Veronica Grigorie v Valcea Law Court (Romania)

This is an extradition case where the High Court is evaluating “afresh” whether extradition would be a proportionate interference with Article 8 ECHR rights (to respect for private and family life), including the Article 8 rights of young children for whom extradition brings the prospect of being taken into local authority care. The children are the Appellant’s son aged 7 years 8 months (the “Son”) and daughter aged 3 years 5 months (the “Daughter”). They (“the Children”) were both born in the UK and are British citizens.

The Appellant is aged 42. Her country of origin is Romania. She had come to the UK in August 2013 (aged 31), after which she went back to Romania intermittently. In July 2015 she joined the Children’s father Marius Nicolescu (the “Father”) in the UK. They had recently rekindled a relationship. The Father’s country of origin is Romania and he had come to the UK earlier in 2015. The Father obtained settled status here in April 2021. The Appellant, who has no criminal convictions in the UK, obtained settled status here in January 2019. The Appellant, the Children and the Father lived together as a family. They were joined here in May 2023 by the Appellant’s 75 year old mother (the “Grandmother”). The Appellant is wanted for extradition to Romania, in conjunction with a conviction Extradition Arrest Warrant (“the ExAW”). It was issued on 5 February 2020 and certified on 5 October 2021. The Appellant was arrested on the ExAW on 10 November 2021 and released on bail on 19 November 2021. The index offending (see §35 below) had taken place between December 2013 and May 2014. In September 2018, when the Appellant was on one of her intermittent visits to Romania, she was interviewed about the offences and admitted them on affidavit. She was back in the UK when she was tried, convicted and sentenced in November 2018 to 4 years 4 months imprisonment. The Son was then a 2 year-old. After an appeal, the sentence became final on 28 March 2019. Were the Appellant extradited, she would have a right of retrial under Romanian law. Extradition was ordered by District Judge Turnock (“the Judge”) at Westminster Magistrates Court (“WMC”) on 15 September 2022. That was after an oral hearing on 26 August 2022 at which the Appellant gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. She adopted as her evidence her proof of evidence, the contents of which were summarised by the Judge in the judgment. The Father give evidence in the form of a witness statement which was adopted into evidence by agreement between the parties. He was not required by either party to give oral evidence.

In Deb v Greece [2024] EWHC 1131 (Admin) this Court has repeated the previous warning (see A v Hungary [2013] EWHC 3132 (Admin) at §36) against a “mechanical” exercise of trying to compare features of fact-specific cases. In Deb the Court found, in a tour of 12 authorities, a value in inverse proportion to the time spent (see §§142-146). In this case, Counsel fell into no similar trap. I asked for their help in identifying Article 8 ‘working illustration’ cases where children would, in consequence of extradition, be taken into local authority care (Deb was itself not such a case: see §§153-154). There was no mechanistic comparison or wasted hearing time. Here is a list – with a brief outline – of 7 relevant ‘working illustration’ cases which Counsel and I were able to find:

So far as ‘assessed consequences’ are concerned, three key points emerge:

In HH, Lord Judge said this (at §132):

Extradition is very different from domestic sentencing (see HH §§132, 170). The extradition Court does not, and is not equipped to, undertake a proxy sentencing function: see Swiatek v Poland [2024] EWHC 726 (Admin) at §§22, 28(2). In extradition, the parent is being removed to another country. That country’s judicial and public authorities have the function of addressing questions of sentence, contact arrangements, early release. Nevertheless, there is an Article 8 reference-point for extradition and domestic sentencing, where impacts on children arise (see HH §127; Petherick §16). Having identified his Question (§5 above), Lord Judge made these further observations (§132):

