Ghadami v Bloomfield & Ors

A judge retains a power to vary or reverse his or her decision at any time until the order consequential upon it has been sealed under CPR 40.2 (2) (b). That power is referred to (perhaps inaccurately) as “the Barrell jurisdiction”. The power is to be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective as set out in CPR 1.1: and parties to litigation are required to help the court to further the overriding objective (CPR 1.3). In particular, the parties must assist the court in ensuring that their case is dealt with justly and at proportionate cost. Dealing with the case justly involves (amongst other things) acknowledging the desirability of finality. Dealing with the case at proportionate cost involves (amongst other things) ensuring that there is allotted to the case only an appropriate share of the Court’s resources taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases.

In Re L-B (Children) (Care proceedings: power to revise judgment) [2013] UKSC 8 the Supreme Court held (a) that the power to alter one’s decision is to be exercised judicially and not capriciously; but (b) that this that does not involve a search for “exceptional circumstances” (but rather calls for proper attention to the requirements of the overriding objective). The decision does not give encouragement to litigants who are dissatisfied with the outcome of a hearing routinely to apply to a judge (who is otherwise content to abide by his or her decision) to suspend the drawing up of an order so that an application can be made for a variation to or the revocation of the judgment.

This is an application by Mr Ghadami (a) that no order should be drawn up on an application brought by him in which I determined in October 2016 (having decided a recusal application before delivering judgment) and (b) that my original conclusion should be altered or alternatively that the entire hearing should be re-opened. This is the second such Barrell application: and a third has already been issued (and a five day hearing sought) relating to this very judgment I now deliver (the nature of which was announced at the conclusion of the hearing). I have sought to approach the present application with the observations in mind of Peter Gibson LJ in Robinson v Fernsby [2004] WTLR 257 at para [120], that whilst judicial tergiversation is not to be encouraged, on the other hand, it takes courage and intellectual honesty to admit one's mistakes, and that the best safeguard against having to do so is a fully and properly reasoned judgment in the first place.

I delivered a long and (I hope) adequately reasoned judgment in October 2016 on Mr Ghadami’s application to set aside the order of the Master which struck out his claims against the Second to Nineteenth Defendants (“the Application”). At the end of the hearing of this present application I indicated that I would not depart from the conclusion reached in October 2016 (and confirmed in my dismissal in May 2017 of Mr Ghadami’s first Barrell application). These are my reasons for that conclusion.

I have traversed the ground on 3 previous occasions: and my principal judgment on the Application at [2016] EWHC 2521, my recusal judgment at [2016] EWHC 1448 and my judgment on the first Barrell application at [2017] EWHC 1282 contain both a full account of Mr Ghadami’s claim and also summaries of his case. To keep this judgment short I will assume knowledge of that material. But I will (to provide focus) set out what seems to me to be the key paragraph in the Particulars of Claim: and I will record an explicit self-direction.

It seems beyond dispute that in early 2006 Larios Properties Limited was the registered proprietor of the long leasehold interests in the properties known as 41 and 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 and 42 Reeves Mews. Paragraph 34 of the Particulars of Claim says:-

“In oral discussions Mr Bloomfield agreed that… he would transfer ownership of [42 Upper Grosvenor Street] and [42 Reeves Mews] and [41 Upper Grosvenor Street] and [41 Reeves Mews] to [Mr Ghadami]. ”

In argument it has been Mr Ghadami’s case (though not exactly his pleaded case) (a) that Mr Bloomfield (not Larios Properties Ltd) was the “real” owner and so capable of being bound by the promise; or (b) that Mr Bloomfield was the agent of the “real” owners (alleged to be Mr Jan Bonde Nielsen and Mr Saif Durbar) who were bound by their agent’s promise; (c) that the oral promise created a legally binding obligation (capable of specific performance) to transfer the properties from Larios Properties Ltd to Mr Ghadami; (d) that the remaining Defendants (who are successors in title to Larios Properties Limited or who were directors of (or of the holding companies of) those successors or solicitors retained by those successors) are liable to Mr Ghadami for the economic torts of conspiracy, interference with a contract, procuring a breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful means (essentially because they participated in “sham sales” concerning the properties where only bits of paper circulated and no real money changed hands, but where the bits of paper defeated Mr Ghadami’s claims).

If the facts pleaded in paragraph 34 of the Particulars of Claim (if proved) would not create a legal liability to transfer the four properties to Mr Ghadami then neither the actual promisor nor those whom he is alleged to have bound can be liable to Mr Ghadami, and there can be no secondary liability on the part of the economic tortfeasors.

It is at this point again convenient to record that the Application is not the occasion for Mr Ghadami to “prove” anything. The Application is not a trial: it is (though Mr Ghadami would have it otherwise) a consideration under CPR 23.11 of whether the original application decided by the Master should be relisted for a hearing to be attended by Mr Ghadami (as part of which Mr Ghadami must demonstrate a “real” prospect of success in resisting the Defendants’ strike out/summary judgment application, which is itself dependant on demonstrating a “real” prospect of success for the claim he has brought).

As to that I would repeat what I said in paragraph 76 of my original judgment:-

“Notwithstanding the enormous use of Court resources in providing Mr Ghadami with material and the equally significant use of court time in allowing him to deploy it and to assess its significance I am satisfied that the conspiracy claims and those claims based on an intention to cause Mr Ghadami loss simply have no foundation”

I can now address the present application. On 14 October 2016 I gave judgment on Mr Ghadami’s Application to reopen the Defendants’ strike out/summary judgment hearing before the Master. That same day Mr Ghadami made his first Barrell application relating to that judgment. On 26 May 2017 I dismissed that application as “totally without merit”: a hearing was fixed to deal with all consequential matters (identified in paragraph 108 of my original judgment) on 7 June 2017. On 1 June 2017 Mr Ghadami made his second Barrell application relating to my original judgment. He estimated the length of hearing at 5 hours (with a view to it being heard at the hearing fixed for 7 June 2017 to address consequential matters).

At the commencement of that hearing Mr Ghadami said that he needed at least three days to pursue his second Barrell application (and in the course of submissions he said that he really needed 30): but I ruled that the hearing should last only two days and must deal with (a) the matters to which I had referred in my principal judgment, my recusal judgment, and the first Barrell application judgment and (b) the consequential matters raised by the Defendants. In the event Mr Ghadami had the bulk of the available time to pursue his own application, and Counsel were permitted strictly limited time to address the other issues.

Mr Ghadami relied on two new lever arch files of documents (Nos 30 and 31). They were designed to demonstrate (albeit indirectly) Mr Ghadami’s thesis that the real owners of the properties were from first to last Jan Bonde Neilsen and Saif Durbar. In his wide-ranging submissions I identified 13 points.

First, material concerning 41 Upper Grosvenor Street: this is not Mr Ghadami’s main target, but dealings with it were said by him to be relevant to dealings with 42 Upper Grosvenor Street. Merix (D18) acquired 41 Upper Grosvenor Street from 41 UGS Inc (D19). Mr Ghadami discovered that in 2015 Merix was involved in proceedings in the Central London County Court against two Grosvenor estate companies about whether 41 Upper Grosvenor Street is “a house…reasonably so-called” for the purposes of leasehold enfranchisement. He discovered that a Mr Ved (an accountant) had given evidence in the proceedings. He wanted a copy of Mr Ved’s witness statement which he regarded as “an important new discovery directly related to [his] case” because it would identify who was the predecessor in title of Merix. There was some resistance to the provision of this witness statement, which resistance Mr Ghadami regards as highly suspicious. But Mr Ved’s statement was eventually produced for Mr Ghadami. When produced the witness statement (which is new material) said that Mr Ved acted on the instructions of a BVI company called “41 UGS Ltd”. That seems to me simply to be a misdescription of D19. It adds nothing to Mr Ghadami’s case that the transfer between D19 and D18 was a sham.

