent relied upon by the Applicants were in any event somewhat selective. By way of example, the notes also include the following:

The Second Respondent’s comment in interview with the OR that she and Steven had ‘together decided to start the company’ was the subject of some focus in crossexamination. In oral testimony the Second Respondent said that, ahead of the interview, Steven had ‘advised’ her to say it - and that it was not true: in reality, the Company had been Steven’s idea and it was his business. In her words: ‘I didn’t set up the Company with my brother – I was working on another job’. This was consistent with her written testimony. Her written evidence was that she was working for a company called PR Electronics between March 2013 and 27 May 2014; and that she was not involved at any level with the Company until the end of May 2014. In oral testimony she expressed regret for what she described as her own ‘naivety’ in misrepresenting the position to the OR during her interview and said that she ‘didn’t understand the seriousness of it’ at the time.

I accept that any admission by a witness to having lied on a prior occasion, particularly when, on the occasion in question, the witness had been given the perjury warning, is a factor which must weigh heavily with the Court when assessing the overall credibility of that witness. Nonetheless, on the evidence which I have heard and read, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that it was Steven alone who decided to set up the Company; it was not a decision taken jointly by the Second Respondent and her brother. I so find. I also accept the Second Respondent’s explanation for having misrepresented the position to the OR.

In reaching these conclusions I take account, in particular, of the following:

I would add that, even if, contrary to my findings, the decision to set up the Company had been the joint decision of the Second Respondent and Steven, that of itself would not lead inexorably to any conclusions as to the role they would each play within the Company once it had been set up.

With regard to the circumstances in which the Second Respondent came to attend on the OR for interview, I accept the Second Respondent’s evidence that she attended because the OR asked her to. The Applicants adduced no evidence of any communications with the OR which suggested the contrary. I reject the submission that her attendance at interview was indicative of her own view of the ‘integral role’ she played in the Company.

I was also referred to the notes of Mr Montague’s interview with the OR.

Mr Montague did not file any written evidence and was not called as a witness. I was told that in recent years Mr Montague had suffered from alcoholism and mental health problems; he had made several suicide attempts and had been compulsorily retained in a residential psychiatric unit on at least one occasion. He was considered to be in too fragile a state to give evidence. It was therefore not possible to explore with him the responses which he had given when interviewed by the OR.

The passages from Steven Montague’s interview with the OR relied upon by the Applicants were as follows:

Ms Brooke also maintained that the language used by Mr Montague in interview was indicative of the Second Respondent and Mr Montague running the Company together jointly. By way of example: ‘We sold the office furniture to pay creditors’; ‘We sold off everything we could to pay HMRC’.

For the reasons already given, on the evidence which I have heard and read, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that it was Steven alone who decided to set up the Company. In asserting that it was a decision taken jointly by the Respondents and himself (and thereby implying that it was a joint venture), Steven Montague was misrepresenting the position. The most likely explanation for this is that he was attempting to ‘play down’ or ‘dilute’ his own role.

His responses in interview must be seen in context. By the time of the interview, Steven had partially completed a PIQ which contained material inaccuracies and had told his sister to lie in her own interview.

His claim in interview not to know why he had not become a registered director himself and his assertion that it was ‘just the way it happened’ were plainly untrue. As I have already found, Steven sought out the First Respondent and asked him to be a director, explaining that he could not be a director himself because of his ‘bad credit history’. On the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that, in claiming in interview not to know why he did not become a director of the Company himself, Steven was deliberately misrepresenting the position.

As I have already found, his assertion at interview that he and the Respondents were all bank signatories was also untrue.

Again, for reasons already given, the use by Steven Montague of terms such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ in interview does not in my judgment point unequivocally to the roles adopted by the Second Respondent and Steven Montague in relation to the Company.

Overall, very little weight can be attached to the responses given by Steven Montague in his interview with the OR when considering the role of the Second Respondent in relation to the Company.

The Applicants also relied upon an email dated 18 June 2018 sent by the Second Respondent (on behalf of the Respondents and Steven Montague) to the Applicants in response to the Applicants’ letters of 24 May 2018 and 11 June 2018, in which the Applicants had (inter alia) asked for information regarding the roles and responsibilities of each of the Respondents and Mr Montague in the affairs of the Company. The Second Respondent’s email of 18 June 2018 read as follows:

Again, the Applicants laid great store by the comment ‘we ran the company’. In oral testimony the Second Respondent said that her brother Steven had advised her to ‘keep saying the same’ and that she had followed his advice when stating ‘we ran the company’. The email, she explained, was ’not completely true’; adding ‘I did run the company, but the day to day office. The day to day running, the admin and all that’.

On the evidence overall (and having regard in particular to the factors considered in Paragraph 85 above), I accept the Second Respondent’s explanation.

Moreover, even if I am wrong in that conclusion, references to ‘running the company’ are of limited assistance in determining whether the Second Respondent acted as a de facto director. The term is equivocal. Members of a management team, for example, may together be described as ‘running’ a company, although not all members of that team will be directors or act as such. What is important is not what the individual calls him or herself, but what he or she actually did: Re Paycheck at [32], [90]; Smithton at [38]. The question whether or not an individual acted as a director is to be determined objectively and irrespective of that individual’s own belief: Smithton at [39].

Mr Bramston’s third witness statement highlights the fact that the Second Respondent was paid the same (relatively modest) salary as Steven Montague, which Mr Bramston maintains ‘would suggest that she held an equal role to Mr Montague in the Company’.

From the bank statements in evidence, the usual weekly salary paid to each of the Second Respondent and Steven appears to have been £599, whilst the salaries paid to other members of staff (taking 10 February 2017 as an example) ranged from £354 and £474.

As noted by Mr Cole, salary was not a factor mentioned in any of the authorities cited to me on the issue of de facto directorship. Whilst I do not discount the possibility that, in some contexts, salary may be a relevant factor when taken collectively with others, parity of salary alone will not suffice. The level of salary commanded by an employee is dictated by a range of factors, including the economic value of that employee to the business. The fact that two individuals employed by a business earn the same salary does not necessarily mean that they do the same job. In the present case the Second Respondent’s role may simply have been considered equally valuable in economic terms to that occupied by Steven.

Of far greater importance, in my judgment, is the evidence before the court of what the Second Respondent actually did in relation to the Company: Re Paycheck at [32], [90]; Smithton at [38].

