Rahme v Smith & Williamson Trust Corporation Ltd

Stephen Voice married Lisa Voice (née Rosen) in 1985. They had two children, a son born in 1986 and a daughter born in 1989. The marriage was not happy, at any rate in later years. On the 7^th July 1999, Mrs Voice petitioned for divorce. She applied for an injunction requiring Mr Voice to leave the matrimonial home and such an order was made on the 23^rd November 1999. A decree nisi of divorce was made on 7^th February 2000 and the decree was made absolute on 21^st March 2000.

Mr Voice was acquainted with the Claimant, Ronald Rahme, who lived in a flat in Wimbledon. In around March 2000, Mr Voice contacted Mr Rahme and as a result of their discussions, Mr Voice came to live in Mr Rahme’s flat. Mr Voice wished to make a claim against Mrs Voice for financial provision under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Mrs Voice was a wealthy woman. Mr Rahme had previous dealings with solicitors, namely, C P Christou of London N12. Mr Rahme introduced Mr Voice to Mr Christou of that firm and Mr Christou thereafter acted for Mr Voice in relation to his claim for financial provision. Mr Rahme was involved with Mr Voice in taking advice from Mr Christou on the claim. Mr Voice agreed to pay to Mr Rahme 25% of the sum which Mr Voice received from Mrs Voice by way of settlement of the claim for financial provision.

The claim for financial provision was eventually settled. On 18^th July 2001, Mr and Mrs Voice agreed a consent order providing for Mrs Voice to pay to Mr Voice a lump sum of £2,500,000. On the 20^th July 2001, Mr and Mrs Voice signed a deed providing for Mr Voice to transfer to Mrs Voice his shares in a Cayman Island company called Coastline Property Co Limited in return for a payment to Mr Voice of £285,000. On 30^th July 2001, Mrs Voice duly paid Mr Voice the sums which had been agreed. The Defendant says that Mr Voice paid Mr Rahme some £695,000, which was approximately 25% of the sums received by Mr Voice by way of the divorce settlement. Mr Rahme admits receipt of £695,000 but says that this payment was for something else.

The Defendant also says that Mr Rahme, unbeknown to Mr Voice, had agreed with Mrs Voice that she would pay Mr Rahme £225,000 in certain circumstances. On 1^st August 2001, Mrs Voice gave Mr Rahme a cheque for that sum. On the same day, Mrs Voice paid Mr Rahme £15,000 in cash; this was said to be in respect of legal expenses payable to Mr Christou.

Mr Voice died intestate on 22^nd June 2003. The Defendant, Smith & Williamson Trust Corporation Limited were granted letters of administration on 20^th August 2004. After Mr Voice’s death, Mr Rahme began making claims against Mrs Voice for monies said to be due to Mr Rahme, initially from Mr Voice and then from his estate.

Mr Rahme contended that Mr Voice had never paid him the 25% due to him of the sums received by way of the divorce settlement. Mr Rahme also contended that he had lent very substantial sums of money to Mr Voice which had not been repaid and were therefore outstanding. Mr Rahme also claimed rent for the flat in Wimbledon pursuant to what were said to be signed tenancy agreements in favour of Mr Voice. Mr Rahme also claimed sums which were said to be agreed by Mr Voice for damage to the flat and its contents and for a large quantity of valuable wines and spirits consumed by Mr Voice. The estate of Mr Voice denied liability in relation to all of the claims made by Mr Rahme and Mr Rahme commenced the present proceedings on 30^th May 2006. The Defendant has counterclaimed for payment to it of the £225,000 and the £15,000 which was said to have been received by Mr Rahme from Mrs Voice. The Defendant has also counterclaimed for repayment of the £695,000 paid by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme.

I will refer to Mr Rahme’s claims in the order in which they are pleaded in the Particulars of Claim.

The first claim is for unpaid rent for the period 5^th April 2000 to 31^st December 2003. This claim relates to Flat 5, 6 The Drive, Wimbledon. The registered title to Flat 5 was not in Mr Rahme’s name as it was in the name of a Miss Janine Ludewig. However, Mr Rahme says that he was the beneficial owner of Flat 5. Mr Rahme relies on two tenancy agreements said to have been entered into between himself and Mr Voice. The first written tenancy agreement is dated 27^th December 2000 and relates to a term from 5^th April 2000 until 31^st December 2001. This tenancy agreement reserved a monthly rent of £3,950. Mr Rahme relies on a second written tenancy agreement of 19^th October 2001 for a fixed term of two years from 31^st December 2001 and therefore expiring on 31^st December 2003. The rent under the second tenancy agreement was £4,000 per month. Mr Rahme says that Mr Voice never paid any rent under either tenancy agreement. He claims that the arrears under the first tenancy agreement are either £82,376.36 or £82,430.56. The first figure was said to have been agreed between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice as the amount of the arrears on 19^th October 2001 and the second figure is a revised calculation which is said to be more accurate. The arrears of rent under the second tenancy agreement are said to be £96,000.

The second claim made by Mr Rahme is for what is said to be an agreed sum in respect of damage to Flat 5 and its contents. Mr Rahme says that Mr Voice did damage the flat and its contents and Annex C to the Particulars of Claim identifies eight specific respects in which the contents of the flat were damaged. Mr Rahme goes on to say that Mr Voice agreed in writing that he had damaged the contents of the flat and that the appropriate figure by way of compensation in relation to that damage was £39,700. This figure is said to have been put forward by Mr Voice himself and accepted by Mr Rahme. No part of that sum has been paid and Mr Rahme says the same is now due from Mr Voice’s estate.

Mr Rahme’s third claim is for what is said to be an agreed sum in relation to a large collection of high quality vintage wines and spirits, belonging to Mr Rahme, but consumed by Mr Voice. Annex D to the Particulars of Claim is a list of some of the wines and spirits the subject of this claim. More particularly, Mr Rahme says that Mr Voice agreed the fact of consumption and the figure of £35,400 as compensation due for such consumption. Mr Rahme says that Mr Voice suggested this figure and Mr Rahme agreed to it. It is said that no part of this sum has been paid and the same is now due from the estate of Mr Voice.

Mr Rahme’s fourth claim relates to monies lent by him to Mr Voice which have not been repaid. The dates of the loans and the amounts are as follows: 23^rd May 2000, £25,200; 29^th July 2000, £39,800; 10^th January 2001, £30,000; and 20^th May 2001, £268,000. These sums total £363,000. Mr Rahme relies on four promissory notes signed by Mr Voice, there being one promissory note for each alleged loan. In his Particulars of Claim, Mr Rahme explained that he is the son of Jebrael Rahme who is one of the largest land owners and wealthiest men in the Lebanon. Mr Rahme says he was cut off by his father on or about the 10^th August 2002. The loans in question were made before that date. Mr Rahme customarily visited the Lebanon and returned to the United Kingdom with large quantities of cash. The money which Mr Rahme lent to Mr Voice was in cash, in particular in US dollars. The cash used for the four loans for Mr Voice was either from family vaults in the Lebanon or the vault of the lawyer acting for the family in Tripoli, Lebanon.

Mr Rahme’s fifth claim is for 25% of the sums due to Mr Voice under his settlement with Mrs Voice. Mr Rahme relies upon an oral agreement made in around October 2000 under which such a sum was to be paid and he also relies on a written agreement of 5^th February 2001 which refers to Mr Voice paying 25% of all gross assets and sums awarded to him pursuant to such a settlement. In fact, the Defendant accepts that Mr Voice did agree to pay to Mr Rahme 25% of his divorce settlement. Mr Rahme claims 25% of £2,785,000 that is £696,250. The Defendant says that Mr Rahme was paid virtually all that he was entitled to under the agreement in that he received £695,000. Further, by its Counterclaim, the Defendant claims to set aside this agreement on various grounds and to recover £695,000 from Mr Rahme on various grounds, with or without the setting aside of the agreement.

Mr Rahme’s sixth claim is to contractual interest on the other sums claimed as referred to above. Mr Rahme says that he is entitled to be paid contractual interest of 1% compounded on a monthly basis on all sums outstanding, save in respect of the 25% of the divorce settlement. Mr Rahme relies on clause 6 of the second tenancy agreement to which I have referred. He say that clause 6 of the second tenancy agreement refers to the rent arrears under the first tenancy agreement as well as under the second tenancy agreement and also refers to the agreed sums payable for damage to the flat and its contents and for the consumption of alcohol. Finally, Mr Rahme says clause 6 of the second tenancy agreement deals with the sums due under the promissory notes of 23^rd May 2000, 29^th July 2000 and 10^th January 2001 and interest in relation to the fourth promissory note of 20^th May 2001 was expressly provided for in that note.

The sums claimed by Mr Rahme in respect of contractual interest are very substantial. The interest allegedly due has been calculated in Annexes J1 to J5 to the Particulars of Claim in relation to the period up to 1^st May 2006. The resulting sums claimed are as follows:

interest on rent due under the first tenancy is £67,276.28 (or £62,276.28);

interest on the rent due under the second tenancy is £49,424.48;

interest on the sums due for damage to the flat and contents and the consumption of wines and spirits is £58,645;

interest on the first, second and third promissory notes is £74,185.43; and

interest on the fourth promissory note is £220,659.81.

The Particulars of Claim also advanced a further claim described as “the guarantee claim”. Although this claim was withdrawn by Mr Rahme when he served his witness statement in these proceedings on 5^th June 2007, it is necessary to refer briefly to the original claim which was made and to what was subsequently said about it.

The so called guarantee claim involved an assertion that a friend of Mr Rahme, a Mr Paul Wise, lent Mr Voice in the year 2000, four sums which were £330,000, £295,000, £248,750 and £46,250, totalling £920,000. Mr Rahme contended that the sum of £920,000 was repaid to Mr Wise. Mr Rahme also contended that Mr Wise lent a fifth sum, in the amount of £435,000, to Mr Voice on or around 13^th January 2001. Mr Rahme contended that he agreed with Mr Wise to guarantee the liability of Mr Voice to Mr Wise in relation to this sum. It was said that Mr Voice never repaid any part of the £435,000 to Mr Wise with the result that Mr Wise put pressure on Mr Rahme to pay the sum due pursuant to the guarantee. Eventually (it was said), Mr Rahme’s father paid the full amount due to Mr Wise which, together with interest up to March 2005, had risen to £864,739.29. Mr Rahme contended that he was liable to reimburse this amount to his father. It was said that because Mr Voice’s debt to Mr Wise had been discharged by a payment which Mr Rahme was liable to reimburse to his father, Mr Rahme was entitled to take over Mr Wise’s rights against Mr Voice to recover the sum of £864,739.29.

In his witness statement of 5^th June 2007, Mr Rahme referred to the various loans made by Mr Wise to Mr Voice. He referred to the four payments which totalled £920,000 and to the further loan of £435,000. He then stated that he was no longer pursuing his claim in relation to the loan of £435,000. He stated that he was dropping this claim on legal advice and he claimed privilege in relation to that advice. However, he was prepared to “assure the court” that his reason for dropping the claim had nothing to do with the veracity of this part or any other part of his claim. He said that the decision was also taken for economic reasons, given that there were insufficient funds in Mr Voice’s estate to meet his full claim and costs.

On 16^th March 2009, shortly before the trial of this action began, Mr Rahme served a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim in which he told a different story about the involvement of Mr Wise. In short, Mr Rahme contended that Mr Wise had never lent his money to Mr Voice. Instead, it was contended that Mr Rahme lent his money to Mr Voice. The four sums which totalled £920,000 and the fifth sum of £435,000 were, it was said, all sums lent by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice. As Mr Rahme had been paid £920,000 but not £435,000 the latter sum remained outstanding. Mr Rahme stated in his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim that he wished to claim the sum of £435,000 as money lent by him to Mr Voice, which sum had not been repaid.