Lord Judge’s Question was asked and answered in HH itself. In the case of one requested person (FK), Lord Judge explained that it could “safely be said that an immediate custodial sentence would not be in contemplation” (§133). In the case of another requested person (PH), Lord Judge explained that, making full allowance for the interests and welfare of the children, anything lower than a ten-year sentence would be improbable (§136). Lord Wilson recognised the force of the point (§170). Lord Brown, Lord Mance and Lord Kerr agreed with Lord Judge and Lord Wilson (§§96, 103, 149). From looking at the ‘working illustration’ cases about the prospect of children being taken into care, Lord Judge’s Question was considered helpful in A (Germany) at §§28, 62; and in Horvath at §§18-19 and 76; though it is not treated as a necessary question in the case-law as a whole. In the present case, both Counsel submitted that great care and caution are needed in placing reliance on the answer to Lord Judge’s Question. I am sure they are right. However, approached with great care and caution, Lord Judge’s Question may properly be asked – as it was in HH, A(Germany) and Horvath – at least as a ‘cross-check’, when thinking about the assessed consequence of children facing being taken into care. The point is not to ask what the domestic sentence would be or have been. The point is not to equate UK imprisonment (and contact arrangements) with extradition. Instead, Lord Judge’s Question may add perspective in thinking about how public interest considerations in a criminal justice context interrelate with children’s Article 8 rights, at least in this most anxious context of a child or children facing being taken into care.

High Court extradition appeals are statutorily-designed – where appropriate – to receive fresh evidence and consider changed circumstances. The High Court has no power to remit the case back to WMC for a fresh hearing (Deb §129). As was explained in Josza v Hungary [2023] EWHC 2404 (Admin) at §18: a High Court Judge in a “change of circumstances/ fresh evidence case” should “make my own assessment de novo, on the material as it now stands, in order to determine whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with … Article 8 rights”; and not “go through the rather artificial exercise of trying to determine what the district judge should have decided if [they] had the material now available”. That does not mean putting the WMC judgment entirely to one side. The judgment will serve as an appropriate “platform” (Haczelski v Poland [2024] EWHC 459 (Admin) at §9), insofar as findings on evidence are unaffected by the changed circumstances and fresh evidence, and are otherwise unimpeachable.

Here is how the Judge saw the position, on the evidence before her in September 2022. First, from the Appellant’s evidence (as “the Requested Person”), the Judge recorded:

Then, in the familiar Article 8 ‘balance-sheet’ exercise, the Judge included this as a factor weighing against extradition:

It is common ground that I should receive all of the new material, in what is now a ‘de novo’ case requiring evaluation afresh, to see where it leads. The appeal was lodged on 20 September 2022. On 24 January 2023, permission to appeal was refused on the papers. Procedurally, this is what then happened. On 6 March 2023, the Appellant’s solicitors made a first application to adduce fresh evidence (ie. medical evidence, records and a referral relating to the Son). At a hearing on 7 March 2023, permission to appeal was granted with a direction that the Appellant provide a witness statement (producing and explaining those documents relating to the Son). That witness statement was duly produced (24.3.23). On 22 August 2023, the Appellant’s solicitors made a second application to adduce fresh evidence (ie. a social worker’s assessment (14.6.23) detailing disclosures about the Father). That application also sought (i) prior authority for the instruction of a child psychologist to assess the children and the likely impact of separation from the Appellant and (ii) a direction for a Social Services Report (pursuant to section 7 of the Children Act 1989) in relation to the children. On 20 September 2023, (i) was refused and (ii) was granted. The s.7 Report was duly produced (2.10.23). On 30 October 2023, the Appellant’s solicitors made a third application to adduce fresh evidence (ie. a witness statement from the Appellant (30.10.23) about the Grandmother). That application also sought a direction for a Supplemental s.7 Report in relation to the children. At a hearing on 31 October 2023, the Court directed a Supplemental s.7 Report, to deal with the following:

As has been seen (§9 above), the Judge described the evidence about the Grandmother living in a care home in Romania. In the fresh evidence, the Appellant’s witness statement (30.10.23) tells me the following: that the Grandmother’s husband (the Appellant’s father) passed away 20 years ago and the Grandmother “does not have anyone in Romania”; that 3 years ago the Grandmother had collapsed a few times at her house and was found by a neighbour, after which she went into the care home; that the conditions at the care home were appalling, and it was being closed, so the Appellant “had to bring her over” to England in May 2023 “to live with me”; that the Grandmother is very ill, cannot move and cannot see (having macular degeneration, glaucoma and cataract); that the Appellant is the Grandmother’s carer; that the Grandmother needs care 35 hours a week, cannot go to the bathroom by herself and wears diapers, has dementia and is fully dependent on the Appellant; and that the family does not have “anyone at all” in Romania. Various documents have been filed. There is a UK hospital letter recording the Grandmother’s attendance at a medical retina clinic (19.6.23) following an optometrist referral. There are medical records including a referral for an ECG and dementia tests, with a description of short term forgetfulness and some disorientation. There is a Department for Work and Pensions decision letter (24.8.23) granting the grandmother attendance allowance from 30.6.24, based on her daytime and night-time needs; and another (4.10.23) granting the Appellant carer’s allowance for the grandmother from 2.7.23. The Appellant was cross-examined (see §18 below).

