Ghassemian v Chatsworth Court Freehold Company Ltd & Ors

There are three applications before me today. First, there is an application by Mr Ghassemian, who is the son of the Defendant, Mrs Sartipy, dated 12^th February 2016 seeking to set aside a writ of possession and control dated 28^th September 2015 (“the Writ”). Secondly, there is the Claimants’ application dated 16^th February 2016 for a civil restraint order. Thirdly, there is the Claimants’ application dated 26^th February 2016 to set aside an order of Henderson J. made on 29^th January 2016. Unfortunately, this case has a long and complex history, largely caused by numerous applications by Mr Ghassemian, which means that this ex tempore judgment will be of some length.

The background is as follows. This case concerns flat 56, Chatsworth Court, Pembroke Road, London W8 6DH (“the Property”). The Defendant is the registered proprietor of a long lease of the Property and the Claimants are respectively the lessee-owned freehold company of Chatsworth Court and the maintenance trustee under the lease. Until 30^th September 2015, Mr Ghassemian lived at the Property. He has been the driving force behind, and personally involved in, the opposition to the Claimants’ claim, which was initially for a money judgment for unpaid service charges against the Defendant, followed by a charging order, followed by an order for sale and possession of the property.

Mr Ghassemian has participated in this litigation in three different capacities. First, from the commencement of the service charge claim in 2010 until about 30^th April 2012 he purported to act solely on behalf of the Defendant. Then, from 30^th April 2012 until 30^th September 2015, when the Writ was executed in respect of the Property, he purported to act on his own behalf as the beneficiary under a discretionary trust. That trust, as I will explain, has been held by the court to be a sham. Finally, since 30^th September 2015, he has alleged that he is a regulated tenant of the Property. Mr Ghassemian’s allegation is that when he was 13 years old he was granted a tenancy by his mother in 1987 and he first produced a copy to the Claimants of this alleged tenancy in a witness statement dated 6^th October 2015.

I now need to describe in more detail the chronology of these proceedings. Annexed to this judgment is a copy of a chronology prepared on behalf of the Claimants. As will be seen from this document, there are a series of different proceedings and the chronology is of some complexity. I will try to confine my account in the body of this judgment to the events most relevant to these applications. In summary, the Defendant fell into arrears of service charges due under the lease and so the Claimants issued a claim in May 2010 seeking to cover the arrears. Judgment was obtained on the service charge claim in June 2011, when the Defence was struck out for failure to comply with an unless order. Since then, there has been a host of applications pursued by Mr Ghassemian, either in person or represented by Counsel.

Eventually, a charging order was made over the Property on 28^th March 2014 and an order for sale was made on 10^th June 2015. Mr Ghassemian attended the hearing on 10^th June 2015 and was represented by Counsel, unsuccessfully. He then sought to appeal the order for sale. A hearing took place before H.H.J. Mitchell on 17^th August 2015. The Judge considered the application for permission to appeal together with an application by the Claimants to vary the charging order and order for sale to add additional costs. Following that hearing, by an order dated 18^th August 2015, Judge Mitchell refused permission to appeal and made a civil restraint order, which applies to County Court proceedings, against Mr Ghassemian. Mr Ghassemian subsequently sought to appeal the variations to the charging order and the order for sale and applied for a stay. The stay was refused by Arnold J. on 10^th September 2015. The Writ was issued on 28^th September 2015 and executed on 30^th September 2015.

It is a regrettable fact that Mr Ghassemian has sought to set aside the Writ and/or to be reinstated to the Property on no less than seven occasions, including the current application. As I will explain, it appears that he is currently preparing an eighth application, in case this one is unsuccessful. On 29^th October 2015, Mr Ghassemian filed an appellant’s notice in which he sought to appeal the charging order, the order for sale, an order of 15^th October 2015 which was made in the Central London County Court, and the civil restraint order. On 17^th October 2015, Mr Ghassemian was given permission by Barling J. to appeal paragraph 5 of the order for sale which provided for delivery of possession but this permission was revoked on 19^th January 2016 by Newey J., who held that there was no jurisdiction for the High Court to give permission to appeal, it having been previously refused by Judge Mitchell.

Following the grant of permission by Barling J., Mr Ghassemian sought to be reinstated to the Property pending determination of his appeal, but this was refused. He then sought to appeal that refusal to the Court of Appeal. Even though permission to appeal had been revoked on 19^th January 2016, Mr Ghassemian insisted that the hearing before the Court of Appeal should proceed and at that hearing, represented by Counsel, he sought reinstatement to the property. The Court of Appeal refused Mr Ghassemian’s application on the ground that there was no pending appeal and dismissed his application for permission to appeal.

