Pankhania & Anor v Hackney & Anor

The Claimants, Vraj Pankhania and his wife Joshnia Pankhania, are property developers. In fact, however, Mr Vraj Pankhania, has always acted on behalf of both himself and his wife in all his dealings in this case. For convenience, therefore, I will refer in this judgment only to Mr Pankhania.

The Defendants, the London Borough of Hackney (“Hackney”) and the Metropolitan Police Authority (the “M.P.A.”) sold two properties (together the “Properties”) at an auction on 8^th November 1999. The first property (the “Chocolate Factory”) at 14-18 Nile Street and 7 Shepherdess Place London N.1. was registered at HM Land Registry under title number EGL 402879, and was owned by Hackney. The second adjoining property (the “Car Park”) at 17-35 Westland Place, London N.1. was registered at HM Land Registry under title number EGL 402877, and was owned by the M.P.A.

The Properties were knocked down to Mr Pankhania for £3,925,000Mr Pankhania calculated his acquisition costs at about £4.2 million, of which he borrowed £2.8 million from the Bank of India. The rest he paid from his own resources. The sale was duly completed on 9^th February 2000.

Mr Pankhania brought these proceedings seeking, amongst other things, damages for negligent misrepresentation under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. The trial of liability came on before Mr Rex Tedd Q.C. sitting as deputy Judge of the High Court in the summer of 2002. Mr Tedd delivered a lengthy judgment on 31^st July 2002 in which he made the following findings and holdings:-

In consequence, Mr Tedd made an order against the Defendants for damages to be assessed in respect of the misrepresentation that he had found proved. It now falls to me to assess those damages.

Access to the Chocolate Factory was and is obtained via a narrow road called Shepherdess Place, which is frequently blocked by parked cars and vans (despite the presence of double yellow lines). There was some doubt as to whether or not Shepherdess Place is an adopted highway. Access to the Car Park is from Westland Place, which is an altogether more convenient public road.

Mr Pankhania knew, when he bought the Properties, that:-

Hackney’s informal planning guidelines were also available to Mr Pankhania before the auction sale in respect of both the Chocolate Factory and the Car Park. Suffice it to say that the guidelines suggested:-

There is no doubt that developing the Chocolate Factory without access to the Car Park was always going to be a difficult project for three primary reasons. First the factory site is very tight in that the building is constructed close up to many of the boundaries. Secondly, a crane was likely to be required, and the required size of crane could only conveniently be situated on the Car Park. Thirdly, there was, as I have said, poor access from Shepherdess Place.

There was a certain amount of dispute on the evidence I heard as to what was done after the completion of the purchase of the Properties on 9^th February 2000. The relevant facts are straightforward, and may be summarised as follows:-

Mr Stephen Jourdan, who appeared for Mr Pankhania, and Mr David H.Christie, who appeared for the Defendants, have contended for entirely different approaches to the assessment of damages in this case.

Mr Jourdan submits that this is a case in which the ‘normal rule’ should be applied, so that damages should be assessed as the difference between the price paid for the Properties as represented, and the true value of the Properties as they in fact were at the date of purchase (the “normal measure”). His expert evidence suggested that this difference was about £750,000, and he claimed that sum and no other consequential or other losses.

Mr Christie submitted that:-

Mr Jourdan’s answer to this approach is to argue that Mr Pankhania’s decision to retain the Properties, after he discovered the misrepresentation, breaks the chain of causation, so that what happened thereafter was not part of a continuous transaction of which the negligent misrepresentation was the inception. Accordingly, Mr Jourdan contends that what happened after the decision to retain the Properties is irrelevant. Things could have gone disastrously wrong for Mr Pankhania and he would not have been able to claim more. But if things went well for Mr Pankhania, that is his good fortune. The loss recoverable is the normal measure.

In the face of these starkly different approaches, I should deal first with the law.

Although Mr Tedd found that the Defendants’ agents had made the misrepresentation deliberately and had set a trap for the purchaser (paragraph 62), there was no finding of fraud - mainly because it seems that fraud had not been pleaded.

