Pittack v Naviede

This is an action about property conveyancing. It raises a question of construction on the Standard Conditions of Sale (4th edition), namely whether a clause excluding the transfer of the benefit of the contract operates to exclude sub-sales. There is no doubt that the parties entered into a contract, and no doubt that the contract has been rescinded. The only question is whether it was the purchaser or the vendor who was entitled to rescind, and the answer to that question determines which of them is entitled to the deposit. Neither side claims damages.

Both parties are individuals, and the property in question is a townhouse in Regents Park held on a long lease from the Crown Estate Commissioners. The claimant is the purchaser Mr Daniel Andrew Pittack, and he appeared before me by Mr Timothy Dutton of counsel. The defendant is Mr Muhammad Maximilian Naviede, and he appeared before me in person.

On the purchaser’s side I heard evidence from Mr Pittack himself, from his personal assistant Miss Sarabjeet Howard-Brown (who is also known as Sally Howard) and from his solicitor Mr Garry Stephen Lucas of Lucas McMullan Jacobs. I also read a short witness statement from Mrs Asha Narang, who was at one time intending to be a sub-purchaser of the property. On the vendor’s side I heard evidence from Mr Naviede himself and also from Mr Emanuel Langley, a business associate of Mrs Narang’s son. Mrs Narang is in India, and her statement was admitted under the Civil Evidence Act 1968. All the other witnesses were cross-examined. I may say that, although oral evidence took up over 5 hours of the court’s time, it contained little of value which was not clear from the documents.

The basic facts are that in July 2007 Mr Pittack and Mr Naviede exchanged contracts to buy and sell a leasehold residential property, and the contractual completion date was originally in July 2008, but in the event brought forward to 20 June 2008. During 2008 Mr Pittack formed the intention to sub-sell the property, but no contracts for the sub-sale were ever exchanged, and on 16 June the sub-purchasers withdrew. Mr Pittack had no means immediately available to complete the contract himself, and he did not do so. He claims however that Mr Naviede was already in breach of contract in two ways, namely (1) that Mr Naviede wrongly refused to transfer the property to any sub-purchasers and (2) he had not received the landlord’s licence to assign the lease to Mr Pittack in due time. He claims that each of these alleged breaches entitled him to rescind and recover the deposit. If Mr Pittack is wrong on both those points, it is obvious that he himself was in breach and Mr Naviede can keep the deposit.

In more details the facts are these. A lease of the property was granted by the Crown Estate Commissioners to Mr Naviede himself in 2002 for a term of over 105 years, and the lease is therefore a ‘new tenancy’ for the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995. This means, amongst other consequences, that under section 5 of the Act an assignment of the lease by Mr Naviede would release him from liability under the tenant’s covenants in the lease, even though he is the original lessee.

On 25 July 2007, after several months of pre-contract negotiations, Mr Pittack and Mr Naviede exchanged contracts for the sale of the property to Mr Pittack for £2.7 million. The contract incorporated the Standard Conditions of Sale (4th edition). Clause 1.5 provides : —

the consent has not been given, or

the consent has been given subject to a condition to which a party reasonably objects.

unless the rescission is a result of the buyer’s breach of contract the deposit is to be repaid to the buyer with accrued interest

the buyer is to return any documents he received from the seller and is to cancel any registration of the contract.

There were also special conditions, including the following : —

The contractual date for completion was fixed at 25 July 2008, a whole year after the date of the contract, but the vendor was given the right to bring the completion date forward by serving 3 months’ notice.

The deposit was to be held by the solicitors as the vendor’s agent, so that the vendor had the use of it straight away.

Against those conditions, which were of benefit to the vendor, he agreed not to increase the borrowing secured on the property without the buyer’s consent.

Special condition 9 provides : —

On 31 July 2007, soon after exchange, Lucas McMullan Jacobs asked Mr Naviede’s solicitors Zatman & Co whether they were contacting the landlords’ agents to find out their requirements in relation to the licence to assign. Zatman & Co responded rather slowly, perhaps understandably so in view of the long completion date. On 21 September 2007 they did indeed write to Crown Estate, and on 28 September 2007 Cluttons responded on their behalf enclosing a printed form of application incorporating a request for the information required from an assignor. Some 12 weeks later, on 17 December 2007, Zatman & Co forwarded that to Lucas McMullan Jacobs, and on 2 January 2008 the latter replied that they were obtaining the references and information required, and that they would forward these when they were to hand. In the end that did not literally happen, as will appear.