On 18^th January 2016 Mr Ghassemian issued a new claim (“the New Claim”) seeking a determination that he was a regulated tenant and, as a result, seeking an order that he be reinstated to the Property. This was served on the First Claimant at the Court of Appeal hearing on 26^th January 2016. The New Claim was struck out as an abuse of process by Master Matthews on 22^nd January 2016. On 29^th January 2016 Mr Ghassemian applied to set aside that order and on 19^th February 2016 his application was dismissed. Mr Ghassemian stated at this hearing that he had just issued a further application to set aside the order for possession in the County Court, having sought permission to do so from the judge supervising his civil restraint order. That application, which is clearly preparatory to an eighth application either to set aside the Writ or to be restored to the Property, is due to be heard on 11^th March 2016.

In the application before me, Mr Ghassemian seeks to set aside the Writ, yet again. The arguments on behalf of the Claimants are as follows. First that this application is an abuse of the process of the court. It is well established that, having lost a case, an unsuccessful litigant cannot have “a second bite of the cherry”. The Claimants’ case is that Mr Ghassemian is attempting to have a seventh bite of the cherry. Secondly, the Claimants submit that there is no material change in circumstance to justify yet another application. Thirdly, even if this application were not an abuse, the Claimants contend that that a writ of possession can only be set aside after it has been executed if there is an error in the possession order, which is therefore set aside, or if the writ was obtained by fraud, or there is an abuse of process or oppression in the execution of the writ.

This principle is summarised in the case of Ephson Homes Housing Association v Moisejevs[2001]33 HLR 594. In particular, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Simon Brown L.J. said at page 599:

“The effect of Aldwinckle itself was helpfully summarised by Lord Justice Nourse in London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham v Hill (1994) 27 HLR 368, 371, thus:

‘... after a warrant for possession has been executed in this class of case it can only be suspended or set aside if either (1) the order on which it is issued is itself set aside; (2) the warrant has been obtained by fraud; or (3) there has been an abuse of process or oppression in its execution’”.

Simon Brown L.J. went on to cite the case of Camden London Borough Council v Akanni[1997] 29 HLR 845, 849, where Brooke L.J. said:

“The context in which the court is willing in a rare, but appropriate, case to intervene to nullify the execution of a warrant for possession goes back to the principles set out in the judgment of Bowen LJ in this court in McHenry v Lewis [1882] 22 Ch 397 at 408. He said:

‘I would much rather rest on the general principle that the court can and will interfere whenever there is a vexation and oppression to prevent the administration of justice being perverted for an unjust end. I would rather do that than attempt to define what vexation and oppression mean; they must vary with the circumstances of each case’”.

The Claimants say that Mr Ghassemian’s challenges to the order for sale have failed both in the County Court and the High Court, so it is not possible for him to challenge the possession order, and his assertion that there was a fraud or oppression in relation to the execution of the Writ has no merit whatsoever. In particular, it is alleged that his argument rests on factual allegations which are patently untrue. The Claimants go further and say that as well as lying to the court in this and a series of other applications, Mr Ghassemian has fabricated documents to try to support his case. Finally, the Claimants submit that Mr Ghassemian’s argument that the court should order reinstatement because of the New Claim cannot be correct: first because a court cannot set aside a writ if there are no grounds to do so, and this would not fall within any of the grounds to which I have just referred; and secondly, because the New Claim has been struck out and Mr Ghassemian’s application to set aside that order was also dismissed on 19^th February 2016.

Before I turn to consider the allegations of abuse of process, I need to consider the extensive evidence that has been presented to me of Mr Ghassemian’s dishonesty, attempts to mislead the court, and fabrication of documents. Mr Armstrong referred to a judgment of Patten J. in the case of Re: Equity & Provident Limited [2002] EWHC186 (Ch). A petition was presented by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry which sought the winding up of a company known as Equity & Provident Limited on grounds of public interest. Essentially, the grounds were: the company’s failure to cooperate with requests for information made by the Secretary of State; the misleading nature of the business that was conducted by the company; and the company’s attempts to solicit investments without being authorised to conduct investment business under the Financial Services Act.

Patten J. recorded at [5] that from the date of its incorporation until he resigned on 8^th June 1998 Mr Ghassemian was the sole director of the company. Patten J. went on to make extremely serious findings against Mr Ghassemian in that case. In particular, at [17], referring to some correspondence purportedly from a Mr Langroody relied on by Mr Ghassemian, he said:

“I do not believe one word of this evidence. It seems to me obvious that the correspondence purportedly written by Mr Langroody was designed to obtain some clarification from the FSA of its view of the scope of the provisions of the Insurance Companies Act which might assist the company in the queries which the FSA had raised. To suggest that a letter written in similar terms only a few days later was an unconnected coincidence and that Mr. Langroody referred to English case law unprompted by Mr Ghassemian or the company simply defies belief. The more I listened to Mr Ghassemian the more convinced I became that he was the author of this correspondence and was tripped up when the fax footers were brought to his attention”.

