Gayle-Childs vTimmis & Anor

I have before me applications made by defendants in two sets of proceedings. Both of the claims arise out of a payment of £100,000 that is said to have been made on 3 April 2008 to an account with Lloyds TSB in Worcester in the name of “Heritage” and numbered 03576979. According to witness statements that the claimant has filed in the proceedings, the £100,000 was transferred by the claimant and “the claimant’s partner Sara Louise Robinson”, and a transfer instruction identifies the transferors as “Sara-Louise Robinson & Quinton Leslie Childs”. It is alleged in one of the claims that the account into which the £100,000 was paid was “solely owned” by the First Defendant to those proceedings, Mrs Jacqueline Timmis. The other case proceeds on the basis that Mrs Lesley-Ann Kenrick, the First Defendant to that claim, was the main beneficiary of the proceeds of thefraud that the claimant alleges.

The claimant in the Timmis case is named in the claim form as “Q Leslie Gayle Childs” and in his witness statement as “Quinton Leslie Gayle Childs” and “Quinton Leslie Alphonso Gayle-Childs”. In the Kenrick case, the claimant is identified in the claim form as “Leslie Gayle-Childs” and in his witness statements as “Leslie Gayle-Childs” and “Leslie Alphonso Gayle-Childs”. There is, as I understand it, no issue but that the claimant in the two cases is the same individual.

Various proceedings have been instituted in respect of the £100,000 in the past. In January 2010, 32 cases brought by “Quinton Leslie Childs” were listed before District Judge Silverman in the Edmonton County Court. Five of these cases related to Heritage, and in each of the cases that involved Mrs Timmis the complaint related to a £100,000 payment that was said to have been made into a Heritage account with Lloyds TSB on 3 April 2008 and shared with Mrs Timmis. Three of the five cases were struck out on 15 January, and one of the remaining cases was struck out, again by District Judge Silverman, on 22 July, on the basis that the claimant had assigned any cause of action to a company called GC Financial (London) Limited and so could have no personal interest in the case. The last of the five cases has subsequently, as I understand it, not been pursued by “Quinton Leslie Childs”.

On 2 August 2010 a bankruptcy order was made in the High Court against “Quinton Leslie Childs”.

On 24 August 2010 His Honour Judge Mitchell, sitting in the Central London County Court, made a general civil restraint order against “Quinton Leslie Childs” for a 2-year period. The order referred to seven claims brought by “Quinton Leslie Childs” against a variety of parties which had been struck out as totally without merit, including two that were repetitions of cases that had already been struck out.

Notwithstanding the civil restraint order, there were further court applications. On 2 September 2010, “Q L Gayle Childs” presented a bankruptcy petition against Mrs Timmis in the High Court; that was dismissed on 20 October. On 30 November, another bankruptcy petition was presented against Mrs Timmis; that was dismissed on 18 January 2011. On the following day, the bankruptcy petition against Mrs Timmis was presented by GC Financial (London) Limited, whose directors are said to have included a company called Gayle Childs Holdings Limited, Leslie Nathan Alphonso Childs and Leslie Gayle-Childs. The petitioner’s solicitor was named in the petition as “Kenroy Brown”, and a “Kenroy Brown” is also recorded as having been GC Financial (London) Limited’s secretary. This petition was dismissed on 26 January 2012. On 1 March 2012, “Q L Gayle Childs” presented another bankruptcy petition against Mrs Timmis, with “Q Childs” named as the solicitor; that petition was dismissed as “wholly without merit” on 20 June.

A statutory demand was also served on Mrs Kenrick, on the basis that she was in possession of a vehicle purchased with property belonging to “Quinton Leslie Childs”. District Judge Marston set aside the demand on 18 October 2010, but by then “Quinton Leslie Childs” had issued a claim form against Mrs Kenrick. The particulars of claim alleged that money derived from sums paid to Heritage’s accounts at Lloyds TSB had been used for Mrs Kenrick’s benefit. A further claim followed on 12 November. On this occasion, the particulars of claim referred to the payment of £100,000 made by “Quinton Leslie Childs” and Sara Robinson, who was described as the claimant’s “business partner”, on 3 April 2008 to account number 03576979 in the name of Heritage. However, on 25 and 26 January 2011 Judge Mitchell struck both claims out as in breach of the civil restraint order. “Quinton Leslie Childs” sought to re-open the judge’s decision, but his application was dismissed on 3 June 2011, as was another application “Quinton Leslie Childs” had made. Each application was described as totally without merit.