Some weeks after exchange of contracts Mr Pittack considered that he might wish to borrow money to effect the purchase, and through his PA Miss Howard asked Mr Naviede for a surveyor to have access to the property for the purpose of an inspection. This was refused, despite Miss Howard speaking on several occasions to Mr Naviede himself and also his associate Mr Steve Lavin. Mr Pittack then began considering selling the property on to one or more sub-purchasers.

One potential sub-purchaser, though not the first, was Mrs Narang. By the beginning of April 2008 Lucas McMullan Jacobs were in correspondence with Goldkorn Matthias Gentle, who wrote that they were instructed by Mrs Narang and Mr Langley as co-purchasers. The proposal was that the sub-purchasers would buy the property for the same price which Mr Pittack had agreed to pay, £2.7 million, and Lucas McMullan Jacobs intended that the two contracts would be completed by a single transfer from Mr Naviede to the sub-purchasers. They did not however inform Mr Naviede or his solicitors of that intention at that time.

On 20 March Mr Naviede’s solicitors duly gave notice bringing the contractual date for completion forward to 20 June 2008.

From that point matters moved somewhat more quickly. During May there was correspondence between Goldkorn Matthias Gentle and Lucas McMullan Jacobs in regard to the proposed sub-purchase, and references were obtained for Mr Langley, as was a bank reference for Mrs Narang. On 6 June Lucas McMullan Jacobs sent a draft transfer to Zatman & Co for approval, but this was for a transfer to Mr Pittack alone. But Lucas McMullan Jacobs had also been communicating with Cluttons, as agents for the Crown Estate, and by 10 June a draft licence to assign to Mrs Narang and Mr Langley was in its final form, and Pemberton Greenish, acting for the Crown Estate, had written that they did not expect the Crown to want Mr Pittack to be a party to the licence.

On 11 and 12 June 2008 there was a comparative flood of correspondence which is not easy to analyse, because it does not all appear in strict chronological order in the trial papers. First, Cluttons must have given Zatman & Co the names of the intended sub-purchasers, and Mr Naviede’s view about potential sub-sales was revealed to those acting for the Crown Estate. On 11 June Zatman & Co wrote to Cluttons and Pemberton Greenish to say that it had come to their attention that Lucas McMullan Jacobs had been corresponding directly with them in connection with a licence to assign to Mr Langley and Mrs Narang, and that Mr Naviede did not know Mr Langley and Mrs Narang as he had contracted to sell the property to Mr Pittack. To Pemberton Greenish they added that Mr Naviede had notified them that he was not prepared to be a party to a licence to anyone other than Mr Pittack. On 12 June Cluttons replied to Zatman & Co confirming that Cluttons and Pemberton Greenish had been contacted by Lucas McMullan Jacobs in connection with the assignment, and that they had received satisfactory references for Mr Langley and Mrs Narang. They also wrote that they had advised Pemberton Greenish not to action the assignment any further until the matter was clarified. And Pemberton Greenish wrote that they had been instructed to take no further action on the matter.

Also on 12 June Lucas McMullan Jacobs wrote to Zatman & Co that Mr Pittack may exchange contracts to sell the property prior to completion, and enclosed a second draft transfer, this being for a transfer direct from Mr Naviede to the sub-purchasers.

On the same day Zatman & Co first replied by fax to Lucas McMullan Jacobs’ letter of 6 June. They approved the form of the draft transfer (which was expressed as a transfer to Mr Pittack). As to the licence to assign, they wrote that they did not understand why Lucas McMullan Jacobs had written to Cluttons and Pemberton Greenish, pointing out that the contract provides for this to be done by the vendor. The fax also mentioned that Mr Pittack had not provided the references requested on 17 December 2007. Still on 12 June Lucas McMullan Jacobs replied to the fax of that day, writing that they did not understand Zatman & Co’s objection to their approaching the Crown’s agent directly, and that this was now academic because the Crown were prepared to grant the licence. At about the same time Zatman & Co faxed a short second letter stating that the contract was not assignable, and that Mr Naviede was not prepared to transfer the property to anyone other than Mr Pittack. Lucas McMullan Jacobs therefore added a postscript to their reply, to the effect that Mr Pittack was not assigning the contract, and that he was entitled to direct Mr Naviede to transfer the property to a third party because the contract did not contain a prohibition on sub-sales.