So, the judge concluded that Mr Ghassemian, whilst relying on correspondence apparently from a third party, had written it himself.

At [22], Patten J. referred to Mr Ghassemian’s application to discharge the provisional liquidator, which came before Mr Peter Leaver QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. At [23], Patten J. recorded that Mr Ghassemian made submissions to the effect that there was a legitimate concern that the Deputy Judge might not have been impartial and invited Mr Leaver to set aside his order and remit the matter for hearing before another judge, which Mr Leaver declined to do. Patten J. said:

“I mention this matter not because it has had any practical consequences but because it represents a further example, in my judgment, of the lengths to which Mr Ghassemian is prepared to go in order to seek to obtain the result he wants. I am more than satisfied that the suggestion that he was telephoned by a member of the Lord Chancellor's Department was a complete fabrication on the part of Mr. Ghassemian. It seems to me most unlikely that any member of the Lord Chancellor’s Department would have been in court to hear an application which was not even listed to be heard by Mr Leaver…”

He then continued:

“I also find it impossible to believe that a member of the Lord Chancellor's Department would contact a party to the application without first communicating with the judge. The reality is that Mr Ghassemian invented this story in a vain attempt to obtain a rehearing of his unsuccessful attempt to discharge the provisional liquidator”.

At [36], Patten J. referred to further correspondence, purportedly from a third party, which he decided was written by Mr Ghassemian. He said:

“I have reached the conclusion that all of this correspondence was written by Mr Ghassemian and that he must take full responsibility for the untrue statements made about Mr Ghassemian's involvement in the company”

Understandably, in the light of these very serious findings, Patten J. said at [65]:

“It will be apparent from those parts of my judgment that I regard Mr Ghassemian’s conduct of the Company’s affairs as wholly unacceptable. I am afraid to say that he struck me as both devious and dishonest, and in short was willing to say or do anything to fend off the legitimate enquiries of the regulatory authorities”.

Mr Ghassemian has drawn my attention to the case of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bairstow [2003] EWCA Civ 321. At [27] the Vice Chancellor stated as follows:

“I would accept the submission of counsel for Mr Bairstow that the factual findings and conclusions of Nelson J. in the earlier proceedings are not admissible as evidence of the facts so found in these proceedings. Counsel for the Secretary of State accepted that he could not rely on any statutory or common law exception to render those conclusions admissible for the purpose of proving those facts”.

I accept that I cannot rely on Patten J.’s very serious conclusions about Mr Ghassemian’s perjury and fabrication of documents as evidence in these proceedings that those facts were true. However, at [17] of the judgment in Bairstow the Vice Chancellor, having cited Hollington v F Hewthorn & Co Ltd [1943] KB 587,made clear that a conviction is only proof that another court considered, in that case, that the defendant was guilty of careless driving. It seems to me that when I turn to the Claimants’ application for an extended civil restraint order, Patten J.’s finding that Mr Ghassemian was dishonest in the case before him is something that I must bear in mind when considering whether to exercise my discretion to make such an order.

The next example that has been drawn to my attention, which is much closer to the present case, is that in a claim for adverse possession, which Mr Ghassemian brought against the first Claimant, Deputy Adjudicator Mark found that he had concocted his case, fabricated his evidence and referred to his willingness to mislead. In addition, on 1^st October 2015, Deputy Master Partridge revoked his own order of 30^th September 2015 made in these proceedings. This is one of a number of orders which Mr Ghassemian has obtained ex parte, only for the judge or master, when hearing the inter partes application, to find that he or she had been misled by Mr Ghassemian. On this occasion Deputy Master Partridge revoked his order on the ground that it was made upon the basis of misleading evidence from Mr Ghassemian.

Furthermore, on 23^rd February 2016 the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by a company known as Tigris Industries Inc., in proceedings which were brought against Mrs Sartipy. These proceedings followed an unsuccessful application against Tigris Industries Inc. by Mr Ghassemian and his mother for adverse possession. Mrs Sartipy alleged in those proceedings that she held the Property on trust for Mr Ghassemian. Master Teverson found that the will that was said to give rise to the trust was a sham. Mrs Sartipy successfully appealed to the High Court but the Court of Appeal allowed Tigris’s appeal. It follows that the assertions made by Mr Ghassemian that he was the beneficiary of a discretionary trust in the service charges claim were untrue.

Turning now to the current application, I find that there is that there is extensive evidence that Mr Ghassemian has attempted to mislead the Court and has fabricated documents in order to do so. In particular, a fundamental part of Mr Ghassemian’s current application is that he claims to have issued an application notice dated 1^st June 2015, which included the allegation that he was a regulated tenant, and exhibited his purported tenancy agreement. He alleges that District Judge Silverman, who heard the case on 10^th June 2015, refused to hear his application of 1^st June 2015. The truth is that that application was not issued or filed on 1^st June 2015. It did not exist at that date.