All of Mr Rahme’s claims are resisted by the Defendant, on various grounds. The Defendant puts Mr Rahme to proof that the various documents allegedly signed by Mr Voice on which Mr Rahme relied are genuine documents. The Defendant also contends that, contrary to Mr Rahme’s case, Mr Voice did indeed pay to Mr Rahme 25% of the gross amount of his divorce settlement in that Mr Voice paid to Mr Rahme the sum of £695,000.

The Defendant has served a Counterclaim on Mr Rahme. Some of the claims made in the Counterclaim seek the setting aside of the various transactions which Mr Rahme relies upon for the purposes of his claim. Other parts of the Counterclaim seek payment from Mr Rahme of monies Mr Rahme received from Mr Voice and from Mrs Voice. The Defendant seeks to set aside the various transactions on which Mr Rahme relied by reason of alleged undue influence practised on Mr Voice, on the ground that the transactions are alleged to be unconscionable and, in relation to the agreement to pay 25% of the divorce settlement, on the ground that it was induced by Mr Rahme’s misrepresentations to Mr Voice. The Defendant also claims damages for such misrepresentations. Further, in relation to the agreement to pay 25% of the divorce settlement to Mr Rahme, it is contended that Mr Rahme gave no consideration for such an agreement and the consideration referred to in the agreement was past consideration. The Defendant also claims from Mr Rahme payment of £695,000 said to have been paid by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme pursuant to the agreement as to the divorce settlement. If the agreement as to the divorce settlement is set aside on one of the grounds advanced by the Defendant then it contends that this sum should be repaid. The Defendant has a further ground on which it claims repayment of £695,000. It is said that Mr Rahme’s role in relation to assisting with the negotiation of Mr Voice’s divorce settlement was such that Mr Rahme owed a fiduciary duty to Mr Voice and that Mr Rahme broke that fiduciary duty by taking from Mrs Voice a secret commission of £225,000 and a further payment of £15,000. This breach of fiduciary duty is said to have two important consequences, in particular. The first is said to be that the secret commission of £225,000 or £240,000 is payable by Mr Rahme to the estate of Mr Voice and the second consequence is said to be that the £695,000 paid by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme is now repayable. Alternatively, if it were to be the case that Mr Rahme had not been paid by Mr Voice the 25% of the divorce settlement, then Mr Rahme’s breach of fiduciary duty results in him no longer being able to assert a claim for £696,250, or any part of it, against Mr Voice or his estate.

When these proceedings began in May 2006, Mr Rahme had the benefit of advice from solicitors and counsel. The witness statements were exchanged in around June 2007, again while Mr Rahme had advice from solicitors and counsel. Mr Rahme’s legal advice was funded by the Legal Services Commission. In December 2007, the Defendant’s solicitors wrote to the Legal Services Commission inviting it to reconsider the grant of funding to Mr Rahme. In February 2008 the Legal Services Commission withdrew funding from Mr Rahme. Since that time, Mr Rahme has acted as a litigant in person.

Mr Rahme has made repeated applications to adjourn the trial of this action. His various applications were to adjourn the trial for lengthy periods into the future. He relied on letters from his general practitioner as to his physical and mental state. In April 2008, I declined to adjourn the trial which was scheduled to take place in May 2008. Later, a few days before that trial was due to start, Mr Rahme persuaded another judge to adjourn the trial to enable him to appeal the withdrawal of funding by the Legal Services Commission. Although that was the ground for the adjournment on the eve of the trial, Mr Rahme does not appear to have used the adjournment for that purpose or in any other constructive way. The trial was re-fixed for March 2009 giving Mr Rahme many months of advance notice of the trial date. Two weeks before the trial was due to begin, Mr Rahme applied to me to adjourn the trial for a period of six months or more. He again relied on evidence from his general practitioner. I declined to adjourn the trial. I found the medical evidence to be insufficient justification for the adjournment sought. Whilst I could understand that Mr Rahme as a litigant in person found the prospect of this trial daunting and stressful, I did not think that the situation would be changed by an adjournment. I felt that the time had come for these proceedings to be tried and determined. On 20th March 2009, the Court of Appeal (Arden and Lloyd LJJ) refused Mr Rahme permission to appeal against my decision. On the eve of the trial, Mr Rahme again applied unsuccessfully (to another judge) for an adjournment and on the first day of the trial Mr Rahme repeated that application before me. I gave a short judgment giving my reasons for refusing to adjourn the trial at that stage.

Also on the first day of the trial, the Defendant applied for a summary disposal of all of the claims and counterclaims in these proceedings. The Defendant submitted that the accounts which Mr Rahme had given of the alleged loans by Paul Wise to Mr Voice, and the later statements made by Mr Rahme contradicting those accounts, meant that Mr Rahme had attempted to pervert the course of justice and that a fair trial of Mr Rahme’s claims was not possible with the result that they should all be dismissed and judgment given for the Defendant on the Counterclaim. The Defendant relied on Arrow Nominees Inc v Blackledge[2000] 2 BCLC 167. I did not accede to that application. I gave a short judgment explaining my reasons for holding that the issues could, and should, be tried.

Mr Rahme’s lack of legal representation has placed him at a disadvantage as compared with the Defendant. It has also considerably increased the difficulties for the court in conducting a fair trial in this case. I have endeavoured to give Mr Rahme leeway in various respects. For example, when the Defendant applied two weeks before the trial for judgment on the Counterclaim in default of a Defence to a Counterclaim, I permitted Mr Rahme to serve a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim significantly out of time. I also permitted Mr Rahme to put in a further statement of his evidence during the course of the trial and I permitted Mr Rahme to serve two other late witness statements. I also allowed Mr Rahme to be assisted by a McKenzie Friend.

I recognise that the trial has been a considerable strain on Mr Rahme. As against that, the principal matters that need to be determined in this case are matters of fact. The facts or alleged facts in large part turn on dealings between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice where Mr Rahme is the principal and sometimes the only possible witness of fact. Mr Rahme’s Particulars of Claim and his first witness statement were served at a time when he had legal advice and assistance.

Mr Rahme was able to point to a document signed or allegedly signed by Mr Voice to support each of Mr Rahme’s claims. There is a challenge of one kind or another to most of these documents. In some cases it is said that the document was not signed by Mr Voice. In other cases it is said that the document is a sham. It is therefore necessary to describe these documents in some detail. In doing so, I will take the documents at face value even though there are challenges to the authenticity of these documents and the signatures upon them.

The first document is dated 23^rd May 2000. It is on a sheet of paper torn from a spiral notebook. The document is headed with the full name (Stephen John Voice) and the address of Mr Voice, which is given as Flat 5, 6 The Drive London SW20 8TG. As part of the heading there is a reference to the figures “£25,200.00”. The text of the document is as follows:

The next relevant document is in Arabic but I have a translation. The document is dated 25^th May 2000. The document has been signed by Mr Rahme whose signature is witnessed by Miss Chbayaa, a lawyer in Tripoli, Lebanon. The document has also been signed by Paul Wise and his signature is witnessed. In addition, the document has been stamped by the Mayor of Tripoli to witness the signatures and to “legalise” the document. Mr Voice is not a party to this document but is referred to in it. The document refers to a “loan bill” under which Mr Voice borrowed a sum of money from Mr Wise. No copy of such a loan bill has been produced. The amount of the loan is stated to be $485,250 and it is also stated that this is equivalent to £330,000 on 25^th May 2000, the date of the loan. The document records that Mr Rahme has a power of attorney in relation to a plot of land identified with title number 862, title to which was vested in Mr Rahme’s father. The document records that Mr Wise demanded that Mr Rahme should place this land under mortgage for Mr Wise’s benefit as a guarantee of Mr Voice’s loan. The document then declares that it is the grant of a mortgage of that land to be held as a guarantee of Mr Voice’s loan. The land is described as having an area of about 7,000 square metres on which had been erected seven buildings and so that each square metre is approximately valued at that date at $1,000.

The next relevant document is again in Arabic but again I have a translation. This document is dated 21^st June 2000 and the signatures of the executing parties and witnesses and the stamp of the Mayor of Tripoli are all the same as with the document of 25^th May 2000. This document refers to a loan from Mr Wise to Mr Voice on 21^st June 2000 in the sum of $441,600 said to be equivalent to £295,000 on the date of the loan. The document records that the original mortgage of 25^th May 2000 also extends to cover this transaction of 21^st June 2000. In other words, the land in question is mortgaged as security for the repayment of the loans of 25^th May 2000 and 21^st June 2000.

The next relevant document is also in Arabic but again I have a translation. It is dated 17^th July 2000. The signatures of the executing parties and of the witnesses and the stamp of the Mayor of Tripoli are all the same as with the document of 25^th May 2000. This document refers to a loan by Paul Wise to Stephen Voice on 17^th July 2000 for the sum of $371,150 said to be equivalent to £248,750 on 17^th July 2000, the date of the loan. In substance, the mortgage of 25^th May 2000 is extended to cover this further loan so that the land is mortgaged as security for the payment of the loans of 25^th May 2000, 21^st June 2000 and 17^th July 2000.

The next relevant document is also in Arabic but again I have a translation. It is dated 19^th July 2000. The signatures of the executing parties and the witnesses and the stamp of the Mayor of Tripoli are all the same as with the document of 25^th May 2000. The document refers to a loan by Paul Wise to Stephen Voice on 19^th July 2000 of $69,100 equivalent to £46,250 on the date of the loan. The mortgage of 25^th May 2000 is extended to cover this transaction so that the land is mortgaged as security for the repayment of the loans made on the 25^th May 2000, 21^st June 2000, 17^th July 2000 and 19^th July 2000.

The next relevant document is dated 29^th July 2000. The piece of paper which has been used appears to be one half of a sheet of white A4. The document is similar to the document of 23^rd May 2000 in that it starts with the name and address of Mr Voice; the address is given as Flat 5, 6 The Drive. The figure of “£39,800.00” is written as part of the heading. The document is essentially in the same terms as the document of 23^rd May 2000 save that the amount which Mr Voice promises to pay to Mr Rahme is £39,800.

The next document is a tenancy agreement dated 27^th December 2000. The original of this document is not available and I was provided with a copy. This document describes Mr Rahme as the landlord and Mr Voice as the tenant and the document relates to Flat 5, 6 The Drive. The document grants a tenancy of that flat to Mr Voice for a fixed term starting from 5^th April 2000 and ending on the 31^st December 2001 at a monthly rent of £3,950, payable in advance by equal monthly payments on the first day of each month. In addition to printed clauses in the standard form of tenancy agreement, the document contains handwritten clauses, numbered 6(3) and 6(4). By clause 6(3), it was agreed that the tenant could vacate on giving 2 months notice in writing. By clause 6(4) it was stated that the landlord gave credit for the rent and required the rent and any dilapidations to be paid in full upon the tenant receiving his divorce settlement. The landlord’s address is given as Flat 4, 6 The Drive. The document was apparently signed by Mr Voice at the bottom of the second page. It was also signed by Mr Rahme. A number of alterations to the document have been initialled with the initials “SV”. There are two such initials on the first page and four such initials on the second page.