Second, relations between Mr Ved and Mr Chohan (D3). Mr Ghadami has discovered that in December 2016 Mr Chohan’s wife commenced proceedings against Mr Ved in the Chancery Division relating to a property venture between the two of them that began in September 2014 (seven years after the events touched upon in his own action). He obtained the statements of case and discovered (a) that it was a dispute about their respective shares in a company incorporated to conduct a property development in Elstree and includes an allegation of a constructive trust: and (b) that one plea in the case is that “Mr Ved and Mr Chohan have known each other since they were schoolchildren”.

Mr Ghadami submits (a) that the suggested dealings between Mr Ved and Mrs Chohan and are very like what he says has been going on in the case he has brought against the 19 Defendants; and (b) it is very suspicious that the bookkeeper for 41 UGS Inc should have been a schoolfriend of the solicitor who acted for Merix on the purchase of 41 Upper Grosvenor Street by Merix from 41 UGS Inc. In my judgment none of this adds one grain to the weight of the case which Mr Ghadami brings against the 19 Defendants.

Third Mr Ghadami has written to HM Revenue and Customs enquiring as to the amount of Stamp Duty Land Tax that was paid on transfers of (a) 42 Upper Grosvenor Street (b) 42 Reeves Mews and (c) 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews. He was given the details on 18 May 2017. The letter said that £477,050 was paid in relation to a return (concerning unspecified transactions on an unspecified date or dates) in relation to 42 Upper Grosvenor Street. Mr Ghadami points out that this figure is greater that the stamp duty shown on a Statement of Account which Mr Chohan’s firm prepared for Vitala Investment Holding Limited (D17) for an anticipated completion date of 11 July 2007, and which he has obtained. Mr Ghadami says that this is suspicious and must be examined by permitting the case against the 19 Defendants to proceed.

As to this I hold as follows:-

(a)

The point is not new: the actual SDLT return was before the Master showing the same figure paid as is referred to in HMRC’s letter;

(b)

The discrepancy is not suspicious, the Statement of Account having (wrongly) calculated anticipated SDLT as payable on the purchase price net of VAT whereas the return calculates SDLT on the VAT-inclusive price;

(c)

The fact that Mr Chohan may have made an error in calculation when accounting to his client in no way supports the proposition that the complex transaction in which he was involved was a sham.

(d)

There is no proper ground upon which to revisit my judgment.

Fourth, Mr Ghadami made enquiries of rating authorities. He wanted to know who paid the empty rates on 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews. A telephone note of a conversation with an administrator in the Westminster Business Rates department on 10 October 2013 was included in the material put before me at the original hearing. The information given was that according to the Westminster records the business rates for 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and for 42 Reeves Mews had been paid by Lynn Properties Ltd (D16) with effect from 11 July 2007. Mr Ghadami wanted to place emphasis on this as demonstrating that completion of the purchase of 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews must have taken place on 11 July 2007 (and not at the beginning of August 2007 as the conveyancing documents themselves suggested).

This was not new material. Mr Ghadami made whatever points he wanted to make about this material at the original hearing. The Barrell jurisdiction does not enable litigants to re-argue their cases. Any inference that might otherwise be drawn from the date on which liability for business rates was assumed is overborne by the conveyancing documents themselves.

Fifth, Mr Ghadami has made very many (more than a dozen) applications for third-party disclosure. It is not clear to me that he has made known to the judges concerned that, whilst he had judgment against Mr Bloomfield, his case against other defendants stood struck out. One such application was made against Stevenson Harwood LLP in October 2014. Mr Andrew Hill (a partner) had previously been a partner at Denton Wilde Sapte. Whilst there he had acted for the two Lebanese shareholders in 41 UGS Inc (which company owned 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews). Mr Hill made a witness statement and provided certain documents. Some of those documents were included in the two dozen or so files deployed at the hearing of the Application. But Mr Hill’s witness statement (although available) was not included in the files. Mr Ghadhami now wishes to rely on it in support of his present Barrell application as “new material” which justifies a rehearing. He submitted that the Lebanese shareholders and Dentons were all part of the fraud that was being practised against him and that the purported share sale to Z was a “sham”.

Mr Hill’s statement says the contrary and that his clients “were not involved in the transaction being enquired into”; and, further,

“From Mr Ghadami’s witness statement… it appears that he thinks that my clients and I were involved in the sale of the properties by 41 UGS Inc to Merix to which part of his claim relates….. He is wrong, we were not… ”

As to this I hold:-

(a)

this is not “new material” and I decline to admit further evidence after judgment when that evidence was available at the original hearing;

(b)

in so far as relevant, the new material undermines Mr Ghadami’s case that all transactions were “shams”. The starting point must be that there was a genuine purchase of the shares in (and so assets of) 41 UGS Inc in which real money changed hands.

Sixth, Mr Ghadami has noted that in paragraph [88] of my principal judgment I said that the documents appeared credibly to disclose that on 23 March 2007 “Z” (a shorthand for Zatako Investments Limited) bought the shares in 41 UGS Inc (and that I then went on to deal with a sale of the assets of 41 UGS Inc). He points out (as is confirmed by the statement of Mr Andrew Hill) that the completion of the share sale to “Z” was actually completed on 30 March 2007 and immediately preceded the dealing with the assets. Mr Ghadami is entirely right about this: the contractual completion date (as varied) was further extended. But the fact that the Lebanese shareholders extended the completion date for the share purchase to facilitate a back-to-back sale of the assets of 41 UGS Inc does not raise any real prospect of establishing that the transaction was a “sham”. The different completion date makes no difference to the analysis.

Mr Ghadami also made that point that Mr Saunders (D2) had signed contracts for the sale by Z of the 41 UGS Inc shares to Goldsky before Z had actually acquired them: but this was a point made by reference to documents that were before me at the original hearing (although not then referred to). Even though the sale by Z to Goldsky did not complete and the contract was abandoned, Mr Ghadami submitted that suspicions were raised about such a transaction, that the matter must go further, and that it would be an abuse of power by me if I did not permit it.

As to these I hold

(a)

the error in the actual completion date for the sale of the shares in 41 UGS Inc is irrelevant to the analysis and its correction therefore makes no difference;

(b)

a Barrell application cannot be used to present further argument after judgment on material that was before the Court and could have been deployed at the original hearing.

(c)

The fact that Mr Saunders was prepared to sign (on behalf of Z) a contract for the sale of the shares in 41 UGS Inc before legal title to those shares had been obtained (and at a time when Z itself had only the benefit of a contract to acquire them) shows either that Mr Saunders and those behind Z were prepared to take commercial risks or that Goldsky’s participation was a form of interim funding arrangement under which Goldsky made available a deposit payment. That does not help Mr Ghadami (who himself relies upon property developers having taken commercial risks by promising him rewards even if his development projects did not succeed).

Seventh, Mr Ghadami reverted to the cash statement prepared by or for Mr Saunders in relation to the acquisition of the shares in 41 UGS Inc and the disposal of 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews as at 30 March 2007. (It is referred to in paragraph [90] of my original judgment). The document is by no means easy to understand. Mr Saunders acted for (a) Z (or Zatako) on its acquisition of the shares in 41 UGS Inc; and (b) on Z’s ineffective sale of the 41UGS Inc shares to Goldsky; and (c) for 41 UGS Inc on its disposal of 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews. The cash statement muddles up payments received from and disbursed to these and other entities (including money which found its way to Mr Ghadami via Beacon Industries). It suggests that Mr Saunders was going to pay or had paid the stamp duty on the acquisition of the leaseholds. New material from HMRC does suggest that the sum of £1,034,000 was the SDLT payable on the land transfer (not the share transfer): but it remains the case that the documents show Mr Saunders to have been in error if he said that he paid the SDLT out of 41 UGS Inc’s money (because the funding can be traced elsewhere). Mr Ghadami submits that this error must be questioned and that for that reason I should withdraw my judgment and allow his Application to succeed (either by permitting a rehearing of his Application or alternatively by reversing the Master’s strike out order so as to permit a full trial against these 19 Defendants).