Other claims of relevance have also been brought in the High Court. Aside from the two claims that are before me, I am aware of six sets of proceedings that have connections with the present claimant, or, if different, the claimant in the proceedings to which I have just been making reference. In two cases, the claimant was named as “Leslie Gayle Childs”. The earlier of these claims, issued on 14 April 2011, alleged that Ashton Global Investments Limited owed some £138 million and that the debt had been assigned to “Gayle Childs & Company” by Heritage Commodities AG. On 21 July 2011 Master Teverson struck the claim out as totally without merit. The second claim brought by “Leslie Gayle Childs” was issued on 6 June 2012 against HM Revenue & Customs and related to the execution of a search warrant on 31 May 2012. The claim was discontinued in July 2012.

The other claims are brought by “Kenroy Brown” or “Ken Brown”. On 17 May 2011, “Ken Brown” issued proceedings against Antey Group Co Limited for some £22 million. A week later, “Kenroy Brown” issued a claim for more than £262 million against the Libyan Foreign Investments Company and Libyan Investment Authority. “Ken Brown” issued a similar claim for about £1.2 billion on 18 July. Both claims were purportedly admitted on the defendants’ behalf by “Paine Crow and Partners” as their solicitors, and judgment was entered in the first set of proceedings. However, Allen & Overy subsequently came onto the record as the defendants’ solicitors, and on 27 September 2012 they obtained an order for the claims to be struck out. As was explained in a witness statement from a partner in Allen & Overy, Mr Jonathan Hitchin, the defendants’ position was that that the claims represented frauds perpetrated by Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs. In the course of his witness statement, Mr Hitchin said this:

“I believe that Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs and Quinton Leslie Childs are in fact the same person. I understand that at a winding-up petition hearing on 21 May 2012 before Registrar Barber Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs gave his name as Gayle Quinton Childs. He subsequently filed a witness statement in those proceedings under the name Quinton Leslie Gayle-Childs. At a later winding-up petition hearing on 4 July 2012 before Registrar Derrett he gave his name as Mr Gayle-Childs. At no point has Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs suggested that these names relate to different people. Moreover, at the hearing of 4 July 2012 Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs made reference to his having appeared at the 21 May 2012 hearing. I therefore believe that Mr Leslie Gayle-Childs changes his name regularly and that Quinton Leslie Childs is one of the names he uses. Examples of other names he has used include (a) Leslie Gayle-Childs Litigation Manager of NCML in statutory demand dated 27 January 2012 and litigation assistant of NAML in application notice 4 July 2011 and the certificate of service dated 20 August 2011; (b) Gayle-Childs Legal Officer of GC Financial (Europe) Limited in application notice 21 July 2011 and claim form; (c) Leslie Gayle-Childs partner of GK Webb & Partners LLP and director at GC Financial (London) Limited, Sun E Marine Limited and Sun E Property Limited; (d) Leslie Childs Director of Gayle-Childs Holdings Limited; and (e) Leslie Nathan Alphonso Childs former Director of GC Financial (London) Limited.”

[Quotation not checked]

“Paine Crow and Partners” also feature in the sixth claim. On 22 July 2011, “Kenroy Brown” issued proceedings against Capitana Seas Limited for in excess of £20 million. “Paine Crow and Partners” admitted liability on the defendants’ behalf.

The claims before me today were both issued on 28 August 2012. On 21 September, the defendants in the Kenrick case applied for the claim to be struck out or stayed. On 27 September, Mrs Timmis issued an application for similar relief, but also for a civil restraint order to be made against the claimant.

On 2 November 2012, Chief Master Weingarten adjourned both applications to the judge. He also referred to the judge the question of whether a further claim form should be issued. The claim form in question once again seeks relief against Mrs Timmis. It seeks to remedy the problem with the previous proceedings that no particulars of claim had been provided.

I have been supplied by Chief Master Winegarten with a copy of a page from the passport for a Mr Leslie Alphonso Gayle Childs. The Chief Master informs me that the individual in question appeared before him on 5 October 2011 calling himself “Kenroy Brown” and again on 1 November 2012 as “Leslie Gayle-Childs”.