The next document is dated 10^th January 2001. This document appears to have been written on a piece of writing paper or possibly a piece of paper which has been torn from a larger piece of writing paper. The heading to the document again refers to Mr Voice’s full name and his address as Flat 5, 6 The Drive. The heading to the document refers to the figures “£30,000”. The document is in essentially the same terms as the earlier documents of 23^rd May 2000 and 29^th July 2000 save that the sum which Mr Voice promises to pay to Mr Rahme is £30,000.

The next document is dated 13^th January 2001 and is written in English. The document names Mr Voice as the borrower and Mr Wise as the lender. The document records that Mr Voice promised to pay Mr Wise the principal sum of £435,000 with interest payable at 1% “accumulative interest per month” calculated monthly starting from 13^th January 2001. The document records that the “value” was received by Mr Voice in cash. The document is signed by Mr Voice and witnessed by Mr Rahme who gives his address as Flat 4, 6 The Drive.

The next relevant document is in Arabic but I have a translation. This document is dated 13^th January 2001. The signatures of the executing parties and the witnesses and the stamp of the Mayor of Tripoli are all as in accordance with the first Arabic document to which I have referred, dated 25^th May 2000. This document records that Mr Wise lent Mr Voice on 13^th January 2001 the sum of $642,850 which is said to be equivalent to £435,000. It is said that Mr Voice received that sum in cash from Mr Wise and subsequently Mr Voice signed an agreement with Mr Wise to repay the loan of £435,000. The document then records that Mr Wise has asked Mr Rahme to sign a loan bill for Mr Wise’s benefit and also asked Mr Rahme to give a guarantee by mortgaging some of Mr Rahme’s properties as security for the repayment by Mr Voice of the loan. Clause 2 of the document is a guarantee by Mr Rahme for the loan to Mr Voice. By clause 5 of the document, Mr Rahme declares that he has granted a mortgage over an identified piece of land to secure repayment of the money owed by Mr Voice to Mr Wise. Clause 7 is described as “a penalty clause” which provides for a high rate of interest in certain circumstances.

On 5^th February 2001 Mr Voice and Mr Rahme entered into a written agreement. I will set out the terms of that agreement in full.

Upon the full conclusion of the divorce proceedings I Mr Stephen Voice will pay to my friend Mr Ronald Rahme 25% of all gross assets and sums awarded to Me, such payments to be paid pro rata as and when I Mr Stephen Voice receives my financial settlement in the divorce proceedings.

I will provide my friend Mr Ronald Rahme with full details of all sums awarded in the divorce proceedings and payments received and I will account to my friend Mr Ronald Rahme for all sums due to him, and I will ensure that the transfer of all sums due to him reaches him within the following 24 hours of me receiving any payments.

For the avoidance of doubt it is expressly agreed and declared that my friend Mr Ronald Rahme is not underwriting or being responsible for my (Mr Voice) legal expenses in the divorce proceedings. I Stephen Voice remain solely liable for payment of my legal fees.

We Mr Stephen Voice and Mr Ronald Rahme hereby respectively agree that during the continuance of this agreement or at any time thereafter we will not disclose, divulge, make public or make use of any confidential information whether written, electronic or oral which may be available or may become known regarding the business and personal affairs of each other for any purpose.

This agreement shall continue until all monies due to Mr Rahme are paid in full in relation to the divorce proceedings.

All communication between the parties shall be in writing and communicated to the address stated in the agreement or at any other address provided by the parties from time to time in writing to the other party.

This agreement is governed by English law and the parties hereto irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the U. K. courts.”

The Defendant accepts that Mr Voice did sign this agreement and that the agreement was not a sham although the Defendant contends that some of the statements as to the consideration being given by Mr Rahme in return for this agreement were not accurate statements. At the time of this agreement, Mr Voice was being advised by his solicitors, in particular, a Mr Christou. Mr Christou recommended certain amendments to the agreement before it was executed and Mr Christou witnessed the signatures of both Mr Rahme and Mr Voice.

The next relevant document is a document which purports to record an agreement between Mr Rahme and Mrs Voice. The agreement is dated 10th May 2001. I will set out the terms of that agreement in full.

The agreement is signed by Mrs Voice and by Mr Rahme. There is a copy of this document without an endorsement and copy with an endorsement. The endorsement in question reads: “Received £225000 by cheque 1/8/01 on behalf of J R Rahme”. That endorsement is again apparently signed by Mr Rahme.

The next relevant document is dated 20^th May 2001. The document has the same heading as the earlier documents of 23^rd May 2000, 29^th July 2000 and 10^th January 2001 in that Mr Voice’s full name is set out and his address is given as Flat 5, 6 The Drive. As part of the heading there is the figure “£268,000”. The text of the document reads:

The next document is dated 1^st August 2001. It states:

The next relevant document is dated 8^th August 2001. This document was not disclosed by Mr Rahme on disclosure but was produced by him during the trial. He stated that the document had initially been lost but later came to light. The document is again headed with Mr Voice’s full name and his address is given as Flat 5, 6 The Drive. The heading includes the figure “£696,250.00”. The document records a promise by Mr Voice to pay Ronald Rahme on demand the sum of £696,250. The document is written in black biro pen but appears to be signed by Mr Voice in blue biro pen. The paper on which the document is written is a part of a larger piece of paper and is very similar to the paper used for the document of 20^th May 2001.

The next relevant document is a tenancy agreement in which Mr Rahme is named as the landlord and Mr Voice is named as the tenant. The agreement grants a term certain of 2 years from 31^st December 2001 at a rent of £4,000 per month payable in advance on the first day of each month. The agreement is dated 19^th October 2001. In addition to the terms of the standard form of tenancy agreement, Mr Rahme has included the following provision as clause 6 of the agreement:

The last document to which it is relevant to refer at this stage is a type written document in the following terms:

The document of 20^th October 2001 appears to be signed by Mr Voice.

On 18^th July 2001 and 20^th July 2001, Mr and Mrs Voice executed documents by way of settlement of Mr Voice’s claim for financial provision following the divorce. On 18^th July 2001, Mr and Mrs Voice signed a consent order in the matrimonial proceedings. By clause 1 of the order, Mrs Voice was ordered to pay forthwith to Mr Voice a lump sum of £2,500,000. Clause 2 of the order provided that upon payment of that lump sum the claims by Mr Voice and by Mrs Voice for periodical payments, secured periodical payments and lump sum property adjustment orders should stand dismissed. It was agreed that there would be no order as to costs.

On 20^th July 2001, Mr and Mrs Voice signed a further agreement which related to Coastline Property Co Limited and Coastline Property I Inc. By clause 3 of this agreement, Mr and Mrs Voice agreed to hand to each other, for secure destruction, documents and other materials including information in electronic form concerning Mr and Mrs Voice’s personal life, business affairs, public life and financial affairs and anything relating to any company with which either had been associated. By clause 5 of this agreement, Mrs Voice agreed to pay to Mr Voice £285,000 in full and final settlement of all taxes or other liability in relation to Mr Voice’s transfer of his 50% of the issued share capital in Coastline Property I Inc/Coastline Property Co Limited. By clause 6 of the agreement, Mr Voice agreed to transfer forthwith to Mrs Voice his 50% of the issued share capital in Coastline Property Co Limited and Coastline Property I Inc. In return Mrs Voice was to pay to Mr Voice £285,000. On the 20^th July 2001, Mr Voice resigned as a director of Coastline Property Co Limited and also resigned as a director of Coastline Property I Inc. On the same day, he assigned his shares in Coastline Property Co Limited to Mrs Voice. The documents do not include an assignment of his shares, if any, in Coastline Property I Inc. It may be that the explanation of these documents is that Coastline Property Co Ltd owned the shares in Coastline Property I Inc so that the only shares vested in Mr Voice and capable of being transferred by him were the shares in Coastline Property Co Ltd.

On 30^th July 2001, the sum of £2,500,000, the subject of the consent order, was transferred to Mr Voice’s solicitor’s client account. Also on 30^th July 2001, Mr Voice received a bankers draft for £285,000, the payment due under the agreement of 20^th July 2001.

Most of the issues in this case are issues of fact. In relation to many of those issues, Mr Rahme is the principal, if not the only, witness purporting to give direct evidence of the relevant facts. It is therefore critical that I assess the reliability of Mr Rahme’s evidence. My clear conclusion is that Mr Rahme’s own evidence is unreliable in the extreme. I will refer to some examples of the evidence given and then make some more general points which have led me to my conclusion.

The first matter concerns the case which Mr Rahme put forward, and later withdrew, as to the loans made by Paul Wise to Mr Voice. That case involved Mr Rahme contending that as a matter of fact Mr Wise had lent substantial sums to Mr Voice and that Mr Rahme had stood guarantor for Mr Voice’s liability to repay Mr Wise. The first four loans were said to amount to £920,000 and the fifth loan was of £435,000. It was contended that Mr Voice did pay £920,000 to, or for the benefit of, Mr Wise so that the first four loans were paid off. It was contended that Mr Voice did not pay any part of the £435,000 due to Mr Wise with the result that Mr Wise became more and more pressing for payment and in order to avoid “penalty” interest charges, Mr Rahme persuaded his father to repay the loan together with interest to Mr Wise. That and other matters were said to entitle Mr Rahme to take over Mr Wise’s claim against Mr Voice.

Mr Rahme now says that the involvement of Mr Wise was a complete sham. It was a sham because Mr Rahme says he wished to disguise from his family the real facts, namely, that Mr Rahme himself had substantial resources which enabled him to lend £920,000 and £435,000 to Mr Voice. If his family had become aware of those facts, his family would, or might, have asked questions which would, or might, have led the family to appreciate that Mr Rahme had in his possession a substantial quantity of gold left to him by his grandfather and which Mr Rahme had always concealed from his family. In order for Mr Rahme to put forward this sham transaction, Mr Rahme’s account is that he fooled Mr Voice and his own solicitor, Miss Chbayaa, into believing that the transaction was as it seemed to be. He also paid Mr Wise some $10,000 to persuade him to appear to participate in the transaction. Further, Mr Rahme has explained that he intended to go on with the transaction and to try to pass it off as a genuine transaction in court proceedings against Mr Voice or his estate. What caused a difficulty for Mr Rahme proceeding in that way was that Mr Wise wanted a cut of the proceeds of the action against Mr Voice or his estate. When that emerged, Mr Rahme says that he arranged a variation of the alleged facts which involved his father pretending that he had paid off Mr Wise and thus giving rise to the assertion of a right of subrogation to Mr Wise’s claim, without Mr Wise having to be involved in the proceedings. That was the version of the transaction put forward in the Particulars of Claim, supported by a statement of truth signed by Mr Rahme. It was only when, Mr Rahme now says, his father and other family members made demands on Mr Rahme relating to other transactions, that Mr Rahme felt he could not continue to put forward the original or the revised sham versions of these transactions. At that point, he was advised by solicitors to abandon the claim to recover £435,000 from the estate of Mr Voice. Nonetheless in his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, Mr Rahme stated that he wished to put forward the true underlying transaction which was that he had loaned his own money to Mr Voice and while Mr Voice had repaid £920,000, a further £435,000 plus interest remained outstanding and payable to Mr Rahme.

What Mr Rahme’s most up to date version of the facts, relating to the loans in the name of Mr Wise, shows is that Mr Rahme was prepared to create documents which misdescribed the true position and to persist in relying on those documents for the purposes of court proceedings. Insofar as Mr Rahme is the only witness as to the arrangements he made with Mr Wise, Mr Voice and his father in relation to these alleged loans, it is in my judgment impossible to be able to rely safely on either his first version of the events or, indeed, his second version. Mr Rahme has shown himself in these respects to be an unreliable witness who is prepared to mislead the court. On his own account, he was prepared to put forward whatever version of the facts he thought was necessary in order to advance his case.