The Second Respondent’s evidence, which in this regard I accept, was that she did not start working for the Company until the very end of May 2014. Until that point, she worked for a company called PR Electronics.

The Applicants invited me to reject the Second Respondent’s evidence on this issue. I decline that invitation. For reasons already given, I have accepted the First Respondent’s account of the circumstances in which the Company was set up. It was Steven’s idea to set up the Company and it was his business. Had it been a joint venture between the Second Respondent and Steven from the time that the Company was incorporated, there was nothing to stop the Second Respondent taking appointment as a director and becoming a shareholder. She did neither. The Applicants adduced no evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that the Second Respondent was involved with the Company at any point prior to the end of May 2014. Having considered the evidence as a whole, on a balance of probabilities I accept her account of when she started working for the Company and the circumstances in which she did so.

Her evidence was that she started working for the Company at the end of May 2014 at the invitation of her brother Steven. She said that Steven wanted her “to join his new business and deal with the day to day administration of the business, staff and other practical day-to-day issues that might arise.” Her evidence, which I accept, was that she was “never asked to be a director” and that she was “never referred to (internally or externally) as a director”; it was Steven who “managed the business”, “managed the call centre operations … did the hiring and firing, contacted and dealt with the data suppliers, did all the billing and dealt with the planning and development of the business.”

By her testimony of the tasks which she herself undertook, the Second Respondent describes an essentially administrative role which includes data entry, filing, dealing with suppliers, dealing with staff issues and wages, looking after stationery and petty cash.

At paragraph 7 of her statement, she described her functions within the Company as follows:

“I did data entry for Steven, did the filing, took calls from suppliers on routine matters and prepared the bills that Steven wanted sending out. Generally I would deal with any staff issues arising, sending weekly wages to the accountants for payments, organising and sending out the post and filing the sale sheets. My other duties were to maintain the office equipment and stationery levels. I looked after petty cash and I was asked from time to time to draw out some cash. I did not have a company bank or credit card and did not have access to one so that on each occasion that I was asked Steven had to provide me with his card and I would return this to him. I did not have access to the company’s bank account.” 111. At paragraphs 8 to 10 of her statement, she continued:

“8.

I did not know how well the company was doing at any particular time. I was never involved in any financial management decisions of the company. These were decisions that were purely taken by Steven. He had access to all of the financial information on his tablet or laptop.

9.

I was never involved with the company’s accountants regarding the company’s accounts or tax position. These were always dealt with my Steven. I never even saw the accountants or had sight of the accounts drawn up.

10.

I did not deal with any data suppliers or their contracts. This was purely dealt with by Steven. Steven also dealt with all the contracts for the utilities, the rents, data companies and Royal Mail amongst others.”

By her written evidence, the Second Respondent further confirmed that she was “not involved in the training or management of the staff” this being usually undertaken by one of the other staff, a woman called Bobby.

The Applicants filed evidence in reply, in the form of Mr Bramston’s third witness statement. This, however, devoted only three paragraphs to the Second Respondent’s role and relied simply upon the OR interviews and parity of income, as already addressed.

In cross-examination, the Second Respondent held her ground. When pressed to explain what her role was in “sorting out” the staff, for example, she explained: “I was giving them their packs and data in the morning and giving them pens and pencils, taking their orders; that’s what ‘sorting out staff’ means.” At a later stage in her oral testimony, she explained that she “wouldn’t sit with the staff”; she would “just set up in the morning”, adding that “Steve gave [her] the data to hand out and the scripts”.

She accepted that she had some involvement in complaints from customers. She explained that if a letter of complaint came in, she would open it and pass it on to Steven. If a complaint was made by email, she said that it would usually go straight to Steven.

She was not a signatory to the Company’s bank account; “only Warren” (the First Respondent) was signatory.

When it was put to her that she had attended meetings with or had discussions with Trading Standards, the Second Respondent was adamant that she had not, explaining that her reference during the OR interview to Trading Standards was simply “what was repeated to me after Steven had the meeting. Steven told me what was said at the meeting.”

When asked about her dealings with the Company’s accountant, Joy Emms, she explained that she would send “weekly wages” to Ms Emms but did not play a part in any of the other accounting information passing between Ms Emms and the Company; in her words she “just emailed wages”. She accepted that there was a laptop at the Company’s premises for her to use but was insistent that the only financial information which she sent out from that laptop related to wages.

Overall, by both her written and oral testimony, the tasks which the Second Respondent maintained that she undertook in relation to the Company were all consistent with an administrative and not a directorial role.

On behalf of the Applicants Ms Brooke urged me to reject that evidence as selfserving.

I accept that the Second Respondent would have every incentive, in the context of these proceedings, to play down any managerial or directorial functions which she may have undertaken. I am mindful of that.

That said, the burden of proof lies with the Applicants. On the evidence which I have heard and read, the Applicants have not established on a balance of probabilities that the Second Respondent acted as a de facto director in relation to the Company. Their evidence does not establish on a balance of probabilities that she undertook any tasks of a directorial nature or that she was held out, whether internally to staff, or externally to the outside world, as a director. Their evidence does not establish on a balance of probabilities that the Second Respondent was ‘one of the nerve centres’ of the Company. The Applicants cannot blame this all on the paucity of Company books and records. They adduced no evidence from other members of staff, the Company’s accountant, the Company’s landlord, the Company’s bankers, the Company’s suppliers, or any other third parties, to establish how the Second Respondent was held out by the Company internally and externally and what she actually did in relation to the Company. Their case on de facto directorship was, as Mr Cole put it, ‘extremely thin’.

Ms Brooke submitted that even if the evidence adduced by the Applicants did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the Second Respondent acted as a de facto director of the Company, that evidence raised a prima facie case which shifted the evidential burden on to the Second Respondent.

I do not accept that the evidence adduced by the Applicants is sufficient to raise a prima facie case shifting the evidential burden. Even if I am wrong in that conclusion, however, on the evidence which I have heard and read, the Second Respondent has discharged that burden. I accept her evidence that she was not held out, internally or externally, as a director of the Company. I accept her evidence on the range of tasks that she undertook in relation to the Company. Those tasks point clearly to an administrative role and not a directorial role. Standing back and viewing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that the Second Respondent’s role in the Company was administrative and not directorial. I so find.

For all of these reasons, the Applicants’ application against the Second Respondent shall stand dismissed.

