Singh & Ors v Teeng & Ors

This case concerns a property used as a Gurdwara in High Street, Smethwick, B66 3AP. The Claimants (who are five trustees of the property, together with three members of what is or was a committee of management of the activities carried on at the Gurdwara) seek a declaration that the election of a new purported committee, of which the First Defendant is said to be president, is invalid and of no effect. It also seeks injunctions restraining the Defendants from unlawfully interfering with the property and operation of the Gurdwara. Damages and costs are also sought.

The dispute arises out of an election which took place on 21^st of April of this year. It is said by the Claimants that the election was invalidly conducted. Against that, it is said by the Defendants that the election was properly conducted and that it makes no difference anyway because under the specific trusts affecting the property the trustees have to act in accordance with the instructions of the de facto committee, whether properly appointed or not, and that under an amendment to the constitution of the Gurdwara, adopted recently, formal defects of the kind objected to by the Claimants do not invalidate anything done.

As well as issuing the claim form, the Claimants also sought injunctive relief on an interim basis restraining the Defendants from exercising any of the duties or powers conferred on the trustees or office bearers of the Gurdwara and interfering with the exercise by the Claimants of such duties or powers, using any monies for the purpose of legal costs and conspiring with anyone else to do any of the things I have just mentioned.

They also sought a mandatory order for the delivery up of the records, books, accounts and minutes of meetings; the handing over of keys and a summary order for an account, effectively, of all monies collected by the Defendants since their election. Finally, an anti-harassment injunction was sought.

The matter was said on 10^th May to be very urgent when it first came before me on an inter partes basis.

The preliminary point was then taken by Mr. Quirke (for the Defendants) that the Gurdwara is a charity and that these are charity proceedings. It is now accepted that, if the Gurdwara is a charity, these are charity proceedings, though this did not appear to be accepted on 10^th May.

Mr. Brown's main position on 10^th of May was that there is a distinction between the trustees, who hold title to the Gurdwara itself as a matter of real estate, and to the running of the Gurdwara, which is conducted upon the basis of a constitution which does not, he says, consist of exclusively charitable objects. He did not, I think, demur from the fact that the title to the Gurdwara itself is held upon a charitable trust the terms of which require the trustees in general to follow the instructions of the management committee of the Gurdwara.

The Gurdwara’s constitution has been amended from time to time. Clearly, however, members of the Gurdwara could not arrogate to themselves the power to change charitable trusts to something which ceased to be charitable. What I am invited to do therefore, despite the close correlation between the trusts affecting the Gurdwara and its constitution is to treat the trusteeship of the Gurdwara and its constitution as relating to two entirely separate bodies, one of which may be a charity (and, as far as I can see, incontestably is) and the other of which may not be a charity.

Mr. Quirke raised this point, as I say, on the first occasion, in order hopefully to defeat the application for injunctive relief. It did seem to me that, logically, that point had to be decided first, especially as the Claimants were suggesting imminent disaster if the entire matter was not resolved as soon as possible.

Since 10^th May (and I am now sitting on 20^th May) there has been contact with the Charity Commission, something which one might expect would have happened before proceedings were commenced. The Charity Commission require an application to be made for registration of a charity and will not express any final view on whether or not permission should be given to bring these proceedings, which on the face of it is required under section 115(2) of the Charities Act 2011, until such an application is made and determined.

Having not expressed a final view, they did nonetheless make their position extremely clear that permission (if needed) will only be given as a last resort and that all other forms of dispute resolution come much higher up their agenda.

Mr. Brown (for the Claimants) today asks me to stay the proceedings. This is not because he accepts that there is a charity, or that these are charity proceedings, but so that the attitude of the Charity Commission can be finally ascertained.

On 10^th May I made an order adding the Attorney General as a defendant and requiring service upon him forthwith. The Claimant's solicitors naturally complied with that order. Because of the shortness of time the Attorney General has said that he is in no position to express a view.

The application of 7^th May was adjourned until today. That was the application for injunctive relief and it was provided that at today's hearing the court would determine a preliminary issue, namely whether this claim constitutes charity proceedings relating to a charity for the purposes of section 115(2) of the Charities Act 2011. There were then directions, which have been complied with, for the filing of further evidence.

This was a necessary course because the position of Mr. Brown on that occasion was that he wished, because of the urgency of the matter, to proceed with his application for injunctive relief. I did not grant injunctive relief over the adjournment.

There is a very clear division amongst members of the Gurdwara’s congregation as to whether they are (or are not) satisfied with the election of the Defendants. A significant number are not satisfied but, having said that, there was an election and that was apparently the result of it. There may have been irregularities in the election and they may or may not be material. If, however, the Gurdwara is a charity, then these are matters that I am presently precluded from entertaining or proceeding with under section 115(2) of the 2011 Act. It is therefore necessary first to decide, if it can be decided economically and appropriately, whether the Gurdwara is a charity.

Mr. Brown has, in truth, though he has addressed himself with such eloquence as to conceal the point almost totally, been guilty of a complete volte-face. The point was not missing on Mr. Quirke's solicitors, Murria, who rang Mr. Brown's solicitors to ask if they were now conceding the position, the Claimants previously having disputed that these were charity proceedings.

The position is that they have not conceded that position and therefore Mr. Quirke presses to have this issue determined.

I made an order for a preliminary issue to be tried on the last occasion. There has been no material change of circumstances other than that, as cannot be wholly unexpected, the Charity Commission has refused to be bounced into a decision by one party or another at the drop of a hat.

It seems to me that the court ought to proceed to determine the preliminary issue and that is what I propose to do. I told the parties last week that if there was overrun today we could probably go into Tuesday and I confirm now that we can.

How long will the argument take?