It is possible for a witness to be unreliable, or even dishonest, in relation to one part of his evidence but reliable and honest in relation to other parts of his evidence. However, the difficulty for the court is in being able to distinguish one part of the evidence from another. The court may find that it cannot make such a distinction with any real confidence. If Mr Rahme is the only source of evidence on a particular topic, as he has shown himself to be a contaminated source, he has only himself to blame if he fails to persuade the court to accept another part of his evidence

The second relevant matter concerns the affidavit Mr Rahme swore in other proceedings on 7th August 2003. Those proceedings were matrimonial proceedings brought by Mr Rahme’s second wife, Charraf (also known as Sarah) Rahme. It is plain from Mr Rahme’s affidavit that his second wife had alleged that Mr Rahme owned Flat 5, 6 The Drive, Wimbledon. In the claim before me, Mr Rahme positively asserts that he was the beneficial owner of that flat and the legal owner was a mere nominee. However, when it suited him to say the opposite in the matrimonial proceedings brought by his second wife, he strenuously and repeatedly denied that he owned Flat 5. This again indicates that Mr Rahme has, in the past, been prepared to say whatever seems to him to suit his case at the particular time. Further, he has been prepared to act in that way even when it involves his sworn evidence in court proceedings.

A third relevant matter concerns Mr Rahme’s repeated refrain, when asked to explain certain documents or events in the past. Mr Rahme not infrequently offered the explanation that his arrangements were a disguise of the true position because it suited him not to reveal the true position. This applied in particular to the possibility that either his first wife or his second wife might make a claim on his assets. That led him, he explained, to transfer his assets into the names of others or to appear to have debts and liabilities so that third parties might be persuaded that he did not have the asset strength that he now says he actually did have.

I also take into account the way in which Mr Rahme gave his evidence. I have already commented that it was obvious that Mr Rahme found these proceedings stressful and I have reminded myself that this could have caused Mr Rahme to fail to do himself justice. Nonetheless, when cross-examined, Mr Rahme hardly ever, or never, attempted to give a straight answer to a straight question. Straight questions in cross-examination were met by lengthy answers which were a mixture of protest and irrelevant matters. I have to conclude that in many cases, Mr Rahme was wholly unable to provide any answers, let alone convincing answers, to the problems in his case, some of which were pointed out to him in his cross-examination. This produced the result that much of the cross-examination did not produce any answers of any real assistance to me in reaching detailed conclusions as to the facts.

It is also right to remark that in relation to the documents apparently signed by Mr Voice, which I have described in detail above, and on which Mr Rahme relies, there was no detailed cross-examination as to the circumstances in which those documents were created and in which they came to be allegedly signed by Mr Voice. In another case, I would have expected those matters to be explored in detail in cross-examination and I would have been more hesitant before finding that the documents were not genuine in the absence of such a cross-examination. However, in the present case, based on the way in which Mr Rahme effectively refused to answer any searching question put to him, I am quite clear that Mr Rahme would not have offered any reliable answers to detailed questions as to the circumstances in which the documents in question came to be executed. On the question as to the authenticity of certain documents, there is no doubt that Mr Rahme knew the case he had to deal with and there was cross-examination on that topic, albeit in general terms. Accordingly, if I do later come to the conclusion that some of these documents were not genuine, I am satisfied that there is nothing in the course of the trial which would make such findings unfair to Mr Rahme.

Turning to more general considerations, there are many features of Mr Rahme’s evidence which appear somewhat improbable. Nonetheless, improbable things do happen. I have also reminded myself that many features of the lives of Mr Voice and Mr Rahme were unusual and the probabilities are not necessarily to be judged by the standards appropriate to more conventional individuals. Further, in so far as there was evidence of what happened in the Lebanon, I think it is right to be cautions before concluding that something was improbable and therefore did not happen, when an assessment of the probabilities would require me to have a better understanding, than I do have, of what does and does not typically happen in the Lebanon. Having warned myself against too ready a finding that something was improbable and therefore did not happen, it remains the case that there are many examples in the evidence of Mr Rahme’s account being improbable and I can take that fact into account when weighing all the evidence on a particular subject.

In addition, there are examples in the evidence of Mr Rahme’s account being contradicted by documents which are, or appear to be, reliable documents. There are two particular examples which I will mention. The first is that I am satisfied that Mr Rahme deliberately told lies in his evidence about the money he had borrowed from a Mr Malcolm Ryan. Secondly, I am satisfied that Mr Rahme deliberately told lies in his evidence about the arrangements he made with Mrs Voice and Mr Ozin on 10^th May 2001 and about the payments of £225,000 and £15,000 made by Mrs Voice to Mr Rahme. Beyond these examples, it will be apparent from my later findings of fact where I have felt the improbability and/or the contradictions represented by the documents has contributed to my conclusion that I have been unable to accept Mr Rahme’s evidence on a particular topic.

Mr Rahme called the following witnesses to give evidence: Mrs Julie Rahme, Ms Debra Matthews, Mr Haddad and Ms Chbayaa.

Mrs Julie Rahme was Mr Rahme’s first wife. She married Mr Rahme in 1973 and they were divorced in about 1997 on what she described as her fifth attempt. There were 3 children of the marriage. For reasons which I need not go into, it is clear that Mrs Julie Rahme owed Mr Rahme no favours. She was reluctant to get involved and to give evidence in this case. However, her daughter showed her a witness statement prepared by Mr Rahme’s sister, Denise Rahme. That witness statement made certain remarks about Mrs Julie Rahme. Those remarks were largely irrelevant to what I had to try but Mrs Julie Rahme wished to come to court to allow her position to be understood. Mrs Julie Rahme was able to give evidence about background matters but not about the central issues in the case. I found her to be a truthful witness. She had no reason to give evidence in favour of Mr Rahme unless it was in an attempt to tell the truth to the best of her ability. That does not necessarily mean that her recollection was perfect in all respects. It is entirely possible that she has misremembered things. I will take her evidence into account together with the evidence of any other truthful witness in coming to my conclusions on the facts.

Mr Rahme also called Ms Debra Matthews who had been a friend of Mr Voice and who had visited Flat 5 while Mr Voice was living there. I found Ms Matthews to be a truthful witness. As with Julie Rahme, her evidence went to matters of background and although I accept she was a truthful witness, that does not mean that her recollection was accurate in all respects.

Mr Rahme’s next witness was a Mr Haddad, who had been a close friend of Mr Rahme in the Lebanon for many years. Before commenting on Mr Haddad’s evidence, I need to refer to the subject matter of his evidence and the circumstances in which he came to give that evidence.

The subject of Mr Haddad’s evidence was Mr Rahme’s alleged ownership of a large quantity of antique gold coins in the Lebanon and the suggestion that he sold those coins from time to time. It was Mr Rahme’s case that he had acquired a large quantity of antique gold coins on the death of his grandfather in 1976, that he had hidden this fact from his family until the remaining coins were discovered by Mr Rahme’s brother in 2002 and in the period between 1976 and 2002, Mr Rahme had been able to go to the Lebanon, take some of the gold coins and sell them for U.S. dollars.

The possible relevance of the gold coins for present purposes is that Mr Rahme relied on his ownership of the gold coins to explain how he was in a position to lend very substantial sums of money to Mr Voice. The sums said to have been lent were not only the £363,000 said to have been lent directly by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice but also the £920,000 and the £435,000 lent to Mr Voice ostensibly by Mr Wise but in fact (it was said) by Mr Rahme. In this litigation, Mr Rahme originally explained his access to funds as being due to him having access to family funds. He only mentioned the gold coins as a possible source of funds in his Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, which was served about a week before the commencement of the trial. When Mr Rahme was cross-examined, it was put to him that the story about the gold coins was a complete fabrication. Mr Rahme did not accept that suggestion.

Mr Haddad’s evidence was to the effect that Mr Rahme did indeed have a large quantity of gold coins which he sold for U.S. dollars on a large number of occasions between 1976 and 2000. Mr Haddad was able to give evidence as to what he had himself seen and he also recounted what Mr Rahme had told him over the years about the source of, and the extent, of the gold coins.

Mr Rahme produced a witness statement from Mr Haddad. The witness statement was in Arabic but a translation was provided. The witness statement was dated 19^th October 2007. Mr Rahme had not exchanged this witness statement in accordance with the directions as to such exchange. He had referred to the existence of this witness statement when he made his various applications for an adjournment of the trial. He had promised to provide a copy of the witness statement but consistently failed to do so until a few days after the commencement of the trial.

Mr Haddad gave his evidence in a clear and persuasive way. There was nothing in his demeanour to suggest that he was not trying to assist the court with his genuine recollection of the relevant events.

Mr Haddad gave evidence in chief in accordance with his witness statement. He was then cross-examined by counsel for the Defendant. He was then “re-examined” by Mr Rahme but the so called re-examination went rather wider than it should have done and as a result I permitted counsel for the Defendant to cross-examine on the new evidence which had emerged as a result of Mr Rahme’s questions. At no time did counsel for the Defendant suggest to Mr Haddad that the evidence was not accurate or that Mr Haddad was doing anything other than attempting to describe the events to the best of his recollection.

In later submissions, counsel for the Defendant asked me to reject Mr Haddad’s evidence as being a fabrication. However, I indicated to counsel that I did not feel that course was open to me in view of the Defendant’s failure to suggest that to Mr Haddad when he was cross-examined. Later in this judgment, I will explain my reasons for that indication.

If Mr Haddad’s evidence were not pure fiction, then I will have to accept that Mr Rahme did indeed, over a long period at least from 1976 to 2000, have access to a large number of gold coins and that he did sell them for substantial sums which he was paid in U.S. dollars. I do not necessarily have to accept the figures given by Mr Haddad for the sums involved as Mr Haddad described those matters differently at different times in his evidence and an honest witness might well not have been able to recall precisely the sums which were involved. After all, Mr Haddad was merely a bystander when the gold coins were being sold and he did not himself participate in the transactions.

Mr Rahme’s last witness was Ms Chbayaa. She was and is a lawyer practising in the Lebanon. She had acted for Mr Rahme and also for his father, in the latter case, in relation to a very large number of disputes as to title to land. The disputes were connected with the civil war in the Lebanon between the middle 1970s and the early 1990s. Ms Chbayaa had prepared a witness statement dated 4^th June 2007. That statement was written in English. Ms Chbayaa stated that another Lebanese lawyer had assisted her with the preparation of that statement as she was not fluent in English. The documents in the trial bundle also included a number of letters or statements which Ms Chbayaa had prepared on earlier occasions to explain certain transactions which it was said she was familiar with. Mr Rahme produced a further witness statement from Ms Chbayaa. This witness statement was in Arabic but translations were provided, one by Mr Rahme and one by the Defendant’s solicitors. The witness statement was dated 14^th January 2008. Mr Rahme had not exchanged this witness statement in accordance with the directions as to such exchange. He had referred to the existence of this witness statement when he made his various applications for an adjournment of the trial. He had promised to provide a copy of the witness statement but consistently failed to do so until a few days after the commencement of the trial.

Ms Chbayaa’s evidence went to various topics. One topic concerned the availability of funds for Mr Rahme. She referred to monies being deposited in her safe by Mr Rahme and later withdrawn by Mr Rahme. The documents which were created to refer to these withdrawals were designed to give the impression that the monies were deposited to pay legal fees and expenses. It is very difficult to accept that description of the purpose of the deposits. The sums allegedly involved were far too great to be needed for such a purpose.