I do not accept this submission. I readily acknowledge that if one goes over incomplete conveyancing documents relating to share and lease sales and purchases that completed a decade ago some questions are likely to arise to which there is no ready answer. But, as I have said to Mr Ghadami on sundry occasions, my function is not to conduct a state trial or a public enquiry in the abstract: it is to decide (ultimately) whether Mr Ghadami has shown that his case in conspiracy and the other economic torts against the 2^nd to 19^th Defendants concerning 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews stands a real prospect of success. In relation to that issue the fact that this Cash Statement concerning 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews raises unanswered questions (even if some of its various entries can be traced to the bank statements of Beacon Industries Ltd) does not assist. The fundamental questions remain. What enforceable right did Mr Ghadami have to call for the transfer to him of 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews? Who was primarily bound by any such obligation? Upon what ground are the other defendants secondarily liable (in particular what sort of case is there that they were all participants in sham transactions concerning 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews entered into so as to defeat Mr Ghadami’s claims? The questionable account that Mr Saunders (who does not appear to have been a very careful solicitor and who has produced a number of documents containing information contradicted elsewhere) rendered to one or more of his clients is not weighty material which assists in the answer to these questions; and Mr Ghadami’s repetition of arguments did not alter my view.

Eighth, Mr Ghadami reverted to a document which had been contained in the files of documents before me at the original hearing (and to a point which was also argued to in the course of the first Barrell application: see paragraph [26(b] of that judgment). It was a note of the telephone conversation made by Mr James Hill of Messrs Hill Jones on 31 January 2007 in connection with some instructions from Goldsky (which company, it will be recalled, was to enter into a contract on 6 February 2007 to purchase the shares in 41 UGS Inc from Z). Mr Hill was instructed by Goldsky

“…all title and corporate due diligence already covered via Saunders Bearman (which firm will likely be acting for the Buyer [different Partner]….”

Mr Ghadami says this is not a reference to different partners in the same solicitor’s firm acting on different sides of a conveyancing transaction. Mr Ghadami submits that this indicates that there is in the background a different joint venture partner. He has picked up a reference in another hand written note (of James Hill?) which refers to an entity called “Glenco Corporation” as being a “junior JV partner”: so he says any reference to “partner” is a reference to a joint venture partner. When I enquired what was the relevance of this point, Mr Ghadami said that it demonstrated a “sham” because there was a concealed joint venture partner who was the real “Buyer”, the concealment being required to show something to the Royal Bank of Scotland that was not true. He suggested that the “real” partner was a Kazakh politician acting as a “front” for Mr Durbar.

I regard this as an entirely fanciful construct based on a misreading of conveyancing solicitor’s note, and as completely irrelevant to Mr Ghadami’s claim to 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews. When I put the irrelevance of this matter to his claim Mr Ghadami said he wanted to amend his Particulars of Claim to suit and now to claim 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews as well. But that is no answer.

Ninth, Mr Ghadami wanted to introduce a transcript of a telephone conversation which he had had with a Mr Andrew Brooks of Messrs Levys (solicitors). The conversation had been taped (according to the transcript, without informing Mr Brooks) on 18 May 2009. Mr Brooks had acted for a Mr White who at one stage in October 2006 had wanted to put a restriction on the title to 42 Upper Grosvenor Street in connection with some entirely separate claim of his company A4 Grup to acquire the shares in Lynn Properties Ltd. In the course of the conversation Mr Brooks skim read a document which referred to “Larios Jersey company and A4 Grup”. Mr Ghadami said that this confirmed the existence of a Jersey company called Larios Properties Ltd, and that a share certificate in Jersey form (on which he had spent some time in his original submissions) was not a “mistake”. I agree that there may well have been a Jersey company called Larios Properties Ltd. But its existence is irrelevant to any issue germane to Mr Ghadami’s case that he has an enforceable right to call for the transfer of 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews or to be compensated by third parties for his failure to acquire those properties. The “Larios Properties Ltd” that owned the relevant leasehold interests was not a Jersey company.

Tenth, Larios originally held a single lease of 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews from the Grosvenor Estate. It was proposed that the redevelopment might proceed by the severance of that interest and the grant of separate leases to new entities. It does not matter what became of that proposal. For present purposes what is important is (a) that Mr Ghadami has obtained various drafts prepared in connection with the severance proposal including a draft Rent Deposit Deed, a draft License and Deed of Variation and a draft Supplemental Lease; (b) that these drafts name as one of the parties “Lynn Properties Ltd (a company incorporated in [the British Virgin Islands] under number [ ] whose registered office is at [ ]….”; (c) that the draft is dated (in minute print as a footer) “04/04/2007”; (d) that a company called Lynn Properties Ltd was not incorporated in the British Virgin Islands until 8 May 2007. Mr Ghadami submits that this proves that it was always known that Lynn Properties Ltd (BVI) was going to be incorporated so this demonstrates that the transaction in which it participated was a “sham”.

I do not accept this submission. So far as I can see the document was prepared by Messrs Boodle Hatfield on behalf of the Grosvenor Estate. On the basis of the material I have seen I regard it is fanciful to suggest that they were part of the sham sales designed to defeat Mr Ghadami’s interests. It is not unusual for property interests to be held by an SPV. It is not unusual for that SPV to be incorporated as matters proceed. The fact that Lynn Properties Ltd (BVI) was incorporated after negotiations had commenced is not of itself suspicious. In fact what seems to have happened is that the original proposal was for Larios Properties Ltd to hive down a severed leasehold interest to a company intended to be called “Lynn Properties Ltd” (incorporated onshore or offshore) and then to sell the entire issued share capital in that company to the party that wanted the asset (possibly for stamp duty reasons). This changed to being a straightforward asset sale. So the purchaser incorporated a company called Lynn Properties Ltd to whom the lease was sold. I referred to this in paragraphs [81] and [82] of my original judgment. But whether I am right or wrong about the detail of this, the detail of the date of a draft is of no weight in assessing a real prospect of success for Mr Ghadami’s claim.

Eleventh, Mr Ghadami was anxious to demonstrate that Mr Saunders (D2) was unlikely to be a witness of truth and had acted unprofessionally. He drew my attention to unflattering assessments of Mr Saunders as a witness in a judgment handed down in April 2017 (and so “new material”). He drew my attention to an agreement for the sale of the entire issued share capital Larios Properties Ltd by Festio to Goldsky (which I think must have been obtained in 2015) which bore the endorsement in the handwriting of Mr Saunders that he had been exchanged under Law Society Formula B on 10 January 2007, although the document reference in the footer on the cover sheet was “SB/FESTIO/COMPANY SPA Larios GOLDSKY 12 JAN” (the footer on other pages was different). He noted that in this version of the contract the deposit was said to be £325,000, whereas Mr Hill said (in a document in volume 16) that the actual deposit was £475,000.

Whether Mr Saunders was a bad witness in other proceedings, whether Mr Saunders misdated documents (or failed accurately to record the terms of the deal) in the course of transactions that did not complete and which form no part of the events by which Mr Ghadami says his interests were defeated is in my judgment immaterial to the issues I have to decide. As I have previously indicated on several occasions, deficiencies in the defence founded upon Mr Saunders’ shortcomings do not arise until such time as Mr Ghadami has himself established that there is a real prospect of demonstrating what he alleges, namely, that all dealings with both properties were “sham” sales and purchases undertaken with the intention of defeating his enforceable claim to have 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews transferred to him.