In Royscott Trust Ltd v. Rogerson [1991] 2 Q.B. 297, the Court of Appeal held that measure of damages for negligent misrepresentation under section 2(1) of the 1967 Act was the same as that for fraudulent misrepresentation, because the section introduced a ‘fiction of fraud’ (page 306H per Balcombe JL, pages 308-9 per Ralph Gibson LJ). Though this decision has been the subject of some academic criticism (see, for example, Lord Steyn in Smith New Courtinfra at pages 283A-C), and Mr Christie wished to reserve his position as to its correctness, it was accepted that it was a decision binding on me, and that I should follow it.

Thus, I must assess Mr Pankhania’s damages as if they were damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. The leading case on damages for fraudulent misrepresentation inducing a contract is Smith New Court Securities Limited v. Citibank N.A. [1997] A.C. 254, where the House of Lords held that there was no inflexible rule that the damages had to be assessed by reference to the value of the asset acquired at the transaction date (Lord Browne-Wilkinson at page 264H-265E, and Lord Steyn at pages 283H-284E). The ‘overriding compensatory rule’ is that the claimant is entitled to reparation for all the actual damage he sustained directly flowing from (i.e. caused by) entering into the transaction. Put in the words of Lord Steyn quoted below: the plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the financial loss flowing directly from his alteration of position under the inducement of the fraudulent representations of the defendants.

As Lord Browne-Wilkinson made clear at page 266D-F in Smith New Court, however, the normal measure has not been abrogated altogether:-

“Thus, if the asset acquired is a readily marketable asset and there is no special feature (such as a continuing misrepresentation or the purchaser being locked into a business that he has acquired) the transaction date rule may well produce a fair result. The plaintiff has acquired the asset and what he does with it thereafter is entirely up to him, freed from any continuingadverse impact of the defendant’s wrongful act. The transaction date rule has one manifest advantage, namely that it avoids any question of causation. One of the difficulties of either valuing the asset at a later date or treating the actual receipt on realisation as being the value obtained is that difficult questions of causation are bound to arise. In the period between the transaction date and the date of valuation or resale other factors will have influenced the value or resale price of the asset. It was the desire to avoid these difficulties of causation which led to the adoption of the transaction date rule. But in cases where property has been acquired in reliance on a fraudulent misrepresentation there are likely to be many cases where the general rule has to be departed from in order to give adequate compensation for the wrong done to the plaintiff’ in particular where the fraud continues to influences the conduct of the plaintiff after the transaction is complete or where the result of the transaction induced by fraud is to lock the plaintiff into continuing to hold the asset acquired” (underlining added).

Lord Steyn also acknowledged that the normal measure might still apply in some cases at page 284A-C, where he said:-

“It is right that the normal method of calculating the loss caused by the deceit is the price paid less the real value of the subject matter of the sale. To the extent that this method is adopted, the selection of a date of valuation is necessary. And generally the date of the transaction would be a practical and just date to adopt. But itis not always so. It is only prima facie the right date. It may be appropriate to select a later date. That follows from the fact that the valuation method is only a means of trying to give effect to the overriding compensatory rule:Potts v. Miller, 64 C.L.R. 282, 299, per Dixon J. and County Personnel (Employment Agency) Ltd. v. Alan R. Pulver & Co. [1987] 1 W.L.R. 916, 925-926, per Bingham L.J. Moreover, and more importantly, the date of transaction rule is simply a second order rule applicable only where the valuation method is employed. If that method is inapposite, the court is entitled simply to assess the loss flowing directly from the transaction without any reference to the date of transaction or indeed any particular date. Such a course will be appropriate whenever the overriding compensatory rule requires it. An example of such a case is to be found in Cemp Properties (UK.) Ltd. v. Dentsply Research & Development Corporation [1991] 2 E.G.L.R. 197, 201, per Bingham L.J.There is in truth only one legal measure of assessing damages in an action for deceit: the plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the financial loss flowing directly from his alteration of position under the inducement of the fraudulent representations of the defendants.The analogy of the assessment of damages in a contractual claim on the basis of cost of cure or difference in value springs to mind. In Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd. v. Forsyth [1996] A. C. 344, 360G, Lord Mustill said.’“There are not two alternative measures of damages, as opposite poles, but only one; namely, the loss truly suffered by the promisee.” In an action for deceit the price paid less the valuation at the transaction date is simply a method of measuring loss which will satisfactorily solve many cases. It is not a substitute for the single legal measure: it is an application of it” (underlining added).