I turn next to the case against the First Respondent.

The Applicants proceed under s.212 IA 1986 against the First Respondent in respect of all sums claimed. The re-amended application notice, so far as material, is set out at paragraph 28 of this judgment.

In broad terms, by their primary case, the Applicants allege that the First Respondent (1) ‘caused or allowed’ the Company to cold call members of the public in breach of the PECR, resulting in a monetary penalty; and (2) ‘caused or allowed’ (or in one instance ‘caused or permitted’) the Company to make certain payments.

By their alternative case, the Applicants allege that the First Respondent was in breach of his duties as a director and misfeasant under s212 IA 1986 in ‘abdicating his duties and responsibilities as a director and/or failing to supervise and thereby enabling the actions and omissions’ set out in the application notice.

The duties to which company directors are subject are set out at ss171-175 Companies Act 2005 (‘CA 2006’) and include the following:

Under s.171 CA 2006, a director must act in accordance with the company’s constitution and only exercise his powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.

Under s.172 CA 2006, a director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company. This duty is subjective, unless the director fails to consider whether the challenged act or omission was in the best interests of the company, in which case the proper test is whether an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director of the relevant company could, in all the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that he acted to benefit the company: Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd at [91-92].

From when the director knows, or should have known, that the company is or is likely to become insolvent, either on a cash flow or balance sheet basis, the s.172 duty requires him to consider the interests of the company’s creditors as a whole. In this context, ‘likely’ means probable: BAT Industries Plc v Sequana SA [2019] 1 BCLC 347 at [213-220].

Under s.174 CA 2006, a director must exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. This means the care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has. This test is both objective and subjective.

The Applicants rely upon the following principles drawn from case law:

The First Respondent maintains that he had no involvement in the Company’s affairs and no knowledge of any wrongdoing.

His case as put by Mr Cole may be summarised thus:

Mr Cole first took me to the case of Cohen v Selby [2002] BCC 82 at [24]. This case involved a misfeasance application brought under s.212 against a father and son, who were de facto and de jure directors respectively of a company which bought and sold jewellery. The son, who was a full-time student, played no part in the management of the company and had no knowledge of its affairs. In December 1993, the father took uninsured jewellery on a selling trip to Europe. The jewellery was stolen on a ferry. The company had no funds to pay for the lost jewellery and went into CVL. The company’s liquidators brought misfeasance proceedings. At first instance the deputy judge found that the son knew nothing of what was going on but found both father and son liable. The son was found liable on the ground of total dereliction of duties. The son appealed.

During the course of his judgment on appeal Chadwick LJ made reference to an allegation made in paragraph 10 of the points of claim that ‘in causing or permitting the [jewellery] to be taken overseas whilst uninsured … [the son] acted negligently and in breach of [his] fiduciary and common law duties [to the company]’. At paragraph [24] of his judgment, Chadwick LJ noted (with emphasis added):

A similar approach was taken by Briggs J at first instance in Lexi Holdings Plc v Luqman [2007] EWHC 2652 (Ch) when hearing a summary judgment application against a ‘non-active’ director called Monuza, whose brother, a fellow director, had committed fraud against the company. At [225] Briggs J said (with emphasis added):

The need for knowledge in this context (subject to the caveat flagged in paragraph 135(6) above) was again acknowledged by Popplewell J in Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liquidation) v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 who said at [192] (with emphasis added):

In this case, Mr Cole submits, the First Respondent knew nothing at any material time of the Company’s breaches of the PECR and of any of the misappropriations of Company monies forming the basis of this application. On that ground alone, he argues, the allegations that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ or ‘caused or permitted’ the Company’s breaches of the PECR and the misappropriations of Company monies relied upon must fail.

This, he argued, left simply the Applicants’ alternative case: abdication of responsibilities and/or failure to supervise.

When addressing the Applicants’ alternative case, Mr Cole again referred me to the case of Cohen v Selby, the facts of which are summarised above. In Cohen, the appeal was allowed on the ground that the breach of duty found by the deputy judge (total dereliction of duty) went outside the pleaded case: loc cit., [31]. In allowing the appeal on that ground, however, Chadwick LJ (Rix LJ and Sir Andrew Morritt VC concurring) was at pains to stress that the failure to allege the breach of duty on which the judge relied went ‘beyond a mere pleading point’, adding (at [32]):

Chadwick LJ had earlier noted that s.212 IA 1986 does not of itself create any new rights or obligations and that, whilst it was open to a liquidator to proceed under s.212 where all that is alleged is common law negligence, ‘if he does so, he must establish a cause of action at common law; that is to say, he must show that the breach of duty of which he complains has caused loss or damage’: Cohen at [21]. When exercising the power conferred by s.212(3)(b) to compel a director to ‘contribute such sum to the company’s assets by way of compensation in respect of the … breach of … duty’, in a case where the breach complained of is a breach of the common law duty to take reasonable care, Chadwick LJ continued at [21]:

I was next taken to the judgment of Popplewell J in the case of Madoff Securities International Ltd (In Liquidation) v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 (Comm) at [290] to [293]. Whilst the matters addressed are strictly obiter (see [289]), they do helpfully summarise the approach to be adopted by the court on causation:

In considering causation in a case of total inactivity, the court must distinguish between what, consistently with his duty as a director, that director should have done and what, in all probability, he would have done: Lexi Holdings plc per Sir Andrew Morritt C at [38]:

The Applicants submit that in considering their alternative case (abdication of responsibility/failure to supervise), the court should adopt the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Lexi Holdings at [38-54], as follows:

Having considered carefully the submissions of counsel and the authorities to which they have helpfully referred me, my conclusions on the correct approach to the evidence are as follows.

To make out their primary case, that of ‘causing or allowing’, or ‘causing or permitting’, the events and transactions complained of, the Applicants must prove either activity on the part of the First Respondent, or conscious (ie knowing) inactivity: Cohen v Selby [2002] BCC 82 at [24]; Lexi Holdings Plc v Luqman [2007] EWHC 2652 (Ch) per Briggs J at [225]; Madoff Securities International Limited (In Liquidation) v Raven [2013] EWHC 3147 per Popplewell J at [192].