On 13 June Zatman & Co repeated Mr Naviede’s insistence that he would transfer only to Mr Pittack and that Mr Pittack was obliged to provide references for himself. At the same time they spoke to Cluttons by telephone, who told them that, as Mr Pittack was a current lessee of the Crown Estate, references for him may not be required. Zatman & Co faxed Cluttons to ask them to confirm this in writing.

The next working day was Monday 16 June. Zatman & Co telephoned Cluttons again, and after receiving confirmation that the Crown Estate would not require references for Mr Pittack, asked Cluttons to arrange for a licence to assign to be prepared authorising a transfer to Mr Pittack. Cluttons duly replied, stating that Pemberton Greenish had been instructed to continue with the granting of the licence in favour of Mr Pittack. That letter was sent by post, and there is no evidence that it was either delivered by hand (to Zatman & Co in Manchester) or transmitted to them or anyone else by fax or by e-mail.

Also on 16 June Goldkorn Matthias Gentle e-mailed Lucas McMullan Jacobs to say that their clients were not proceeding with the purchase, and they confirmed this by letter the following day. Mrs Narang and Mr Langley gave differing reasons for the withdrawal, she that Mr Naviede was not co-operating with the landlords, he that Mr Naviede had not allowed access to the property (and it is the case that Mrs Narang and Mr Langley had only ever seen the outside). But the reasons do not matter. The fact is that no contracts for any sub-sale were exchanged. I should record that Mr Langley gave evidence before me that he never intended to be a co-purchaser himself, despite having apparently authorised Goldkorn Matthias Gentle to represent to all relevant parties that he was. This casual attitude to accuracy raised doubts about his evidence generally, but in the end nothing turned on it.

Mr Lucas was away from the office for the whole of the week beginning 16 June, and an assistant solicitor Mr Mughal was holding the fort at Lucas McMullan Jacobs. On 19 June Mr Mughal e-mailed Zatman & Co that Mr Pittack would not be completing the purchase because Mr Naviede had improperly refused to execute a sub-sale transfer and had not provided a licence to assign. Zatman & Co replied by fax, repeating that Mr Naviede was obliged only to transfer the property to Mr Pittack (referring to paragraph 14.3.1 of the Law Society’s Conveyancing Handbook), and stating that the reason why the licence to assign had not been provided was that Mr Pittack had failed to provide references. Even so they had found that the Crown Estate would grant the licence, and the letter enclosed a draft licence which needed only the addition of Mr Pittack’s full address.

During 19 June there was some attempt to negotiate terms for a supplemental agreement, but this did not result in a concluded agreement. Instead, on 20 June Zatman & Co served a standard-form notice to complete, giving 10 working days to complete by 4 July and making time of the essence.

After that date there was no attempt on the part of Mr Pittack to complete the purchase. Instead on 1 July Lucas McMullan Jacobs wrote a formal letter which re-asserted the argument that clause 1.5 does not exclude direct-transfer sub-sales, so that Mr Naviede’s refusal to transfer on those terms was improper, and gave notice rescinding the contract on the basis of Mr Naviede’s repudiatory breach, and alternatively because the licence to assign was not available by the required date. On 7 July Zatman & Co replied, relying on Mr Pittack’s failure to complete on 4 July in accordance with the notice to complete, and rescinded the contract.

At the root of this case is the true construction of clause 1.5 of the Standard Conditions, which provides that a purchaser is not entitled to transfer the benefit of the contract to a third party.

On behalf of the purchaser Mr Pittack, Mr Dutton says that it means what it says but no more, and that it does not prevent sub-sales. He also points to Special Condition 9, which would be irrelevant in regard to a new lease to which the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995 applies except in the case of a sub-sale completed by a direct transfer to the sub-purchaser. This implies, he says, that the possibility of a direct transfer to a sub-purchaser was impliedly acknowledged in the terms of the contract.