Thus, it can be seen from Smith New Court that if the normal measure is appropriate and if the normal measure produces a fair result, then such damages would not be reduced on the ground that whatever happened to the property after discovery of the misrepresentation loss has reduced or mitigated that loss. The question really is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the normal measure properly reflects the overriding compensatory rule (to which Lord Steyn referred).

In my judgment, questions of mitigation and causation are intimately bound up with whether the application of the normal rule does indeed achieve a fair result. But if it does, then, as Lord Browne Wilkinson said “The plaintiff has acquired the asset and what he does with itthereafter is entirely up to him”.

As Lord Browne-Wilkinson indicated in the passage I have set out above, two situations will be indicative of the normal measure being inapplicable:-

Before leaving Smith New Court, I should mention that Lord BrowneWilkinson sought to set out at pages 266H-267D a series of seven rules for the assessment of damages in fraudulent misrepresentation cases. Mr Christie placed great emphasis on the seventh of these rules: “the plaintiff must take all reasonable steps to mitigate his loss once he has discovered the fraud”. I do not understand that rule to be in conflict with the approach Lord Browne-Wilkinson had set out earlier in his judgment. All he was saying was that the normal rules of mitigation apply as much in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation was they do elsewhere.

The basic rule as to mitigation of loss was set out by Lord Haldane in British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd v. Underground Electric Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673, Viscount Haldane L.C. said at page 689 that: “The fundamental basis is thus compensation for pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second, which imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach, and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps. In the words of James LJ in Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever, “The person who has broken the contract is not to be exposed to additional cost by reason of the plaintiffs not doing what they ought to have done as reasonable men, and the plaintiffs not being under any obligation to do anything otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.” This principle applies as much in tort as in contract.

It should not, however, be overlooked that the measures which a Claimant is required to take to extricate himself from a problem created by the defendant ought not, as Lord Macmillan put it in Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow [1932] A.C. 452 at page 506 to be “weighed in nice scales”. Lord Macmillan continued by saying that “It is often easy after an emergency has passed to criticise the steps which have been taken to meet it”.

Before dealing with the question of how the application of the normal measure interacts with the principles of mitigation, I should explain how those principles of mitigation usually operate in a case where loss has actually been avoided. That is important in this case, because Mr Christie’s main argument is that, at worst, Mr Pankhania has only lost the £72,000 he paid NCP. Otherwise, he has now got what he bid for at the auction.

The question of whether loss which has actually been avoided can be recovered has arisen in numerous cases.

In Hussey v. Eels [1990] 2 Q.B. 227, the Court of Appeal applied the normal measure (assessed by reference to the cost of the repairs at the date of discovery) where the claimant had purchased a bungalow after a misrepresentation that it was not the subject of subsidence. The Defendant argued that that measure should be reduced because the claimant had mitigated his loss by applying for planning permission, demolishing the bungalow and replacing it with two new buildings. It was held by Mustill LJ at page 241 that: “It seems to me that when the plaintiffs unlocked the development value of their land they did so for their own benefit, and not as part of a continuous transaction of which the purchase of land and bungalow was the inception”.

In Gardner v. Marsh & Parsons [199731 W.L.R. 489, the Court of Appeal again rejected a defendant’s attempt to argue that the normal measure should be displaced because of subsequent events. In that case, the claimant had bought the maisonette in reliance on a misrepresentation as to its structural integrity. When the defect was discovered some years later, after prolonged negotiations, the landlord remedied the defect. Hirst L.J. held as follows at page 503:-

“In evaluating these arguments I bear very much in mind Mustill L.J.’s salutary warning against laying down potentially unreliable statements of principle in the field of damages [in Husseysupra], and I respectfully adopt his approach, namely that the issue is primarily one of fact, and that the relevant considerations are mutatis mutandis those cited by him in his conclusion, which seem to me in line with the Westinghouse case [1912] A. C. 673 (see especially the second passage quoted above from Viscount Haldane L. C.’s speech, at pp. 691-692). . . In my judgment, having regard to the intervening events and to the long interval of time, the repairs executed in 1990 were not part of a continuous transaction of which the purchase of the lease as a result of Mr. Dyson’s negligence was the inception. Furthermore, these repairs undertaken by Guidedale at the plaintiffs insistence were res inter alios acta and therefore collateral to Mr. Dyson’s negligence” (underlining added).

