Hripsime Lake v Lancaster Magistrates Court & Anor

This is the claimant’s renewed application for permission to bring judicial

The second defendant brought proceedings in relation to unpaid council tax

The claimant then made application to this court seeking permission tocommence judicial review proceedings. The case has been characterised by thefiling of multitudinous documents, containing long narratives setting out thepurported basis upon which the challenges are to be brought. At the renewalhearing there are three separate bundles before the court, the core bundle runsto some 389 pages and there is a hearing bundle of 707 pages, with a separateauthority bundle of 48 pages. In addition, the claimant has provided five leverarch ring binders of documents. The documents filed are not proportionate tothe issues at stake, even making some allowance for the fact that the claimant isa litigant in person.

The matter was considered on the papers by HHJ Stephen Davies, sitting as aHigh Court Judge on 5 June 2023. HHJ Davies refused the application forpermission and gave extensive case management directions in the event that theclaimant sought to renew her application. Those directions contain clearinstructions to the claimant, who has acted on her own behalf throughout, as towhat she would need to do in terms of clearly stating the basis on which she wasseeking to challenge the relevant decisions. HHJ Davies further pointed out thatinsofar as the claimant was seeking to challenge the liability order of 30 May2022, the claim has been made well outside the time limit imposed by Part54.5(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules, namely promptly, but in any event notlater than 3 months after the grounds to make the claim first arose. He suggestedthat an application for an extension of time should be considered if theapplication were to be renewed.

HHJ Davies concluded that the claim for review of first defendant’s certificateof refusal disclosed no legal basis for challenge. He indicated that it was notnecessary for him to go on to consider any apparent challenges to the liabilityorder since that could be done, if necessary, at any renewal hearing.

HHJ Davies further directed that, in the event of a renewed application, theclaimant should come to the renewal hearing prepared to deal with the question

At this renewal hearing I have heard at length from Ms Lake as to her position

I indicated that I would deal with the issue of any alleged contempt of court byrecording of the telephone hearing before the Magistrates Court at the end ofthis hearing. As a preliminary issue I asked the second defendant to indicate itsposition in relation to the professional transcript of that recording. Ms Najahindicated that there was no objection to the transcript being accepted intoevidence, but she reserved her position on the question of contempt.

Both parties had filed skeleton arguments setting out their respective positions.Ms Najah confirmed that, whilst she had referred to an application to strike outthe proceedings for abuse of process, no formal application had been made. Iconfirmed that because this was a permission hearing and she was contendingthat permission should be refused and the application certified as totally withoutmerit, the application to strike out was somewhat otiose.

The challenge to the liability order is made well outside the time limit. At the

Even if application had been made and time extended, I am wholly satisfied thatthe claimant’s voluminous submissions disclose no respectable legal groundsfor challenge to the liability order.

The challenge relates the decision of the first defendant to make a liability orderpursuant to regulation 34 of The Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement)Regulations 1992. The challenge appears to have two parts: firstly, a contentionthat the second defendant did not have any legal basis to charge council taxbecause there is no contract between the claimant and the second defendant andsecondly, the legal process and hearing were unfair.

A Local Authority’s ability to set and charge Council Tax comes from the Local

This statute and accompanying statutory regulations set out a local authority’srights to set and demand council tax to fund services in their local area. Aperson’s liability to council tax is not dependent on, and does not require, theexistence of a contractual relationship between the local authority and theperson liable to pay tax. Any appeal to as to the amount of council taxdetermined or to discounts in relation to council tax or to whether or not anindividual is the correctly named individual on the council tax demand are madeto the Valuation Tribunal.

Unpaid council tax liabilities are pursued in the Magistrates Court pursuant toregulation 34 of The Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement)Regulations 1992 which provides:

“34.—(1) If an amount which has fallen due under regulation 23(3) or (4) is wholly or partly unpaid, or (in a case where a final notice is required under regulation 33) the amount stated in the final notice is wholly or partly unpaid at the expiry of the period of 7 days beginning with the day on which the notice was issued, the billing authority may, in accordance with paragraph (2), apply to a magistrates' court for an order against the person by whom it is payable.

(2)

The application is to be instituted by making complaint to a justice of the peace and requesting the issue of a summons directed to that person to appear before the court to show why he has not paid the sum which is outstanding….

… (6) The court shall make the order if it is satisfied that the sum
has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid.”

The demand for payment was duly made in this case. The claimant does notappear to take issue with the amounts claimed. She contends that there is nostatutory basis on which the local authority can demand payment for counciltax. The claimant is plainly wrong. The legislation has been passed by thelegislature and has received royal assent. Any challenge to the operation of suchstatutes falls outside the ambit of this application for judicial review.