My findings are as follows. (1) The Grandmother is 75. She came to the UK in May 2023. She lives in the same family home as the Appellant and the Children. The Grandmother has a family life with the Appellant and the Children, at the family home. (2) She has significant care needs which have been assessed by the relevant UK public authority. She has the various eye conditions claimed; and there is a suspicion of dementia. The Appellant has state-recognised caring responsibilities. (3) The Grandmother was previously in a care home in Romania for around two years. The Appellant chose to have the Grandmother come to the UK rather than be in a care home, or a new care home, in Romania. That was after the Appellant’s extradition had been ordered and when the Appellant’s position was known to be precarious. (I do not accept that there was no alternative for the Grandmother in Romania, where she had lived as a single older person for 20 years including two years in a care home; and there is no evidence to corroborate closure of the care home or sudden unaffordability of care home fees.) (3) If the Appellant were extradited: the Grandmother would lose her recognised carer and her home in the UK; she would likely become dependent on state welfare support here, with the alternative of return to Romania to a care home environment. The Appellant’s extradition would break up that family life between the Grandmother, the Appellant and the Children. There is a real risk that the children would lose touch with the Grandmother.

As has been seen (§10 above), the Judge described the evidence of “some developmental delays” meaning that the Son “may require special assistance/care”. I have fuller and more up-to-date information. Mr Clej says the documents show the following picture, which I accept: the Son is a 7 year old child with “developmental difficulties”; he is now making “good progress” (“significant progress”, with “lots of progression”); he is “beginning to follow routines” and “is beginning to show a little independence to access teaming within some lessons”; that progress has arisen in the context of the Son being settled at school, and having the support of the Appellant as mother and care-giver.

The social worker’s Supplemental s.7 Report (25.3.24) included this:

This raised a number of particular challenges. The Judge had made a decision which emphasised a finding that the Father would be able to take care responsibilities for the Children (§10 above); rejecting assertions, as to his inability to do so, from the Father and from the Appellant (§9 above). That decision was under appeal. Now, in the run up to the appeal hearing, the Father was said to have disappeared. The truth of this was not accepted. The sole evidential basis relied on was a recorded statement of what the Appellant had told a social worker, two months earlier. There was no witness statement or proof of evidence from the Appellant on this topic. There was no evidence from her with a statement of truth. There had been further witness statements from her, filed earlier in the appeal (24.3.24 and 30.10.23), put forward with two of the many applications to adduce fresh evidence. But nothing now, on this topic. There was no independent corroborative evidence. The Supplementary s.7 Report (§4.5) told me that a “third party professional body” had provided unconfirmed information that the Father “may be frequenting” the family home. The Appellant has convictions in Romania for dishonest criminal conduct. One obvious possibility was that the ‘disappearing Father’ narrative had been constructed to bolster the prospects of this appeal; and he is ‘waiting in the wings’. Those were key challenges for the Court, in thinking about the Children.