This is subject to the caveat that, where a director knows of an improper practice being perpetrated by those managing a company’s affairs, and does nothing about it, he may properly be treated as having permitted not merely those examples of that practice of which he is actually aware, but also the subsequent continuation of that practice, even if not aware of the specific instances of it, where he does nothing to

To make out their alternative case, (that of abdication of responsibility/failure to supervise, leading to loss), the Applicants must identify and establish to the satisfaction of the court:

The counterfactual analysis involved in this three-step process involves both evidence and submissions. As put by Briggs J in Lexi Holdings 2007 EWHC 2652 at [235], whilst the causation question which arises from a case of culpable neglect does involve a hypothetical analysis (namely, as to that which would have occurred if the duties breached had been performed), nonetheless, ‘it is an analysis which has to be conducted against a matrix of detailed fact’.

I shall deal first with the Applicants’ primary case against the First Respondent in relation to the ICO Penalty.

On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the First Respondent (1) did not know of the provisions of the PECR relevant to companies undertaking direct marketing by telephone prior to the date on which the Company began trading or at any material date thereafter (2) did not know prior to commencement of trading that the Company’s proposed use of third party data put the Company at risk of breaching PECR; (3) played no active part in the Company at any material time; and (4) did not know at any material time prior to being informed of the MPN that the Company was trading in breach of the PECR or had ever so traded. I so find.

On the evidence which I have heard and read, the Applicants have not made out their primary case, as set out in paragraph (a) of the re-amended application notice, that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ the Company to ‘cold call members of the public’ in breach of the PECR. He played no active role in the Company at any material time and knew nothing about how the Company conducted its business. At no material time was he aware that the Company was ‘cold-calling’ members of the public in breach of the PECR.

The next question therefore is whether the Applicants can make out their alternative case. According to paragraph (k) of the re-amended application notice, this is that the First Respondent was ‘in breach of his duties as a director and misfeasant under s.212 Insolvency Act in abdicating his duties and responsibilities as a director and/or failing to supervise and thereby enabling’ the Company to cold call members of the public in contravention of the PECR, which resulted in the ICO penalty.

To make out their alternative case, the Applicants must identify and establish to the satisfaction of the court:

With regard to (1): as I have already found, the First Respondent knew nothing of the requirements of the PECR or of the Company’s breaches of the same at any material time prior to being told of the MPN. In my judgment, however, as sole director of the Company, the First Respondent ought to have known of the provisions of the PECR prior to the Company beginning to trade (or at the very latest on receipt of the initial complaints, of which he ought to have known, referred to the Company by TPS in April 2015). He should have kept himself apprised of ongoing regulatory requirements throughout the course of the Company’s period of trading. In this regard I accept the Applicants’ submission that it is incumbent upon all directors to acquire and maintain sufficient knowledge to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors. Directors can only properly discharge their duties if they have knowledge and understanding of any legislation applicable to the company’s sphere of business, and the steps required to comply with the same. This is particularly so where, as in this case, statute sets out strict rules governing the sphere in which the Company operated. If the First Respondent was unable to access or to understand the guidance published by the ICO on how to comply with the PECR, he should have sought professional assistance and advice prior to commencement of trading or, at the very latest, on receipt of initial complaints from TPS in April 2015.

With regard to (2): Mr Cole submits that the Applicants have not adequately particularised or evidenced their case on what steps the First Respondent should have taken, consistently with his duties, in light of the knowledge that he should have had. I have some sympathy with this submission. There were no pleadings in this case and the evidence in support of the application relies heavily (and rather lazily) upon the conclusions set out in the ICO report.

Reading that evidence as a whole, however, it is in my judgment tolerably clear that the steps which the Applicants maintain that the First Respondent should have undertaken were to ensure that the Company either (1) used TPS screened data (ie data which excluded TPS subscribers completely) or, (2) if relying on ‘opt-in’ consent obtained by third parties, undertook ‘due diligence checks’ on the opt-in data supplied. The due diligence identified in the ICO report (and adopted by Mr Bramston in his first statement at paragraph 52) comprised the following: (a) asking the third party consent supplier (in this case TDP) to provide sample audio recordings which could then be checked to ensure that consent to the opt-in had been properly obtained, (b) checking that consent was reasonably recent (no more than 6 months old) and (c) checking that the consent extended either to the Company specifically or to organisations fitting the Company’s description.

Having considered the evidence and submissions on what steps the First Respondent should have taken, consistently with his duties, in light of the knowledge that he had or should have had, I am satisfied that on or prior to the commencement of trading, the First Respondent should have taken steps to ensure that the Company either (1) used only TPS screened data or (2) if using ‘opt-in’ data supplied by a third party provider such as TDP, ensured that the Company undertook ‘due diligence checks’ (of the kind identified in paragraph 161(a)-(c) above) on the opt-in data supplied, with a view to confirming that the same was PECR compliant.

Moreover even if TDP had somehow managed to pass the initial due diligence checks prior to the Company’s commencement of trading, on receipt of complaints referred by TPS to the Company in April 2015, the First Respondent ought to have concluded that the data supplied by TDP was not reliable. Having so concluded he should have taken steps to ensure that thereafter the Company either (1) used only TPS screened data or (2) if continuing to use ‘opt-in’ data supplied by a third party provider, that the Company selected an alternative provider having taken reasonable steps to confirm by way of due diligence checks that the alternative provider selected was PECR compliant.

With regard to (3): what would have happened if the First Respondent had complied with his duties, and whether, but for the breach, the transaction or loss complained of would have occurred: On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that had the First Respondent complied with his duties, the loss caused to the Company by the MPN would have been avoided.

Had the First Respondent ensured that the Company undertook due diligence of the caller data purchased from TDP in the manner described in paragraph 161(a)-(c) at the outset, on a balance of probabilities he would have discovered that the data purchased from TDP contained one or more of the following (a) consents which had not been properly obtained (b) consents which were more than 6 months old and (c) consents which did not extend to the Company. Having established in this way that the data supplied by TDP was not PECR compliant, the First Respondent could and should have taken steps to ensure either that (a) the Company used only TPS screened data or (b) that the Company ceased use of data supplied by TDP and purchased PECR compliant opt-in data from an alternative supplier. Had these steps been taken timeously, on a balance of probabilities the ICO penalty would have been avoided.

Moreover, even if TDP had managed to pass the initial due diligence checks undertaken at the time of the Company’s commencement of trading, had the First Respondent taken prompt steps to select an alternative PECR compliant provider on learning of the complaints referred to the Company by TPS from April 2015 onwards, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that the IPO penalty would have been avoided.