The claimant in the proceedings that are before me has put in witness statements in each of the two sets of proceedings. In the course of those witness statements, he has denied that he has ever been made bankrupt. It is apparent, moreover, from those statements that the claimant would have it that there are other members of his family with similar names to his. He has referred to a half brother called “Quinton Leslie Childs” and a son called “Leslie Nathan Alfonso Childs”.

Mr Martin Strutt, who appears before me today for Mrs Kenrick, has drawn my attention to matters which might be said to tend to confirm that the claimant with whom I am concerned is a different individual to the “Quinton Leslie Childs” who has in the past brought proceedings. Mr Strutt drew my attention first to the fact that his instructing solicitor’s recollection was that the person whom he met at the hearing before the Chief Master on 2 November 2012 was younger than the individual who had appeared at a hearing before Worcester County Court in relation to the application to set aside the statutory demand. The second matter to which Mr Strutt drew my attention is that he was told by the present claimant outside court on 2 November that he was not “Quinton Leslie Childs”. On that occasion, the claimant produced his own passport and made reference to a half brother.

Notwithstanding those matters, it seems to me that I am justified in concluding, on the basis of the materials before me, that the individual who has brought the present claims is the same individual who has in the past brought proceedings under the name “Quinton Leslie Childs”. Various matters point in that direction. In the first place, the present claimant’s denials in his evidence that he has been made bankrupt entirely lack any particularity. More generally, the evidence he has adduced in response to the evidence put in by the applicants consists to a great extent of mere assertions.

Secondly, the present claimant has not appeared before me today to deny the suggestion that he is the same individual who brought the previous proceedings. As was pointed out to me by Mr Strutt, the claimant will have been well aware that that was the suggestion. The point was raised by Mr Andrew Lester in a witness statement in support of Mrs Kenrick’s application, and it was aired between Mr Strutt and the present claimant outside court on 2 November. It further appears that the claimant will have been supplied with a copy of a note that the Chief Master has provided to me in which concerns are raised as to the identity of the present claimant.

A third point is that it is apparent from the matters to which I have referred that the present claimant has in the past been willing to use more than one name. As I explained towards the beginning of this judgment, he describes himself in slightly different terms in the claim forms before me and the witness statements he has served in the proceedings. Much more seriously, it appears that he has used an entirely different name, “Kenroy Brown”, in other proceedings. There is also the evidence from Mr Hitchin of Allen & Overy as to the propensity of the person described as “Kenroy Brown” in those proceedings to use both the names “Leslie Gayle-Childs” and “Quinton Leslie Childs” in addition to a number of other names. Further, the claimant on his own case in the current proceedings seems to imply that he has in the past used the name “Quinton Leslie Childs”. The materials that he has adduced in these proceedings indicate that the claimant was a party to the transfer instruction given by “Sara Louise Robinson and Quinton Leslie Childs”. The “Quinton Leslie Childs” referred to would, on the claimant’s own case, be the present claimant. It is to be noted, moreover, that Sara Louise Robinson was described as the partner of “Quinton Leslie Childs” in the earlier proceedings and is now described by the present claimant as his partner.

Another piece of important evidence in this area was drawn to my attention this morning by Mr Lewis Preston, who appears for Mrs Timmis. As he pointed out to me, a statement dated 12 June 2012 was put in by “Quinton Leslie Gayle Childs” in connection with bankruptcy proceedings brought against Mrs Timmis. In that statement, the person making the statement said, “In August 2010 I was made bankrupt”. A person describing himself as “Quinton Leslie Gayle Childs” thus acknowledged that he was the “Quinton Leslie Childs” against whom a bankruptcy order was made on 2 August. It is also notable in this connection that, while the Edmonton County Court proceedings were brought simply in the name “Quinton Leslie Childs”, somewhat different names were used in the later bankruptcy proceedings against Mrs Timmis. The petition to which I have just been making reference was presented in the name “QL Gayle Childs”. An earlier petition in the same name had been brought in September 2010. Once again, one sees variants of the name used by the present claimant being used in connection with the same subject matter and seemingly by the same person.

A further point of relevance is that the claims with which I am now concerned were issued immediately after the expiry of the civil restraint order that Judge Mitchell had made on 24 August 2010. As I have mentioned, both of the present claims were issued on 28 August 2012. That again tends to indicate that the person bringing the claims had previously been constrained by the civil restraint order that Judge Mitchell had made against “Quinton Leslie Childs”.