As can be seen from ‘working illustration’ cases (§3 above), extradition Courts encounter events – or claimed events – which raise concerns as to manipulation or fabrication. A rather different example arose in HH, where a child had been conceived very soon after both parents had been arrested on the extradition arrest warrant. That was said to raise a question about a manipulative motive. What happened was that the judge at WMC dealt with the point, hearing evidence, and declining to find there had been any “deliberate attempt to improve the position” in the extradition proceedings (see HH §77). That meant this could not be an adverse factor – alongside the obvious and legitimate interests of the child – in the assessment of Article 8 proportionality (see §§78, 139). Another example, also in HH, was that family members were saying they could not look after the children. That was addressed, with the benefit of inquiries by the Official Solicitor, which enabled Lady Hale to say that these assertions appeared to be “genuine” (see §69). In M (Poland), grandparents had written a letter saying they were not willing or able to care for the children (§26). That evidence was accepted (§29). In Horvath, a psychologist’s report recorded family members in Hungary saying they were now no longer able to help (§56). That was an assertion which the High Court rejected, finding it likely in the event of extradition that the child would be cared for by those relatives (§79). Evidence of a similar change of position by family members had also been rejected in a first High Court case in Stumbre (see §5). But it was later found to be reliable in WMC after oral evidence and cross-examination (see §51). In Parlinska, the district judge at WMC had recorded the father’s specific confirmation that he would look after the children (§8), but the High Court accepted from a social services report and requested person’s witness statement (§§12-14) that this had now changed (§16). In Deb the mother had returned to Bangladesh, was said to have no present contact and to be unable to care for the children. The High Court rejected that evidence, finding she was deliberately lying low, and was likely to make arrangements if the father were extradited (§§140, 147, 152-154). All of these were assessments of evidence, making findings. The only oral evidence and cross-examination was where the question arose at WMC (HH §77; Stumbre §51).

I have described the particular challenges in this case (§16 above). Ultimately, both Counsel were agreed about three things. First, that the Court should receive from the Appellant a further witness statement (§19 below), prepared and signed at lunch-time, with a statement of truth. Secondly, that this Court has the power on an extradition appeal, exceptionally, to hear oral evidence. Thirdly, that it would be appropriate – in the special circumstances of the present case – to exercise that power. That was the joint invitation of the parties and I acceded to it. Each Counsel had the considered the procedural position and made submissions. The Appellant had attended Court. Counsel were agreed that, at WMC, there would undoubtedly have been oral evidence and cross-examination. Mr Clej told me that he wished to call the Appellant to give oral evidence, and that she wished to give oral evidence; here and now. No adjournment was sought. No interpreter was needed. Mr du Sautoy told me that he wished to cross-examine; here and now. This could readily be done, without any delay, and without materially affecting the time estimate for the hearing. It was a tight and focused solution. It could readily be taken in the stride of the hearing. It furthered the interests of justice and the overriding objective. So far as concerns the jurisdiction, exceptionally, to receive oral evidence, this is seen in HH §67 (where the High Court “heard as well as read the psychiatric evidence”); Dzurkova v Czech Republic [2016] EWHC 1480 (Admin) (psychiatric evidence); and Popoviciu v Romania [2021] EWHC 1584 (Admin) at §§62, 167 (Romanian lawyer). After hearing oral evidence in this case, I have seen the observations in Deb (at §131), where – in the context of calling an expert psychologist – Kerr J said he “would not wish to encourage applications to cross-examine in an appeal; the more they proliferate, the more like a ‘second first instance procedure’ the appeal becomes”.

This is what the Appellant told me in her new witness statement on the day of the hearing:

The Appellant’s oral evidence was given on oath. She adopted the new witness statement. She also told me the following. If she were extradited, the Children could not be looked after by the Father, because “he’s gone”. She has not seen him. He has “blocked her everywhere”, on phone and social media. There are letters which were still coming for him, including from bailiffs who were collecting a fine. She has removed him from the council tax and tenancy documents. She has also started to return letters to their senders. She does not know whether the Father is in the UK. He said to her in December 2023 that he would go from the UK. She would no longer want him in her life, though she would still intend him to be in the Children’s lives. She had not previously known about his sex offence in Romania.