In Needler Financial Services Ltd. v. Taber [2002] 3 All ER 501, Sir Andrew Morritt V-C declined to reduce the claimant’s damages for negligent financial advice on the ground that the claimant had received shares on the demutualisation of the Norwich Union with whom he had been advised to take out a personal pension plan. After reviewing the authorities, he said at paragraph 24: “In my view the authorities to which I have referred establish two relevant propositions. First, the relevant question is whether the negligence which caused the loss also caused the profit in the sense that the latter was part of a continuous transaction Of which the former was the inception. Second, that question is primarily one offact.”

Finally, in Burdis v. Livsey [2003] Q.B. 36, Aldous LJ, giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal drew an important distinction between direct and consequential losses. It is to be borne in mind that the Court in Burdis was considering the normal tort of negligence, not fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, so what is said about remoteness (at the very least) will be inapplicable:-

“84.

In our judgment a fundamental distinction must be drawn, for present purposes, between repair costs and hire charges. When a vehicle is damaged by the negligence of a third party, the owner suffers an immediate loss representing the diminution in value of the vehicle. As a general rule, the measure of that damage is the cost of carrying out the repairs necessary to restore the vehicle to its pre-accident condition: see Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, 406 per Lord Hobhouse.

. . .

88.

In a case of direct loss, subsequent events will operate to reduce or extinguish the loss only in so far as such events are referable to the claimant’s duty to mitigate his loss, and hence referable in a causative sense to the commission of the tort: see the British Westinghouse case [1912] AC 673 and Koch Marine Inc v D’Amica Societa di Navigazione ARL [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 75. In the Koch Marine case Robert Goff J said, at p 88.’ “what is alleged to constitute mitigation in law can only have that effect if there is a causative link between the wrong in respect of which damages are claimed and the action or inaction of the plaintiff”

. . .

91.

In our judgment, the authorities to which we have so far referred establish that subsequent events which are not referable in a causative sense to the commission of the tort, that is to say events which, on a true analysis, are collateral to the commission of the tort, or res inter alios acta, or too remote - we regard these expressions as interchangeable - do not affect the measure of a direct loss suffered when the tort was committed.

92.

In the case of potential future losses, on the other hand, the general rule is that to the extent that such a loss is in fact avoided, for whatever reason, it is a loss which is never suffered and which is accordingly irrecoverable for that reason.”

Mr Christie placed emphasis on the passage from Lord Hobhouse’s speech in Diamond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384, which Aldous LJ also set out in paragraph 99 of his judgment in Burdis. Lord Hobhouse said that: “Each case depends upon its own facts but loss of use of the chattel in question is, in principle, a loss for which compensation should be paid. However one of the relevant principles is that compensation is not paid for an avoided loss. So, if the plaintiff has been able to avoid suffering a particular head of loss by a process which is not too remote (as is insurance), the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover in respect of that avoided loss. If the loss has only been avoided by incurring a substituted expense, it is that substituted expense which becomes the measure of that head of loss. Under the doctrine of mitigation, it may be the duty of the injured party to take reasonable steps to avoid his loss by incurring that expense”.

The question that arises in this case is whether the principles that I have sought to set out above in relation to mitigation and avoided loss (which normally apply in a case of fraudulent misrepresentation), also apply in the situation in which the normal measure is applicable. In my judgment they do. But their application is not quite as straightforward where the normal measure is applicable, as compared to where it is not.