I find that Mr Ghassemian backdated an application issued in October 2015 and falsely claimed in his witness statement that it had been issued and filed on 1^st June 2015. The evidence in support of this is set out in a witness statement from Susan Fritsche, solicitor for the Claimants, dated 17^th February 2016. In particular, at [18], Ms Fritsche responded to Mr Ghassemian’s evidence that he lodged an application notice on 1^st June 2015. She explained that:

Ms Fritsche then states at [19]-[20]:

“19.

Furthermore, earlier today I attended a Central London County Court Users Group meeting. I raised the issue of Mr Ghassemian’s alleged application of 1 June 2015 and I also referred to the email that he has exhibited to his statement from Alex Scott dated 4 June 2015 (page 23 of his exhibit). Mr Ghassemian relies on this email as evidence that he did issue the application (and pay the fee) on or around 1 June 2015. See paragraph 47 of his statement.

20.

Mr Ghassemian states, quite clearly, that the email from Alex Scott acknowledged receipt of the £50 court fee in respect of the1 June application. The documents which I have been given are exhibited herewith marked “SF12” and they prove beyond any reasonable doubt that Mr Ghassemian is misleading the court once again”.

This evidence requires further explanation.

Mr Ghassemian said at [47] of his witness statement dated 12^th February 2016:

“CLCC confirmed by letter on 28.1.2016 that they received £50 and £140 on 30.06.2015. The latter amount was for the appellant’s notice I lodged – as from the order for sale of 10.6.2015 and the former amount of £50 was in respect of the all important 1.6.2015 application notice that the then Manager of CLCC had emailed to me on 4.6.2015 acknowledging receipt of the same and confirming that it will be before the hearing on 10.6.2015 that as I stated earlier was unfortunately not to be so…”.

So, Mr Ghassemian was quite clearly saying in his witness statement that he had paid £50 in respect of his 1^st June 2015 application and that this had been confirmed by email. In support of this, he exhibited an email from Mr Scott recording receipt of £50. Comparing this document to Ms Fritsche’s exhibit SF12, it is clear that Mr Ghassemian has removed from this email chain his own email which reveals what the £50 fee was paid in respect of. The email to Mr Scott makes clear that the £50 payment was in respect of a quite different application dated 15^th May 2015. The fact that Mr Ghassemian, on this application, has deliberately deleted his own email from this email chain and has falsely claimed in his witness statement that the fee was paid in respect of the 1^st June 2015 application is extremely serious. It amounts to lying to the court and falsification of documents.

Unfortunately, that is not the only allegation of dishonesty which I have to deal with. Mr Ghassemian, for purposes connected with his allegation that the Writ was wrongly issued, has sought to allege that the Writ was obtained pursuant to a form known as a N293A form which he has included at tab 3 of his bundle. This form is only suitable for a writ of possession against trespassers. Mr Ghassemian has put forward a case that the wrong document was used, and that the Claimants misled the court because he is not and never has been a trespasser.

There is overwhelming evidence before me that this document, far from being filed by the Claimants, was created by Mr Ghassemian for the purposes of his application. As is made quite clear in evidence to which I refer below, the Claimants allege that the document is a forgery. At the request of Mr Ghassemian, on 25^th February 2106, I granted an adjournment to enable him to put in evidence to meet this very serious allegation. He has not done so. He has produced a couple of emails which, as I will explain, say absolutely nothing.

I now turn to the evidence which has been served by the Claimants which explains that the N293A form was not filed by them. First, there is a witness statement of Susan Fritsche dated 23^rd February 2016 which sets the background from her perspective as the solicitor acting for the Claimants. In particular at [9] she says:

“In paragraph 18 of Mr Ghassemian’s skeleton argument he makes reference to false information being given to the High Court on the application for the writ of possession and transfer of the enforcement of the order for possession from the County Court to the High Court. In support of that allegation, he makes reference in paragraph 19 to a form N293A which he exhibited in Tab 3 of his bundle. I have shown both Ben Pinner and Cheryl Thomas a copy of the N293A document exhibited by Mr Ghassemian and they have informed me that it was not a document which was filed by them and it is a document that would only have been used to evict trespassers and persons unknown. Cheryl Thomas has also highlighted various discrepancies in the document produced by Mr Ghassemian such as (a) the failure to include the defendant’s address in part one of the form, which is impossible for the High Court Enforcement Officer not to do as the form is generated on their computer system (b) the amount claimed in the form is incorrect and (c) the figure for interest is also incorrect.”