Cross-examined by Mr du Sautoy about recent visits to the home address, the Appellant told me that an officer involved in the Father’s sex offender registration had come in February 2024. She had told the officer that the Father was not at home and had said: “I don’t know; maybe he’s working; maybe he’s sleeping in his truck”. This, she explained, was a reference to his being an HGV driver who would be away and sleep in the HGV cab. When reminded of her proof of evidence before the Judge, which said she and the Father worked for the “same” transport company, where he was an “agency driver”, the Appellant said: that this was “wrong”; that they had “never worked together”; that she had worked for Patrick Transport Ltd for two years (until her maternity leave at the end of December) and again from August 2021 to June 2023 (when “they would not give me part-time work”); that she was doing the rotas for the drivers working as agency drivers for other companies; that the Father was never one of those agency drivers; that he had never worked for that company; that he had instead driven, direct, for Jure Transport; that he had stopped working in September 2023 (saying he “wanted a break”); and that he had already stopped financially supporting her and the Children “in June or July 2023” (because he was gambling). When asked whether documents from Patrick Transport would confirm what she was now saying – that they “never worked together” for that company – the Appellant told me: that the Father “owned” that company; but that he never “worked” for it; that he worked for Jure Transport. Given an opportunity after the hearing to produce any further documentation on which she wished to rely, the Appellant produced 8 invoices in the Father’s name to Jure Transport (one week in May 2021, one in September 2021, one in December 2021, two in March 2022, one in May 2022, one in October 2022 and three in August 2023). She also produced her P60 Forms for 2021 and 2023.

I found the Appellant to be an unreliable witness. Her evidence of telling the officer in February 2024 “maybe he’s working; maybe he’s sleeping in his truck”, raised obvious questions about what she knew. She sought to distance herself from his work, saying things which now meant her proof of evidence had been wrong, which she could not explain. Having distanced herself, but then faced with the prospect that company documents could be obtained, she accepted that it was “his company”, maintaining he never drove for it. She produced 8 invoices, covering 10 weeks across 2 years. There was and is no explanation of why the proof of evidence, put forward as evidence in chief in August 2022 – and recorded in the Judge’s judgment – should have been wrong, and never corrected. It said clearly: “I work in transport for a Company called Patrick Transport Ltd… My partner works for the same company and is an agency driver”. This was an important document. It had a statement of truth. It was produced for the oral hearing before the Judge. It was put to the Appellant and adopted by her as her evidence. There is no plausible reason as to why that statement should have been made as it was, if it was wrong on two scores: (i) they did not work for the same company; and (ii) he was not an agency driver. There is no reason why that would have been said, and why it would not have been corrected at any time. There is also no plausible reason why the Appellant would now say “they would not let me work part-time”, when it was her partner’s company. There is no plausible reason why he would “own” a company, for HGV drivers; that he would himself be an HGV driver; and yet he would never work as a driver within his own company. I could find no plausible reason why he would stop working – supposedly for “a break” – in September 2023. Nor why he would stop financial support “in June or July” of 2023. Nor, if he did so, why this would not be mentioned in any of the fresh evidence or applications for fresh evidence. I cannot accept the Appellant’s assertions that she has had no knowledge of the Father’s whereabouts since before December 2023. I find that she knew – and knows – much more about his recent whereabouts than she was prepared to say to this Court. I find that she knows he has remained in the UK, driving HGV lorries.

Despite this impaired reliability, I do not find that the Father’s ‘disappearance’ has been ‘staged’ to bolster the prospects of success of this appeal. There is a clear risk that this is what has happened, and that he is ‘waiting in the wings’. But, on balance, I find as follows. There has been a breakdown in the relationship between the Appellant and the Father. She wants nothing more to do with him and does not want him in her life. She was not previously aware of his sex offence in Romania. That fits with the documents which are before the Court. It fits with the background chronology. It fits with the Appellant’s oral evidence – which I accept – about being unaware of his conviction in Romania for the sex offence. The documents include the Social Worker’s Assessment (14.6.23). It was addressed to the Appellant and records a previous (21.3.23) police referral about the Father’s past. The documents contain no mention of the Appellant being understood, by any of the authorities, to have been aware of that past. The question of her knowledge is specifically recorded as not known and a feature for investigation. The s.7 Report (2.10.23) explains what had happened. The Father had been arrested for a driving offence and, upon conducting ACRO checks, it was

I can now return to Mr Clej’s submission (§15 above) that the Appellant’s extradition is “likely” to result in “care proceedings” for the Children. My key findings are as follows. I find it is likely, if the Appellant were extradited, that the Son and the Daughter would be taken into local authority care. I find that there is a real risk that, in local authority care, they would be separated from one another.

My reasons for these findings are as follows.