The breaches which ultimately triggered the ICO penalty spanned over a year and involved over 150 complaints. Had appropriate action been taken on commencement of trading, or promptly on receipt of the initial complaints referred to the Company by TPS, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that the ICO penalty would not have been imposed.

For the reasons which I have given, the Applicants have made out their alternative case of misfeasance in relation to this head of claim. On the evidence before me I am satisfied that in failing prior to commencement of trade (or at the very latest promptly after the initial complaints referred to the Company by TPS in April 2015) to take appropriate steps (1) to inform himself of the PECR requirements applicable to the company’s intended sphere of business and (2) to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Company traded only with PECR compliant data, the First Respondent acted in breach of the duties owed by him to the Company pursuant to s.174 CA 2006 and thereby caused the Company loss.

In the light of my conclusions I shall order the First Respondent to compensate the Company in a sum equivalent to the ICO fine together with any interest properly due in respect thereof, pursuant to s.212 IA 1986. I shall hear submissions on interest on the handing down of judgment.

I shall deal next with the payments made by the Company to the First Respondent. It is common ground that the First Respondent received for his own benefit three payments from the Company, as follows:

Where a director is the recipient of a benefit from the company, the evidential burden is on the director to prove that the payment was proper: Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd at [115]; Idessa (UK) Ltd v Morrison [2011] EWHC 804 (Ch) per Lesley

I shall deal with the third payment first. On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the third sum (of £600) was a payment made to the First Respondent from Company funds in respect of maintenance work which he had carried out at Steven Montague’s private residence. I so find.

I accept the First Respondent’s evidence that he paid no attention to the source of this payment at the time that he received it and did not knowingly accept Company funds for a building job privately undertaken for Steven Montague.

Nonetheless, I was taken to no evidence to justify the payment of £600 to the First Respondent as a legitimate use of Company funds. As a director of the Company in receipt of a benefit from the company, the evidential burden is on the First Respondent to prove that the payment was proper: GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 per Newey J at [149]. The First Respondent has failed to discharge this burden. Accordingly the sum of £600 must be repaid to the Company.

The remaining two payments (of £2500 and £7500 on 20 March 2017) fall for separate consideration. These payments were made to the First Respondent from Company funds at his request. He knew the source of the funds. In my judgment it is clear (and I so find) that he ‘caused or allowed’ these two payments from Company funds.

The First Respondent maintains that the two payments in question represent repayment of loan advances made by him to the Company to assist with start- up costs. On the evidence which I have heard and read, I accept the First Respondent’s explanation for these payments.

By his written evidence (at paras 9-11) the First Respondent states that Steven Montague asked him to lend the Company £2500 when it was first being set up and later asked him to inject further loan monies into the Company to assist with buying supplies and furniture for the Company (para 14). The First Respondent admitted that he was ‘not very good with dates’ but stated that he agreed to make further payments which ‘came to just under £10,000.’ He could not recall precisely how much he lent in total but believed it to be in the region of ‘between £10,000 and £12,500’ in approximate terms.

At paragraph 22 of his witness statement, the First Respondent addressed repayment of his loan, stating:

Pausing there, he was clearly mistaken about the reason for the payment of £600. On the evidence overall, however, I am satisfied that this was an innocent mistake.

When pressed in cross-examination to explain why he had adduced no documentary evidence of the loan advances of £10,000 subsequently repaid to him, the First Respondent stated that he had made the loan advances in cash, explaining that he had done some private building work and had made the loan advances from ‘building money’. As it was a ‘family’ arrangement, he hadn’t felt the need to document it or agree a specific time frame for repayment .

I accept the First Respondent’s explanation for making the loan advances in cash and failing to document the same. Given his trade it is entirely unsurprising that he would have such sums available in cash. Given the family connections it is also unsurprising that he would not have asked for a receipt.

The Applicants placed some store by the response to paragraph 2.5 of the PIQ partially completed by Steven Montague on 20 February 2018. This stated that no loans had been made by officers of the Company. In my judgment, for reasons already explored, little weight can be attached to this document. When taken to the relevant passage from the PIQ in cross examination, the First Respondent stated that it was ‘incorrect’.

The Applicants also relied upon the notes of Steven Montague’s interview with the OR on the same day (20 February 2018), in which Steven is said to have stated:

Again, for reasons already explored, little weight can be attached to the notes of Steven Montague’s interview with the OR. It will also be noted that even the first line of the quoted extract from the interview is inconsistent with the PIQ which he had partially completed the same day. In cross examination the First Respondent stated that Steven’s comments on this issue in interview were ‘incorrect.’

In the notes of his own interview with the OR on 20 February 2018, the First Respondent stated :

Overall, on the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the sums of £2500 and £7500 paid by the Company to the First Respondent on 20 March 2017 were repayment of loan monies which the First Respondent had advanced to the Company to assist with start-up costs. Setting up a call centre would inevitably involve some initial outlay. There was no evidence before me to suggest that start-up costs were funded from any other source. On the evidence before me, it is most unlikely that Steven Montague could have funded the same himself, given his bad credit history. It is entirely plausible that he would have asked the First Respondent,

Notwithstanding the fact that the payments of £2500 and £7500 represented repayment of loan monies advanced by him to the Company, however, the First Respondent was misfeasant in causing or allowing these payments to be made to him from Company funds on 20 March 2017.

By the time of the loan repayments of 20 March 2017, the Company was or was likely to become insolvent. This was due to a combination of payments wrongfully made from the Company bank account which were not for the benefit of the Company, including (by 20 March 2017) ‘in branch cash withdrawals’ of £10,400, ‘bakery equipment’ of £3762, ‘miscellaneous’ of £4,300, ‘personal expenditure’ of £2009, and payments totalling £37,400 to a company known as Peace of Mind Plans Limited. The sums paid to Peace of Mind were paid on to another company and used to fund a business which has since ceased trading. All these sums, which totalled £57,871, were likely to be irrecoverable. But for these wrongful payments, the Company is likely to have been in a position to pay off all its creditors; by the date of winding up, the only debt outstanding was the £40,000 ICO penalty. Nonetheless, as matters stood, by 20 March 2017, the Company had ceased trading and was or was likely to become insolvent.