In a case where the normal measure is not applicable, because it does not accord with the overriding compensatory principle for one of many possible reasons, the claimant will be unable to recover (a) any direct losses which have been avoided as part of a continuous transaction of which the tort was the inception, (so that events which allow the direct loses to be avoided will be ignored only if they are collateral to the commission of the tort) and (b) any consequential losses that are in fact avoided for whatever reason.

In a case where the normal measure is applicable, the normal measure will not be reduced because particular losses have in fact been avoided, nor will it be increased because the transaction has turned out worse for the claimant than it might have, due to some subsequent misfortune: But that is because the court will have already decided, in the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Smith New Court, that the normal measure gives a “fair result”, or, in the words of Lord Steyn in the same case, that the normal measure “give(s) effect to the overriding compensatory rule”.

In deciding whether the normal measure gives a fair result, the court has, in my judgment, to consider in a general way what damages would be awarded, according to the overriding compensatory principle, if the normal measure were not applied. That may not be easy. It will certainly involve the consideration of the principles of mitigation and avoided loss that I have referred to above. In my judgment, however, the court is not obliged to conduct a scientific exercise in every case to work out the precise sum which would be awarded on each basis. The court is entitled to take a general view of what heads of loss would be recoverable if the normal measure were not applied, and which of such losses can properly be said to have been avoided by mitigation. If, taking those matters into account, the court forms the view that the normal measure broadly represents the claimant’s loss flowing from the tort, and broadly satisfies the overriding compensatory principle, it can award the normal measure without deduction for any elements comprised in the valuation method that may in fact have been avoided. If the normal measure can be seen to represent over-compensation, it will not be appropriate and will not give a fair result, and the court will not employ it.

I have had the benefit of considerable argument about the actual figures applicable in this case. But, before turning to the figures, I want to deal with the question as a matter of the application of the law to the facts of this case. Although the figures will provide a test of whether the principles have been properly applied, in a case where there is much doubt about the figures (as there is here), one is better to be guided by principle.

The normal measure in this case involves two valuations of the Properties as at the date of the auction (or the date of completion - the differences are immaterial). The parties’ expert surveyors agreed that the price paid by Mr Pankhania (£3.925million) properly represented the true value of the Properties as described.

The value of the Properties as they in fact were (i.e. subject to a tenancy, rather than a licence, in favour of NCP) attracted much argument between the experts. But the important point is that the va1uation methods adopted by both surveyors took intoaccount the future prospects for the development of the Properties. Losses that Mr Pankhania might have sustained in the future as a result of NCP occupying under a tenancy were fully considered in at attempt to value what would have been paid for the Properties at the auction if NCP’s tenancy had been accurately described. Both experts considered the fact that the tenancy made it likely that the development would take longer (because of the need to remove NCP either by negotiation or through the courts). They took into account, amongst many other things, the extra finance costs that might arise as a result of the tenancy making the development slower, the additional costs of getting possession from NCP, and the additional costs of construction caused by NCP’s presence. Each expert took different figures and approached the valuation in a different way, but their evidence as to the normal measure was premised on their evaluation of these and other matters.

I have considered carefully the matters for which Mr Pankhania would be entitled to compensation if the normal measure were not applied. It seems to me that he would, in that situation be able to claim at least the following consequential losses:-

The question arises as to whether, in addition, on this basis, Mr Pankhania would also be able to claim, as direct loss, the additional amount that he paid for the Properties, which he would not have paid, had the misrepresentation not been made. This would be likely to the same as the normal measure itself. It is to be noted in this regard that Mr Tedd found, in effect, that Mr Pankhania would not have bought the Properties at all, but for the misrepresentation. It seems to me, therefore, that, in the absence of the normal measure, this additional amount is not automatically recoverable. It is not like the repair costs of a damaged car or a subsided house. Since he would not have bought the Properties at all, he should be put in the same position as if the misrepresentation had not been made. He is not entitled to be put in the same position as he would have been in had the absence of a tenancy been warranted. Had the misrepresentation not been made, he would not have bought at all. What he would have done with the money he spent on the Properties, and what benefit or detriment the purchase has caused him, is a huge enquiry about which there has been no evidence whatsoever. It is also worthy of note that Lord Steyn in Smith New Court over-ruled Hobhouse LJ’s decision in Downs v. Chappell [1977] 1 W.L.R.426 at page 444 “to compare the loss consequent upon entering into the transaction with what would have been the position had the represented, or supposed, state of affairs actually existed”. It seems to me that I need not go so far as to consider these questions.