I then turn to the statement of Ben Pinner, a paralegal High Court Enforcement Officer and agent for High Court Solutions. At [5]-[8] of his statement he says:

“5.

I received instructions from High Court Solutions to apply for the transfer of the enforcement of the order for sale from the County Court to the High Court and to obtain a sealed writ of possession for the property known as 56 Chatsworth Court, Pembroke Road... [he gives the address].

6.

With my instructions, I received the completed form PF86A Writ of Possession dated 21 September 2015 which had been signed by the claimants’ solicitors… together with a copy of the order for sale...

7.

On 28 September 2015, I issued an application notice N244… in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court which sought leave for the transfer of the enforcement of the Order for Sale to the High Court pursuant to section 41 of the County Courts Act 1984. There was no requirement for the application to be dealt with on notice and I attended before Deputy Master Partridge on the same day who ordered the claim to be transferred to the High Court…

8.

I then presented the sealed PF86A form and sealed Order of Deputy Master Partridge to the High Court for the Writ of Possession to be sealed. The sealed Writ of Possession was then sent by me to High Court Solutions on 28 September 2015 to be enforced”.

He confirms that the document produced by Mr Ghassemian, namely the N293A Combined Certificate of Judgment, had never been seen by him and it is not a document that he had filed with the court. Mr Pinner exhibits the documents that he filed including the relevant form PF86A. Ms Cheryl Thomas, also employed by High Court Solutions, has confirmed this in further evidence. She says at [5] that she has sent a completed PF86A form to Susan Fritsche to be signed and returned to her: “The signed form was returned and I then sent it to Mr Pinner with instructions to deal with the transfer of the Order for Possession to the High Court by a High Court Enforcement Officer”. She then says that there are many discrepancies in the form N293A which has been produced by Mr Ghassemian. I shall refer to certain examples. She says:

“9.2

Had we raised the N293A form, then we would most definitely have included the defendant’s address in part one of the form. It is impossible for us not to do this as the form is generated on our system at a click of the button. Furthermore, a case cannot be generated on our system without the defendant’s address…

9.4

Our system would generate the amount due as £50381.80 and not as shown with the comma. The figure is also incorrect. Whoever has completed the spoof form has requested an additional £111.75 which cannot and is never added to the N293A form but is added to the subsequent Writ of Possession only”.

There are many other examples that she gives. Her evidence is that this document is a relatively amateur forgery which her system could never have produced. Mr Ghassemian adduced no evidence in reply to this but merely produced an email that he had sent to someone in the Queen’s Bench Division asking for confirmation that a form N293A was on the relevant file. He did not receive that confirmation. Finally, and conclusively in my view, Mr Cripps, another witness on behalf of the Claimants, has served a statement which explains that he has checked the relevant file and there is no N293A form on it. In my view, the only possible explanation is that Mr Ghassemian has forged this document for the purposes of these proceedings and has been caught doing so.

I should also add that it appears that Mr Ghassemian attempted to hide documents from the Court File which showed that the correct forms had been issued. In particular, documents obtained from the Court File on the afternoon of 18^th February 2016, when this matter was heard by Master McCloud, show that the Claimants’ agent had issued the correct form of request, namely PF86A, had applied for transfer of enforcement under section 41 of the County Courts Act 1984 on a form N244 and that Deputy Master Partridge had ordered the transfer as requested. However, according to the evidence of Mr Cripps, Mr Ghassemian tried to remove form PF86A, N244, and the order of Deputy Master Partridge from the Court File. He took the relevant documents, which Master McCloud had allowed to be copied at the court office, and hid them behind curtains in the Royal Courts of Justice. They were then found by Mr Cripps who had followed Mr Ghassemian when he left the court office before reappearing.

Furthermore, there have been a number of minutes of order which have made their way into the Court File, prepared by Mr Ghassemian, which have not been the orders made by the relevant masters on those occasions. I refer in particular to the bundle prepared by Mr Ghassemian for the hearing on 18^th February 2016 which includes what purports to be an order made by Master McCloud on 9^th December 2015. It is in fact completely different to the minute of order which was approved by the Master. Ms Fritsche’s evidence makes clear that is not the only occasion where Mr Ghassemian has produced a minute of order which is very different to the version which a judge or master has approved. The same thing happened in relation to an order of District Judge Silverman. Judge Silverman confirmed that Mr Ghassemian’s minute was not the correct version, which had been received by the Claimant’s solicitors from the court.

It follows that, on the evidence before me, I conclude that Mr Ghassemian has repeatedly attempted to mislead the court on this application and on previous applications in these proceedings, has lied in his witness statement and has fabricated documents to support his case.