From the First Respondent’s own written testimony, it is clear that, by the time of repayment of the sum of £10,000 on 20 March 2017, the First Respondent knew that the business was at an ‘end’. At paragraph 22 of his witness statement, the First Respondent stated:

As director of the Company he ought also to have known by 20 March 2017 that the Company was or was likely to become insolvent. From the notes of his interview with the OR, it is clear (and I so find) that the First Respondent knew prior to cesser of trading that the Company had been fined. Whilst the First Respondent was unsure of the exact date on which he was told that the Company had ceased trading, I am satisfied that by 20 March 2017, he knew of the ICO penalty and knew that the Company had ceased to trade. By then he had, in his own words, ‘found out about the end of the business’ and asked for his money back. A simple review of recent banking transactions, projected run-off income, outstanding debts and projected liabilities (including the ICO penalty then under appeal) would have made clear that, as of 20 March 2017, the Company was or was likely to become insolvent.

By 20 March 2017, it was therefore the First Respondent’s duty pursuant to s.172(3) CA 2006 to have regard to the interests of the creditors as a whole. On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that in causing or allowing the payments to himself of £10,000, the First Respondent gave no thought to their interests. The objective test therefore applies: Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch). The Court must ask itself whether a reasonable and honest man in the position of a director of the company concerned could, in the circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions (in this case the two payments totalling £10,000) to the First Respondent were for the benefit of the creditors as a whole.

Applying that test, it is clear (and I so find) that as at 20 March 2017, a reasonable and honest man in the position of a director of the Company could not reasonably have believed that the two payments to the First Respondent totalling £10,000 were for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. The First Respondent should not have been seeking and accepting repayment of the sum of £10,000 for his own personal benefit at that time. In causing or allowing that sum to be repaid to him at such a time, he acted in breach of his duties under s.172(3) CA 2006. I shall therefore order the First Respondent to restore that sum to the Company pursuant to s.212 IA 1986.

The Applicants further seek an order that the First Respondent restore to the Company sums totalling £15,422.20 paid to the Second Respondent and Steven Montague by way of salary; in the case of the Second Respondent £11,080.60 for the period 17 February 2017 to 10 November 2017: and in the case of Steven Montague £4341.60 for the period 12 February 2017 to 30 March 2017.

As presented to me, the Applicants’ primary case is that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ these salary payments; that, at the time that they were made, the Company was or was likely to become insolvent, and that accordingly the First Respondent was under a duty pursuant to s.172(3) to act in the best interests of the creditors as a whole. They say that in causing or allowing these payments, he acted in breach of his duty under s.172(3) and accordingly should restore these sums to the Company.

On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the First Respondent knew that the Second Respondent and Steven Montague worked for the Company and were each paid a regular weekly salary by the Company up to cesser of trading. To that extent at least, in relation to the regular weekly salary payments of £599.60 received by the Second Respondent and Steven Montague up to cesser of trading, I am satisfied that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ the same. He may not have known the precise amount they were paid each week, but he knew that they each drew a regular weekly salary and he allowed it.

On the evidence as a whole I am not satisfied that the First Respondent knew that the Second Respondent and Steven Montague received double their usual salary on 10 March 2017 (the date trading ceased) or that they continued to receive any sums by way of salary after that date. I will return to this point.

On the evidence before me I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that, from the date of the first salary payment relied upon (12 February 2017), the Company was insolvent or likely to become insolvent. The evidence before me on the timing of insolvency was scant, but from such evidence as there was, it was clear (and I so find) that the Company did not become insolvent as a result of the ICO penalty. It became insolvent as a result of a series of misappropriations spanning February and March 2017. Whilst the Company’s fate was well and truly sealed by 20 March 2017 (the date of repayment of the First Respondent’s loans), the position for most of February 2017 was unclear.

Moreover even if I am wrong in that conclusion, and that, as at 12 February 2017 the Company was or was likely to become insolvent, it does not inexorably follow that the First Respondent was misfeasant in ‘causing or allowing’ a salary payment of £599.60 per week to be made to each of the Second Respondent and Mr Montague from 12 February 2017 down to cesser of trading on 10 March 2017.

Applying the objective test (it being clear on the evidence that the First Respondent gave no thought to the interests of the Company or its creditors at any material time), in my judgment a reasonable and honest man in the position of a director of the Company would have reasonably believed that the weekly salary payments made to the Second Respondent and Steven Montague in the standard sum of £599.60 up to the cesser of trading (and indeed, up to the end of March 2017) were for the benefit of the Company (and, at the point at which it became or was likely to become insolvent), the creditors as a whole.

The Second Respondent and Steven Montague undoubtedly provided services to the Company up to cesser of trading and drew a fairly modest regular salary for the same. Whilst the Company ceased to trade on 10 March 2017, on the evidence overall I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that up to the end of March 2017, the Second Respondent and Mr Montague continued to provide valuable services to the Company, including services relating to the winding down of the Company’s business operations following cesser of trading (such as emptying the Company’s office premises, cancelling utilities, and addressing maternity leave issues for one of the employees). I am also satisfied that a reasonable and honest man in the position of a director of the Company would reasonably have believed that the services provided post cesser of trading down to 30 March 2017 were for the benefit of the creditors as a whole.

It follows that, in relation to the standard salary payments of £599.60 per week made to the Second Respondent and Mr Montague over the period 12 February 2017 to 30 March 2017, the Applicants’ primary case fails. In my judgment their secondary case in relation to these payments also fails; on the evidence as a whole, they have failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the payments caused the Company any loss.

The ‘double-salary’ payment of £599.60 made to each of the Second Respondent and Mr Montague on 10 March 2017, and the purported salary payments made to the Second Respondent in the period 1 April 2017 to 10 November 2017 (collectively, the ‘extra salary payments’), fall for separate consideration. On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the First Respondent did not know of, or receive

The remaining payments forming the subject matter of this application may be categorised as follows:

The Company’s bank statements record a number of payments from the Company’s bank account to Peace of Mind Plans Limited and I4Sign Limited, purportedly in respect of ‘database purchases’. All payments save for that of £2000 paid on 13 March 2017 were paid to Peace of Mind Plans Limited, a company of which the Second Respondent was sole director. The remaining £2000 was paid to a business known as I4 Sign. The payments were as follows:

On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that none of these payments were made for the benefit of the Company. All such payments were misapplications of Company funds. I so find.