Twelfth, Mr Ghadami obtained (it is not clear when) a copy of an agreement made in April 2006 between Aldersgate (1) Telimo (2) and Alegratrans UK Ltd (which became Greenoak UK Ltd) (3). This Agreement was therefore apparently made after the events pleaded in paragraph 34 of Mr Ghadami’s Particulars of Claim and before the “2006 Commission Split Agreement”: see paragraphs [5] to [9] of my original judgment for Mr Ghadami’s account of the narrative. The agreement is complex, is conditional and was subject to variation after it was entered. It gave Alegratrans UK Ltd the right to acquire the Larios shares and to transfer them to a nominee. It explains how Festio acquired the shares in Larios (which owned 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews). The point Mr Ghadami wanted to make was that Alegratrans UK Ltd was at 31 December 2006 (according to his researches: he has obtained the filed accounts for Alegratrans UK Ltd for the year ending 31 December 2006 and looked at Note 4) the wholly-owned subsidiary of Batumi Terminals Ltd. Batumi Terminals Ltd later became known as Naftrans Ltd and Naftrans Ltd was involved in the Commercial Court action to which I referred in paragraphs [84] and [85] of my original judgment. I think Mr Ghadami’s point was that Jan Bonde Neilsen was connected (through Greenoak UK Ltd) to Larios Properties Ltd.

Mr Ghadami delights in demonstrating his investigative prowess and in establishing connections. This is another example. Mr Ghadami is trying to establish personal liability against Jan Bonde Neilsen either as a primary obligor or as secondarily liable because of his personal participation in an economic tort. But as I pointed out in my original judgment even if Jan Bonde Neilsen had a direct or indirect economic interest in a company, that would not make him personally liable to Mr Ghadami (see paragraph [67]); and even if he had an economic interest in companies on either side of a transaction that does not make the transaction a “sham” (see paragraph [81]). So all this time-consuming establishing of connections goes no way toward giving Mr Ghadami’s case a real prospect of success.

Last, at various points in his submissions Mr Ghadami relied on the assertion that one of the ineffective transactions involved the deceit of the Royal Bank of Scotland in connection with an extended loan, that this demonstrated that it was a “sham”, and founded the inference that all transactions were likewise “shams”. As I understand it the intended transaction was the sale of the shares in Larios Properties Ltd (having hived down 42 Reeves Mews to another company): and the prospect of the exchange of this contract was used to keep in place funding that had been provided by the Royal Bank of Scotland.

As to this I hold:-

(a)

the material upon which this argument was grounded was included in volume 26 of the material before me at the time of the original hearing but was not then relied upon, and a Barrell application not the occasion to deploy previously unused material in an attempt to re-argue the case;

(b)

a consideration of the material shows that the ineffective transaction (involving Hamlins LLP negotiating on behalf of a complete stranger to any of the transactions that eventuated) cannot realistically labelled a “sham”;

(c)

fact that its existence and prospective completion may have used to persuade a bank to continue extending facilities might demonstrate a willingness to deceive a bank, but cannot demonstrate that the transactions which did eventuate were shams designed to defeat Mr Ghadami’s interests.

I therefore declined to revoke or vary my original judgment. I regard this second Barrell application as totally without merit (and indeed as an abuse of the jurisdiction). My original judgment will stand.

I direct that Mr Ghadami’s third Barrell application shall be stayed and shall not be listed for hearing (whether for five days or for any lesser period). Whether it has merit or not (and as to that I make no assumptions) the time has simply come to treat the Application at an end. It has taken an inordinate time, has consumed a wholly disproportionate share of the Court’s resources (both in court and out of court) and has put the other parties to needless expense and delay. Mr Ghadami does not like my judgment and has declared that he is “fed up with thus Court”. His remedy is to seek to appeal.

There remain some loose ends relating to Mr Ghadami’s applications.

First in the course of the Application Mr Ghadami intimated an intention to bring contempt proceedings against a solicitor called Mr Johnson for (as he said) fabricating a document or putting forward a false document: see paragraph [60] of the main judgment. No formal application was made. I dismiss the informal application (a) for failure to comply with CPR Part 81: and (b) because on the material I have seen there is no real prospect that permission would be granted.

Second, as part of the Application Mr Ghadami sought to bring contempt proceedings against Mr Saunders, Jan Bonde Nielsen, Peter Bonde Nielsen, Saif Durbar, Mr Rhodes and Mr Bakhda: see paragraph [34] of the main judgment. I indicated (ibid. paragraph [108]) that I would address the matter at the hearing fixed to deal with consequential matters. That took place on 7 June 2017. In fact Mr Ghadami spent his time mounting his second Barrell application. I set out the principles to be applied when I was dealing with Mr Ghadami’s application to commit Mr Risbey for contempt: see paragraph [30] of my judgment on the first Barrell application. Applying those principles I dismiss all of the committal applications (a) for failure to comply with CPR 81 and (b) for the same reasons as were set out in paragraph [34] of my judgment on the first Barrell application.

Third, on the last full day of the original hearing of the Application (20 December 2015) Mr Ghadami issued an application to amend his Particulars of Claim (which then stood struck out so far as relating to 2^nd to 19^th Defendants). The form of relief sought was:-

“A Directional Order that the Claimant in Person now amend his Particulars of Claim within a reasonable time with further reasonable time for the Defendants to reply if they so wish.”

No draft Amended Particulars were then produced. What the amendment application itself argued was that the case had been prematurely struck out before standard disclosure “so C must rely on his fresh evidence and as such must amend his POC accordingly”. I explained in paragraph [108] of my main judgment that this application would be addressed on the date fixed for the disposal of the consequential matters. This was 7 June 2017. Mr Ghadami spent his time advancing the second Barrell application. No draft amended Particulars of Claim were produced.

I dismiss this application for the following reasons:-

(a)

Mr Ghadami’s case against the 2^nd to 19^th Defendants is and remains struck out so that there is nothing to amend;

(b)

If the purpose of the amendment was to enable Mr Ghadami to plead in relation to his existing causes of action material facts evidenced by the “new evidence” he seeks to adduce then I have held in my main judgment and in my first Barrell application judgment (and have held at the conclusion of the second Barrell application) that none of this “new evidence” makes good the deficiencies in Mr Ghadami’s presently pleaded case;

(c)

There are still no draft Amended Particulars of Claim and I could not in any event grant a general and unspecific permission to amend;

(d)

The only hint that Mr Ghadami has given as to what is proposed is that on the basis of advice (said to have been received from one or more QCs) he wants to plead proprietary estoppel or unjust enrichment. But the original decision to plead an oral contract and not to rely on some form of estoppel was a quite conscious one made in a pleading signed by Counsel: and I cannot see how (in relation to events occurring between 2005 and 2007) a claim in unjust enrichment could overcome the hurdle presented by CPR 17.4(2).

Fourth, by paragraphs 6 and 7 of his Order of 28 March 2014 the Master gave permission to amend the Particulars of Claim “limited to a claim for an account” and directed that Mr Ghadami

“shall (if so advised) file and serve Amended Particulars of Claim in respect of his claim against the Fourth and Eleventh Defendants within 28 days of the determination of the Claimant’s application to set aside this order failing which the remainder of the claim against the Fourth and Eleventh Defendants do stand dismissed”.

At the original hearing of the Application Mr Buttimore (Counsel for Jan Bonde Nielsen) submitted that if Mr Ghadami was seeking a rehearing of the application before the Master then it was open to me to revisit (and to vary) this particular order. In paragraph [96] of my judgment I held that since Mr Buttimore’s application had only been included by way of a footnote in a skeleton argument that would not be fair to Mr Ghadami, and that I would leave the Master’s order undisturbed.