Ms Chbayaa also gave evidence of conversations she had with Mr Rahme’s father. This evidence was based on statements she had earlier made at a time when Mr Rahme was advancing a case that Mr Wise had made loans to Mr Voice, that Mr Rahme had guaranteed repayment of those loans and that Mr Rahme’s father had repaid £435,000 plus interest to Mr Wise on certain terms agreed between Mr Rahme and his father. That evidence is all very strange in the light of the fact that Mr Rahme now says that the matter was not dealt with in that way. The only possible way to square Ms Chbayaa’s account with truthfulness on her part is to say that both Mr Rahme and his father misled Ms Chbayaa in the relevant respects. There is therefore a very serious question as to the reliability of Ms Chbayaa’s evidence.

Ms Chbayaa also gave very detailed evidence about the transactions which, so far as the documents were concerned, involved Mr Wise. Indeed, Ms Chbayaa had prepared all the documents. She described in detail the negotiations, the handing over of large sums of money, the deposit of a share certificate or two share certificates and, importantly, the involvement of Mr Voice in some at least of these matters. Again, all of this evidence is very odd in view of Mr Rahme having changed his case in recent weeks so that he now says that in truth Mr Wise was not a lender to Mr Voice and, instead, Mr Rahme himself lent large sums to Mr Voice and the transactions were dressed up to look very different. If Ms Chbayaa’s evidence is correct, then it follows that Mr Rahme seriously misled her at all stages. That does nothing to establish Mr Rahme as a credible witness. It paints him as an untruthful and highly devious individual. On the other hand, it is possible that Ms Chbayaa prepared her evidence at a time when Mr Rahme was intending to stick to his story about Mr Wise at least to some extent and the purpose of the evidence was to provide false corroboration to a story which Mr Rahme now says was not the real position. These considerations raise further serious questions as to Ms Chbayaa’s reliability.

On the other hand, Ms Chbayaa gave her evidence in a very clear and detailed way. It could be said that she had thoroughly prepared herself by pre-reading all the documents which she had earlier created and that she simply stuck to the story in those documents. Further, although it was suggested to Ms Chbayaa that her accounts of her conversations with Mr Rahme’s father were not true and that she had come to tell a story which Mr Rahme had asked her to tell, the cross-examination in these respects was very limited indeed. If the Defendant had wanted to invite me to find that Ms Chbayaa’s evidence was deliberately untrue then I would have expected a much more forceful and direct challenge in cross-examination.

In the end, I am very troubled as to the reliability of Ms Chbayaa’s evidence but I am also troubled by my ability to reject her evidence outright. I have real doubts as to whether she has indeed fabricated evidence so as to help Mr Rahme with one version of his case or whether she acted innocently and was misled by Mr Rahme as to what was happening. As will be seen, my overall conclusion on these events, or possible events, involving Ms Chbayaa, is that Mr Rahme did have money available to him and that he was “up to something” in relation to that money and that it is possible Mr Voice was assisting him with whatever scheme Mr Rahme was pursuing. In the end I feel I do not have to decide whether Ms Chbayaa was knowingly involved in Mr Rahme’s scheme and has deliberately given untruthful evidence in this case or whether Mr Rahme was misleading Ms Chbayaa as to what he was up to and so that Ms Chbayaa is merely giving evidence of how matters were explained to her at the time, even though it now turns out she was being seriously misled by Mr Rahme.

The Defendant called Ms Winspeare, Ms McMahon, Mr Ozin and Ms Denise Rahme. It also relied upon an affidavit sworn by Mr Rahme’s father, Mr Jebrael Rahme.

Ms Winspeare is an associate director of the Defendant. She gave evidence as to the assets in Mr Voice’s estate at the date of his death and the contents of relevant records as to Mr Voice’s bank accounts. There was no real challenge to this evidence and I accept it.

Ms Mc Mahon was Mr Voice’s girl friend in the last year or so of his life. She was on holiday with Mr Voice when he died in Miami in June 2003. She has made a claim against the estate of Mr Voice under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Because of the existence of that claim, I think it is right to be cautious about some of Ms Mc Mahon’s evidence which might have a bearing on that claim. That comment applies for example to matters such as the date when she met Mr Voice, when Mr Voice moved from Flat 5 to live with Ms Mc Mahon at her flat, the precise nature of the relationship between Mr Voice and Ms Mc Mahon and the financial arrangements between them. Further, it might be said that it is in her interests as a claimant under the 1975 Act to defeat or diminish the claims put forward by Mr Rahme. After all, if Mr Rahme were to succeed in his present claims, then there would be little or nothing left in Mr Voice’s estate. In addition, in one or two possibly isolated ways, it is possible that Ms Mc Mahon has not behaved honestly; I refer to the question of council tax and withdrawals which Ms Mc Mahon made from Mr Voice’s bank account after his death. Nonetheless, there are parts of Ms Mc Mahon’s evidence that I feel I can accept with confidence. I refer in particular to the time when Mr Voice went to the bank with his solicitor following receipt of the divorce settlement, the conversation between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice in August 2001 and the fact that Mr Rahme and Mr Voice were not in communication after August 2001.

Mr Ozin worked for Mrs Voice’s father, Mr Cecil Rosen, in the latter’s property business for many years and was until recently connected with Mrs Voice in relation to that business. Mr Ozin was involved in certain negotiations involving Mr Rahme and Mrs Voice about Mr Voice’s financial provision claim. Mr Ozin was also involved on behalf of Mrs Voice with the payments of £225,000 and £15,000 to Mr Rahme on 1^st August 2001. Mr Ozin also gave evidence, not originally in his witness statement, about certain funds originally owned by Mr Rosen and later owned by Mrs Voice which had not been disclosed to the United Kingdom tax authorities. I think that Mr Ozin tended to play down his part in the negotiations to which I have referred and also, perhaps, played down his awareness in the past of the funds which were not disclosed to the tax authorities. However, subject to those comments, I find that Mr Ozin was a reliable witness and I have no hesitation in accepting his evidence as to the circumstances in which payments were made by or on behalf of Mrs Voice to Mr Rahme.

Ms Denise Rahme is Mr Rahme’s sister. There is obviously a great deal of ill feeling between Mr Rahme and Denise Rahme. Indeed, Mr Rahme appears to be estranged at present from his father and some or all of his siblings. There appear to be significant disputes about the ownership of land in the Lebanon and the rights of various persons to inherit that land and other assets. Denise Rahme has a very low opinion of Mr Rahme. She told me: “he is a dangerous con artist who is driven by money”. I have formed my own assessment of Mr Rahme as I stated earlier in this judgment. I have reached those conclusions independently of the views of Denise Rahme. Her evidence relates to background matters rather than to the central issues. In view of the bitterness between brother and sister, I think I should be cautious about accepting Denise Rahme’s evidence. It seems to me quite likely that she has overstated matters against her brother and has been influenced to do so by her very strong personal feelings.

Mr Jebrael Rahme is now an elderly man. He originally prepared a witness statement in readiness for his attending to give oral evidence at a trial in May 2008. He came to London from the Lebanon in May 2008 to give that evidence but the trial was adjourned at the last moment on Mr Rahme’s application. Mr Jebrael Rahme then swore an affidavit setting out the evidence he could give. He swore this affidavit in view of his age and the state of his health. He was due to come to court again to give oral evidence at the trial before me but he was seriously injured in a car accident on his way to the airport in Lebanon. I was asked to, and I did, admit his affidavit as hearsay evidence under the Civil Evidence Act 1995.

As I have already stated, Mr Rahme is now estranged from his father. Nonetheless, there is little reason to think that Mr Jebrael Rahme’s evidence is unreliable on that account. The evidence in the affidavit appears to fit with many of the known facts and is inherently credible. However, the contents of the affidavit do conflict with other evidence I have received, for example, from Ms Chbayaa and I have to remember that I did not have the advantage of a cross-examination of the deponent.

Before coming to my findings of fact, I wish to make three further comments as to matters which are relevant to those findings.

The first comment is as to the time when Mr Rahme’s claims were first put forward. Mr Voice’s divorce settlement was at the end of July 2001. Almost immediately thereafter, Mr Rahme received from Mr Voice sums which, more or less, represented 25% of the divorce settlement. Shortly thereafter, Mr Rahme claimed a further £25,000 from Mr Voice. I accept the evidence of Ms Mc Mahon and the evidence in a tape recording of a conversation between Mr Voice and his solicitor, Mr Christou, on 3^rd October 2001 that this further claim upset Mr Voice and he told Mr Christou that no money was due to Mr Rahme. Although Mr Rahme gave evidence that he did make his further claims against Mr Voice during Mr Voice’s lifetime, I reject that evidence from Mr Rahme. It follows from that finding that the first time that Mr Rahme put forward the claims which he then pursued in these proceedings was after Mr Voice’s death.

In my judgment, it is a relevant consideration that the claims now put forward were not pursued during Mr Voice’s lifetime. If they had been, then the court would know the specific nature of Mr Voice’s reaction to those claims. Because the claims were only put forward after Mr Voice’s death, the court is deprived of knowledge of Mr Voice’s reaction to them. Furthermore, Mr Rahme knew when he made his claims that Mr Voice would not be alive to give evidence to rebut the claims. In those circumstances, I ought to consider carefully whether the claims are genuine or whether Mr Rahme has sought to take advantage of Mr Voice’s death to put forward false claims when Mr Voice cannot give evidence to rebut them. This comment does not affect the standard of proof which applies in this case. The standard of proof remains proof on the balance of probabilities. However, the need to take into account the possibility of a false claim in these circumstances is merely a matter of common sense. Further, the approach I adopt in this respect is in no way novel: see Holder v Holder [1968] Ch 353 at 390-391 per Harman LJ where he referred to scrutinising a claim against a deceased person “with a jealous eye”.

My second comment is that the court does have available to it the file of Mr Voice’s solicitors in relation to his divorce and his claim to financial provision. This file records in detail the instructions given by Mr Voice to his solicitors on matters which are relevant to these proceedings. For example, the file discloses Mr Voice’s instructions as to a tenancy agreement of Flat 5, of where Mr Voice was living at certain times, as to Mr Voice’s overall financial position and, in particular any debts owed by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme or third parties. Mr Voice’s instructions to his solicitors in these respects are of particular value in resolving the present dispute because Mr Rahme was often present when these instructions were given or was otherwise aware of what the instructions were. If the instructions given by Mr Voice to his solicitor, to the knowledge of Mr Rahme, conflict with what Mr Rahme now says the real position is, I will give far more weight to what I see in the contemporaneous documents as compared with Mr Rahme’s oral evidence.