It would, in any event, be a hugely complex exercise to assess the consequential losses that can be clearly identified. It would be necessary to decide whether any of the losses arose as a result of a failure to behave reasonably in mitigation of the damage. The evidence was that Mr Pankhania’s construction works were slowed down and cost more as a result of being unable to gain access to the Chocolate Factory through the Car Park until June 2001. But there was no evidence from a quantity surveyor as to what those extra costs amounted to. The additional finance costs arising from what were undoubtedly additional construction costs would also be a complicated calculation.

I have formed the clear view that all these questions can properly avoided in this case for the following reasons:-

If the normal measure were not applied, the court would be faced with an exceedingly complex task, which would be imprecise.

I am satisfied that the losses which would, if the normal measure were not applied, eventually be assessed as recoverable under the heads I have set out above, would be of the same order as would be produced by the normal measure. It is possible, they would be greater.

This is because I accept that Mr Pankhania’s costs were significantly increased by his failure to be able to obtain access to the Car Park in April 2000, as he would have been able to do if the representation had been true. I accept also that his finance costs must also have been increased. Mr Pankhania would by this route also recover what he actually paid NCP (namely £72,000 without VAT), because I am sure that what he paid was reasonable to avoid the uncertainties of litigation.

There remains the question of whether Mr Jourdan was right to say that the decision to retain the Properties broke the chain of causation, so that no mitigation or benefits arising thereafter had to be taken into account. Or put in the way the Vice-Chancellor put it in Needler, was the decision to retain the Properties part of a continuous transaction of which the tort was the inception? For the reasons I have sought to give, I do not think that that is the relevant question in this case. Loss has not truly been avoided by that decision, in any event. And the question would only arise anyway if the value difference were being claimed as a direct loss in addition to other consequential losses. If, however, I had to answer that question, I would say that the decision to retain the Properties was indeed collateral to the tort, because Mr Pankhania would not have bought the Properties, but for the tort. He could have been expected to sell the Properties when he found out about the Tenancies, but he chose not to in the circumstances then prevailing. That was not part of a continuous transaction of which the misrepresentation was the inception.

For the reasons I have given, as a matter of principle, this is a case in which the normal measure is apposite, and should be applied.

Mr Patrick Hill FRICS of Savills gave expert evidence for Mr Pankhania and Mr Sandy Macqueen FRICS of Daniel Watney gave evidence for the Defendants. I found Mr Hill the more impressive witness. This was not for any want of diligence on Mr Macqueen’s part. It was simply that Mr Macqueen did not have a great deal of recent and appropriate experience of considering the rather complex valuation of this kind of development property.

Mr Hill and Mr Macqueen helpfully agreed a joint statement. They agreed also that the valuation of the Properties as described were £3.925million, which was what Mr Pankhania bid for them. They differed, however, in their approach to the method of valuing the Properties on the basis that NCP had a tenancy rather than a licence.

Both experts employed the residual method of valuation, which makes use of a complex computer programme into which one feeds certain variables upon which the valuer has made judgments. Unfortunately, however, they used different computer programs. The aim of the residual valuation is to find out what price a developer might pay for a property by working backwards from the value of the development it is intended to create. In working out what the value of the development site must be, one has to feed in figures for the required profit, construction costs, finance costs, contingencies and many other elements.

Mr Macqueen valued the Properties on the basis of the tenancy by using the benefit of hindsight. He fed in to the computer program, the figures that he thought best represented what had actually happened in the development. Mr Hill, on the other hand looked at the worst-case position from the developer’s point of view as at the date of the auction, without considering what actually occurred after the auction. He then compared that with valuation of the Properties as described with a view to considering the marriage value of the Properties with NCP so as to identify what a developer would pay for the Properties, on the basis that he would want to do a deal with NCP to persuade them to vacate the Car Park. He told me that this process (or a variation of it) was commonly used by developers.