The question then arises: at what point was Mr Ghadami’s application to set aside the Master’s order “determined”? Mr Buttimore submitted that the application was “determined” when I handed down my main judgment in October 2016. Mr Ghadami submitted that the Application has still not been determined because no order has yet been drawn up. I hold that on any footing the Application was “determined” when at noon on 8 June 2017 I confirmed that I would not withdraw my main judgment (for reasons to be given later). If Mr Ghadami has in fact filed and served amended Particulars of Claim addressing the claims for an account that he advances against Jan Bonde Nielsen and Larios Properties Ltd by 7 July 2017 then his claim against those parties continues. If he did not, then his claim against them stands dismissed and he must apply for relief from sanctions.

Fifth, there remains outstanding an issue relating to Mr Ghadami’s application that I should recuse myself. The parties opposing that application asked me to find that it was “totally without merit”. In paragraph [50] of my recusal judgment I held that it would not be fair to Mr Ghadami to make that holding without affording him the opportunity to make representations (since it might be significant): and that I would accordingly consider that issue when I handed down my main judgment (the consequential issues arising from which were dealt with on 7 June 2017). The recusal application was I think “totally without merit”: it depended ultimately on the proposition that a fair observer would consider me a liar who participated in a charade, and for that there was no rational basis. I consider that Mr Ghadami simply regards a recusal application as part of his litigation armoury, for he deployed it also in respect of the Master (though to his credit he did not pursue it to the end).

Last, when I announced my decision on 8 June 2017 Mr Ghadami immediately applied for a stay on the grounds that there remained outstanding his application to amend his Particulars of Claim. When I enquired what was the relevance of the general amendment application Mr Ghadami responded by saying that no litigant in person had ever won a case before me, that I did not tell the truth, that I was wrong (and that was enough reason for a stay), and that I lied. (This last was a reference to my summary of Counsel’s attitude to the vast volume of additional material Mr Ghadami had introduced in terms that pragmatically they accepted he could refer to it, that they would respond as best they could and that they otherwise reserved their positions: a summary that Mr Ghadami does not think accurate). I do not accept the truth of Mr Ghadami’s accusations and I do not regard them as sufficient to warrant a stay. The position is simply that Mr Ghadami will not accept “no” for an answer from me: and does not appeal (because he says that, as a result of his own applications, there is no order to appeal). The time has come to move forward.

This brings me to the applications made by other parties.

First, the other represented parties asked me to find that the second Barrell application is (like the first) “totally without merit” because it was devoid of rational supporting argument. Although I have endeavoured in this judgment to identify and then consider the various points made by Mr Ghadami, (and have striven to ignore the wilder allegations Mr Ghadami has made against me) in the ultimate analysis I conclude that this application was bound to fail: and to fail not because I do not decide cases in favour of litigants in person or because I am not “big enough” to acknowledge that Mr Ghadami is right and I am wrong (indeed this judgment contains just such an acknowledgment) but because Mr Ghadami’s fascination with the fruits of his research and his mastery of the minutia of the case blind him to its substantial and substantive deficiencies.

Second, the other represented parties ask me to make a Civil Restraint Order: to which Mr Ghadami’s immediate response is that a passionate litigant in person who has made a small number of “without merit” applications is not “an extreme circumstance”. So I shall look at the Defendants’ evidence and argument with that firmly in mind. I am in any event (and notwithstanding any application by a Defendant) required to consider whether a CRO ought to be made: see CPR 23.12.

Deputy Master Mark struck out the claims against the Second, Third, Fifth to Tenth and Twelfth to Nineteenth Defendants. In compliance with CPR 3.4 he considered the merit and then recorded in his Order that “the Court’s present view” was that the claims against those parties were “totally without merit”.

On 17 June 2016 I handed down judgment on Mr Ghadami’s recusal application, noting that the represented Defendants had asked me to characterise it as “totally without merit”, but declining to do so until Mr Ghadami could be heard on the issue. Having now afforded him that opportunity I have held the application to be “totally without merit”

On 31 March 2017 Warren J dismissed an application by Mr Ghadami for third party disclosure as “totally without merit”.

On 11 April 2017 David Richards LJ dismissed an application for permission to appeal my judgment on the recusal application as “totally without merit”.

On 25 June 2017 I dismissed Mr Ghadami’s first Barrell application as “totally without merit”: and by this present judgment I have held the second Barrell application is likewise “totally without merit”

For my own part, when considering whether it was right to characterise Mr Ghadami’s applications in that way I have been concerned to address the question whether they were applications that were bound to fail because they were not capable of rational support: and I have endeavoured to grapple with the detail. The length of those judgments does not reflect the strength of the arguments.

As to Mr Ghadami’s determination to pursue the Defendants there can be no doubt. As he put it to me:-

“I have lost battles but the war is there to be won. I will put in every effort of my blood to get justice….. I am going to get judgment at the end of the day. It is not revenge. It is a matter of property...”

As I have noted, there is already a third Barrell application issued. Provided that Mr Ghadami’s evident determination results in applications that do not completely lack merit and which stand a real prospect of success, and which are in each case pursued in a way that accords with the overriding objective, he may pursue that course. The Court process is there to enable him to achieve justice, but not to enable him to heap injustice upon others.

CPR PD 3C paragraph 5 provides that where a party seeks the making of a CRO then that party must issue a Part 23 application (unless the Court otherwise directs) and specify in it which type of CRO is sought. On 8 May 2017 the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Defendants applied for a Limited CRO to be made. On 24 May 2017 the Third Defendant applied for an Extended CRO. Where the Court is required to consider whether to make a CRO and if so of what type it must exercise that power in conformity with the overriding objective and, in particular, so as to ensure procedural fairness. The fact that individual parties have made applications means that both the possibility of a CRO being made, and the possible type of CRO have been canvassed. This makes it fair for me to consider a Limited or Extended Order, but in the circumstances unfair to consider a General CRO.

For an Extended CRO to be made I must be satisfied that Mr Ghadami has “persistently….made applications which are totally without merit”. The requirement of “persistence” has both a quantitative and a qualitative element. As to the quantitative element, there have now been six findings of “totally without merit” by four judges. As to the qualitative element, these findings have principally been made in the context of a determined refusal to accept the Court’s assessment that the underlying case is hopeless, a refusal that has absorbed an enormous quantity of Court resources both in and out of Court, and which it is sought to continue by a yet further application said to require 5 more days (plus time for judgment). It does not avail Mr Ghadami to say (as he does) that he has made more than a dozen other connected evidence-gathering applications which have not been held to be totally without merit. This simply underlines the degree to which scarce resources have been allocated to support underlying applications which themselves are not capable of rational support.

In my judgment an Extended Civil Restraint Order is called for, restraining Mr Ghadami from issuing claims or making applications in the High Court or the County Court concerning any matter involving or touching upon or leading to the matters alleged or relief sought in this present action without the permission of judges to be identified by the Chancellor. For the sake of clarity that restraint does not apply to (a) an application seeking permission to appeal the making of this present CRO; (b) an application seeking permission to appeal my orders (i) dismissing the Application or (ii) refusing to withdraw my main judgment in consequence of the first Barrell application or the second Barrell application or (iii) directing that the third Barrell application shall not be listed for hearing or (iv) costs orders arising out of this application or (v) other orders made as a result of this present hearing. The requirement of permission is a sufficient filter.