My third comment concerns the extent to which my freedom to make findings of fact is inhibited by the way in which Mr Rahme’s witnesses were, or were not cross-examined. Every counsel should know the general rule that it is not open to counsel to invite the court to reject the evidence of a witness as deliberately untrue when the witness was not challenged in that way. It was not suggested to Mr Haddad in cross-examination that he was giving evidence which was deliberately untrue but yet I was invited by counsel to reject his evidence on that basis. The need for cross-examination which specifically challenges the truthfulness of the witness’ account is clearly established and is described in Phipson on Evidence, 16^th ed., at para. 12-12 and is the subject of a very helpful consideration in the judgment of the Court of Appeal (delivered by Jacob LJ) in Markem Corp v Zipher Ltd [2005] RPC 761 at [50] – [61], discussing the decision of the House of Lords in Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 and the Australian case of Allied Pastoral Holdings v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1983) 44 ALR 607. Whilst this approach may be open to some very limited exceptions, there is no possible exception relevant in the present case. In view of the failure to put to Mr Haddad that his evidence was a concoction, it is not open to me to consider that possibility. It would be completely unfair to Mr Haddad to make such a finding against him. Similarly, it would be completely unfair to him even to hint at what I might have thought if my hands had not been tied in this respect by the failure to challenge his evidence in this respect. I will therefore proceed on the basis that Mr Haddad’s evidence was honestly given. If it was honestly given, then so far as Mr Haddad’s own observations of events are concerned, there is no room for me to hold that he was mistaken although, as I have earlier pointed out, it does not necessarily follow that I am obliged to accept all the matters of detail spoken to by Mr Haddad, on which he might not have been reliable. Nor am I obliged to accept the truth of what Mr Rahme told Mr Haddad in view of my concerns about Mr Rahme’s truthfulness.

I will begin with Mr Rahme’s financial position. Mr Rahme was concerned with one or more businesses which related to ladies fashions. He frankly accepted that he did not make any money out of these businesses which, indeed, were loss making throughout. There is considerable documentary evidence of Mr Rahme being in debt and struggling to raise funds and failing to repay when he ought to have repaid. Conversely, there is evidence that Mr Rahme had money from somewhere. He had money to spend on restaurants, night clubs, mistresses, flats and a car for mistresses, cars for himself, private education for his 3 children and the acquisition of 1 or 2 warehouses in the Wimbledon area. It is difficult to understand how Mr Rahme carried on such a lifestyle if it is to be asserted that it was all based on him running up debts. He did have access to, properly or improperly, the proceeds of sale of his mother’s property at The Ridgway, Wimbledon, but that money seems to have been used up fairly quickly. One possibility is that Mr Rahme did indeed have access to family money. After all he had a power of attorney in relation to certain bank accounts in his father’s name. However, it is not clear how much would have been available to Mr Rahme from that source. That leaves the possibility that Mr Rahme says he owned, and was able to sell, a substantial quantity of antique gold coins. In the absence of Mr Haddad’s evidence, I would have regarded Mr Rahme’s evidence on that topic as pure invention. However, based on what I have already described in respect of Mr Haddad’s evidence, the unchallenged evidence is that Mr Rahme had access to a considerable amount of antique gold coins in the period from 1976 to 2000 and, on Mr Rahme’s account, up to 2002.

Mr Haddad’s evidence as to the gold coins does provide an explanation as to the funding of Mr Rahme’s lifestyle. However, that evidence has to be taken together with the history of debt and failures to repay. How does one combine the different pieces of evidence? In my judgment, the evidence as a whole suggests that Mr Rahme had no source of funds apart from the gold coins. For considerable periods, Mr Rahme appears to have been in financial difficulties but at other times he was able to relieve those difficulties by selling gold coins. Beyond those findings, it is difficult to go. I am not prepared to accept some of the more elevated figures for the sums involved in sales of gold coins. Even on the basis that Mr Haddad was giving honest evidence of his recollection of what he saw, I have to take account of all the evidence as to the funds available to Mr Rahme and that evidence does not show Mr Rahme to be as well off as the figures for the sale of gold coins would suggest, if taken at face value and in isolation.

There is another possibility, namely, that the court has simply not been told the whole truth about how Mr Rahme went about getting funds from time to time. On Mr Rahme’s evidence, he was dealing in substantial sums of money in 2000 and 2001. He was doing so ostensibly through Mr Wise. On his own evidence and on the evidence of Ms Chbayaa, Mr Rahme conducted himself in a misleading way as to what he was really up to. Mr Voice may have been involved but for the reasons I will give later, I am simply not able to accept that the transactions were loans to Mr Voice. Accordingly, Mr Rahme was handling sums of money for some reason and in circumstances where, on Ms Chbayaa’s evidence, he wanted to mislead his own lawyer about what he was up to. It may be that if these transactions in 2000 and 2001 in the name of Mr Wise really happened, as Ms Chbayaa said they did, then Mr Rahme was, to put it colloquially, “up to something”. I doubt if the evidence in this case will enable me to get to the bottom of that something. Mr Rahme now accepts, indeed contends, that he was acting deviously. This may be a case of: “what a tangled web we weave when first we practise to deceive”. I do not think that I need further to unravel Mr Rahme’s tangled web to decide the issues in this case.

I accept Mr Rahme’s evidence that he was the beneficial owner of Flat 5, 6 The Drive, London W20. I find that Mr Rahme allowed Mr Voice to live in Flat 5 for a period beginning in March 2000. The evidence is in conflict as to whether Mr Rahme shared Flat 5 with Mr Voice or whether Mr Rahme lived in Flat 4 with his mother and allowed Mr Voice to have Flat 5 to himself. On the balance of probabilities, I think Mr Rahme shared Flat 5 with Mr Voice. Even if Mr Rahme had his base in Flat 4, it seemed to be undisputed that he spent a lot of his time in Flat 5.

I find that Mr Voice did sign the first tenancy agreement which bears the date of 27^th December 2000. I do not find one way or the other whether that agreement was signed on that date or at a later time although it is quite likely that it was not signed until later than the date it bears.

I find that the purpose of Mr Rahme and Mr Voice entering into the first tenancy agreement was so that the agreement could be used to show Mrs Voice and her advisers that Mr Voice had commitments in terms of rent due for his accommodation. I base this finding on the way in which the need for a tenancy agreement is described in various places in Mr Voice’s solicitor’s file. Mr Rahme may also have wished to have a signed tenancy agreement to show Mrs Julie Rahme but I am much less sure about that being a reason for entering into the agreement.

It is common ground that Mr Voice agreed with Mr Rahme, in the terms set out in the written agreement of 5^th February 2001, that Mr Voice would pay to Mr Rahme 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement.

The question arises whether the arrangement between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice required Mr Voice to pay to Mr Rahme the rent nominally due under the first tenancy agreement in addition to the 25% figure under the agreement of 5^th February 2001. The purpose which led to the execution of the first tenancy agreement would suggest that it was not intended that the rent would be paid separately from the 25% figure. Further, the documents in the solicitor’s file are consistent with that being the arrangement. Further, I think I should accept Ms McMahon’s evidence that this was how Mr Voice explained it to her.

I accept the evidence that Mr Voice or his friends and acquaintances did cause damage to Flat 5 and to some of its contents. The evidence suggests that the damage took the form of cigarette burns and wine stains and general shabbiness and the odd broken item of furnishings. Beyond that, I am not able on the evidence to make detailed findings as to the extent of the damage. I think it is extremely unlikely that Mr Voice or anyone else did think, or could think, that the extent of the damage was to be assessed at £39,700.

I find that Mr Voice did drink some alcoholic drinks which belonged to Mr Rahme or to his mother. I am not able on the evidence to make detailed findings as to the extent to which this happened. I find that the list of wines and spirits now put forward by Mr Rahme is unreliable. I think it is extremely unlikely that Mr Voice or anyone else did think, or could think, that the extent of the consumption was to be assessed in the sum of £35,400.

Subject to the later question which I will consider as to the authenticity of the documents of 19^th and 20^th October 2001, I find that the arrangement between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice was that the return to Mr Rahme for him allowing Mr Voice to use Flat 5, together with the consequential damage done to the flat and its contents and the consumption of any alcoholic drinks in the flat was the 25% sum, the subject of the agreement of 5^th February 2001. I accept the evidence of Ms Mc Mahon that that was how Mr Voice understood the position. Such an arrangement was inherently likely and the idea that Mr Rahme could have the 25% figure and then claim for damage to the property, contents and drinks on top is inherently unlikely.

I am prepared to accept that Mr Rahme did make certain loans to Mr Voice. It is not possible to make any very specific findings as to the total amount lent. I am prepared to accept that Mr Rahme made a number of loans of sums of money, perhaps a few thousand pounds at a time. I also find that it is possible that at some point the total of these sums was added up. It is just possible that when these loans were added up they genuinely amounted to £25,200, which was the amount of the promissory note of 23^rd May 2000. This was the promissory note that was provided to Mr Voice’s solicitor. No other promissory note was so provided.

I am not able to find that Mr Rahme lent any further sums to Mr Voice.

Mr Rahme’s case is that Mr Voice borrowed a considerable amount of money between May 2000 and May 2001. Mr Rahme’s original case was that Mr Voice had borrowed 4 sums direct from Mr Rahme and 5 sums from Mr Wise. Mr Rahme now says that Mr Wise never lent any of his (Mr Wise’s) money to Mr Voice and these 5 loans were actually loans by Mr Rahme direct to Mr Voice. On this basis, Mr Rahme lent 9 sums of money to Mr Voice in the 12 month period. Putting these 9 loans in date order, the alleged sums were:

23rd May 2000, £25,200;

25th May 2000, £330,000;

21st June 2000, £295,000;

17th July 2000, £248,750;

19th July 2000, £46,250;

29th July 2000, £39,800;

10th January 2001, £30,000

13th January 2001, £435,000

20th May 2001, £268,000.

These 9 loans totalled £1,718,000. Mr Rahme alleges that £920,000 was needed to repay the American lender. It was not explained why Mr Voice would have needed to borrow £920,000 from an American lender in the first place. Mr Rahme’s own evidence was that Mr and Mrs Voice had unlimited funds available to them to enjoy a lavish lifestyle in the United States. There is insufficient evidence to persuade me that Mr Voice would have run up that level of debt after he had separated from his wife. Furthermore, if Mr Voice had a debt of £920,000 owed to an American, I was not given any explanation as to why Mr Voice (and Mr Rahme) would have kept that fact from Mr Voice’s solicitor when the latter asked Mr Voice for a list of his liabilities to be listed in his financial statement for the purposes of his financial provision claim. By the time of that statement, Mr Rahme says that the American lender had been paid off but the debt was then allegedly due to Mr Wise/Mr Rahme and that debt also was not disclosed to the solicitor.

Putting the alleged loan of £920,000 on one side, the other alleged loans total some £800,000. Although Mr Rahme has referred to Mr Voice having a lavish and therefore an expensive lifestyle, I find it hard to see how Mr Voice could have got through so much money on such a lifestyle quite so quickly. Furthermore, I prefer the evidence of Ms Mc Mahon as to Mr Voice’s lifestyle which certainly would not explain expenditure of the level which would require borrowings of the extent involved. Mr Rahme tried to explain the loan of £435,000 as money due by way of interest on the loan of £920,000. But on Mr Rahme’s account that sum was repaid to the American lender in July 2000 and in return the American lender released the share certificate(s) previously held as a security for repayment, with the result that Mr Rahme’s explanation does not make much sense, if it was intended to refer to interest due to the American lender. If the explanation was intended to refer to interest due to Mr Wise or Mr Rahme, then the explanation is contrary to the terms of the document apparently signed by Mr Voice on 13^th January 2001.

Quite apart from the question of what Mr Voice might have been spending the money on, there is the further question of where Mr Rahme would have got such sums of money from to enable him to lend them to Mr Voice. Mr Rahme’s final version of the story involves him personally lending £1.7 m of his own money to Mr Voice. I have already dealt in detail with Mr Rahme’s evidence about the gold coins and the extent to which I am prepared to accept that evidence. However, I am unable to accept that Mr Rahme had available to him as large a sum as £1.7m over the 12 month period in question.