According to this argument, what clause 1.5 prevents is the actual transfer to a third party of the benefit of the contract, by which, after due notice to the vendor, the assignee takes the place of the original purchaser and can maintain a claim against the vendor himself. The general law provides that the purchaser is generally entitled to obtain a transfer to himself or as he directs, and clause 1.5 does not remove that right. If this is right, then when on 12 and 13 June 2008 Mr Naviede refused outright to transfer the property to anyone other than Mr Pittack, that amounted to an improper repudiation of the contract, and Mr Pittack was entitled to rescind on the strength of that repudiation, as he did on 1 July, and will be able to recover the deposit. For this purpose, says Mr Dutton, it is immaterial that Mr Langley and Mrs Narang withdrew from the purchase on 16 June.

Mr Dutton showed me the corresponding clause in the Standard Commercial Property Conditions of Sale (2nd edition). I shall call these the ‘commercial’ standard terms to distinguish them from the ‘non-commercial’ standard terms which were incorporated into the Pittack-Naviede contract. Clause 1.5 of the commercial standard terms has a different heading and an extra sub-clause : —

The buyer is not entitled to transfer the benefit of the contract.

The seller may not be required to transfer the property in parts or to any person other than the buyer.’

The first step is to establish what the position would be in the absence of clause 1.5. Some of the modern textbooks on land law and conveyancing do not deal with sub-sales at all. Nor has Mr Dutton’s research discovered recent judicial authority on the matter. What he does point to is a dictum of Sir George Jessel MR in Earl of Egmont v Smith (1871) 6 Ch D 469. That case primarily concerned the purchaser’s ability to insist on the property being conveyed to him in separate lots, but the relevant clause also mentioned sub-sales. Clause 6 of the contract provided : —

Sir George Jessel MR said this about that clause at page 474 : —

Mr Naviede submits that this should be read in a narrow sense, limited by the context, namely that a purchaser can direct the vendor to convey the land, to the purchaser himself, in whatever lots he requires. But Mr Dutton says that it should be taken as meaning also that a purchaser is entitled to direct the vendor to transfer the property to a third party, such as a sub-purchaser, on completion. He points out that the wider reading was adopted by no less an authority than Williams on Vendor and Purchaser (4th edition, 1936) at page 641–642 : —

That passage does not use the word sub-sale or sub-purchaser, but to my mind the meaning is clear enough. In the absence of a provision to the contrary, express or implied, a purchaser may effect a sub-sale and require the purchaser to execute a conveyance or transfer in favour of the sub-purchaser direct; though the original purchaser may be required to participate for the reason stated. There is also a clear distinction between an assignment of the benefit of the contract and a requirement to effect the conveyance in favour of a third party.

A similar question arose in Curtis Moffat Limited v Wheeler [1929] Ch 224, which also concerned a contract for the sale of leasehold property having a prohibition on assignment without the landlord’s consent. The landlord was not prepared to grant a licence to assign to the plaintiff, being a company, but it was willing to grant a licence in favour of an individual as nominee for the company. The plaintiff requested an assignment in favour of a nominee, and it was held that the vendor was not entitled to refuse. After referring to authorities in which a lessor who has entered into a contract to grant a lease to a particular person can be compelled to grant the lease to a solvent nominee, Maugham J applied the same principle to the case of an assignment of a lease : —

The conclusion which I draw from these passages is that, in the absence of provision to the contrary, a buyer is entitled to require the vendor to transfer the property on completion to a third party of his choosing. In my view this applies similarly to the sale of leasehold property, including cases where the prohibition on assignment without consent (if any) cannot be unreasonably withheld, though in this last case the fact may be that the landlord withholds his consent reasonably, in which case other considerations arise.

It remains to decide what effect clause 1.5 of this particular contract has on that general statement of law.