This brings me to the question of costs. Mr Hubble QC for Mr Chohan (D3) applied for an order (a) that Mr Ghadami pay Mr Chohan’s costs on the indemnity basis, (b) that the provision in paragraph 11(i) of the Order of the Master that Mr Ghadami pay £35,000 on account of the costs of the Third Defendant “28 days after the determination of his application to set aside this order” should have effect (by way of concessionary extension) 28 days after 8 June 2017 (when I dismissed the second Barrell application) and (c) that in respect of the total costs shown on a Statement of Costs in the sum of £231,891 (as amended) I should award £150,000 (inclusive of the £35,000 just mentioned) payable 28 days from 8 June 2017.

I take as my starting point the general rule in CPR 44.2(2)(a). Mr Chohan is undoubtedly the successful party in the Application, the Appeal and the action as a whole. I shall treat the costs of all of those together. Having reviewed all the circumstances of the Application, the Appeal and the various ancillary applications which have occupied a significant part of my time since December 2015 I see no reason to depart from that general rule. This is plainly not a case for summary assessment (by reason of the size and complexity of the bill). I will therefore order a detailed assessment.

That assessment will be conducted on the indemnity basis i.e. Mr Chohan will not recover costs which have been unreasonably incurred or are unreasonable in amount, but any doubt as to those matters will be resolved in his favour. Indemnity costs are appropriate because:-

(a)

Mr Chohan’s involvement in the events recounted in Mr Ghadami’s narrative was that he was a conveyancing solicitor acting for a purchaser, but Mr Ghadami chose to accuse him of participation in “sham” sales as part of a conspiracy to deprive Mr Ghadami of certain benefits that Mr Bloomfield had promised him, and as acting as a conduit for “dirty” Kazakh money: these were serious charges for any professional to face, yet they were speculative and there was no real ground for them.

(b)

Mr Ghadami’s pursuit of Mr Chohan has been exceptionally intrusive and in that regard significantly unreasonable (including an examination of the dissolution of his partnership and enquiries into litigation in which Mr Chohan’s wife is involved).

(c)

Mr Chohan has been involved not only in the pursuit of the Application and the Appeal but also in responding to applications which themselves totally lacked merit so that the pursuit of the case against him marks this case as one apart from the norm.

(d)

On 10 October 2013 Mr Chohan made an offer of a “drop hands” settlement: this was rejected.

By CPR 44.2(8) it is provided that having made an order for costs to be the subject of a detailed assessment then I should order Mr Ghadami to pay a reasonable sum on account of costs unless there is good reason not to do so. No good reason has been advanced, and I can think of none.

The total bill submitted for the action as a whole amounts to £231,891. The question of whether that is proportionate to the nature of the dispute does not arise. Mr Chohan seeks 66% of that (rounded down to £150,000). That is in my judgment a relatively modest request on an indemnity assessment. I will order Mr Ghadami to pay £150,000 by 4.00pm 15 September 2017. That period is some two weeks longer than Mr Hubble QC suggested: but seems fair, given that judgment will be handed down in a holiday period. I do not accept that the period for payment should be extended until 28 days after the determination of Mr Ghadami’s intended appeals. Any such extension is a matter for the Court of Appeal.

Ms Galley made submissions on costs on behalf of Mr Saunders (D2) Mr Durbar (D3) and Mr Risbey (D9).

I deal first with Mr Saunders. I shall apply the same principles as are set out in relation to Mr Chohan. For reasons which will appear I will leave undisturbed paragraph 10 of the Master’s Order (that Mr Saunders is entitled to his costs of the applications before the Master and of the claim to the date of that order to be the subject of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis). I will address only costs of the Application and of the Appeal and of the recusal and Barrell applications and the consequential hearings (together “the Relevant Matters”).

In relation to the Relevant Matters Mr Saunders is undoubtedly the successful party. The general rule applies: but the consideration of all the circumstances of the case brings the issue of conduct into play. Mr Ghadami and Mr Saunders have throughout the consideration of the Relevant Matters traded derogatory remarks and thoroughly irritated one another, culminating in Mr Saunders losing control and assaulting Mr Ghadami in the Court precincts after one heated day. For that he has both apologised and paid the penalty criminal law requires: but it is perhaps the clearest instance of Mr Saunders failing to behave in a manner to be expected of a solicitor of the Senior Courts. Furthermore, the examination of the evidence has thrown up instances of Mr Saunders’ behaviour as a conveyancing solicitor which simply provided Mr Ghadami with ammunition for his cause. I do not propose to deprive Mr Saunders of his costs on that account.

CPR 44.3(1)(b) makes clear that the court has a discretion not only about who should pay the costs but also about the amount of those costs: the amount of costs is dependent upon the basis of assessment. Having weighed the issue of conduct against the factors that might otherwise indicate the propriety of an indemnity costs order I propose to give Mr Saunders his costs of the Relevant Matters to be the subject of a detailed assessment on the standard basis. (In so doing I am not intending to restrict or to guide the costs judge himself or herself from addressing “conduct” in relation to individual items under CPR 44.4(3)(a) in the course of the assessment process: I am simply ensuring that proportionality is considered and that the burden of satisfying the costs judge falls on the claiming party who is responsible for some unacceptable conduct).

What are those costs? That is difficult to discern. At the end of the hearing I was unclear to what extent Mr Saunders’ former firm had been on the record as acting for him, to what extent he acted as a practising solicitor conducting his own defence, and to what extent he was simply acting in person. For the purpose of the exercise I will accept that he has incurred disbursements of £71,280 (inclusive of VAT): and I assume that part of that will have been incurred in relation to matters that were before the Master. Ms Galley submitted, first, that if Mr Saunders were to charge out his time at a solicitorial rate of £300 per hour he would levy an “own time” charge of £36,300. She submitted, second, that if he was to be treated as a litigant in person who was a solicitor then he was entitled to recover compensation for the use of his own time, and that amounted to at least £200 per hour (under CPR 46.5(2)). She submitted, third, that if he were to charge out at a rate appropriate to a litigant in person of £19 per hour then his time charge would be £2299. What is the proper charge will have to be determined by the costs judge on assessment in the light of such cases as Zakirov v Newmans, [2012] EWHC 90222 (Costs): but for present purposes I can take as a working figure £73,580 as the total costs. Allowing for the fact that part of that will be assessed on the indemnity basis (down to 28 March 2014) and the remainder to date on the standard basis I assess the amount payable on account in the sum of £45,000 (just over 60%, a relatively high proportion because of the low base). The Master did not make an order for an interim payment in relation to Mr Saunders: so the order will simply be for the payment of that sum by 4.00pm 15 September 2017.

I deal next with Mr Durbar, applying the same principles. In his case I can simply look at the costs of the action. He is undoubtedly the successful party. Reviewing all the circumstances of the case I see no proper ground from departing from the general rule. He is entitled to his costs of the action to be the subject of a detailed assessment. The case against him is apart from the norm because serious allegations of conspiracy were levelled against him on a speculative basis, which allegations have been pursued in a wholly exceptional way. He is entitled to his costs assessed on the indemnity basis. He has avoided attending some hearings in relation to the Relevant Matters (though he was represented by Counsel at the hearing of the Application and the Appeal). His total costs bills is said to be £94,598. The Master ordered an “on account payment” of £25,000 to be made 28 days after the determination of the Application. Ms Galley seeks an interim payment of £62,000 (inclusive of that £25,000). I regard that as a moderate request: and so order.

I deal next with Mr Risbey. Ms Galley was instructed by Messrs Brooke Martin to seek a costs order in his favour. The Master made an order Mr Ghadami should pay his costs of the action to the date of his order, to be assessed on the indemnity basis: but he made no order for an interim payment. I start with that order and will address costs only in relation to the Relevant Matters. Mr Ghadami has been unsuccessful in relation to the Application and the Appeal and in relation to a contempt application brought against the Ninth Defendant. The starting point is therefore again the general rule. A review of all the circumstances of the case brings into consideration the question of conduct. Mr Risbey acted as a litigant in person as regards the Relevant Matters: both he and Mr Ghadami indulged in name-calling and in unedifying exchanges, Mr Risbey’s letter of 14 December 2015 provokingly describing Mr Ghadami as “mentally deranged” and as “a vexatious litigant” and referring to a criminal conviction deep in Mr Ghadami’s past. In the febrile atmosphere of this case such behaviour foreseeably renders the resolution of issues more difficult, and is not to be countenanced.