I have considered what is shown in Mr Voice’s solicitor’s file in connection with his financial provision claim. As I have explained, the solicitors were concerned to find out from Mr Voice the extent of any debts he might have had. They were also concerned to present a claim for maintenance which required them to identify the expected level of expenditure on the part of Mr Voice. In the context of assessing Mr Voice’s indebtedness to third parties, there is a mention of some relatively small debts but nothing of the size of the loans allegedly made by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice. The question of possible loans by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice came in the context of working out Mr Voice’s expenditure. The strong impression one gets from reading the file is that it was seen to be in Mr Voice’s interests for the purposes of his maintenance claim to give high figures for Mr Voice’s expenditure. One immediate difficulty posed by presenting high figures in that way was to explain how Mr Voice was currently living. If he was spending money at the claimed rate, where was the money coming from? Mr Voice was able to point to certain sources of capital or income but nowhere near enough to suggest he was incurring actual expenditure at the rate claimed. The solicitors’ notes then identify “loans from Mr Rahme” as bridging the gap between the money coming in and the claimed expenditure. The solicitors’ file did include the promissory note dated 23rd May 2000 for £25,200 said to have been loaned by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice. The solicitors’ file did not include the three other promissory notes said to record loans from Mr Rahme to Mr Voice. A figure of £90,000 is given for the total of the loans from Mr Rahme to Mr Voice whereas the relevant promissory notes total £95,000. It seems most unlikely that the promissory notes of 29^th July 2000 and 10th January 2001 were in existence on the dates they bear.

Based on the solicitor’s file alone, it seems virtually inconceivable that Mr Voice had borrowed £920,000 or £435,000 from Mr Rahme. Based on that file alone, it is possible that Mr Voice borrowed smaller sums of money from Mr Rahme.

My overall conclusions about the alleged loans from Mr Rahme to Mr Voice are as follows. I find that Mr Rahme did not lend Mr Voice £920,000. I find that Mr Rahme did not lend Mr Voice £435,000. Even if I accept Ms Chbayaa’s evidence that she saw Mr Voice on 13^th January 2001 sign the document recording a loan of £435,000, I find on the balance of all the evidence that Mr Rahme did not lend that sum to Mr Voice. If as I think likely Mr Rahme was “up to something” it is entirely possible that he had persuaded Mr Voice to join in that “something” to some extent but not to the extent of providing money to Mr Voice, which Mr Voice was obliged to repay. Based on what was said by Mr Voice to his solicitor on 3^rd October 2001 (to which I refer below) it is a real possibility that Mr Rahme got Mr Voice to engage in an elaborate charade to pretend that Mr Voice owed money to Mr Wise, which debt was guaranteed by Mr Rahme, so that when Mr Voice paid 25% of the divorce settlement to Mr Rahme, Mr Rahme could pretend to his second wife that these monies were not Mr Rahme’s but were by way of repayment of a debt to Mr Wise. I do not accept that the sum of £435,000 was needed to pay interest to the American lenders or to Mr Wise or to Mr Rahme. I also accept Ms Mc Mahon’s evidence that Mr Voice did not have substantial sums of cash on him or in his luggage on his return from the Lebanon in January 2001.

I also find that Mr Rahme did not lend Mr Voice £268,000. I find that the promissory note of 20th May 2001 cannot have been genuine. I have described the piece of paper on which the note has been written. I accept the evidence of various witnesses that Mr Voice was asked to give Mr Rahme, and did give Mr Rahme, blank pieces of paper bearing Mr Voice’s signature, which pieces of paper were allegedly to be used by Mr Rahme to advance Mr Voice’s interests in connection with the negotiations of the divorce settlement. It is more probable than not that Mr Rahme created this promissory note out of such a piece of paper. The note does not genuinely record a debt owing from Mr Voice to Mr Rahme.

As indicated earlier, I accept that Mr Rahme did lend some money to Mr Voice. The loans might have added up to £25,200. On the balance of probabilities, I find that the promissory notes of 29^th July 2000 (for £39,800) and of 10^th January 2001 (for £30,000) were not genuine documents signed by Mr Voice and Mr Rahme has not established that he lent those amounts, or any part of them, to Mr Voice.

I also find that whatever sums Mr Rahme lent to Mr Voice, those sums were not intended to be straight forward loans repayable as such. The way in which, and the only way in which, Mr Rahme was to receive the benefits back from Mr Voice was that Mr Voice was to pay to Mr Rahme 25% of Mr Voice’s divorce settlement and Mr Rahme foresaw that a payment in that way would be significantly above the much more modest sums which Mr Rahme lent Mr Voice. Mr Voice told Julie Rahme that Mr Rahme had lent money to Mr Voice and that Mr Voice was to pay it back from his divorce settlement. Mr Voice told Debra Matthews the same thing. It is possible that this description of the arrangement might have involved Mr Voice repaying the loans as well as paying Mr Rahme 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement but it seems to me to be more likely than not that the arrangement was that the 25% of the divorce settlement was a global figure, expected to be a large figure, which would compensate Mr Rahme for everything he had done for Mr Voice, including the use of Flat 5, the damage to the flat and its contents, the consumption of wines and spirits, the loans made from time to time and the support provided by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice. Accordingly, I find that Mr Rahme was not entitled to be repaid the amount of his loans to Mr Voice, whatever that amount might have been, in addition to receiving 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement.

Mr Voice’s solicitors, have prepared a statement of account indicating what happened to the sum of £2,500,000 received from Mrs Voice into their client account. There are three entries in that statement relating to Mr Rahme. The first shows a transfer on 31^st July 2001 of £625,000. The second shows a transfer on 2^nd August 2001 of £46,250. The third shows a transfer on 6^th August 2001 of £23,750. Those three sums total £695,000. In each case, the statement refers to “Mr J Rahme” rather than Mr Ronald Rahme, the Claimant. That is because Mr Ronald Rahme asked the solicitors to pay the monies to an account in the Lebanon in the name of Mr Rahme’s father, Mr J R Rahme. The documents before me include a bank statement for the relevant bank account which shows the arrival of the three sums from Mr Voice’s solicitors. The amount of the credits is slightly less than the amount shown in the solicitors’ statement but this is readily to be explained by charges made for the transfer.

Shortly after the arrival of £625,000 (or a little less) in the Lebanese bank account of J R Rahme, the sum of £620,000 was withdrawn on 2^nd August 2001 and £3,000 and £2,000 were withdrawn on 3^rd August and 2^nd August 2001 respectively. Shortly after the arrival of £46,200 (£50 having been deducted from the sum of £46,250 transferred, presumably for charges) the sum of £46,200 was withdrawn on 7^th August 2001. Shortly after the arrival of a sum a little under £23,750, the sum of £23,700 was withdrawn on the 9^th August 2001. The documents show that the withdrawals of £620,000, £46,200 and £23,700 were in favour of another bank account in the joint names of Mr Rahme and his daughter, Joelle Rahme.

On 1^st August 2001, a Mr Ozin, who was acting on behalf of Mrs Voice, gave to Mr Rahme a cheque for £225,000, the figure stated in the earlier agreement of 10^th May 2001. The cheque was made payable to Mr Rahme’s father, J R Rahme. Mr Ozin gave evidence, which I accept, that Mr Rahme told Mr Ozin that he wanted the cheque payable to his father so he could avoid paying UK tax on the money. Mr Rahme also asked Mr Ozin to pay a further sum in cash. The sum in question was £15,000 and was said to be in relation to legal fees which Mr Voice was obliged to pay to his solicitor. Mr Ozin stated that Mrs Voice had earlier informed him that she had agreed to pay that sum to Mr Rahme for legal fees and, accordingly, Mr Ozin gave Mr Rahme £15,000 in cash.

I find that the payments made by Mr Voice’s solicitor to J.R. Rahme were payments of, or slightly more accurately towards, the 25% of the divorce settlement which Mr Voice had agreed to pay to Mr Rahme. There was no reason for Mr Christou to pay any money for the benefit of Mr Rahme (as these payments clearly were). Nobody had told Mr Christou that Mr Voice owed monies to Mr Wise or Mr Rahme by way of repayment of loans which had earlier been made.

It follows from these findings that Mr Voice paid to Mr Rahme the sum of £695,000 towards his liability to pay 25% of the divorce settlement. Strictly speaking the sum due was £696,250 so that (unless the parties had informally agreed to the round figure of £695,000) Mr Voice still owed Mr Rahme the sum of £1,250.

I find that Mrs Voice paid Mr Rahme the sum of £225,000 for the purposes described in the signed note of 10^th May 2001. I accept Mr Ozin’s evidence as to the circumstances in which that note was signed and the payment of £225,000 was made. I reject Mr Rahme’s explanation of that payment. He had asserted that Mrs Voice had agreed (albeit not recorded anywhere in the documents recording the divorce settlement) to pay the sum of £248,750 to discharge Mr Voice’s remaining debts to Mr Wise and that she had reneged on that promise and had paid only the sum of £225,000. Mr Rahme’s account in this respect and as to why he signed a receipt for the sum of £225,000 in the terms in which he did is simply incredible.

I also accept Mr Ozin’s evidence as to the basis on which Mr Rahme asked for and received the cash payment of £15,000 make by Mr Ozin on behalf of Mrs Voice.

I find that Mr Voice was completely unaware at the time, and indeed until around late October 2001, of the fact that Mr Rahme had negotiated with Mrs Voice and Mr Ozin for payments of £225,000 and £15,000 or that Mr Rahme had received those sums.

I accept Ms Mc Mahon’s evidence as to the telephone conversation between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice in early August 2001 to the extent that I find that Mr Rahme telephoned Mr Voice and said that Mr Voice had not paid enough to Mr Rahme. I am not able to make any specific finding as to what was said in that conversation as to the sum which Mr Rahme said was outstanding nor as to the basis of the claim to a further sum. However, based on the tape recording of 3^rd October 2001, to which I refer below, I am able to make a finding later in this judgment as to what was in dispute in the period up to 3^rd October 2001.

I find that the promissory note for £696,250 is not genuine. This figure is the sum which is 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement. There was no reason for Mr Voice to sign such a promissory note when he had already signed the agreement dated 5^th February 2001 in relation to Mr Rahme’s 25% share. Further, I have already found that Mr Voice paid, before 8^th August 2001, £695,000 towards Mr Rahme’s 25% share of the proceeds of the divorce settlement so that a promissory note signed on 8^th August 2001 to pay Mr Rahme £696,250 makes no sense. Further, I have already accepted the evidence of other witnesses that Mr Rahme had available to him blank pieces of paper which had been signed by Mr Voice. The existence of this piece of paper was not pleaded by Mr Rahme, was not produced on disclosure and only belatedly appeared during the course of the trial. I find that Mr Rahme has created this document and it does not genuinely record any commitment on the part of Mr Voice.

I find that Mr Voice met his solicitor Mr Christou on 3^rd October 2001 (rather than some other date as suggested by Mr Rahme). I have a tape recording of their conversation. As a result of that tape recording, I am able to find the following:

Mr Voice had paid to Mr Rahme what Mr Voice thought was 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement.

There was a dispute between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice as to what figure was properly due as 25% of the proceeds. This dispute was understood by Mr Voice to be based on whether the proceeds were to be calculated gross or net (after paying the solicitor’s charges). The sum in dispute seemed to be £25,000. It seems to me that Mr Voice may not have quite understood what was in dispute nor the basis of that dispute. I say that because the monies which had been paid to Mr Rahme in early August 2001 amounted to £695,000 whereas the figure of 25% of the gross amount of the proceeds was £696,250 and if one took the net figure for the proceeds after deduction of the legal charges, the amount due would have been less than £695,000. However, what matters for present purposes was that Mr Rahme’s claims by 3^rd October 2001 were that he was owed £25,000 and he did not put forward the claims that are now being forward in these proceedings.