I must grapple with the impact and implications of this. Any extradition case where there is the prospect of a child or children being taken into local authority care, and where there is the prospect of siblings being separated, will always receive close and anxious scrutiny. HH spoke of “intense and long lasting distress” (§68); A (Hungary) spoke of “undoubted devastating consequences” (§38); A (Germany) described “deep emotional and psychological harm” (§56); M (Poland) spoke of “severe harm” and “devastating harm with longer-term consequences” (§37); Prisacariu spoke of “serious emotional harm” (§92); Stumbre spoke of “very severe” consequences “of a different order to the overwhelming majority” of article 8-based extradition claims (§19). In A (Germany) the Court recognised that the impact of a child being taken into care, as a consequence of extradition, would be “deeply distressing both for her and her mother” (§74).

I accept the evidence in the Supplemental s.7 Report, describing the impacts in this way:

Mr Clej rightly accepts that there is no evidence that the impact of extradition would be adoption. He accepts that – given her settled status in the UK – if the Appellant were extradited and served 4 years 4 months, that period of absence would not prevent her subsequent return to the UK. The Judge had rightly identified that as a factor in support of extradition. The Son and Daughter are UK citizens. On all the evidence before me, I find as follows. The likely consequence of extradition would be separation for 4½ years, with the Children in local authority care and possibly separated from one another, until being reunited with the Appellant. There is a real risk that contact between each of the Children and the Appellant will be difficult, during that 4½ year period, while the Appellant is serving the prison sentence in Romania.

In conducting afresh the Article 8 assessment, I now need to consider the other features of the case. I start with the position 2013 to 2018. The Judge found as follows: that the Appellant moved to the UK in August 2013, but was back in Romania intermittently after that; that she was in Romania in December 2013, then back in the UK in January 2014, then back in Romania in September 2014; that the Father was living in the UK in 2015, working as a truck driver; that the Appellant and the Father rekindled a romance in 2015 (they had first met back in 2003, but that did not work out); that the Appellant came to the UK in July 2015 to join the Father here; that the Son was born here in September 2016; that the Appellant could only be interviewed by the investigating Romanian authorities in September 2018, when she returned to Romania for the baptism of the Son; that the Appellant then made a full confession admitting the offending, including in a sworn affidavit (dated 18.9.18), and asked for the proceedings to proceed based on the confession; that the Appellant then left Romania for the UK again, in the full knowledge (a) that she had admitted the offending (including in that sworn affidavit), (b) that the case could proceed in her absence, and (c) that she was likely to be convicted and face a sentence of imprisonment; that it was not credible that she thought – as she claimed – that it would be a suspended sentence; that she was summoned to attend the trial, including by emails to the email address she had given; and that she became aware of the sentence by checking on the relevant website. These findings relating to 2013 to 2018 stand as unimpeachable findings of facts on the evidence, unaffected by the fresh evidence and the changed circumstances. I adopt them.

As to fugitivity, the Judge recorded that it was conceded by the Respondent that it could not be proved to the necessary criminal standard that the Appellant was a fugitive. That is a factor in the Appellant’s favour. But it is not a weighty factor in all the circumstances. As the Judge also found (§29 above), the Appellant left Romania in 2018 to return to the UK having admitted the offence on affidavit and being aware of the prospect of conviction and of a custodial sentence; and she later became aware of the sentence itself. Accordingly, as the Judge rightly recognised, the public interest in the UK not being a “safe haven” for those sought by other countries to serve a sentence is plainly engaged in this case. That was correct: see eg. Deb at §123.

The Judge identified as a factor weighing against extradition the passage of time (8 years) since the offending. But, as the Judge went on to explain, delay was not a significant factor in the Article 8 balancing exercise. That was to say, on all the facts found by the Judge, there was no delay properly attributable to the Romanian authorities, such as could materially diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest in support of extradition (HH §8(6)). As the Judge explained, the Appellant could only be interviewed by the authorities in relation to this offence when she returned to Romania for the baptism of the Son in September 2018, after which she then left Romania. The Appellant also appeared, on the evidence, to have made repeated applications to adjourn and/or appeal against decisions made in the criminal proceedings. The reasons for any delay in this case therefore appeared to the Judge to be entirely attributable to the Appellant’s conduct. This assessment was criticised by Mr Clej, but it was in my judgment an assessment plainly open to the Judge. Being thus unimpeachable, it stands as part of the platform for my consideration afresh. Having said all this, as the Judge also rightly recognised, and as is a consequence of the passage of time, the Appellant has a young family, has been living in the UK since January 2014, has a firmly established life here. These were all factors which weigh against extradition. They are aspects of the passage of time serving to increase the impact upon private and family life (HH §8(6)).