Mr Dutton is prepared to acknowledge a potential difficulty with his construction in the context of a lease where the vendor has covenanted not to assign the lease without the consent of the landlord. That was the case here. The relevant clause is clause 8.3 the important parts of which I have quoted in paragraph 6 above. The essence is that the purchaser is required to provide references and other information as required by the landlord, and the vendor is then required to obtain the licence at his own expense. If there is a sub-sale, in whose favour should the licence to assign be obtained? And if the purchaser initially intends to take the assignment himself, and the vendor obtains a licence to assign to him, and then the purchaser contracts to sub-sell and requires the vendor to complete by a direct transfer to the sub-purchaser, what is the vendor obliged to do? Does he have to obtain a further licence in favour of the sub-purchaser, again at his own expense?

In such a case it seems to me that, unless and until the purchaser informs the vendor of the identity of the sub-purchaser, the only obligation on the vendor is to obtain a licence to the original purchaser, and a pre-requisite to that is for the purchaser to provide whatever references and other information are required by the landlord. In addition he is no doubt required under his own contract to obtain the licence to assign to his sub-purchaser, subject to the sub-purchaser providing his references and other information. Under the main contract it remains the duty of the vendor only to obtain consent for the assignment to the purchaser. The purchaser will have to obtain consent for the assignment to the sub-purchaser.

I therefore find that the difficulties under clause 8.3 do not truly help me to construe clause 1.5. Clause 8.3 creates only an obligation to obtain consent for the assignment to the purchaser, but that does not seem to me inconsistent with the purchaser being entitled to nominate his sub-purchaser as transferee, provided that the purchaser obtains the necessary additional consent.

Mr Naviede resists all of this analysis of clause 1.5. He acknowledges, doubtless in deference to the passage from Earl of Egmont v Smith (above) on which Mr Dutton relies, and also Curtis Moffat Limited v Wheeler (above), that a purchaser may require the vendor to transfer the property direct to a nominee of the purchaser, but that this applies only to a true nominee. He acknowledges too that there is nothing to stop a purchaser effecting a sub-sale and arranging for a separate transfer from the purchaser to the sub-purchaser, after (perhaps immediately after) the vendor has effected a transfer in favour of the original purchaser. In short, he says, clause 1.5 does not prevent a transfer to a nominee or back-to-back transfers. But he says that a direct transfer from the vendor to a sub-purchaser involves the transfer of the benefit of the contract to the sub-purchaser and is therefore prohibited by clause 1.5. On the other hand he accepts that, if he is wrong about clause 1.5 and it does not exclude sub-sales by direct transfer to the sub-purchaser, then Mr Pittack was entitled to rescind when he, Mr Naviede, refused to complete in favour of anyone other than Mr Pittack. He made that concession first in the witness box, and he repeated it in his closing submissions.

The most strongly expressed ground for his hostility to a substituted transferee was that a direct transfer would, or might, avoid stamp duty land tax (SDLT) and that the vendor should not be compelled to be party to a document effecting any such transaction. He also pointed out that the property is a listed building, and that he was apprehensive (if I may paraphrase his concerns) about being made personally liable for breaches of the regulations committed in future by successors in title.

I am unimpressed by those reasons. As to SDLT, either a direct sub-sale does avoid the imposition of two charges to tax or it does not, and there are provisions in the Finance Act 2003 (as amended) determining that question. To my mind there is therefore nothing improper in a purchaser and sub-purchaser seeking to effect the sub-sale by a direct transfer, and no impropriety in the vendor acceding to such a request, even if he is not required to do so. As to the rules relating to listed buildings, a vendor either is or not exposed to possible fraudulent claims by successors in title alleging that defaults of their own were effected by him, but that does not seem to me to be affected one way or the other by the sub-sale being effected by a direct transfer as opposed to back-to-back transfers.

Mr Naviede has also seized on the qualification expressed by Maugham J in the passage cited from Curtis Moffat Limited v Wheeler in paragraph 30 above) that the freedom to substitute a sub-purchaser of a lease applies only if ‘the contract was not entered into upon considerations personal to the purchaser’. He points to the prohibition in Special Condition 9 against him borrowing more than a stated amount. But that is not in my view a consideration personal to the purchaser. If anything it is a consideration personal to the vendor, but in reality it is neither. It is a prohibition inserted by agreement, in recognition of the long completion date and the deposit being available to the vendor. The term was designed to ensure, as Mr Pittack stated in his evidence, that the property would not become overburdened with debts secured on it, a circumstance which might have hindered the vendor in satisfying his obligation to discharge incumbrances on completion. It is a term of benefit to any transferee. I do not regard it as a consideration personal to the individual purchaser. In any case what Maugham J referred to was a contract (not individual terms in a normal contract) made for personal considerations.