The principal event which had led to the conversation on 3^rd October 2001 was that Mr Rahme’s second wife, Sarah Rahme, had got wind of the fact that Mr Rahme had received or was going to receive from Mr Voice a large sum of money. That would be relevant to Sarah Rahme’s claim against Mr Rahme for financial provision. Sarah Rahme wished to find out what the facts were. I find that Mr Voice had agreed with Mr Rahme that Mr Voice would not tell Sarah Rahme, or Julie Rahme for that matter, what Mr Rahme had received. The fact of that agreement suggests the possibility that the pretence which Mr Voice might have engaged in, in January 2001, to the effect that he was borrowing a sum of money from Mr Wise was for the purpose of pretending that when Mr Voice paid sums of money to Rahme as 25% of the divorce settlement, that Mr Rahme would be able to pretend to Sarah Rahme that these sums were not received beneficially by Mr Rahme but were instead payments of a debt owed by Mr Voice to Mr Wise.

Mr Voice told his solicitor that the signed tenancy agreement (that can only have been a reference to the agreement dated 27^th December 2000) and the one or more promissory notes in favour of Mr Rahme were for the purpose of showing Lisa Voice, in the context of the financial provision claim, that Mr Voice had debts.

I find that the alleged tenancy agreement dated 19^th October 2001 is not genuine. It seems inconceivable in the light of the conversation of 3^rd October 2001 that Mr Voice would have signed such an agreement. Further, I find that Mr Voice had left Flat 5 long before October 2001. Indeed, Mr Rahme had excluded Mr Voice from Flat 5 long before October 2001 and would not allow Mr Voice to recover from Flat 5 certain presents which Mr Voice had bought for his children and which he had wished to given them on his return from the Lebanon in January 2001. I also find that in October 2001, Mr Voice had no intention of making any use of Flat 5 and there were no circumstances in which Mr Voice would have wished to take on a commitment of a tenancy of Flat 5 for 2 years at £4,000 per month. I find that this second tenancy agreement has been created by Mr Rahme and does not record any genuine agreement with Mr Voice.

Clause 6 of the second tenancy agreement purported to provide for payments by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme in respect of rent under the first tenancy agreement, agreed sums for damage to the flat and its contents and for the consumption of alcoholic drinks, for the sums due under 4 promissory notes and for interest. I find that Mr Voice did not agree these matters and the second tenancy agreement is not a genuine document binding Mr Voice in these respects. The document has been created by Mr Rahme for the purpose of these proceedings.

In relation to the alleged agreement of 20^th October 2001, I find that particularly in the light of the conversation of 3^rd October 2001, it is inconceivable that Mr Voice would have signed any such document. I find that that this document is not a genuine document binding Mr Voice and that Mr Rahme has created it for the purpose of these proceedings.

I will now set out the result, in relation to Mr Rahme’s claims, of the above findings before I go on to consider the position in relation to the claims made by the Counterclaim.

As regards the claim to 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement, I find that Mr Rahme received £695,000 in respect of an entitlement (subject to the matters raised by way of Counterclaim) of £696,250.

As regards the rent under the first tenancy agreement, I find that Mr Rahme is not entitled to rent nominally due under that agreement as any such entitlement is subsumed within, and was not intended to be enforceable separately from, his entitlement to 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement.

As regards the rent under the second tenancy agreement, I find that Mr Voice did not agree to the terms set out in the purported tenancy agreement, which is not a genuine agreement.

As regards the claim for compensation for damage to Flat 5, I find that Mr Rahme is not entitled to claim any such compensation. Any such claim was agreed to be subsumed into Mr Rahme’s entitlement to 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement. I also find that the references to such a liability in the documents of 19^th and 20^th October 2001 do not bind Mr Voice as he is not bound by those documents, which are not genuine.

As regards the claim to compensation for consumption of wines and spirits, I find that Mr Rahme is not entitled to claim any such compensation. Any such claim was agreed to be subsumed into Mr Rahme’s entitlement to 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement. I also find that the references to such a liability in the documents of 19^th and 20^th October 2001 do not bind Mr Voice as he is not bound by those documents which are not genuine.

As regards the claim to repayment of loans, the only loans made by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice were to be repaid only by way of Mr Rahme’s entitlement to 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement.

The Defendant claims repayment from Mr Rahme of the £695,000 paid by Mr Voice to Mr Rahme and further claims payment by Mr Rahme of the sums of £225,000 and £15,000 paid by Mrs Voice to Mr Rahme.

The Defendant says that Mr Rahme owed fiduciary duties to Mr Voice in connection with his conduct of negotiations on behalf of Mr Voice with Mrs Voice, that Mr Rahme broke those fiduciary duties by making an agreement with Mrs Voice as recorded in the document of 10^th May 2001 and by accepting the payments of £225,000 and £15,000 from Mrs Voice.

The Defendant says that the legal consequences of this are threefold. The first comparatively minor consequence is said to be that Mr Rahme is not entitled to claim £1,250, being the difference between the £696,250 which was the sum due under the 25% share agreement and the £695,000 already received by Mr Rahme. The second consequence is that Mr Rahme is obliged to repay the £695,000 which he received from Mr Voice. The third consequence is said to be that the Defendant is entitled to be paid by Mr Rahme the sums of £225,000 and £15,000 which were bribes or secret commissions received by Mr Rahme.

I find that Mr Rahme did owe to Mr Voice duties of a contractual and a fiduciary character to act for Mr Voice, and in the interests of Mr Voice, in connection with any negotiations which Mr Rahme carried on with Mrs Voice. In summary, Mr Rahme was supposed to achieve for Mr Voice the best settlement which was available.

I also find that Mr Rahme committed a clear and serious breach of his duties to Mr Voice when he made an agreement with Mrs Voice to keep the amount of the settlement down to £2.5m. There is the clearest conflict between an obligation to Mr Voice to maximise the amount of the settlement and an agreement with Mrs Voice to reduce the amount of the settlement.

The legal principles as to the consequences of a breach of fiduciary duty of this kind are now well established. Some of those principles have been recently restated in emphatic terms in Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009] EWCA Civ 63.

With a breach of fiduciary duty of this kind, the fiduciary forfeits the right to remuneration under the arrangement with his principal. This is the case even where the fiduciary has provided the services intended to be provided. There is no allowance made to the fiduciary for the value of those services. If the principal has already paid the remuneration to the fiduciary, that payment is recoverable by the principal: see Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 18^th ed., at para. 7-050, Illustration no. 4 and footnote 94, and Andrews v Ramsay [1903] 2 KB 635, followed in Imageview. The principal is also entitled to be paid by the fiduciary the amount of the secret commission: see Bowstead & Reynolds at para. 6-082, Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd[2005] Ch 119 at [51] – [56] and Imageview.

Applying these legal principles to the facts as I have found them to be, I hold that all three of the legal consequences identified in paragraph 137 above apply in this case. Mr Rahme is not entitled to any further remuneration or payment under his agreement with Mr Voice as to a 25% share of the proceeds of the divorce settlement, Mr Rahme is obliged to repay the sum of £695,000 which he received from Mr Voice and Mr Rahme is obliged to pay to the Defendant the sums of £225,000 and £15,000 which he received from Mrs Voice.

For the avoidance of doubt, I expressly state that the result of the above legal principles is that Mr Rahme is obliged to pay back in full the £695,000 which he received even thought he did provide accommodation to Mr Voice for a time, that Mr Voice did damage the flat and its contents, that Mr Voice did consume some of the wines or spirits in the flat, that Mr Rahme lent Mr Voice some money and that Mr Rahme did spend time on Mr Voice’s behalf in connection with Mr Voice’s claim for financial relief. Mr Rahme is obliged to repay the £695,000 in full because of the seriousness of his breach of fiduciary duty and the strictness of the principles which apply in this area.

The above findings suffice to deal with the relief sought by the Claim and by the Counterclaim. It is therefore not necessary to deal with the alternative claims in the Counterclaim but I will make brief comments on some of those claims, in case that might be of assistance to the parties.

The Defendant has applied to set aside any agreements made between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice on the grounds of undue influence or other unconscionable behaviour by Mr Rahme. The only agreement which on my findings was binding on Mr Voice was the agreement of 5^th February 2001 to pay to Mr Rahme 25% of the proceeds of the divorce settlement. However, I have also held that by reason of Mr Rahme’s breach of fiduciary duty, he is obliged to repay to the Defendant all the sums he received under that agreement. Accordingly, there is no need to set aside that agreement. So far as other alleged agreements are concerned, I have held that the alleged agreements were not genuinely entered into by Mr Voice. It seems to me it would be artificial to assume for the sake of argument that those agreements were genuinely made and then to ask whether they were the result of undue influence or unconscionable behaviour by Mr Rahme.

In relation to the claim to set aside the agreement of 5^th February 2001 on the grounds of undue influence or unconscionable behaviour, a number of issues would arise. These include: what was the relationship between Mr Rahme and Mr Voice at different periods of time; did the agreement of 5^th February 2001 call for an explanation; did Mr Voice exercise an independent will when he made the agreement and/or when he later made the payments in August 2001; what was the significance of Mr Voice having legal advice including the involvement of his solicitor in drafting the agreement; did Mr Voice affirm the agreement by making the payments under it when possibly the effect of any earlier undue influence had been removed; is the court able to restore the parties to their pre-agreement positions; should Mr Rahme receive anything for the benefits he arguably conferred on Mr Voice?

Some of the issues referred to in the last paragraph would require a detailed discussion of the evidence. Further, not all of the issues that have occurred to me have been pleaded by Mr Rahme and they have not been argued. Mr Rahme is in person and was not in a position to make submissions on many of these issues. In view of these considerations and the fact that it is not necessary for the disposal of the claim and counterclaim to determine these issues, I will not proceed any further to deal with the claim to set aside the agreement of 5^th February 2001 on the basis of undue influence or unconscionable behaviour on the part of Mr Rahme.

The Defendant also asks for the agreement of 5^th February 2001 to be set aside for misrepresentation on the part of Mr Rahme. The misrepresentation alleged relates to the statements in the agreement as to the effect on Mr Rahme of his giving his time to assisting Mr Voice. This claim also raises a raft of issues such as: were these statements untrue; did Mr Voice believe them to be true so that they induced the agreement; did Mr Voice affirm the agreement by making the payments under it when he knew of the earlier misrepresentation; is the court able to restore the parties to their pre-agreement positions; should Mr Rahme receive anything for the benefits he arguably conferred on Mr Voice? For reasons similar to those given above when discussing the undue influence claim, I will not proceed any further to deal with the claim to set aside the agreement of 5^th February 2001 on the ground of misrepresentation. In view of my earlier findings as to the sums now due from Mr Rahme to the Defendant, it seems to me to be unnecessary to consider whether the Defendant would have had a claim in damages for any misrepresentation made by Mr Rahme to Mr Voice on which Mr Voice might have relied.

I do not feel it is necessary to deal with the claim that the agreement of 5^th February 2001 was not supported by consideration.

The Defendant claims interest on the sums recovered pursuant to the counterclaim. I will hear submissions on the claim to interest following the handing down of this judgment.

The overall result is that I will dismiss the claim in its entirety and I will give judgment on the counterclaim for £695,000 and £225,000 and £15,000. I will hear submissions on interest and costs and any other matters consequential on the giving of this judgment.