I now turn to the substance of the applications. The first issue that I must consider is whether Mr Ghassemian is barred from making this application as it is an abuse of process of the court. As I have said, this is the seventh time in which the same or a similar application has been made by him. The policy reasons for refusing to allow litigants to have a second bite of the cherry are twofold. First, the successful party should not be vexed in the same matter twice. Secondly, the administration of justice and the public interest requires that a litigant should not be entitled repeatedly to bring his case. This prejudices other litigants who wish to use these courts. In my judgment, there is overwhelming evidence that Mr Ghassemian has presented this case and these allegations on numerous occasions. When he has been unsuccessful, he has issued a fresh application before a different judge or master. I will not set out in this judgment all of the details of his many attempts. Rather, I will rely on the chronology which has been prepared by the Claimant and which I have annexed to this judgment.

I am in no doubt that this application is an abuse of the process of the court. It is plain that yet another application by Mr Ghassemian to set aside the Writ cannot be allowed to proceed. I have also considered Mr Ghassemian’s attempt to argue at [35] of his witness statement that a very different set of circumstances now apply compared to his previous applications. This is a high hurdle to surmount, given the number of applications seeking essentially the same relief that Mr Ghassemian has tried to make. The only material change in factual circumstances since the hearing before Barling J. on 17^th December 2015 is that the permission to appeal which he was granted on that occasion has now been revoked. In other words, the change of circumstance, if anything, has made Mr Ghassemian’s position even weaker. The Writ was issued to enforce the order for sale and all of his challenges to the order for sale have now been unsuccessful.

Mr Ghassemian also tried to rely on a Practice Note from Master Fontaine dated 14^th December 2015 as a change of circumstance. In my view, that Practice Note is irrelevant to the present case. It concerns N293A forms. Given that I have found that Mr Ghassemian’s claim that the Claimants obtained the Writ pursuant to an N293A form is false, then the Practice Note, which concerns judgment debts of £600 or possession orders against trespassers, has nothing to do with the present case. Furthermore, a change in court practice in December 2015 could not be used to invalidate a writ already executed in accordance with the appropriate practice and procedure in force at the time. So, even if the Practice Note did have some relevance, which it does not, it would not affect the present case.

I also note that Mr Ghassemian tried to raise lack of notice as a ground to set aside the Writ before Master McCloud in December 2015. His arguments were accepted when presented to the Master at an ex parte hearing. However, when Master McCloud heard both parties on 9^th December 2015, in common with many other masters and judges in this case, she considered that she had been misled by Mr Ghassemian and revoked her order. So, the only change that has occurred since the previous applications is that Mr Ghassemian’s position has become even worse, and it is quite clear that there is no reason to reopen this case.

Even if I am wrong about that, I consider that the allegations that Mr Ghassemian seeks to raise are totally without merit. First, his argument based on his alleged status as regulated tenant cannot be entertained on the present application. He could only raise this issue by an appeal against the order for sale but his attempts to appeal have all failed. Secondly, I turn to Mr Ghassemian’s arguments relating to the issue and/or enforcement of the writ itself. Many of those arguments did not focus on alleged oppression in the execution of the writ, which is the relevant question. Mr Ghassemian’s main arguments were that no permission was obtained from the court to issue the Writ and that he was not given notice of the Writ. The allegation that no permission was obtained, as I understand it, was not raised until this hearing, and so the Claimants have not had the opportunity to respond to it in evidence. I doubt if it is correct, as it appears from the evidence of Mr Pinner that he attended on the Master and the application and the Writ were approved by the court. In any event, I would not consider, in the exercise of my discretion, that this would be a ground for setting aside the Writ. This would require evidence of some kind of oppression or positive unfairness against Mr Ghassemian, and I have seen nothing like that.

As to Mr Ghassemian’s argument that he should have been given notice of the Writ, he relied on an ex tempore judgment of Rose J. in Helen Nicholas v Secretary of Statefor Defence [2013] EWHC 2945 (Ch). That case concerned an application by Ms Nicholas to set aside an order made by Deputy Master Matthews granting the Secretary of State permission to issue a writ of possession. There were two grounds pursuant to which Rose J. felt it appropriate to set aside the writ in that case. The first was that the court had been informed, when permission to issue the writ of possession was obtained, that the defendant had not applied for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and that there was no order in force staying the order for possession. That was untrue, and the court was misled. Secondly, Rose J. considered CPR 83.13(8)(a) and concluded that notice was required to be given to Ms Nicholas, and that the absence of notice was an additional reason for setting aside the writ of possession.