Applying the same reasoning as I applied in relation to Mr Saunders (though I recognise that the balance is a finer one), I shall order that the costs of the Relevant Matters shall be assessed on the standard basis (and with the same intent). Ms Galley did not make detailed submissions about any on-account payment: but having made an order for a detailed assessment I am obliged to consider such, and ought to make one unless persuaded that there is good reason not to do so. No reasons were advanced (save that my judgment was wrong, that it would plainly be overturned on appeal and that any costs orders should therefore be expressed as coming into effect 28 days after the determination of Mr Ghadami’s intended appeals). I am not persuaded that those are good reasons not to make an interim order: and it will be for the Court of Appeal to determine whether a stay should be granted on any order I do make.

Brooke Martin’s statement of costs totals £17,390. I shall order a payment on account of £8695 by 4.00pm 15 September 2017.

Mr Buttimore appeared for Jan Bonde Nielsen (D4), Peter Bonde Nielsen (D5) Mr Rhodes (D7) and Mr Bakhda (D8). He sought an award of indemnity costs (and a payment on account) because serious accusations had been made against his clients, all of which had been found to be baseless (save for a claim to an account which Mr Ghadami had been afforded the opportunity to reformulate, but which the Master’s order had made plain (in paragraph 9) could still be the subject of summary disposal application). He submitted, and I find it to be the case, that none of the “new evidence” on which Mr Ghadami relied as justifying a reopening of my original decision, touched upon the position of his clients, though that could not be known until such time as Mr Ghadami concluded his submissions.

The position of the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Defendants is plain. In Mr Ghadami’s narrative their role was entirely peripheral and his Particulars of Claim no clear case was ever pleaded against them. They are undoubtedly successful parties on the Application, the Appeal and all ancillary applications. There are no grounds to depart from the general rule that they should recover the costs from Mr Ghadami, to be the subject of a detailed assessment. The case against them was by its nature and by the manner in which it was conducted a departure from the norm: it was, in my judgment, in both respects unreasonable to a high degree. It is a clear case for indemnity costs.

The position of the Fourth Defendant is less plain. It must be taken in two stages. First, even though Mr Ghadami appeared to bring one claim in contract directly against Jan Bonde Nielsen (a telephone promise made in 2007 and referred to in paragraph [12] of my main judgment) the Master ordered Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Fourth Defendant, of the strike out application and of the claim itself, to the date of his order, such costs to be assessed on an indemnity basis. He ordered Mr Ghadami to make a payment on account of those costs (as part and parcel of an order in favour also of the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth defendants) in the sum of £30,000. There was no appeal against that order: and since I have refused Mr Ghadami’s application to reopen the whole matter that order stands.

I can therefore focus on the second stage namely a consideration of the Relevant Matters. Here Mr Ghadami’s “new evidence” did not address any direct contract claim against Jan Bonde Nielsen but was designed to support the conspiracy claim brought against those secondarily liable. None of the material produced in support of the Relevant Matters provided anything of substance to support this case against Jan Bonde Nielsen, I have dismissed the Application, the Appeal and all ancillary applications. In the event I can (as regards the Relevant Matters) treat Jan Bonde Nielsen in the same way as the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Defendants.

There are no grounds for departing from the general rule. Mr Ghadami will pay these costs to be the subject of a detailed assessment. This assessment will be conducted on the indemnity basis (having regard to the nature of the allegation and the manner in which it was conducted). No good reason has been advanced why I should not order a payment on account. The total costs bill submitted in respect of those who Mr Buttimore represents amounts to £182,570. Mr Buttimore seeks an additional £84,000 on top of what the Master ordered (making an aggregate of £114,000). Given that (by contrast with the material deployed against Mr Chohan) Mr Ghadami’s evidence was not really directed to any of these Defendants (save for an attempt to establish a connection between Jan Bonde Nielsen and the Kazakhstan political elite) there may be greater scope for challenge to a bill of this size even on an assessment on the. I therefore award 60% of this sum namely £109,000.

Mr Rosenthal sought an order for costs on behalf of Lynn Properties Ltd (D16), Vitala Investment Holding Limited (D17) and Merix International Ventures Limited (D18), on the indemnity basis. The Master had ordered that they should have their costs of the strike out/summary judgment applications and of the claim (to be the subject of detailed assessment on the indemnity basis) and had ordered a payment on account in the sum of £35,000. Mr Rosenthal submitted that that order must stand and that since the date of that order these Defendants had incurred costs of £120,828 on the Application and Appeal plus £21,745 responding to the first Barrell application plus £8810 in respect of the application for a CRO (a total of £151,383).

I have endeavoured to look at this application with fresh eyes and not to treat it as predetermined by the outcome of other applications. But of necessity one must go through the same process. These Defendants are undoubtedly successful parties entitled to begin their analysis with reliance on the general rule. I have reviewed all of the circumstances attending the Application and the Appeal as regards these Defendants (and also the ancillary applications). I do not see any reason to depart from the general rule (and Mr Ghadami did not suggest any). Mr Ghadami will therefore pay the costs of these Defendants in dealing with the Relevant Matters, such costs to be the subject of a detailed assessment. Having regard to the nature of the Application and the Appeal, the manner in which it was pursued, and to the fact that the recusal application (which was not attended by these Defendants but on which they made short written submissions) and the two Barrell applications are held to be “totally without merit” these costs will be assessed on the indemnity basis.

Having made an order for detailed assessment I must consider whether an order should be made for payment on account. There is no good reason why such an order should not be made. I will make an order in the sum of £98,000 (being 65% of the submitted bill) in addition to the £35,000 awarded by the Master, payable by 4.00pm 15 September 2017.

I was told that Mr Ghadami has recently made significant dispositions of his property for (as I understood from him) private family reasons. No doubt his family will stand by him and help him with the significant costs burdens which (unless stayed) he faces in the immediate future.

There remains yet one more application to address. This was an application by the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Defendants (who remain the registered proprietors of (a) 42 Upper Grosvenor Street (Vitala) (b) 42 Reeves Mews (Lynn) and (c) 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews (Merix)). Issued and served on 30 May 2017 (one week before the consequentials hearing) it seeks an injunction restraining Mr Ghadami from registering further unilateral notices against the registered titles.

My main judgment I recorded how in October/November 2007 Mr Saunders had obtained the cancellation of unilateral notices which Mr Ghadami had registered against 42 Upper Grosvenor Street and 42 Reeves Mews. On 1 December 2008 Mr Ghadami brought about the registration of fresh unilateral notices. In June 2009 Vitala and Lynn procured their removal. On 10 April 2013 Mr Ghadami replaced them. In March 2014 Vitala and Lynn procured their removal. On 22 April 2015 Mr Ghadami applied to register fresh unilateral notices (this time also against 41 Upper Grosvenor Street). The Land Registry rejected application. So on 11 May 2015 Mr Ghadami reapplied, and this time succeeded. Lynn, Vitala and Merix applied for the removal of the unilateral notices: they were removed on 29 November 2016.