It is also of some significance that there was no attempt to involve any other member of the Gayle-Childs or Childs family in 2011. As Mr Strutt pointed out, an application was made at that stage to join Sara Louise Robinson. One would have thought that, had the present claimant been a different individual from the “Quinton Leslie Childs” involved in the past proceedings, an attempt would have been made to join him as well at that stage.

In all the circumstances, the materials before me suffice, as it seems to me, to establish that the present claimant is the person who has brought a variety of claims in respect of the £100,000 in the past, and also that he is the person who was made bankrupt in August 2010. It follows from that that any claim that the claimant might otherwise have had in respect of the £100,000 payment to which reference is made in the proceedings will have vested in his trustee in bankruptcy. It is, of course, trite law that when a bankruptcy order is made, the bankrupt’s assets vest in his trustee in bankruptcy, and the assets in question will include claims that he has. That being so, the claims that are now brought must be unsustainable for that reason alone. In the light of the bankruptcy order, the present claimant can have no continuing interest in the matters of which he complains, even if, contrary to the defendants’ positions, there was some substance in the claims. It is relevant to note in this connection that the Insolvency Service has confirmed that the bankrupt has not been given permission to pursue proceedings.

In the case of the claim against Mrs Timmis at least, there seems to me to be another complete answer to the present claimant’s claim. Whatever the position may be in respect of the other county court proceedings instituted in relation to the £100,000, it is clear that one such claim was struck out on the merits. The order in question was that made by District Judge Silverman on 22 July on the basis that any cause of action had been assigned to GC Financial (London) Limited. A claim based on the same facts having been struck out on the merits, I cannot see that it could be open to the present claimant to bring a further claim against Mrs Timmis, even had there been no bankruptcy order.

Mr Preston and Mr Strutt both canvassed the possibility of the claimant’s claims being stayed until earlier costs orders have been satisfied. As I have indicated, however, it seems to me that I am justified in going further than that and striking out the claims. So far as Mrs Timmis is concerned, the claim is doomed both in the light of the order of July 2010 and because of the bankruptcy order. So far as Mrs Kenrick is concerned, the claim is doomed on the basis of the bankruptcy order, aside from any other point.

Accordingly, I shall strike out both sets of proceedings. Given the history which has now emerged, it seems to me further that I am justified in categorising both claims as totally without merit. On the assumption that I am correct in thinking that the present claimant is the individual who has brought the various earlier proceedings, his claim will have been entirely hopeless as a result of the bankruptcy order, and his attempt to pursue these yet further proceedings, notwithstanding the failure of the numerous earlier proceedings, can, I think, fairly be described as entirely without merit.

The further question which arises is whether I should make a civil restraint order. In that connection, it is relevant not only that I am categorising the claims before me as totally without merit, but that, as is apparent from the civil restraint order made by Judge Mitchell on 24 August 2010, some seven claims had already been struck out as totally without merit by then, and further claims brought by the individual I take to be the present claimant have been categorised as totally without merit subsequently. I have in mind in that connection the petition dismissed on 20 June 2011, the applications which Judge Mitchell described as “totally without merit” in June 2011, and the order made by Master Teverson on 21 July 2011 striking out the claim before him as being totally without merit.

In the circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the claimant has brought numerous claims which were totally without merit, and that he has been prepared to persist in doing so, even after a civil restraint order had been made against him. I should point out that that civil restraint order will not have barred proceedings being brought in the High Court, but it ought nevertheless to have served as a warning to the claimant not to bring groundless proceedings. Even aside therefore from the concerns which arise from the histories of the proceedings brought in the name “Kenroy Brown”, it seems to me that I am amply justified in taking the view that the claimant should be unable to bring proceedings in the High Court or county court without the approval of a designated judge. It appears to me, moreover, that this is a case in which an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate. It is to be noted in that connection that the claims brought by the claimant in the past have not been limited to a single subject matter or a particular defendant. It is noteworthy too that he has persisted in litigating despite the earlier civil restraint order.

In the circumstances, I shall make a general civil restraint order against the claimant for the maximum period of 2 years, and I shall ask counsel to assist with the precise terms of the order to be made.