The Judge rightly recognised that the Appellant has committed no criminal offences since the offence for which the ExAW was issued. That means no further criminal offending since May 2014, which is now just over ten years. This is a factor which weighs in the balance against extradition.

As the Judge recognised, and as must I, there are constant and weighty public interests in extradition: that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the UK should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no safe havens for those sought by other countries to serve a sentence.

As the Judge recognised, and as must I, the weight to be attached to the public interest considerations in favour of extradition in the particular case vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. That is another aspect which I need to consider with care. One clear indicator of seriousness is the 4 year 4 month prison sentence imposed by the Romanian court and upheld on appeal.

The following description reflects the summary in the Judge’s judgment in the same sequence as in the ExAW, from which some further details are derived. Between December 2013 and May 2014, the Appellant defrauded ten victims to a total of 25,783.21 lei (approx. £4,421), using fake advertisements for goods on the internet. The ten instances of the fraud are summarised as follows:

The Judge’s characterisation of this offending was that it involved “serious” criminality, committed transnationally; and that it was “particularly” serious. The Judge added that it was, moreover, criminal conduct committed while the Appellant was living intermittently between the UK and Romania; which means the Appellant started building her life in the UK against the background of this fraudulent activity. There is, in my judgment, no basis for impugning any of this. I adopt it.

The Judge thought it was significant that the offending was aggravated by the fact that the Appellant had a previous conviction; so that the offending was both “particularly serious” and “aggravated by her previous criminality”. The Judge did not accept the Appellant’s evidence that she thought she would get a suspended sentence, “particularly in light of the fact that she had previously been convicted of similar offending in Romania and received a suspended sentence of imprisonment”. The Judge recorded that the Appellant, in cross-examination, had accepted having used her ID card to cash money “for the offences of which she was previously convicted”. Mr Clej points out that the Respondent has adduced no ACRO international conviction record in evidence. But the ExAW records the three incidents of the same kind of offences, committed between September 2011 and August 2012, for which the Appellant received a 3 year sentence of imprisonment imposed on 18 September 2013, which became final on 2 December 2013, which was suspended. Here is the previous offending as recorded in the ExAW:

I have identified and analysed the key features of the present case. Having done so, I need now to retake the decision. These are key features which weigh against extradition:

These are the key features which weigh in favour of extradition:

These are difficult cases. I recognise that the Judge described the arguments as “finely balanced”, and used the word “crucially” when relying on the Father being able to fulfil the parental and carer role (§10 above). I have had the responsibility of retaking the decision, afresh, standing on the platform of the Judge’s findings of fact. I have considered all the features and circumstances of the case, as identified and analysed through the course of this judgment, with Counsel’s assistance. I have taken such assistance as I properly can from fact-specific ‘working illustration’ cases (§3 above). Subject to a final cross-check, my conclusion would be as follows. I find that the Article 8 balance comes down in favour of extradition. The cumulative effect of the factors weighing in favour of extradition outweigh the cumulative effect of those capable of weighing against it. Extradition would not be a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of any, and all, those affected.

I have chosen so far to put to one side Lord Judge’s Question (§5 above), as to which great caution and circumspection is needed (§§6-7 above). But, in the end, I would not want to determine this case without asking Lord Judge’s Question, at least by way of a final cross-check. Given the same broadly similar facts, and after making proportionate allowance – as we would in domestic sentencing – for the interests of dependent children, would sentencing courts here nevertheless be likely to impose an immediate custodial sentence? Mr du Sautoy’s answer was “yes”. Mr Clej’s answer was “not necessarily”. I think Mr du Sautoy is clearly right. I have considered the Sentencing Guideline for Fraud:

For the reasons I have given, I am not able to accept that extradition would be incompatible with the Article 8 rights of those affected. The appeal will therefore be dismissed.