CPR 83.13(8)(a) provides that permission to issue a writ of possession will not be granted unless it is shown:

“that every person in actual possession of the whole or any part of the land (“the occupant”) has received such notice of the proceedings as appears to the court sufficient to enable the occupant to apply to the court for any relief which the occupant may be entitled;”

The note at paragraph 83.13.9 of the White Book indicates that the effect of this rule is that notice of an application for a writ of possession must be given to every occupant of all or a part of the property, and that the court will not grant permission without the occupants having had the opportunity to apply to the court for relief. The case of Leicester City Council v Aldwinkle (The Times, April 5 1991) is relied on in support of this proposition. Mr. Armstrong submitted, convincingly, that the proposition set out in the White Book is incorrect and is not supported by the case therein cited. He submitted that the rule is concerned with whether or not the relevant occupant has had actual notice, not whether he or she has been given notice. However, this is not a point that I need to decide. I have held that Mr Ghassemian is barred from raising this allegation.

In any event, even if it is the case that notice is required to be given under CPR 18.13(3)(a), in order to set aside a writ of possession I would need to be satisfied that the execution of the writ had been oppressive. In the circumstances of the present case it is clear that Mr Ghassemian had notice of the relevant proceedings and that he was well aware of the order for possession. He made many unsuccessful applications for relief from the effects of this order. Therefore, in the words of CPR 83.13(8), he received notice of the proceedings sufficient to enable him to apply to the court for relief.

Furthermore, there has clearly been no oppression in the manner of execution of the Writ. Nothing has been unfair to Mr Ghassemian and therefore even if I had considered that his submission about the effect of CPR 83.13(8)(a) was correct, I would certainly not have set aside service of the writ. I should add, finally, that Mr Ghassemian tried to rely on the New Claim as justifying an order for reinstatement. That is a claim that has been struck out and his application to set aside the strike out has also been dismissed. Therefore, it does rise to any arguable point on this issue.

For the reasons set out above, I conclude that Mr Ghassemian’s application is totally without merit and I dismiss it.

I then turn to the Claimants’ application for an extended civil restraint order. The Claimants first applied for a limited civil restraint order on 14^th December 2015. That position has then been updated by extensive evidence which Mr Ghassemian was given the opportunity to answer in evidence but did not do so. There are two express findings that prior to this application Mr Ghassemian has made applications which were totally without merit. In particular, I refer to the order of Deputy Master Partridge and the order of Master Fontaine. I have also found that this application is totally without merit. Furthermore, there are numerous instances, which I have set out in this judgment, of cases where Mr Ghassemian has applied ex parte to the court, has misled the judge or master and has obtained an order which has subsequently been discharged, the judge or master referring to the fact that he or she has been misled. Although not expressly stated by the judge or master to have been applications which were totally without merit, this was plainly the case.

I should also add that Mr Ghassemian issued the New Claim which was an abuse of process, and showed his refusal to accept the decision of the court. This, as a part of the long history of repeated applications to which I have referred, shows his determination to raise the same matters again and again if a civil restraint order is not made. So, for those reasons I will make an extended civil restraint order and will hear from Counsel shortly as to the form of that order.

Finally, I consider the application of the Claimants to discharge Henderson J.’s order of 29^th January 2016. That is another instance where Mr Ghassemian misled the court into making an order. The relevant facts are set out by Ms Fritsche in her witness statement of 18^th February 2016. In summary, Ms Fritsche says that:

“On 27^th January 2016, I informed Mr Ghassemian that the Claimants were willing to undertake not to sell the property or remove any contents until his new claim had been determined or a further order. I objected to the paragraph in the application notice dated 18^th January 2016 seeking a determination of the new claim prior to 29^th January”.

She then says at paragraph 30 that in spite of that limited assurance of a temporary undertaking, “I then discovered that he filed an application to set aside Master Matthews’ order and it was listed for 19^th February”. She continues at [31]-[32]:

“31.

I assumed that this would resolve matters until the hearing on 19^th February 2016. However, on 1st February 2016 I was surprised to receive an email from Mr Ghassemian enclosing an order he had obtained from Mr Justice Henderson on Friday 29^th January 2016 ordering the Claimants not to exchange contracts for sale of the Property or remove the contents and chattels pending determination of the appeal in claim number CH/2015/0495. Mr Ghassemian had of course given absolutely no indication he was going to make such an application.

32.

That order was made in claim CH/2015/0495 i.e. the main proceedings in which Mr Ghassemian had sought to appeal the various county court orders. The only matter which was still live, however, was the application for permission to appeal against the civil restraint order of HHJ Mitchell dated 18^th August 2015. That appeal is of course of no relevance whatsoever to the sale of the Property. Permission to appeal against the order of 10^th June 2015 had been revoked”.

So, Mr Ghassemian had appeared before Henderson J. ex parte and had obtained an order preventing exchange of contracts on the Property until determination of proceedings which had absolutely nothing to do with the sale of the Property.

Ms Fritsche then contacted Henderson J.’s clerk and received an email in response which included the following:

“On reflection, I have very grave doubts whether there was a proper jurisdictional basis for my order of 29^th January. I regret this but hope that no harm has been caused because its purpose was merely to record in formal terms an undertaking which on the material before me the respondents, through Wedlake Bell, had already expressed their willingness to give. No order for costs was sought”.