By her witness statement the First Respondent confirmed that she was a director and shareholder of Peace of Mind Plans Limited and that it had ‘never traded’. In oral testimony, she volunteered that Steven Montague had arranged the payments to Peace of Mind, adding:

The ‘bakery’ referred to by the Second Respondent was a bakery purchased by Monty’s Bakery Ltd, a company incorporated in January 2017, of which both the Second Respondent and Steven Montague were directors and shareholders. The Second Respondent resigned as a director in July 2017 as a result of her brother’s heavy drinking and inappropriate behaviour with customers. In oral testimony she said that her brother had left the bakery ‘massively in debt’.

From the Company’s bank statements, it was clear that the monies paid to Peace of Mind did not truly represent sums ‘put aside’ by Steven. From the timing of the payments, compared with the timing of receipts into the Company’s bank account from Checkout Pay, it was clear (and I so find) that the monies represented trading income of the Company.

From the timing of the payment to I4Sign, which post-dated cesser of trading by the Company and again bears the reference ‘database purchases’, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that payment to I4 Sign was also a misapplication of Company funds.

The Company’s bank statements also show payments in relation to catering and bakery equipment in March 2017, the month in which the Company ceased trading. The payments were as follows:

H2 Products are the suppliers of commercial catering equipment. Brock Food Process are suppliers of bakery equipment. At all material times, the Second Respondent and Steven Montague were directors of Monty’s Bakery Limited, whose registered office is the residential address for the Respondents.

By her witness statement the First Respondent states (at para 33)

The bank statements for the Company account, however, show no credits from Steven in the run up to these payments being made and I was taken to no other evidence to suggest, still less establish, that these payments were indirectly funded by Steven, or to explain why an indirect payment would have to be made.

These payments were plainly not for the benefit of the Company. On the evidence I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the payments were further misapplications of Company monies. I so find.

The Company’s bank statements detail 18 debit transactions in the sum of £22,240 in the period 14 February 2017 to 1 December 2017, as follows:

The last two payments post-dated the date of presentation of the petition and so are void transactions under s.127 IA 1986.

I was taken to no evidence to suggest that any of these cash withdrawals were for the benefit of the Company. Given the business model of the Company it is difficult to see what need it would have for cash withdrawals in these sums, even whilst trading; still less after it ceased to trade on 10 March 2017. On a balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that these cash withdrawals, totalling £22,240, were not for the benefit of the Company but were instead misapplications of Company funds. I so find.

The Company’s bank statements detail cash withdrawals in the sum of £5985.55 in the period 3 March 2017 to 17 July 2017. Of these, cash withdrawals totalling £5645.55 were made on or after 10 March 2017, at a time when the Company had ceased to trade.

The Second Respondent’s evidence, which in this regard I accept, was that she was from time to time told by Steven Montague to refresh petty cash, for use purchasing stationery and other equipment used on a day to day basis within the business of the

I was taken to no evidence to suggest that any of the remaining cash withdrawals, totalling £5445.55, were for the benefit of the Company. These were all made after the Company had ceased trading. I consider it legitimate to conclude that these cash withdrawals were not for the benefit of the Company but were instead misapplications of Company monies. I so find.

The Company’s bank statements also disclose a number of payments the purpose of which is said to be unknown. These comprise a payment of £4300 on 6 March 2017 made to ‘Simon’, a payment of £9.58 made to Eastergate 04 2Esg on 24 March 2017, and four payments over the course of July and August 2017 marked ‘tpdo’.

On a balance of probabilities it is more likely than not that the four payments bearing the description ‘tpdo’ relate to third party debt orders. I consider it legitimate to conclude that these payments were for Company purposes.

In relation to the remaining two payments in this category, I was taken to no evidence to suggest that either payment was for the benefit of the Company. Set against the pattern of other misapplications of Company money already addressed and given the

The Company’s bank statements also contain a number of payments which do not appear to be genuine business expenditure, including vehicle maintenance and petrol charges totalling £2,087.12, supermarket expenditure of £286.41, hardware store charges of £373.61 and sky charges of £771.62. A full breakdown of the payments appears in the exhibit to Mr Bramston’s first witness statement. The bulk of the payments post-date cesser of trading in March 2017. Overall, the payments run to October 2017, some seven months after the Company ceased to trade.

I was taken to no evidence to suggest that the payments in this category were for the benefit of the Company. Set against the pattern of other misapplications of Company money already addressed and given the timing of the majority of the same, on the evidence as a whole I find on a balance of probabilities that these payments, totalling £4091.29, were not for the benefit of the Company but were instead misapplications of Company monies.

On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied that the First Respondent did not personally receive or benefit from any of the Remaining Payments. I so find.

I am further satisfied that the First Respondent did not know of any of the Remaining Payments. He had nothing to do with the Company or its banking arrangements.

I am also satisfied that the First Respondent did not know of any improper practice being perpetrated by those managing the Company’s affairs. The fact that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ repayment of his loan of £10,000 in breach of s.172(3) CA 2006 does not justify a conclusion that he was aware of any improper practice; he did not know that the repayment of his loan was improper. This is not a case falling within the category of cases identified in Lexi Holdings v Luqman (No 1) [2007] EWHC 2652 at [202].

For all of these reasons, the Applicants’ primary case in relation to the Remaining Payments, that the First Respondent ‘caused or allowed’ or ‘caused or permitted’ such payments, therefore fails.

The next question therefore is whether the Applicants can make out their alternative case in relation to the Remaining Payments and the extra salary payments

According to paragraph (k) of the re-amended application notice, the Applicants’ alternative case is that the First Respondent was ‘in breach of his duties as a director

I have some concerns over the manner in which the Applicants have presented their alternative case on the Payments in their re-amended application notice and written evidence. As made clear by Chadwick LJ in Cohen v Selby, in a case based on abdication of duties, it is necessary to set out with some particularity what it is that the director ought to have done that he did not do; and what it was that he failed to do that caused the loss which the company suffered. These matters should be fully pleaded or, in the absence of pleadings, set out clearly in the written evidence in support.

An officeholder wishing to rely upon abdication of duties as the basis of a misfeasance claim under s.212 should particularise and evidence his case as he would a common law negligence claim; he must identify the duty, give particulars of the breach of that duty (including when the breach occurred), and show, on a ‘but-for’ basis, that the breach has caused the loss or damage complained of. As put by Chadwick LJ in Cohen: ‘the court has to be satisfied that the negligence has caused a loss in respect of which compensation can be awarded. The position, in this respect, is the same as it would be if the company had brought an action in its own name’.