Even so Mr Naviede has respectable support for his argument, namely the Law Society’s Conveyancing Handbook (16th edition). Part B.14 of this handbook is headed Sub-sales, and paragraph 14.3 states (in part) as follows : —

Where a buyer intends to sell the property to a third party by way of sub-sale he must ensure that his existing contract to purchase the land contains no restriction which would prevent the sub-sale. Standard Condition 1.5 and Standard Commercial Property Condition 1.5 both state that the buyer is not entitled to transfer the benefit of the contract. As a result the seller cannot be forced to transfer the title to anyone other than the buyer named in the contract. This provision will not prevent sub-sales of freeholds nor sub-assignments of leases. However, the buyer will have to complete the second transaction separately and subsequent to his own purchase. The provision does however provide protection on the grant of a lease as the seller (landlord) cannot be forced to grant the lease to anyone other than the buyer (tenant) in the contract. A seller should resist a buyer’s request to remove Condition 1.5 from the contract, because its presence ensures that the seller will take the benefit of the covenants given by the first tenant on grant of a lease.

If a restriction against sub-sales is included in the buyer’s contract, he will be able to contract to resell the land to a third party, but will have to complete this second transaction separately and subsequently to his own purchase.

Where there is a restriction on sub-sales in the contract it may be possible for the buyer to assign the benefit of his contract with the seller to the third party and then to complete the purchase as nominee for the third party.’

To the same effect is paragraph 16.9 of Frances Silverman’s The Standard Conditions of Sale : A Conveyancer’s Guide (7th edition); unsurprisingly so, given that Mrs Silverman is, I am told, also the author of the Law Society’s Conveyancing Handbook.

If it is correct that clause 1.5 of the non-commercial standard terms excludes sub-sales, then I agree with the passage just cited. But I regret that I find Mrs Silverman’s commentary unsatisfactory, because it does not mention, let alone emphasize or explain, the difference between the texts of the commercial and non-commercial standard terms. It asserts, but does not explain, that the short-form clause 1.5 of the non-commercial standard terms does prohibit sub-sales, and at the same time it points out that sub-sales completed by back-to-back transfers cannot be prevented. I certainly accept that sub-sales completed by back-to-back transfers cannot in practice be prevented, however clause 1.5 is construed, and whichever version of the standard terms is in issue. The vendor in such a case is not being asked to do anything but execute a transfer to the contractual purchaser subject to receiving the balance of the sale price. But I find difficulty with two remaining questions : —

If a direct transfer to a nominee is permitted, in the sense that the purchaser can insist on it, as Mr Naviede accepts, how is it that a direct transfer to a sub-purchaser is not also permitted?

If a sub-sale completed by back-to-back transfers is permitted, so that ex hypothesi it does not amount to a transfer of the benefit of the contract, exactly how and when does a sub-sale completed by direct transfer become a transfer of the benefit of the contract so as to be excluded by clause 1.5?

I do not find satisfactory answers to those questions. The most promising answer at first sight, preserving some consistency, is that on reflection a vendor cannot be required to effect a direct transfer in favour of a nominee, and that every sub-sale does on analysis amount to the transfer of the benefit of the contract. After all clause 1.5 is not couched in technical terms, and it might therefore be right to read it in a non-technical way which does equate the substitution of a sub-purchaser with a transfer of the benefit of the contract. If correct, that would allow a vendor to refuse any demand by the purchaser to execute a transfer in favour of a third party. It would nevertheless have to recognize that the vendor cannot in practice prevent back-to-back transfers.

But in the end I am persuaded that such a construction of clause 1.5 is not justified. The Egmont dictum and particularly the passage from Williams on Vendor and Purchaser which I have cited in paragraph 28 above, show that that there are two potential difficulties for a vendor, and that they are different though perhaps often connected. One difficulty is the purchaser assigning the benefit of the contract to a third party, thus exposing the vendor to unwanted contractual obligations owed to the assignee. The draftsmen of the standard terms (in both versions) evidently regard it as commonplace for a vendor to wish to exclude that difficulty. The other difficulty is a sub-sale not including a transfer of the benefit of the contract, and the draftsmen of the commercial standard terms evidently regard it as commonplace for a vendor of commercial property to wish to exclude that possibility too. But the draftsmen of the non-commercial standard terms have not visibly reached the same conclusion in regard to residential conveyancing.