Both experts emphasised the imprecise nature of this method of valuation. Indeed, Mr Jourdan referred me to page 176 of Modern Methods of Valuation (9^th edition, 2000) by Tony Johnson and others, which draws attention to the uncertainty of the method, and to the fact that Lands Tribunal does not like it because it is not tested by ‘haggling in the market’.

Nonetheless, in my judgment, the residual method, using estimates as Mr Hill has done, is the appropriate approach in this case. Here, the object of the valuation is to find out the ‘normal measure’. The normal measure demands that the court identifies the value of the Properties as they really were at the date of the tort. One cannot properly make that assessment by reference to matters that occurred thereafter. For that reason, I believe that Mr Macqueen’s approach was flawed, and I disregard it.

I turn then to determine the true value of the Properties as they were at the date of the auction/completion. The difference between the two dates is, as I have said, immaterial.

It was common ground between the experts that a developer, even one looking at a worst-case scenario, would assume that he could get possession from NCP, even if it had a tenancy, on the basis of section 30(l)(f) of the 1954 Act. There was a difference as to timing, but I formed the view that the very worst position that could be expected was that it might take 2 years to obtain possession from NCP.

I start, as Mr Hill started, by looking, from the hypothetical purchaser developer’s point of view, at the worst-case scenario. There were, in effect, 6 variables which Mr Hill used for this valuation which were in dispute:-

My findings on each of these points of contention are as follows:-

In the result, I have broadly accepted Mr Hill’s worst-case valuation except for the figures for the NCP buy-out. Mr Hill’s computer program produced the figure of £2,934,850, which he rounded down to £2.925million. I was warned against thinking that any one figure would simply make a difference to the bottom line figure. But Mr Hill’s costs and receipts figures were wrong by £57,231, which added to Mr Hill’s valuation gives £2,992,081. Doing the best I can, therefore, I have reached the conclusion that a fair worst-case valuation should have been £3 million.

I have now to decide how a developer would decide how much more than his worst-case valuation to pay for the Properties at auction. Mr Hill’s approach was to determine that NCP would want to split the difference between the two valuations as a ransom figure, and then to discount the 50% by half to represent the risk and uncertainty of the negotiations with NCP. Mr Macqueen did not embark on this course at all, because he had not used the worst-case figures in the first place.

In my judgment, Mr Hill made too much allowance for the developer’s feeling that NCP might be awkward. He accepted that his worst-case valuation was on the basis that NCP would leave within 2 years. That meant that the risks and uncertainties for the developer were limited. In addition, though we know that NCP demanded £60,000 plus a 5-year excluded lease, we do not know what the value of such a lease would have been.

Again, doing the best I can, I have decided that I should follow Mr Hill’s 50/50split of the difference between the worst-case value of the Properties with the tenancy (£3 million), and the value as described (£3.925 million), making £462,500, but only reduce that figure by 10% for the risks of the negotiation with NCP. I take into account thatNCP could have appealed a decision of the court, and that things can go wrong, but I do not think that a full 50% ofthe £462,500 is justified.

By this calculation, therefore, the value of the Properties as they really were at the auction was £3,416,250 (£3m plus £462,500 less £46,250),which should be rounded up to £3 .425 million.

On the basis of the above figures, the normal measure in this case is the agreed value of the Properties as described of £3.925m, less the value of the Properties as they really were (i.e. with a tenancy in favour of NCP) being £3.425 million. The normal measure is, therefore, £500,000. It is that figure that I regard as the appropriate damages to award to the Claimants in this case.

At this point, I should say that I have tested the figure that I have reached for the appropriate damages back against the reasoning that I have followed as to the law. It seems to me that £500,000 does indeed give a fair result in valuing Mr Pankhania’s loss. It is quite possible that the additional costs he incurred in trying to start the development of the Chocolate Factory without access to the Car Park, and the additional finance costs he incurred, could quite easily have exceeded that sum, even without considering the true cost of the NCP buy-out.

For the reasons I have set out, I assess the Claimant’s damages under section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 at £500,000. I will hear counsel on the appropriate rates of interest, if they cannot be agreed.