Unfortunately, unbeknown to Henderson J., because the order extended the undertaking until the conclusion of quite separate proceedings, its effect was not the same as the undertaking which Wedlake Bell had offered. Therefore I have no hesitation in discharging the order of Henderson J., as I am sure he would wish to do in the present circumstances. That concludes this judgment.

MR ARMSTRONG: Exactly, so I was going to... when I had spoken to Mr Holden I was going to suggest that it be altered to add, so that it will read:

“It is ordered that you be restrained from issuing claims or making applications in any of the courts specified below concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this order was made and in particular which relates to the property known as flat 56 Chatsworth Court, Pembroke Road... [etcetera] without the permission of...”

Of course, the next thing is that a judge has to be named. Having dealt with this matter, I would invite your lordship to nominate yourself as the named judge. Obviously, I did not want to put it in there. I did not want to sort of overstep the mark but clearly you have made very important findings in relation to this matter and you have had the―

THE JUDGE: It seems pretty general. It says... I have got it now in your bundle:

“If at any stage in proceedings commenced in the County Court or transferred to the County Court under section 40 the High Court thinks it desirable that the proceedings or any part of them should be heard or determined in the High Court, it may order the transfer to the High Court of the proceedings or as the case may be that part of them”.

So, what I intend to do is transfer that part of the proceedings, namely that application to me now and is there anything you would like to tell me about it?

THE JUDGE: I am going to order that the application that Mr Ghassemian indicates that he has made in the County Court be transferred to me now in the High Court pursuant to section 41 of the County Courts Act 1984 which provides that if at any stage in proceedings commenced in the County Court or transferred to the County Court the High Court thinks it is desirable that the proceedings or any part of them should be heard and determined in the High Court he may order the transfer to the High Court of the proceedings or, as the case may be, any part of them. Mr Ghassemian has indicated that he has made an application in the County Court to be joined as a party to these proceedings and to apply for the possession order to be set aside.

Having transferred that application to myself, it is closely related to the matters that I have considered in my judgment. This appears to me to be an obvious abuse of process, a further collateral attack on judgments which the court has already given, dismissing Mr Ghassemian’s many applications and I have no hesitation in dismissing this further application as an abuse of process and totally without merit. I should also indicate that because of the seriousness of the matters that I have found in my main judgment, particularly concerning fabrication of documents in order to mislead the court, I have decided to refer these papers to the Attorney General to see if further action needs to be taken.

So, I am now going to give judgment in this separate case which is Tigris Industries and Hamila Ghassemian and Shahrooz Ghassemian Langroody. Mr Ghassemian made an application dated 25^th February 2016 that he be made a party and whilst his application is pending a stay of any sale be made. I should add that it is in respect of the same property that I have dealt with in my main judgment concerning Chatsworth Court Freehold Company Limited and that his overriding interest as a regulated tenant over the property pursuant to his tenancy of 1^st September 1987 be binding on the Claimant and any purchaser of the property. The facts are set out in a witness statement of Dominic Holden, who is an associate solicitor employed by Ashford LLP acting on behalf of the Claimant, Tigris Industries Limited.

In summary, on 28^th January 2013, Master Teverson made a final order for sale of the relevant property. Mr Ghassemian, who in that litigation appears to be called Mr Langroody was present and indeed appeared to be running the litigation throughout the various hearings leading up to that final order. Although he intimated that he might have reason to object, he chose not to raise the question of any regulated tenancy which he now seeks to raise at that juncture. On 23^rd February 2016, the Court of Appeal allowed the Claimant’s appeal against the judgment of Mr Justice Norris on the grounds that Mr Ghassemian’s case, or possibly his mother’s case, was an abuse of process. The current application, it is submitted, is similarly an abuse of process and should be dismissed on the same basis. He has not previously raised his regulated tenancy of the property. The document on which he has relied has not been referred to previously in the Tigris litigation. There is an order of the Court of Appeal and judgment of the Court of Appeal effectively upholding the final order for sale. This application again seems to me to be quite clearly an abuse of process and a collateral attack on the judgment of the court, which is final. Therefore, for those reasons, I dismiss it and hold that it is totally without merit.

THE JUDGE: I am now dealing with an application for permission to appeal from the orders that I have just made in the Tigris Industries case. I refuse permission on the basis that that appeal has no reasonable prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason to grant permission. It is evident from the note of the judgment of the Court of Appeal that I received that the Court of Appeal regarded the last claim brought by Mr Ghassemian as an abuse of process and regretted the fact that the lower courts had allowed it to arrive at the Court of Appeal. In those circumstances, if permission to appeal is to be granted it must be by the Court of Appeal.