In my judgment Mr Dutton’s approach to clause 1.5 is correct. It is possible to include an exclusion of sub-sales, as clause 1.5.2 of the commercial standard terms does, and it is open to any vendor adopting the non-commercial standard terms to include an explicit exclusion to the same effect. But if that explicit exclusion is not present, clause 1.5 of the non-commercial standard terms should in my view be read as not excluding sub-sales. It is significant that the commercial standard terms are different, and the Law Society’s Handbook and the Conveyancer’s Guide mentioned above are unfortunate or even misleading in failing to draw a distinction between the two.

Mr Dutton has also relied on a second argument, added by a relatively late amendment to his pleading, based on the licence to assign. Under clause 8.3.2 the buyer is required to provide all information and references reasonably required, and under clause 8.3.3 it is the obligation of the vendor to procure the licence. If the licence has not been received three working days before the contractual date for completion, the purchaser is entitled to rescind and recover the deposit, unless indeed he is himself in breach of his obligations under clause 8.3.2. The contractual completion date was 20 June 2008, so the requirement was to ‘receive’ the licence by the close of business, or possibly before midnight, on 16 June : see Aubergine Enterprises Limited v Lakewood International Limited [2002] 1 WLR 2149 (CA) at paragraph 46. Accepting that no particular form may be needed, it nevertheless does need to be in writing, and it needs to be received. Mr Naviede relies on the letter from Cluttons dated 16 June, mentioned at paragraph 17 above. That letter might indeed have been adequate confirmation that the licence would formally be given, but there is no evidence that it was received until 17 June at the earliest. In particular there is no evidence that it was received by fax or e-mail on 16 June. There was also an earlier draft of a licence to be issued in favour of Mr Pittack, but that was clearly no more than a draft.

I have therefore to conclude that Mr Naviede did not receive a written licence to assign three working days before 20 June. The factual question therefore is whether or not Mr Pittack had provided ‘all information and references reasonably required.’ On that question, Crown Estate did not require references from Mr Pittack at all, and there is no question of them requiring any other information not already provided, except perhaps for Mr Pittack’s address (which I regard as trivial). Mr Pittack was therefore not in breach, and he was entitled to rescind.

For both those reasons I have come to the conclusion that Mr Pittack was entitled to rescind and, not being himself in breach of the contract, is entitled to the return of the deposit with interest.

I reach that conclusion without a great deal of satisfaction. Mr Pittack strikes me as fortunate in the extreme, having failed to prepare for the possibility of his intended sub-purchasers withdrawing, that Mr Naviede reacted so uncompromisingly to the suggestion of a sub-sale. Mr Dutton described Mr Naviede as ‘too clever by half’ in his attempt to box Mr Pittack into a corner. That phrase has a pejorative connotation which I do not endorse, even though by refusing access to the property Mr Naviede had acted consciously in making things difficult for Mr Pittack. The fact is that a substantial degree of mistrust had arisen on both sides. I would characterize Mr Naviede merely as unfortunate that he objected to the sub-sale before the sub-purchasers withdrew. As for the licence to assign, the fact is that Mr Naviede never made a formal application for the licence, relying on Mr Pittack’s failure to provide him with references. He was again unfortunate that Mr Pittack himself had provided what Cluttons needed. Even so, by the time he discovered the position on 16 June, he could have obtained written confirmation from Cluttons by fax or e-mail that day, and I can only suppose that the urgency of the matter was not then appreciated.

Mr Pittack’s pleadings include a claim for a lien over the property to enforce the return of the deposit. However, this was not pressed at the hearing, and indeed Mr Dutton’s only submission (if that is the word) on this point was that he handed up copies of two pages from Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property (7th edition), containing paragraph 15–056, a paragraph with a plethora of authorities, none of which I was invited to read, and none of which Mr Naviede had any proper opportunity to answer. I make no order on this part of the claim.