On 2 December 2016 Mr Ghadami applied yet again to register fresh unilateral notices (even though I had by then held that he had no arguable claim to specific performance of an obligation to transfer 42 Upper Grosvenor Street or 42 Reeves Mews, noted that he was not claiming transfer of 41 Upper Grosvenor Street or 41 Reeves Mews, and held that his claim could not be advanced as a proprietary estoppel claim). Mr Ghadami submitted to the Land Registry that my main judgment was simply “an approved draft judgment which is still being considered” and that “an order may be given thereafter” but that “there is… a further application to be determined on 13 February 2017 including a request… that in fact no order be made on the basis of the Panama Paper leak”. He asserted an unspecified “interest” in the properties. There is a pending application to remove these unilateral notices. But even if that application succeeds Mr Ghadami is likely (as the history I have recounted demonstrates) simply to invoke the administrative procedure of registration, and then await the implementation of the cancellation process.

The refurbishment of 42 Upper Grosvenor Street is almost complete and the property will be marketed. The redevelopment of 42 Reeves Mews as luxury met residential accommodation is nearing completion: these flats will also be marketed shortly. Merix is still in the course of redeveloping 41 Upper Grosvenor Street/41 Reeves Mews as a single dwelling.

By section 77(1) of the Land Registration Act 2002 the right to apply for the entry of unilateral notice must not be exercised without reasonable cause. The registered proprietors submit that Mr Ghadami is persistently entering unilateral notices without cause and is thereby committing the statutory tort identified in Nugent v Nugent [2015] Ch 121 at 129 (paragraph [23]): and they seek a final injunction restraining him.

In fairness to Mr Ghadami I think this is too rushed. But I see no difficulty in considering making an interim order which will bite if the outcome of the pending application is the removal of the existing unilateral notices. As Morgan J said in Nugent (in the paragraph cited):-

“I can see no difficulty in principle which would prevent the court from making an order, before a person applies to register a unilateral notice without reasonable cause, to restrain such a person from committing such a tort….. If an application were made for such [an order] on an interim basis, the usual approach in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 and/or Nottingham Building Society v Eurodynamics Systems plc [1993] FSR 468…. would be applied… ”

I will apply that approach. I am satisfied that (looking at matter most favourably from Mr Ghadami’s point of view) there is at least a serious issue to be tried as to whether he is committing the statutory tort. (There is an argument that on the determinations I have made that it is plain that he is committing the statutory tort: but now is not the time to address it). If an order is withheld damages are unlikely to be a sufficient remedy to the registered proprietors (given Mr Ghadami’s reported dispositions). If the injunction is issued protective steps can be taken to ameliorate the risk to Mr Ghadami. The registered proprietors can be subjected to an obligation to give Mr Ghadami (say) 14 days’ notice of any intended disposition: he will then be in a position to move for an injunction to restrain any disposal, if it would imperil his unspecified property interest. He will have to satisfy the Court that the existence of such an interest represents a serious issue to be tried and will have to give a cross-undertaking in damages (demonstrating the worth of that undertaking). Of course, because of the ECRO he will have to persuade the supervising judge that his injunction application stands a real prospect of success: and some of the timescales may have to be shortened to make his right effective. But subject to that requirement an injunction restraining Mr Ghadami from continuing to place unilateral notices on the register would seem to me to reflect the appropriate balance of convenience. I will so order. Although this is an interim order I do not require any cross-undertaking in damages because Mr Ghadami is enabled to protect his own interests.

The very final matter is an application by these Defendants that Mr Ghadami should pay their costs of the injunction application. In my judgment that is not a fair order to make against Mr Ghadami. I have disposed of the injunction application on an interim basis and by reference to the balance of convenience without making a final determination of the merits. The appropriate order is “costs reserved”. The practical effect of this is that if these Defendants do not apply for a permanent injunction and Mr Ghadami makes no application to discharge the interim injunction and makes no application for an injunction to prevent disposals then the matter will not come back before the Court, and the question of costs (which are modest) will not be adjudicated. But if the Defendants in effect require costs to be determined or if Mr Ghadami does make some application (to discharge the order or to seek an injunction himself) then the question of these costs can be addressed.

My order will therefore

(a)

Dismiss the Application (dated 14 March 2014);

(b)

Dismiss the Appeal (dated 22 April 2014);

(c)

Dismiss the recusal application (dated 4 February 2016);

(d)

Dismiss the first Barrell application (dated 14 October 2016);

(e)

Dismiss the second Barrell application (dated 1 June 2017);

(f)

Stay Mr Ghadami’s current (and third) Barrell application generally;

(g)

Refuse Mr Ghadami’s oral application for permission to bring contempt proceedings against Mr Johnson;

(h)

Refuse Mr Ghadami’s application (dated 14 October 2016) for permission to bring contempt proceedings against the Ninth Defendant;

(i)

Refuse Mr Ghadami’s application (dated 14 March 2014) for permission to bring contempt proceedings the Second and each of the Fourth to Eighth Defendants inclusive;

(j)

Refuse Mr Ghadami’s application (dated 20 December 2015) for permission to amend his Particulars of Claim;

(k)

Make an ECRO against Mr Ghadami in the terms indicated in paragraph [62] above.

(l)

Order Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Second Defendant to be assessed on the indemnity basis down to and including 28 March 2014 and from and after that date on the standard basis and to pay £45,000 on account of those costs by 4.00pm 15 September 2017;

(m)

Order Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Third Defendant of the action to be the subject of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis and to pay £150,000 on account of those costs by 4.00pm 15 September 2017;

(n)

Order Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Defendants of the action to be the subject of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis and to pay £109,000 on account of those costs by 4.00p.m. on 15 September 2017;

(o)

Order Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Sixth Defendant of the action to be the subject of a detailed assessment on the indemnity basis and to pay £62,000 on account of those costs by 4.00p.m. on 15 September 2017;

(p)

Order Mr Ghadami to pay the costs of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Defendants of the action to be assessed on the indemnity basis and to pay £133,000 on account of those costs by 4.00pm 15 September 2017;

(q)

Direct that where an order has been made for detailed assessment then the paying and receiving party may instead agree the amount of such costs;

(r)

Grant an injunction until further order restraining Mr Ghadami from seeking to register any unilateral notice against the respective registered titles of Vitala, Lynn or Merix to 42 Upper Grosvenor Street, 42 Reeves Mews and 41 Upper Grosvenor Street and 41 Reeves Mews but ordering them to give 14 days’ written notice to Mr Ghadami of any intended disposal (meaning a transfer or the grant of any derivative interest) to the intent that Mr Ghadami may be enabled to consider what (if any) application he wishes to seek to issue;

(s)

Reserve the costs of the injunction application dated 30 May 2017 to the next hearing concerning the injunction or any application arising out of it.

It is my intention that the foregoing will form a sufficient summary of the order to enable Mr Ghadami to advance any appeal even if there is no sealed order. I myself refuse permission to appeal so that Mr Ghadami is enabled to proceed forthwith.

At hand-down I added a footnote to this judgment. After the judgment had been prepared in readiness for hand-down at 2.00pm today Mr Ghadami sent me two e-mails (at 12:06) requesting me not to deliver judgment, but to allow him the opportunity to adduce new evidence to demonstrate that there never had been a Jersey company called Larios Properties Ltd.

In my main judgment at paragraph [54] I noted submissions made by Mr Ghadami about the existence of a Larios Properties Ltd share certificate in Jersey form (though it was common ground that the Larios Properties Limited that owned the Mayfair properties was a Cypriot company): I said that the Jersey form seemed to me a mistake. In the second Barrell application Mr Ghadami drew my attention to another reference to “Larios Jersey”: I dealt with this in paragraph [30] above. Mr Ghadami now wishes to demonstrate that there never was a Jersey company called Larios Properties Ltd, asserts that this is “obviously relevant when considering whether the transactions were sham transactions”, and argues that paragraph [54] of my main judgment (suggesting that the Jersey form share certificate may be a mistake) is wrong - because there is no Jersey company.

None of this matters. So I handed down judgment.