I am further satisfied that all legal requirements in relation to the issue of thesummons were properly complied with. The claimant contends that there areprocedural irregularities in the way in which the summons is issued. Thesummons was in the correct format and was sent by the second defendant in the

The hearing was conducted by telephone and a representative from the seconddefendant was in attendance, together with the claimant. The claimant suggeststhat this was not a proper court hearing because it was not in person in acourtroom. However, the Civil Procedure Rules provide a wide discretion tocourts as to how they can exercise discretion in conducting proceedings andexercising case management powers in arranging hearings.

It is within the rules for hearings to be conducted by telephone in cases wherethe interests of justice are served and access to justice is not curtailed. Indeed,there are likely to be cases in which access to justice is facilitated for some courtusers by the use of telephone hearings in cases where there would be difficultiesin attending court. Given the nature and type of proceedings here, I am satisfiedthat it was entirely proper to conduct the hearing by telephone, the claimant wasnot placed at any disadvantage in putting her case and it was a proportionate useof technology.

I have read the transcript and it is apparent that the claimant was provided withample opportunity to put her grounds for contesting the making of an order. Theclaimant confirmed that the hearing lasted for 27 minutes. The MagistratesCourt Legal Advisor properly provided assistance by informing her as to theprocedure and that she would need to convince the court that there was a genuinereason for not paying the council tax due. The claimant confirmed that she hadreceived the summons and said that she did not see why she was being dealtwith in the Magistrates Court because she has never been charged with acriminal offence. The court advisor interjects on a number of occasions to seekto re-focus Ms. Lake’s submissions and to enable her to provide reasons for theliability order not being made.

The local authority representative confirms the amounts of unpaid council taxdue. He outlines the option of payment by instalments and goes on to set outpossible recovery action in the event that a liability order is made. At this pointMs Lake contends that there is no contractual obligation between herself andthe council in relation to the tax, a point pursued before this court. There is thenan exchange between one of the Magistrates and Ms Lake. Ms Lake appears toaccept that she used to pay her council tax and then suggests that she has notpaid later bills because “they are not my bills”.

There are a number of further exchanges before the Magistrates retire and thenreturn to announce their decision. The liability order was made as requested.Having regard to the transcript it is clear that the claimant was provided with afair and reasonable opportunity to put her case. The second defendant hadestablished that the property was subject to council tax, that a bill and reminder

The claimant’s various submissions reveal a number of objections to thepayment of council tax, none of which have any basis in law. Her claim to belawfully withholding council tax on the basis that it is unused for unspecifiedpurposes, purposes such as the covid vaccination programme to which she doesnot agree, have no legal basis. This challenge is completely unmeritorious, andpermission is refused.

An appeal to the High Court by way of case stated is made under s. 28(1) Senior

Following the making of the liability order, the claimant submitted a 212-pagedocument to the first defendant with her request for a statement of case. Thefirst defendant refused the application on the basis that the application did notdisclose any valid question of law or jurisdiction or the erroneous finding offact. This is unsurprising given that the arguments which I have dealt withabove and dismissed as having no legal foundation appear in the request. Assuch the first defendant stated that the application was frivolous in its opinionand certified that application refused.

The claimant’s document setting out her request does not contain any details asto how the claimant considered the case to be wrong in law or outside thejurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. It was without any legal basis and the firstdefendant properly refused to state a case as requested. In my view it wasproperly characterised as frivolous. Therefore, the challenge to the refusal tostate a case is wholly without merit and permission is refused.

The second defendant asked that I certify the claim as being totally without

The claimant freely accepted that she had recorded the telephone hearing before

After considering the above facts I indicated to Ms.Lake and Ms. Najah that Idid not intend to take any further action in relation to the telephone recording.Ms. Lake was informed that unauthorised recording of court proceedings is acontempt of court and a matter which the court takes seriously.

Following this judgment, it is necessary for me to deal with the issue of costs.

Civil Procedure Rule 54A, Practice Direction 7.5 provides that a defendant whoattends and successfully resists the grant of permission at a renewal hearing willnot usually recover from the claimant the costs of attending the hearing. Acourt, in considering an award of costs against an unsuccessful claimant at apermission hearing, should only depart from the general principles above if it isconsidered that there are exceptional circumstances for doing so. The court has
a broad discretion on the facts of the case when considering whether there areexceptional circumstances which justify an award of costs against the claimant.Paragraph 25.4.5.5 of The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2023provides examples of where this may be appropriate. Administrative CourtJudicial Review Guide 2023 - Courts and Tribunals Judiciary

I would ask that Ms Najah to prepare a draft order for my approval. The ordershould contain provision that the second defendant shall file and serve within 7days their submissions on the issue of costs; the claimant shall have a further 7days to file and serve any response to the costs application and the seconddefendant shall file any reply within 7 days thereafter. Each submission,response and reply shall be limited to 3 pages. The court shall determine theissue of costs in writing unless it considers a further hearing is necessary.

I would ask that Ms Najah to draw up the requisite draft order and send it to the