In the present case Mr Cole submits that the Applicants have failed by their reamended application notice and written evidence adequately to particularise the breaches of duty relied upon or to demonstrate that the breaches relied upon caused the loss represented by the Payments.

Had paragraph (k) of the re-amended application notice alleged simply abdication of duties, I would have accepted this submission. Paragraph (k) however, contains a further allegation, that of a ‘failure to supervise’. In the context of the application notice and supporting evidence read as a whole, in my judgment this falls properly to be construed as referring to (or including reference to) a failure to monitor or supervise use of the Company’s bank account over the period forming the subject matter of this application in relation to the Payments (1 February 2017 to 1 December 2017).

I accept that the drafting is far from ideal. In my judgment however, it is sufficiently clear, read in the context of the application notice and supporting evidence as a whole, to indicate the basis of the alternative claim in relation to the Payments. In this regard I remind myself that the Respondents, when represented by solicitors, consented to the amendment of the application notice which resulted in the inclusion of paragraph (k). I was taken to no evidence to suggest that they objected to the formulation of paragraph (k), sought directions for pleadings or made a request for further information in relation to paragraph (k). In the circumstances it is in my judgment legitimate to conclude that the First Respondent understood, in broad terms, what was being alleged against him by this paragraph.

With these considerations in mind, I turn next to address the following issues, following the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Lexi Holdings:

With regard to (1): by the time of the first of the Payments (that of 1 February 2017 in favour of Peace of Mind), had he performed his duties as a director, the First Respondent ought to have known that the Company was subject to the ICO penalty and that there was a significant risk that any appeal would fail. He ought also to have discussed with Steven Montague the impact of the ICO penalty on the Company. From such discussions he would know that, whilst Steven intended to appeal the penalty (thereby deferring the due date for payment of the same), Steven was also considering shutting the business down, as a result of the reputational impact of the penalty.

With regard to (2): by 1 February 2017, if not before, the First Respondent should have undertaken a review of the Company’s cashflow position (and, as part of that process, the Company’s recent banking transactions) and should have put in place a system of regular reviews thereafter. As sole director of a company employing staff paid weekly, in my judgment the First Respondent should have undertaken such reviews on a weekly basis.

With regard to (3): a review on 1 February 2017 would not have led to the conclusion that the Company was or was likely to become insolvent and (depending on the timing of that review) may not have alerted the First Respondent to the fact that a substantial payment of £7500 had been made out of the Company’s account on 1 February 2017 in favour of Peace of Mind. Regular weekly reviews thereafter, however, would have revealed a pattern of unexplained substantial payments being made out of the Company’s bank account in favour of Peace of Mind Plans Limited; payments of £7500, £7500 and £3900 were made in rapid succession to Peace of Mind on 1, 3 and 6 February 2017. Had the First Respondent undertaken weekly reviews of the Company’s cash position from 1 February 2017 as he should have, on a balance of probabilities I am satisfied that he would have discovered these misappropriations by the end of the second week of February 2017.

Having discovered these misappropriations, he should have raised them with Steven Montague, as the individual having access to and day to day control of the account. As there was no conceivable basis upon which Steven Montague could begin to justify these misappropriations in context (he would have been unable to prove if challenged that the monies were his, and would not have been able to justify loans to a start-up company such as Peace of Mind at a time when the Company was about to cease trading), the First Respondent should have rejected Steven Montague’s excuses and assurances and should have taken control of the Company’s bank account himself.

As sole director and shareholder of the Company and as sole signatory of the Company’s bank account, the steps required to secure control of that account and to ensure that Company funds were preserved and used only for legitimate purposes were well within his grasp. He should have alerted the bank, changed the codes for online access to the Company’s bank account, arranged for the cancellation of any existing bank cards for the account, and arranged for the issue of a new bank card for his sole use, in order to ensure that thereafter, no payments out of the account were made without his informed authority and that all transactions on the account were for the benefit of the Company.

By 10 March 2017 he ought also to have known that the Company had ceased trading and was or was likely to become insolvent. Thereafter he should have taken all steps reasonably required to preserve the assets of the Company for the benefit of the creditors as a whole pending the Company’s entry into a formal insolvency process.

Causation in this case is relatively simple. It was accepted by the First Respondent in cross examination that had he known of the misapplication of funds in the Company’s bank account, he ‘could have taken steps to stop that happening.’

In my judgment the First Respondent should have known by the end of the second week of February 2017 that Company funds were being misappropriated. By 13 February 2017 at the latest, he should have taken control of the Company’s bank account.

On the evidence which I have heard and read, I am satisfied (1) that the First

Moreover in case I am wrong to conclude that, in failing to monitor and supervise the Company’s cashflow position from 1 February 2017, the First Respondent was in breach of duties owed by him to the Company pursuant to s.174 CA 2006, I would add that, on the evidence which I have heard and read, I am in any event satisfied that in failing to monitor and supervise the Company’s cashflow position (including banking transactions) from 10 March 2017 (the date of cesser of trading), the First Respondent was in breach of such duties. I am further satisfied that the loss caused by this breach would comprise such of the Payments found by this judgment to have been misapplications of Company monies as were made after 10 March 2017; a total of £44,262.42, calculated as follows:

By 10 March 2017 the First Respondent ought to have known that the Company had ceased trading. At that stage if not before, he should have undertaken an immediate review of the Company’s cashflow position (including banking transactions), with regular reviews thereafter. He ought to have concluded from the first of such reviews that the Company was or was likely to become insolvent. He ought also to have concluded from the first of such reviews that monies had been misappropriated from the Company’s account from 1 February 2017 onwards. At that stage, even if not before, he should have taken the steps summarised in paragraphs 241 and 242 above. He should also have taken all other steps reasonably required to preserve the assets of the Company for the benefit of the creditors as a whole pending the Company’s entry into a formal insolvency process. Had such steps been taken, the loss caused to the Company of £44,262.42 could readily have been avoided.

For the reasons which I have given, I conclude that:

For the reasons which I have given, the Applicants have not made out their case that the Second Respondent was a de facto director of the Company. The case against the Second Respondent shall therefore stand dismissed.

I shall hear submissions on the terms of the order, interest and costs on handing down judgment.